JUDGMENT : Wangdi, J. 1. This is an appeal u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, seeking to assail the award dated 16.2.2009 passed by the Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, East and North Sikkim at Gangtok, in M.A.C.T. Case No. 14 of 2006, filed by the respondent No. 1, for death compensation of his wife who died in a motor accident involving a taxi being a Tata Spacio bearing registration No.WB 73-A0669 while travelling from Gangtok to New Jalpaiguri on 26.7.2004. Before going into the merits of the appeal, it is relevant to state that appellant, the Branch Manager, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., had filed the memo of appeal along with an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for condoning a delay of 146 days in filing the appeal. Since this was seriously contested by the respondent No. 1, the claimant, it is felt essential to deal with that at the threshold. The grounds raised by the appellant for condoning the delay have been set out in paras 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the application which are reproduced below: (3) That the impugned judgment and award was passed by the learned Member, M.A.C.T., East and North Sikkim at Gangtok on 16.2.2009. Due to communication gap between the advocate of the appellant and the officials of the appellant, the certified copy of the judgment and award was made available only in the last week of May 2009. (4) That the copy of the impugned judgment was then forwarded to Divisional Manager of the appellant and thereafter to the Regional Manager for considering the same for preferring appeal before this Hon'ble court. The Regional Manager sought legal opinion with respect to the said case and after being advised to prefer an appeal has again forwarded the file to the Branch Manager, Gangtok Branch through the Divisional Manager stationed at Siliguri. The movement of the file from Gangtok to Kolkata and seeking legal opinion consumed some time. (5) That after calculation, the last date for filing appeal before this Hon'ble court was 19.5.2009. However, due to the movement of the concerned file from the office of the Branch Manager, Gangtok to that of Divisional Manager stationed at Siliguri and eventually the office of the Regional Manager and also seeking legal advice, the instant appeal could not be filed on or before 19.5.2009. However, due to the movement of the concerned file from the office of the Branch Manager, Gangtok to that of Divisional Manager stationed at Siliguri and eventually the office of the Regional Manager and also seeking legal advice, the instant appeal could not be filed on or before 19.5.2009. There is delay of 146 days in filing the instant appeal. (6) That the delay caused in filing the present appeal is not willful but due to the compulsory requirement of seeking concurrence from higher authorities. It has been stated that the delay was caused due to circumstances beyond the control of the appellant and as the aforesaid grounds constituted 'sufficient cause' that prevented the appellant from preferring the appeal before the expiry of the period prescribed for doing so, the appellant was entitled to condonation of the delay. 2. When the matter came up for hearing on 23.3.2010 before this court, except for the appellant and the learned advocates for the owner, respondent No. 2, neither the respondent No. 1 nor his counsel appeared. Since no steps had been taken for seeking adjournment on behalf of the claimant-respondent No. 1, the matter was heard in his absence and delay in filing the appeal was condoned ex parte fixing 20.4.2010 for hearing on admission of the appeal. Later, on 19.4.2010, an application u/s 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, was filed on behalf of the respondent No. 1 for setting aside the ex parte order dated 23.3.2010, condoning the delay on the ground that non-appearance of the respondent No. 1 and/or his counsel was due to the fault of the learned advocate who inadvertently failed to make entry of the date in his diary resulting in their absence in court on 23.3.2010. The application was duly supported by an affidavit affirming statements contained in the application. Considering the facts and circumstances contained therein, this court directed the application to be put up along with M.A.C. Appeal No. 6 of 2009 to be considered when the appeal would be heard granting liberty to the parties to raise the issue of delay. 3. The application was duly supported by an affidavit affirming statements contained in the application. Considering the facts and circumstances contained therein, this court directed the application to be put up along with M.A.C. Appeal No. 6 of 2009 to be considered when the appeal would be heard granting liberty to the parties to raise the issue of delay. 3. The application for condonation of delay filed on behalf of appellant had been objected to by the claimant-respondent No. 1 by filing a written objection, the crux of which was that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, being a special Act is a complete Code by itself and section 173 thereof provides for the entire procedure with regard to the filing of an appeal and matters related thereto including the question of delay in doing so and that powers are vested in the court in entertaining a belated appeal on being satisfied that the appellant was prevented by 'sufficient cause'. It was further urged in the objection that the aforesaid provision being complete by itself, an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act would not be permissible as being excluded by necessary implication and, therefore, the application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act filed on behalf of the appellant was not maintainable. The grounds raised for condoning the delay contained in the application have been denied categorically by the respondent No. 1 which have been summarised in para 10 of the written objection, the relevant portion of which is as follows: (10)...The appellant-petitioner has suppressed the fact that the certified copy of the judgment and award which was passed by the learned Tribunal on 16.2.2008 was applied for by appellant-petitioner only on 30.3.2009, i.e., after a delay of 42 days that is almost half the period of 90 days within which the appeal ought to have been filed which goes to prove that the appellant-petitioner was callous and negligent. Further, the so-called communication gap between the officials of the appellant and the advocate of the appellant has not been sufficiently and fully explained and is incomprehensible from the petition in absence of more detailed information as to what is meant by communication gap between learned advocate of the appellant and officials of the appellant. 4. Further, the so-called communication gap between the officials of the appellant and the advocate of the appellant has not been sufficiently and fully explained and is incomprehensible from the petition in absence of more detailed information as to what is meant by communication gap between learned advocate of the appellant and officials of the appellant. 4. Since all pleadings were complete and there were no further steps required for the purpose of hearing of the appeal, with the consent of the parties, the appeal was taken up for final hearing on 30.4.2010 at the stage of admission only. At the very outset, Mrs. Laxmi Chakraborty, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant, sought to raise objection to the maintainability of the application u/s 151 of the CPC filed on behalf of the respondent No. 1 and, on being allowed to do so, submitted that the application was not maintainable in view of provision of sub-section (2) of section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and that the application of the CPC is excluded thereby. It was further urged that the only remedy available to the appellant would be under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In order to deal with the contention, it would be convenient to reproduce sub-section (2) of section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which reads as follows: 169. Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunals.--(1) xxx (2) The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a civil court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for all purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).... 5. When we consider the aforesaid provision, it is difficult to accept the contention raised by Mrs. 5. When we consider the aforesaid provision, it is difficult to accept the contention raised by Mrs. Chakraborty in as much as the provision simply vests the Tribunal with the powers of the civil court for the particular purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects for such other purposes as may be prescribed and does not exclude, either expressly or by necessary implication, the application of other provisions of the Code, which is how the learned counsel sought to interpret. It is an age-old and well-established principle that every court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, the administration of which is the sole purpose of its existence. Such power, of course, should not be exercised arbitrarily and in conflict with the express provisions of the law. In the present case, this court taking into consideration the grounds stated in the petition deemed it appropriate to pass the order dated 20.4.2010 allowing the parties to raise the issue of delay for the ends of justice. This court, while passing that order, also took into consideration that it was dealing with a benevolent piece of legislation under which certain right had accrued in favour of the claimant, the respondent No. 1, and that the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, did not restrict this court from passing the said order invoking its power that is inhered in it. Considering the above position, the objection raised by Mrs. Chakraborty would be unsustainable and, therefore, stands rejected. 6. We may, therefore, now take up the application u/s 5 of Limitation Act for condonation of delay filed on behalf of appellant. Mr. Joshi, learned advocate, resisting the application submitted that the application was not maintainable since provision of section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is a self-contained provision that prescribes for filing of appeal against the order of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, the period within which the appeal may be filed and the power to condone delay. Mr. Joshi in support of his contention relied upon the case of Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. Vs. The Custodian, , by drawing the attention of this court to para 17 thereof, relevant portion of which is reproduced below: (17)... Mr. Joshi in support of his contention relied upon the case of Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. Vs. The Custodian, , by drawing the attention of this court to para 17 thereof, relevant portion of which is reproduced below: (17)... Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides for the application of the provisions of section 4 to section 24 of the 1963 Act including section 5, to any special or local law which prescribes a period of limitation in respect of any suit, appeal or application different from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act. In other words, the general rule as far as special and local Acts are concerned is that the specified provisions including section 5 of the Limitation Act will apply provided the special or local Act provides a period of limitation different from that prescribed under the Limitation Act. There is an additional requirement, viz., that the special/local Act does not expressly exclude the application of the Limitation Act. It has been held in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. that the word 'exclusion' also includes 'exclusion by necessary implication'. This proposition of law is not in dispute. The only question is: does the Act expressly or necessarily exclude the provisions of the Limitation Act? We think it does. The fact that it has provided for a power to condone delay u/s 10 (3) of the Act, shows that Parliament had consciously excluded the power of the court in relation to section 4 (2). This view also finds support in the decision of this court in Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar. The statutory provision under consideration in that case was section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. It was held: When in the same statute in respect of various other provisions relating to filing of appeals and revisions, specific provisions are made so as to give benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act and such provision is not made to an application to be made u/s 8 of the Act, it obviously and necessarily follows that the legislature consciously excluded the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act. 7. 7. Next, it was contended by the learned advocate that assuming that the proviso to section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, brings within its ambit the principle of section 5 of the Limitation Act as to the interpretation of the term 'sufficient cause', the appellant had miserably failed to explain satisfactorily that it was prevented by 'sufficient cause' from preferring the appeal in time. As per the learned advocate other than making vague assertions of the communication gap between the appellant and his advocate and the various stages that the matter had to pass through at different levels in the hierarchy of the appellant, no material particulars have been furnished as to the nature of the communication gap, the manner of deliberations at various levels as claimed by the appellant, the complete absence of any documentary evidence or affidavit by the concerned authorities or by the learned advocate of the appellant dealing with the matter before the learned Tribunal. Such vague averments as per the learned advocate cannot constitute 'sufficient cause' for the delay to be condoned. In this regard, reliance was placed in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Nav Bharat Construction Co., AIR 2005 SC 2795 , in which the Apex Court having found the application to be completely vague, upheld the rejection of such application by the High Court as follows: (21) We have perused the impugned order whereby application seeking condonation of delay was rejected and the revision petition was dismissed as barred. The cause for the delay stated was long strike of government employees. In the application seeking condonation of delay there was no mention as to when the strike commenced and terminated. The application was completely vague and the High Court committed no error in rejecting it.... 8. It was further submitted that the appellant had suppressed material fact in as much as it had not been disclosed in the application that the application for certified copy of the judgment was filed after 42 days of the judgment which clearly reflects the utter callousness and negligence on the part of the appellant to follow up the matter. Relying upon the decision in the case of The State of West Bengal Vs. Relying upon the decision in the case of The State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality and Others, AIR 1972 SC 749 , it was contended that the delay in filing an appeal should not be for reasons which indicate the party's negligence in not taking necessary steps which he could have or should have taken. Mr. S. Joshi drew attention of this court to paras 26, 29 and 30 of the judgment but it will be sufficient if we reproduce para 30 which reads: (30) From the above observations it is clear that the words 'sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. 9. It was submitted that if 'sufficient cause' for excusing the delay is shown, discretion lies with the court to condone it and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice and that the words 'sufficient cause' would receive a liberal construction with the objective of advancing substantial justice only when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant. As per Mr. S. Joshi, since the facts and circumstances clearly show gross negligence on the part of the appellant, the appellant was not entitled to receiving a liberal construction on the cause shown by him in the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. In the above facts and circumstances, it was submitted that the appellant having failed to make out 'sufficient cause' for filing the appeal with an inordinate delay of 146 days deserved to be rejected and consequently, therefore, the appeal. 10. Mrs. Laxmi Chakraborty, learned counsel on behalf of the appellant, in support of the application for condonation of delay, submitted that mentioning a wrong provision of the law at the head of the application would not entail its dismissal if from the substance of the application, it can be traced to the relevant provision of the statute that would be applicable. Laxmi Chakraborty, learned counsel on behalf of the appellant, in support of the application for condonation of delay, submitted that mentioning a wrong provision of the law at the head of the application would not entail its dismissal if from the substance of the application, it can be traced to the relevant provision of the statute that would be applicable. It is submitted that since the application for condonation of delay can be traced to the second proviso to section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, this court had the necessary powers and the jurisdiction to consider it as an application thereunder. Furthermore, it was submitted that in order to arrive at what is 'sufficient cause' it would be necessary to rely upon the principle of the said term enunciated with regard to section 5 of the Limitation Act. Mrs. Chakraborty submitted that the ground for condoning the delay as set out in the application constituted 'sufficient cause' for the delay being condoned. Mrs. Chakraborty relied upon the decision of this court in Ram Kumar Goyel and Others Vs. Bhuwan Singh Pradhan, AIR 2007 Sikk 39 , where it has been laid down as under: (18) It is, therefore, well settled by now that the explanation put forward in the application for condonation of delay should be considered along with the merits of the appeal and if serious points of law are prima facie found to have been raised in the appeal, the application for condonation of delay is not to be lightly brushed aside taking into account only the length of delay in the matter. A reference to the merits of the appeal for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether arguable points of law have been raised would invariably be desirable for advancing the cause of substantial justice while considering the question of condonation of delay u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. 11. The decision of this court in Principal Secretary, Transport Department, Government of Sikkim Vs. 11. The decision of this court in Principal Secretary, Transport Department, Government of Sikkim Vs. Narmaya Das, (2006) ACJ 150, was also referred to and relied upon with specific reference to paras 11 and 12 which read as under: (11) In view of the above, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the object underlying section 5 of the Act is to enable the court to do substantial justice and as such, the court should approach the question of sufficient cause with the liberal approach while deciding application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. A justice oriented approach is what is necessary while deciding a question of sufficient cause in an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. (12) Further, it also becomes clear from the above that where arguable points of facts and law are involved, the explanation furnished should not be brushed aside taking hyper technical view of the matter. It is indeed well established that merits of the case may also be taken into consideration in excusing the delay. In Urban Improvement Trust Vs. Poonam Chand, AIR 1997 Raj 134 , it has been held as follows: (19) Now it must be taken to be well settled principle of law that before rejecting applications u/s 5 of the Limitation Act and dismissing appeals as barred by lapse of time, the courts of law are required to put a glance as a condition precedent on the merits of the appeals and unless the appeals are found to be hopelessly devoid of merits ordinarily efforts should be made to decide the appeals on merits. In addition to the above, the recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Divisional Manager, Plantation Division, Andaman and Nicobar v. Munnu Barrick, AIR 2005 SCW 109 , leaves no room for doubt that where serious questions of law are raised by the appellants the court should take a liberal view on the application for condonation of delay. 12. 12. It was submitted that from the principle of law laid down in the above cases, the explanation put forward in the application for condonation of delay should be considered along with the merits of the appeals and if serious points of fact and law are prima facie found to have been raised in the appeal, the application for condonation of delay is not to be lightly brushed aside by taking into account only the length of delay in the matter. It was further submitted that while considering the question of delay reference to the merits of the case would not be out of place and where it is found that arguable points of facts or law are involved in the appeal, the explanation furnished should not be rejected taking a pedantic view of the matter. As per Mrs. Chakraborty since the appellant had raised arguable points in the appeal it would be in the interest of justice if a liberal view is taken in the matter and the delay be condoned. 13. I have given careful consideration to the various contentions raised on behalf of the parties, the averments contained in the application for condonation of delay, the written objection to that application, the grounds of appeal raised in the memo of appeal and the materials available on the records of the case and in my view the application for condonation of delay cannot be entertained for the reasons stated hereunder. 14. In the first instance, it is made clear that the application though filed u/s 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be rejected as being not entertainable on the assumption that the Limitation Act would not be applicable in matters concerning belated appeal u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, when second proviso thereof specifically makes provisions in that respect. In the interest of furthering substantial justice, it is discretionary upon this court to consider it as an application having been filed under that proviso, as the principle for condoning the delay under the said proviso would be pari materia to the one u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. In the interest of furthering substantial justice, it is discretionary upon this court to consider it as an application having been filed under that proviso, as the principle for condoning the delay under the said proviso would be pari materia to the one u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. There can be no doubt that while searching for the guiding principles as regards the interpretation of the 'sufficient cause' appearing in the second proviso to section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, it would be permissible to rely upon the one enunciated in respect of u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. I, therefore, hold that the application is maintainable. The decision in the Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. Vs. The Custodian, (2004) 122 CompCas 683 , cited by Mr. Joshi is clearly distinguishable from the facts, law and the circumstance involved in the present case. In that case, the Supreme Court was considering the question as to whether the Special Court constituted under the Special Court (Trial of Offences relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992, has the power to condone the delay in filing a petition u/s 4 (2) of the Act. The court held that in view of the express provisions contained in the Act excluding the applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act, it could not be invoked. This is quite clear from para 19 of the judgment which is reproduced below: (19) But in this case apart from the mandatory and compulsive provision of sub-section (2) of section 4 of the Act, there are in addition two provisions of the Act which show that the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked. These are: an express provision for condonation of delay u/s 10 (3) and the non obstante provision in section 13 of the Act which states that the provisions of the Act: 13.... shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law, other than this Act, or in any decree or order of any court, Tribunal or other authority. On going through section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, we find no such provision that excludes the applicability of section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, the contention stands rejected. 15. On going through section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, we find no such provision that excludes the applicability of section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, the contention stands rejected. 15. Insofar as the question as to whether or not the averments extracted here before contained in the application for condonation of delay would constitute 'sufficient cause' that prevented the appellant from preferring the appeal in time is another matter. One of the grounds raised for the delay being condoned as set out in para 3 is 'due to communication gap' between the learned advocate of the appellant and the officials of the appellant which resulted in the certified copy of the judgment and award being made available only in the last week of May 2009. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Joshi, learned advocate on behalf of the respondent No. 1, the pleadings are quite vague and devoid of material particulars. No effort has been made to state as to how the communication gap occurred between the advocate of the appellant and the officials of the appellant. Being the principal contesting respondent in the case before the Tribunal, it is expected that the appellant would be diligent in following up with the case by keeping regular contact with his counsel. The responsibility lies primarily with the party in following up his case and not be solely dependent upon his counsel. Curiously enough, even the counsel conducting the case has not come forward with any affidavit to support that there was indeed a communication gap. Apart from this, the appellant has concealed the fact that the application for certified copy of the award of the learned Tribunal was filed only after 42 days of the award which is evident from the entry made by the Head Copyist in the certified copy supplied to the appellant that has been filed with the memo of appeal. 16. In paras 4 and 5 of the application for condonation of delay, it has not been specified as to when the impugned judgment had been forwarded to the Divisional Manager of the appellant. 16. In paras 4 and 5 of the application for condonation of delay, it has not been specified as to when the impugned judgment had been forwarded to the Divisional Manager of the appellant. It has also not been specified as to when the Divisional Manager referred to the Regional Manager for his consideration and the details of the stages followed by the Regional Manager for seeking legal opinion and as to the advice that was said to have been given to the Branch Manager, Gangtok Branch, through the Divisional Manager stationed at Siliguri. West Bengal to prefer an appeal. Apart from the vague statements no material particulars have been furnished in the application with regard to the movement of the file let alone the filing of any records of the appellant showing such deliberations. Keeping in view the principles of law laid down in the cases (supra) referred to by Mr. Joshi, I have no hesitation in holding that apart from the averments set out as grounds for condoning the delay that are quite vague, the appellant has been grossly negligent in taking steps in the matter. No bona fide can be attached to the appellant in the facts and circumstances obtaining in the case. Suppression of material fact of the application for certified copies being filed in a lackadaisical manner makes the case all the more worse for the appellant. I, therefore, hold that appellant failed to show that he was prevented by 'sufficient cause' in preferring the appeal in time. 17. Despite the above position, this court in the interest of and for furthering the cause of substantial justice felt it essential to go into the merits of the case keeping in view the principle of law laid down by this court in the cases of Ram Kumar Goyel and Others Vs. Bhuwan Singh Pradhan, AIR 2007 Sikk 39 and Principal Secretary, Transport Department, Government of Sikkim Vs. Narmaya Das, (2006) ACJ 150, referred to on behalf of the appellant that a reference to the merits of the case while considering the question of condonation of delay would not be out of place where it is found that arguable points of facts and law are involved in the appeal. This court, therefore, proceeded to hear the appeal on its merit also and accordingly, the appeal was heard at length for the purpose. 18. This court, therefore, proceeded to hear the appeal on its merit also and accordingly, the appeal was heard at length for the purpose. 18. In order to do so, it is essential to set out the factual matrix of the case. The claimant is the husband of the deceased Dr. Yanuta Cintury. On 26.7.2004, when they were travelling together from Gangtok to New Jalpaiguri on a Tata Spacio taxi vehicle bearing registration No. WB 73-A 0669, it met with an accident due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle at Gai Dhara, 14th Mile, NH 31-A, East Sikkim, in which the deceased sustained severe head injuries and was rushed to the Central Referral Hospital, 5th Mile, Tadong. On 30.7.2004, she succumbed to her injuries at about 3.45 p.m. Shorn of the facts not relevant to the matter in issue, it may be stated that the claimant who is the legal representative of the deceased filed an application u/s 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for compensation before the Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, East and North Sikkim at Gangtok in M.A.C.T. Case No. 14 of 2006. The appellant resisted the claim petition by a written objection on various grounds most of which were of formal nature, the only material one being that the age and income of the deceased at the time of the alleged accident were disputed and the deceased had no income of her own at the time of the accident. 19. In the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal the respondent No. 2, the owner of the accident vehicle, was proceeded ex parte and it was the appellant alone who contested the claim petition. In support of his claim, the respondent No. 1 who is the claimant filed the following documents: (1) All India Secondary School Examination, 1988 Certificate issued by the Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi in favour of Yanuta Cintury dated 22.8.1988 showing the date of birth of the deceased Yanuta Cintury as 19.2.1972 in original, Exh. 1. (2) Degree of Doctor of Medicine, conferred by the Ranchi University, dated 13.2.2004 in favour of deceased Yanuta Cintury in original, Exh. 2. (3) Promotion letter issued by Director (Medical & HS), Durgapur Steel Plant, in favour of deceased Yanuta Cintury dated 28.9.2002 in original, Exh. 3. 1. (2) Degree of Doctor of Medicine, conferred by the Ranchi University, dated 13.2.2004 in favour of deceased Yanuta Cintury in original, Exh. 2. (3) Promotion letter issued by Director (Medical & HS), Durgapur Steel Plant, in favour of deceased Yanuta Cintury dated 28.9.2002 in original, Exh. 3. (4) Salary certificate for the month of July 2003 issued in the name of the deceased Yanuta Cintury by the Steel Authority of India, Durgapur Steel Plant in original, Exh. 4. (5) Certificate of marriage of deceased Yanuta Cintury with Subrata Mitra dated 19.1.2001 issued by Marriage Officer, Calcutta and South 24 Parganas, Exh. 6. (6) Attested copy of the F.I.R. dated 26.7.2004 in connection with accident of Tata Spacio taxi bearing registration No. WB 73-A 0669, Exh. 7. (7) Certified copy of inquest report of Singtam Police, Exh. 8. (8) Attested copy of certificate of registration in respect of vehicle No. WB 73-A 0669, Exh. 9. (9) Attested copy of certificate of insurance of vehicle, Exh. 10. (10) Attested copy of driving licence of driver Raju Chettri, Exh. 11. (11) Certified copy of post-mortem report of deceased Yanuta Cintury, Exh. 12. (12) Certified copy of the post-mortem certificate of deceased Yanuta Cintury, Exh. 13. (13) Certified copy handing and taking memo of dead body in respect of Yanuta Cintury, Exh. 14. (14) Death certificate of the deceased Yanuta Cintury in original, Exh. 15. (15) Form 3, Return of income dated 12.6.2002 in original, Exh. 5. 20. The Claims Tribunal framed two issues on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and they were as under: (1) Whether the claimant is entitled to the claim made by him? (2) To what relief or reliefs is the claimant entitled? No documents were filed by the insurance company, appellant. Claimant had appeared in the witness-box and deposed on the facts of the case and proved the aforesaid documents. On appreciation of the evidence on record and the oral testimony of the claimant, the Claims Tribunal decided both the issues in favour of claimant-respondent No. 1 and awarded as compensation to the claimant, Rs. 35,38,740 (rupees thirty-five lakh thirty-eight thousand seven hundred and forty), out of which the loss of earnings was calculated at Rs. 35,14,240 (rupees thirty-five lakh fourteen thousand two hundred and forty) by assessing the monthly income of deceased at Rs. 35,38,740 (rupees thirty-five lakh thirty-eight thousand seven hundred and forty), out of which the loss of earnings was calculated at Rs. 35,14,240 (rupees thirty-five lakh fourteen thousand two hundred and forty) by assessing the monthly income of deceased at Rs. 25,840 (rupees twenty-five thousand eight hundred and forty) and by application of multiplier 17 as contained in column 1 of the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 21. Before this court Mrs. Chakraborty, learned advocate for the appellant, submitted that the only ground that she would urge was the excessiveness of the quantum of the award passed in favour of claimant-respondent No. 1. As per learned advocate, it was an admitted position that deceased was employed as a Senior Medical Officer at Durgapur Steel Plant till 31.10.2003 drawing a gross salary of Rs. 25,840 (rupees twenty-five thousand eight hundred and forty) but after that she had no income which was the situation at the time of her death, i.e., 30.7.2004. When admittedly the deceased did not have any income at the time of her death, it was erroneous on the part of the learned Tribunal to have assessed the income at the rate arrived at by it when the notional income prescribed under column 6 of the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, in respect of those persons having no income prior to the accident was Rs. 15,000 (rupees fifteen thousand) per annum. Since this was the only substantive ground raised in respect of the appeal, it would be useful to consider the material on record which would be essential to consider the merit of the objection. 22. In the claims petition, it has been set out in column 7 that the monthly income of the deceased person was Rs. 30,000 (rupees thirty thousand) while in column 6, it has been stated that deceased worked as a Senior Medical Officer at Durgapur Steel Plant till 31.3.2003 after which she was engaged in private practice as Neuro-psychiatrist at Durgapur, Ukhra, Asansol in West Bengal. Claimant has also categorically stated this fact in his oral evidence. During cross-examination of claimant by the appellant's counsel on this point, only a suggestion had been made to the witness that the deceased did not earn at an average of Rs. 30,000 (rupees thirty thousand) per month from her private practice as claimed which was denied by the claimant. Mrs. During cross-examination of claimant by the appellant's counsel on this point, only a suggestion had been made to the witness that the deceased did not earn at an average of Rs. 30,000 (rupees thirty thousand) per month from her private practice as claimed which was denied by the claimant. Mrs. Laxmi Chakraborty sought to raise a controversy with regard to the denial and pointed out that the fact that the claimant in response to the suggestion had stated that "it is not a fact that my late wife used to earn at an average of Rs. 30,000 per month..." amounted to an admission that the deceased did not earn that amount as claimed by the claimant. Mr. Joshi on the other hand submitted that the sentence had appeared in that form due to typographical error and it ought to have been "it is not the fact that my late wife did not earn at an average of Rs. 30,000 per month from her private practice...". Mr. Joshi submitted that this had been pointed out to the Tribunal during which time the learned advocate conducting the case on behalf of appellant before the Tribunal had conceded to this, but remained uncorrected in the records due to oversight. Mrs. Chakraborty fairly conceded to this fact and rightly so, because the error appears to be quite apparent on the face of the record. No evidence was led on behalf of the appellant before the Tribunal to disprove this fact. In fact, no evidence was adduced at all on behalf of the appellant. The contention of Mr. Joshi that the sentence was incorrectly typed is, therefore, accepted. 23. Mrs. Laxmi Chakraborty contended that the claimant-respondent No. 1 had failed to produce any evidence in support of the fact that the income of the deceased was about Rs. 30,000 per month from her private practice as Neuropsychiatrist. It has been urged that the Tribunal has assessed the compensation without any reasonable criteria, is arbitrary and quite mechanical. It is submitted that the assumption of the income of the deceased at the time of her death as being Rs. 25,840 per month is not supported by any material particulars and that by doing so, the award of compensation that has been calculated is quite exorbitant and would amount to a bonanza in favour of the claimant. 24. I find substance in this submission of Mrs. Chakraborty. 25,840 per month is not supported by any material particulars and that by doing so, the award of compensation that has been calculated is quite exorbitant and would amount to a bonanza in favour of the claimant. 24. I find substance in this submission of Mrs. Chakraborty. Before embarking upon the correctness of the award, it would be essential to lay down the principles governing assessment of awards in fatal accident claims. It has been held in various pronouncements of the Apex Court that the Tribunal while awarding compensation ought to be just and reasonable, and the determination of the compensation has to be rational to be arrived at by following a judicious approach. It should neither be punitive to the person against whom the claim is decreed nor should it be a source of profit to the person in whose favour it is decreed. The pecuniary loss has to be ascertained only by balancing on the one hand the loss of the claimants of the future pecuniary benefits, and on the other pecuniary benefits which may come to them from whatever source by reason of death, i.e., the balance of loss and gain to the dependants by the death must be properly ascertained. In the case of State of Haryana and Another Vs. Jasbir Kaur and Others, AIR 2003 SC 3696 , it has been held as follows: (7) It has to be kept in view that the Tribunal constituted under the Act as provided in section 168 is required to make an award determining the amount of compensation which is to be in the real sense 'damages' which in turn appears to it to be 'just and reasonable'. It has to be borne in mind that compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in golden scales. But at the same time it has to be borne in mind that the compensation is not expected to be a windfall for the victim. Statutory provisions clearly indicate that the compensation must be 'just' and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of profit; but the same should not be a pittance. The courts and Tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the amount of compensation, which should be just. What would be 'just' compensation is a vexed question. Statutory provisions clearly indicate that the compensation must be 'just' and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of profit; but the same should not be a pittance. The courts and Tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the amount of compensation, which should be just. What would be 'just' compensation is a vexed question. There can be no golden rule applicable to all cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb. Measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. It would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiar or special features, if any. Every method or mode adopted for assessing compensation has to be considered in the background of 'just' compensation which is the pivotal consideration. Though by use of the expression 'which appears to it to be just' a wide discretion is vested in the Tribunal, the determination has to be rational, to be done by a judicious approach and not the outcome of whims, wild guesses and arbitrariness. The expression 'just' denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness, and non-arbitrariness. If it is not so it cannot be just. [See Mrs. Helen C. Rebello and Others Vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corpn. and Another, AIR 1998 SC 3191 ](Emphasis supplied) 25. In General Manager, Punjab Roadways, Nangal Depot and Another Vs. Smt. Santosh Chadha and Others, AIR 1997 HP 36 , a Division Bench of Himachal Pradesh High Court has most elaborately set out the principles for determination of the quantum of compensation which would be relevant to be extracted and the same reads as under: (14) In fatal accident action the measure of damages is the pecuniary loss suffered and/or is likely to be suffered by each dependant as a result of the death. Thus except where there is express statutory direction to the contrary, the damages to be awarded to a dependant of a deceased person under the Fatal Accidents Acts must take into account any pecuniary benefit accruing to that dependant in consequence of the death of the deceased. It is the net loss on balance which constitutes the measure of damages. Thus except where there is express statutory direction to the contrary, the damages to be awarded to a dependant of a deceased person under the Fatal Accidents Acts must take into account any pecuniary benefit accruing to that dependant in consequence of the death of the deceased. It is the net loss on balance which constitutes the measure of damages. (15) For the assessment of damages to compensate the dependants, it has to take into account many imponderables, e.g., the life expectancy of the deceased and the dependants, the amount that the deceased would have earned during the remainder of his life, the amount that he would have contributed to the dependants during that period, the chances that the deceased may not have lived or the dependants may not live up to the estimated remaining period of their life expectancy, the chances that deceased might have got better employment or income or might have lost his employment or income altogether. (16) The manner of arriving at the damages is to ascertain the net income of the deceased available for the support of himself and his dependants, and to deduct therefrom such part of his income as the deceased was accustomed to spend upon himself, as regards both self maintenance and pleasure, and to ascertain what part of his net income the deceased was accustomed to spend for the benefit of the dependants. Then that should be capitalised by multiplying it by a figure representing the proper number of year's purchase. (17) Much of the calculation necessarily remains in the realm of hypothesis 'and in that region arithmetic is a good servant but a bad master' since there are so often many imponderables. In every case 'it is the overall picture that matters', and the court must try to assess as best as it can the loss suffered. (Emphasis supplied) It is a settled principle that the determination of the quantum of compensation must answer what contemporary society "would deem to be a fair sum such as would allow the wrongdoer to hold up his head among his neighbours with their approval that he has done the fair thing". The sum awarded must be fair and reasonable by accepted legal standards. 26. We may also refer to the case of Bijoy Kumar Dugar Vs. The sum awarded must be fair and reasonable by accepted legal standards. 26. We may also refer to the case of Bijoy Kumar Dugar Vs. Bidyadhar Dutta and Others, AIR 2006 SC 1255 , in para 8 of which it has been held as follows: (8)...It is by now well settled that the compensation should be the pecuniary loss to the dependants by the death of a person concerned. While calculating the compensation, annual dependency of the dependants should be determined in terms of the annual loss, according to them, due to the abrupt termination of life. To determine the quantum of compensation, the earnings of the deceased at the time of the accident and the amount, which the deceased was spending for the dependants, are the basic-determinative factors. The resultant figure should then be multiplied by a 'multiplier'. The multiplier is applied not for the entire span of life of a person, but it is applied taking into consideration the imponderables in life, immediate availability of the amount to the dependants, the expectancy of the period of dependency of the claimants and so many other factors. Contribution towards the expenses of the family naturally is in proportion to one's earning capacity....(Emphasis supplied) 27. Keeping the above principles in view when we examine the award, it is not clear as to how the Tribunal has assessed the income of the deceased as Rs. 25,840 per month. On scanning through the records to seek out the basis of such assessment, the only evidence that supports the Tribunal's determination is the payslip of the deceased, Exh. 4, which indicates that at the time of her employment with Durgapur Steel Plant, the deceased was drawing a gross salary of Rs. 25,836 per month. The relevant portions of the award of the Tribunal in this regard may be reproduced as under: (10)...Exh. 4 establishes, however, that gross monthly pay of the deceased was Rs. 25,836.40 and not Rs. 30,000 as claimed by the claimant/petitioner. xxx (14) Accordingly, it is hereby ordered as follows: In view of the fact that deceased was 32 years of age at the time of her death, the multiplier to be adopted for the purpose of arriving at the amount of compensation is 17 as per the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act. Thus multiplying the annual income of the deceased, i.e., Rs. 25,840 (Rs. Thus multiplying the annual income of the deceased, i.e., Rs. 25,840 (Rs. 25,840 x 12 months) by multiplier 17 the amount comes to Rs. 52,71,360. By deducting 73rd from the said amount which the deceased would have spent for her own maintenance had she been alive, the amount of compensation comes to Rs. 35,14,240.... The above determination in my view appears to be quite cryptic, bereft of any reasoning and erroneous when we test it on the anvil of the principles laid down for determination of compensation as set out above. 28. It is necessary to be mindful of the fact that this is a case where the sole claimant is the husband of the deceased who was just 33 years at the time of accident. From the affidavit dated 29.4.2010 filed by him with the written objection to the application for condonation of delay and the affidavit dated 19.4.2010 filed with the application u/s 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is found that the claimant is employed as a Manager in a private company. They were childless and evidently the deceased also has no parents who were dependent on her during her lifetime. Although in terms of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, it is permissible for him to make the claim for compensation being a legal representative of the deceased, it has to be seen as to whether he is dependent on the deceased. Neither the claim petition nor the evidence on record throws light on this fact. This in my view is a serious infirmity because as per the principles set out in the catena of decisions on this, the measure of damages in fatal accident claims is the pecuniary loss suffered and is likely to be suffered by each 'dependant' as a result of death. Despite this serious constraint, this court in order to further the cause of substantial justice, has proceeded on the assumption that the deceased did provide support to the family income consisting of the claimant and the deceased as they would be inter-dependent for a comfortable living. Having assumed thus, we may now proceed to determine the compensation keeping in view the principles laid down for the purpose. 29. Considering the fact that deceased was earning Rs. Having assumed thus, we may now proceed to determine the compensation keeping in view the principles laid down for the purpose. 29. Considering the fact that deceased was earning Rs. 25,836 per month till the year 2003 in the employment of Durgapur Steel Plant, we may safely assume that her professional income as Neuropsychiatrist would have been at least Rs. 20,000 per month on the average, considering the uncertainty and instability of income in a private practice, length of which was just about one year after she had left her employment. Since the essential criteria for determination of compensation is the extent of 'dependence' of the 'dependant' who is the husband of the deceased in the present case, it is incomprehensible to this court as to how the Tribunal has taken Rs. 25,840 per month, i.e., the entire gross monthly salary of the deceased when employed under Durgapur Steel Plant, as his 'dependence' on the deceased. The basis for having arrived at that has not at all been mentioned. If the award is allowed to remain as it is, then in my view, it would amount to an unjustifiable windfall and a bonanza to the claimant. The dependence of the claimant at the time of the accident, as it appears from his deposition, is limited to the deceased financing his expenditure towards the management course he was undergoing which ceased to exist on completion of the course and now does not exist anymore as he is presently employed as a Manager in a private company. It would, therefore, be necessary to assess the probable dependency after completion of the management course and after he has started earning on being employed when the dependence of the claimant would naturally taper down to a lower sum. As the compensation is being awarded in a lump sum amount, it would be reasonable to take an overall view of the entire matter to arrive at a fair compensation. 30. Keeping the above in view and considering the living standards of the claimant and the deceased, the latter being a Neuropsychiatrist, we may safely take the 'dependence' of respondent No. 1 on the deceased as Rs. 10,000 per month being the probable net amount that would be contributed by the deceased to the income of the family, i.e., Rs. 30. Keeping the above in view and considering the living standards of the claimant and the deceased, the latter being a Neuropsychiatrist, we may safely take the 'dependence' of respondent No. 1 on the deceased as Rs. 10,000 per month being the probable net amount that would be contributed by the deceased to the income of the family, i.e., Rs. 1,20,000 annually, by the application of multiplier 17 which is the one relevant to the age group to which the deceased falls in, total amount of dependency would, therefore, amount to Rs. 20,40,000. For the purpose of statutory deduction, 1/3rd of the amount in terms of the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, would be Rs. 6,80.000. The total amount that the claimant would be entitled to without interfering with the other components is calculated as follows: Loss of earnings after deducting 1/3 rd Rs. 13,60,000 Funeral expenses Rs. 2,000 Loss of consortium Rs. 5,000 Loss to estate Rs. 2,500 Medical expenses Rs. 15,000 Total Rs. 13,84,500 It is trite that much of the calculation necessarily remains in the realm of hypothesis since there are so often many imponderables. The above amount has been arrived at by taking the overall picture and the losses suffered by the claimant have been assessed by applying the principle of just and judicious approach in the facts and circumstances of the case. 31. In view of the above and in view of the decisions of this court in the cases of Ram Kumar Goyel and Others Vs. Bhuwan Singh Pradhan, AIR 2007 Sikk 39 and Principal Secretary, Transport Department, Government of Sikkim Vs. Narmaya Das, (2006) ACJ 150, the irresistible conclusion is that appellant has been successful in making out an arguable case and has raised points of law and fact that require serious consideration persuading this court to take a liberal view of the grounds set out in the application for condonation of delay. It would in fact be a travesty of justice if the delay is not condoned and is accordingly condoned. 32. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part. The amount awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal hereby stands modified in terms of the finding set out above. 33. It would in fact be a travesty of justice if the delay is not condoned and is accordingly condoned. 32. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part. The amount awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal hereby stands modified in terms of the finding set out above. 33. The appellant is directed to make payment of the award with necessary deduction of the amount already paid to the claimant, if any, within a period of one month from this order with interest of 10 per cent per annum thereon from the date of filing the claim petition, i.e., on 1.7.2006. Failing to comply with this shall entail payment of additional interest of 2 per cent till payment of the entire amount. 34. No order as to costs. 35. A copy of the judgment be sent to the court below for information and compliance. The records of the court below be returned forthwith.