JUDGMENT Amitava Roy, J. 1. The revisional jurisdiction of this court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ('the Code') has been sought to be invoked to annul the order dated 16.9.2009, passed by the learned Civil Judge No. 2, Kamrup, in Misc. (J) Case No. 223/2008, arising out of Money Suit No. 105/2003. Thereby, the related application for condonation of delay for 385 days in filing the accompanying petition, being Misc. (J) No. 224/2008, under order 9, rule 13 of the Code had been rejected. Consequently, the application for setting aside the ex parte judgment and decree has also been rejected. 2. I have heard Mr. B.M. Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioner and the C.K. Sarma Baruah, senior advocate assisted by Mr. N. Rajkhowa, advocate for the opposite party/respondent. 3. The run up of facts to the instant petition has to be sketched briefly. The present opposite party instituted the aforementioned suit against the Assam State Co-operative Marketing and Consumer Federation Ltd. ('STATFED'), then in existence along with its office bearers, as named therein, for a decree for Rs. 81,76,406.15 paise with interest thereon. During the pendency of the suit, vide notification No. CSS1/2006/41, dated 14.6.2006 of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Assam, the registration of STATFED was cancelled and it ceased to be a body corporate. Its assets and liabilities were entrusted to the Liquidator appointed by the said notification under section 66 of the Assam Co-operative Societies Act, 1949 ('the Act'). Admittedly, one Md. Jiya Uddin Choudhury was appointed as the Liquidator. The opposite party-plaintiff having come to learn of the above developments, it filed an application under order 1, rule 10(2) of the Code in the suit, seeking impleadment of the Liquidator. The prayer was allowed and Md. Jiya Uddin Choudhury was impleaded as the respondent No. 4 therein. He thereafter espoused the cause of the erstwhile STATFED in the suit and arranged for its defence. Written statement was filed resisting the claim of the opposite party-plaintiff. His learned senior counsel, however, after some time expressed his disinclination to represent the defendant. Though a series of communications, beseeching his continuation followed, but to no avail. Meanwhile, the suit was decreed ex parte on 8.6.2007. The present petitioner took over the charge of the office of the Liquidator on 8.11.2007. His learned senior counsel, however, after some time expressed his disinclination to represent the defendant. Though a series of communications, beseeching his continuation followed, but to no avail. Meanwhile, the suit was decreed ex parte on 8.6.2007. The present petitioner took over the charge of the office of the Liquidator on 8.11.2007. It was thereafter, that his learned Advocate (newly engaged) came to learn about the judgment and decree on 22.7.2008. Necessary records were, thereafter, consulted and eventually the belated application under order 9, rule 13 of the Code was filed. Meanwhile, a delay of 385 days had occurred. 4. The application for condonation of delay was opposed by the opposite party-plaintiff, contending, in essence, that the grounds disclosed thereby were insufficient. By the impugned judgment and order as above, the application for condonation of delay has been rejected and additionally, as a consequence, the one for setting aside the ex parte decree has also been dismissed. 5. Mr. Choudhury has persuasively argued that the Liquidator having filed his written statement, the STATFED being a public institution, it ought not to be non-suited, as it had no control over the sudden turn of events at the relevant point of time. According to him, the reasons cited in the application for condonation of delay constitute sufficient cause under section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 and, therefore, the learned court below erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction in passing the impugned order. He has further urged that the rejection of the application under order 9 rule 13 as a consequence is also vitiated by an incurable jurisdictional failing. When confronted with the decision of the Apex Court in Shyam Sunder Sarma, v. Pannalal Jalswal and Ors., AIR 2005 SC 226 , to the effect that rejection of an application for condonation of delay accompanying a belated appeal would result in valid dismissal of the appeal as well, Mr. Choudhury has insisted that the said analogy would not be applicable to an application for condonation of delay accompanying one, for setting aside an ex parte decree. In the alternative, he has argued that having regard to the enormous public money involved, it would be a fit case where the present revision petition be allowed to be converted into an appeal for an appropriate scrutiny on merits of the order impugned. In the alternative, he has argued that having regard to the enormous public money involved, it would be a fit case where the present revision petition be allowed to be converted into an appeal for an appropriate scrutiny on merits of the order impugned. In support of this plea, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in The Reliable Water Supply Service of India (P.) Ltd. v. The Union of India and Ors., AIR 1971 SC 2083 and of this court in Himangsu Kumar Nath v. Mihir Kanti Nath and Ors., (1991) 2 GLR 46. 6. In reply Mr. Sarma Baruah has maintained that having regard to tone and tenor of the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Shyam Sunder Sarma (supra), there is no conceivable reason for non-applicability of the said proposition to the facts of the instant case. He has urged that as the learned court below has, on a valid and in depth scrutiny of the relevant materials refused to condone the delay, this court would not entertain the prayer for conversion of the present revision petition into one for appeal. Further, as the impugned order does not suffer from any want of jurisdiction, the prayer for conversion on that count as well, ought not to be acceded to. In support of his plea, Mr. Sarma Baruah has placed reliance on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Bahori v. Vidya Ram, AIR 1978 All. 299 and that of Delhi High Court in Jiwan Das Rawal v. Narain Das and Ors., AIR 1981 Del. 291 . 7. The pleadings on record and the arguments advanced have been duly attended to. The sequence of events, as recited hereinabove, is not in dispute. It transpires on the face of the records that, though following the impleadment of the then Liquidator, Md. Jiya Uddin Choudhury, a written statement was filed defending the cause of the STATFED, thereafter, however, representation of the defendant-liquidator ceased, his learned senior counsel having declined to make his appearance in the suit. Admittedly, since thereafter till the passing of the ex parte decree on 8.6.2007, the defendant-Liquidator remained absent without taking steps in the suit. 8. Jiya Uddin Choudhury, a written statement was filed defending the cause of the STATFED, thereafter, however, representation of the defendant-liquidator ceased, his learned senior counsel having declined to make his appearance in the suit. Admittedly, since thereafter till the passing of the ex parte decree on 8.6.2007, the defendant-Liquidator remained absent without taking steps in the suit. 8. The plea of the present petitioner is that he had assumed the charge of the office of the Liquidator on 8.11.2007, whereafter, the factum of passing of the ex parte judgment and decree was known to his learned counsel on 22.7.2008. The application for condonation of delay was thereafter filed. Admittedly, the delay of 385 days was sought to be explained thereby. Visibly, there is no clarification whatsoever for the period from 8.6.2007 to 8.11.2007, the date on which the present petitioner assumed the charge of the office of the Liquidator. Even the explication for the period starting from the point of default of the defendant-liquidator till the passing of the ex parte judgment and decree on 8.6.2007 is not satisfactory. Even assuming that his learned senior counsel for reasons best known to him, had declined to appear in the suit, he being a defendant in the proceedings ought to have been more vigilant, alert and enterprising to pursue his defence in the suit, more particularly, as public money was involved. 9. In the above factual premise, the scrutiny made by the learned trial court and the conclusion recorded by it that the delay had not been satisfactorily explained, cannot be faulted with by any objective legal criteria. Though, in responding to a prayer for condonation of delay, the general trend is to adopt a liberal attitude, sufficient cause, as is contemplated under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, would signify that the elucidation furnished is cogent, rational and persuasive. No condonation on sympathy or compassion is warranted. As any decision in a legal proceeding results in the vesting of a valuable right in the successful party in the lis, the delay only fortifies the same and, therefore, sufficient cause has to be construed to be one, which when weighed in the facts and circumstances of the case, justifies dislodgment of such investiture. As any decision in a legal proceeding results in the vesting of a valuable right in the successful party in the lis, the delay only fortifies the same and, therefore, sufficient cause has to be construed to be one, which when weighed in the facts and circumstances of the case, justifies dislodgment of such investiture. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the explanation put forward by the petitioner is insufficient and unsatisfactory and, therefore, the determination of the learned trial court does not warrant any interference. On a perusal of the impugned order, this court is satisfied that not only the relevant facts have been appropriately marshalled and analysed to reach the ultimate conclusion, the same by no means, can be said to be vitiated by want of jurisdiction or error in the exercise thereof. 10. The Apex Court in Shyam Sunder Sarma (supra) while seized with a an almost identical situation where a belated appeal was accompanied by an application for condonation of delay, in essence enunciated the proposition that, in case the delay is not condoned, dismissal of the accompanying appeal would validly ensue. The above proposition, in the opinion of this court is attracted to the present case. 11. On the aspect of conversion of the present revision petition into one of appeal, suffice it to mention that their Lordships in The Reliable Water Supply Service of India (P.) Ltd. (supra), did not propound any proposition of law of uniform application in this regard. This decision, therefore, does not advance the case of the petitioner to this effect. This court in Himangsu Kumar Nath (supra), only observed that the power to entertain such a request would be in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under section 151 of the Code. While reiterating this view, the Allahabad High Court in Bahori (supra), emphasised that such discretionary power is to be exercised in the interest of justice to prevent the abuse of the process of the court in particular. The Delhi High Court in Jiwan Das Rawal (supra), expressed the view that the power to convert an appeal into revision, if called for, can be exercised if the considerations laid down under section 115 of the Code are satisfied. The Delhi High Court in Jiwan Das Rawal (supra), expressed the view that the power to convert an appeal into revision, if called for, can be exercised if the considerations laid down under section 115 of the Code are satisfied. The judicial enunciations as noticed hereinabove, therefore, proclaim in clear terms that the power of conversion, inherent though, has to be exercised on some well founded principles to prevent the abuse of the process of the court and in the interest of justice. As noticed hereinabove, the order impugned in the comprehension of this court, does not suffer from any legal or jurisdictional infirmity. The cause shown by the revision petitioner has been examined exhaustively and the reasons in support of the conclusions cannot be denounced as perverse, irrational or in defiance of logic. No illegality or lack of jurisdiction of the learned trial court is decipherable. In the above view of the matter, this court is not persuaded to accede to the prayer for conversion of the present revision petition into one of appeal. On a totality of the considerations as above, this revision petition fails and is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.