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Uttarakhand High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 608 (UTT)

RANI DEVI v. RAKAM SINGH

2010-08-26

TARUN AGARWALA

body2010
JUDGMENT Heard Shri Siddhartha Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Lok Pal Singh, the learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The petitioner is the landlord and had filed the suit for eviction u/S 20(2)(c) and (d) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 alleging therein that the tenant was not only in arrears of rent but also made material alterations in the building in question which was resulted in diminishing the value of the building. The tenant resisted the suit and contended that the building was letout not only for residential purposes but also for business purposes and that he had not made any material alterations and, that the constructions raised in the open space were only temporary in nature. 3. The trial court, after considering the evidence, held that the building was let out only for residential purposes and that the tenant had made material alterations in the open space by making construction for keeping the fodder and water for the cattle and was illegally using it for dairy business. The trial court, consequently, held that the tenant was using the premises which was inconsistent with the usage of the property and that the alterations made by the tenant had diminished the value of the building. The trial court, accordingly, decreed the suit. The tenant, being aggrieved, filed a revision u/S 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 4. The revisional court allowed the revision and set aside the order of the trial court and further dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. The revisional court held that the building was not only let out for residential purposes but was also let out for business purposes right from the very inception and that the structural alterations made in the open space did not diminish the value of the building and, consequently, allowed the revision and dismissed the suit. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the order of the revisional court, has filed the present writ petition. 5. Heard Shri Siddhartha Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Lok Pal Singh, the learned counsel for the respondents. 6. The only ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the revisional court had transgressed its powers which were conferred u/S 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 5. Heard Shri Siddhartha Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Lok Pal Singh, the learned counsel for the respondents. 6. The only ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the revisional court had transgressed its powers which were conferred u/S 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The learned counsel submitted that the powers given u/S 25 of the Act confers only a supervisory power and not an appellate power and that the revisional court was only required to see that the decree, if any, was according to law. The learned counsel submitted that if the revisional court found that the decree was not according to law, it could have set aside the decree and remitted the matter back to the trial court for a decision afresh but had no power or jurisdiction to reassess or re-appraise the evidence which in the present case had been done. The learned counsel accordingly submitted that the order of the revisional court was patently erroneous and was liable to be quashed. In support of his submission, the learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Laxmi Kishore and another vs. Har Prasad Shukla, 1981 ARC 541 and also placed reliance upon another decision of the Allahabad High Court in Om Prakash and others Vs. IInd Additional District Judge, Saharanpur and others, 2000 (2) ARC 739, wherein the Court held that the revisional court u/S 25 of the Act had no power to examine de novo findings of fact reached by the trial court nor had any power to examine and scrutinize the evidence meticulously to decide whether finding of fact arrived at by the courts below was justified by the evidence on record or not. The court further held that the revisional court could only point out the legal error committed by the trial court by recording a finding of fact and the revisional court could rectify the defect and interfere in a finding of fact so permissible if it suffered from the defect of non-consideration of vital and material evidence. 7. Having considered the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the court finds that the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner, though attractive, was patently erroneous. 7. Having considered the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the court finds that the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner, though attractive, was patently erroneous. The Supreme Court in the case of Shyam Lal vs. Rasool Ahmed, (2002) 9 SCC 499 held that the powers of a court u/S 25 of the Act was not so limited as it may be u/S 115 of the C.P.C. The Supreme Court further held that where the revisional court assigns convincing reasons for arriving at a finding different from the one arrived at by the trial court and, on the material available on record, the revisional court in such circumstances was validly justified in interfering with the findings of fact arrived at by the trial court. In Laxmi Kishore and another (supra), the Division Bench of the Allahabad held that the court deciding the revision u/S 25 of the Act has to satisfy itself that the decree or order of the trial court was according to law and if it finds that there was no evidence to sustain the finding on a particular issue of fact, it could ignore that finding but had no power to reassess and re-appraise the evidence in order to determine an issue of fact. 8. In the light of the aforesaid, the learned counsel for the petitioner tried to impress upon the court that the revisional court exceeded its jurisdiction in reappraising the evidence while coming to a conclusion that the premise in question was not let out for residential purpose and that, in fact, it was let out for residential as well as business purposes. 9. Having perused the order of the trial court as well as of the revisional court, this Court is not inclined to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner as it finds that the order of the trial court that the building was let out for residential purposes was based on no evidence. The court finds that there was no evidence to sustain the finding that the building was let out for residential purposes and, consequently, that finding can be totally ignored. The court finds that there was no evidence to sustain the finding that the building was let out for residential purposes and, consequently, that finding can be totally ignored. The revisional court held that on the basis of the rent note, it could not be deciphered that the building was let out for residential or for non residential purposes and, consequently, the finding given by the trial court on this issue was perverse based on no evidence. The revisional court thereafter concluded on the basis of the material evidence on record that the building was let out for both the purposes right from its very inception. 10. In view of the aforesaid, the revisional court concluded that there was no inconsistent use made by the tenant since the property was let out for residential and non residential purposes and also came to the conclusion that there was no structural alterations made by the tenant which would diminish the value of the building. In my opinion, the said findings are findings of fact which cannot be interfered in a writ jurisdiction. The submission that the revisional court has exceeded its power u/S 25 of the Act is patently erroneous. 11. For the reasons stated aforesaid, the court does not find any merit in the writ petition and is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost. JUDGMENT Heard Shri Siddhartha Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Lok Pal Singh, the learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The petitioner is the landlord and had filed the suit for eviction u/S 20(2)(c) and (d) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 alleging therein that the tenant was not only in arrears of rent but also made material alterations in the building in question which was resulted in diminishing the value of the building. The tenant resisted the suit and contended that the building was letout not only for residential purposes but also for business purposes and that he had not made any material alterations and, that the constructions raised in the open space were only temporary in nature. 3. The tenant resisted the suit and contended that the building was letout not only for residential purposes but also for business purposes and that he had not made any material alterations and, that the constructions raised in the open space were only temporary in nature. 3. The trial court, after considering the evidence, held that the building was let out only for residential purposes and that the tenant had made material alterations in the open space by making construction for keeping the fodder and water for the cattle and was illegally using it for dairy business. The trial court, consequently, held that the tenant was using the premises which was inconsistent with the usage of the property and that the alterations made by the tenant had diminished the value of the building. The trial court, accordingly, decreed the suit. The tenant, being aggrieved, filed a revision u/S 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 4. The revisional court allowed the revision and set aside the order of the trial court and further dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. The revisional court held that the building was not only let out for residential purposes but was also let out for business purposes right from the very inception and that the structural alterations made in the open space did not diminish the value of the building and, consequently, allowed the revision and dismissed the suit. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the order of the revisional court, has filed the present writ petition. 5. Heard Shri Siddhartha Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Lok Pal Singh, the learned counsel for the respondents. 6. The only ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the revisional court had transgressed its powers which were conferred u/S 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The learned counsel submitted that the powers given u/S 25 of the Act confers only a supervisory power and not an appellate power and that the revisional court was only required to see that the decree, if any, was according to law. The learned counsel submitted that the powers given u/S 25 of the Act confers only a supervisory power and not an appellate power and that the revisional court was only required to see that the decree, if any, was according to law. The learned counsel submitted that if the revisional court found that the decree was not according to law, it could have set aside the decree and remitted the matter back to the trial court for a decision afresh but had no power or jurisdiction to reassess or re-appraise the evidence which in the present case had been done. The learned counsel accordingly submitted that the order of the revisional court was patently erroneous and was liable to be quashed. In support of his submission, the learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Laxmi Kishore and another vs. Har Prasad Shukla, 1981 ARC 541 and also placed reliance upon another decision of the Allahabad High Court in Om Prakash and others Vs. IInd Additional District Judge, Saharanpur and others, 2000 (2) ARC 739, wherein the Court held that the revisional court u/S 25 of the Act had no power to examine de novo findings of fact reached by the trial court nor had any power to examine and scrutinize the evidence meticulously to decide whether finding of fact arrived at by the courts below was justified by the evidence on record or not. The court further held that the revisional court could only point out the legal error committed by the trial court by recording a finding of fact and the revisional court could rectify the defect and interfere in a finding of fact so permissible if it suffered from the defect of non-consideration of vital and material evidence. 7. Having considered the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the court finds that the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner, though attractive, was patently erroneous. 7. Having considered the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the court finds that the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner, though attractive, was patently erroneous. The Supreme Court in the case of Shyam Lal vs. Rasool Ahmed, (2002) 9 SCC 499 held that the powers of a court u/S 25 of the Act was not so limited as it may be u/S 115 of the C.P.C. The Supreme Court further held that where the revisional court assigns convincing reasons for arriving at a finding different from the one arrived at by the trial court and, on the material available on record, the revisional court in such circumstances was validly justified in interfering with the findings of fact arrived at by the trial court. In Laxmi Kishore and another (supra), the Division Bench of the Allahabad held that the court deciding the revision u/S 25 of the Act has to satisfy itself that the decree or order of the trial court was according to law and if it finds that there was no evidence to sustain the finding on a particular issue of fact, it could ignore that finding but had no power to reassess and re-appraise the evidence in order to determine an issue of fact. 8. In the light of the aforesaid, the learned counsel for the petitioner tried to impress upon the court that the revisional court exceeded its jurisdiction in reappraising the evidence while coming to a conclusion that the premise in question was not let out for residential purpose and that, in fact, it was let out for residential as well as business purposes. 9. Having perused the order of the trial court as well as of the revisional court, this Court is not inclined to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner as it finds that the order of the trial court that the building was let out for residential purposes was based on no evidence. The court finds that there was no evidence to sustain the finding that the building was let out for residential purposes and, consequently, that finding can be totally ignored. The court finds that there was no evidence to sustain the finding that the building was let out for residential purposes and, consequently, that finding can be totally ignored. The revisional court held that on the basis of the rent note, it could not be deciphered that the building was let out for residential or for non residential purposes and, consequently, the finding given by the trial court on this issue was perverse based on no evidence. The revisional court thereafter concluded on the basis of the material evidence on record that the building was let out for both the purposes right from its very inception. 10. In view of the aforesaid, the revisional court concluded that there was no inconsistent use made by the tenant since the property was let out for residential and non residential purposes and also came to the conclusion that there was no structural alterations made by the tenant which would diminish the value of the building. In my opinion, the said findings are findings of fact which cannot be interfered in a writ jurisdiction. The submission that the revisional court has exceeded its power u/S 25 of the Act is patently erroneous. 11. For the reasons stated aforesaid, the court does not find any merit in the writ petition and is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost.