JUDGEMENT 1. This is an application for condonation of delay of 1 year 109 days in preferring the appeal. 2. In the application for condonation of delay it has been averred on what circumstances the delay has occurred. In paragraph 4 of the application, the procedural aspects have been exposited and eventually in paragraphs 6 to 8, it has been averred as follows:- "(6) That thus, due to movement of file from one Section to other section, one officer to other officer and from Water Resources Department to Law Department for obtaining Legal advice, there has been delay of 476 days in preferring the present memo of appeal. (7) That the delay in taking decision with respect to filing the present memo of appeal has also been caused due to confusion over the two orders of this Honble Court, one order dated 29.11.2007 passed in CWJC 9070/97 remanding the matter to disciplinary authority and the other order dated 14.12.2007 passed in CWJC 12114/1998 determining various service as well as post retirement dues. (8) That there is a good chances of the Memo of appeal being allowed and therefore in the interests of justice, the delay in preferring the present memo of appeal be condoned." 3. In support of the application it is submitted by Mr. Prabhat Kumar Singh, learned Standing Counsel XXI for the State that the grounds which have been urged are genuine and, that apart, if the delay is not condoned, the State would be under obligation to pay 9% interest on all service dues. It is canvassed by him that the writ petitioner had not prayed for all service dues and, in fact, could not have prayed for as departmental proceedings were initiated against him. It is his further submission that when the learned single Judge has taken note of the fact that there has been remand of the departmental proceedings by virtue of the order passed in C.W.J.C. No. 9070/ 1997, there was no ground to direct grant of interest of all service dues as well as retiral dues. Mr. It is his further submission that when the learned single Judge has taken note of the fact that there has been remand of the departmental proceedings by virtue of the order passed in C.W.J.C. No. 9070/ 1997, there was no ground to direct grant of interest of all service dues as well as retiral dues. Mr. Singh has invited our attention to the order passed on 30.10.2009 in C.W.J.C. No. 11689/2009 whereby both the departmental proceedings have been quashed and after quashment of the said proceedings this Court had passed following orders:- "The Respondents are directed to make available all consequential monetary benefits to the petitioner including revision of his retiral dues accordingly within a maximum period of four months from the date of receipt and/or production of a copy of this order. The order of punishment in so far as it directs recovery is also set aside. As the petitioner has retired, the order withholding promotion, imposing censure etc. lose their relevance and warrant no adjudication." 4. In essence, the submission of Mr. Singh is that in the latter decision this Court had not directed for grant of interest on all consequential monetary benefits but the learned Single Judge in the order impugned has granted the benefit in anticipation. 5. It is propounded by Mr. Singh that the State has no objection to pay simple interest @ 9% on the differential sum pertaining to pension, that is, 30% within a stipulated time, but as far as the interest that has been directed to be paid on all service dues, which includes retirement dues, the State is not liable to pay the interest in view of the latter decision of this Court. Learned counsel for the State has urged that as there was a state of confusion, the delay has occurred. It is contended by him that as far as the State is concerned, a liberal approach has to be adopted for the purpose of condonation of delay inasmuch as decisions are to be taken at various levels to prefer an appeal. That apart, contends Mr. Singh, there is excellent chance of success in the appeal inasmuch as if the earlier order and the latter order are read in juxtaposition, the appellants would not be bound in law to pay the interest as directed by the learned Single Judge. 6. That apart, contends Mr. Singh, there is excellent chance of success in the appeal inasmuch as if the earlier order and the latter order are read in juxtaposition, the appellants would not be bound in law to pay the interest as directed by the learned Single Judge. 6. At this juncture we may fruitfully refer to the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another V/s. Mst. Katiji and Others, (A.I.R. 1987 SC 1353), it has been held as uhder:- "3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that:- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against his when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." 7. In G. Ramegowda V/s. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, ( AIR 1988 SC 897 ) their Lordships of the Apex Court held thus:- "7. The contours of the area of discretion of the Courts in the matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in a number of pronouncements of this Court. See Ramlal V/s. Rewa Coalfield Ltd., (1962)2 SCR 762 : ( AIR 1962 SC 361 ); Shakuntala Devi V/s. Kuntal Kumari, (1969)1 SCR 1006 : ( AIR 1969 SC 575 ); Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. V/s. Nirmala Devi, (1979) 3 SCR. 694 : ( AIR 1979 SC 1666 ); Mata Din V/s. Katiji, (1987)2 SCC 107 : ( AIR 1987 SC 1353 ) etc. There is, it is true, no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bonafides on the part of the party or its counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts. However, the expression sufficient cause in Section 5 must receive a liberal constructions so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay. However, the expression sufficient cause in Section 5 must receive a liberal constructions so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay. In Katijis case (supra) this Court said : "When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a not-deliberate delay." "It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." 8. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another aspect which perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decision of Government are collective and institutional decision and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for Governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of Section 5 it might, perhaps, be somewhat realistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristics of the functioning of the Government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have a little play at the joints. Due recognition of these limitations on Governmental functioning-is necessary if the judicial approach is not rendered unrealistic. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have a little play at the joints. Due recognition of these limitations on Governmental functioning-is necessary if the judicial approach is not rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning in procedural delay incidental to the decision making process........" 8. In State of Haryana and Others V/s. Chandra Mani and Others, ( AIR 1996 SC 1623 ) a three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court has held as under:- "10. It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court- be it by private party or the State-are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an evenhanded manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officer/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on for considerable time causing delay- intentional or otherwise-is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every days delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and require adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every days delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and require adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless than case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for the lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from the perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay." 9. in State of Madhya Pradesh V/s. S.S. Akolkar, ( AIR 1996 SC 1984 ) their Lordships have opined that the delay in official business requires its broach and approach from public justice perspective. 10. In N. Balakrishnan V/s. M. Krishnamurthy ( AIR 1998 SC 3222 ) the Apex Court held that the words "sufficient cause" used in the Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance the substantial cause of justice. After so stating their Lordships expressed the view as follows:- "13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. After so stating their Lordships expressed the view as follows:- "13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of malafides or it is not put-forth as part of a dilatory strategy the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when Courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the Court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss." It is worth noting that in the aforesaid case there was delay of 883 days and their Lordships directed the appellants therein to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only) to the respondents. 11. In M.K. Prasad V/s. P. Arumugam, ( AIR 2001 SC 2497 ) their Lordships after referring to the decision rendered in N. Balakrishnan (supra) have held thus:- "9. In the instant case, the appellants tried to explain the delay in filing the application for setting aside the ex parte decree as is evident from his application filed under S. 5 of the Limitation Act accompanied by his own affidavit. Even though the appellant appears not to be as vigilant as he ought to have been, yet his conduct does not, on the whole, warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. He should have been more vigilant but on his failure to adopt such extra vigilance should not have been made a ground for ousting him from the litigation with respect to the property, concededly to be valuable. While deciding the application for setting aside the ex parte decree the Court should have kept in mind the judgment impugned, the extent of the property involved and the stake of the parties. While deciding the application for setting aside the ex parte decree the Court should have kept in mind the judgment impugned, the extent of the property involved and the stake of the parties. We are of the opinion that the inconvenience caused to the respondent for the delay on account of the appellant being absent from the Court in this case can be compensated by awarding appropriate and exemplary costs. In the interest of justice and under the peculiar circumstances of the case we set aside the order impugned and condone the delay, we have examined the merits of the main application and feel that sufficient grounds exist for setting aside the ex parte decree as well." 12. In Vedabai alias Vaijayantabai Baburao Patil V/s. Shantaram Baburam Patil and Others ( AIR 2001 SC 2582 ), the Apex Court has expressed thus:- "5.... The Court has to exercise the discretion on the facts of each case keeping in mind that in construing the expression sufficient cause, the principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance." 13. In Apangshu Mohan Lodh V/s. State of Tripura, (2004)1 SCC 119 a contention was canvassed before the Apex Court that the High Court should not have condoned 460 days in filing the Letters Patent Appeal. Their Lordships repelled the said submission by stating that the power of condonation is discretionary and has to be liberally construed. 14. In State of U.P. V/s. Heera N. Gurnani, (2004)13 SCC 582 the controversy arose where the High Court has held that there was inordinate delay in filing the appeal and the appellant-State had not given any satisfactory reasons to condone the delay. Aggrieved by the said order the State of U.P. had approached the Apex Court. Their Lordships placing reliance on the earlier decisions rendered in Harish Chandra (supra), G. Ramegowda Major and Ratan Lal Sahu (supra) opined thus:- "2......The ratio of these decisions is to the effect that in case of an appeal being filed by the State or institutions, decision is to be taken at various levels which causes delay, and the courts should consider these aspects also when a decision is taken in the matter of condonation of delay." After so holding the delay was condoned with cost that was assessed at Rs. 5,000/-. 5,000/-. 15 In Divisional Manager, Plantation Division, Andaman & Nicobar Islands V/s. Munnu Barrick and Others, (2005)2 SCC 237 their Lordships while dealing with the concept of condonation of delay have observed thus:- "23. In a case of this nature where serious questions of law were raised by the appellant, in our opinion, the Division Bench of the High Court should have taken a liberal view on the application for condonation of delay filed by the appellant wherefor the respondent workmen could have been adequately compensated on monetary terms." 16. In Sainik Security V/s. Sheela Bai and Others, (2008)3 SCC 257 the delay of 769 days was condoned subject to payment of cost of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only) on noticing sufficient cause. 17. The present factual matrix has to be adjudged on the aforesaid enunciation of law for the purpose of condonation of delay. The five basic principles that can be culled out are, namely, the concept of sufficient cause must be conferred liberal meaning and the courts should adopt a liberal approach in the matter of condonation of delay; that while dealing with the applications for condonation of delay preferred by the State, official procedure involved in a bureaucratic set up has to be kept in mind and public interest should never be forgotten; that when serious question of law is involved and it touches the arena of collective interest the approach has to be liberal; to avoid prejudice to the other party who has spent amount on litigation, compensation by way of cost should be granted; and that condonation of delay it discretionary and the court must consider it from all spectrums having a lenient approach. 18. In view of the aforesaid we are inclined to condone the delay subject to the condition that the appellant-State shall pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- to the respondent no.1 by way of a Bank Draft drawn in favour of the respondent no. 1 within four weeks from today. After the amount is paid, liberty is granted to the appellants to move this Court for listing the appeal for the purpose of admission. The interim order passed on earlier occasion shall remain in force till 10th of February, 2010 and, if costs is paid, the same shall continue till the matter is listed for admission.