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2010 DIGILAW 600 (ORI)

SRI JAGDISH RAI PURI v. STATE OF ORISSA

2010-08-20

S.C.PARIJA, V.GOPALA GOWDA

body2010
JUDGMENT : S.C. Parija, J. - This writ petition is directed against the order dated 28.1.2010 passed by the Special Secretary to Government, G.A. Department, (Annexure-5), refusing to grant permission for transfer of Plot No. 5/B, measuring 100' x 109' near Raj Bhawan, Unit-VIII, Bhubaneswar, in favour of petitioner and allowing transfer of the same in favour of opposite party no. 4. 2. The brief facts of the case is that Plot No. 5/B, measuring 100' x 109' near Raj Bhawan, Unit-VIII, Bhubaneswar, was originally leased out in favour of one Major Balakrishna Sharma by the erstwhile Political & Services Department, Government of Orissa, in the year 1967. Major Sharma transferred the aforesaid plot of land in favour of Late Epari Bhaskar Patra (father of present opposite parties 2 and 3) on 17.7.1975, after obtaining due permission from the State Government. On 17.7.1979 Late E.B. Patra applied to the State Government for granting him necessary permission to transfer the said plot of land in favour of present petitioner and an agreement for sale was executed between the petitioner and Late E.B. Patra at Bhubaneswar, wherein price of the property was fixed at Rs. 1,30,000/- and as per the terms and conditions of the agreement, Late E.B. Patra received Rs. 11,000/- as advance and balance consideration amount of Rs. 1,19,000/- was to be paid at the time of registration. As Late E.B. Patra did not comply with the terms and conditions of the agreement for sale, the petitioner filed O.S. No. 76 of 1980-I before the Sub-Judge, Bhubaneswar, for specific performance of contract. The said suit filed by the petitioner was decreed in part, holding that the petitioner is entitled to damages in lieu of specific performance. This judgment and decree of the Sub-Judge, Bhubaneswar, passed in O.S. No. 76 of 1980-I was challenged by the petitioner before this Court in F.A. No. 348 of 1984, which was disposed of by this Court by order dated 30.8.1994, by passing the following decree: The appeal is allowed with cost. The judgment of the trial Court rejecting the prayer for specific performance of contract of sale is set aside and the plaintiff's suit for specific performance of contract of sale is decreed. The judgment of the trial Court rejecting the prayer for specific performance of contract of sale is set aside and the plaintiff's suit for specific performance of contract of sale is decreed. The defendant will submit application to the appropriate functionary of the State Government seeking permission for sale of the suit property to the plaintiff within two months and on obtaining such permission shall execute the sale deed within a month of receipt of permission. The decretal dues of the Life Insurance Corporation against the defendant shall be paid out of the sum of Rs. 1,34,502.32 which is stated to have been deposited by the plaintiff in the trial Court. If any further sum is required for clearing the decreetal dues, the plaintiff will deposit the same. If the defendant fails to apply or to execute the sale deed, the learned sub-ordinate Judge will take necessary steps in the matter if the State Government refuses to accord permission for the sale, the plaintiff will be entitled to receive damages of Rs. 22,000/- as stipulated in the agreement with interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of institution of the suit. 3. In the meantime on 10.01.1991, Late E.B. Patra (father of present opposite parties 2 and 3) entered into an agreement for sale in respect of the self-same plot of land with M/s Indian Charge Chrome Ltd.-opposite party no. 4 for a consideration amount of Rs. 15.00 lakhs. On payment of Rs. 14.00 lakhs as advance, the said opposite party no. 4 took over possession of the land in question. Thereafter, basing on a irrevocable Power-of-Attorney granted by Late E.B. Patra, the opposite party no. 4 constructed a building over the said land for housing of its executives. Subsequently, opposite party no. 4 filed Title Suit No. 341 of 1993 before the Sub-Judge, Bhubaneswar, for specific performance of contract against Late E.B. Patra and the State Government, wherein the present petitioner was impleaded as a party. The said suit of the opposite party no. 4 was decreed on 20.3.2003 for specific performance of the agreement for sale. During pendency of Title Suit No. 341 of 1993, opposite party no. The said suit of the opposite party no. 4 was decreed on 20.3.2003 for specific performance of the agreement for sale. During pendency of Title Suit No. 341 of 1993, opposite party no. 4 filed another suit, i.e. Title Suit No. 354 of 1997 with a prayer to declare the decree dated 30.8.1984 passed by this Court in F.A. No. 348 of 1994 as not binding on them, which was dismissed by the Sub-Judge, Bhubaneswar, by judgment dated 26.7.2003. Against the said judgment, opposite party no. 4 filed R.F.A. No. 172 of 2003, which is pending in this Court. After entering into the agreement for sale in respect of the plot of land in question with opposite party no. 4 and handing over physical possession, Late E.B. Patra applied to the State Government for permission to transfer the said land to the opposite party no. 4. The State Government in the G.A. Department by letter no. 5939, dated 4.5.1996 informed Late E.B. Patra that the permission for sale of the plot of land in question could not be granted in favour of any one except the present petitioner, in view of the decree of this Court passed in F.A. No. 348 of 1984 and accordingly the request for grant of permission to transfer the land in favour of opposite party no. 4 was refused. The said fact was also intimated to the petitioner vide letter no. 5940 dated 4.5.1996 (Annexure-6). 4. The petitioner filed execution proceeding No. 44 of 1996 before the Sub-Judge, Bhubaneswar, seeking execution of the decree dated 30.8.1994, passed by this Court in F.A. No. 348 of 1984. The executing Court directed the State Government either to grant or refuse permission for transfer of the case land in favour of the petitioner within a stipulated period, as per the direction of this Court in F.A. No. 348 of 1984. The executing Court also observed that in case the State Government refused to accord permission for sale of the said plot of land to the petitioner, he will be entitled to receive damages of Rs. 22,000/- with interest ' 9% per annum, as mentioned in the agreement. The executing Court also observed that in case the State Government refused to accord permission for sale of the said plot of land to the petitioner, he will be entitled to receive damages of Rs. 22,000/- with interest ' 9% per annum, as mentioned in the agreement. In pursuance of the order of the executing Court, the State Government refused to grant permission for transfer of the plot of land in question in favour of the petitioner by its order dated 23.12.1998, which was duly communicated to the executing Court. Accordingly, the executing Court by its order dated 21.1.1999 directed payment of all damages by Late E.B. Patra to the petitioner in accordance with the judgment and decree passed in F.A. No. 348 of 1984. 5. The petitioner assailed the aforesaid order of the State Government dated 23.12.1998, refusing to grant of permission for transfer of the plot of land in his favour in O.J.C. No. 10072 of 2000, which was disposed of by this Court by order dated 31.7.2002, directing the State Government for fresh consideration of the request made by the executing Court regarding grant of permission for sale of the land in question in favour of the petitioner, after giving opportunity of hearing the parties. The Special Secretary to Government, G.A. Department, vide order dated 23.5.2003 again refused permission for transfer of the said land to the petitioner on the ground that Late E.B. Patra having allowed opposite party no. 4 to take possession of the land in question and construct a building over the same for commercial purpose in violation of the terms of the lease, he cannot be permitted to transfer the case land to the petitioner and that the State Government would consider resuming back the plot from Late E.B. Patra. 6. The said order of refusal of the State Government dated 23.5.2003 was challenged by the petitioner before this Court in W.P.(C) No. 7230 of 2003. This Court after detailed discussion of the back ground facts, vide judgment 8.10.2004, came to hold that the reasons assigned in the order of refusal was not proper and justified. The relevant findings are extracted below: There was an agreement between opposite party no. 1 and the petitioner for transfer of the case land and basing on that agreement the competent Court granted the decree directing opposite party no. 1 to perform his part of the contract. The relevant findings are extracted below: There was an agreement between opposite party no. 1 and the petitioner for transfer of the case land and basing on that agreement the competent Court granted the decree directing opposite party no. 1 to perform his part of the contract. Because opposite party no. 1 did not cooperate, the Court asked the Government in G.A. Department to consider grant of permission in favour of the petitioner so that deed of transfer would be executed by the Court. Initially, the Government indicated that such permission is implied and asked the petitioner to get the sale deed registered so that his name can be mutated against the case plot. Then at a later stage, permission was refused by the G.A. Department with observation that opposite party no. 1 is asking for permission to sell the case plot to different persons and had recently applied for permission to sell the case land to opposite party no. 3. Now, in the impugned order, permission for transfer of the land in favour of the petitioner has been refused on the plea that opposite party no. 1 has violated the terms of the lease by allowing opposite party no. 3 to construct a commercial building on the plot. From these orders, it appears that permission was not refused for any fault or lapse on the part of the petitioner. It is to be noted that the petitioner entered into a valid agreement and also obtained valid decree from the competent Court and in course of execution of that decree, the Court requested the Government in G.A. Department to accord or refuse permission in favour of the petitioner. In that situation, the Government being a public authority was required to use discretion in a rational, judicious, fair and just manner. If the petitioner would have committed any error, irregularity or illegality or made collusion with opposite party no. 1 or would have violated any of the terms of the lease, then refusal of permission for transfer of the case land in favour of the petitioner would have been reasonable and fair. But it appears that for the violations committed by opposite party nos. 1 or would have violated any of the terms of the lease, then refusal of permission for transfer of the case land in favour of the petitioner would have been reasonable and fair. But it appears that for the violations committed by opposite party nos. 1 and 3, permission in favour of the petitioner has been refused, if such decision of the-State is accepted as fair and reasonable, then every unscrupulous seller would enter into collusion with a third party and deprive the rightful purchaser or decree holder from obtaining a rightful permission for transfer of the lease land in his favour. Here, opposite party no. 3 entered into an agreement subsequently and basing on that agreement, it constructed a commercial complex without obtaining permission or clearance from the Government. To cover up its lapses it also got a decree in the year 2003 from the Additional District Judge, Bhubaneswar, directing opposite party No. 1 to execute the sale deed in favour of opposite party no. 3, without bringing the previous developments to the notice of that Court. Now, for all these anti-actions of opposite party no. 3, it is not expected of the Government to refuse permission for transfer of the case land in favour of the petitioner, who has got a valid decree of a competent Court. It is worthwhile to note that because opposite party no. 1 did not perform his part of the contract and did not abide by the direction of the Court, the executing Court had to write to the State Government for granting or refusing the permission for transfer of the case plot in favour of the petitioner. Accordingly, this Court directed the State Government to accord necessary permission for transfer of the land in question in favour of the petitioner within a period of two months and thereafter Late E.B. Patra will execute the deed of transfer in favour of the petitioner within a period of one month from the date of grant of such permission by the State Government and if Late E.B. Patra fails to execute the deed of transfer, the executing Court would execute the deed of transfer in respect of the case land. This Court further directed that the valuation of the construction made on the case land by opposite party no. This Court further directed that the valuation of the construction made on the case land by opposite party no. 4 shall be made by the Executive Engineer, C.P.W.D. and the value so determined will be intimated to the petitioner, who shall pay the same by way of bank draft within six months of such intimation, failing which, the petitioner shall sell the said land to opposite party no. 4 at the current market price to be determined by the Collector, Khurda, after obtaining permission from the State Government. 7. Opposite party no. 4 assailed the judgment of this Court dated 8.10.2004 passed in W.P.(C) No. 7230 of 2003 before the apex Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 7934 and 7935 of 2004. The Hon'ble Court while agreeing with the findings of this Court that the order of the State Government dated 23.5.2003 refusing permission was unsustainable, was of the opinion that this Court should not have directed the State Government to execute the deed of transfer in favour of the petitioner. Instead, this Court should have remitted the matter back to the State Government for deciding the application seeking permission to transfer the said land afresh on relevant considerations. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vide order dated 03.12.2008 modified the judgment of this Court to that extent and remitted the matter to the State Government to decide the application seeking permission to transfer the said land afresh in accordance with law, after hearing the parties concerned. 8. Pursuant to the order of the Supreme Court dated 03.12.2008, the State Government-opposite party no. 1 by order dated 28.1.2010 has allowed the prayer of Late E.B. Patra for transfer of the said land in favour of opposite party no. 4 and by implication has rejected the application seeking transfer of the said land in favour of the petitioner, which is now the subject matter of challenge in this writ petition. 9. The petitioner who appeared in person submitted in view of the background facts as detailed above and the judgment of this Court dated 8.10.2004 passed in W.P.(C) No. 7230 of 2003, there was no scope for the State Government to refuse permission for transfer of the said plot of land to the petitioner and allow the same in favour of opposite party no. 4. 4. It is further submitted that the impugned order of refusal of permission (Annexure-5) does not contain any reason whatsoever for not granting permission for transfer of the land in question to the petitioner and allowing transfer of land in favour of opposite party no. 4. In this regard, it is submitted that as the apex Court had modified the judgment of this Court passed in W.P.(C) No. 7230 of 2003 to the limited extent and remitted the matter to the State Government for deciding the application seeking permission to transfer the land in question to the petitioner on relevant considerations and in accordance with law, it was incumbent on the part of the State Government to consider the matter afresh, keeping in view the findings and observation of this Court in W.P.(C) No. 7230 of 2003, which has not been done. The petitioner alleged malafides against the State for having conveniently ignored its earlier decision, as communicated vide letter nos. 5939 and 5940, both dated 04.5.1996, wherein the permission sought for in favour of opposite party no. 4 had been rejected and also the subsequent order dated 23.5.2003, wherein permission was refused by the State Government on the ground that Late E.B. Patra had allowed opposite party no. 4 to take possession of the said land and construct a building over the same for commercial purpose in violation of the terms of the lease. 10. The State Government-opposite party no. 1 has not filed any counter affidavit in this case. On being asked as to what are the reasons for rejecting the application seeking permission for transfer of the land in question to the petitioner, learned Government Advocate fairly conceded that no such clear and specific reasons have been recorded in the impugned order, however, in support of the impugned order, he submitted that the State Government has considered all aspects of the matter and has decided to allow transfer of the land in question in favour of opposite party no. 4. 11. Mr. Chatterjee, learned Senior Counsel appearing for opposite party no. 4 vehemently submitted that as the writ petition has been filed purportedly under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and a prayer has been made seeking quashing of the impugned order (Annexure-5), the same cannot be allowed. 4. 11. Mr. Chatterjee, learned Senior Counsel appearing for opposite party no. 4 vehemently submitted that as the writ petition has been filed purportedly under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and a prayer has been made seeking quashing of the impugned order (Annexure-5), the same cannot be allowed. It is submitted that this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction cannot sit in appeal over the impugned order passed by opposite party no. 1, granting permission for transfer of the case land in favour of opposite party no. 4. In this regard, reliance has been placed upon a decision of the apex Court in the case of Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai and Others, 12. On the merits of the case, learned Senior Counsel appearing for opposite party no. 4 submits that though the impugned order may not have been correctly written or happily worded, it cannot be said that the same is without any reasons, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. In this regard, opposite party no. 4 has specifically referred to paragraphs. 22, 23, 24 and 25 of the impugned order, to show that some reasons have been assigned in support of the decision of the State Government to grant permission for transfer of the case land in favour of opposite party no. 4. It is further submitted that pursuant to the impugned order of opposite party no. 1 dated 28.1.2010 and during pendency of this writ petition, the plot of land in question has already been transferred in favour of opposite party no. 4 and accordingly a Tripartite Deed has been executed between the parties and registered on 19.7.2010, copy of which was filed. 13. As regards the first contention of learned Senior Counsel for opposite party no. 4. regarding maintainability of the writ petition, we find no substance in the same. It is now well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party prior to invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief. xx xx xx (See Shangrila Food Products Ltd. and another Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and another, ). 14. Once the Court is satisfied about arbitrariness and injustice, then no restrictions or rule can stand in the way of this Court for rendering justice in exercise of discretionary and supervisory jurisdictions. The power of Courts is not confined to the prerogative writs or the order asked for by the petitioner, but it has the discretion to frame a proper order which would suit the exigencies of the case before the Court. The approach of the writ Court in moulding relief, where such a relief is available in law, has been liberal and never hyper-technical. Relief cannot be denied for inartistic or defective prayer made in the writ petition or for furnishing wrong nomenclature and the Court should weigh the equitable realities of the situation. 15. In Surya Dev Rai's case (supra), the Supreme Court while considering the difference between the Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, observed as under: 22. Article 227 of the Constitution confers on every High Court the power of superintendence over all Courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction excepting any Court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the armed forces. Without prejudice to the generality of such power the High Court has been conferred with certain specific powers by sub-articles (2) and (3) of Article 227 with which we are not concerned here at. It is well settled that the power of superintendence so conferred on the High Court is administrative as well as judicial and is capable of being invoked at the instance of any person aggrieved or may even be exercises suo motu. The paramount consideration behind vesting such wide power of superintendence in the High Court is paving the path of justice and removing any obstacles therein. The paramount consideration behind vesting such wide power of superintendence in the High Court is paving the path of justice and removing any obstacles therein. The power under Article 227 is wider than the one conferred on the High Court by Article 226 in the sense that the power of superintendence is not subject to those technicalities of procedure or traditional fetters which are to be found in certiorari jurisdiction. Else the parameters invoking the exercise of power are almost similar. 23. The history of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, and how the jurisdiction has culminated into its present shape under Article 227 of the Constitution, was traced in Waryam Singh and Another Vs. Amarnath and Another. The jurisdiction can be traced back to Section 15 of High Courts Act, 1861 which gave a power of judicial superintendence to the High Court apart from and independently of the provisions of other laws conferring revisional jurisdiction on the High Court. Section 107 of the Government of India Act 1915 and then Section 224 of the Government of India Act 1935, were similarly worded and reproduced the predecessor provision. However, sub-section (2) was added in Section 224 which confined the jurisdiction of the High Court to such judgments of the inferior courts which were not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. That restriction has not been carried forwarded in Article 227 of the Constitution. In that sense Article 227 of the Constitution has width and vigour unprecedented. Difference between a writ of certiorari under Article 226 and supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. 24. The difference between Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was well brought out in Umaji Keshao Meshram and Others Vs. Radhikabai and Another. Proceedings under Article 226 are in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court while proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution are not original but only supervisory. Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 excepting that the power of superintendence has been extended by this Article to tribunals as well. Though the power is akin to that of an ordinary Court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate Courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. Though the power is akin to that of an ordinary Court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate Courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the Court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercise in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction. 25. Upon a review of decided cases and a survey of the occasions wherein the High Courts have exercised jurisdiction to command a writ of certiorari or to exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in the given facts and circumstances in a variety of cases, it seems that the distinction between the two jurisdictions stands almost obliterated in practice. Probably, this is the reason why it has become customary with the lawyers labeling their petitions as one common under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, though such practice has been deprecated in some judicial pronouncement. Without entering into niceties and technicality of the subject, we venture to state the broad general difference between the two jurisdictions. Firstly, the writ of certiorari is an exercise of its original jurisdiction by the High Court; exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is not an original jurisdiction and in this sense it is akin to appellate revisional or corrective jurisdiction. Secondly, in a writ of certiorari, the record of the proceedings having been certified and sent up by the inferior Court or tribunal to the High Court, the High Court if inclined to exercise its jurisdiction, may simply annul or quash the proceedings and then do no more. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only quash or set aside the impugned proceedings, judgment or order but it may also make such directions as the facts and circumstances of the case may warrant, may be by way of guiding the inferior Court or tribunal as to the manner in which it would not proceed further or afresh as commended to or guided by the High Court. In appropriate case the High Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, may substitute such a decision of its own in place of the impugned decision, as the inferior Court or tribunal should have made. Lastly, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is capable of being exercised on a prayer made by or on behalf of the party aggrieved; the supervisory jurisdiction is capable of being exercised suo motu as well. 16. Coming to the merits of the case, from the impugned order (Annexure-5), we find that no reasons have been assigned to show as to why the permission for transfer of the land in question in favour of the petitioner was refused and as to why the same has been allowed in favour of opposite party no. 4. As claimed by learned counsel for opposite party no. 4., the purported findings of the State Government as recorded in paragraphs 22, 23, 24 and 25 of the impugned order reads as under: 22. It reveals that there was an agreement between Late E.B. Patra and Sri J.R. Rai Puri for transfer of the case land. Mr. Puri's suit for specific performance of contract has finally landed him no where in getting the permission in favour of his vendor to execute the deed of sale in his favour. Now he has no decree or Court order as such with him for getting the agreement for sale in his favour, specifically enforced after permission, if any, nor for grant of permission. His litigations have met their end passing through the events and results thereof which are as under: Suit's judgments and decree which ultimately merged with that passed in appeal carried by Mr. Puri puts no fetter on the State Government to decide the matter of grant of permission when it says that; If the State Government refuses to accord permission for the sale, the Plaintiff (Mr. Puri) will be entitled to receive damage of Rs. 22,000/- as stipulated in the agreement ' 9% per annum from the date of suit. 23. When the order pursed by the Executing Court was challenged in writ (later on converted to revision), the Hon'ble High Court did not grant the relief in the form of a direction to the Executing Court to finalise the sale deed in favour of Mr. Puri. 23. When the order pursed by the Executing Court was challenged in writ (later on converted to revision), the Hon'ble High Court did not grant the relief in the form of a direction to the Executing Court to finalise the sale deed in favour of Mr. Puri. The Revisional Court rather declined to dwell upon the question as to whether the refusal of State Government for grant of permission in the meantime was valid or not and the matter was left open to be decided by appropriate forum if such relief was sought for. 24. At the same time IMFA's contentions that it had entered into an agreement bonafide at a stage when there was no litigation pending and that too without being aware of prior agreement or decision was also not taken into consideration since they had filed two suits to be decided by competent Court as per law. The execution case by then having been dismissed, it was observed that if at all fresh execution case was filed, the executing Court would render decision as to whether it would await the decision of Civil Court in suits of IMFA. Thereafter on 21.1.99, the Executing Court on being informed about refusal for permission, directed Judgment Debtor (Mr. Patra) to pay compensation. On State's refusal to grant permission though, Mr. Puri filed the writ. There was an order for reconsideration and that order was not interfered with until the matter come before the Hon'ble Apex Court. Lastly Mr. Puri had the order in writ in his favour so far as grant of permission for sale of land to him is concerned, but that order now stands set aside. Hence the matter is before the State for consideration for permission. It is further seen that no fresh execution case was filed by Mr. Puri nor did he take any step to restore the earlier filed execution case. In the meantime, the suit filed by ICCL (IMFA), i.e. T.S. No. 341/93 wherein Mr. Puri was a party along with the State and others has been decreed for specific performance of agreement in their favour and that having gone unchallenged has reached its finality. The said judgment runs as under:- The Defendant No. 1 (Mr. In the meantime, the suit filed by ICCL (IMFA), i.e. T.S. No. 341/93 wherein Mr. Puri was a party along with the State and others has been decreed for specific performance of agreement in their favour and that having gone unchallenged has reached its finality. The said judgment runs as under:- The Defendant No. 1 (Mr. Patra) is directed to execute and register the sale deed in respect of the suit property after obtaining necessary permission from the Government (Defendant No. 2) within a period of three months failing which the Plaintiff (ICCL) will be at liberty to make the registration of the land through due process of law. 25. The decree passed in T.S. No. 341/93 is executable and the period for the same has not expired as per law. 17. On a perusal of the aforesaid paragraphs of the impugned order, we find that no reasons whatsoever have been assigned therein for refusing permission for transfer of the land in question to the petitioner and allowing such transfer in favour of opposite party no. 4. It is now a well-settled proposition of law that an order passed by a public authority exercising administrative/executive of statutory powers must be judged by the reasons stated in the order. The legal position in this regard is settled by the decision of the apex Court in Commissioner of Police, Bombay Vs. Gordhandas Bhanji wherein the Hon'ble Court observed: Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be constructed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. The aforesaid position of law has been reiterated by a recent decision of the apex Court in East Coast Railway and another -vrs.- Mahadev Appa Rao and others, AIR 2010 SCW 4210 . 18. Even in respect of administrative orders, Lord Denning, M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engg. Union observed (All ER p. 1154h) : The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration'. 18. Even in respect of administrative orders, Lord Denning, M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engg. Union observed (All ER p. 1154h) : The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration'. In Alexander Machinery (Dubley) Ltd. v. Crabtree it was observed: Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision-taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the 'inscrutable face of the sphinx', it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reasons is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system, reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter before Court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking-out the 'inscrutable face of a sphinx' is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance. (See- State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Manoj Kumar @ Chhotu, . 19. Moreover, the impugned order on the face of it, appears to have been passed in complete disregard of the findings and observations recorded in the judgment dated 8.10.2004 passed in W.P.(C) No. 7230 of 2003, wherein this Court with reference to the order of rejection dated 23.5.2003, impugned therein, had come to find that the State Government had refused permission on the ground that late E.B. Patra had violated the terms of clause 2 (xiv) of the lease, which puts an embargo that the lessee shall not use the land for any purpose other than the purpose for which it was allotted, except with the consent/ leave of the State Government. The State Government had observed that as Late E.B. Patra had allowed opposite party no. 4 to take possession of the case land and construct a building over the same for commercial purpose, in violation of clause 2 (xiv) of the lease, he cannot be permitted to transfer the case land to the petitioner and the State Government would consider resuming back the case land from Late E.B. Patra. 4 to take possession of the case land and construct a building over the same for commercial purpose, in violation of clause 2 (xiv) of the lease, he cannot be permitted to transfer the case land to the petitioner and the State Government would consider resuming back the case land from Late E.B. Patra. This Court accordingly found that the refusal of permission for transfer of the case land to the petitioner was not proper and justified, especially when the petitioner had not committed any error, irregularity or illegality or had colluded with Late E.B. Patra for violation of any terms of the lease. 20. We are surprised to note that while in the earlier order of rejection dated 23.5.2005 the State Government had declined permission for transfer of the case land to the petitioner on the plea that Late E.B. Patra had violated the terms of the lease by allowing the present opposite party no. 4 to construct a commercial building on the land in question, in violation of the terms of the same, the said authority has now done a volte-face and has proceeded to grant permission for allotment of the land in favour of said opposite party no. 4. This, in our considered view, amounts to arbitrary and improper exercise of executive power by the State. By the impugned order allowing transfer of the land in question in favour of opposite party no. 4, the State Government while denying the rightful claim of the petitioner, has rewarded the opposite party no. 4 for colluding with Late E.B. Patra and violating the terms of the lease and also in regularizing the illegal constructions made over the said land by the opposite party no. 4. 21. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order dated 28.01.2010 (Annexure-5) allowing transfer of the land in question in favour of opposite party no. 4 and the consequent Tripartite Deed dated 19.7.2010 executed between the opposite parties are quashed. The matter is remitted back to opposite party no. 1 to consider the same afresh, after providing opportunity of hearing to the parties. The authority while disposing of the matter, shall keep in view the findings and observations of this Court recorded in the judgment dated 8.10.2004 in W.P.(C) No. 7230 of 2003, as indicated above and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. The exercise shall be completed by opposite party no. The authority while disposing of the matter, shall keep in view the findings and observations of this Court recorded in the judgment dated 8.10.2004 in W.P.(C) No. 7230 of 2003, as indicated above and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. The exercise shall be completed by opposite party no. 1 within two months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No costs. V. Gopala Gowda, CJ. 22. I agree. Final Result : Allowed