ORDER: 1. The cases on hand project another facet of reservations to Backward Classes in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The Legislature of the State of Andhra Pradesh has enacted “The Andhra Pradesh Reservation in favour of Socially and Educationally Backward Classes of Muslims Act, 2007” (A.P. Act 26 of 2007) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 2007 Act’) for providing reservations to the extent of 4% of total seats to backward classes among Muslims in the matter of admissions in educational institutions and in public employment for their upliftment. We, therefore, feel it expedient to briefly trace the history of reservations in the State. Background of reservations in Andhra Pradesh 2. Even before the State of Andhra Pradesh had been formed, reservations to backward classes in educational institutions and in public services had been provided under G.O. Ms. No. 110 dated 30th May, 1953 to 112 Castes by the State of Nizam. In the year 1963, when the State of Andhra Pradesh had issued a government order providing for reservation of seats in government medical colleges, this Court had nullified the same on the ground that it was violative of Articles 15 and 29 (2) of the Constitution and it had been provided without applying the criteria laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore AIR 1963 SC 649 . Subsequently, in the year 1964, a list of 112 castes or communities were identified as backward. The validity of the said list was challenged before this Court by filing writ petitions on the ground that the list so prepared was solely on the basis of caste. The writ petitions were allowed by this Court by striking down the reservation for Backward Classes in professional colleges. The invalidation was upheld by the Honble Supreme Court in State of A.P. v. P. Sagar AIR 1968 SC 1379 . 3. Thereafter, the State of Andhra Pradesh had appointed a multi-member Commission, initially headed by Justice Manohar Prasad, former Chief Justice of this Court and subsequently by Shri Anantaraman, ICS to investigate into the claims made by certain groups claiming to be belonging to backward classes. In pursuance of the report of Anantaraman Commission, the State issued G.O.Ms.No.1793, Education Department, dated 23.9.1970 providing reservation to Backward Classes under four distinct groups viz., Group A, B, C & D with separate quota for each group. In pursuance of the report of Anantaraman Commission, the State issued G.O.Ms.No.1793, Education Department, dated 23.9.1970 providing reservation to Backward Classes under four distinct groups viz., Group A, B, C & D with separate quota for each group. However, subsequently, the government deleted two castes and added 3 more castes to the original list. The said action was challenged in this Court and the same was quashed by this Court. The Honble Supreme Court, in State of A.P. v. U.S.V. Balaram (1972) 1 SCC 660 , however, upheld the above Government Order, and the list of backward classes. 4. In 1981 – 82, Muriladhara Rao Commission had recommended that the policy of reservations should be continued for 25 years with periodic re-assessments. Muralidhara Rao Commission had also recommended that some concessions be given to Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBCs) in the State of Andhra Pradesh. 5. The issue of reservation had raised a serious controversy in 1990s which finally led to the historic Mandal Case – Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 1992 Supp. (3) SCC 217 (hereinafter referred to as “Indra Sawhney I”). The law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney I will be referred to hereinafter in the course of the judgment. 6. In 1993, the respondent Statead enacted the Andhra Pradesh Commission for Backward Classes Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as, the 1993 Act) and in the year 1994, the Andhra Pradesh Commission for Backward Classes (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Commission’) was constituted on permanent basis so as to examine the requests for inclusion of any class of citizens as a backward class in the list of backward class of citizens and to hear the complaints in relation to inclusion or exclusion of any backward class from such a list and to give suitable advice to the Government in relation thereto. 7. On 25.8.1994, the Backward Classes Welfare (P.II) Department, vide G.O.Ms.No.30, referred the requests of persons belonging to certain castes and communities, including the Muslim community, to the Commission for their inclusion in the list of Backward Classes. The same is still pending with the Commission. 8. In the year 2000, the Government of Andhra Pradesh extended the reservations, which were proposed to be implemented only for ten years initially, till the revision that might be suggested by the Commission. The same is still pending with the Commission. 8. In the year 2000, the Government of Andhra Pradesh extended the reservations, which were proposed to be implemented only for ten years initially, till the revision that might be suggested by the Commission. Pending revision by the Commission, on 4.6.2004, the respondent State, vide G.O.Ms.No.15, directed the Commissionerate of Minority Welfare to submit a report on the social, economic and educational backwardness of the Muslim community in the State so as to opine whether the community could be included in the list of backward classes so as to give them the benefit under Articles 15 (4) and 16 (4) of the Constitution. On the basis of a report dated 5.7.2004 submitted by the Commissionerate, the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.33, Backward Classes Welfare (C-2) Department, dated 12.7.2004 providing 5% reservation to the entire Muslim community in the State of Andhra Pradesh in educational institutions and public employment, over and above the reservations provided to the backward classes, by treating them as Backward Class and by including them in the existing list of Backward Classes as Category ‘E’. When the said G.O. was challenged, a Larger Bench of this Court in T. Muralidhar Rao v. State of A.P. 2004 (6) ALD 1 = 2004 (5) ALT 634 , set aside the same by holding that consultation with the Commission, before undertaking any revision of the Backward Classes List, was mandatory under the provisions of the 1993 Act and yet there was no such consultation. It was also held that in the absence of any criteria laid down for ascertaining backwardness, the entire report of the Commissionerate was bad in law and that the approach adopted by the Sate was improper and invalid. It was also held that the impugned Government Order amounted to providing reservation on the basis of religion, which is prohibited by Articles 15 (1) and 16 (2) of the Constitution. Thus, it was held that for the afore-stated and other reasons stated in the said judgment, Muslims could not have been classified as persons belonging to Backward Class either for the purpose of Article 15 (4) or 16 (4). The Government Order was struck down. 9. Thus, it was held that for the afore-stated and other reasons stated in the said judgment, Muslims could not have been classified as persons belonging to Backward Class either for the purpose of Article 15 (4) or 16 (4). The Government Order was struck down. 9. Subsequently, the matter was referred by the State to the Commission vide G.O.Ms.No.57, Backward Classes Welfare (C-2) Department, dated 18.11.2004 seeking its opinion under Section 9 (1) of the 1993 Act, whether the Muslim community could be included in the list of the Backward Classes. Basing on the recommendation by the Commission, the State issued an Ordinance dated 20.6.2005 being the A.P. Reservation of Seats in the Educational Institutions and of appointments/posts in Public Services under the Muslim Community Ordinance, 2005 declaring the whole Muslim community as backward class and providing 5% reservation to them in educational institutions and public employment. The said Ordinance was challenged before this Court and this Court, in B. Archana Reddy v. State of A.P. 2005 (6) ALD 582, declared the same as unconstitutional being violative of Articles 15 (4) and 16 (4) of the Constitution on the ground that the Muslim community as a whole, based on religion, was declared as backward class without there being any identification of the social backwardness of Muslims by the Commission. 10. The respondent State has challenged the above judgment before the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide SLP (Civil) Appeal No.7513 of 2005 and the same is pending adjudication. While so, the State again referred the matter to the Commission for identifying socially and educationally backward groups among Muslims and basing on the recommendations received from the Commission, the Legislature has enacted the 2007 Act. 11. Thus, the respondent State, as a matter of policy, had decided to provide reservation to the Muslim groups, who were socially and educationally backward and accordingly added such groups to the existing lists of Backward Classes as Group E by virtue of the impugned Act. The Writ Petitions 12. In Writ Petition No.15267 of 2007, the constitutional validity of the 2007 Act and the consequent order vide G.O.Ms.No.23, BC Welfare (C2) Department, dated 7.7.2007 issued by the respondent State have been challenged. The Writ Petitions 12. In Writ Petition No.15267 of 2007, the constitutional validity of the 2007 Act and the consequent order vide G.O.Ms.No.23, BC Welfare (C2) Department, dated 7.7.2007 issued by the respondent State have been challenged. By virtue of the impugned Act and the G.O., certain Muslim groups have been declared as socially and educationally backward and these were included in the list of Backward Classes under a separate category-E whereby they have been provided 4% reservation. The petitioners have also prayed that G.O.Ms.No.3, Backward Classes Welfare Department, dated 04.4.2006 issued by respondent No.2 be declared as arbitrary and illegal. They have further prayed for a direction to respondent No.2 and the Commission for excluding the creamy layer by fixing criteria and for carrying out a revision of the lists as per Section 11 of the 1993 Act. 13. Likewise, some other petitions viz., Writ Petition Nos. 15268, 15269, 15270, 15330, 17086, 18494, 25852 of 2007 & 7520 and 17679 of 2008 have been filed praying for an identical relief. 14. In Writ Petition No.16562 of 2007, the petitioner has prayed for quashing G.O.Ms.No.231, Health, Medical and Family Welfare (E1) Department, dated 11.7.2007 issued as a sequel to G.O.Ms.No.23, dated 07.7.2007. 15. Writ Petition Nos.15267, 18494 and 25852 of 2007 have been filed in public interest whereas Writ Petition Nos.15268, 15269, 15270, 15330, 16562, 17086 of 2007 and 7520 and 17679 of 2008 have been filed in individual capacity questioning the validity of the 2007 Act. In the writ petitions filed in public interest, the petitioners have challenged the 2007 Act on the ground that the Act and the subsequent G.O.Ms.No.23, dated 07.7.2007 issued by the respondent State were affecting the fundamental rights of various students and unemployed persons in the State with regard to their admissions in educational institutions and appointments in public employment respectively. It is also their case that inclusion of Muslim community in the list of backward classes would adversely affect the legitimate interest of the already listed backward classes. 16. It is also their case that inclusion of Muslim community in the list of backward classes would adversely affect the legitimate interest of the already listed backward classes. 16. In the writ petitions filed in individual capacity, the petitioners, some of whom are students, assert to be aggrieved by the impugned Act because, prior to the enactment of the impugned Act, they were hopeful of obtaining admission to MCA, MBBS or BDS and LL.B. Courses, either on merit or under sports quota, but, by virtue of the impugned Act, the total number of seats available to the general pool would be reduced proportionately thereby decreasing their chances of getting admissions to courses of their choice. 17. The petitioner in Writ Petition No.15269 of 2007, who belongs to “Kurma” caste, which is included in Group “B” in the existing list of backward classes, is aggrieved because he and his community would be adversely affected by the impugned Act. 18. The petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.25852 and 15269 of 2007 had filed objections before the Commission opposing inclusion of Muslim community in the backward classes list on the ground that the community did not satisfy the criteria for inclusion in the list. 19. Though the object behind providing reservations to the SEBCs. among Muslims is not in dispute, the main grievance of the petitioners is that the 2007 Act is religion specific and the State, by the impugned Act, has inserted a separate group viz., Group E in the list of backward classes by providing 4% reservation to them. It is their case that the State did not explain why some more groups should be provided reservation when there are already included some Muslim groups in Groups A and B of the Backward Classes list. The challenge 20. It is the case of the petitioners that when the revision had to be done by the Commission in pursuance of G.O.Ms.No.30, dated 25.8.1994, the respondent State ought to have waited till the revision was completed, or ought to have requested the Commission to expedite the revision and submit its report. It has been further submitted that the State Government had hastily taken up the issue of providing reservation to SEBCs among Muslims alone when claims of 112 other castes/groups were pending before the Commission. 21. It has been further submitted that the State Government had hastily taken up the issue of providing reservation to SEBCs among Muslims alone when claims of 112 other castes/groups were pending before the Commission. 21. It is also the case of the petitioners that the Commission had shown undue haste while making its recommendation with regard to inclusion of certain groups of Muslims in the list of backward classes. According to them, due care was not taken while collecting data for arriving at a conclusion that the persons belonging to the groups referred to in the Schedule appended to the impugned Act were socially and educationally backward and the Commission had blindly relied upon the data collected by other bodies and no proper survey was undertaken by the Commission. Moreover, no criteria had been fixed for coming to a conclusion whether a particular group was socially and educationally backward and even without defining the word ‘Muslim’, Muslim groups were indicated by the Commission. It has also been alleged that the impugned Act is religion specific and this would induce people to convert to Islam and that is against secularism. 22. It is the case of the State that even prior to the 2007 Act, all the Scheduled Caste The Defence converts were placed under one group viz., Group C and simply because the 14 identified groups belonging to Muslim community were included in the list under a separate Group E, the impugned Act cannot be termed as religion specific. If the newly identified groups were included in the already existing groups, they could not have competed with the other backward classes and, therefore, they were shown in a separate group. It is their further case that the process of revising the existing lists of backward classes under Section 11 of the 1993 Act is different from the process of identifying backward classes under Section 9 (1) of the Act, which does not prohibit consideration of new groups or classes for inclusion in the list, pending revision. According to the respondent authorities, claims of Brahmin, Vaishya, Velama and several other well-known socially advanced castes were also included in the 112 claims and though claims of the said groups were pending, it was open to the Commission to consider other groups of backward class persons. According to the respondent authorities, claims of Brahmin, Vaishya, Velama and several other well-known socially advanced castes were also included in the 112 claims and though claims of the said groups were pending, it was open to the Commission to consider other groups of backward class persons. The cases of the above claimants were considered and enquired into by the Commission and an advice in respect of those castes/ communities had been forwarded to the State Government and the respondent State had duly considered the said advice and in pursuance thereof, the impugned Act was enacted whereby members of some Muslim groups were declared as belonging to socially and educationally backward class. It is also the case of the respondents that the claimants, whose cases were pending before the Commission, had not approached this Court, and as the petitioners were not representing those 112 claimants, the petitioners could not have argued on behalf of those claimants. Moreover, it has also been submitted that looking to the fact that the impugned Act has been enacted so as to give effect to the constitutional provisions, which enable the State to do the needful for upliftment of social and educational backwardness among Muslim groups, the Act should not be subjected to judicial review. Chronology of the present litigation 23. On 24.7.2007, a Division Bench of this Court admitted Writ Petition Nos. 15267, 15268, 15269, 15270 and 15330 of 2007 and passed an interlocutory order directing the respondents that admissions given after the filing of the writ petitions by implementing the provisions of the 2007 Act would remain subject to the final adjudication and directed the respondents to incorporate this fact in the letters of admission or otherwise notify to the students. The Division Bench, at the same time, keeping in view the fact that the issue raised in the writ petitions was of substantial public importance, felt that the matter should be heard by a Larger Bench. 24. Subsequently, on 29.8.2007, a Bench of five Judges heard Writ Petition Nos. The Division Bench, at the same time, keeping in view the fact that the issue raised in the writ petitions was of substantial public importance, felt that the matter should be heard by a Larger Bench. 24. Subsequently, on 29.8.2007, a Bench of five Judges heard Writ Petition Nos. 15267, 15268, 15269, 15270, 15330, 16562 and 17086 of 2007 and taking into consideration the fact that some of the questions considered by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India ] (2008) 6 SCC 1 might have direct impact on the challenge thrown by the petitioners to the 2007 Act and the subsequent Government Orders, deferred the hearing of the petitions till the reference pending before the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court is finally decided and directed that the interim order passed earlier should remain operative, subject to the adjudication of the writ petitions. 25. Challenging the interlocutory order passed by this Court on 24.7.2007 in WPMP No. 19265 of 2007 in Writ Petition No.15267 of 2007, the petitioners therein filed Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) Nos.17195-17196 of 2007 with SLP (C) Nos. 18052 and 18118 of 2007 and Writ Petition (C) No.535 of 2007 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which, on 28.9.2007, had passed an interim order directing the respondent State that no further admissions shall be made under the impugned Act. However, on 12.10.2007, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while disposing of the above petitions, observed that this Court should proceed with the hearing of the writ petition and finally dispose of the same by 31.10.2007; if the writ petition could not be disposed of by 31.10.2007, this Court might consider passing an appropriate order regarding admissions of students and, till then the interim order granted on 28.9.2007 should continue. 26. Subsequently, on 02.11.2007, when it was brought to the notice of the 5-Judge Bench of this Court that admissions to B.Ed. 26. Subsequently, on 02.11.2007, when it was brought to the notice of the 5-Judge Bench of this Court that admissions to B.Ed. and B.Pharmacy (Bi.P.C. stream) courses were not taken up as the admissions were stayed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and as the Bench had opined that it would take sometime to hear the writ petitions and finally decide them, it had ordered that the respondent State might proceed with the counselling of those courses and other courses and consider the admission of the reserved category, including the reservation to B.C. ‘E’, finalise the selections, but the selection lists should not be given effect to. The Bench had observed that if the respondent State finalises the counselling and the process of admission before the writ petitions were decided, it would be at liberty to move appropriate applications before this Court. 27. On 27.11.2007, WPMP No.32844 of 2007 filed by respondent No.2 in Writ Petition No.15267 of 2007 seeking permission to give effect to the select lists pertaining to B.C. ‘E’ category for admission to B.Ed., B. Pharmacy (Bi.P.C. stream), M.E./M.Tech./M. Planning/M. Pharmacy Planning/ M. Pharmacy courses for the academic year 20072008 in order to save the academic year, came up for hearing before the Bench. 28. On 24.1.2008, during the course of arguments, it was brought to the notice of the Bench that the specific direction/ criteria, as pointed out in paragraphs 114, 279, 293, 378 and 379 of Archana Reddy (that the Commission had to evolve criteria for identifying social backwardness), had not been adhered to by the Commission. Keeping in view the aforesaid submission, the Bench opined that the matters were required to be heard and re-considered by a 7-Judge Bench and accordingly passed an order. The operative portion of that order reads: “… In view of the aforesaid judgment emanated from a coordinate bench of five judges of this Court and in the absence of any provision in the statute for publication of the criteria whether this Court can supplant the provisions of the Act and the Rules by making publication mandatory as per the observations as contained in paras stated supra and other observations made by the coordinate bench, are contrary to the observations made by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India – 1992 Supp. (3) SCC 217 - where it was left open for the concerned authorities to lay down the criteria, apart from contrary to principles laid down in regard to strict scrutiny approach, as laid in Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of India (2003) 11 SCC 146 and also the principles laid down in other decisions of the Apex Court. After hearing the counsel on either side appearing on behalf of respondents, we are of the view that the matters are required to be heard and reconsidered by a 7-Judge bench. Accordingly, we direct the registry to place these matters before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for passing appropriate orders.” 29. That is how the matters were listed before this 7-Judge Bench for hearing. 30. On 29.4.2008, this Bench extended the interim stay granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 28.9.2007 with regard to admissions under the 2007 Act relating to Category-E till the hearing of these writ petitions. 31. On 19.8.2008, after hearing the submissions of the parties, this Bench opined that the writ petitions should be heard de novo on merits and, accordingly, arguments were advanced by the counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties on merits of the case, both on facts and law. 32. We have heard Shri K. Ramakrishna Reddi, Shri D. Prakash Reddy, learned Senior Advocates, and Shri B. Adinarayana Rao, Shri G. Vidyasagar, Shri S. Sriram, Shri L. Ravichander, Shri K.S. Murthy, advocates appearing for their respective petitioners, and Shri K. Kondal Rao and Shri P.S.N. Murthy, parties-in-person. We have also heard the learned Advocate General for the State, Shri S. Satyanarayana Prasad, Standing Counsel for the Commission, Shri K.G. Kannabhiran, Shri Anoop George Chowdary and Shri Rajeev Dhavan, learned Senior Advocates appearing for some of the private respondents and Shri Hashmi appearing in person in support of the 2007 Act. We have also carefully considered the judgments referred to by them. 33. The challenge in all the writ petitions is mainly to the 2007 Act and the Government Orders issued pursuant to the said Act. We, therefore, do not consider it necessary to narrate the facts in each of the writ petitions in detail. Since common questions of fact and law are involved, we have heard all the writ petitions together and are deciding them by this common order. Issues 34. We, therefore, do not consider it necessary to narrate the facts in each of the writ petitions in detail. Since common questions of fact and law are involved, we have heard all the writ petitions together and are deciding them by this common order. Issues 34. In the context of the rival contentions, qua the 2007 Act, the following broad issues fall for our consideration: i) What are the appropriate parameters for judicial review; on whom lies the burden of proof and what is the appropriate standard of scrutiny of legislative action?; ii) Whether the recommendations of the Commission are sustainable? i) Judicial Review – Extent – level of scrutiny 35. The learned Advocate General appearing for the State of Andhra Pradesh and other learned advocates supporting the validity of the impugned Act and the G.O. issued in pursuance thereof have submitted that as the State has exercised its legislative power to enact the 2007 Act and having regard to the noble purpose for which the impugned Act has been enacted, this Court has no power to review the same, whereas, the learned advocates appearing for the petitioners have submitted that it is open to this Court to examine the legality and validity of the impugned Act. The learned advocates have also supported their version by referring to several authorities, which have been referred to hereinbelow. 36. The people of India declared the country as a democratic republic and the Constitution guards our democratic system. It reflects the hopes and aspirations of the people. It is fundamental, superior or paramount and its authority and sanction are higher than those of ordinary laws. 37. The Constitution provides the framework for the three great wings of the State viz., the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. It recognises and gives effect to the concept of equality among these three wings and the concept of “checks and balances” is inherent in the scheme. Each wing has to perform the functions entrusted to it and respect the functioning of others. The Constitution entrusts the task of interpreting and administering the law to the judiciary whose view on the subject is made legally final and binding on all till it is changed by a permissible legislative measure. Each wing has to perform the functions entrusted to it and respect the functioning of others. The Constitution entrusts the task of interpreting and administering the law to the judiciary whose view on the subject is made legally final and binding on all till it is changed by a permissible legislative measure. Thus, in order to discharge its duty of safeguarding the Constitutional scheme, the Courts are empowered to interfere with the acts of the executive or legislature, if they are found transgressing the constitutional spirit. 38. While the fundamental rights of citizens enumerated in Part III of the Constitution are justiciable, Part IV deals with the Directive Principles of State Policy that largely enumerates objectives pertaining to socio-economic entitlements. The Directive Principles aim at creating an egalitarian society whose citizens are liberated from the abject social, economic and physical conditions that had hitherto prevented them from establishing their identities. They are the creative part of our Constitution and fundamental to the governance of the country. However, the key feature is that the Directive Principles are non-justiciable, but still they can be the basis of executive and legislative actions. 39. The ideal of social justice, which has invited frequent judicial intervention, is that of affirmative action. The framers of the Constitution not only included the guarantee of equal protection before the law in Article 14, but also permitted differential treatment in order to advance the interests of the historically or otherwise disadvantaged sections, which came to be designated as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The affirmative action policies took the form of reservation of seats in legislatures, public employment and in educational institutions. As observed in M.R. Balaji and Indra Sawhney I by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while the judiciary has steadfastly supported the principle of affirmative action, there has been frequent litigation pertaining to the specific application of the same in different settings. There has also been a significant litigation over questions that involve an interface between the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution and the broad objectives of ensuring social justice. In certain instances, there has also been a clash between the understanding of fundamental rights on one hand and the governmental objectives of ensuring social justice on the other. There has also been a significant litigation over questions that involve an interface between the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution and the broad objectives of ensuring social justice. In certain instances, there has also been a clash between the understanding of fundamental rights on one hand and the governmental objectives of ensuring social justice on the other. However, the most important feature is that the fundamental rights provided the Supreme Court and the High Courts with a clear set of criteria to regulate relations between citizens and the Government (i.e. vertical application of rights) as well as among citizens themselves (i.e. horizontal application of rights). Furthermore, the Supreme Court and the High Courts have interpreted these rights both in negative and positive dimensions. 40. Article 15 of the Constitution prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, class and gender – but, at the same time, permits the State to make special provision for the advancement of women as well as socially and educationally backward sections of the society. Hence, Article 15 forms the basis of affirmative action policies. Article 16 creates obligations on the State to ensure fairness in matters pertaining to public employment. We are not dealing with the other rights guaranteed to the citizens under Part III as they are not relevant for the purpose of this judgment. 41. In Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar AIR 1958 SC 538 , the Honble Supreme Court observed that though Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (ii) that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is however essential is that there must be a nexus between the basis of the classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of our Courts that Article 14 prohibits discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure. 42. What is however essential is that there must be a nexus between the basis of the classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of our Courts that Article 14 prohibits discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure. 42. The concern with maintaining the independence of the judiciary is interlinked with two core features of a constitutional democracy – i.e. separation of powers between the wings of Government and the vigorous exercise of judicial review over executive and legislative action. The fundamental rights enumerated in the Constitution hence equip the constitutional courts with tangible criteria to exercise judicial review over governmental action. The power of ‘judicial review’ in Article 13 is explicit. In the words of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, this provision forms the heart and soul of the Constitution. 43. In Golaknath v. State of Punjab AIR 1967 SC 1643 , the Honble Supreme Court had ruled that the power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution was limited, and that the Courts were within their power to inquire into such amendments. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225 , when an amendment was made to the Constitution extending the power of the Parliament to amend any part of the Constitution by means of the process prescribed under Article 368, the Honble Supreme Court has laid down the doctrine of the inviolable ‘basic structure’ of the Constitution which limited the power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution. In separate but concurring opinions, majority of the judges (7-6) ruled that certain features of the Constitution were integral to its existence and could not be altered by way of amendments by the legislature. They also defended the power of the judiciary to inquire into legislative actions for safeguarding this ‘basic structure’. This decision holds immense significance since it re-asserted the role of the judiciary as the sentinel on the qui vive. 44. The decisions in I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N. (2007) 2 SCC 1 and Raja Ram Pal v. Honble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) 3 SCC 184 , in which the power of the Courts to review Parliaments legislative and non-legislative functions was involved, demonstrate that the Honble Supreme Court is embarking on a new era of judicial review. 44. The decisions in I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N. (2007) 2 SCC 1 and Raja Ram Pal v. Honble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) 3 SCC 184 , in which the power of the Courts to review Parliaments legislative and non-legislative functions was involved, demonstrate that the Honble Supreme Court is embarking on a new era of judicial review. In Coelho, the question before the Honble Supreme Court was whether it could review the acts of the Parliament placed in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution. In the said case, the Honble Supreme Court held that it could strike down any law inserted into the Ninth Schedule if it was found to be contrary to the constitutional provisions. It was observed: “The jurisprudence and development around fundamental rights has made it clear that they are not limited, narrow rights but provide a broad check against the violations or excesses by the State authorities. The fundamental rights have in fact proved to be the most significant constitutional control on the government, particularly legislative power.” 45. In the above judgment, the Honble Supreme Court has also observed that “it cannot be said that the same Constitution that provides for a check on legislative power, will decide whether such a check is necessary or not. It would be a negation of the Constitution.” 46. In Raja Ram Pal, which is popularly known as the “cash for query in Parliament” case, the question was whether Parliaments internal procedures were justiciable. The Honble Supreme Court decided the issue regarding the unconstitutionality of the expulsion of Members of Parliament and simultaneously upheld the principles of judicial review. While observing that the Constitution was the “suprema lex in this country”, the Honble Supreme Court held: “Parliament is a coordinate organ and its views do deserve deference while its acts are amenable to judicial scrutiny … mere coordinate constitutional status … does not disentitle this Court from exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review.” 47. In the afore-stated case, the Honble Supreme Court has accepted that though it may not question the truth or correctness of the material nor substitute its opinion for that of the legislature, the proceedings of the Parliament, which may be tainted on account of substantive or gross illegality or unconstitutionality, could still be reviewed by the judiciary. 48. In the afore-stated case, the Honble Supreme Court has accepted that though it may not question the truth or correctness of the material nor substitute its opinion for that of the legislature, the proceedings of the Parliament, which may be tainted on account of substantive or gross illegality or unconstitutionality, could still be reviewed by the judiciary. 48. The above cases have re-asserted the constitutional scheme of a balance of power between the legislative and judicial branches, and ensured that the political and executive branches will no longer be able to evade the scrutiny of the judicial branch. 49. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1 , Anuj Garg v. Hotel Assn. of India (2008) 3 SCC 1 , State of A.P. v. P. Sagar AIR 1968 SC 1379 , E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of A.P. (2005) 1 SCC 394 , M.Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 212 and Shree Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (1990) 3 SCC 223 , are some other cases in which the Honble Supreme Court had interfered when legislations/orders by the Legislature were found unconstitutional. 50. Thus, so as to limit or put a check on the arbitrary actions of the Legislature, this Court can examine validity of any statute if it is in violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution i.e., if it violates the rule with regard to distribution of powers or violates the fundamental rights of a citizen etc. In the circumstances, the submission made by the learned Advocate General to the effect that the 2007 Act has been enacted with a noble object and, therefore, it cannot be subjected to judicial review, does not merit acceptance. Extent of Review 51. It has been submitted by the learned advocates appearing for the petitioners that identification of backward classes is an objective process and should be based on objective material and, therefore, the exercise so conducted by the State for identifying the backwardness – social, educational and economic – among some of the Muslim groups should be subjected to careful, intensive and in-depth scrutiny. 52. The learned Advocate General urged that the Constitution mandates the State to take measures for social justice including by providing reservation for SCs, STs and BCs to attain equality among its citizens. 52. The learned Advocate General urged that the Constitution mandates the State to take measures for social justice including by providing reservation for SCs, STs and BCs to attain equality among its citizens. If social justice measures taken either by the executive or the legislature are challenged, the judiciary has to examine the same and determine whether the same are constitutionally valid, but there are no special standards of judicial scrutiny of such social justice measures and Courts are bound by normal standards laid down for judicial scrutiny of any administrative or legislative action. 53. According to the learned Advocate General, the Courts may examine whether there is no material or there is some relevant material; the sufficiency of the material cannot, however, form the basis for judicial scrutiny. According to him, the Courts should not pick holes in the process of decision making and should give due deference to such policy decision in the path of social justice action by co-equal wings i.e. the executive or the legislature. 54. It is undisputed that judicial review can operate, both, in the narrow as well as in the wider sense. In the narrow sense, it does not go into the merits of the impugned decision, but examines only the constitutionality or the basic legality. In the wider sense, judicial review would be like an appeal to be decided on the merits of the decision by an administrative or a judicial authority. All questions of fact and/or of law i.e. the merits of the whole case would be open to review. The review in the wider sense may be of a dispute between private parties or between a private party and the State or a public authority and is, therefore, mostly a question of private law. But the narrower view is essentially a question of public law. It is directed against administrative or legislative action as being without jurisdiction or unconstitutional. For all practical purposes, judicial review has acquired narrow usage to signify the power of the Courts to determine the constitutionality of legislative acts which fall within their normal jurisdiction. 55. Judicial review of a legislative act is necessary in order to preserve individual liberties against the rule of the majority and to protect individuals and groups against invidious attacks by the public authorities or the departments of the Government. 55. Judicial review of a legislative act is necessary in order to preserve individual liberties against the rule of the majority and to protect individuals and groups against invidious attacks by the public authorities or the departments of the Government. In our Constitution, we have a list of fundamental rights, which are to be protected by the Courts. As long as the fundamental rights exist and are part of the Constitution, the power of judicial review has to be exercised so as to see that those rights are not violated. 56. In Narendra Kumar v Union of India AIR 1960 SC 430 , it has been observed that a law would be valid, if the interference with the fundamental right was reasonable, but would be invalid if the test of reasonableness was not passed. It has also been observed therein that while applying the test of reasonableness, the Court has to consider the question in the background of the facts and circumstances under which the law was enacted, taking into account the nature of the evil that was sought to be remedied by such law, the degree of harm which might be caused to individual citizens and the benefit which might be gained by the general public. It has been further observed that it would also be necessary to consider in that connection whether the restraint caused by the law is more than was necessary in the interest of the general public. 57. In Kesavananda Bharati, Justice P. Jaganmohan Reddy has explained the two concepts that are inherent in Article 14: “Two concepts are inherent in the guarantee in Article 14 – one of “equality before law”, a negative one similar to that under the English common law; and the other “equal protection of laws”, a positive one under the United States Constitution. The negative aspect is in the prohibition against discrimination and the positive content is the equal protection under the law to all who are situated similarly and are in like circumstances. The impact of the negative content on the positive aspect has not so far been clearly discerned in the decision of this Court, which has been mostly concerned with the positive aspect.” 58. In Anuj Garg, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that any legislation with pronounced “protective discrimination” serves as a double-edged sword. The impact of the negative content on the positive aspect has not so far been clearly discerned in the decision of this Court, which has been mostly concerned with the positive aspect.” 58. In Anuj Garg, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that any legislation with pronounced “protective discrimination” serves as a double-edged sword. Therefore, strict scrutiny test should be employed while assessing the implications of this variety of legislation. The Legislation should not be only assessed on its proposed aims, but rather on the implications and the effects. In this case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while determining the issues arising out of the biological differences between the sexes, has observed that such legislations deserve deeper judicial scrutiny and that the test to review such a protective discrimination statute would entail a two-pronged scrutiny viz., a) the legislative interference should be justified in principle, and b) the same should be proportionate in measure. 59. In Kesavananda Bharathi, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Directive Principles embodied in Part IV of the Constitution also deals with important rights of individuals. Parts III and IV of the Constitution form a basic element of the Constitution without which its identity will be completely changed. It was to give effect to the main objectives of the Preamble, Parts III and IV were enacted. The dignity of an individual can be achieved only when Parts III and IV are balanced and harmonized. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows: “… The purpose of the Fundamental Rights is to create an egalitarian society, to free all citizens from coercion or restriction by society and to make liberty available for all. The purpose of the Directive Principles is to fix certain social and economic goals for immediate attainment by bringing about a non-violent social revolution. Through such a social revolution the Constitution seeks to fulfill the basic deeds of the common man and to change the structure of our society. It aims at making the Indian masses free in the positive sense. … Without faithfully implementing the Directive Principles, it is not possible to achieve the Welfare State contemplated by the Constitution. ... Equally, the danger to democracy by an over-emphasis on duty cannot be minimised. … Indeed the balancing process between the individual rights and the social needs is a delicate one. … Without faithfully implementing the Directive Principles, it is not possible to achieve the Welfare State contemplated by the Constitution. ... Equally, the danger to democracy by an over-emphasis on duty cannot be minimised. … Indeed the balancing process between the individual rights and the social needs is a delicate one. This is primarily the responsibility of the “State” and in the ultimate analysis of the courts as interpreters of the Constitution and the law.” (paras 712 to 715) 60. Thus, it is clear from the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court since Ramakrishna Dalmia that administrative/legislative action is susceptible to judicial review when it is found that the administrative action of the State or the legislation enacted by a State Legislature/Parliament has not passed the test of reasonableness. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also observed that the Courts, while considering the validity of a legislation touching Article 14 of the Constitution, have to determine whether the classification satisfies the test of reasonableness and whether the classification proposed to be made by such legislation is based on some differentia which distinguishes such persons in whose favour the legislation is made, and whether such differentia have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute. 61. It is also well settled that the scope of judicial review depends on the nature of the subject matter and there is no special or distinct standard of judicial review when a beneficial legislation like the one under challenge is under consideration. The law is well settled on this aspect and the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are uniform. It is apt to quote the observations by Justice Jeevan Reddy in Indra Sawhney I: “It is enough to say on this question that there is no particular or special standard of judicial scrutiny in matters arising under Article 16(4) or for that matter, under Article 15 (4). The extent and scope of judicial scrutiny depends upon the nature of the subject-matter, the nature of the right affected, the character of the legal and constitutional provisions applicable and so on. The acts and orders of the State made under Article 16 (4) do not enjoy any particular kind of immunity. At the same time, the Court would normally extend due deference to the judgment and discretion of the executive — a coequal wing — in these matters. The acts and orders of the State made under Article 16 (4) do not enjoy any particular kind of immunity. At the same time, the Court would normally extend due deference to the judgment and discretion of the executive — a coequal wing — in these matters. The political executive, drawn as it is from the people and represent as it does the majority will of the people, is presumed to know the conditions and the needs of the people and hence its judgment in matters within its judgment and discretion will be entitled to due weight. More than this, it is neither possible nor desirable to say. It is not necessary to answer the question as framed.” (Paras 842 and 859) 62. Justice Reddy had also observed in paragraph 737 of the said judgment that any determination of backwardness is neither a subjective exercise nor a matter of subjective satisfaction and if, for collateral reasons, the executive includes groups or classes not satisfying the relevant criteria, it would be a clear case of fraud on its power. 63. The principles that would emerge from the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are that any interference by the State with the fundamental rights of the citizens should be reasonable and such interference must stand the scrutiny of the Court. When there is a challenge to a legislative action of the State as offending Articles 14, 15 (4) or 16 (4), the Court can and should verify whether the level of discrimination is excessive and whether the asserted classification has a nexus with the objective intended to be achieved by the State; and in applying the test of reasonableness, the Court has to consider the background of the facts and circumstances under which the legislation was made, and in particular, when a legislation aims to discriminate the citizens on the basis of religion, race etc., the Courts have to make a careful and deeper scrutiny to test such legislation. Level of scrutiny 64. It has been submitted by the learned advocates appearing for the petitioners that the standard of judicial review laid down in Archana Reddy is not based on the doctrine of strict scrutiny applied by the U.S. Supreme Court and is consistent with the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ashoka Kumar Thakur, that the Courts have to apply a careful and deeper scrutiny. It has been submitted by them that for satisfying the American standard of strict scrutiny, the respondent State has to satisfy the two essential components viz., a) compelling State interest; and b) least restrictive requirement and narrow tailoring; and in Archana Reddy, this Court referred to but did not apply the strict scrutiny doctrine in the American sense. 65. Per contra, it has been submitted by the learned Advocate General that in Archana Reddy though the Bench had extensively considered the scope of judicial review and held that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney I had not set any standard of judicial scrutiny in the matters of affirmative action of the State, Justice Raghuram and Justice V.V.S. Rao of the Bench have held that strict scrutiny test is applicable in cases of this nature. It is his case that the Bench (view of Justice V.V.S.Rao) erred in holding that Justice Jeevan Reddy in Indra Sawhney I did not either accept or reject strict scrutiny test to review social justice measures. 66. It has further been submitted by the learned Advocate General that in Archana Reddy (view of Justice V.V.S. Rao) this Court has relied on the judgments of the U.S. Supreme Court delivered after Indra Sawney I and has held that the U.S. Supreme Court has ultimately accepted strict scrutiny standard in matters of judicial review of affirmative action and applied the same in Archana Reddy. According to him, this Court (view of Justice V.V.S. Rao) failed to distinguish the fundamental differences between the U.S. Constitution and the Indian Constitution in the matter of the mandate of equality (Article 14 of the Indian Constitution and the 14th Amendment of U.S. Constitution) and wrongly applied the American principle of “strict scrutiny” to the Indian context. 67. The learned Advocate General has also contended that in Archana Reddy (view of Justice G. Raghuram), while referring to the judgments of the U.S. Supreme Court, which are unsuitable to the Indian context, this Court has observed that the State must satisfy that the means adopted are the only way to achieve the compelling objective, and has held that religion specific classification would constitute a suspect classification and, therefore, it requires strict scrutiny. He has further submitted that the observations of this Court (view of Justice Raghuram) that the Hon’ble Supreme Court, starting from State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan AIR 1951 SC 226 to State of Uttar Pradesh v. Pradeep Tandon 1975 (2) SCR 761 = AIR 1975 SC 563 , applied rigorous scrutiny test, are not correct and that this Court has also not explained as to the relevance of U.S. jurisprudence to Indian context. 68. It has also been urged by the learned Advocate General that different levels of scrutiny viz., strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and rational basis scrutiny were evolved and are being followed by the U.S. Supreme Court and though the same were in existence even when the judgment in Indra Sawhney I was delivered and the judgment of this Court in T. Muralidhar Rao, both Courts thought it fit not to import this principle, in view of the differences in the Constitutions of the two countries. 69. It has been submitted by him that there is a great deal of difference between racial discrimination and discrimination based on caste system; that the language used in Articles 14 to 16 of the Indian Constitution is different when compared with the language in 14th amendment of the U.S. Constitution; and the expression used in Article 14 viz., “equality before the law” is absent in the U.S. Constitution. It is his case that social justice action including reservations in our country is a constitutional obligation of the State and such an obligation is absent in the U.S. Constitution. 70. In view of the submissions made by the learned advocates on either side on the aspect of level of scrutiny to be applied by the Courts, we consider the judgments of the Supreme Court touching on the point in issue. 71. In Ramkrishna Dalmia, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that when a statute comes up for consideration before the Court on a question of its validity under Article 14 of the Constitution, the same may be placed in any of the five classes enumerated by it. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also observed that the following principles will have to be constantly borne in mind by the Court when it is called upon to adjudge the constitutionality of any particular law attacked as discriminatory and violative of the equal protection of the laws: “12. … … ... The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also observed that the following principles will have to be constantly borne in mind by the Court when it is called upon to adjudge the constitutionality of any particular law attacked as discriminatory and violative of the equal protection of the laws: “12. … … ... (i) A statute may itself indicate the persons or things to whom its provisions are intended to apply and the basis of the classification of such persons or things may appear on the face of the statute or may be gathered from the surrounding circumstances known to or brought to the notice of the court. In determining the validity or otherwise of such a statute the court has to examine whether such classification is or can be reasonably regarded as based upon some differentia which distinguishes such persons or things grouped together from those left out of the group and whether such differentia has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute, no matter whether the provisions of the statute are intended to apply only to a particular person or thing or only to a certain class of persons or things. Where the court finds that the classification satisfies the tests, the court will uphold the validity of the law, as it did in Chiranjitlal Chowdhri v. Union of India {(1950) SCR 869}, State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara {(1951) SCR 682}, Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal {(1954) SCR 30}, S.M. Syed Mohammad & Company v. State of Andhra {(1954) SCR 1117}, and Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar { (1955) 1 SCR 1045 }. (ii) A statute may direct its provisions against one individual person or thing or to several individual persons or things but no reasonable basis of classification may appear on the face of it or be deducible from the surrounding circumstances, or matters of common knowledge. In such a case the court will strike down the law as an instance of naked discrimination, as it did in Ameerunnissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum {(1953) SCR 404} and Ramprasad Narain Sahi v. State of Bihar {(1953) SCR 1129}. In such a case the court will strike down the law as an instance of naked discrimination, as it did in Ameerunnissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum {(1953) SCR 404} and Ramprasad Narain Sahi v. State of Bihar {(1953) SCR 1129}. (iii) A statute may not make any classification of the persons or things for the purpose of applying its provisions and may leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify persons or things to whom its provisions are to apply. In determining the question of the validity or otherwise of such a statute the court will not strike down the law out of hand only because no classification appears on its face or because a discretion is given to the Government to make the selection or classification but will go on to examine and ascertain if the statute has laid down any principle or policy for the guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of the selection or classification. After such scrutiny the court will strike down the statute if it does not lay down any principle or policy for guiding the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of selection or classification, on the ground that the statute provides for the delegation of arbitrary and uncontrolled power to the Government so as to enable it to discriminate between persons or things similarly situate and that, therefore, the discrimination is inherent in the statute itself. In such a case the court will strike down both the law as well as the executive action taken under such law, as it did in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar {(1952) SCR 284}, Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh {(1954) SCR 803} and Dhirendra Krishna Mandal v. Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs { (1955) 1 SCR 224 }. (iv) A statute may not make a classification of the persons or things for the purpose of applying its provisions and may leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify the persons or things to whom its provisions are to apply but may at the same time lay down a policy or principle for the guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of such selection or classification, the court will uphold the law as constitutional, as it did in Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra {(1952) SCR 435}. (v) A statute may not make a classification of the persons or things to whom their provisions are intended to apply and leave it to the discretion of the Government to select or classify the persons or things for applying those provisions according to the policy or the principle laid down by the statute itself for guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of such selection or classification. If the Government in making the selection or classification does not proceed on or follow such policy or principle, it has been held by this Court e.g. in Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra that in such a case the executive action but not the statute should be condemned as unconstitutional.” 72. It is undisputable that judicial review or scrutiny and its extent are not defined in the Constitution. The Courts have evolved general principles as to the scope of such scrutiny with self-imposed restrictions. The extent and scope of judicial review or scrutiny depends upon the nature of the subject-matter, the nature of the right affected, the character of the legal and constitutional provisions applicable and so on. 73. Much has been said with regard to the nature of scrutiny required when any law in the nature of the impugned Act is enacted by the State. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has expressed that the American doctrine of strict scrutiny should not be imported by us looking to the fact that the circumstances prevailing in the American society and in our society are different. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has expressed that the American doctrine of strict scrutiny should not be imported by us looking to the fact that the circumstances prevailing in the American society and in our society are different. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has referred to the concept of rigorous scrutiny for examining the validity of law in Champakam Dorairajan, M.R. Balaji, P. Sagar, A.Peeriakaruppan (Minor) v. State of T.N. (1971) 1 SCC 38 , U.S.V. Balaram, Janki Prasad Parimoo v. State of J & K (1973) 1 SCC 420 , Pradeep Tandon and Indra Sawhney I. 74. We have thus to decide what degree and quality of scrutiny is appropriate while examining the legality of the impugned Act. We have mainly gone through the judgment rendered by this Court in Archana Reddy, the final outcome of which has given rise to the impugned Act and we have also gone through the judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney I. In Indra Sawhney I, Justice Sawant has opined as under: “529. There are no special principles of judicial review nor does the scope of judicial review expand when the identification of backward classes and the percentage of the reservation kept for them is called in question. So long as correct criterion for the identification of the backward classes is applied, the result arrived at cannot be questioned on the ground that other valid criteria were also available for such identification. It is possible that the result so arrived at may be defective marginally or in marginal number of cases. That does not invalidate the exercise itself. No method is perfect particularly when sociological findings are in issue. Hence, marginal defects when found may be cured in individual cases but the entire finding is not rendered invalid on that account. 530. The corollary of the above is that when the criterion applied for identifying the backward classes is either perverse or per se defective or unrelated to such identification in that it is not calculated to give the result or is calculated to give, by the very nature of the criterion, a contrary or unintended result, the criterion is open for judicial examination. 537. 537. To sum up, judicial scrutiny would be available (i) if the criterion inconsistent with the provisions of Article 16 is applied for identifying the classes for whom the special or unequal benefit can be given under the said article; (ii) if the classes which are not entitled to the said benefit are wrongly included in or those which are entitled are wrongly excluded from the list of beneficiaries of the special provisions. In such cases, it is not either the entire exercise or the entire list which becomes invalid, so long as the tests applied for identification are correct and the inclusion or exclusion is only marginal; and (iii) if the percentage of reservations is either disproportionate or unreasonable so as to deny the equality of opportunity to the unreserved classes and obliterates Article 16(1). Whether the percentage is unreasonable or results in the obliteration of Article 16 (1), so far as the unreserved classes are concerned, it will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and no hard and fast rule of general application with regard to the percentage can be laid down for all the regions and for all times. 552. … There is no special law of judicial review when the reservations under Article 16 (4) are under scrutiny. The judicial review will be available only in the cases of demonstrably perverse identification of the backward classes and in the cases of unreasonable percentage of reservations made for them.” 75. The afore-stated observations by the Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly reveal that there is no special law on the subject of judicial review when a reservation under Article 16 (4) of the Constitution is made and the law giving right of reservation in favour of a particular class is under scrutiny. 76. In the afore-stated circumstances, so as to simplify the concept with regard to judicial scrutiny, we can only say that the scrutiny should depend upon the subject matter of legislation and its impact upon legal or fundamental rights of one class of the society. 76. In the afore-stated circumstances, so as to simplify the concept with regard to judicial scrutiny, we can only say that the scrutiny should depend upon the subject matter of legislation and its impact upon legal or fundamental rights of one class of the society. When, so as to achieve the goal enshrined in the Constitution of helping disadvantaged class, a law is enacted so as to give more rights to such a disadvantaged class at the cost of another class of persons, in our opinion, what is required to be examined by this Court is: whether the purpose for which such an Act was enacted was, in fact, served and whether the conclusions on the basis of which the Act was enacted were correctly arrived at. If the reason for which a particular class was considered a disadvantaged class was not rightly arrived at, the enactment made to favour such a class at the cost of the general community would not be just, proper or valid. 77. In Saurabh Chaudri, the question was as to whether reservation on the basis of residence, was constitutionally permissible. While answering the question, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that reservation on the basis of domicile is impermissible in terms of Article 15 (1) of the Constitution. On the issue of applicability of scrutiny, the Honble Supreme Court observed as follows: “36. The strict scrutiny test or the intermediate scrutiny test applicable in the United States of America as argued by Shri Salve cannot be applied in this case. Such a test is not applied in the Indian courts. In any event, such a test may be applied in a case where a legislation ex facie is found to be unreasonable. Such a test may also be applied in a case where by reason of a statute the life and liberty of a citizen is put in jeopardy. This Court since its inception apart from a few cases where the legislation was found to be ex facie wholly unreasonable proceeded on the doctrine that constitutionality of a statute is to be presumed and the burden to prove contra is on him who asserts the same. The courts always lean against a construction which reduces the statute to a futility. The courts always lean against a construction which reduces the statute to a futility. A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative “on the principle expressed in the maxim: ut res magis valeat quam pereat”. (See CIT v. S. Teja Singh { AIR 1959 SC 352 } and Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam { (1989) 3 SCC 709 = AIR 1990 SC 123 }).” 78. However, the Court did not accept the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners for applying the strict scrutiny test and to set aside the statute saying that such a test was not applied in the Indian Courts, but, in any event, such a test may be applied in a case where a legislation is ex facie found to be unreasonable or where by reason of a statute the life and liberty of a citizen is put in jeopardy. 79. Now, we will deal with the observations in Ashoka Kumar Thakur on the applicability of strict scrutiny’ doctrine to the Indian context. The Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India, Shri K.G. Balakrishnan, while dealing with the question - whether the principles laid down by the United States Supreme Court for affirmative action such as “suspect legislation”, “strict scrutiny” and “compelling State necessity” are applicable to the principles of reservation or other affirmative action contemplated under Article 15 (5) of the Constitution of India? – in paragraph 206, has observed that the Courts, both in India as well as in the United States of America, have looked with ‘extreme caution and care’ at any legislation that aims to discriminate on the basis of race in the United States and on the basis of caste in India and that the American decisions are not strictly applicable to us and when the principles of strict scrutiny and suspect legislation were sought to be applied, the Honble Supreme Court had rejected the same in Saurabh Chaudri. Referring to the observations in the said judgment as to the applicability of strict scrutiny, as noticed above, the Hon’ble Chief Justice observed: “209. Referring to the observations in the said judgment as to the applicability of strict scrutiny, as noticed above, the Hon’ble Chief Justice observed: “209. The aforesaid principles applied by the Supreme Court of the United States of America cannot be applied directly to India as the gamut of affirmative action in India is fully supported by constitutional provisions and we have not applied the principles of “suspect legislation” and we have been following the doctrine that every legislation passed by Parliament is presumed to be constitutionally valid unless otherwise proved. We have repeatedly held that the American decisions are not strictly applicable to us and the very same principles of strict scrutiny and suspect legislation were sought to be applied and this Court rejected the same in Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of India (supra). … … … 210. Learned counsel Shri Sushil Kumar Jain contended that the classification of OBCs was not properly done and it is not clear as to whose benefit the legislation itself is made, therefore, it is a suspect legislation. This contention cannot be accepted. We are of the view that the challenge of Act 5 of 2007 on the ground that it does not stand the “strict scrutiny” test and there was no “compelling State necessity” to enact this legislation cannot be accepted.” 80. Justice Arijit Pasayat, speaking for himself and Justice C.K. Thakker, while answering almost an identical question, has observed in paragraph 251 of the judgment that “… the American cases which have been highlighted by the petitioners relate essentially to strict classification, strict scrutiny and narrow tailoring. This issue is of considerable importance when so much debate is taking place about respect being shown by courts of a country to a decision of another country. The factual scenario and the basic issues involved in the cases sometimes throw light on the controversy.” Justice Pasayat elaborately discussed the American and Indian case law on the subject and, in paragraph 268, observed as follows: “In India there has to be collective commitment for upliftment of those who needed it. In that sense, the question again comes back to the basic issue as to whether the action taken by the Government can be upheld after making judicial scrutiny. Much assistance is not available to the petitioners from the American decisions.” 81. In that sense, the question again comes back to the basic issue as to whether the action taken by the Government can be upheld after making judicial scrutiny. Much assistance is not available to the petitioners from the American decisions.” 81. On the extent of judicial scrutiny to be applied, Justice Pasayat, in paragraph 269, observed: “It is to be noted that the doctrine of separation as is prevalent in the American society is not of much consequence in the Indian scenario. It needs to be clarified that the expression “strict scrutiny” has also been used by the Indian courts in Narendra Kumar v. Union of India (supra) but it appears to have been used in different context. What really appears to be the intention for the use of the expression is “careful and deeper scrutiny” and not in the sense of strict scrutiny of the provisions as is prevalent in the American jurisprudence. It is used in different sense. The application appears to be in technical sense in the American courts, for example, Regents of University of California v. Allan Bakke 57 L Ed 2d 750 = 438 US 265 (1978).” 82. Justice Dalveer Bhandari, while answering the question on strict scrutiny test, has observed in para 623 that “… where others have reviewed similar issues in great detail, it behoves us to learn from their mistakes as well as accomplishments.” It has also been observed that “let the path to our constitutional goals be enlightened by experience, learning, knowledge and wisdom from any quarter”. It has been further observed in para 545 that “… the judgments delivered by US courts on affirmative action have great persuasive value and they may provide broad guidelines as to how we should tackle our prevailing condition. A large number of English laws have been inherited by India and America. English and American cases are frequently cited by our courts. We need to keep our window open and permit the light of knowledge to enter from any source.” Justice Bhandari has also referred to a foreword written by the former President of India, Mr. R. Venkataraman, to a book (Democracy and Rule of Law: Foundation and Frontiers) by the eminent constitutional expert Dr. L.M. Singhvi, which has been extracted at paragraph 623 of the judgment. The foreword of Mr.R. Venkataraman reads as under: “Society progresses only by exchange of thoughts and ideas. R. Venkataraman, to a book (Democracy and Rule of Law: Foundation and Frontiers) by the eminent constitutional expert Dr. L.M. Singhvi, which has been extracted at paragraph 623 of the judgment. The foreword of Mr.R. Venkataraman reads as under: “Society progresses only by exchange of thoughts and ideas. Imagine what a sorry state the world would have been in had not thoughts and ideas spread to all corners of the globe. Throughout history, philosophers, reformers, thinkers, and scholars have recorded their thoughts, regardless of whether they were accepted or not in their times, and thus contributed towards progress of humankind. India was the first to encapsulate this seminal global thought. The Rig Veda says: Ano bhadrah krtavo yantu viswatah Let noble thought come to us from every side.” 83. Justice Dalveer Bhandari has, however, answered the question on strict scrutiny, after discussing the American case law on the issue, in the following words: “640. The principles enunciated by the American Supreme Court, such as, “suspect legislation”, “narrow tailoring”, “strict scrutiny” and “compelling State necessity” are not strictly applicable for challenging the impugned legislation.” 84. In paragraph 556, Justice Dalveer Bhandari has also observed as follows: “556. As I have observed, American courts carefully review racial classifications. Given that the Ninety-third Amendment on its face discriminates against general category students, we should give it careful scrutiny. The Article 14 right to formal equality deserves as much. If 49.5% caste-based reservation was upheld in Sawhney (1) for government employment, it follows that 49.5% caste-based reservation is permitted in aided educational institutions. While I am compelled by Sawhney (I) to hold that the impugned legislation passes careful scrutiny with respect to reservation in aided institutions, its implementation is contingent upon the directions given in this opinion.” 85. From a reading of the separate observations of K.G. Balakrishnan, CJI, Justice Arijit Pasayat and Justice Dalveer Bhandari, it is clear that though the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have observed that the law on strict scrutiny applied by the U.S. Supreme Court is inapplicable in our country, the judgments delivered by the U.S. Supreme Court on affirmative action have great persuasive value and may offer broad guidelines as to how we should tackle our prevailing condition. They have referred to the cases of the U.S. Supreme Court believing that the factual scenario and the basic issues involved in the cases therein may sometimes throw light on the standard of scrutiny to be applied by the Courts in India. What the Honble Judges have done is, they have referred to Saurabh Chaudri to clarify the applicability of strict scrutiny doctrine in the Indian context in the facts and circumstances of the case in Ashoka Kumar Thakur, which relates to providing reservations under Article 15 (5) to other backward classes (OBCs) in the State-aided institutions and the Constitution Bench declared the said reservations to be valid to the extent that it permitted reservations for SEBCs in the State or State-aided institutions subject to the exclusion of the “creamy layer” from the other backward classes. 86. On a careful consideration of the above judgments, it would emerge that when an affirmative action of the State providing reservations to backward classes was under challenge in the context of Article 14, the Honble Supreme Court had gone into the details of the basis for making the classification and gave its findings. However, it did not prescribe the level of scrutiny to be applied and providing reservation on such affirmative action was tested on the standards of ‘deeper scrutiny’, ‘in-depth scrutiny’ or ‘extreme care and caution’, and in some cases the doctrine of ‘strict scrutiny’ was applied. All the judgments touching upon reservations consistently applied exacting scrutiny or rigorous scrutiny. In Indra Sawhney I, the Hon’ble Supreme Court analysed the Mandal report minutely, which, in our view, exemplifies application of a rigorous and exacting standard of scrutiny. 87. In a recent judgment by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Subhash Chandra v. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board Judgment dated 04.8.2009 delivered in SLP (C) No.24327 of 2005 (SB Sinha & Cyriac Joseph, JJ), it has been observed that if it has come to light that those who are entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of protective discrimination contained in Clause (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution of India had been deprived of their constitutional right, and when the affirmative action of the State is challenged, the Courts would be entitled to apply the principle of strict scrutiny test or closer scrutiny test or higher level of scrutiny. Referring to M. Nagaraj, the Court has observed that the doctrine of guided power had been used in the said case as a corollary of strict scrutiny rule. It is a distant relative of continuing mandamus. It has been further observed in Subhash Chandra that “strict scrutiny paves the way for a more searching judicial scrutiny to guard against invidious discriminations, which could have been made by the State against a group of people in violation of the constitutional guarantee of just and equal laws. The court must adopt a weighted balancing approach or in other words pursue an even-handed balancing of the interests.” In the above case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has widened the scope of the applicability of the doctrine of strict scrutiny by adding the following categories of cases in which it may be applied: “i) Where a statute or an action is patently unreasonable or arbitrary. [Mithu v. State of Punjab [ (1983) 2 SCC 277 ]. ii) Where a statute is contrary to the constitutional scheme. [E.V. Chinniah]. iii) Where the general presumption as regards the constitutionality of the statute or action cannot be invoked. iv) Where a statute or executive action causes reverse discrimination. v) Where a statute has been enacted restricting the rights of a citizen under Article 14 or Article 19 as for example clauses (1) to (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India as in those cases, it would be for the State to justify the reasonableness thereof. vi) Where a statute seeks to take away a person’s life and liberty which is protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India or otherwise infringes the core human right. vii) Where a statute is ‘Expropriatory’ or ‘Confiscatory’ in nature. viii) Where a statute prima facie seeks to interfere with sovereignty and integrity of India.” (We have noticed this judgment, which was pronounced after we had reserved judgment in this case, and we refer to it as this is a precedent relevant to this issue.) 88. Analyses of the judgments referred to above illustrate that when affirmative action of the State is challenged as offending the equality injunctions of the Constitution, particularly in the matter of reservations to SCs, STs and BCs, though there is a presumption as to the constitutionality of the statute, the Courts have examined such statutes rigorously, with great care and caution. Analyses of the judgments referred to above illustrate that when affirmative action of the State is challenged as offending the equality injunctions of the Constitution, particularly in the matter of reservations to SCs, STs and BCs, though there is a presumption as to the constitutionality of the statute, the Courts have examined such statutes rigorously, with great care and caution. Therefore, the contention advanced on behalf of the State that the standard of scrutiny actually applied in Archana Reddy does not suit the Indian conditions or is inconsistent with the law laid down in Ashoka Kumar Thakur, has to be rejected. Burden of proof 89. It has been submitted by the learned Advocate General that Article 14 read with Articles 15 (1) and 16 (1) casts a mandatory duty on the State to remove inequalities and to take social welfare measures like providing reservations to persons belonging to backward classes. It is a constitutionally mandated obligation on the State and looking to the object of the 2007 Act, it cannot be treated as a suspect legislation. Therefore, the burden lies on the petitioners to show that the impugned Act is violative of other constitutional provisions and is liable to be struck down. The burden also lies on the petitioners to establish that a particular group included in the list of backward classes is not backward, socially and educationally. 90. It has also been submitted by the learned Advocate General that in T. Muralidhar Rao, though the High Court interfered with the executive action of the State, insofar as judicial scrutiny is concerned, it has not deviated from the law laid down in Indra Sawhney I. However, Archana Reddy introduced the theory of strict scrutiny and shifted the burden of proof from the petitioners to the State, erroneously. 91. In Ram Krishna Dalmia, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that when the Court is called upon to adjudge the constitutionality of any particular law attacked as discriminatory and violative of equal protection of the laws, the law may be declared constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual has been treated as a class by himself. It has also been observed that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles. The Court must also presume that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discrimination is based on adequate grounds. In order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality, the court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived to be existing at the time of the legislation. It has also been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and un-known reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation. 92. In Jagadish Saran (Dr.) v. Union of India (1980) 2 SCC 768 , where the constitutionality of reservation of seats or quota for local candidates in professional courses was under challenge, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the burden, when protective discrimination for promotion of equalization is pleaded, is on the party who seeks to justify the ex facie deviation from equality. The case in defence of the deviation from equality must be clearly made out and not merely asserted. 93. In S.R. Bommai, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that when the Proclamation issued by the President of India under Article 356 (1) of the Constitution is challenged by making out a prima facie case with regard to its invalidity, the burden would be on the Union Government to satisfy that there existed material which showed that the Government could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Since such material would be exclusively within the knowledge of the Union Government, in view of the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the burden of proving the existence of such material would be on the Union Government. 94. In M. Nagaraj, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that before making the provision for reservations for persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in matters of promotions, the State concerned will have to show in each case the existence of the compelling reasons viz., backwardness, inadequacy of representation and overall administrative efficiency. 95. In E.V. Chinnaiah, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that in providing reservation to disadvantaged classes of people, the burden is on the State to show that such classification is reasonable and it has nexus with the object sought to be achieved. 96. In AIIMS Students’ Union, where 1/3rd quota of seats in post-graduate courses was reserved in favour of institutional candidates, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that when protective discrimination for promotion of equalization is pleaded, the burden is on the party who seeks to justify the ex facie deviation from equality. 97. In the recent case of Anuj Garg also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the burden of proving that legislation was enacted to achieve the constitutional goal of removing inequalities among different sections of the society, is on the State. It is for the State to show that such legislation does not violate Articles 14 and 15. 98. Thus, a close reading of the propositions laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court discloses that presumption is in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is on the person attacking its constitutionality, that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles. However, such a presumption of constitutionality of a statute is not available if it can be shown that facially the law or the surrounding circumstances on which the classification is based did not warrant such a classification and the statute made an invidious discrimination among citizens similarly situated. However, such a presumption of constitutionality of a statute is not available if it can be shown that facially the law or the surrounding circumstances on which the classification is based did not warrant such a classification and the statute made an invidious discrimination among citizens similarly situated. It is also discernible from the above propositions that when a statute is challenged and a prima facie case is made out by the person attacking such statute, the burden shifts to the State to satisfy that there exists some material which justifies the State action of a departure from the basic principle of equality; and as such material would be exclusively within the knowledge and domain of the State, the burden is upon the State to prove the existence of such material. For the reasons recorded hereafter, we are of the view that there was no material with the State to legitimize the classification involved in the impugned Act and as it is violative of Articles 15(1) and 16 (2) of the Constitution, the petitioners have discharged their initial burden and, therefore, the burden shifts to the State to place before the Court sufficient material for sustaining the impugned legislation. ii) Whether the recommendations of the Commission are sustainable 99. As stated hereinabove, there is no prescribed special standard of scrutiny. To examine the validity of the impugned Act, we must examine whether the conclusion arrived at by the State that the groups of Muslims incorporated in the Schedule appended to the impugned Act are, in fact, SEBCs. It is of vital importance to examine the same because, while giving certain rights to them by providing reservation, the State is proportionately depriving persons of other class of their opportunity to higher education and to employment in public services. Once a reservation is provided to the extent of 4% to the groups of Muslims incorporated in the impugned Act, the persons getting admission in educational institutions or getting employment in public services would be getting the said benefit at the cost of other persons belonging to either the unreserved classes or even persons legitimately belonging to other reserved classes. 100. In our opinion, what is important in the instant cases is to see whether the State had arrived at a correct conclusion by adopting rational methods of ascertaining social and educational backwardness of groups of Muslims. 101. 100. In our opinion, what is important in the instant cases is to see whether the State had arrived at a correct conclusion by adopting rational methods of ascertaining social and educational backwardness of groups of Muslims. 101. For the afore-stated purpose, the Court has to examine the entire procedure very meticulously for the reason that by virtue of the impugned enactment, rights of several other persons would be impacted and this Court has to protect the rights of other persons unless their rights are lawfully abridged so as to help disadvantaged groups as per the provisions of Articles 15 (4) and 16 (4) of the Constitution. In our opinion, our afore-stated view has been buttressed in principle by the observations made and law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney I. 102. Thus, for the purpose of ascertaining legality of the impugned enactment, we must scrutinise whether the conclusion by the State in relation to the social and educational backwardness of groups of Muslims enumerated in the Schedule appended to the impugned Act is just and proper. We have also to examine whether the methodology adopted by the Commission, on whose recommendation the State has enacted the impugned Act, was just and proper. 103. If the methodology adopted by the Commission for ascertaining whether the afore-stated groups of Muslims were socially and educationally backward, is found to be erroneous, in our opinion, the entire basis on which the impugned Act has been enacted would also be invalid and in that event, rights of other persons belonging to the unreserved classes and other reserved classes would be violated because, in that event, persons belonging to those groups or classes would be deprived of the opportunity of having admissions in certain educational institutions and public employment to the extent to which persons of groups enumerated in the Schedule appended to the impugned Act would get such benefit. 104. Thus, in our opinion, without giving any label to the nature of judicial review, we would examine the legality and validity of the impugned Act, keeping in view the afore-stated principles. 104. Thus, in our opinion, without giving any label to the nature of judicial review, we would examine the legality and validity of the impugned Act, keeping in view the afore-stated principles. If it is ultimately found that by virtue of the impugned Act, some rights given to a section of people are abridged in accordance with the constitutional provisions and that too for upliftment of disadvantaged classes, then the impugned Act would be legal and valid, but the same would not be valid if found otherwise. Methodology followed by the Commission 105. Pursuant to the judgment of this Court in Archana Reddy, on 17.4.2007, the Backward Classes Welfare Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh had addressed a letter to the Member Secretary of the Commission referring the matter pertaining to identification of backward classes among Muslims in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The relevant portions of the said letter are as under: “… in light of the commitment of the Government towards the cause of socially and educational backward classes of the population, including those belonging to the Muslim Community, and taking note of the observations made by the High Court in the said judgment and of the developments since the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, it is decided to make a reference to the A.P. Commission for Backward Classes under section 9 (1) of the A.P. Commission for Backward Classes Act, 1993 to make a survey / study of the Muslim community in Andhra Pradesh and identify the classes / communities / groups among the Muslim population in the State that can be classified as socially and educationally backward classes of citizens in the light of the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court in W.P.No.13832 of 2005 dated 7-11-2005 and judgment of the Hon’ble supreme Court in the Indra Sawhney case ( AIR 1993 SC 477 ), so that special measures like reservations be considered for such groups / classes / communities in terms of Article 15 (4), 15 (5), 16(4) and other provisions of the Constitution of India. The report with clear recommendations of the Commission with data pertaining to such groups / classes / communities to justify the recommendations should be sent to the Government as early as possible.” 106. The report with clear recommendations of the Commission with data pertaining to such groups / classes / communities to justify the recommendations should be sent to the Government as early as possible.” 106. In the afore-stated letter, the Government had requested the Commission to conduct a survey/study of the entire Muslim community of Andhra Pradesh and identify the classes/ communities/groups among the Muslim population in the State that can be classified as socially and educationally backward so that special measures like providing reservation can be considered for such groups in terms of Articles 15 (4), 15 (5) and 16 (4) among other provisions of the Constitution. The contents of the letter also disclose that the above exercise had to be done by the Commission purportedly keeping in view the judgment of this Court in W.P.No.13832 of 2005 dated 7-11-2005 (reported as B. Archana Reddy v. State of A.P.) and the judgment of the Hon’ble supreme Court in Indra Sawhney I. 107. The 2007 Act was enacted as an earlier attempt of the respondent State had failed when the afore-stated writ petition challenging Ordinance No.13 of 2005 and the consequent A.P. Reservation of Seats in the Educational Institutions and of Appointments/Posts in the Public Services under the State to Muslim Community Act, 2005, was allowed. In this context, we refer to the relevant portions of the summary of conclusions of the Honble Supreme Court in Indra Sahwney I at para 859, which were relied upon and followed by this Court in Archana Reddy on the question of the procedure or method for identification of Backward Classes. The same read as under: “859. … … … 3 (b) Neither the Constitution nor the law prescribes the procedure or method of identification of backward classes. Nor is it possible or advisable for the court to lay down any such procedure or method. It must be left to the authority appointed to identify. It can adopt such method/procedure as it thinks convenient and so long as its survey covers the entire populace, no objection can be taken to it. Identification of the backward classes can certainly be done with reference to castes among, and along with, other occupational groups, classes and sections of people. One can start the process either with occupational groups or with castes or with some other groups. Identification of the backward classes can certainly be done with reference to castes among, and along with, other occupational groups, classes and sections of people. One can start the process either with occupational groups or with castes or with some other groups. Thus one can start the process with the castes, wherever they are found, apply the criteria (evolved for determining backwardness) and find out whether it satisfies the criteria. If it does — what emerges is a “backward class of citizens” within the meaning of and for the purposes of Article 16(4). Similar process can be adopted in the case of other occupational groups, communities and classes, so as to cover the entire populace. The central idea and overall objective should be to consider all available groups, sections and classes in society. Since caste represents an existing, identifiable social group/class encompassing an overwhelming minority of the country’s population, one can well begin with it and then go to other groups, sections and classes. (Paras 780 and 785). (c) It is not correct to say that the backward class of citizens contemplated in Article 16 (4) is the same as the socially and educationally backward classes referred to in Article 15(4). It is much wider. The accent in Article 16(4) is on social backwardness. Of course, social, educational and economic backwardness are closely inter-twined in the Indian context. (Paras 786-789) (d) ‘Creamy layer’ can be, and must be excluded. (Paras 790-793) (e) It is not necessary for a class to be designated as a backward class that it is situated similarly to the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes. (Paras 794 and 797) (f) The adequacy of representation of a particular class in the services under the State is a matter within the subjective satisfaction of the appropriate Government. The judicial scrutiny in that behalf is the same as in other matters within the subjective satisfaction of an authority. (Para 798) (4) (a) A backward class of citizens cannot be identified only and exclusively with reference to economic criteria. (Para 799) (b) It is, of course, permissible for the Government or other authority to identify a backward class of citizens on the basis of occupation-cum-income, without reference to caste, if it is so advised (Para 800). (5) There is no constitutional bar to classify the backward classes of citizens into backward and more backward categories (Paras 801 to 803). (Para 799) (b) It is, of course, permissible for the Government or other authority to identify a backward class of citizens on the basis of occupation-cum-income, without reference to caste, if it is so advised (Para 800). (5) There is no constitutional bar to classify the backward classes of citizens into backward and more backward categories (Paras 801 to 803). (6) (a) and (b) The reservations contemplated in clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%. While 50% shall be the rule, it is necessary not to put out of consideration certain extraordinary situations inherent in the great diversity of this country and the people. It might happen that in far-flung and remote areas the population inhabiting those areas might, on account of their being out of the mainstream of national life and in view of the conditions peculiar to end characteristic of them need to be treated in a different way, some relaxation in this strict rule may become imperative. In doing so, extreme caution is to be exercised and a special case made out. (Paras 804 to 813) (c) The rule of 50% should be applied to each year. It cannot be related to the total strength of the class, category, service or cadre, as the case may be. (Para 814) (8) While the rule of reservation cannot be called anti-meritarian; there are certain services and posts to which it may not be advisable to apply the rule of reservation. (Paras 832 to 841) (9) There is no particular or special standard of judicial scrutiny applicable to matters arising under Article 16(4). (Para 842) (13) The Government of India and the State Governments have the power to, and ought to, create a permanent mechanism — in the nature of a Commission — for examining requests of inclusion and complaints of over-inclusion or non-inclusion in the list of OBCs and to advise the Government, which advice shall ordinarily be binding upon the Government. Where, however, the Government does not accept the advice, it must record its reasons therefor. (Para 847) (14) In view of the answers given by us herein and the directions issued herewith, it is not necessary to express any opinion on the correctness and adequacy of the exercise done by the Mandal Commission. It is equally unnecessary to send the matters back to the Constitution Bench of five Judges. (Paras 848 to 850)” 108. (Para 847) (14) In view of the answers given by us herein and the directions issued herewith, it is not necessary to express any opinion on the correctness and adequacy of the exercise done by the Mandal Commission. It is equally unnecessary to send the matters back to the Constitution Bench of five Judges. (Paras 848 to 850)” 108. In Archana Reddy, this Court had declared Ordinance No.13 of 2005 and the consequent A.P. Reservation of Seats in the Educational Institutions and of Appointments/Posts in the Public Services under the State to Muslim Community Act, 2005 as unconstitutional on the ground that the Ordinance and the 2005 Act were violative of Articles 15 (4) and 16 (4) of the Constitution. This Court held therein that the conclusions arrived at by the Commission for suggesting the Backward Classes were based on identification and application of irrelevant criteria to a grossly inadequate data collected by the Commission. It was further held that since declaration of 5% reservation for the entire Muslim community in educational institutions and public services was based on religion and the total reservation to the backward classes, including 5% reservation to Muslims, was exceeding 50% ceiling limit, the impugned Ordinance and the Act were not sustainable and were liable to be set aside. The relevant portion from the summary of conclusions in the above judgment reads as under: “… … … 377. … When a legislation or executive action providing reservations is challenged before the Constitutional Court, primary scrutiny should be searching and strict scrutiny. Primary review is mainly concerned with the legislative competency of the legislation enacting the impugned law and question whether such legislation or executive action violating the fundamental rights under Article 14, 15 and 16 of Constitution of India. During such primary review, so as to satisfy the strict scrutiny test, it is for the State to demonstrate before the Court that the conditions precedent for exercising the power under Article 15(4) and 16(4) exist. The burden entirely lies on the State to prove and justify the legislation when such legislation prima facie is suspect of being unconstitutional. However, when the secondary review is taken up to examine the question of irrationality and arbitrariness in the provisions of the impugned legislation or executive action, the Court need to apply intermediate or deferential scrutiny by applying Wednesbury principle. 378. ... However, when the secondary review is taken up to examine the question of irrationality and arbitrariness in the provisions of the impugned legislation or executive action, the Court need to apply intermediate or deferential scrutiny by applying Wednesbury principle. 378. ... While determining social backwardness of a class of citizens, an expert body like B.C.Commission has to necessarily evolve absolutely relevant criteria for the purpose of caste test, occupation test and means test. Wherever social backwardness is due to a class of people being born in a homogenous endogamous group called caste with common traits and rigid customs and social rules, the caste test itself lead to an inference that the class/caste is socially backward. If the occupation of majority of a class of citizens is considered inferior and unremunerative, and such class of people is considered lowly placed in the society, it would ordinarily satisfy the test of social backwardness. The means test presupposes that by reason of birth in a class of people, historically and traditionally the entire class suffers from perennial poverty, in which case, the means test would enable the determination of social backwardness. The B.C. Commission did not evolve any criteria for identifying social backwardness and did not apply the three tests in a scientific and objective manner. 379. … the B.C. Commission at the stage of collecting preliminary data, evolving criteria and conducting public hearings for the purpose of hearing objections from the public, did not take such steps which can be called transparent and fair. Though, the nature of enquiry by B.C.Commission cannot be strictly treated as quasi-judicial, but still while undertaking an exercise for identification of backward class of citizens, the Commission is legally bound to be fair and transparent and afford all such opportunity to objectors and proponents for effective representation before the Commission. The prior non-publication of criteria and data collected by the B.C.Commission renders the report of the B.C.Commission illegal being contrary to provisions of B.C.Commission Act and principles of fairness. 380. ... The sample collected by the B.C.Commission is not representative of the population both with reference to general population and Muslim population. The sampling design is defective and imperfect. The analysis of the data by the B.C. Commission is faulty for more than one reason. 380. ... The sample collected by the B.C.Commission is not representative of the population both with reference to general population and Muslim population. The sampling design is defective and imperfect. The analysis of the data by the B.C. Commission is faulty for more than one reason. So to say, the collection of the data, the analysis of the data and the conclusions drawn from the data are not scientific and B.C. Commission totally failed in considering the reference made to it in an objective manner after taking into consideration the entire population, as mandated by the nine-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney-I. 381. ...The B.C. Commission laid over-emphasis on educational backwardness and economic backwardness of Muslim community in coming to the conclusion that Muslims are socially backward. This is contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Balaji, Jayasree, Vasanth Kumar and Indra Sawhney-I, to the effect that mere poverty, economic backwardness and educational backwardness are not indicative of social backwardness which is unignorable conditionality for operating Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India. To be branded as a socially backward, apart from poverty, economic backwardness and educational backwardness, there should be something more in a class of citizens for qualifying for the benefit of reservation. The B.C.Commission totally ignored this aspect of the matter and therefore its report cannot stand the scrutiny of this Court. The B.C.Commission and the impugned Ordinance which is entirely based on it is unconstitutional and ultra vires Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India. 382. ... The impugned Ordinance is religion specific aimed at providing five per cent reservation to Muslim community. The preamble, the long title and Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the impugned Ordinance abundantly make it clear that it is a legislation intended to benefit a class of people who belong to Muslim community. Such legislation is violative of Article 15(1) and 16 (2) of Constitution of India and therefore void. 383. … The action of the State in making a single point reference to B.C. Commission, though number of claims for inclusion in the list of backward classes by other communities are pending, does not in any manner violate Article 14 of Constitution of India. … … …” 109. 383. … The action of the State in making a single point reference to B.C. Commission, though number of claims for inclusion in the list of backward classes by other communities are pending, does not in any manner violate Article 14 of Constitution of India. … … …” 109. While allowing the writ petitions, Archana Reddy had given the following directives in paragraphs 114, 293, 378 and 379, which read as under: “1) There must be a causal nexus between the Islamic faith aggregate and the pursuit of certain professions, trades or humble economic circumstances. (para 114) 2) The very purpose of issuing notification inviting objections and conducting public hearings, would be defeated if the criteria is not decided prior to undertaking the collection of data and putting the objectors on notice. (para 293) 3) While determining the social backwardness of a class of citizens, an expert body like B.C. Commission has to necessarily evolve absolutely relevant criteria for the purpose of caste test, occupation test and means test. (para 378) 4) While undertaking an exercise for identification of backward class of citizens, the Commission is legally bound to be fair and transparent and afford all such opportunity to objectors and proponents for effective representation before the Commission. (para 379)” 110. At this stage, we cannot ignore that the law laid down by this Court in Archana Reddy still holds the field, though its validity has been questioned before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.7513 of 2005. In the said Civil Appeal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, by its order dated 04.1.2006, while directing maintenance of status quo with regard to admissions into educational institutions, has observed: “Having heard the learned counsel and having perused the constitutional provisions and the Report as also the impugned judgment, we are not inclined to stay the operation of the impugned judgment and make operational a law which has been invalidated by the High Court, as an interim measure. In view of the above, there will be a limited stay, above indicated.” 111. In view of the above, there will be a limited stay, above indicated.” 111. It is also pertinent to mention that the observations made by this Court in Archana Reddy are in conformity with the guiding principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in Indra Sawhney I. The learned advocates appearing for the parties concede the position that the Commission was bound by the methodology suggested in the afore-stated two judgments while collecting data for determining whether a particular group can be considered as backward for the purpose of recommending affirmative action by the State. 112. As per the procedure suggested in Indra Sawhney I and this Court in Archana Reddy, the Commission -- 1) must notify the proposed criteria, invite objections and suggestions to the said criteria and conduct public hearings by putting the objectors to notice. Based on the responses, it must formulate rational, scientific and objective criteria for determining the caste test, occupation test and the means test; 2) can adopt any method/procedure for identification of social and educational backwardness of a particular class/group, but it has to conduct a field survey covering the population of a particular class of citizens, record oral and documentary evidence, apply the criteria evolved earlier to the data collected and find out whether the data of that particular class satisfies the criteria so evolved for declaring them as socially and educationally backward; 3) has to investigate whether the said backward classes are inadequately represented in the services of the State and if not, should give its report recommending for inclusion of such classes into the list of backward classes. 113. Now, we have to see whether the Commission had followed the afore-stated principles and methodology while drawing up its report and recommending the specified Muslim groups as being socially and educationally backward and for their inclusion in the list of Backward Classes. 114. It has been submitted by the petitioners that, when in the year 1994, the Government had requested the Commission to undertake revision of the socioeconomic position of all castes in the State and the matter was pending, the Government of Andhra Pradesh ought to have waited till the report was given by the Commission, or ought to have requested the Commission to expedite the revision and submit its report. It has been further submitted that the State Government had hastily taken up the issue of providing reservation to Muslims alone when the claims of 112 other castes/groups were pending before the Commission. It has been further submitted by the petitioners that - 1) The Commission had failed to i) evolve and notify any criteria, ii) conduct a survey to ascertain the comparative backwardness among Muslims and/or others; iii) identify the social and educational backwardness; iv) furnish necessary material to the objectors prior to public hearing; v) produce any material in support of ‘inadequate representation’ as required under Article 16 (4) of the Constitution; and vi) evaluate the reports of Anantaraman, Mandal, Muralidhar Rao and National Commission for Backward Classes (NCBC); 2) When the Commission itself was in existence, the very appointment of Mr. P.S. Krishnan for identification of backwardness among Muslims was ultra vires the 1993 Act and Article 162 of the Constitution; 3) Mr.P.S. Krishnan had relied on the articles written by different authors and published in People of India Series compiled by the Anthropological Survey of India (AnSI); 4) Dependence by the Commission on Mr. Krishnans report was illegal and in contravention of the directions of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney I and of the High Court in Archana Reddy as the exercise of classification by Mr.Krishnan was wholly irrelevant to Articles 15 (4), 16 (4); 5) The share of Muslims in public employment was 9.09% at the relevant time and that was commensurate with their population percentage in the State. The sample size collected by the Commission was not in proportion to the Muslim population. Reservations provided to the backward classes under the four categories A, B, C and D were based on the population, whereas category E had been included by virtue of the 2007 Act; 6) Though this Court, in B. Archana Reddy, has observed that to tide over all the infirmities, there should be an increase in the sample size, and the Commission had also expressed its view that sample size of not less than 2% was necessary for a fair result, the samples collected by it were not even 1/38th of the standard sample size; 7) The Commission did not declare on what basis it had determined social backwardness. It did not define even conceptually the terms “educational backwardness”, “social backwardness” and “inadequate representation in the services under the State”. It did not define even conceptually the terms “educational backwardness”, “social backwardness” and “inadequate representation in the services under the State”. It also did not explain the total educational deficiency among the Muslim groups. The data of 2001 Census does not support the conclusion of the Commission that Muslims are socially and educationally backward; 8) The recommendations of the Commission were deficient because it had failed to gather and compute the data of individual population of each of the 32 Muslim groups so as to declare that they were inadequately represented, and enclose the same with the report. The Commission had assumed on the basis of illusory data that Muslims were under-represented; 9) Though the process of collection of data, compilation of the survey material and discussion on the collected material was completed by 29.6.2007 (27.6.2007, as stated in the report), the Commission had submitted its report on 02.7.2007, which is about 206 pages, within a span of two days after analyzing the data collected by it, which legitimizes an inference as to inadequate application of mind to a solemn exercise. 115. On the other hand, it has been submitted on behalf of the State and the other respondents that -- 1) Even prior to the 2007 Act, all the Scheduled Caste converts were placed under one group viz., Group C and simply because the 14 identified groups belonging to Muslim community were included in the list under a separate Group E, the impugned Act cannot be termed as religion specific. If the newly identified groups were included in the already existing groups, they could not have competed with the other backward classes and, therefore, they were shown in a separate group; 2) i) The process of reviewing the existing backward classes in the list under Section 11 of the 1993 Act is different from the process of identifying the backward classes under Section 9 (1) and the Act does not prohibit inclusion of new groups or classes in the list, pending the revision. There was nothing wrong if the Commission looked into some of the claims out of 112 claims, which included even the claims made by the persons belonging to unreserved classes like Brahmin, Vaishya, Velama etc.; ii) the claimants whose cases were pending consideration before the Commission had not approached this Court, and the petitioners, who are not concerned with the claimants, could not plead or advocate the case of those claimants; 3) i) There cannot be a uniform procedure/criteria for identification of backward classes; ii) the body entrusted to identify the backward classes can adopt such approach and procedure, as it deems appropriate, but such approach should be rational; iii) Neither in Indra Sawhney I nor in any other case has the Honble Supreme Court has ruled that the criteria evolved or adopted by the Commission needs to be published. The 1993 Act also would not obligate the Commission to publish the criteria evolved by the Commission; iv) it is not open to the Courts to scrutinise the criteria evolved by the Commission in minute detail; v) in the cases on hand, the Commission was only asked to identify SEBC Muslims keeping in view the judgments delivered in Indra Sawhney I and Archana Reddy, whereas the previous Commissions viz., Anantaraman, Muralidhar Rao and Mandal were asked to lay down the criteria. Even otherwise, the previous Commissions had published the criteria after the entire exercise was completed i.e. after hearing all the objections and while preparing the report, but not before preparing their reports; vi) the petitioners had not challenged the reference letter dated 19.7.2005 in the writ petitions; 4) There was no prohibition on the State Government either under the Constitution or under any statute to entrust the work relating to collection of necessary material through an expert like Mr.P.S. Krishnan, for fulfilling its constitutional obligation. The Commission’s function would be only to submit its report for making recommendations or giving advice to the State Government and it would be for the State to take appropriate final decision. Mr. The Commission’s function would be only to submit its report for making recommendations or giving advice to the State Government and it would be for the State to take appropriate final decision. Mr. Krishnans appointment for the purpose of gathering information on the issue, while simultaneously referring the matter to the Commission on the subject, was well within the powers of the State Government; 5) i) Under Section 9 (1) of the 1993 Act, “examine” and “hear” are two different expressions used for two distinct functions referred to therein and, therefore, when the Commission performs the function of “examining” the requests for inclusion of any class of citizens as backward class in the list, the question of “hearing” the petitioners does not arise. ii) A decision, which has no adjudicatory character, cannot comprise the subject of judicial scrutiny; 6) Mr. Krishnans function was to discover the occupational and other social groups of Muslims, having regard to their historical and sociological background coupled with their contemporary positions and Mr. Krishnan had studied the subject scrupulously and carefully by relying on various sources, and only after collecting and suitably analyzing the data in a proper manner and after considering the same from various angles, he had submitted his well considered report after thorough application of mind. AnSI report was based on anthropological study, dealing with social strata of various groups, but not in the context of Articles 15 and 16. Mr.Krishnan had relied on AnSI report only for identifying the existence of distinct homogenous groups in the Muslim community; 7) There was nothing wrong if the Commission used the sound material like Mr.Krishnans report. It had not only relied on Mr.Krishnans report, but had also followed the ‘fast track’ and ‘rough and ready criteria’ adopted by the National Commission for Backward Classes (NCBC), besides following the criteria evolved by the Mandal Commission for identifying Backward Classes among non-Hindu communities. The Commission had also conducted an independent enquiry/survey, as it deemed necessary. The findings of the Commission on the backwardness of “Atchukattlavandlu” and “Turaka Kasha” were solely based on is own efforts and Mr.Krishnan’s report had no role in the said conclusion; 8) i) Though the percentage of employment of Muslim community in the State Public employment was 9.262%, which was more than their population proportion of 9.17%, their employment had mainly concentrated in Class III and IV posts. The percentage of SEBCs among Muslims in public employment was much less in Class III and IV posts and it was negligible in higher posts. ii) The public employment obtained through reservation cannot be counted to compute and assess adequate representation in the services under the State; iii) it has to be seen whether a particular group is adequately represented in higher cadres of public employment and merely because some groups occupy places in public employment in the lower rung, the same cannot be treated as adequate representation in public employment in its true spirit and sense; 9) The survey conducted by the Commission was to ascertain contra-evidence, if any. The Commission had conducted the survey by making inquiries from more number of persons than surveyed by the earlier Commissions. Adequacy or inadequacy of the sample or survey cannot be gone into by this Court and sufficiency of material gathered by a fact finding body would not fall within the ambit of judicial scrutiny; 10) i) Though the Commission was aware of the total population of Muslims, the details of population with regard to the individual communities were not available and unless the Commission had the figures of the population of the individual groups, it was not possible for the Commission to fix the size of the sample to be studied for collection of data of particular communities. ii) Absence of caste-wise or group-wise census was no bar for identification of SEBC Muslims and the survey that had been conducted by the Commission was to cross-check whether a particular community existed elsewhere in the State or not; 11) The petitioners had neither pleaded that the identified groups were not socially and educationally backward nor had questioned the action of the Commission in identifying the backwardness of the identified groups on the basis of their traditional occupation. There was no plea, in any of the writ petitions, that in Andhra Pradesh, the 14 identified groups were not in existence and no contra-material had been placed by them to show that the identified groups were socially and educationally advanced. 116. In view of the above competing submissions, firstly, we may notice the functions of the Commission, which are enumerated in Section 9 of the 1993 Act, which read as under: “9. 116. In view of the above competing submissions, firstly, we may notice the functions of the Commission, which are enumerated in Section 9 of the 1993 Act, which read as under: “9. The functions of the Commission are: 1) to examine requests for inclusion of any class of citizens as backward classes in the list and hear complaints of over inclusion or under inclusion of any backward class in such list and tender such advise to the Govt. as it deems appropriate, 2) to make recommendations on any other matter relating to the backward classes that may be referred to it by the Govt. from time to time, 3) to make an interim report in regard to any castes or classes in whose case urgent action, necessary under the Act in the opinion of the Govt., 4) to enquire into specific complaints with regard to the non-observance of the rule of reservation in the admissions into educational institutions and also reservation of appointments to posts/services under the Govt. and other local authorities or other authority in the State. 117. A reading of the provisions of Section 9 shows that besides other functions, the Commission has to examine the requests for inclusion of any class of citizens, hear complaints of over-inclusion or under-inclusion and make recommendations on any other matter to the Government relating to backward classes. What the Commission did 118. In terms of the reference made by the Government vide letter dated 17.4.2007, the Commission had conducted a survey and submitted the report to the State Government, which is placed on record of the writ petitions. A detailed perusal of the report discloses that the Commission had sub-divided its report into six chapters viz., 1) introduction, 2) constitutional provisions, 3) methodology followed by the Commission, 4) statistics regarding Muslim communities in A.P., 5) social groups, survey and analysis and 6) recommendations. It can be seen from Chapter III of the report that the Commission had issued a public notification on 26.4.2007 inviting representations, suggestions and objections on the inclusion of certain communities/groups/classes among Muslims in the list of backward classes. It can be seen from Chapter III of the report that the Commission had issued a public notification on 26.4.2007 inviting representations, suggestions and objections on the inclusion of certain communities/groups/classes among Muslims in the list of backward classes. In this notification, the Commission mentioned that though previously some of the Muslim groups viz., 1) Fakeer (Darvesh), 2) Pakeerla (Bonthala), 3) Labbi/Labbai, 4) Qureshi (Muslim Butcher), 5) Muslim Rajakas, 6) Thuraka Kasha and 7) Achukatlavandlu (Muslim) had already made representations for their inclusion into the list of backward classes, keeping in view the terms of the reference, it had decided to call for the representations/ suggestions/objections in the matter of inclusion of all classes/communities/groups among the Muslim community from all interested persons. The Commission had accordingly conducted the first round of public hearings on 14.5.2007, 15.5.2007, 16.5.2007, 22.5.2007, 28.5.2007 and 01.6.2007; and had received several representations from the individuals and associations – some in favour of inclusion of the Muslim community as a whole and some for inclusion of certain occupational groups among Muslim community in the list of backward classes. In all, the Commission was requested to include 37 Muslim groups into the list of backward classes. It can also be seen from Chapter III that the Commission had also received objections from five individuals/associations for inclusion of Muslims in the list of backward classes. Shri K. Kondal Rao, Advocate, Hyderabad (the petitioner in Writ Petition No.25282 of 2007 and a party-in-person), is one of the objectors before the Commission. 119. Upon perusal of Chapter III, it is found that Mr. P.S. Krishnan, a retired IAS Officer had been appointed as Advisor to the Department of Backward Classes Welfare for identifying SEBCs among Muslim communities in Andhra Pradesh. Mr.Krishnan had submitted his report and the said report had been forwarded by the Principal Secretary to the Government, Backward Classes Welfare Department, to the Commission on 11.6.2007. The said report was put on website on 12.6.2007 by the Commission for information to the public at large and for the purpose of inviting views, suggestions, and objections from the public. The Commission had also fixed a Schedule whereby objections and views of people were to be received and public hearing on the subject was to take place. Hearing was given to the public at large on the afore-stated subject by the Commission from 23rd to 26th June, 2007. 120. The Commission had also fixed a Schedule whereby objections and views of people were to be received and public hearing on the subject was to take place. Hearing was given to the public at large on the afore-stated subject by the Commission from 23rd to 26th June, 2007. 120. It is also borne out from Chapter III that the Commission, apart from the report of Mr.P.S. Krishnan, had referred to the reports of Justice Ranganath Mishra, Justice Rajindar Sachar and had concluded that the approach adopted by Mr.P.S.Krishnan was realistic, valid and legally sustainable. The Commission had also deputed a survey team headed by the Deputy Director (Statistics) to conduct door-to-door survey so as to gather the relevant data. The survey team had formulated a questionnaire for identification of socially and educationally backward classes in the Muslim community, namely: a) social status, b) occupation, c) aspects of discrimination with regard to profession, occupation, social situation, d) economic status, e) details of ownership of movable and immovable property etc. f) status of indebtedness, g) access to amenities like telephone, personal transport, h) details of residence and whether living in a slum, i) literacy and level of education completed and j) details of employment, if any, in public services. The Commission had apparently deliberated on the survey data and the analysis thereof is set out in Chapter V of its report. 121. It can also be seen from Chapter III of the report that the Commission had referred to the guidelines adopted by the National Commission for Backward Classes for consideration of requests for inclusion and complaints of under-inclusion in the Central List of other Backward Classes Annexure - 3a at pg.174 of Commission’s report., especially the guidelines for those questions which pertain to “fast track” NCBC guidelines for filling up questionnaire is enclosed as Annexure-3b. “Fast track” procedure discussed at the bottom of pg.181. and the two criteria of Mandal Commission for identification of socially and educationally backward classes in Non-Hindu Communities. 122. Chapter-IV of the Commissions report deals with the statistics of Muslim communities in Andhra Pradesh. In this chapter, the Commission has referred to the list of Muslim communities and other minorities, who were declared as other backward classes at the all India level. The Commission had gathered this list from the National Backward Classes Commission in 2006. 122. Chapter-IV of the Commissions report deals with the statistics of Muslim communities in Andhra Pradesh. In this chapter, the Commission has referred to the list of Muslim communities and other minorities, who were declared as other backward classes at the all India level. The Commission had gathered this list from the National Backward Classes Commission in 2006. The Commission had incorporated the details of percentage of Muslims selected in various entrance examinations and in various recruitments and observed that the low figures shown in the tables included Muslim BC groups for whom there was reservation and the other Muslim groups, who were not socially backward. It is also mentioned in this Chapter that the figures collected by the Commission in 2001 would show that out of the 9,48,980 employees working in 27 departments, 77,919 were Muslim employees, other than those of the reserved category. There were also 587 Mehtar and 9389 Dudekula Muslims, who belonged to the reserved category. The Commission expressed its inability to segregate the Muslim employees group-wise. The Commission categorically admits that it could not obtain the relevant figures for some of the groups of Muslims, who were under its consideration. 123. A mention is also made in Chapter IV of the report that the Chairman of the Commission had addressed a letter to the Chief Secretary to the Government on 05.5.2007 to direct all the Heads of Departments to furnish the particulars of persons belonging to groups/classes among Muslim community and on 08.5.2007 the Government had asked all the Secretaries to furnish the particulars to the Commission. In that letter, the Commission had sought information in respect of only seven social groups among Muslims viz., 1) Fakeer (Darvesh), 2) Pakeerulu (Bonthala), 3) Labbi/Labbai, 4) Qureshi (Butcher), 5) Muslim Rajakas, 6) Turaka Kasha and 7) Achukatlavandlu and had received information in respect of these seven social groups. The Commission clearly records that it could not collect any information with regard to the other social groups of Muslims, since their cases had come up before it at a subsequent date i.e. after 05.5.2007. 124. The Commission had forwarded its recommendations for inclusion of several classes of Muslims in the list of backward classes without information and data. The Commission clearly records that it could not collect any information with regard to the other social groups of Muslims, since their cases had come up before it at a subsequent date i.e. after 05.5.2007. 124. The Commission had forwarded its recommendations for inclusion of several classes of Muslims in the list of backward classes without information and data. The Commission did not explain the urgent need for recommending the other so-called social groups of Muslims viz., 1) Guddi Eluguvallu, 2) Siddi, 3) Garadi, 4) Attar Saibulu, 5) Gosangi Muslim, 6) Shaik/ Sheik, 7) Hajam/Nai and 8) Shia Imami Ismaili/Khoja, 9) Arab 10) Bohara, 11) Syed/Saiyed/ Sayyad/Mushaik, 12) Mughal/Moghal, 13) Pathan, 14) Navayat, 15) Irani, 16) Kutchi Memon, 17) Jamayat, for their inclusion in the list of backward classes without making even minimal effort for gathering information and data regarding these groups. 125. The Commission dealt with the survey and analysis of the community status among Muslims in Chapter V of its report. At the commencement of this Chapter, the Commission has stated that the survey details of social groups of Muslims are based on the description of each social group by the Anthropological Survey of India in its book “People of India”. In this Chapter, the Commission has referred to the identity, synonyms, geographical location, special dress, background, social status, educational status, employment status, economic status of 1) Faqir/Fhakir Budbudki, 2) Borewale, 3) Labbai/Labbi, 4) Qureshi/Kureshi/Khureshi, 5) Dhobi Muslim/ Muslim Dhobi/Dhobi Musalman, 6) Chakketakare, 7) Achukatlavandlu (Muslims), 8) Guddi Eluguvallu, 9) Siddi, 10) Garadi/Garadi Muslim, 11) Attar Saibulu, 12) Gosangi Muslim, 13) Shaik/Sheikh, 14) Hajam/Nai/Navid, and to the recommendations made by Mr. P.S.Krishnan in his report and then has recorded its recommendations that since the above groups belonged to the lower strata and that they were socially and educationally backward, they deserved to be included in the list of backward classes. The Commission has also considered other groups of Muslims viz., 1) Shia Imami Ismaili/Khoja, 2) Arab, 3) Bohara, 4) Syed/Saiyed/ Sayyad/Mushaik, 5) Mughal/Moghal, 6) Pathan, 7) Navayat, 8) Irani, 9) Kutchi Memon and 10) Jamayath and observed that these communities enjoyed a high social status and were not socially backward and, therefore, were ineligible for inclusion in the list of backward classes. 126. Chapter VI of the report of the Commission deals with its recommendations. 126. Chapter VI of the report of the Commission deals with its recommendations. In this Chapter, the Commission has observed that the Ahle Hadeeth, Ahle Sunnath Wal Jamat,Mahadavis, Sunni, Shia, Tableegi, Wahabi, who had made requests for inclusion in the backward classes list, were all religious denominations or sects and not social groups and, therefore, it advised the government that their requests be rejected. The Commission has, however, recommended for inclusion of other Muslim groups, excluding 1) Syed/ Saiyed/Sayyad/Mushaik, 2) Mughal/Moghal, 3) Pathans, 4) Irani, 5) Arab, 6) Bohara, Bohra, 7) Shia Imami Ismaili, Khoja, 8) Cutchi-Memon, 9) Jamayat and 10) Navayat and all the synonyms and sub-groups of the above excluded groups and except those who have been already included in the State list of backward classes. The reason given for inclusion of “other Muslim groups” is given as under: “V(c). Commission also considered item 14 of the recommendation of the Advisor Shri P.S. Krishnan. It notes that this principle of excluding the socially advanced classes of Muslims has been in practice in the Central OBC lists for Kerala and Karnataka. This exclusion ensures that only the socially and educationally backward come into the BC list and should give confidence about the correctness of the inclusions. Further, it is also a fact that there may be communities or groups that are so remote and lacking in awareness that they have not moved for inclusion, and the State and its institutions and also academic scholars have not been able to reach out to them. Such groups will also be automatically covered under this item. They will then not have to lose time making requests and waiting for the Commissions enquiry and advice and Governments orders which is a time consuming process. One more important factor in favour of this item is that, in the various hearings and reports in the newspapers many Muslim groups have expressed the feeling that the Muslim community has evolved over time, that many of them have left their traditional occupations and moved over to the towns and cities and have left behind their ancient moorings, that many of them are not well to do and that there may be some segments of the Muslim population who would not like to be associated with the old professions which are considered as socially inferior or due to the basic egalitarian principle of Islam. Such groups would be covered under “Other Muslims”. The Commission also feels that this clause cannot be misused as all identified socially non-backward groups are proposed to be excluded as proposed in Chapter V (15) and further as the creamy layer is proposed to be excluded. Hence, the Commission agrees with this recommendation of Sri P.S. Krishnan and recommends inclusion as item (15) ...” 127. Now, we may briefly peruse the reports of the Anantaraman and Mandal Commissions with regard to the procedure/criteria followed by them, not for comparison, but to have an idea as to the methodology adopted by those Commissions for identifying the social and educational backwardness. We are referring to the reports of these Commissions because Anantaraman Commission was the first Commission appointed by the State of Andhra Pradesh, whose report has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Balaram. As regards the report of the Mandal Commission, the Commission was constituted for identifying the backward classes throughout the country, and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney I has observed that the Commission had made its recommendations on the basis of massive statistics collected by it and accordingly upheld its report holding that the recommendations made therein were supportive of affirmative action programmes. 128. A study of the Anantaraman Commission report discloses that it had provided opportunity to all individuals, associations and organisations to express their views and had issued a questionnaire suggesting criteria so as to give a chance to the people to show under which criteria they can be regarded as backward. In pursuance of this effort, the said Commission had received many replies and memoranda expressing divergent views and some suggestions to determine social and educational backwardness. In that process, the Anantaraman Commission had also noticed the criteria followed by the other State Governments and the Backward Classes Commission appointed by the Government of India. After examining various suggestions and views and the criteria followed by the other State Governments, the Anantaraman Commission had spelt out various tests for determining social backwardness. Therefore, it becomes clear that the said Commission had followed a rational and scientific method for laying down the criteria for identifying social and educational backwardness. 129. After examining various suggestions and views and the criteria followed by the other State Governments, the Anantaraman Commission had spelt out various tests for determining social backwardness. Therefore, it becomes clear that the said Commission had followed a rational and scientific method for laying down the criteria for identifying social and educational backwardness. 129. In its report, the Mandal Commission observed that the objective tests and criteria for proper classification of socially and educationally backward classes had to be laid down because the recommendations of the first Backward Classes Commission (Kaka Kalelker Commission) were rejected on that score. The Mandal Commission had employed great care to collect facts and figures relevant for the purpose. It had issued three different questionnaires to the State Governments, to Central Ministries/Departments and to the General Public, voluntary organisations, etc. The information collected in response to these questionnaires was systematically compiled and analysed and then it had evolved criteria on the basis of field investigations and other independent evidence. Even in respect of fixation of the sample size, the Mandal Commission had obtained the views of the experts’ panel and the technical advisory committee and on the basis of the advice, it was decided that 100% coverage of two villages and one urban block in each district of the country would be adequate as 1% sample of the countrys population might be too large. The Commission, after having wide ranging discussions, evolved eleven indicators or criteria for determining social and educational backwardness. These indicators were grouped under three broad heads viz., social, educational and economic and separate weightage points were given to them. 130. The present Commission had neither evolved any criteria nor published the same before inviting objections except stating that it had followed the two criteria evolved by the Mandal Commission for identification of SEBCs among non-Hindu communities. The Commission had also not finalized the criteria after hearing the objectors. What the Commission had done is that it had issued a public notification inviting representations, suggestions and objections on the inclusion of only seven Muslim groups viz., 1) Fakeer, 2) Pakeerla, 3) Labbi/Labbai, 4) Qureshi, 5) Muslim Rajakas, 6) Turka Kasha and 7) Achukatlavandlu. It did not notify the criteria and the factors which it intended to consider or apply before proceeding further in identifying social and educational backwardness of the above Muslim groups. It did not notify the criteria and the factors which it intended to consider or apply before proceeding further in identifying social and educational backwardness of the above Muslim groups. This procedural error committed by the Commission is fatal to its report and its consequent recommendations. 131. Another important aspect is with regard to obtaining relevant data to ascertain whether the groups of Muslims, who have been included in Group ‘E’ were, in fact, socially and educationally backward. In order to ascertain whether the members of a particular group are socially and educationally backward for giving them the benefit of reservation, the Commission was required to collect the relevant data and upon analysis of the data regarding social status, education, income etc. of persons belonging to that group with that of the others, it ought to have considered whether persons belonging to the particular group are socially and educationally backward or socially backward and under-represented in public employment, as the case may be. 132. For the afore-stated purpose, necessary survey should have been conducted by the Commission either by means of collecting data with regard to the entire population or by adopting a scientific sampling method. Perhaps, to collect data with regard to the entire population is difficult and in such cases, data may be collected on scientific basis by adopting any of the standard and well established methods of sampling. For determining the size of the sample, first of all the size of the population must be ascertained. Upon knowing the population size, the concerned person or the Commission should have decided the size of the sample and the locations from where the sample was to be collected for gathering the relevant data. 133. It is deplorable that in the instant case, the Commission was not aware about the total population of the persons belonging to the groups of Muslims, who have been included in Group ‘E’. It is an admitted fact that the Commission was not having details about total population of the groups, which have been included in Group ‘E’. In our considered opinion, it is necessary to know the total population because, for the purpose of determining the size of the sample, it is necessary to know the total population. It is an admitted fact that the Commission was not having details about total population of the groups, which have been included in Group ‘E’. In our considered opinion, it is necessary to know the total population because, for the purpose of determining the size of the sample, it is necessary to know the total population. In Indra Sawhney I, on the basis of the report submitted by the Mandal Commission, it has been observed that the sample size of 1% of the countrys population comprising 65 lakh persons may be too large, especially in view of the limited time available to it. Unless one knows the total size of the population, it cannot be decided as to how big or small the sample size should be. 134. In the absence of any idea with regard to the population of persons belonging to each of the groups included in Group ‘E’, we fail to understand how the Commission could have decided upon the sample size. In fact, the sample size had not been determined by the Commission. Therefore, the procedure of collecting data by sampling was perverse. 135. It is also important to consider whether the authority collecting the data is collecting the data by itself or is relying upon the data collected by somebody else, which is popularly known as secondary data. 136. In the instant case, the Commission has relied upon the secondary data because, it has relied upon the data collected by the AnSI and Mr.Krishnan. While relying upon the secondary data, it is very important to know the purpose for which someone else had collected the data. If the purpose for which another person/agency had collected the data and the purpose for which the data is being used by the Commission are unconnected, the final conclusion arrived at by the Commission on the basis of such secondary data would be incorrect. The data collected by the AnSI was clearly not for the purpose of determining whether the persons in respect of whom the data was collected were socially and educationally backward classes. We have already referred to hereinabove the purpose for which the AnSI had collected the data. The data collected by the AnSI was clearly not for the purpose of determining whether the persons in respect of whom the data was collected were socially and educationally backward classes. We have already referred to hereinabove the purpose for which the AnSI had collected the data. Looking to the variance of the purpose for which the data was collected by the AnSI and the purpose for which the Commission had used the same, in our opinion, the conclusions by the Commission on the basis of the said data cannot be sustained and it would not be legitimate for the State to formulate a reservation policy on the basis of such irrelevant recommendations by the Commission. 137. A perusal of the report of the Commission, particularly in relation to the methodology of the survey conducted by it, shows that the Commission had deputed a survey team to conduct door-to-door survey in the field, but, in fact, there is nothing to show that an appropriate sample size/percentage was determined and the sample of the population scientifically studied. It has been submitted across the Bar that the survey was conducted to cross-check whether the data already collected was correct and the so-called fast-track method was adopted to collect/cross check the data. It is true that the Commission can adopt any methodology suited for the purpose, but it should commensurate with the standard methods of sampling, as discussed above. To us, it appears that the fast-track approach adopted by the Commission was nothing but a non-scientific method of sampling, which is otherwise known as “opportunity sampling” or “non-probability sampling”. In other words, such sample would be drawn from that part of the population which is close to hand. As the nomenclature itself indicates, the readily available and convenient sample drawn cannot provide a reasonably correct idea about the total population, because that sample would not be representative. Therefore, if the sample is not representative of the population, it cannot be made the basis for coming to a conclusion. 138. The above conclusion of ours may be tested with the report of the Commission in comparison with the report of AnSI, which was followed by Mr.Krishnan and the Commission in extenso. 139. Therefore, if the sample is not representative of the population, it cannot be made the basis for coming to a conclusion. 138. The above conclusion of ours may be tested with the report of the Commission in comparison with the report of AnSI, which was followed by Mr.Krishnan and the Commission in extenso. 139. In its report, the Commission has stated that according to People of India Series, Atchukatlavandlu (Muslims) are predominantly living in Kadapa District and they are distributed in small number in Srikakulam, Vizinagaram and East Godavari districts, and perhaps for the said reason the Commission had conducted survey in June 2007 in Kadapa and Adilabad Districts. But, a perusal of the report of AnSI shows that there is no discussion about this Muslim community, though there is a discussion about their Hindu counterpart. Perhaps, the traditional occupation of this community is similar to its counterpart in Hindus, and this might be the reason for the Commission to recommend its inclusion. 140. With regard to Faqir/Fhakir Budbudki, it has been stated in the Commissions report that though they are distributed all over the State, mainly they reside in the areas of Banganapalli, Kondampeta, Krishnagiri, Mangampeta, Sandrapalli, Guwagudu, Vajrakaruru, Pattikonda, Uravakonda, Kadiri, Madanapalli, Reddipalli and Pamudoddi, which are in the Rayalaseema region of the State. However, the staff of the Commission had conducted its survey in Warangal, Karimnagar, Adilabad and Nizamabad Districts, which are in the Telangana region of the State. Discussing about their social status, the Commission has stated that a considerable proportion of this community is engaged in the traditional occupation of begging and most of those who had changed their traditional occupation were engaged as daily wage labourers in agricultural and non-agricultural activities. A perusal of the statistics set out in the report of the Commission discloses that this community is not carrying on its traditional occupation and their percentage of literacy is 47.04% as against the State average of 60.47%. However, Mr.Krishnan, who also relied on the AnSI report, describes this community as nomadic and a very low class, which is mainly dependent on begging and this group is also found in Hindus, who are already included in the list of backward classes. Perhaps, this might be the reason for Mr.Krishnan recommending inclusion of Fakir Budbudki in the SEBC group. 141. Perhaps, this might be the reason for Mr.Krishnan recommending inclusion of Fakir Budbudki in the SEBC group. 141. As regards Siddi community, the Commission has stated that they are located in A.C. Guards area of Hyderabad, in addition to their location in other major cities in the country. According to the report, this community was traditionally engaged in giving security but at the time of conducting the survey, their source of livelihood was rickshaw pulling. The Commission justifies its recommendation for inclusion only because their counterpart in Gujarat was included in Scheduled Tribe and in the list of backward classes in Karnataka. Mr.Krishnan has also relied on the AnSI report and observed that as this community is of foreign origin, it deserved inclusion. 142. So far as Garadi community is concerned, according to the survey conducted by the Commission, seven households comprising 40 persons had been surveyed in Medak District. Of those who had been surveyed i.e. 100% of them had stated that they were not given any discriminatory treatment by the society and they were also not in their traditional occupation. Moreover, they all had submitted that they were treated as normal social beings by the other members of the society. In spite of the above facts gathered by the Commission, it had recommended that Garadi community be treated as socially and educationally backward. It is also pertinent to note that the total population of the Garadi community was not known. Therefore, one does not know whether the 40 persons who had been considered were, in fact, socially, educationally or economically representative of the entire population of Garadi Muslims in the State. 143. Insofar as Gosangi community is concerned, data from only one family had been collected by the Commission in Nizamabad District and on the basis of the information given by that family, the entire community had been recommended for inclusion in the socially and educationally backward classes list. 144. With regard to the community Chakketakare, the Commission had surveyed six households comprising 29 persons in Adilabad District and on the basis of the information given by them, the entire community was recommended for being included in the list of SEBCs. 145. 144. With regard to the community Chakketakare, the Commission had surveyed six households comprising 29 persons in Adilabad District and on the basis of the information given by them, the entire community was recommended for being included in the list of SEBCs. 145. Upon perusal of the report submitted by the Commission, it also appears that with regard to Guddi Eluguvallu, which has been recommended for inclusion in the list of SEBCs., no survey whatsoever had been conducted and no data had been collected by the Commission. 146. Likewise, with regard to other communities also, we find that the Commission had not conducted the survey objectively to justify its recommendations. 147. What the Commission had done was that it had referred to the reports of Mr.P.S.Krishnan and that of AnSI and on the basis thereof, it had made its recommendations without conducting any scientific survey. Moreover, it would not have been possible for the Commission to conduct a detailed survey within a short span of about 2½ months. The Commission was requested vide letter dated 17.4.2007 to conduct a survey and submit the report. The report was submitted on 2.7.2007. Meanwhile, on 11.6.2007, the Government had forwarded the report of Mr.Krishnan to the Commission to examine the same and send its recommendations at an early date. So, the Commission had relied upon the said report so as to make its recommendations at an early date without even a minimal professional effort to find out the facts, which were required for the purpose of coming to a conclusion whether a particular group of Muslims was, in fact, socially and educationally backward. If the Commission had formulated its own criteria and had surveyed even a part of the population of such Muslim groups in a scientific manner, in our opinion, it could not have made its recommendations so soon. In our opinion, the hit and run method adopted by the Commission was neither legal nor sustainable. 148. It is also seen from the record that though compilation of data was completed on 27.6.2007 (as stated at page 40 of the Commission’s report in Chapter III), some more data with regard to Shaik, Gosangi, Siddi and Hajam groups had been collected on 28.6.2007 and 29.6.2007 by visiting Kamareddy in Nizamabad District. This fact has not been denied by the respondent State or the Commission. This fact has not been denied by the respondent State or the Commission. Moreover, the Commission had submitted its report comprising 206 pages to the government on 02.7.2007. Within a short span of two days, the survey with regard to the above communities could not have been completed and the report prepared. It is thus legitimate to infer that either undue haste was employed or, in fact, no scientific survey was conducted by the Commission. 149. It should also be examined whether the Commission could have relied upon the report of Mr.P.S. Krishnan and the material collected by AnSI. In our opinion, it was for the Commission to gather primary data for coming to the conclusion as to whether a particular group of Muslims was socially and educationally backward for the purpose of making its recommendations. It was also open to the Commission to refer to or rely upon some relevant material to verify or cross-check its conclusions to enable it to make recommendations on the subject. Moreover, the material relied upon should have a rational nexus with the purposes for which it was collected. On the same subject, data could be collected for a variety of purposes. Data collected for one purpose may not be useful for a dissimilar purpose. We, therefore, consider now the data/reports, which were referred to and relied upon by the Commission. Data published by Anthropological Survey of India 150. The Anthropological Survey of India had published a set of books - “People of India” in respect of all the States. The book was published in two parts, which are inter-related. The first part consists of a 11- volume national series, five of which contain abstracts on all the communities across the length and breadth of the country. The data generated in this respect is supported with additional information from Census and other secondary sources. These volumes include one on the Scheduled Castes, one on the Scheduled Tribes, and three on all the communities of India. Two volumes contain data on the languages and scripts and biological variation in Indian population. Two other volumes present a quantitative profile of the Indian society and communities, lists of communities and their segments, synonyms, surnames and titles. The remaining two volumes are on Introduction and Anthropological Atlas. The second part pertains to the States/Union Territories, with detailed write-ups on each community of India. Two other volumes present a quantitative profile of the Indian society and communities, lists of communities and their segments, synonyms, surnames and titles. The remaining two volumes are on Introduction and Anthropological Atlas. The second part pertains to the States/Union Territories, with detailed write-ups on each community of India. Volume XIII of the first part gives the particulars of the communities relating to the State of Andhra Pradesh. 151. In his note on the books, the General Editor Shri K.S. Singh has stated about the object behind publishing them. The same reads as under: ‘There is an information gap on a very large number of communities in India and whatever information that exists on them is scanty or needs to be updated. The Anthropological Survey of India (AnSI) launched a project on the People of India on October 2, 1985. The objective of the project was to generate a brief, descriptive anthropological profile of all the communities in India, the impact on them of change and development processes and the links that bring them together. This was in accordance with the objectives of the AnSI, which was established in 1945. The AnSI has been pursuing bio-cultural research among different population groups from its eight regional centres. Its objectives have been redefined in the policy resolution, adopted in 1985, which commits this organization to a survey of the human surface of India.” 152. A reading of the note would also go to show that in its compilation of the lists of the communities of India under the People of India project, AnSI has taken into consideration the ethnographic surveys, lists of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes drawn up by the Government of India, lists of Backward Classes prepared by the Backward Classes Commissions set up by various state governments, including the list mentioned in the Mandal Commission Report. After conducting a survey, in all, it could identify 4694 communities. It has been further stated in the note that as many as 500 scholars had participated in the project, including 197 scholars from 26 different institutions. About 3000 scholars had participated in about 100 workshops and several rounds of discussions were held in all the States and Union Territories. The relevant portion of the note reads as under. It has been further stated in the note that as many as 500 scholars had participated in the project, including 197 scholars from 26 different institutions. About 3000 scholars had participated in about 100 workshops and several rounds of discussions were held in all the States and Union Territories. The relevant portion of the note reads as under. “… The investigators spent 26,510 days in the field, which works out to 5.5 days per community studied in the various States and Union Territories of India. Our scholars interviewed a large number of people, out of whom we have recorded only the key informants i.e. 24,951. This works out to about five ‘informed’ informants per community. Of the informants, 4981 were women. Our instruction to the investigators was to study a community at two or three places, and in at least two or three cultural regions into which the larger States of India are divided. Interviews were conducted in connection with the study of the communities in 3581 villages, mostly multi-community villages, and in 1011 towns and cities spread over almost all the districts of India, i.e. 421 districts and 91 cultural regions. We were able, thus, to study on an average a community at about two places. … most of the smaller communities could be studied at only one place since they are not located in more than one area.” 153. The note would also indicate that 500 scholars had collected the information from about 25,000 of the informants over the period from 1985 to 1992 and the percentages relate strictly to the responses made by the informants to the questionnaire contained in the schedule guideline and computer format and to the queries made by the investigators at the places of investigation. According to the note, the responses had been supplemented with the observations of the investigators, the secondary material from the Census, ethnographic records etc. and the material had been checked and cross-checked by local scholars at many levels with other sources of information. 154. According to the note, the responses had been supplemented with the observations of the investigators, the secondary material from the Census, ethnographic records etc. and the material had been checked and cross-checked by local scholars at many levels with other sources of information. 154. It can be seen from parts I to III of Volume XIII that different authors, who were deputed by the Anthropological Survey of India, had made research over the existence of different communities in Andhra Pradesh viz., 1)Achchukattalavandlu/Singamvallu, 2) Attar Saibulu, 3) Dhobi Muslim/Muslim Dhobi/Dhobi Musalman, 4) Borewale, 5) Chaakketakare 6) Faqir/Fhakir Budbudki 7) Garadi/Garadi Muslim, 8) Gosangi Muslim, 9) Guddi Eluguvallu, 10) Hajam/Nai/Navind, 11) Labbai/Labbi,12) Qureshi/ Kureshi/ Khureshi, 13) Shaik/Sheikh, and 14) Siddi, in the areas where they were mostly spread, and studied about their occupation, custom, daily habitat etc. This was a generic anthropological study. Report of Mr.P.S.Krishnan 155. The report of Mr.P.S.Krishnan, a retired IAS officer, contains nine chapters. They are: I) Introduction, Background and Approach, II) Social ideology of Islam and social stratification in Muslim societies, III) Emergence and Growth of Muslim society in India, South India and Andhra Pradesh, IV) Indian caste system and social stratification in Indian Muslim society, V) Social stratification in South Indian Muslim society, VI) Social stratification in Andhra Pradesh Muslim society, VII) Identification of socially and educationally backward classes among Muslims – General principles and judicial decisions – findings of social backwardness, VIII) Data analysis and IX) recommendations. In Chapter I of his report, Mr.Krishnan refers to the task entrusted to him by the Government of Andhra Pradesh on 18.5.2007 vide G.O.Ms.No.21, for preparing and submitting a report on identification of socially and educationally backward classes in the Muslim population, taking note of the judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No.832 etc. (probably the judgment in Archana Reddy) and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney I and the subsequent developments, and further materials and facts since available, so that necessary measures can be undertaken to widen opportunities for them in various schemes, including, and more particularly, admission in educational institutions and public employment. (probably the judgment in Archana Reddy) and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney I and the subsequent developments, and further materials and facts since available, so that necessary measures can be undertaken to widen opportunities for them in various schemes, including, and more particularly, admission in educational institutions and public employment. It has been further stated by him that in view of his close association stretching over the last five decades with Andhra Pradesh as well as all over India in various capacities, governmental, non-governmental and post-governmental, and in view of his commitment to the cause of social justice and to the State and the people of Andhra Pradesh, he had accepted the task as a privilege. 156. It has been stated in Chapter I that his approach towards the task had been broadly guided by the following aspects: 1) the social structure of the Muslim society in Andhra Pradesh, and 2) the guidance provided by the Supreme Court and the Andhra Pradesh High Court, more particularly in the Mandal case (Indra Sawhney I) in 1992 and the Muslim community reservation case (Archana Reddy) of this Court in 2005 regarding the constitutional provisions, their interpretation and their application. 157. In Chapter II, Mr.Krishnan has discussed about the social ideology of Islam and how the social stratification, contrary to its social ideology, arose in Muslim society. In this chapter, Mr.Krishnan has referred to the research by Mr. M.K.A. Siddiqui of the Anthropological Survey of India, who had done research in social stratification among Muslims, Mr.A.R. Momin, sociologist of the University of Bombay, who had done research in Indo-Islamic tradition, Mr.Imtiaz Ahmad, former Professor of Jawaharlal Nehru University, Mr.Ghaus Ansari, a pioneer in the study of Muslim society, Mr.Hasan Nishat Ansari, Head of the Department of History, SMD College, Magdh University, Punpun (Patna) and Mr.M.Mohd. Irfan Basha. 158. Chapter III of his report deals with the emergence and growth of Muslim society in India, South India and Andhra Pradesh. Irfan Basha. 158. Chapter III of his report deals with the emergence and growth of Muslim society in India, South India and Andhra Pradesh. In this chapter, he has discussed the general role of sufis and traders in the spread of Islam (para 3.1 at pg.13), role of Sufis and traders in Tamil Nadu and adjacent Andhra area (para 3.3 at pg.14), social motivation and history behind spread of Islam among masses (para 3.5 at pg.16), social identities in Indian Muslim society in Deccan and Andhra Pradesh (para 3.6.10 at pg.40) and has recorded his conclusion at para 3.7 (pg.42) that the major agencies of the spread of Islam in India were Muslim traders and Sufi preachers and saints, more particularly in the Peninsula, including Andhra Pradesh. The bulk of the people who adopted Islam and moved to the Islamic fold were those who belonged to the lower castes – the same classes which were now classified as SCs and SEBCs/OBCs in terms of the Constitution. Their prime motivation arose from the disadvantages, discriminations, indignities and humiliations they faced under the prevailing caste system and against which they had been struggling from ancient and medieval times in such ways as were open to them from time to time. 159. In Chapter VI, Mr.Krishnan has dealt with the social stratification of Muslim society in Andhra Pradesh. In this chapter, he has discussed about the 1) sources of information for Andhra Pradesh, 2) pre-independence Andhra District Manuals and Gazetteers, 3) post-independence Andhra District Gazetteers, 4) pre-independence Telengana District Gazetteers, 5) post-independence Telangana District Gazetteers, 6) Thesis on Muslims of Rayalaseema, 7) S.A.A. Sahebs profile of social hierarchy of Muslims in Andhra Pradesh, 8) People of India (A.S.I.) list of A.P. Muslim communities/groups, 9) People of India description of A.P. Muslim communities/groups, and 10) Encyclopaedia of World Muslims list of A.P. Muslim communities/groups. 160. It has also been mentioned by him in this chapter that according to the thesis of one Mr.M.Mohd. Irfan Basha of 2005 titled “Socio-economic conditions of the Muslims of Rayalaseema”, Rayalaseema, comprising four districts, has the largest percentage of Muslim population i.e. 12.5% among the three regions of Andhra Pradesh, which, as a whole, has a Muslim percentage of 9.17; whereas the ten Telengana districts, which were longest in the Nizams dominion, have 12.43% and the nine districts of coastal Andhra have only 4.54% Muslims. It has also been mentioned by Mr.Krishnan that according to Mr.Basha, the Muslims of Rayalaseema region can be classified as Syeds, Shaiks, Pathan, Qureshi and Dudekula or Pinjaras and they are not hierarchically ranked castes and that there is no recognition of untouchability among the Muslims and inter-dining freely occurs at feasts; that nothing prevents them from having an intermarriage with strangers and the laws of endogamy and exogamy still have force, at least in some subsections of Muslims like Sayyids, who want to strictly maintain the purity of blood and some occupational groups like Dudekula, Khasaab, Dhobi etc. also prefer endogamy. 161. A further reading of this chapter would go to show that of the various social groups of Muslims in existence in Andhra Pradesh, only Dudekula or Pinjari or Nurbash has been known, identified and referred to for a long time. According to Mr.Krishnan, the two recent accounts of social groups of Muslims of Andhra Pradesh are that of Shaik Abdul Azeez Saheb and the same is available in People of India Series of the Anthropological Survey of India on Andhra Pradesh. Mr.Krishnan states that Mr.Saheb had observed that Muslim castes are occupationally and culturally different. On the study of Mr.Saheb on the 14 Muslim groups in Andhra Pradesh viz., Syed, Shaik, Pathan, Habbi, Khureshi, Attar-saibulu, Atar, Gair-e-Mehadi, Chekketakare, Borewale, Garadi, Hazam and Fhakir-budbudki and Dudekula, Mr.Krishnan has stated as follows: “6.7.1 … These are formed on the basis of their traditional occupation and are endogamous. In social hierarchy, the Syeds occupy the top place, since they form the traditional clergy. They claim that they are the true descendants of the prophet. Shaiks claim the second place, who are believed to be a ruling class. The Pathans claim the third position. They are said to be the descendants of those warriors, who sacrificed their lives for the propagation of Islam. The Labbais occupy the fourth place. They get their lower status because they are the descendants of Arabs, who came to India for trade and not to propagate Islam. They also married native women and settled in India. In the fifth place are the Khureshi, the descendants of the Khuresh tribe of Arabia, to which the prophet belongs. Attar-saibulu, the perfume (Attar) traders, come next. Atar, who sell petty domestic items used at the time of festivals of Muslims and Gair-e-Mehadi are below them. They also married native women and settled in India. In the fifth place are the Khureshi, the descendants of the Khuresh tribe of Arabia, to which the prophet belongs. Attar-saibulu, the perfume (Attar) traders, come next. Atar, who sell petty domestic items used at the time of festivals of Muslims and Gair-e-Mehadi are below them. They are considered a Shia sect. The Chekketakare who are traders in mortar vehicles, Borewale who are the palm leaf weavers and Garadi, jugglers are placed in the sixth place. At the lowest level come the Dudekula the cotton cleaners, barbers (hazam), and mendicants (Fhakir-budbudki). The Dudekula are placed in the last category because they use a thread made out of the intestinal tissue from the dead cattle, while cleaning cotton. Since they work touching dead cattle, they occupy a lower place in the hierarchy and are not eligible for marriage alliance with the above said Muslim groups.” 162. Mr.Krishnan has also referred to the book “People of India” (AnSI) published in 2003 which describes about the existence of 391 communities in Andhra Pradesh and out of them 24 are Muslim communities. They are: 1) Arab, 2) Attar Saibulu, 3) Bohara, 4) Chakketakare, 5) Dhobi Muslim/Muslim Dhobi/Dhobi Musalman, 6) Dudekula/Anjikutti, 7) Faqir/Fhakir Budbudki, 8) Garadi/Garadi Muslim, 9) Gosangi Muslim, 10) Hajam/Nai/Navid, 11) Irani, 12) Khatik/Khatik Muslim/Kasab, 13) Labhai/Labbi, 14) Mehtar, 15) Mughal/Moghal, 16) Noor Basha, 17) Pathan, 18) Qureshi/Kureshi/Khureshi, 19) Shaik/ Sheikh, 20) Shia Imami Ismailis/Khoja, 21) Siddi 22) Syed/ Saiyed/Sayyad/Mushaik, 23) Borewale, and 24) Guddi Eluguvallu. According to Mr.Krishnan, both Khatik/Khatik Muslim/Kasab and Qureshi/Kureshi/ Khureshi are the same. 163. In para 6.9 of this chapter, Mr.Krishnan has referred to the description in the People of India study about the existence of Muslim communities in Andhra Pradesh. According to Mr.Krishnan, both Khatik/Khatik Muslim/Kasab and Qureshi/Kureshi/ Khureshi are the same. 163. In para 6.9 of this chapter, Mr.Krishnan has referred to the description in the People of India study about the existence of Muslim communities in Andhra Pradesh. He has discussed about the studies by the different authors of the People of India on 1) Syed/ Saiyed/Sayyad/Mushaik, 2) Shaik/Sheikh, 3) Mughal/ Moghal, 4) Pathan, 5) Irani, 6) Arab, 7) Bohara, 8) Shia Imami Ismalilis/Khoja, 9) Mehtar, 10) Gosangi Muslim, 11) Faqir/Fakhir Budbudki, 12) Attar Saibulu or Attarollu, 13) Chakketakare, 14) Dhobi Muslim/ Muslim Dhobi/Dhobi Musalman, 15) Garadi/ Garadi Muslim, 16) Hajam/Nai/Navid, 17) Labbai/Labbi, 18) Siddi, 19) Dudekula/Panjikutti, 20) Noor Basha, 21) Qureshi/ Kureshi/Khureshi, 22) Khatik/Khatik Muslim/Kasab,23) Borewale and 24) Guddi Eluguvallu and opined that Syed, Moghal, Pathan, Irani, Arab, Bohara, Khoja, Labbai/Labbi, are socially advanced classes; and Gosangi Muslim, Fhakir budbudki, Attar Saibulu, Chekketakare, Dhobi Muslim, Garadi Muslim, Hajam, Siddi, Qureshi, Khatik/Khatik Muslim/Kasab and Guddi Eluguvallu, as the communities, which deserve to be included in the list of socially and educationally backward classes. The other two communities Mehtar and Dudekula have already been included in the list of backward classes of the State. 164. In Chapter VII of his report, Mr.Krishnan has referred to the social basis for inclusion of Muslim communities/groups in socially and educationally backward classes list (para 7.2) and the Commission’s approach to SEBC Muslims (para 7.3) wherein the previous Central Backward Classes Commission reports were discussed. In para 7.3, he has discussed the reports of the State Governments and State Commissions wherein a mention has been made about the Sachar Committees/NSSOs all-India inter-State comparative picture showing the percentage of Muslim population in 2001 and socially and educationally backward class Muslim population figures of 1999-2000 and 2004-2005 (para 7.3.3 at pg.217). The figures relevant to Andhra Pradesh for the purpose are recorded as under: 165. With regard to the methodological difference in North India and South India for listing the backward classes and the methodology adopted by the National Commission for Backward Classes, Mr. Krishnan in para 7.3.4.1 (from pgs.240 to 242) has stated that the groups existing in Karnataka and Kerala and who moved to Islam in north India were mainly artisans and persons belonging to other occupational castes. They are the same castes which now find place in the socially and educationally Backward Classes and Scheduled Castes of Hindus. Krishnan in para 7.3.4.1 (from pgs.240 to 242) has stated that the groups existing in Karnataka and Kerala and who moved to Islam in north India were mainly artisans and persons belonging to other occupational castes. They are the same castes which now find place in the socially and educationally Backward Classes and Scheduled Castes of Hindus. After conversion, their occupational pattern and other features have remained the same as before conversion and they have retained the same community name and social identity and are carrying on the same traditional occupation. He has also stated that neither the State Commissions nor the State Governments in the States of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh nor the Mandal Commission included Sayyed, Sheikh, Pathan, Moghul, Bohara, Cutchi Memon, Khoja etc. in the list of socially and educationally backward groups. 166. It has been further observed by Mr.Krishan in para 7.3.4.2 that in southern States, conversion to Islam seems to have been from Scheduled Castes and backward classes and it is perhaps for this reason that the practice of including the entire Muslim community in the State lists has been in vogue. It has also been stated that the Muslim communities at the lower end of the spectrum which retained their traditional occupation and ranking low in hierarchy were also included in the State lists. Mr.Krishnan has also observed that such a low proportion of Muslim being in the list of backward classes is on account of a lacuna in the perception of certain specificities of that community and that the existing situation has arisen from a number of factors, one being the Muslim civil society leadership put all its weight behind the efforts to get the entire Muslim community recognised as “socially and educationally backward”. 167. In the end of Chapter VII, Mr. Krishnan has observed that Borewala and Shaik also are socially and educationally backward communities and deserved to be included in the list of Backward Classes. 168. In Chapter VIII, Mr. Krishnan has given the table showing Muslim presence at different levels of education furnished by the Commission in 2005 and observed that there is considerable shortfall at all levels except primary level to Class V; the gap is serious from Class X to Graduation, while it is grave and disturbing at professional and technological levels. 168. In Chapter VIII, Mr. Krishnan has given the table showing Muslim presence at different levels of education furnished by the Commission in 2005 and observed that there is considerable shortfall at all levels except primary level to Class V; the gap is serious from Class X to Graduation, while it is grave and disturbing at professional and technological levels. He has also furnished the table showing number of Muslim candidates selected for the years 2004-05 to 2006-07 to various services in the State, and opined that the identified Muslim groups were inadequately represented in the services of the State. 169. In Chapter IX, Mr. Krishnan has made a recommendation for inclusion of the groups identified as SEBC Muslim groups in Chapters VI and VII in the list of Backward Classes. He has, however, observed that the percentage of reservation may be limited to 4% in view of the maximum limit of 50% prescribed by the Honble Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney I. The exercise by Mr.Krishnan is per se not based on any survey, socioeconomic criteria, representative sample collection, data analysis on the basis of evolved criteria or the like. Mr.Krishnan’s exertion cannot per se be a legitimate basis for the State to evolve an affirmative action. 170. On a careful consideration of the report of the Commission, it can be seen that the Commission, without conducting any independent, detailed and scientific survey of each of the identified communities, had simply adopted the report of Mr.Krishnan, which in turn was substantially based on the AnSI report. It is clear that the reports of Mr.Krishnan and of the AnSI were not prepared after an objective and scientific exercise. Mr.Krishnan has drawn up his report taking into consideration the various District Gazetteers of Telengana, Andhra and Rayalaseema regions and the thesis reports of some research scholars, whereas the report of the AnSI was only a compilation of articles written by different scholars, who conducted a general study of the communities living in India from the anthropological perspective. 171. As already noticed, though the r evision of backward classes’ list was pending with the Commission since 1994, the respondent State, in the year 2007, had requested the Commission to give its recommendations after identifying the social and educational backwardness among Muslims. At the relevant time, only 2001 Census figures were available with the Commission. 171. As already noticed, though the r evision of backward classes’ list was pending with the Commission since 1994, the respondent State, in the year 2007, had requested the Commission to give its recommendations after identifying the social and educational backwardness among Muslims. At the relevant time, only 2001 Census figures were available with the Commission. Therefore, in order to have the latest data about various Muslim groups, the Commission ought to have undertaken a detailed study to collect the material and to make its recommendations. Instead, the Commission simply followed the 2001 Census figures without conducting any field investigation. Moreover, the Commission being a statutory body could have utilised all possible sources to tap information from all corners of the State. Besides this, the Commission could have requested the State Government to make an exercise for collection of the population figures with regard to the different groups of Muslims in the State. When the revision was pending since 1994, the Commission all of a sudden woke up in 2007 when it was requested to study the social and educational backwardness among Muslims, virtually ignoring its statutory duty. 172. Further, the educational backwardness among Muslims, as projected by the Commission in its report, cannot be accepted because, it did not take into consideration the relevant data for arriving at the conclusion. As contended by the learned advocates for the petitioners, the Commission ought to have taken into account the figures relating to admission of Muslims in minority and non-minority private educational institutions, while computing the data with regard to educational backwardness among Muslims. For identifying a class or group as backward – social, economical and educational – the backwardness with respect to any particular indicator should be more than 50% and if it is just below the State or country’s average or equal, such group or class cannot be treated backward. In the additional affidavit of the petitioner in Writ Petition No.18494 of 2007, it has been averred that the literacy rate among Muslims, including female literacy, is much higher when compared to either the State average or the average of Hindus. In order to substantiate this assertion, the petitioner has relied on the 2001 Census and has furnished a table, which is as follows: 173. In order to substantiate this assertion, the petitioner has relied on the 2001 Census and has furnished a table, which is as follows: 173. As seen from the table, against the State literacy average of 61%, the literacy rate among Muslims is 68%; and against the State female average of 53.2%, among Muslim females, literacy rate is 59.1%. These figures furnished by the petitioner have not been controverted by the respondents by producing any supporting material and, therefore, they are presumed to be true. The report of the Commission is based on the 2001 Census. It is strange to note as to how the Commission could arrive at a different conclusion and make its recommendations, when, in fact, the figures relating to the literacy rate among Muslims given by the petitioner from the same 2001 Census are otherwise. In such a case, so as to show that a particular group of Muslims is less literate, the Commission must establish the same with facts and figures by conducting survey in a scientific manner, which had not been done by it. 174. In view of the above discussion, it is evident that the Commission failed to formulate criteria for identifying the backward classes among Muslims, but had simply conducted a household survey in places close to its hand. Even assuming that the Commission had adopted its own methodology for identifying the backward classes, in our view, it had not applied any scientific criteria to check whether a sizeable number of occupational groups like Fakir Budbudki, Garadi Muslim, Gosangi, Guddi Eluguvallu etc., who had practically changed their occupations, were in existence and required upliftment. The learned Advocate General has tried to justify the Commissions report by submitting that as Hindu counterparts of majority of the identified communities were enjoying the status of backward classes and the reservation, the Commission had adopted fast track and rough and ready criteria for arriving at the conclusion and making the recommendation. We are not inclined to accept the said submission because, according to us, only after careful collection and study of the data so collected, the status of backward class can be conferred upon a particular class or group, as such a status given to one group or class adversely affects the rights of several other citizens. 175. Normally, the benefit of reservation is given to members of the group of citizens, who seek such reservation. 175. Normally, the benefit of reservation is given to members of the group of citizens, who seek such reservation. As stated hereinabove, almost 112 applications from different groups seeking inclusion in the list of backward classes were pending before the Commission and without considering the same, the Commission had decided to include all the remaining groups of Muslims except those enumerated in Item No.15 of the Schedule appended to the impugned Act. It is strange to hear from the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Commission that possibly it included those groups without there being any application from them because they were located at such remote places that it was not possible to have access to them and even they were not aware of their right of being included in the list of backward classes. We are not in agreement with the said submission for the reason that if they were located at such remote places, how the Commission could gather information about persons of those groups so as to include them in Item 15 of the Schedule, without even referring to their names! In the circumstances, we are constrained to believe that undue favour was done to the groups other than those enumerated for exclusion in Item 15, by including them in the list of backward classes. 176. In the afore-stated circumstances, we are of the considered view that the report of the Commission cannot constitute a lawful basis for affirmative action by the State. 177. In view of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the appointment of Mr.Krishnan as Advisor to the Government of Andhra Pradesh to collect data and submit a report on the backward classes among Muslims in Andhra Pradesh is illegal and violative of Article 162 of the Constitution, we briefly notice the constitutional provisions on the issue. 178. Article 162 of the Constitution lays down that - “162. 178. Article 162 of the Constitution lays down that - “162. Extent of Executive power of State:- Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power of a State shall extend to the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws: Provided that in any matter with respect to which the Legislature of a State and Parliament have power to make laws, the executive power of the State shall be subject to, and limited by, the executive power expressly conferred by this Constitution or by any law made by Parliament upon the Union or authorities thereof.” 179. Article 162 does not contain any definition as to what the executive function is and what activities would legitimately come within its scope. Ordinarily, the executive power connotes the residue of governmental functions that remain after legislative and judicial functions are taken away. Our Constitution has not recognised the doctrine of separation of powers in its absolute rigidity, but the functions of different parts or branches of the government have been sufficiently differentiated and consequently it can very well be said that our Constitution does not contemplate assumption, by one organ or part of the State, of functions that essentially belong to another. The executive indeed can exercise the powers of departmental or subordinate legislation when such powers are delegated to it by the legislature. It can also, when so empowered, exercise judicial functions in a limited way. 180. The executive or the State in exercise of its executive power is charged with the duty and responsibility of carrying on the general administration of the State. So long as the State Government does not go against the provisions of the Constitution or any law, the width and amplitude of the executive power cannot be circumscribed. If there is no enactment covering a particular aspect, the government can carry on the administration by issuing administrative directions or instructions, until the legislature makes a law in that behalf. The State Government can act in relation to any matter with respect to which the State Legislature has power to make laws even if there is no legislation to support such executive action. The State Government, however, can never go against the provisions of the Constitution or of any law. The State Government can act in relation to any matter with respect to which the State Legislature has power to make laws even if there is no legislation to support such executive action. The State Government, however, can never go against the provisions of the Constitution or of any law. If there is a statutory rule or an Act on the matter, the executive must abide by that Act or rule and it cannot, in exercise of the executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution, ignore or act contrary to that rule or Act. Any such transgression made by the executive or the State is liable to be struck down as ultra vires. Reference in this connection can be made to the judgments of the Honble Supreme Court in Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1955 SC 549 , Mahalakshmi Mills v. State AIR 1967 SC 266 , B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore AIR 1966 SC 1942 , ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla (1976) 2 SCC 521 , Bishambar Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P. (1982) 1 SCC 39 and Pancham Chand v. State of U.P. (2008) 7 SCC 117 . 181. In the cases on hand, the respondent State had appointed Mr.P.S. Krishnan, as Advisor to Government of Andhra Pradesh, Backward Classes Welfare on 18.5.2007 vide G.O.Ms.No.21 by entrusting the work of collection of data pertaining to backward classes. Clause (iv) of para 3 of the said G.O., which is relevant for the purpose of these cases, is extracted below: “3 (iv). Clause (iv) of para 3 of the said G.O., which is relevant for the purpose of these cases, is extracted below: “3 (iv). His duties include, inter alia, collection of data, conducting research; consultation with the Andhra Pradesh Backward Classes Commission, concerned Government Officials and non-Government organisations and individuals, preparation and submission of draft report to the Government in May 2007 for wider consultation; finalisation of report after taking note of various suggestions, keeping the observations of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Supreme Court on this issue; briefing the government and the Council of Ministers (if need be); filing of caveats, preparation of counter affidavit on behalf of the Government and defending the government in Courts of law, if need be; and such other work as may be entrusted by the government from time to time, for the benefit of the socially and educationally backward classes of the people of Andhra Pradesh in general, and in particular those belonging to these classes in the Muslim population.” 82. On a perusal of the functions assigned to Mr.Krishnan, it is clear that the State had entrusted him the very same functions as were to be undertaken by the Commission under the provisions of the 1993 Act. By the above reference, Mr.Krishnan was asked by the Government to collect data relating to backward classes among Muslims keeping in view the observations of this Court and the Supreme Court on the issue. This task had been entrusted to him by Principal Secretary to Government under an executive order, while the Commission, a statutory body constituted under the provisions of the 1993 Act is legislatively authorized to regulate its own functions. So long as the 1993 Act is on the statute book, the executive must abide by it and cannot, in exercise of its executive power, overreach, supplant, supplement, ignore or act contrary to the 1993 Act. In our opinion, by issuance of G.O.Ms.No.21, dated 18.5.2007, the respondent State has transgressed into the powers of the Commission constituted under the 1993 Act. When the statutory Commission was in force since 1994 and the Government by its letter dated 17.4.2007 had requested the Commission to undertake a survey of the Muslim community in Andhra Pradesh and identify the socially and educationally backward classes among them, there was no point in appointing Mr.Krishnan for the same purpose, on 18.5.2007. When the statutory Commission was in force since 1994 and the Government by its letter dated 17.4.2007 had requested the Commission to undertake a survey of the Muslim community in Andhra Pradesh and identify the socially and educationally backward classes among them, there was no point in appointing Mr.Krishnan for the same purpose, on 18.5.2007. If necessary, the Commission could have taken the assistance of any research scholar or report prepared by an expert in the field, including Mr.Krishnan, if so deemed appropriate by the Commission. In our considered view, by this appointment, the State had trenched into the functions of the statutory Commission. The appointment of Mr.Krishnan is thus pro tanto invalid, insofar as the entrustment of functions includes such functions as are legislatively within the domain of the Commission qua the provisions of the 1993 Act. 183. With regard to the provision of 4% reservation to the identified Muslim groups, we fail to understand the basis for such a conclusion. The Mandal Commission (paragraphs 12.19 to 12.21 at Chapter XII (Identification of OBCs) of its report), had estimated the population of OBCs throughout the country to arrive at the percentage of reservations to be recommended and, in paragraph 12.22, given the percentage distribution of Indian population by caste and religious groups. The Mandal Commission had recommended the percentage of reservation to OBCs at 27% (though total OBC population arrived at is 52% according to 1931 Census) keeping in view the percentage of reservation given to SCs and STs and also the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the total percentage of reservations should be less than 50%. Though the total population figure at the time when Mandal Commission had undertaken the survey was not available, it had taken into account the proportionate population growth of various/communities into consideration. 184. A perusal of the report of the present Commission does not reflect such scientific and rational exercise. Even otherwise, according to the 2001 Census, the total Muslim population is 9.2% of the total population in Andhra Pradesh and the percentage of backward classes among Muslims is 19.5%. Thus, the total backward class Muslim population comes to around 2% of the total population in Andhra Pradesh. Even otherwise, according to the 2001 Census, the total Muslim population is 9.2% of the total population in Andhra Pradesh and the percentage of backward classes among Muslims is 19.5%. Thus, the total backward class Muslim population comes to around 2% of the total population in Andhra Pradesh. According to the report of the Commission also, 19.5% of Muslims are covered under OBCs in Andhra Pradesh and the relevant portion from page 53 of the report of the Commission reads as under: “Sachaar Committee report shows that the Distribution of population in 2004-05 indicates that 25.6% of Hindu population comes under SCs & STs., 50.2% of Hindu population comes under OBCs, making a total of 75.8% covered under reservation in A.P. On the other hand, the Sachar-NSSO figures indicates that 19.5% of the Muslim population are covered under OBCs in Andhra Pradesh. Thus, about 75% of the Hindu population is covered under OBCs in Andhra Pradesh, whereas 19.5% of the Muslims are covered under OBCs in A.P.” 185. The general practice in vogue in almost all the States in the country is to provide reservation to S.Cs., S.Ts. or SEBCs. after considering the total population and the population of persons belonging to such classes. So, reservation to be provided to such classes must be commensurate with the percentage of the total population. We do not find any justification for providing 4% reservation to SEBC Muslims under the impugned Act. Similarly, the Commission has also not given any explanation, much less even a plausible reason, justifying its recommendation for providing 4% reservation to the so-called identified fifth group viz., Group E, in education and public employment. As has been discussed supra, the Commission, while dealing with the different communities of Muslims, has only recorded an observation whether that particular community is socially and educationally backward, but has not given any figure illustrating its ultimate finding that without providing 4% reservation to these groups, justice would not be done. The logical inference is that since only 4% percentage reservation was left available to be provided by the State to other identified backward class people, after the 46% reservation already provided to the different groups of S.Cs., S.Ts. and OBCs (A, B, C & D). This cannot be a legitimate justification for providing 4% reservation to Group ‘E’. 186. The logical inference is that since only 4% percentage reservation was left available to be provided by the State to other identified backward class people, after the 46% reservation already provided to the different groups of S.Cs., S.Ts. and OBCs (A, B, C & D). This cannot be a legitimate justification for providing 4% reservation to Group ‘E’. 186. Another important aspect of the matter is that the Commission has not included the already existing Muslims groups in Groups ‘A’ and ‘B’ into the newly identified Group ‘E’. The reasons for not including the Muslim groups Dudekula, Laddaf, Pinjari/Noorbash and Mehtar find place neither in the Commission’s report nor in the Government Order notifying Group ‘E’. 187. With regard to the question of providing reservations to SEBC Muslims under a separate group ‘E’, but not including the Muslim groups already included in the lists ‘A’ and ‘B’, the respondent State has tried to justify its action by stating that the Muslim groups in the lists ‘A’ and ‘B’ were enjoying the benefit of reservation since 1970 and in order to give an opportunity to the newly included groups of SEBC Muslims to enjoy the benefit of reservation and improve their standard of living, the State had shown them separately in the list of backward classes and provided separate reservation to them. This explanation of the State is not acceptable, since the date of publishing the list of socially and educationally backward classes viz., 23.9.1970 vide G.O.Ms.No.1793, several groups of backward classes were included in the existing four groups in the list, right from 1972 {from the date of inclusion of “Mehtar (Muslim) on 5.7.1972 to “Patra” on 28.8.2006} to 2006. During these subsequent inclusions, the newly added groups were not shown separately in the list of backward classes. Though Schedule Caste converts to Christianity were shown separately in Group C when they were included in the list of backward classes in the year 1981, the status of the Schedule Caste converts was shown in the higher strata when compared to the Scheduled Castes and placed them in the list of backward classes in a separate Group ‘C’. As a consequence of the impugned Act, all the identified Muslim groups of backward classes (earlier and now included) are to be found in Groups ‘A’, ‘B’ and now the bulk of them in Group ‘E’. As a consequence of the impugned Act, all the identified Muslim groups of backward classes (earlier and now included) are to be found in Groups ‘A’, ‘B’ and now the bulk of them in Group ‘E’. Those Muslim communities earlier included in Groups ‘A’ and ‘B’ would have to compete with others for the percentage of affirmative opportunities allotted to Groups ‘A’ and ‘B’, while those included in Group ‘E’ would enjoy an exclusive package of affirmative opportunities of 4%. This action of the State constitutes a discriminatory treatment among the identified Muslim groups and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 188. It is also pertinent to note that as per the Scholars, who have studied Islamic law and way of living of Muslims, firmly believe that there is no caste system among Muslims. It is also a matter of fairly common knowledge that caste system is prevalent mainly among Hindus. The conclusion by experts and sociologists that when Hindus got converted to Islam, they had continued their way of living and occupation, including caste insularities. Thus, only on conversion of Hindus to Islam, there used to be different classes among Muslims, based on their traditional occupations etc. Therefore, Muslims groups, which have been identified as SEBCs, ought to have been included in either Group ‘A’ or under Group ‘B’ or even in Group ‘D’, where their Hindu counterparts were already admitted to the benefits of reservation. Even the learned Advocate General had stated that in certain cases there was perhaps no justification for including certain Muslim groups in the list of backward classes, except for the reason that their Hindu counterparts were already included as SEBCs., and for this reason, the Commission, without any survey to ascertain their way of living, level of education and economic condition, had recommended certain groups to be included in the list of backward classes. Whether the 2007 Act is religion specific 189. The petitioners have contended that as the object behind enactment of the 2007 Act is to provide reservation to some of the socially and educationally backward groups among Muslim community only, the same is religion specific and discriminates even among people of backward classes on the basis of religion and is violative of Articles 15 (1) and 16 (2) of the Constitution. It has been also alleged that the 2007 Act is religion specific and in particular Item 15 of the Schedule appended thereto would encourage conversion of members of other religious groups to Islam for enjoying the benefit of reservations. 190. Referring to Clause 15 of the Schedule to the 2007 Act, it has been submitted that the provision for reservation for ‘other Muslim groups’ without a definition of the said phrase in the Act, has the direct potential to encourage others to convert to Islam, which is violative of the core of secularism – a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. 191. It has been further submitted that Article 15 (4) empowers the State to provide for reservation to the socially and educationally backward citizens, but it does not enable religion specific reservation and the State action in taking religion as the basis for identification of backward classes is unconstitutional. 192. It has been submitted that earlier, the Anantaraman Commission had looked into the backwardness of all communities in the entire society, including Muslims, and had recommended inclusion of only two occupational groups of the Muslim community viz., Mehtar and Dudekula into the list of backward classes. However, in the cases on hand, the State Government had directed the Commission to investigate the backwardness among the classes/communities/groups of Muslims alone. If the intention of the State Government was to provide reservation based on occupational groups, there was no justification to restrict the investigation to the identification of backwardness of the Muslim community alone. 193. It has been next submitted that neither the Commission nor the State has explained the urgency in providing reservation to the backward classes among Muslims alone when the claims of about 112 communities from different religions viz., Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs were pending before the Commission for their inclusion into the list of backward classes. 194. The State has enacted the 2007 Act to provide reservation to SEBC Muslims in educational institutions and public employment for their upliftment and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 1 of the Act specifies the short title, extent and commencement of the Act, Section 2 deals with the definitions of the words “Commission”, “educational institutions”, “notification”, “public services” and “Schedule”. Section 1 of the Act specifies the short title, extent and commencement of the Act, Section 2 deals with the definitions of the words “Commission”, “educational institutions”, “notification”, “public services” and “Schedule”. While Section 3 enumerates the declaration of Muslim communities and groups as backward classes, Section 4 speaks of reservation in favour of backward classes of Muslim communities and groups and Section 5, the percentage of reservations. Sections 6 to 8 empower the State Government to amend the Schedule appended to the 2007 Act, to make a provision for the purpose of carrying out all or any of the provisions of the 2007 Act and to remove any difficulty which arises in giving effect to the provisions of the Act respectively and Section 9 repeals the Ordinance issued in the year 2005. The Schedule appended to the 2007 Act reads thus: SCHEDULE 1) Achchukattalavandlu, Singali, Singamvallu, Achchupanivallu, Achchukattuvaru, Achukatlavandlu. 2) Attar Saibulu, Attarollu. 3) Dhobi Muslim/Muslim Dhobi/Dhobi Musalman, Turka Chakla or Turka Sakala, Turaka Chakali, Tulukka Vannan, Tsakalas, Sakalas or Chakalas, Muslim Rajakas. 4) Faqir, Fhakir Budbudki, Ghanti Fhakir, Ghanta Fhakirlu, Turaka Budbudki, Darvesh, Fakeer. 5) Garadi Muslim, Garadi Saibulu, Pamulavallu, Kani-kattuvallu, Garadollu, Garadiga. 6) Gosangi Muslim, Phakeer Sayebulu. 7) Guddi Eluguvallu, Elugu Bantuvallu, Musalman Keelu Gurralavallu. 8) Hajam, Nai, Nai Muslim, Navid. 9) Labbi, Labbai, Labbon, Labba. 10) Pakeerla, Borewalc, Deera Phakirlu, Bonthala. 11) Qureshi, Kureshi/Khureshi, Khasab, Marati Khasab, Muslim Katika, Khatik Muslim. 12) Shaik/Sheikh. 13) Siddi, Yaba, Habshi, Jasi. 14) Turaka Kasha, Kakkukotte Zinka Saibulu, Chakkitakanevale, Terugadu Gontalavaru, Thirugatigantla, Rollaku Kakku Kottevaru, Pattar Phodulu, Chakketakare, Thuraka Kahsa. 15) Other Muslim groups excluding: Syed, Saiyed, Sayyad, Mushaik; Mughal, Moghal; Pathans; Irani; Arab; Bohara, Bohra; Shia Imami Ismaili, Khoja; Cutchi-Memon; Jamayat; Navayat; and all the synonyms and sub-groups of the excluded groups; and except those who have been already included in the State List of Backward Classes. 195. A perusal of the provisions of the 2007 Act and the Schedule appended thereto shows that the Act is intended to provide reservation to the socially and educationally backward classes among Muslims only. The object behind making such a legislation is as follows: “Object of the Act An Act to provide reservation to Socially and Educationally Backward Classes of Muslims in the Educational Institutions and Public Employment for their upliftment and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The object behind making such a legislation is as follows: “Object of the Act An Act to provide reservation to Socially and Educationally Backward Classes of Muslims in the Educational Institutions and Public Employment for their upliftment and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Whereas, the Andhra Pradesh Commission for Backward Classes found that the entire Muslim Community is socially, educationally and economically backward and therefore, recommended that provision be made providing 5% reservation to the Muslim Community in all Educational Institutions and Public Services in the State excluding the creamy layer among them; And whereas, basing on the recommendations of the Commission, the Andhra Pradesh Reservation of Seats in the Educational Institutions and of appointments or posts in the Public Services under the State to Muslim Community Act, 2005 was enacted providing for 5% reservation of seats in Educational Institutions and in appointments in Public Services to the Muslim Community excluding the creamy layer amongst them; And whereas, the Larger Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No.13832 of 2005 and batch dated 7.11.2005 held inter alia, that the Backward Classes Commission has not identified the social backwardness of Muslims to declare them as backward and accordingly, declared the above Act as unconstitutional and violative of Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India; And whereas, State Government filed SLP in Civil Appeal No.7513 of 2005 in the Supreme Court against the above judgment and it is still pending; And whereas, Government referred the matter to the Andhra Pradesh Commission for Backward Classes basing on the decision of the Honble High Court of Andhra Pradesh again to identify the Muslim Communities and Groups which can be regarded as socially and educationally backward for the purpose of providing reservation to them; And whereas, the Andhra Pradesh, Backward Classes Commission in their report recommended that certain Muslim Communities and Groups are to be considered as socially and educationally Backward Classes of citizens for providing to them reservations under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India; And whereas, Government approved the recommendations of the Andhra Pradesh Commission for Backward Classes to provide reservation to the eligible socially and educationally Backward Classes of Muslims; And whereas, the provisions of the said Act, 2005 cannot be made applicable in the State; And whereas, it has been decided to provide reservation in favour of the Socially and Educationally Backward Classes of Muslims as recommended by the Backward Classes Commission;” 196. From the statement of the objects and reasons, it is apparent that initially the Commission had found that the entire Muslim community was socially, educationally and economically backward and, therefore, had recommended 5% reservation to the Muslim community in all educational institutions and public services in the State, excluding the creamy layer among them. The State Government had accepted the same, and in the year 2005, when the Andhra Pradesh Reservation of Seats in the Educational Institutions and of appointments or posts in the Public Services under the State to Muslim Community Act, 2005 was enacted providing such reservation, in Archana Reddy, this Court had declared the said Act as unconstitutional and violative of Articles 15 (4) and 16 (4) of the Constitution on the ground that the Commission had not identified the social backwardness of Muslims so as to declare them “backward”; that during the pendency of the appeal filed before the Supreme Court challenging the order of the High Court, the State Government referred the matter to the Commission to identify the Muslim communities and groups, which could be regarded as socially and educationally backward for the purpose of providing reservation to them. Accordingly, in the year 2007, the Commission had recommended that certain communities and groups of Muslims should be considered as socially and educationally backward for providing them reservation under Articles 15 (4) and 16 (4). Hence, the 2007 Act has been enacted to provide reservation to SEBC Muslims in educational institutions and public services. It is, therefore, clear that the State, as a matter of policy, has decided to provide reservation to certain groups of Muslim community in educational institutions and in public services on the ground that they are socially and educationally backward. 197. The grievance of the petitioners is that because of the impugned Act, the reservation to the backward classes has been increased from 46% to 50% and during the academic year 2007-08 some of the petitioners, who could find place in the merit list for admission in professional colleges viz., Engineering, Medical and Post-Graduate courses, lost an opportunity of securing seats in view of the impugned enactment. The grievance of some of the petitioners, who have filed the petitions in public interest, is that the Commission had not taken into consideration their objections for inclusion of certain other communities including Muslim community, in the list of backward classes. The grievance of some of the petitioners, who have filed the petitions in public interest, is that the Commission had not taken into consideration their objections for inclusion of certain other communities including Muslim community, in the list of backward classes. It has been submitted by them that the inclusion of the identified groups among Muslim community, which does not satisfy the criteria, would adversely affect the persons belonging to forward classes, in general, and the legitimate interest of the already listed backward classes as well. 198. Our Constitution permits application of the equality clause by grant of additional protection to the disadvantaged classes irrespective of their religion, so as to bring them on an equal platform with other advantaged classes of people. Where, however, reservation is provided to a community or group of communities professing a particular religion or a religious denomination, without a lawful determination of social and educational backwardness, the classification so made would be exclusively on the basis of religion, prohibited by Articles 15 (1) and 16 (2). Reference in this connection may be made to the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Thakur Pratap Singh AIR 1960 SC 1208 (para 9), Triloki Nath Tiku v. Stateof J & K AIR 1969 SC 1 (para 4) and R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India 1994 Supp. (1) SCC 324 (para 137). 199. In Thakur Pratap Singh, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the notification of the Government granting exemption under Section 15 (5) of the Police Act in favour of Harijans and Muslims was discriminatory against the law abiding members of the other communities as it was only on the basis of “caste” or “religion” and, therefore, the notification was violative of Article 15 (1) of the Constitution. In Triloki Nath Tiku, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Policy of the State of Jammu & Kashmir, whereby 50% of vacancies were reserved for the Muslims of Kashmir for the entire State, 40% for Hindus of Jammu and 10% for Kashmiri Hindus, was not justified in view of the provisions of Article 16 of the Constitution. 200. On a further reading of the provisions of the 2007 Act, it is seen that there is no definition of the phrase “Muslim” or “other Muslim groups” in the definitions under Section 3. 200. On a further reading of the provisions of the 2007 Act, it is seen that there is no definition of the phrase “Muslim” or “other Muslim groups” in the definitions under Section 3. Without defining the phrase “Muslim” or “other Muslim groups” and without clarity as to who are those Muslim groups that fall under the said group, Item No.15 in the Schedule has been enumerated providing reservation to such “other Muslim groups”. This failure introduces an ambiguity. It is well-settled that legislation should be clear and without ambiguity and a statute whose provisions are vague is void. 201. Article 25 of the Constitution provides that every citizen has a right to profess, practice and propagate any religion. Item No.15 of the Schedule potentially encourages a citizen to convert to Islam, with a view to claim the benefits of reservation. If a person, who is not a Muslim and who belongs to a forward caste embraces Islam, then the question would arise as to in which group he would fall. If he does not belong to any of the groups specifically narrated in the Schedule appended to the impugned Act, he would be included in “other Muslim groups” i.e. he would be in Item No.15; but as he would not be in groups, which have already been referred to in Item No.15 (i.e. the excluded communities), he would be a member of “other Muslim groups” and would be eligible for the reservation provided he is not a member of a creamy layer. In such an event, in our opinion, anybody can avail the benefit of reservation under the impugned Act and that would be against the spirit of secularism and in equal measure subversive of the purposes for which the 2007 Act has been enacted as well. This is a significant aspect, which has not been considered at all while enacting the impugned Act and this would have disastrous consequences. Not only unscrupulous persons embracing Islam would get the benefit of reservation, but that would result in depletion of the opportunities of enjoying reservation by those Muslim groups, who are otherwise entitled to the benefit of reservation in pursuance of the impugned enactment. 202. Further, it is also to be noticed that the 2007 Act does not define the word “Muslim”. 202. Further, it is also to be noticed that the 2007 Act does not define the word “Muslim”. In the absence of any definition in the Act, naturally we have to fall back to the dictionary meaning. According to Oxford Dictionary, “Muslim” means, ‘a follower of the religion of Islam’. The meaning given in the Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary to the word “Muslim” would read that he is ‘a believer in Islam’. Taking the dictionary meaning, a Muslim is a person who sincerely embraces the religion of Islam and believes in Islam. The word “Islam” has been defined by the New International Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary of the English language, as ‘the religion of the Muslims, which maintains that there is but one God, Allah, and that Mohammed is his Prophet; Mohammedanism’. It would also mean ‘the body of Muslim believers, their culture, and the countries they inhabit.’ It has been defined by the new Oxford Dictionary of English, as the ‘religion of the Muslims, a monotheistic faith regarded as revealed through Mohammed as the Prophet of Allah.’ Thus, a Muslim is a person, who tries to worship God by following the teachings of Prophet Mohammed. Therefore, any follower of Islam can be regarded as a Muslim. The Legislature ought to have taken care, while making the enactment, to define the word “Muslim” and the phrase “other Muslim groups” and state clearly as to who actually falls within these definitions, for enjoying the benefits under this Act. 203. Looking to the facts of the case, in our opinion, the 2007 Act is religion specific and potentially encourages religious conversion, and is thus unsustainable. 204. On the aforesaid analyses, we record the summary of our conclusions as under: a) The validity of a legislation is subject to judicial review on established grounds such as legislative competence qua the distribution of legislative powers or on the ground of transgression of other limitations on the exercise of legislative powers under the provisions of the Constitution. b) There is no special standard or principle of judicial review pertaining to affirmative action/State action under Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution. Identification of socially and educationally backward classes of persons is essentially an exercise in classification and must answer the twin tests of reasonable differentia and rational nexus. b) There is no special standard or principle of judicial review pertaining to affirmative action/State action under Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution. Identification of socially and educationally backward classes of persons is essentially an exercise in classification and must answer the twin tests of reasonable differentia and rational nexus. The degree of scrutiny must be appropriately calibrated to ensure that the impeached State action involving the classification satisfies the twin tests. c) Where the petitioner presents a prima facie case of hostile or invidious discrimination in a factual matrix where the monopoly of information/material is with the State, the burden of justifying the apparent discriminatory State action as falling within the constitutionally permitted area of classification {in this case, for affirmative action under Articles 14, 15 (4) and 16 (4)} shifts to the State. d) Though the strict scrutiny standard evolved by the Courts in U.S.A. may not be applicable in the Indian context, a careful, in-depth or rigorous scrutiny of affirmative State action is inevitable where validity of an affirmative action of the Sate is to be examined. The level and rigor of scrutiny actually applied in B. Archana Reddy v. State of A.P. {(2005) 6 ALD 582} cannot be said to be inconsistent with the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of India { (2003) 11 SCC 146 } and Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India { (2008) 6 SCC 1 }. e) The recommendations set out in the report (dated 02.7.2007) of the A.P. Commission for Backward Classes are unsustainable due to: i) Failure of the Commission to evolve and spell out proper and relevant criteria for identification of social and educational backwardness or social backwardness and inadequate representation in public employment, among classes of persons belonging to the Muslim community. ii) Failure of the Commission to obtain the population figures of the several classes, groups of persons belonging to the Muslim community for inclusion in Group ‘E’. iii) Failure of the Commission to adopt a scientific method for determining the appropriate location for conducting a survey of the population of each of the classes/groups recommended for inclusion; with a view to ensuring that the locations surveyed are representative of the inhabitants of the relevant classes/groups. iii) Failure of the Commission to adopt a scientific method for determining the appropriate location for conducting a survey of the population of each of the classes/groups recommended for inclusion; with a view to ensuring that the locations surveyed are representative of the inhabitants of the relevant classes/groups. iv) Failure of the Commission to consider, determine and apply a scientific and statistically rational method of sampling like determination of sample size, location for sampling etc. v) Failure of the Commission to apply uniform criteria or even standards of analysis across the several classes/groups recommended for inclusion, while recording conclusions as to social or educational backwardness or under representation in public employment. f) The Commission had substantially relied on the data collected and observations made by the AnSI study (People of India Series) for the purpose of making its recommendation though the data collected by the AnSI study had no relevance or nexus with the affirmation action/reservation under Articles 15 (4) and 16 (4) of the Constitution, which the State was to take on the basis of recommendations made by the Commission. The data so collected by the AnSI was only to make anthropological profile of the Indian population. Similarly, the report made by Mr.P.S.Krishnan was substantially based on the research work done by others and that too for the purpose other than the one for which the Commission had to use the said material. Reliance of the Commission on such material, which was not scientifically collected and which was bereft of any survey made for the purpose, had led to incorrect conclusions. 205. Since the impugned legislation fails to define the expression “Muslim” and “other Muslim groups” and since the identification of social and educational backwardness and under representation in public employment of the several classes/groups among Muslims as socially and educationally backward classes/groups for inclusion in Group ‘E’ is held by us to be irrational and unsustainable, the inclusion of such classes/groups of Muslims is resultantly and exclusively religion specific, in particular the “other Muslim groups” referred to in Item No.15 of the Schedule of the 2007 Act. The 2007 Act is thus violative of Articles 14, 15 (1) and 16 (2) of the Constitution. 206. The Andhra Pradesh Reservation in favour of Socially and Educationally Backward Classes of Muslims Act, 2007 is unsustainable and is so declared. The 2007 Act is thus violative of Articles 14, 15 (1) and 16 (2) of the Constitution. 206. The Andhra Pradesh Reservation in favour of Socially and Educationally Backward Classes of Muslims Act, 2007 is unsustainable and is so declared. This conclusion follows since the exclusive basis for this legislation is the report dated 02.7.2007 of the A.P. Commission for Backward Classes, which we have hereinbefore declared to be unsustainable. 207. Consequently, G.O.Ms.No.23, Backward Classes Welfare (C2) Department, dated 07.7.2007 and G.O.Ms.No.231, Health, Medical and Family Welfare (E1) Department, dated 11.07.2007 respectively cannot be sustained and are accordingly quashed. 208. Insofar as G.O.Ms.No.3, Backward Classes Welfare Department, dated 4.4.2006 is concerned, the challenge to this Government Order is on the basis of the alleged irrationality in identifying the creamy layer. In view of the substantive conclusions in this judgment as to the validity of the Andhra Pradesh Reservation in favour of Socially and Educationally Backward Classes of Muslims Act, 2007, it is not necessary to pronounce on the validity of G.O.Ms.No.3, dated 4.4.2006. 209. In the light of the analyses and conclusions above, the writ petitions are allowed. 210. All interlocutory orders pending these writ petitions stand dissolved. Common Judgment: (Smt. Justice T. Meena Kumari, J.) I have perused the judgment of the Hon’ble Chief Justice. After perusing the same, I thought of rendering my judgment independently. 1. When these Writ Petitions were initially listed before the Bench consisting of 5 Judges, it was argued before the said Bench that the specific directions/criteria as pointed out in the larger bench decision in B. Archana Reddy and others vs. State of A.P. & Others (supra) and also the guidelines issued by the Apex Court in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (supra) have not been followed by the B.C. Commission and it did not put forth any criteria for identifying socially backward classes as such, the Bench hearing the matters felt the necessity to refer the matter to a Larger Bench by its order dated 24-01-2008. The reference is as follows: “These writ petitions have been filed praying to declare the Ordinance issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh and the consequential G.O. Ms. The reference is as follows: “These writ petitions have been filed praying to declare the Ordinance issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh and the consequential G.O. Ms. No. 23, dated 7.7.2007 issued by the Backward Classes Welfare (C-2) Department, providing 4% reservation of seats for admission into the Educational Institutions and appointments for the posts in Public Services, which has subsequently become an Act, namely, “Andhra Pradesh Reservation in favour of Socially and Educationally Backward Classes of Muslims Act, 2007” (Act No. 26 of 2007) as illegal, unconstitutional and offending Articles 14,15 and 16 of the Constitution of India. On an S.L.P. filed by one T. Muralidar Rao and others, namely, Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s). 17195-17196/2007, the Supreme Court on 12th October, 2007 directed this Court to dispose of the writ petitions finally before 31st October, 2007. Pursuant to the same, the above batch of writ petitions were listed before this bench and the same was coming up for hearing from 27.11.2007. 2. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners while pointing out to certain observations made by a coordinate Bench of five judges of this Court with regard to identification of Muslim community as backward class in B. ARCHANA REDDY AND OTHERS vs. STATE OF A.P. & OTHERS (1st cited), sought to contend that the B.C. Commission did not evolve any criteria for identifying social backwardness. It was also their contention that the specific direction/criteria as pointed out in later larger bench has not been adhered to. He relied on paragraphs 114,279,293,378 and 379 of the said judgment which read thus: “114. The Commission has neither found nor recorded that self-employment in petty business, occupations like rickshaw pulling, push-cart trade, agricultural labour, marginal land ownership, mal-nutrition, inaccessibility to medical facility, lower life expectancy, engagement as unskilled labour, masons or drivers, pursuit of professions or occupations such as cycle repairing or vulcanizing, engagement of women and children in beedi-rolling, are circumstances either peculiar to the Muslim community or that professing the faith of Islam (definition of ‘Muslims’ in Sec.2(c) of the Ordinance) and these (occupational, professional, extreme poverty and want) circumstances have a causal relationship. In the absence of a causal nexus between the Islam faith aggregate and the pursuit of certain professions, trades or humble economic circumstances; the occupation and/or the means test, provides neither a legal nor a rational and logical basis for the conclusion that all Muslims are socially backward because some or many of them are in dire economic straits. 279. Transparency in governance is exhortation of the day. In this context, a little elaboration is necessary. Doctrine of rule of law in legal and political philosophy means many things for many people. The universal theme, however, is that the constitutional governance by rule of law is preferable to governance by a few persons. Democracy presupposes peoples’ rule by law or rule of law through people. The broad principle of rule of law contemplates that (i) all laws should be prospective, open and clear, (ii) laws should be stable, (iii) making of particular laws should be guided by stable and general rules, (iv) the principles of natural justice must be observed, and (v) there should be a system of implementation of laws guaranteeing the independence of judiciary duly conferring on it the power to review public law functions. Another important principle of rule of law is that the rulers must know the rules to the ruled. All persons must know what are the laws, rules and regulations by which they will be governed. This is more important in a democratic polity where an independent judiciary, lords over the exercise of legislative, judicial and administrative powers by other organs of the State, by reason of doctrine of judicial review. Transparency in public administration and constitutional governance is therefore a part of rule of law and indeed it is inseparable adjutant of ‘rule of law’. This Court may make reference to Jaisinghani and Merkur Island Shipping Corporation v. Laughton (1983) 2 AC 570 (CA) and the decision of the Supreme Court in BALCO Employes’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India (2002)2 SCC 333 . 293. In an enquiry of the nature undertaken by B.C. Commission, mere issue of notification inviting objections and conducting public hearings at different places would only satisfy the principles of fairness to some extent. 293. In an enquiry of the nature undertaken by B.C. Commission, mere issue of notification inviting objections and conducting public hearings at different places would only satisfy the principles of fairness to some extent. In the absence of notifying the objectors of criteria prior to such hearings and furnish the material to such objectors prior to conducting public hearings, the enquiry conducted by the B.C. Commission cannot be called fair. The very purpose of issuing notification inviting objections and conducting public hearings, would be defeated if the criteria is not decided prior to undertaking, the collection of data and putting the objectors on notice. We accordingly hold against the State. 378. Fourthly, while determining social backwardness of a class of citizens, an expert body like B.C. Commission has to necessarily evolve absolutely relevant criteria for the purpose of caste test, occupation test and means test. Wherever social backwardness is due to a class of people being born in a homogenous endogamous group called caste with common traits and rigid customs and social rules, the caste test itself lead to an inference that the class/caste is socially backward. If the occupation of majority of a class of citizens is considered inferior and unremunerative, and such class of people is considered lowly placed in the society, it would ordinarily satisfy the test of social backwardness. The means test presupposes that by reason of birth in a class of people, historically and traditionally the entire class suffers from perennial poverty, in which case, the means test would enable the determination of social backwardness. The B.C. Commission did not evolve any criteria for identifying social backwardness and did not apply the three tests in a scientific and objective manner. 379. Fifthly, the B.C Commission at the stage of collecting preliminary data, evolving criteria and conducting public hearings for the purpose of hearing objections from the public, did not take such steps which can be called transparent and fair. Though, the nature of enquiry by B.C. Commission cannot be strictly treated as quasi-judicial, but still while undertaking an exercise for identification of backward class of citizens, the Commission is legally bound to be fair and transparent and afford all such opportunity to objectors and proponents for effective representation before the Commission. Though, the nature of enquiry by B.C. Commission cannot be strictly treated as quasi-judicial, but still while undertaking an exercise for identification of backward class of citizens, the Commission is legally bound to be fair and transparent and afford all such opportunity to objectors and proponents for effective representation before the Commission. The prior non-publication of criteria and the data collected by the B.C. Commission renders the report of the B.C. Commission illegal being contrary to provisions of B.C. Commission Act and principles of fairness.” In view of the aforesaid judgment emanated from a coordinate bench of five judges of this Court and in the absence of any provision in the statute for publication of the criteria whether this Court can supplant the provisions of the Act and the Rules by making publication mandatory as per the observations as contained in paras stated supra and other observations made by the coordinate bench, are contrary to the observations made by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, where it was left open for the concerned authorities to lay down the criteria, apart from contrary to principles laid down in regard to strict scrutiny approach, as laid in Saurabh Chandra v. Union of India and also the principles laid down in other decisions of the Apex Court. After hearing the counsel on either side appearing on behalf of the respondents, we are of the view that the matters are required to be heard and reconsidered by a 7-Judge Bench. Accordingly, we direct the registry to place these matters before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for obtaining necessary orders.” 2. Accordingly the writ petitions were posted before a larger Bench consisting of Seven Judges and they were heard for considerable length of time. 3. The batch of Writ Petitions have been filed questioning the validity of the impugned Act No. 26 of 2007, dated 13-08-2007, replacing the Ordinance 5 of 2007, dated 06-07-2007, wherein the Government of Andhra Pradesh enacted an Act with an object to provide reservation to socially and educationally backward classes of Muslims in the Educational Institutions and Public Employment for their upliftment and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The Act 26 of 2007 is called as “Andhra Pradesh Reservation in favour of Socially and Educationally Backward Classes of Muslims Act, 2007” (Act No.26 of 2007). The Act 26 of 2007 is called as “Andhra Pradesh Reservation in favour of Socially and Educationally Backward Classes of Muslims Act, 2007” (Act No.26 of 2007). At the first instance, the petitioners have chosen to file the Writ Petitions questioning the Ordinance and in view of the enactment of the Act replacing the Ordinance, they have subsequently sought to amend the prayers in the Writ Petitions, and same was allowed by this Court. In the Schedule, the Government has declared 15 classes of Muslims residing in the state (Other than Dudekula, Laddaf, Pinjari/Noorbash and Mehtar) as identified by the A.P. Commission for Backward Classes as socially and educationally backward and included them in the lists of backward classes under separate category ‘E’. 4. The vires of the said Act is challenged in these writ petition. 5. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the above enactment is the result of the Report and Recommendations of the Respondent No.3 – Andhra Pradesh Backward Classes Commission (hereinafter called, ‘B.C. Commission’) dated 02-07-2007. It is further contended that B.C. Commission Report is based on the Report submitted by one, Mr.P.S. Krishnan, who was appointed as an Advisor to the State Government by virtue of G.O.Ms.No.21, dated 18-05-2007. It is also contended that his duties included collection of data, conducting research and consultation with B.C. Commission, concerned Governmental officials and preparation and submission of the draft report to the Government in May, 2007 for wider consultation, finalization of report after taking note of various suggestions, such as keeping the directions of the A.P. High Court and the Supreme Court on these issues, briefing the Government and the Council of Ministers if need be, filing of caveats, preparation of counter-affidavit on behalf of the Government and defending the Government in Courts of Law if need be and such other work as may be entrusted by the Government from time to time, for the benefit of the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens of Andhra Pradesh and in particular those belonging to these classes in the Muslim Population. It is contended that in the said G.O. it is stated that the Government of Andhra Pradesh is concerned with the conditions of the socially and educationally backward classes in the Muslim Population to take all possible special measures for the advancement of those belonging to such classes in terms of Article 5(4), 15(5), 16(4) and other provisions of the Constitution. Relying upon the Judgment of this Court in W.P.No.13832 and others read with judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney’s case and also taking into consideration subsequent developments, it is contended that the said Officer, who was appointed by virtue of G.O.Ms.No.21, dated 18-05-2007, has submitted his report on 11-06-2007 identifying specific classes of Muslims recommending to include in the list of socially and educationally backward classes as a separate group ‘E’ excluding the other Muslim groups, who are also socially and educationally backward. It is also contended by the learned counsel that B.C. Commission has also recommended for inclusion of the said classes in the separate group ‘E’ basing on the Report of Sri P.S.Krishnan. It is contended by the counsel that the enquiry conducted and the data collected by the Commission is not in conformity with the guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney’s case and also the decision of the Larger Bench of this Court in Archana Reddy’s case.. It is further contended that the inclusion of the Muslim groups in the B.C. list was done by the respondents mechanically without adequate and relevant data. It is also contended that the B.C. Commission has acted in a haste manner, in conducting the survey and also in collecting the data for recommending the 15 groups as specific classes of the Muslims to be included in Group ‘E’ of the B.Cs. in addition to ‘A, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’ for reservation into educational institutions and appointment to posts in the public service under Article 15 (4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India. It is also contended by all the learned counsel that in the State of Andhra Pradesh there exists a B.C. list wherein certain group of Muslims have already been identified right from 1968 onwards. It is also contended that Anantha Raman Commission identified and prepared a B.C. list of 92 caste groups, out of which they have excluded Dudekula, Laddaf, Pinjari or Noorbash. It is also contended that Anantha Raman Commission identified and prepared a B.C. list of 92 caste groups, out of which they have excluded Dudekula, Laddaf, Pinjari or Noorbash. The Commission has rejected the claim of other groups of Muslims and afterwards several developments have taken place and the Government tried to include certain groups of Muslims by way of providing reservations under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) and by virtue of G.O.Ms.No.33 dated 12-07-2004 and also tried to include the Muslim community as backward class in the B.C. list in Group ‘E’ by providing 5% of reservation in Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India by virtue of G.O.Ms.No.33, dated 12-07-2004 and the same was subject matter before the High Court in T.Muralidhar Rao v. State of A.P (1972) 1 SCC 660 and the said G.O. was quashed by this Court on the ground that the entire community cannot be declared as backward class and the reservation is also excessive. It is also contended that including all the socially educated group of classes would amount to division of existing B.C. list and the elimination of creamy layer is in contravention of the directions issued by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney’s case. It is emphatically argued before this Court that the Government has issued G.O.Ms.No.3, dated 04-04-2006, wherein it was ordered that adoption of criteria to determine the creamy layer among the B.C.s as fixed by the Government of India except the annual income limit, which is fixed by Government of India at Rs.2.50 lakhs per annum whereas the rate has been fixed at Rs.4,00,000/- per annum, which is contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Nair Service Society v. State of Kerala 992 Supp. (3) SCC 217. 6. It is contended on behalf of petitioners that the respondent No.1 i.e., the Principal Secretary to Government in the Writ Petition has sent the report of Sri P.S. Krishnan to respondent No.3 i.e., B C Commission and the respondent No.3 conducted the hearings and its Report is based on material supplied by Anthropological Survey of India and following the report of Sri P.S. Krishnan. It is contended that the Commission has never evolved any criteria nor collected any sufficient data nor made any comparative assessment with other communities and the way in which the B.C. Commission has conducted itself in a hurried manner goes to show that the survey was conducted within a short period. The hearings were held on 14.5.2007, 16.5.2007, 22.5.2007, 28.5.2007 and 1.6.2007 at Hyderabad and the hearings were also held on 23-06-2007 at Kadapa, on 24-06-2007 at Kurnool on 24-06-2007 at Mahaboobnagar, on 25-06-2007 at Guntur, on 25-06-2007 at Prakasam and on 26-06-2007 at Hyderabad. It is contended that the way in which the B.C. Commission has conducted the hearings and fixed the schedule would itself go to show that the entire exercise was done in a hurried manner and in violation of the norms and they have not conducted the survey of the entire population of Muslims in the State. It is also contended that the B.C. Commission has taken the report of P.S.Krishnan as basis and just endorsed the views expressed by P.S.Krishnan to identify the 15 groups of Muslims as socially and educationally backward class of Muslims to be included in the Group ‘E’ in the existing B.C. list. It is contended that in the absence of any data available and also without arriving at the figures of the entire population of Muslims, it would be highly difficult for any Commission to arrive at the said conclusion to classify certain groups or classes of persons as socially and educationally backward classes to be included for the purpose of Articles 15 (4), 15(5) and 16(4). It is also contended that there is no rationale in arriving at the figures and for coming to such conclusion as the Commission has conducted the survey on sample basis and has not followed the guidelines issued in Archana Reddy’s case and Indra Sawhney’s case. 7. It is also contended that the Government has no power to make a reference under Section 9(1) read with Rule 3(1) for calling the Report for identification of socially and educationally backward classes from the Muslim community or any class or community. Therefore, the reference, dated 16-04-2007, by the Government is without jurisdiction. It is also contended that under Section 9(1), of the Act the Government has no power to make a reference. Therefore, the reference, dated 16-04-2007, by the Government is without jurisdiction. It is also contended that under Section 9(1), of the Act the Government has no power to make a reference. It is also contended that the reference is made by the Government said to be in exercise of the powers conferred under section 11(1) of the Act, 1993 (Act No.20 of 1993). When reference under Section 11 (1) is pending, the impugned reference is void and consequently, Report made by the B.C. Commission is also illegal. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the reference is wrong as the recommendations are not with reference to the law laid down in Indra Sawhney’s case and Archana Reddy’s case and recommendations in the reference are insufficient. The B.C. Commission has not conducted any enquiry and the methodology adopted by the Commission in finding of the groups of the persons to classify them as socially and educationally backward classes of citizens is itself wrong and that the B.C. Commission has adopted the P.S.Krishnan’s recommendations in verbatim to verbatim and hence the recommendations are wrong and not sustainable under law. It is also contended that some of the communities belonging to Muslim groups were shown as B.Cs. On the basis of the classification, equals hitherto are now treated unequals and it violates Articles 15(1) and 15(4). It is also contended that the population details were not arrived at and the Commission relied only on 1961 and 1991 census and there is no transparency in the methodology adopted by the B.C. Commission and the data was not published as per the guidelines laid down in Archana Reddy’s case. 8. Shri C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned Advocate General has submitted that the impugned enactment is a social welfare legislation traceable to Articles 15(4) & 16(4) the Constitution and in examining such a legislation, what is the duty of the Court, as a judicial arm of the State and what are the principles that are involved at a higher level will have to be taken into consideration and how the Act has to be judicially reviewed are the broader questions. 9. Referring to Article 14 of the Constitution it was contended that it would only remain on paper, if one has go to the historical facts and made provisions to meet such historical facts. 9. Referring to Article 14 of the Constitution it was contended that it would only remain on paper, if one has go to the historical facts and made provisions to meet such historical facts. While reading the contents of Article 15, the learned Advocate General has submitted that Article 15 (4) has been inserted by first amendment for advancement of socially and educationally backward classes and Article 15 (5) has been inserted under the 93rd amendment which came into force from 20.1.2006. According to him, subject of reservation has been the subject matter of controversy which ultimately was settled in Indra Sawhney-I, the Mandal case. While taking the court to Article 29 (2) of the Constitution, it was contended that no citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. The State has to promote the educational and economic interests of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and in this Article, weaker sections include backward classes of citizens, who are socially and educationally backward. 10. While referring to Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala 2004 (6) ALD 1 = 2004 (5) ALT 634 , learned Advocate General has submitted that with this judgment, whatever controversy as to the preamble to be relied on, what is the importance that would be attached to the preamble becomes clear that it is the heart and soul of the Constitution. It is the foundation on which the constitutional edifice is based. It filters and crystallizes all the ideals and ideas, that the constitutional vision to give justice, social and political to all the citizens. And the next important question in adjudicating the constitutional validity of the Act of this nature is the inter-play between Parts-III and IV of the Constitution and the shift in thinking by the Apex Court from treating Part-IV as subservient to Chapter-III and placed reliance on para 10 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Madras v., Champakam Dorairajan 2005 (6) ALD 582. Reliance is also placed on para No.10 of yet another judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v State of Bihar (2008) 6 SCC 1 . 11. Reliance is also placed on para No.10 of yet another judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v State of Bihar (2008) 6 SCC 1 . 11. Learned Advocate General while explaining the importance of the preamble to the Constitution, has submitted that the preamble forms part of the Constitution and when a particular legislation violates the basic structure of the Constitution, the same can be struck down. When the Court is considering the legislation aimed to achieve the goals set out in the preamble, it has to give weightage to the underlying principles and it cannot review the legislation like an ordinary legislation. When a legislation effecting Parts III and IV of the Constitution is challenged, the approach of the Court will be slightly different. There are certain laws which are specifically made to achieve a specific goal contained in Part IV. He further contended that when constitutional issues are under consideration, the Court should avoid narrow interpretation and in this regard placed reliance on para 13 of the judgment Pradeep Jain v. Union of India (2003) 11 SCC 146 , para No. 5 of the judgment in Atam Prakash v. State of Haryana AIR 1958 SC 538 and para No. 158 of the judgment in State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas AIR 1967 SC 1643 . He further submitted that in the judgment reported in Unnikrishnan J. P. v. State of A.P. (1973) 4 SCC 225 the Supreme Court reviewed the entire case law. 12. It is argued that the Court will endeavor to support the constitutionality of the legislation keeping in view the larger constitutional objectives and the impugned Act will have to be looked from that angle and not from various flaws that the petitioners pointed out and the Court will have same obligations to uphold the legislation as that of the State, subject, of course, to abridgement of fundamental rights. It is further submitted that unless the Court comes to the conclusion that the enactment is based on a perverse report, the Court will not interfere and will assess the idea behind such an enactment. 13. Few of the important measures for achieving equality are enumerated in Articles 15 (4), 16(4) and 15(5) also. The State has an option to provide reservation to such categories of persons who are found to be socially and educationally backward. 13. Few of the important measures for achieving equality are enumerated in Articles 15 (4), 16(4) and 15(5) also. The State has an option to provide reservation to such categories of persons who are found to be socially and educationally backward. If one looks at it from this point of view, it is the constitutional mandate of the State and the State is obligated to take necessary steps to achieve this constitutional goal. Keeping in these aspects into mind, the State has enacted the impugned Act. 14. The learned Advocate General has also traced the history of reservations by submitting that there were two lists in the State of Andhra Pradesh, one in Telangana and the other in erstwhile Andhra area, which was part of Madras and these two lists were sought to be clubbed and a common backward classes list was prepared. When writ petition was filed, this Court in State of A.P., P. Sagar (2007) 2 SCC 1 , struck down the same and thereafter a G.O. came to be issued by the Government which was again challenged before this Court on the ground that the government did not conduct any enquiry and caste should never become the basis of reservation. Then the Government constituted Anantaraman Commission, which submitted a report. It was also attacked on identical grounds as sought to be urged now like personal law, lack of data, caste being the basis etc. and this Court struck down the same. The Supreme Court in State of A.P, v. U S V Balaram (2007) 3 SCC 184 reversed the judgment of this Court. In 1921, the State of Mysore included Muslims in the list of backward classes and this was struck down in M R Balaji v. Stateof Mysore (1994) 3 SCC 1 . Then Havanur Commission was constituted and it identified the entire Muslim community as backward. It was challenged before the Karnataka High Court and it upheld the validity of the G.O. Thereafter, in K.C. Vasanth Kumar’s case, the matter was considered by the Supreme Court and Justice Chinnappa Reddy’s Commission was appointed. The same thing happened in Tamil Nadu. Every time, reservation is made by affirmative action, writ petitions are filed before the Courts and ultimately the courts have struck down the same. He submits that the Court shall bear in mind the genuine nature of legislation and constitutional mandate while interpreting such legislations. The same thing happened in Tamil Nadu. Every time, reservation is made by affirmative action, writ petitions are filed before the Courts and ultimately the courts have struck down the same. He submits that the Court shall bear in mind the genuine nature of legislation and constitutional mandate while interpreting such legislations. If the Court perceives that the identified classes exist, then the Court will uphold such law for the purpose of doing social justice. He has further submitted that there is some material available before the State to provide reservation in favour of those classes, and sufficiency of the material, scientific nature of the enquiry sought to be projected by the petitioners are not the requirements. If there is no material, the Court can strike down the legislation. 15. He has further submitted that in Hindu society, every individual is born as a Hindu and born into a caste. A Kshatriya can become a carpenter, but a carpenter can never become a Kshatriya. What is required in the context of Article 15(4) is social backwardness coupled with educational backwardness. He contends that irrespective of the caste to which they belong, if all the persons who are practicing carpentry are to be treated as one class, then they could be provided reservation if they are found to be socially and educationally backward. These two are sine qua non for the purpose of giving benefit under Article 15(4). 16. In D.S. Nakkara Vs. Union of India (2008) 3 SCC 1 while interpreting Article 14, it was stated that the burden lies on the State to prove that the classification is valid and it is submitted by the learned A.G that thereafter, there are no judgments of the Benches of higher strength saying that the burden lies on the State to prove its legislative actions on Article 14. 17. 17. Reverting back to the judicial scrutiny, learned Advocate General further stated that the earlier Division Bench in Archana Reddy’s case, have not followed the observations of Justice Jeevan Reddy as well as Justice Pandian as well as Justice Sawant in Indra Sawhney-I apart from the fact that in Indian context the constituent assembly recognized existence of classes of people who form the majority of the population, who have suffered discrimination, disabilities for centuries and the constitutional scheme itself has under Articles 15 and 16 read with Part-IV of which created a charge over the State and making it obligatory to take action for ameliorating the conditions of such classes of persons. Thereafter, adverting to the contents of paragraphs 143 to 145 of the judgment, he submitted that in matters of this nature, it should have been a deferential scrutiny because of the charge created over the State. 18. While referring to Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of India AIR 1968 SC 1379 , learned Advocate General has submitted that the Court observed that strict scrutiny test or the intermediate scrutiny test applicable in the United States of America cannot be applied in the cases of reservation. Learned Advocate General has, however, submitted that where the legislation ex facie is found to be unreasonable, such a test may be applied. Learned A.G. has submitted that there is sufficient data before the Government, basing on which the impugned enactment is passed. Learned A.g. contended that there should not be a strict scrutiny or in-depth scrutiny or careful scrutiny and relied upon the decision in Indra Sawhney-I, wherein His Lordship Jeevan Reddy J held that no special level of scrutiny for examining the action under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) is necessary. 19. The learned Advocate General has submitted that the petitioners have not discharged their prima facie obligation. There is no allegation in any of their affidavits that any of the communities included in the list of Backward Classes or the groups identified by the BC Commission as socially and educationally backward, are not backward. In view of the dicta laid down in Rajendran, which was approved by majority in Indra Sawhney that burden is on the petitioners and that strict scrutiny principle is not applicable in this case, and is never applied in the Indian context. 20. In view of the dicta laid down in Rajendran, which was approved by majority in Indra Sawhney that burden is on the petitioners and that strict scrutiny principle is not applicable in this case, and is never applied in the Indian context. 20. The learned Advocate General has submitted that a perusal of Anantaraman’s report would find the perception of Mr.Anantaraman. In this context, it is stated that it was with reference to the entire population in the State of Andhra Pradesh. He further submits that after dealing with respective castes or communities or occupational groups among Hindus, the entire Muslim community was dealt as a core and referred to Item No.71 in of the report and has laid emphasis on the words “traditional caste system never existed among the Muslims” and submitted that while enumerating and recognizing that occupational groups do exist, no effort has been made to find it as to what their social status is. It is recognized by Anantaraman that there do exist occupational groups in the Muslims and by virtue of their occupation, that some of the Muslims are considered to be inferior. These factors were recognized, but no effort is made. When it comes to Mehtar, even that group was also not identified. As a result, a community which was equivalent to dalits (in Hindu sense of the term were scavengers), were denied this benefit. Dudekula has already been there in the list of Madras Presidency from 1935 onwards. In view of the fact that this is the perception and no serious efforts are made, except going by what was already included by Madras Presidency, no benefit was extended to anybody at all, except Dudekula, to which the State Government has intended to provide reservation to Muslim groups. 21. It has been contended by the learned Advocate General that the principle of strict scrutiny would not apply in the cases of reservation, which is mostly based by the United States Supreme Court and hence the strict scrutiny test cannot be made mandatory in the cases of reservation. 22. While concluding, the learned Advocate General has submitted that the petitioners are not, in fact, against the reservations and sufficient material is before the Government for providing reservations in favour of certain classes of Muslims, the impugned Act is valid and the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. 23. 22. While concluding, the learned Advocate General has submitted that the petitioners are not, in fact, against the reservations and sufficient material is before the Government for providing reservations in favour of certain classes of Muslims, the impugned Act is valid and the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. 23. The other counsels appearing for implead parties have advanced arguments supporting the arguments of the learned Advocate General. 24. Heard the other learned Counsel appearing for the parties and perused the entire material made available on record. 25. The present Act No. 26 of 2007 is enacted by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to provide reservation to socially and educationally backward class of Muslims in the Educational Institutions and Public Employment for their upliftment and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The said Act is published in gazette dated 13- 26. The history of reservation so far as Andhra Pradesh is concerned can be traced out to issuance of G.O.Ms.No.1886 dated 21-06-1963, wherein certain persons were listed as belonging to backward classes for the purpose of selecting candidates to the seats reserved for backward communities in the Medical Colleges in Andhra Pradesh and provided 25% of the seats to be reserved for Backward Classes in accordance with the list contained therein. The said list was challenged as violative of Articles 15 and 29(2) of the Constitution of India before the High Court and the said G.O. was struck down by the High Court holding that there was no material made available to the Court from the State with regard to economic conditions of various castes, their occupation, habitation, social status and their educational backwardness and that the enumeration of persons as Backward has been made almost exclusively on the basis of the caste – vide Sukh Dev v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh (1) - ((1966) 1 Andh WR 294). 27. In P.Sagar’s case (12 supra) the G.O. Ms.No.1880, dated 29-07-1966, which was issued enumerating 112 communities as backward classes, was challenged in the High Court and the same was struck down by this Court and the matter went up to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court has also upheld the decision of the High Court. 27. In P.Sagar’s case (12 supra) the G.O. Ms.No.1880, dated 29-07-1966, which was issued enumerating 112 communities as backward classes, was challenged in the High Court and the same was struck down by this Court and the matter went up to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court has also upheld the decision of the High Court. The State Government has appointed Anantha Raman Commission by virtue of G.O.Ms.No.870, dated 12-04-1968, to prepare the list of backward classes and in turn the Commission prepared a list wherein the Commission has enumerated 93 communities to be included as backward classes. By issuing G.O.Ms.No.1793, Education Department, dated 23-09-1970, the Anantha Raman Commission’s Report was accepted by the Government declaring the castes and communities specified by the Commission to be socially and educationally backward for the purpose of Article 15 08-2007. (4) of the Constitution of India and the Government provided 25% of the reservation for Backward classes. The said G.O. was also challenged in USV Balram’s case. In the said decision holding that the said G.O. is violative of Article 15(4), the High Court has struck down the said G.O. but the Supreme Court has reversed the judgment of the High Court and held that the G.O. is valid being within the ambit of Article 15(4) of the Constitution. Be that as it may, the State Government while exercising the power conferred under Section 3 of the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952, appointed a Commission for enquiry consisting of Single Member by name N.K. Muralidhara Rao, Ex-Officio Secretary, Social Welfare and Commissioner, Weaker Sections Housing Programme, stating that “The Commission shall – i. review the recommendations made by the Andhra Pradesh Backward Classes Commission, 1970 and the implementation thereof for the purpose of determining the need to continue the existing special provision in their favour under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India, and to review the existing list of Backward Classes in the light of the social and educational progress achieved by the classes; ii. examine the social and educational backwardness of minority communities for the purpose of including them within the purview of the Backward classes of citizens under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India. iii. examine the social and educational backwardness of minority communities for the purpose of including them within the purview of the Backward classes of citizens under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India. iii. present its report to the Government within a period of three months from the data on which it commences its enquiry….” Muralidhra Rao Commission submitted its report on 25-9-1982 containing, inter alia, the following recommendations; i. to include 9 communities (Ayyaraka and others) among the Backward Classes, ii. to delete “Mehtars” (Muslim) from the list inasmuch as the said community has already been included in the list of scheduled castes, similarly, to delete “Kammara” sub-sect of “Visva Brahmmas’ which is also known as “Kammari” from the list of Backward Classes inasmuch as this community has been included in Scheduled Tribes; iii. to delete the words “whose occupation is begging” occurring under the Entries “Jangam” and “Thammali” to include only “Kinthala Kalingas” in the list of Backward Classes and to exclude “Burugan Kalingas” therefrom”. iv. the four sub-groups among the Backward Classes were re-classified into five groups. The former Group “C” was designated as Group ‘E’ and Group ‘D’ was split up into Groups ‘C’ and ‘D’; v. to enhance the quota of reservation both in educational institutions, as well as services, from 25% to 44%. The inter se division of this 44% among the sub-groups ‘A’ to ‘E’ was specified as 10%, 16%, 8%, 8% and 2% respectively; vi. the reservations so provided shall be in force for a period of 25 years, whereafter, a detailed review may be undertaken either to continue the reservations or to modify them.” Thereafter, the commission has submitted a report and by virtue of G.O.Ms.No.166 Social Welfare (P) Department, dated 15-07-1986 the Commission’s Report was accepted by the Government of A.P., and directed as follows: -- “a) the 9 communities recommended by the Muralidhara Rao Commission be included among the Backward Classes; 2. the recommendations of the Commission to delete “Mehtars” (Muslim) and “Kammaras” from the list of backward classes is rejected, inasmuch as the said recommendation is based upon a mistake of fact; 3. the recommendation of the Commission regarding deletion of certain words from the Entry relating to “Jangam” and “Thammali” is accepted. Similarly, among “Kalingas” only “Kinthala Kalingas” shall be included in the list of Backward Classes, and “Burugam Kalingas” excluded; 4. the recommendation of the Commission regarding deletion of certain words from the Entry relating to “Jangam” and “Thammali” is accepted. Similarly, among “Kalingas” only “Kinthala Kalingas” shall be included in the list of Backward Classes, and “Burugam Kalingas” excluded; 4. the Government accepts the recommendation of the Commission to have five subgroups among the Backward Classes i.e., “A” to “E” and also the inter se distribution of quota among them in the proportion of 10%, 16%, 8%, 8% and 2% respectively; 5. the 44 de-notified and Nomadic Tribes mentioned in paragraph 10 of the G.O. shall be included in Sub-Group ‘A’ of the Backward Classes; 6. the list of Backward Classes appended to the G.O. shall be the list of Backward Classes both for the purpose of Article 15(4) as well as Article 16(4); 7. the Government accepts the recommendation of the M.R.Commission to enhance the reservation for Backward Classes to 44%; 8. there shall be no inter-change among the different groups of Backward Classes; any unfilled vacancies in regard to appointments in any of the groups shall be carried forward to the same group for a period of three years; 9. the benefits of reservation for Backward Classes should be restricted only to those belonging to families whose income does not exceed Rs.12,000/- per annum; 10. there is no need to provide for any reservations for Backward Classes in regard to promotions and recruitment by transfer; 11. The reservations so made shall continue up to 2000 A.D. 12. Selections for recruitment and selections for admission already made shall not be affected by this G.O.” 28. The total number of Communities/Groups included in the list of Backward Classes comes to 146. G.O.Ms.No.167 was issued on the same day enhancing the reservations in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes from 14% and 4%, to 15% and 6% respectively. This is stated to have been done on the basis of 1981 census, according to which the population of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes is 14.87% and 5.93% respectively. G.O.Ms.No.168 issued on the same day prescribes the roaster of reservations in consistence with the enhancement in the quota of reservation effected through G.O.Ms.Nos.166 and 167.” 29. This is stated to have been done on the basis of 1981 census, according to which the population of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes is 14.87% and 5.93% respectively. G.O.Ms.No.168 issued on the same day prescribes the roaster of reservations in consistence with the enhancement in the quota of reservation effected through G.O.Ms.Nos.166 and 167.” 29. The said G.O. was challenged in a batch of Writ Petitions in Narayana Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2005) 1 SCC 394 and a Full Bench of this Court has upheld G.O.Ms.No.167 by striking down clauses 13, 14, 15 and 18 as violative of Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution. Clause 17 of the said G.O. was upheld with certain modifications. Like wise the Full Bench also upheld G.O.Ms.No.168, which was issued consequent to G.O.Ms.No.166 and it has been mentioned that the validity of the continued efficacy of G.O.Ms.No.1793, dated 23-9-1970 as extended by G.O.Ms.No.136 dated 21-08-1979 shall in no way be affected. The provisions made therein shall have effect and shall continue to be in operation until further modification by the Government or for the period specified in G.Os., whichever is earlier. It has to be observed that the Government has accepted the recommendation of the Muralidhar Rao Commission in classifying the backward classes in to five sub-groups among backward classes i.e., A to E and also inter se distribution of quota among them in proportion of 10%, 16%, 8%, 8% and 2% respectively; however, rejected the recommendation of the Muralidhara Rao’s Commission to delete Mahatar Muslims from the list of backward classes holding that such recommendation is based on mistake of fact. 30. The Government of Andhra Pradesh has constituted Backward Class commission in the year 1994 under Andhra Pradesh Commission for Backward Classes Act. 1993 (‘the Act, 1993’ for short) to examine the request for inclusion of any class of citizens as a backward class in the list of backward class of citizens. The same is still pending. However, in the year 2004 the Government directed the Commissioner of Minority welfare to submit a report on social, economical and educational backwardness of Muslim community in the State so as to consider whether they can be included in the list of backward classes of citizens. The same is still pending. However, in the year 2004 the Government directed the Commissioner of Minority welfare to submit a report on social, economical and educational backwardness of Muslim community in the State so as to consider whether they can be included in the list of backward classes of citizens. Thereafter, a report dated 5-7-2004 was submitted, basing on which GOMs No. 33 dated 12-7-2004 was issued providing 5% reservation to the entire Muslim community in the State. The said G.O was challenged in T Muralidhar Rao v. State of A.P. (3 supra), wherein a Larger Bench of this Court set aside the said G.O holding that in the absence of any criteria laid down for ascertaining backwardness, the report of the Commission was bad in law. Thereafter, the Government vide GOMs No. 57 dated 18-11-2004 sought opinion of the Commission as to whether the Muslim community could be included in the list of backward classes and the commission has submitted its opinion. Basing on the same, the State Government issued an ordinance being A.P. Reservation of Seats in the Educational Institutions and of appointments/posts in Public Services under the Muslim Community Ordinance, 2005 declaring the entire Muslim community as belonging to backward class and providing for 5% reservation to them in educational institutions and public employment. When the said ordinance was challenged in B Archana Reddy case (supra) a Five Judge Bench of this Court declared the same as unconstitutional since the Muslim community as a whole, based on religion, was declared as backward class, without there being any identification by the B C Commission of social backwardness of Muslims. It appears the said judgment was challenged before the apex Court and the SLP filed in that connection is pending. 31. While so, the State had again referred the matter of providing reservations to Muslims by identifying socially and educationally backward groups among the Muslims. The Commission has submitted a report. Pursuant to which the Government has issued the impugned Act called as “The Andhra Pradesh Reservations in favour of Socially and Educationally Backward Classes of Muslims Act, 2007” which has been challenged in the present Writ Petitions, as violative of Articles 14, 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India. The Commission has submitted a report. Pursuant to which the Government has issued the impugned Act called as “The Andhra Pradesh Reservations in favour of Socially and Educationally Backward Classes of Muslims Act, 2007” which has been challenged in the present Writ Petitions, as violative of Articles 14, 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India. LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCY TO MAKE THE REFERENCE: 32 The other contention raised by the leaned Advocate General was that the enactment itself is affirmative action of the State and the same cannot be questioned on the ground of strict scrutiny or identification of data. It is also pointed out by the learned Advocate General that the certain classes of Muslims have been classified as backward class citizens by the State under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) and reservations in the educational institutions were accordingly made. Arguments advanced by all the counsel have been dealt in extenso by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice. 33. The petitioners’ argument is that the State Government has no power whatsoever to refer the matter to B.C. Commission at the time when the matters with reference to inclusion or exclusion of some castes are still pending. 33. After Archana Reddy’s case, a reference has been made on 17-04-2007 in No.5488/C2/2004-12 by the Principal Secretary to Government, Backward Classes Welfare Department, A.P. Secretariat, Hyderabad to the Member-Secretary, A.P. Commission for Backward Classes as under:- “Government referred the matter to the Andhra Pradesh Commission for Backward Classes to advice on inclusion of Muslims in Andhra Pradesh in the list of Backward Classes for the purpose of articles 15(4) and 16(4)of the Constitution vide letters first read above. Accordingly, the Commission had furnished its report and Government issued orders in G.O.Ms.No.18, B.C. Welfare Department, dated 25-06-2005 and the Legislative Assembly of Andhra Pradesh enacted the Andhra Pradesh Reservation of seats in the Educational Institutions and of appointments or posts in the Public Services under the State to Muslim Community Act, 2005 (Act 21 of 2005) providing 5% reservation to Muslims of seats in Educational Institutions and appoints in the Public Services in the State excluding creamy layer. However, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in its Judgment in W.P. No.13832/05 dated 7-11-2005 set aside the above Act of 2005. Government filed Civil Appeal No.7513 of 2005 before the Supreme Court against the above judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and it is pending. However, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in its Judgment in W.P. No.13832/05 dated 7-11-2005 set aside the above Act of 2005. Government filed Civil Appeal No.7513 of 2005 before the Supreme Court against the above judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and it is pending. However, in light of the commitment of the Government towards the cause of socially and educational backward classes of the population, including those belonging to the Muslim Community, and taking note of the observations made by the High Court in the said judgment and of the developments since the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, it is decided to make a reference to the A.P. Commission for Backward Classes under Section 9(1) of the A.P. Commission for Backward Classes Act, 1993 to make a survey / study of the Muslim community in Andhra Pradesh and identify the classes / communities / groups among the Muslim population in the State that can be classified as socially and educationally backward classes of citizens in the light of the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court in W.P. No.13832 of 2005 dated 7-11-2005 and judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Indra Sawhney case (AIR 1994 SC 477), so that special measures like reservations be considered for such groups / classes / communities in terms of Article 15(4), 15(5) 16(4) and other provisions of the Commission of India. 3. The report with clear recommendation of the commission with data pertaining to such groups / classes / communities to justify the recommendations should be sent to the Government as early as possible.” 34. Again on 11-06-2007 the Principal Secretary addressed a letter to the Backward Classes Commission forwarding a copy of the report of identification of socially and educationally backward classes in the Muslim Community of Andhra Pradesh and recommendations made by Sri P.S. Krishnan IAS (Retd.), Advisor to Government of Andhra Pradesh, Backward Classes Welfare, submitted to the Government on 11-06-2007, requesting the Commission to examine the Report and send its recommendations to the Government. 35. In this connection, it is relevant to refer to Sections 9 and 10 of A.P. Commission for Backward Classes Act, 1993 which read thus; Section 9 of the Act, 1993 reads: “9. 35. In this connection, it is relevant to refer to Sections 9 and 10 of A.P. Commission for Backward Classes Act, 1993 which read thus; Section 9 of the Act, 1993 reads: “9. Functions of the Commission: (1) The Commission shall examine requests for inclusion of any class of citizens as a backward class in the lists and hear complaints of over-inclusion or under-inclusion of any backward class in such list and tender such advise the Government as it deems appropriate. (2) The Commission shall examine and make recommendations on any other matter relating to the backward classes that may be referred to it by the Government from time to time. (3) It shall be competent for the Commission at the request of the Government to make an interim report in regard to any Castes or Classes in whose cases urgent action under the Act is, in the opinion of the Government necessary. Any action taken by the Government on the basis of such report shall be subject to review with prospective effect as and when the final report of the Commission is received. (4) The Commission shall enquire into specific complaints with respect to then on-observance of the rule of reservation in the admissions into educational institutions and also reservation of appointments to posts/services under the Government and other local authority or other authority in the State, as applicable to the listed Backward Classes and furnish its report to the Government.” Section 10 of the Act, 1993 reads: “10. Powers of the Commission:- The Commissions shall while performing its functions under sub-section (1) of Section 9 shall have all the powers of a Civil Court trying a suit and in particular in respect of the following matters namely:- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person from any part of State and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of any document; (c) receiving evidence on affidavits; (d) requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any Court or office; (e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses and documents; and (f) any other matter which may be prescribed.” 36. Section 9 of Act 1993 enables the Commission to examine and recommend any matter relating to the backward class that may be referred to it by the State Government from time to time. Section 9 of Act 1993 enables the Commission to examine and recommend any matter relating to the backward class that may be referred to it by the State Government from time to time. Even though a contention is sought to be raised by the petitioners before this Court that present reference is made under Section 9(1) of the Act 1993, and therefore, reference itself is bad, has to be rejected since the Government has got every power to refer the issue of deciding backwardness of certain groups in view of the Constitutional provisions and judgments of the Supreme Court. May be in the letter dated 17-04-2007 the Government has stated that the reference was made under Sec. 9(1) of the Act, by mentioning a wrong provision, but it is well settled principle that mere misquotation of a provision does not invalidate the order. 37. It is necessary to notice Section 11 of the Act which reads thus: “(1) The Government may at any time, and shall, at the expiration of ten years from the coming into force of this Act and every succeeding period often years thereafter, undertake revision of the lists with a view to excluding from such lists those classes who have ceased to be backward classes or for including in such lists new backward classes. (2) The Government shall while undertaking any revision referred to in sub-section (1) consult the commission.” From the above, it is clear that Section 11(2) mandates that the Government shall consult the B.C. Commission before undertaking any revision of backward classes list. That apart, this Court in T. Muralidhar case while considering the validity of G.O. No.33 dated. 12.7.2004, which was challenged therein, providing 5% reservation to Muslims in educational institutions and employment held to be ultra vires as the Government has not consulted A.P. Backward Classes Commission before providing reservations. Therefore, as per Section 11(2) of the Act, which is a mandatory provision, the State Government is bound to consult the A.P. Backward Class Commission before undertaking any revision (inclusion or addition of any new class) of the backward classes list. Even otherwise the intention of the Government is very clear as the said letter has referred to Article 15(5) of Constitution of India. Even otherwise the intention of the Government is very clear as the said letter has referred to Article 15(5) of Constitution of India. Further, the State Government has constituted B.C. Commission under Andhra Pradesh Commission for Backward Classes Act, 1993 (‘the Act, 1993’ for short), which is a statutory Body and the functions of the Commission are controlled under Section 9 of the Act and therefore the State Government has the power to make a reference to the Commission to identify the backwardness among Muslims. Hence, the State has got every power to make a reference to the B.C. Commission to make a survey or study of the Muslim community in Andhra Pradesh and identify the classes or groups among them to classify them as socially and educationally backward classes of citizens. As such, the contention of the petitioners that the Government has no power to make a reference to Backward Classes Commission cannot be accepted. VALIDITY OF THE IMPUGNED ACT 38. Before examining as to the validity of impugned Act, it is necessary to notice that Article 14 of the Constitution of India makes it obligatory upon the State not to deny any person equality before law or the equal protection of laws within the territory of India. As per Article 15 (1) of the Constitution of India the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. Article 15(4) of the Constitution of India envisages that nothing in this Article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. 39. The other contention raised by the leaned Advocate General was that the enactment itself is affirmative action of the State and the same cannot be questioned on the ground of strict scrutiny or identification of data. It is also pointed out by the learned Advocate General that the certain classes of Muslims have been classified as backward class citizens by the State under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) and reservations in the educational institutions were accordingly made. 40. It is also pointed out by the learned Advocate General that the certain classes of Muslims have been classified as backward class citizens by the State under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) and reservations in the educational institutions were accordingly made. 40. The petitioners’ argument is that the State Government has no power whatsoever to refer the matter to B.C. Commission at the time when the matters with reference to inclusion or exclusion of some castes are still pending. 41. The competency of the State Government to enact a particular law is not in dispute in view of the decision of the apex Court in Ashok Kumar Thakur’s case. Further, The State Government has constituted B.C. Commission under Andhra Pradesh Commission for Backward Classes Act, 1993 (‘the Act, 1993’ for short), which is a statutory body and the functions of the Commission are controlled under Section 9 of the Act. The State Government has the power to refer to the Commission to identify the backwardness among certain classes whether they belong to Hindus’ or ‘Non-Hindus’ if it so desires. 42. The present controversy centers around the reservation of certain groups of Muslims as ‘backward classes’. This is a case where the impugned legislation was enacted purported to be under Article 15(5) of the Constitution of India, which was inserted under the Constitution (Ninety-third Amendment) Act, 2005. 43. Article 15(5) of the Constitution of India reads as under: “Nothing in this article in sub-clause(g) of clause (1) of Article 19 shall prevent the State from making any special provision, by law, for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special provisions relate to their admission to educational institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other than minority educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of Article 30.” 44. In M.R. BALAJI case, the Apex Court has held that the backwardness contemplated by Article 15(4) was both social and educational. It is not either social or educational but it is both social and educational. 45. In K.S. JAYASREE v. STATE OF KERALA (2006) 8 SCC 212 , the Apex Court has observed as below at paragraph No.13: “13. In M.R. BALAJI case, the Apex Court has held that the backwardness contemplated by Article 15(4) was both social and educational. It is not either social or educational but it is both social and educational. 45. In K.S. JAYASREE v. STATE OF KERALA (2006) 8 SCC 212 , the Apex Court has observed as below at paragraph No.13: “13. Backward classes for whose improvement special provisions are contemplated by Article 15(4) are in the matter of their backwardness comparable to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. This Court has emphasised in decisions that the backwardness under Article 15(4) must be both social and educational. In ascertaining social backwardness of a class of citizens, the caste of a citizen cannot be the sole or dominant test. Just as caste is not the sole or dominant test, similarly poverty is not the decisive and determining factor of social backwardness.” 46. In K.C. VASANTH KUMAR v. STATE OF KARNATAKA (1990) 3 SCC 223 Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy while dealing with the two expressions i.e. “backward class of citizens” and “socially and educationally backward classes of citizens” has held as follows in paragraph No.49: “49.Now, it is not suggested that the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens and the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes for whom special, provision for advancement is contemplated by Art. 15(4) are distinct and separate from the backward classes of citizens who are not adequately represented in the services under the State for whom reservation of posts and appointments is contemplated by Art. 16(4). The backward classes of citizens referred to in Art. 16(4), despite the short description, are the same as the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens and the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, so fully described in Art. 15(4): Vide Trilokinath Tiku v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and other cases ( AIR 1967 SC 1283 ).” 47. In Indra Sawhney-I as stated supra, His Lordship Justice Sawant has observed as follows in paragraph No.398: “398. Xxxxxxxxxxxxxx Our Constitution, unlike many others, incorporates in it the framework of the social change that is desired to be brought about. The change has to be ushered in as expeditiously as possible but at the same time with the least friction and dislocation in national life. The duty to bring about the smooth change over is cast on all institutions including the judiciary. The change has to be ushered in as expeditiously as possible but at the same time with the least friction and dislocation in national life. The duty to bring about the smooth change over is cast on all institutions including the judiciary. A deep knowledge of social life with its multitudinous facets and their interactions is necessary to decide social issues like the one in question i.e. a superficial approach will be counter-productive.” It has also been further observed by Justice Sawant at paragraph No.406 that: “406. Xxxxxxx. The basic problems of this country are mass-oriented. India lives in villages, and in slums in towns and cities. To tackle their problems and to implement measures to better their lot, the country needs personnel who have first-hand knowledge of their problems and have personal interest in solving them. What is needed is empathy and not mere sympathy. One of the major reasons why during all these years after Independence, the lot of the downtrodden has however been marginally improved and why majority of the schemes for their welfare have remained on paper, is perceptibly traceable to the fact that the implementing machinery dominated as it is by the high classes, is indifferent to their problems. The Mandal Commissions lament in its report that it did not even receive replies to the information sought by it from various Governments, departments and organizations on the caste-wise composition of their services, speaks volumes or, the point. A policy of deliberate reservations and recruitment in administration from the lower classes, who form the bulk of the population and whose problems primarily are to be solved on a priority basis by any administration with democratic pretensions, is therefore, not only eminently just but essential to implement the Constitution, and to ensure stability, unity and prosperity of the country.” 48. The Apex Court in Indra Sawhney’s case by majority of judgment has upheld the reservation in favour of the socially and educationally backward classes. In the said case, Justice Jeevan Reddy, speaking on behalf of the Majority, has observed at paragraph Nos. 782, 795 and 796-797 as under: “782. Coming back to the question of identification, the fact remains that one has to begin somewhere – with some group, class or section. There is no set or recognized method. There is no law or other statutory instrument prescribing the methodology. 782, 795 and 796-797 as under: “782. Coming back to the question of identification, the fact remains that one has to begin somewhere – with some group, class or section. There is no set or recognized method. There is no law or other statutory instrument prescribing the methodology. The ultimate idea is to survey the entire populace. If so, one can well begin with castes, which represent explicit identifiable social classes/groupings, more particularly when Article 16(4) seeks to ameliorate social backwardness. What is unconstitutional with it, more so when caste, occupation poverty and social backwardness are so closely interwined in our society? [Individual survey is out of question, since Article 16(4) speaks of class protection and not individual protection]. This does not mean that one can wind up the process of identification with the castes. Besides castes (whether found among Hindus or others) there may be other communities, groups, classes and denominations which may qualify as backward class of citizens. For example, in a particular State, Muslim community as a whole may be found socially backward. (As a matter of fact, they are so treated in the State of Karnataka as well as in the State of Kerala by their respective State Governments). Similarly, certain sections and denominations among Christians in Kerala who were included among backward communities notified in the former princely State of Travancore as far back as in 1935 may also be surveyed and so on and so forth. Any authority entrusted with the task of identifying backward classes may well start with the castes. It can take caste ‘A’, apply the criteria of backwardness evolved by it to that caste and determine whether it qualifies as a backward class or not. If it does qualify, what emerges is a backward class, for the purposes of clause (4) of Article 16. The concept of ‘caste’ in this behalf is not confined to castes among Hindus. It extends to castes, wherever they obtain as a fact, irrespective of religious sanction for such practice. Having exhausted the castes or simultaneously with it, the authority may take up for consideration other occupational groups, communities and classes. The concept of ‘caste’ in this behalf is not confined to castes among Hindus. It extends to castes, wherever they obtain as a fact, irrespective of religious sanction for such practice. Having exhausted the castes or simultaneously with it, the authority may take up for consideration other occupational groups, communities and classes. For example, it may take up the Muslim community (after excluding those sections, castes and groups, if any, who have already been considered) and find out whether it can be characterized as a backward class in that State or religion, as the case may be. The approach may differ from State to State since the conditions in each State may differ. Nay, even within a State, conditions may differ from region to region. Similarly, Christians may also be considered. If in a given place, like Kerala, there are several denominations, sections or divisions, each of these groups may separately be considered. In this manner, all the classes among the populace will be covered and that is the central idea. The effort should be to consider all the available groups, sections and classes of society in whichever order one proceeds. Since caste represents an existing, identifiable, social group spread over an overwhelming majority of the country’s population, we say one may well begin with castes, if one so chooses, and then go to other groups, sections and classes. We may say, at this stage, that we broadly commend the approach and methodology adopted by the Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy Commission in this respect. 795. xxxxxxxx. It must be left to the Commission/Authority appointed to identify the backward classes to evolve a proper and relevant criteria and test the several groups, castes, classes and sections of people against that criteria. If, in any case, a particular caste or class is wrongly designated or not designated as a backward class, it can always be questioned before a court of law as well. We may add that relevancy of the criteria evolved by Mandal Commission (Chapter XI) has not been questioned by any of the counsel before us. Actual identification is a different matter, which we shall deal with elsewhere. 796-797. We may now summarise our discussion under Question No.3. (a) A caste can be and quite often is a social class in India. If it is backward socially, it would be a backward class for the purposes of Article 16 (4). Actual identification is a different matter, which we shall deal with elsewhere. 796-797. We may now summarise our discussion under Question No.3. (a) A caste can be and quite often is a social class in India. If it is backward socially, it would be a backward class for the purposes of Article 16 (4). Among non-Hindus, there are several occupational groups, sects and denominations, which for historical reasons are socially backward. They too represent backward social collectivities for the purposes of Article 16 (4). (b) Neither the constitution nor the law prescribe the procedure or method of identification of backward classes. Nor is it possible or advisable for the court to lay down any such procedure or method. It must be left to the authority appointed to identify. It can adopt such method/procedure as it thinks convenient and so long as its survey covers the entire populace, no objection can be taken to it. Identification of the backward classes can certainly be done with reference to castes among, and along with, other groups, classes and sections of people. One can start the process with the castes, wherever they are found, apply the criteria (evolved for determining backwardness) and find out whether it satisfies the criteria. If it does – what emerges is a “backward class of citizens” within the meaning of and for the purposes of Article 16 (4). Similar process can be adopted in the case of other occupational groups, communities and classes, so as to cover the entire populace. xxxxxxxxxxxx” 49. Following the said decision B. Sudershan Reddy, J speaking for a Larger Bench of this Court in T. Muralidhar Rao case (supra 3) has observed as follows: 249. The following are our conclusions and answers to the questions dealt with hereinabove: 1(a) The expression "socially and educationally Backward Classes" in Article 15(4) and the expression "backward class of citizens" in Article 16(4) may include any caste, community or social group which may be identified as socially backward. That a caste is also a class of citizens and if such caste as a whole in its entirety is socially and educationally backward, provisions can be made in favour of such caste on the basis that it has socially and educationally backward class of citizens within the meaning of Article 15(4). The same can be treated as a backward class within the meaning of Article 16(4). The same can be treated as a backward class within the meaning of Article 16(4). Social backwardness may be found in other groups, classes and sections among the populace apart from the caste. 1(b) The Muslims as a group are entitled to affirmative action/social reservations within the constitutional dispensation, provided they are identified as Socially and Educationally Backward Class for the purposes of Article 15(4) and Backward Class of Citizens under Article 16(4). Providing social reservations to the Muslim Community or sections or groups amongst them in no manner militate against secularism, which is a part of basic structure of the Constitution, (2) The problem of determining who are socially Backward Classes is a very complex one. The caste which is a social class if found educationally and socially backward for the purposes of Article 15(4), it would be socially and educationally backward class. Similarly, if it is backward socially, it would be a backward class for the purposes of Article 16(4). The Backward Classes can be identified on the basis of. a caste which is a social class in India provided it is identified to be socially and educationally backward for the purposes of Article 15(4) and backward for the purposes of Article 16(4). There are no legal or constitutional impediments for identification of the Backward Classes with reference to caste. However, the requirement is that a rational and scientific criteria must be evolved for determining backwardness and that criteria must be applied to find out whether any caste, occupational groups, classes or sections of people qualify for classifying them as Backward Classes. If the criteria evolved and applied for identification of the Backward Classes is found to be improper and invalid, then the classification of socially Backward Classes based on that criteria will have to be held to be inconsistent with the requirements of Articles 15(4) and 16(4). In case of non-Hindus social backwardness cannot be identified for the purposes of recognizing as socially backward class on the basis of caste in the conventional sense known to Hindu Society. In all such cases, the part played by the occupation, conventional belief and place of habitation coupled with poverty may play a dominant and significant role in determining social backwardness. No particular procedure or method of identification of Backward Classes is prescribed. In all such cases, the part played by the occupation, conventional belief and place of habitation coupled with poverty may play a dominant and significant role in determining social backwardness. No particular procedure or method of identification of Backward Classes is prescribed. The authority appointed to identify the Backward Classes is free to adopt such method/procedure as it thinks fit and proper and so long, the method/ procedure adopted for the purposes of identification of the Backward Classes is rational, scientific, fair and adequate, the same may satisfy the constitutional requirement. But in either case, identification of Backward Classes cannot be based exclusively and solely on the basis of caste. (3) The process of identification of Muslims as a group as socially backward by the Commissionerate of Minorities Welfare is totally vitiated since it did not determine any specific criteria for the purposes of identifying the Backward Classes and applied the same in order to find out as to whether the Muslims qualify to categorize them as socially backward and as well as backward for the purposes of Articles 15(4) and 16(4). The Commissionerate acted in undue haste. The Commissionerate failed to undertake any serious investigation and enquiry as is required before identifying the Muslim Community as a socially Backward Class. In the absence of laying down the criteria for ascertaining the backwardness, the entire report is to be treated as an exercise in futility. The approach adopted by the authority is improper and invalid. In the absence of any such finding as to the social backwardness, the Muslims cannot be classified as Backward Classes either for the purposes of Article 15(4) or Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India. 4. That Section 11(2) of Act 20 of 1993 is mandatory in its nature. The State Government is bound to consult the A.P. Backward Classes Commission before undertaking any revision of the Backward Classes list. The expression "revision" includes inclusion or addition of any new class into the list of Backward Classes. In the absence of such consultation, the State Government in issuing the impugned G.O. acted in contravention of the mandatory provision of law. The G.O is, therefore, ultra vires. 5. The creamy layer is required to be excluded in the course of identification of Backward Classes. Non-exclusion of creamy layer has the same effect of inclusion of forward caste/groups in the list of Backward Classes. The G.O is, therefore, ultra vires. 5. The creamy layer is required to be excluded in the course of identification of Backward Classes. Non-exclusion of creamy layer has the same effect of inclusion of forward caste/groups in the list of Backward Classes. The creamy layer among the Muslim community are not entitled to the benefit of social reservations. The impugned G.O. which does not make any provision to exclude the creamy layer from the benefit of social reservations is violative of Articles 14 and 15(1) and 16(1) and also of Articles 15 (4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India. 6. The reservations contemplated in clause (4) of Article 15 and as well as clause (4) in Article 16 should not exceed 50% unless to meet extraordinary situations. No case as such is made out in justification of exceeding 50% reservations. 7. The State did not make out that reservations in favour of Muslims were made under Articles 15(1) and 16(1) of the Constitution of India. The plea that reservations can be made in favour of minorities under Articles-15(1) and 16(1) of the Constitution is untenable and unsustainable as the same would amount to making reservations on the basis of religion which is prohibited by Articles 15(1) and 16(2) of the Constitution of India. 8. The determination of backwardness and the process of identification is not a subjective exercise nor a matter of subjective satisfaction. The exercise is an objective one. The authority entrusted with the task of identification is required to evolve objective, social, sociological and other considerations and apply the same before any group or class of citizens could be treated as backward. That if the body entrusted with the task of identification or for that matter, the Executive includes, for collateral reasons any group or class not specifying the relevant criteria as a backward class, it would be a clear case of fraud on power. The decision is liable to be tested on the touchstone of arbitrariness, irrationality and as well as on the grounds of non-application of mind or perversity or on the ground that it was formed on collateral grounds. The decision is liable to be tested on the touchstone of arbitrariness, irrationality and as well as on the grounds of non-application of mind or perversity or on the ground that it was formed on collateral grounds. The norms and parameters for adjudging the validity of administrative action are applicable for testing the validity of exercise of power and in particular, the action taken under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) so far as the identification of Backward Classes is concerned; the yardstick is same and not different. However, formation of opinion regarding adequacy of representation in the services of the State is within the subjective satisfaction of the Government. The State is entitled to form its opinion on the basis of the material it has in its possession already or it may gather such material from a Commission/Committee, person or authority, but even that opinion formed is not beyond the judicial scrutiny altogether. In the absence of existence of the circumstances and the material relevant to the formation of opinion for drawing requisite satisfaction, the decision is challengeable; the judicial scrutiny would be available on the ground of non-application of mind or formulation of collateral grounds. If the formation of opinion is found to be mala fide or is found to be based wholly on extraneous and/ or irrelevant grounds, it is liable to be set aside. The words of Article 16(4) are not simplicitor, "in the opinion of the State" "is not adequately represented" in the services under the State, the State may make provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of backward class of citizens. It is a conditional power and the same can be exercised provided the requisite factual situation which is a condition precedent to the exercise of power exists. Whether condition precedent to the formation of the opinion have a factual basis can always be examined by the Court. However, the sufficiency of the material, reasonableness and propriety cannot be gone into by this Court. 250. In the result, G.O. Ms. No. 33, dated 12.07.2004 is struck down as violative of Articles 14, 15(1) and (4), 16(1) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India. 251. However, the sufficiency of the material, reasonableness and propriety cannot be gone into by this Court. 250. In the result, G.O. Ms. No. 33, dated 12.07.2004 is struck down as violative of Articles 14, 15(1) and (4), 16(1) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India. 251. The following directions are given to the Government of Andhra Pradesh: (1) The Government of Andhra Pradesh shall forthwith initiate the process of reconstituting the Andhra Pradesh Commission for Backward Classes and complete the same within a period of three months. That immediately upon such reconstitution, the Government shall initiate the process of consultation and seek the opinion of the Commission for inclusion of the Muslim Community into the list of Backward Classes. (2) The Commission shall examine the requisition/request of the Government and shall decide the same by duly giving its opinion within a period of six months from the data of such requisition/request being made by the State Government. It shall be open to the State Government to forward the entire material in its possession, including the material collected by the Commissionerate of Minorities Welfare for the perusal and consideration of the Backward Classes Commission. (3) The identification of any caste, social group or community involves exclusion of creamy layer. The State of Andhra Pradesh though a party to the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhneys case (supra), so far did not lay down any criteria for identification of creamy layer. In the circumstances, it would be just and necessary to direct the State Government to lay down the criteria for identification of creamy layer so that it could be applied while considering the case of the Muslim Community for identification as backward class. That an appropriate criteria shall be evolved by the Government in terms of the directions of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhneys case (supra). The very process of identification of Backward Classes involves identification of creamy layer amongst them. That an appropriate criteria shall be evolved by the Government in terms of the directions of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhneys case (supra). The very process of identification of Backward Classes involves identification of creamy layer amongst them. The criteria in this regard shall be laid down by the State Government within a period of three months or in the alternative to follow the criteria laid down by the Government of India in its Memorandum dated 8.9.1993 which has received its affirmation in Ashok Kumar Thakur v. State of Bihar (supra) and Indra Sawhneys case-II (supra), in order to facilitate the expeditious disposal of the claim of the Muslim Community for their identification as a Backward Class.” 50. Another Larger Bench of this Court, referring to the decisions in Indra Sawhney and Muralidhar Rao’s cases, in Archana Reddy’s case held as under: Paragraph No.114 of Archana Reddy’s case reads as follows: “114. The Commission has neither found nor recorded that self-employment in petty business, occupations like rickshaw puling, push-cart trade, agricultural labour, marginal land ownership, mal-nutrition, inaccessibility to medical facility, lower life expectancy, engagement as unskilled labour, masons or drivers, pursuit of professions or occupations such as cycle repairing or vulcanizing, engagement of women and children in beedi-rolling, are circumstances either peculiar to the Muslim community or that professing the faith of Islam (definition Ordinance) and these (occupational, professional, extreme poverty and want) circumstances have a causal relationship. In the absence of a causal nexus between the Islam faith aggregate and the pursuit of certain professions, trades or humble economic circumstances; the occupation and/or the means test, provides neither a legal nor a rational and logical basis for the conclusion that all Muslims are socially backward because some or many of them are in dire economic straits.” It has also been observed at paragraph No.119 as follows: “119. On the analysis above we hold that the Commission had no basis, in concept or fact to support the conclusion that Muslims are socially backward. This conclusion of the Commission is the produce of a succession of fundamental misconceptions: that Muslims are a homogeneous collectivity; that humble occupations or trades, poverty and unhygienic habitation are specific (in some way) attributes of Muslims; and that these attributes constitute the Muslims a social class and a backward class. In the considered view of this Court, each of these assumptions is erroneous. In the considered view of this Court, each of these assumptions is erroneous. The Commissions conclusions based on a composition of erroneous assumptions, are therefore unsustainable.” In the said decision it was also held as under: 293. The very purpose of issuing notification inviting objections and conducting public hearings, would be defeated if the criteria is not decided prior to undertaking the collection of data and putting the objectors on notice. (para293) While determining the social backwardness of a class of citizens, an expert body like B.C. Commission has to necessarily evolve absolutely relevant criteria for the purpose of caste test, occupation test and means test. (para 378) While undertaking an exercise for identification of backward class of citizens, the Commission is legally bound to be fair and transparent and afford all such opportunity to objectors and proponents for effective representation before the Commission. (para 379)” 51. With regard to the publication of criteria and calling for the objections, it has to be observed that the A.P. Backward Classes Commission did not envisage any such procedure to be followed at the pre-identification stage enabling the objectors to file their objections during the course of hearing. Though in Indra Sawhney’s case, it was held that it is for the State to adopt its own procedure, yet no procedure known to law is followed by the Commission. 52. In the instant case after hearing the arguments advanced by both the counsel for petitioners as well as learned Advocate General whose argument is based on the ground that there is no necessity for the BC Commission or the State Government to pre-publish the data or the criteria, the point that arises for consideration is Whether the criteria can be evolved at different levels by the Commission. If the principles evolved in Archana Reddy’s case are strictly looked into, they envisage as follows: “Firstly notification of proposed criteria; Secondly conducting public hearing for obtaining objections on notice; and Thirdly evolving a rational criteria for detecting the caste test or occupation test and the means test”. 53. In Archana Reddy it was never spelt out on what basis the criteria has to be evolved by the commission and at what stage the criteria should be the components of caste test, occupation test and means test. 53. In Archana Reddy it was never spelt out on what basis the criteria has to be evolved by the commission and at what stage the criteria should be the components of caste test, occupation test and means test. Looking at the principles as laid down in the said case, the point emerges is that objections have to be called for at first instance followed by conducting a population survey and the conclusions have to be arrived at basing on the criteria which is not same criteria at first instance for the reason that the objectors have no opportunity to meet the criteria evolved and arrived at after collecting the data. If the principles laid in Archana Reddy’s case are to be construed as strict principles, it leads to multiplicity of criteria as stated above. The law laid down in the said case cannot be applied in rigidity, in the light of the observations made by the apex Court in Indra Sawhney-I that there is no recognized method or law statutory instrument prescribing the methodology and the ultimate idea is to survey the populace of Muslim (in this case). 54. Under the above circumstances, with reference to the guidelines issued in Archana Reddy it has also to be observed that provisions of the Act, 1993 does not provide for any publication of criteria or to call for objections even before the process of identification has started. 55. In Archana Reddy’s case the learned Judges while dealing with the standards of review, observed that the standards can be classified as (a) the mere rationality standard; (b) strict scrutiny standard; and (c) the intermediate-level review standard. 56. With regard to strict scrutiny standard of review, learned Advocate General and other counsel appearing for respondents have vehemently contended that in view of the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Thakur Case20 the said principle cannot be made applicable to the cases of reservation. 57. In this regard, it is apt to notice the observations of the Supreme Court in the above said case, which read as under; “209. 57. In this regard, it is apt to notice the observations of the Supreme Court in the above said case, which read as under; “209. The aforesaid principles applied by the Supreme Court of the United States of America cannot be applied directly to India as the gamut of affirmative action in India is fully supported by constitutional provisions and we have not applied the principles of “suspect legislation” and we have been following the doctrine that every legislation passed by Parliament is presumed to be constitutionally valid unless otherwise proved. We have repeatedly held that the American decisions are not strictly applicable to us and the very same principles of strict scrutiny and suspect legislation were sought to be applied and this Court rejected the same in Saurabh Chaudri vs. Union of India ( (2003) 11 SCC 146 ). Speaking for the Bench, V.N. Khare, C.J., said (scc P.164, PARA 36) “36. The strict scrutiny test or the intermediate scrutiny test applicable in the United States of America as argued by Shri Salve cannot be applied in this case. Such a test is not applied in Indian Courts. In any event, such a test may be applied in a case where a legislation ex facie is found to be unreasonable. Such a test may also be applied in a case where by reason of a statute the life and liberty of a citizen is put in jeopardy. This Court since its inception apart from a few cases where the legislation was found to be ex facie wholly unreasonable proceeded on the doctrine that constitutionality of a statute is to be presumed and the burden to prove contra is on him who asserts the same.” “210. Learned counsel Shri Sushil Kumar Jain contended that the classification of OBCs was not properly done and it is not clear as to whose benefit the legislation itself is made, therefore, it is a suspect legislation. This contention cannot be accepted. We are of the view that the challenge of Act 5 of 2007 on the ground that it does not stand the “strict scrutiny” test and there was no “compelling State necessity” to enact this legislation cannot be accepted. 58. This contention cannot be accepted. We are of the view that the challenge of Act 5 of 2007 on the ground that it does not stand the “strict scrutiny” test and there was no “compelling State necessity” to enact this legislation cannot be accepted. 58. In the said decision, a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, while considering the validity of the Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006, has categorically held that the strict scrutiny test or the intermediate scrutiny test applicable in the United States of America cannot be applied in the cases of reservation in India and such a test should not be applied in Indian Courts. In view of the above observations, the principles of strict scrutiny standard and intermediate level review standard as laid down in Archana Reddy’s case cannot be made applicable to the cases like the instant ones. 59. The B C Commission started functioning as soon as it was directed by the Government and the material on record furnished before us go to show that the commission has collected data within a short span of 4 days. The record further shows that the commission has followed Mr. Krishnan’s report to a larger extent in verbatim and the report of Anthropological survey to come to a conclusion that particular group of ‘Muslims’ can be classified as ‘backward class’. That apart though the process of collection of data, compilation of the survey material and discussion on the collected material was completed by 29.6.2007 (27.6.2007 as stated in the report), the Commission had submitted its report on 2.7.2007, which is about 206 pages, within a span of two days. As the B C Commission has acted in hasty manner without any scientific survey, I am of the opinion that the data collected and the material collected is not sufficient for the Government to come to the conclusion that specific classes of Muslims can be classified as backward class for the purpose of Articles 15(4),15(5) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India. In view of the fact that the data collected by the B C Commission is not the study which should essentially be an exploratory analysis of data on the implementation of reservation policies. I am also of the opinion that to have a deeper understanding of the phenomenon, the multivariate analysis is required. In view of the fact that the data collected by the B C Commission is not the study which should essentially be an exploratory analysis of data on the implementation of reservation policies. I am also of the opinion that to have a deeper understanding of the phenomenon, the multivariate analysis is required. In the absence of analysis of data, there is no need to discuss about exclusion of creamy layer from the said class by the Government. 60. The State Government has not placed any material before this Court that for ignoring the similarly placed group of persons belonging to same class and the reasons for treating the equals as unequals by enacting such legislation. The burden lies on the State Government to prove that it has sufficient material to have the subjective satisfaction to enact the particular enactment. But the material which has been collected by the B C Commission cannot found place for the subjective satisfaction of the State Government. 61. In Ashoka Kumar Thakur’s case (supra 2), the Supreme Court held as follows: Per Balakrishnan, C.J, at paras 157, 158 and 159, 162, 164 and 225 “157. In India, caste, in a socio-organizational manner would mean that it is not characterized merely by the physical or occupational characteristics of the individuals who make it up; rather, it is characterized by its codes and its close-knit social controls. In the case of classes, however, there may not exist such close-knit unit social controls, and there may exist great disparity in occupational characteristics. 158. A social class is therefore a homogeneous unit, from the point of view of status and mutual recognition; whereas a caste is a homogeneous unit from the point of view of common ancestry, religious rites and strict organizational control. Thus the manner in which the caste is closed both in the organizational and biological sense causes it to differ from social class. Moreover, its emphasis upon ritual and regulations pertaining to cleanliness and purity differs radically from the secular nature and informality of social class rules. In a social class, the exclusiveness would be based primarily on status. Social classes divide homogeneous populations into layers of prestige and esteem, and the members of each layer are able to circulate freely with it. 159. In a caste, however, the social distance between members is due to the fact that they belong to entirely different organizations. In a social class, the exclusiveness would be based primarily on status. Social classes divide homogeneous populations into layers of prestige and esteem, and the members of each layer are able to circulate freely with it. 159. In a caste, however, the social distance between members is due to the fact that they belong to entirely different organizations. I may be said, therefore, that a caste is a horizontal division and a class, a vertical division.” 162. A plea was raised by the respondent-State that categorization of Scheduled Castes could be justified by applying the "creamy layer" test as used in Indra Sawhneys case (supra) which was specifically rejected in paragraph 96 of the E.V. Chinnaiahs case (supra). It is observed: But we must state that whenever such a situation arises in respect of Scheduled Caste, it will be Parliament alone to take the necessary legislative steps in terms of Clause (2) of Article 341 of the Constitution. The States concededly do not have the legislative competence therefor. 164. Based on the Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment Act, Act 5 of 2007 has been enacted. According to the petitioners Counsel, this is a "suspect legislation" and therefore, it is to be subjected to "strict scrutiny" as laid by the United States Supreme Court and only by passing this test of "strict scrutiny", such legislation could be put into practice. 225. On 17th November, 1949, the Constituent Assembly began the third reading of the Constitution Bill. While replying to the debate, Dr. Ambedkar stated: This anxiety is deepened by the realization of the fact that in addition to our old enemies in the form of castes and creeds we are going to have many political parties with diverse and opposing political creeds. Will Indians place the country above their creed or will they place creed above country? I do not know. But this much is certain that if the parties place creed above country, our independence will be put in jeopardy a second time and probably be lost forever. This eventuality we must all resolutely guard against. We must be determined to defend our independence with the last drop of our blood. (See: CAD on 25th November, 1949 pp 977-978)” Per Pasayat and Thakker, JJ at para 328: “328. Classifications on the basis of castes in the long run has tendency of inherently becoming pernicious. Therefore, the test of reasonableness has to apply. We must be determined to defend our independence with the last drop of our blood. (See: CAD on 25th November, 1949 pp 977-978)” Per Pasayat and Thakker, JJ at para 328: “328. Classifications on the basis of castes in the long run has tendency of inherently becoming pernicious. Therefore, the test of reasonableness has to apply. When the object is elimination of castes and not perpetuation to achieve the goal of casteless society and a society free from discrimination of caste, judicial review within permissible limits is not ruled out. But at the same time compelling State interest can be considered while assessing backwardness. The impact of poverty on backwardness cannot be lost sight of. Economic liberation and freedom are also important.” Per Raveendran, J at paras 650 and 664: “650. Failure to exclude the “creamy layer” from the benefits of reservation would render the reservation for Other Backward Classes under Act 5 of 2007 unconstitutional; and Act 5 of 2007 providing for reservation for Other Backward Classes will however be valid if the definition of “Other Backward Classes” is clarified to the effect that if the identification of Other Backward Classes is with reference to any caste considered as socially and economically backward, “creamy layer” of such caste should be excluded. 664. A caste can be identified to be socially and economically backward, only when the creamy layer is removed from the caste and a compact class emerges which can be identified as a socially and educationally backward class. Thus, the determination is not by first identifying a caste as a socially and educationally backward class and, thereafter, to remove or exclude the creamy layer for the purpose of bestowing the benefits flowing to such class. On the other hand, until and unless the creamy layer is removed from a caste, there is no compact class which can be termed as socially and educationally backward class at all. Thus, while the process of identifying socially and educationally backward class can conveniently start with a socially and educationally backward caste, removing the creamy layer therefrom results in the emergence of compact class which can be termed as a socially and educationally backward class. If the creamy layer is not excluded the benefit of reservation will be appropriated by such advanced sections.” Per Bhandari, J at para 590, 597 and 637: “590. If the creamy layer is not excluded the benefit of reservation will be appropriated by such advanced sections.” Per Bhandari, J at para 590, 597 and 637: “590. Economic criteria must include occupation and land holdings because income alone is insufficient. To decrease the likelihood that the undeserving evade identification, it is wise to employ more than one criterion. 597. The National Commission for Backward Classes aside, I have set out to eventually install a system that only takes cognizance of economic criteria. Using purely economic criteria would lighten the identification load, as ascertaining caste would no longer be required. Respondents and others level a common criticism against the exclusive use of economic criteria. Most of the country is poor. Thus, too many people would be eligible for the benefit. This is only a problem if you hand out reservations based on the groups proportion of the total population. Such a reservation would be excessively unreasonable and would likely violate the Balaji cap of 50% [see M.R. Balaji and Ors. v. State of Mysore (1963) Supp (1) SCR 439]. If economic reservation were limited to a reasonable number, it could be upheld. 637. Sawhney I compels me to conclude that use of caste is valid. It is said that if reservation in education is to stay, it should adhere to a basic tenet of Secularism: it should not take caste into account. As long as caste is a criterion, we will never achieve a casteless society. Exclusively economic criteria should be used. I urge the Government that for a period of ten years caste and other factors such as occupation/income/property holdings or similar measures of economic power may be taken into consideration and thereafter only economic criteria should prevail; otherwise we would not be able to achieve our constitutional goal of casteless and classless India. In ASHOK KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA AIR 1951 SC 226 , his lordship Balakrishnan, C.J. has also observed as follows: “The amendment to Article 15 by inserting Article 15(5) and the new Act (Act 5 of 2007) are to be viewed in the background of these constitutional provisions. It may also be recalled that the Preamble to the Constitution and the Directive Principles of State Policy give a positive mandate to the State and the State is obliged to remove inequalities and backwardness from society. It may also be recalled that the Preamble to the Constitution and the Directive Principles of State Policy give a positive mandate to the State and the State is obliged to remove inequalities and backwardness from society. While considering the constitutionality of a social justice legislation, it is worthwhile to note the objectives which have been incorporated by the Constitution makers in the Preamble of the Constitution and how they are sought to be secured by enacting fundamental rights in Part III and Directives Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the Constitution. The Fundamental Rights represent the civil and political rights and the Directive Principles embody social and economic rights. Together they are intended to carry out the objectives set out in the Preamble of the Constitution.” Under the above circumstances, in view of the observations made by the Apex Court in Ashok Kumar Thakur’s case, it has to be observed that the principles laid down by the United States Supreme Court for affirmative action such as suspect legislation, strict scrutiny and compelling State necessity are not at all applicable to the Indian Courts. 62. Articles 15(4) & 16(4) enable the State to have policies as necessary to promote educational advancement of socially backward sections of the society. The first amendment to the constitution brought the clarification that social backwardness mentioned in clause (4) of Article 15 includes economic backwardness also. Catena of decisions rendered by High courts and Supreme Court on the issue of reservations have interpreted that the caste alone cannot be considered as an “indicator” as social backwardness. It is also maintained that the level of income of the family should also be considered as necessary criteria for determining the social backwardness of different sections of the people. Article 15(4) of the constitution authorizes the State to make special provision for advancement of socially and educationally backward citizens and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Article 16(4) authorizes the State Government to make reservations in favour of socially and educationally backward classes of citizens, who are inadequately represented in the services. 63. In this regard, it is necessary to refer the decision of Janki Prasad vs., State of J & K 1975 (2) SCR 761 = AIR 1975 SC 563 , wherein it was observed that “21. 63. In this regard, it is necessary to refer the decision of Janki Prasad vs., State of J & K 1975 (2) SCR 761 = AIR 1975 SC 563 , wherein it was observed that “21. Article 15(4) speaks about socially and educationally backward classes of citizens” while Article 16(4) speaks only of “ any backward class of citizens”. However, it is now settled that the expression ‘backward class of citizens” in Article 16(4) means the same thing as the expression “any socially and educationally backward class of citizens” in Article 15 (4). In order to qualify for being called a ‘backward class citizen’ he must be a member of a socially and educationally backward class. It is social and educational backwardness of a class which is material for the purposes of both Articles 15(4) and 16 (4).” “22. xxx Reservation may be adopted to advance the interests of weaker sections of society, but in doing so, care must be taken to see that deserving and qualified candidates are not excluded from admission to higher educational institutions.. xxxx” 64. It is well settled law that there is no specific law or other statutory instrument prescribing the method in identification of only classes or groupings or communities. Effort should be made by the State to consider all the available groups, sections and classes of society in whichever order it is. If, in any case, a particular caste or class is wrongly designated or not designated as a backward class it can always be questioned before the Court of law and the Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution can examine as to whether a particular group is not designated as a backward class correctly or not. The requirement of the State is that a rational and scientific criteria must be evolved for determining backwardness and that criteria must be applied to find out whether any group or class of people qualify for classifying them as backward classes. If the criteria evolved and applied for identification of the backward classes is found to be improper and invalid, then the classification based on that criteria will have to be held to be inconsistent with the requirements of Articles 15(4) & 16(4). It is also well settled that the determination of backwardness and the process of identification is neither a subjective exercises nor a matter of subjective satisfaction. But it is an objective one. It is also well settled that the determination of backwardness and the process of identification is neither a subjective exercises nor a matter of subjective satisfaction. But it is an objective one. The Commission which is entrusted with the task of identification is required to evolve objective social and other considerations and apply the same before any group or class of citizens can be treated as backward. If the Body entrusted with the said job, has not discharged its duty in collecting sufficient material, then the conclusions arrived at can be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 apart from other grounds. 65. Keeping in view the above principles, this court will examine as to whether the impugned Act enacted by the State is valid. 66. All the counsel who have argued before this Court brought to our notice about the violation of the principles laid down in Archana Reddy’s case on the ground that the B.C. Commission had to pre-publish the criteria data relied upon for identification of backward class before publication as laid down in Archana Reddy’s case. 67. It is relevant to state that the Commission in pursuance of the said letters dated 17.4.07 and 11-6-07 addressed by the Govt. undertook the exercise of identification which started the public hearing on 23-06-2007 to 26-06-2007. The schedule was as under: Date Time District Venue 23-06-2007 10.00 AM Kadapa Shabha Bhavan 24-06-2007 10.00 AM Kurnool Zilla Parishad 24-06-2007 4-00 pm Mahaboobnagar Revenue Hall 25-06-2007 10-00 AM Guntur Collectorate 25-06-2007 04-00 PM Prakasam Prakasa Bhavan 26-06-2007 11-00 AM Hyderabad Collectorate 68. The Commission has relied upon the analysis report and recommendations of Sri P.S. Krishnan and also the table contending the details of percentage of Muslims selected in various entrance examinations, details of percentage of Muslims selected in various recruitments and Statement showing the number of employees belonging to Muslim Community and certain occupational groups working in the State Government and its Public Undertakings based on employees census conducted by A.P.B.C. Commission in 2001. 69. The Survey and analysis was conducted on the communities of Faqir/Fhakir Budbudki, Borewale, Dhobi Muslim / Muslim Dhobi/Dbohi Musalman, Chakketakare, Atchukatlavandlu (Muslims), Guddi Eluguvallu, Siddi, Garadi / Garadi Muslim, Attar Saibulu, Gosangi Muslim, Shaik/Sheikh, Hajam / Nai / Navid, Shia Imami Ismaili / Khoja, Arab, Bohara, Syed / Saiyed / Sayyad / Mushaik , Moghal / Moghal, Pathan, Navayat, Irani, Kutchi Memon. 70. 70. Having conducted the enquiry, the recommendations of the Commission was found at Chapter-VI and observed as follows; “(1) a fifth group titled “Socially and Educationally Backward Classes of Muslims” under the Head of ‘E’ be created in the Backward Class list. (2) The following specific Classes of Muslims be included under this group ‘E’ of BCs in addition to ‘A,B,C & D’ already existing for reservation for admission into educational institutions and in appointment to posts and vacancies in the services under the state for the purpose of articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India. 1) Achchukattalavandlu, singali, Singamvallu, Achchupanivallu, Achchukattuvaru, Achukatlavandlu 2) Attar Saibulu, Attarollu 3) Dhobi Muslim/Muslim Dhobi/Dhobi Musalman, Turka Chakla or Turka Sakala, Turaka Chakali, Tulukka Vannan, Tsakalas, Sakalas or Chakalas, Muslim Rajakas 4) Faqui, Fhakir Budbudki, Ghanti Fhakir, Ghanta Fhakirlu, Turaka Budbudiki, Darvesh, Fakeer 5) Garadi Muslim, Garadi Saibulu, Pamulavallu, Kani-Kattuvallu, Garadollu, Garadiga. 6) Gosangi Muslim, Phakeer, Sayebulu Guddi Eluguvallu, Elugu Bantuvallu, Musalaman Keelu Gurralavallu 8) Hajam, Nai, Nai Muslim, Navid. 9) Labbi, Labbai, Labbon, Labba 10) Pakeerla, Borewale, Deera Phakirlu, Bonthala 11) Qureshi, Kureshi/Khureshi, Khasab, Marati Khasab, Muslim Katika, Khatik Muslim 12) Shaik/Sheikh 13) Siddi, Yaba, Habshi, Jasi 14) Turka Kasha, Kakkukote Zinka Saibulu, Chakkitakanevale, Terugadu Gontalavaru, Thirugatigantla, Rollaku Kakku,Kottevaru, Pattar Phodulu, Chakketakare, Thuraka Kasha 15) Other Muslim groups excluding Syed, Saiyed, Sayyad, Mushaik; Mughal, Moghal; Phatans; Irani; Arab; Bohara, Bohra; Shia Imami Ismaili, Khoja; Cutchi-Memon; Jamayat; Navayat, and all the synonyms and sub-groups of the excluded groups; and except those who have been already included in the State list of Backward Classes. 3. That 4% reservation be provided in education and public employment to the classes of Muslims identified in item 2 above. 4. The principle of exclusion of socially advanced persons / sections (creamy layer) already laid down by the State Government will automatically and naturally apply to the classes now recommended for inclusion.” 71. The material placed before this Court go to show that the Commission after receipt of letter from the Principal Secretary to Government has chosen to conduct the survey from 23-06-2007 to 26-06-2007 in places like Kadapa, Kurnool, Mahaboobnagar, Guntur, Prakasam, Hyderabad. 72. The material placed before this Court go to show that the Commission after receipt of letter from the Principal Secretary to Government has chosen to conduct the survey from 23-06-2007 to 26-06-2007 in places like Kadapa, Kurnool, Mahaboobnagar, Guntur, Prakasam, Hyderabad. 72. As seen from the above, the facts themselves speak that the commission has not toured the entire State in extenso and it only touched some parts of the State (6 Districts only) and came to the conclusion that particular classes of Muslims are socially and educationally backward. But no explanation is forthcoming from the Commission for conducting such a short survey in a hurried manner. The report of the Commission should, therefore, be held to be mechanical and perfunctory in nature and there was no independent survey and proper application of mind. 73. The Commission in its report recommended for inclusion of certain sects of Muslims as a separate group under group ‘E’. The State Government, without sufficient material, has included a particular group of citizens under group ‘E’ but no explanation is forthcoming from the State Government with regard to the non-inclusion of other classes of citizens who are similarly situated to that of the present group of Muslims. The fact remains that neither the unofficial respondents nor the State Government has placed any material before this Court to show that the data collected is sufficient for coming to such a conclusion. Even though an argument is advanced by the learned Advocate General that sample survey can be conducted and the Courts have no power to have a judicial scrutiny over such acts of the State Government, but in this case, as stated supra, it is the fact that that the Commission has conducted the survey within a span of 9 days (conducted hearings on 9 days) and submitted its report by making the similar observations as were made in Krishnan’s report and ASI report, which clearly shows that the Commission has utterly failed to exercise it’s mind, independently, on the reference made to it by the Government. Therefore, it can be said that the Commission had not acted in a proper manner and the report of the Commission could not have been based as a piece of evidence for the State to have ‘objective satisfaction’. 74. Therefore, it can be said that the Commission had not acted in a proper manner and the report of the Commission could not have been based as a piece of evidence for the State to have ‘objective satisfaction’. 74. No doubt Article 15(5) of the Constitution makes it obligatory on the part of the Government for making a special provision, by law, for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special provisions relate to their admission to educational institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, and Article 19(1)(g) shall not prevent the State for such act. But, the question remains that whether backwardness can be restricted only to a group of persons when there are so many similarly situated persons in the same religion who claim themselves as also equally socially and educationally backward by making representation. There is no material placed before this Court by the State Government that those persons have also been considered and they cannot be termed as educationally and socially backward. By way of impugned enactment, the equals are being treated as unequals. But the Courts never allowed such a legislation to be acted upon in the field of reservation as it is a clear case of discrimination violating the provisions of equality clause enshrined under Art. 14 of the Constitution. 75. However, it is not the case where the competency of State Government in enacting a particular legislation is questioned, but when the State Government acts in violation of the provisions of the Constitution, often, Courts will come to the rescue of the affected persons and the Governments will never be allowed to treat equals as unequals. Under the above circumstances, it is to be held that the above enactment, which is challenged in these writ petitions, is a discriminatory one in nature and also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 76. It is also well known fact that Art. 15(5) which was brought in to by the Constitution ( First Amendment) Act 1951, was upheld by the Apex Court in Ashoka Kumar Thakur vs. Union of India (1971) 1 SCC 38 , which is a famous case known as ‘OBC reservation case’. 76. It is also well known fact that Art. 15(5) which was brought in to by the Constitution ( First Amendment) Act 1951, was upheld by the Apex Court in Ashoka Kumar Thakur vs. Union of India (1971) 1 SCC 38 , which is a famous case known as ‘OBC reservation case’. The present Act No.26 of 2007 is impugned in the present writ petitions on the ground that certain classes of Muslims have been notified as backward classes, which itself is a religious specific and that would induce people of other castes to get converted into Islam. Even on earlier occasion, when the ordinance was made, that was struck down in Archana Reddy as entire class of Muslims has been classified as socially and educationally backward. 77. In this case, the competency of the State Government to enact the impugned Act is not questioned seriously, but, however, whether the State Government has acted within its parameters and taking into consideration the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the State Government has not followed the guidelines issued in Archana Reddy, it has to be looked into whether the enactment withstands its validity in law and whether such legislation is valid in the eye of law. 78. It was observed by the Apex Court in Ashoka Kumar Thakur’s case that no doubt the Government has power to enact particular law for educationally backward classes under Article 15(4), however, there is a distinction between exercise of power and the manner of it’s exercise. 79. It has been pointed out before this Court that the Article 15(4) has to be read as supplement in conjunction with the other Article 29(2). The argument advanced by the State Government that the Article 15(4) has to be read as supplement to Article 29(2) which would enable that no citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. Article 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution give executive and legislature broad discretion in their application, wherein judicial review is not entirely excluded. 80. It is not out of place to reiterate that the courts have the power to scrutinize the government’s designation of backward classes to see that the beneficiaries are indeed the backward classes. Article 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution give executive and legislature broad discretion in their application, wherein judicial review is not entirely excluded. 80. It is not out of place to reiterate that the courts have the power to scrutinize the government’s designation of backward classes to see that the beneficiaries are indeed the backward classes. The courts may also examine the Government schemes to see that they work in favour of the intended beneficiaries and not to their detriment and that the extent or method of operation of the schemes does not unduly impair the rights of the others. 81 When the State Government has enacted reservation on earlier occasion, this Court in T. Muralidhar Rao has struck down such reservation on the ground that the matter was not referred to B.C. Commission as once the state intends to provide reservations to the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens, the matter, has to be referred to B.C. Commission. 82. In view of the above observations, it has been pointed out that dependence of the Commission on Mr. Krishnans report for coming to conclusion in recommending for inclusion of certain classes of Muslims as backward class citizens in group ‘E’ was illegal and in contravention of the directions of the Apex Court in Indra Sawhney I and of the High Court in T. Muralidhar Rao as the report of Mr.P.S. Krishnan was wholly irrelevant and offends Articles 15 (4), 16 (4). There was no real application of the mind by the Commission. 83. In view of the law laid down in Muralidhar Rao and also looking at the provisions of A.P. Backward Class commission Act 1993, the State Government has got power to make a reference to Commission for identifying backward classes in pursuance of the provisions under Article 15(5) of the Constitution so as to enable it to make a law for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes of citizens. In my view, it is for the Government to lay down criteria as held by B. Sudershan Reddy, J, in the said case and Commission has to call for objections before finalization of the list and even complaints to examine and make recommendations in relation to backward classes that may be referred to it under the provisions of Section 9(1) of the Act, 1993 read with Section 9(2) of the Act, 1993. Further, the criteria adopted by the State Government cannot be accepted unless supported by other relative considerations. I am not satisfied that the State Government has succeeded in bringing the case within Article 15(4) of the Constitution. The material before us is woefully inadequate and fails to sufficiently support the validity of the classification. I am of the opinion that the impugned enactment made by the State dated 13-8-2007 must be declared invalid. 84. The principles laid down in Archana Reddy’s case are mainly with reference to the publication of criteria calling for the objections before the identification of the backward classes by the Backward Class Commission. They have to be scrutinized with reference to the provisions of the A.P. Backward Classes Commission Act and also with reference to the observations made in Indra Sahwaney-I case. 85. So far as identification of backward classes of citizens is concerned, it has been observed in Indra Sahwaney.I cae that the method varies from State to State, region to region and from rural to urban. While dealing with the classes, where caste system is not prevailed, Justice Jeevan Reddy has observed that “each and every situation cannot be visualised and answered. That must be left to the appropriate authorities appointed to identify.” 86. The Supreme Court has taken the view in STATE OF A.P. v. P. SAGAR (1973) 1 SCC 420 that the backwardness of the backward class under Article 16(4) being social and educational, must be similar to the backwardness from which the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes suffer. 87. No doubt the State of Andhra Pradesh has already included certain groups having the synonymous names in Muslim community in the backward class list in group-A and also in group-B. It is contended that in view of the synonymous names the reservation cannot be made to a particular group of Muslims under the guise of the impugned enactment of the State Government. It is also contended that as already certain reservations have been provided for some classes of Muslims in group-A and Group-B, there cannot be any further reservation under special group under group-E by virtue of the special enactment. This contention cannot be gone into in view of the aforementioned discussion that the State has no sufficient material before enacting the impugned Act. 88. This contention cannot be gone into in view of the aforementioned discussion that the State has no sufficient material before enacting the impugned Act. 88. A perusal of the record read with the arguments of different counsel for the parties would go to show that the commission has not followed the procedure known to law and submitted the report in a hasty manner. 89. In view of the above discussion, the argument of the petitioners that the reference itself is bad cannot be agreed upon. But, however, looking at the procedure adopted by the Commission to arrive at the conclusion and for conducting the survey from 23-06-2007 to 26-06-2007 i.e. within a short span of time, in limited towns of Andhra Pradesh i.e., Kadapa, Kurnool, Mahaboobnagar, Guntur, Prakasam and Hyderabad, 6 Districts out of 23 districts, leaving other parts of the towns in the State, it has to be observed that it is highly impossible for a Commission which has to identify the group of backward classes with reference to their number in the population. When the procedure adopted by the Statutory Commission in conducting the survey for identification of the socially and educationally backward classes among Muslim Community as required by the State Government, the question that arises for consideration is whether is it possible for the commission to identify the social status, educational status, employment, economic status of the Community, as stated above, within a short span of four days beginning from 23-06-2007 to 26-06-2007?. The straight answer for the said question is ‘No’. The Commission ought to have taken proper care and caution in identifying backward classes among Muslims, as the object of the classification is ‘to help to those who are at the bottom rungs of the ladder in social, economic and educational development’. The backward classes have to be drawn from all weaker sections of the citizens irrespective of any particular religion. Further, the Court can insist upon the State to satisfy itself about the social and educational backward class of the groups included in the group ‘E’. Such list should be based upon the report of the commission suggesting suitable criteria for the deserving classes. In the present case, the criteria suggested by the Commission are not sufficient for the State to come to such conclusion for extending the benefit to the deserving classes. 90. Such list should be based upon the report of the commission suggesting suitable criteria for the deserving classes. In the present case, the criteria suggested by the Commission are not sufficient for the State to come to such conclusion for extending the benefit to the deserving classes. 90. In Naghpur Improvement Trust and another vs, Vithal Rao 57 L Ed 2d 750 = 438 US 265 (1978), the apex Court while dealing with Article 14 of the Constitution with regard to classification for the purpose of legislation, at para 23 observed as follows: “23. It is now well-settled that the State can make a reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. It is equally well-settled that the classification in order to be reasonable must satisfy two tests: (i) the classification must be founded on intelligible differentia and (ii) the differentia must have a rational relation with the object sought to be achieved by the legislation in question. In this connection it must be borne in mind that the object itself should be lawful. The object itself cannot be discriminatory, for otherwise, for instance, if the object is to discriminate against one section of the minority the discrimination cannot be justified on the ground that there is a reasonable classification because it has rational relation to the object sought to be achieved”. 91. Turning to the present case, there is no material placed before this court by the State Government to prove the valid classification which has got nexus with its policy and object to be achieved. The material is not sufficient to show that such a classification is based on intelligible differentia and the basis has rational nexus with the policy and object to be achieved under the statute. In view of the above, the impugned Act has to be struck down as violative of Art.14 of the Constitution being irrational and illegal. 92. Further, the standards applied to the data by the Commission are equally applicable when the Government determines to provide benefit of such an inquiry. The State should produce material before the Court to show that there was a proper inquiry and relevant criteria adopted and the decision is reasonable, but mere expression is not sufficient. 92. Further, the standards applied to the data by the Commission are equally applicable when the Government determines to provide benefit of such an inquiry. The State should produce material before the Court to show that there was a proper inquiry and relevant criteria adopted and the decision is reasonable, but mere expression is not sufficient. In the absence of any data with regard to social backwardness or educational backwardness, the action of the State Government in providing reservation to socially, educationally backward classes among Muslims have to be struck down as the data lacks the criteria of the material for determining social backwardness and criteria for educational backwardness. The Commission has utterly failed to have a statewide social and economic survey combined with educational survey and also failed in conducting test of income and occupation for selecting the individuals who compose a backward class. In the absence of criteria basing on the inaccurate data, it can be said that the Commission has not formulated any standards for the application of income or occupation tests and also in respect of the educational backwardness. Further there is no correct data furnished either by the State Government or by the B.C Commission that whether in the opinion of the Government, the present identified classes of Muslims are inadequately represented in the services of the State. Even in the counter filed on behalf of State Government with reference to the state average in determining the educational backwardness, it did not disclose the group wise percentage of literacy. On the basis of meager data collected by the Commission for the assessment of educational/employment backwardness, it can be said that the data is unsatisfactory. It is un-understandable as to how the Commission could prepare a report within two days and it shows that the Commission has acted in haste and without proper application of mind. As the B.C Commission has acted in a hasty manner and without any scientific survey, I am of the opinion that the data collected is not sufficient for the Government to come to the conclusion that specific classes of Muslims can be classified as ‘backward class’ for the purpose of Articles 15(5) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India. The Commission has not proceeded on correct lines to assess the social and educational backwardness as indicated in other cases or has followed any criteria for such assessment. The Commission has not proceeded on correct lines to assess the social and educational backwardness as indicated in other cases or has followed any criteria for such assessment. In the absence of any such material, it has to be held that the State Government has utterly failed to discharge its onus of proof to establish that the reservations are for socially and educationally backward classes of citizens and that the enactment is based on sufficient material to support the classification. If the court perceives that the identified classes exist, then the Court will uphold such law for the purpose of doing social justice, but in the instant case the exercise of identifying specific group of backward classes is not rational; therefore the Court cannot uphold the law made by the State. The same has to be struck down for want of sufficient material or appropriate data. CONCLUSIONS 93. For the above said reasons, it has to be held: (1) the State Government has got the power to refer to the State Commission for identifying backward classes to provide reservation to socially and educationally backward classes under the provisions of the said Act; (2) the State has got power for making any special provision, by enactment, for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens relating to their admission to educational institutions and public employment; (3) in the present case the investigation made by the Statutory Commission is not sufficient, and the report submitted by it is not based on real facts, data or analysis and is without any proper survey. The Commission limited its’ survey to 6 Districts only (within 3 days from 23-6-2007 to 26-6-2007) leaving the other parts of the State; (4) the report should be held to be mechanical, perfunctory in nature and is without application of mind as the Commission followed the report of Mr P.S. Krishnan in verbatim. (5) The principle of strict scrutiny and intermediary scrutiny as laid down in Archana Reddy’s case is not in conformity with the guidelines framed in Indra Sawhney & Ashok Kumar Thakur’s case; (6) the impugned Act No.26 of 2007, dated 13-8-2007, which is based on the said report of the Commission is invalid, unconstitutional, being violative of Articles 14, 15(4), 15(5) and 16(4); (7) the writ petitions are allowed to the above extent accordingly. B. Prakash Rao, J.) I have gone through the Judgment of Hon’ble Sri Anil R. Dave, The Chief Justice along with Sri Justice A.Gopal Reddy, Sri Justice V Eshwaraiah and Sri Justice Goda Raghuram, apart of Smt Justice T Meenakumari, however, I deem more expedient to give my opinion independently on the questions arising. At the start, these cases, came up before us on a reference, from a larger Bench of five Judges as per orders dated 24.1.2008, which reads as under; “During the course of arguments, leaned counsel for the petitioners while pointing out to certain observations made by a coordinate Bench of five judges of this Court with regard to identification of Muslim Community as backward class in the case of B Archana Reddy and Others Vs State of A P & Others 2005(6)ALD 582 (LB) sought to contend that the B.C. Commission did not evolve any criteria for identifying social backwardness. It was their contention that the specific direction/criteria as pointed out in later larger bench has not been adhered to. He relied on paragraphs 114, 279, 293, 378 and 379 of the said judgment which read thus; 114. The Commission has neither found nor recorded that self-employment in petty business, occupations like rickshaw pulling, push cart trade, agricultural labour, marginal land ownership, mal-nutrition, inaccessibility to medical facility, lower life expectancy, engagement as unskilled labour, masons or drivers, pursuit of professions or occupations such as cycle repairing or vulcanizing, engagement of women and children in beedi-rolling, are circumstances either peculiar to the Muslim community or that professing the faith of Islam (definition of ‘Muslims’ in Sec.2(c) of the Ordinance) and these (occupational, professional, extreme poverty and want) circumstances have a causal relationship. In the absence of a causal nexus between the Islam faith aggregate and the pursuit of certain professions, trades or humble economic circumstances; the occupation and/or the means test, provides neither a legal nor a rational and logical basis for the conclusion that all Muslims are socially backward because some or many of them are in dire economic straits. 279. Transparency in governance is exhortation of the day. In this context, a little elaboration is necessary. Doctrine of rule of law in legal and political philosophy means many things for many people. The universal theme, however, is that the constitutional governance by rule of law is preferable to governance by a few persons. 279. Transparency in governance is exhortation of the day. In this context, a little elaboration is necessary. Doctrine of rule of law in legal and political philosophy means many things for many people. The universal theme, however, is that the constitutional governance by rule of law is preferable to governance by a few persons. Democracy presupposes peoples’ rule by law or rule of law through people. The broad principle of rule of law contemplates that (i) all laws should be prospective, open and clear, (ii) laws should be stable, (iii) making of particular laws should be guided by stable and general rules, (iv) the principles of natural justice must be observed, and (v) there should be a system of implementation of laws guaranteeing the independence of judiciary duly conferring on it the power to review public law functions. Another important principle of rule of law is that the rulers must know the rules to the ruled. All persons must know what are the laws, rules and regulations by which they will be governed. This is more important in a democratic polity where an independent judiciary, lords over the exercise of legislative, judicial and administrative powers by other organs of the State, by reason of doctrine of judicial review. Transparency in public administration and constitutional governance is therefore a part of rule of law and indeed it is inseparable adjutant of ‘rule of law’. This Court may make reference to Jaisinghani and Merkur Island Shipping Corporation v. Laughton (1983) 2 AC 570 (CA) and the decision of the Supreme Court in BALCO Employes’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India (2002) 2 SCC 333 = AIR 2002 SC 350 293. In an enquiry of the nature undertaken by B.C. Commission, mere issue of notification inviting objections and conducting public hearings at different places would only satisfy the principles of fairness to some extent. In the absence of notifying the objectors of criteria prior to such hearings and furnish the material to such objectors prior to conducting public hearings, the enquiry conducted by the B.C. Commission cannot be called fair. The very purpose of issuing notification inviting objections and conducting public hearings, would be defeated if the criteria is not decided prior to undertaking, the collection of data and putting the objectors on notice. We accordingly hold against the State. The very purpose of issuing notification inviting objections and conducting public hearings, would be defeated if the criteria is not decided prior to undertaking, the collection of data and putting the objectors on notice. We accordingly hold against the State. 378..Fourthly, while determining social backwardness of a class of citizens, en expert body like B.C. Commission has to necessarily evolve absolutely relevant criteria for the purpose of caste test, occupation test and means test. Wherever social backwardness is due to a class of people being born in a homogenous endogamous group called caste with common traits and rigid customs and social rules, the caste test itself lead to an inference that the class/caste is socially backward. If the occupation of majority of a class of citizens is considered inferior and unremunerative, and such class of people is considered lowly placed in the society, it would ordinarily satisfy the test of social backwardness. The means test presupposes that by reason of birth in a class of people, historically and traditionally the entire class suffers from perennial poverty, in which case, the means test would enable the determination of social backwardness. The B.C.Commission did not evolve any criteria for identifying social backwardness and did not apply the three tests in a scientific and objective manner. 379.. Fifthly, the B.C.Commission at the stage of collecting preliminary data, evolving criteria and conducting public hearings for the purpose of hearing objections from the public, did not take such steps which can be called transparent and fair. Though, the nature of enquiry by B.C.Commission cannot be strictly treated as quasi-judicial, but still while undertaking an exercise for identification of backward class of citizens, the Commission is legally bound to be fair and transparent and afford all such opportunity to objectors and proponents for effective representation before the Commission. Though, the nature of enquiry by B.C.Commission cannot be strictly treated as quasi-judicial, but still while undertaking an exercise for identification of backward class of citizens, the Commission is legally bound to be fair and transparent and afford all such opportunity to objectors and proponents for effective representation before the Commission. The prior non-publication of criteria and data collected by the B.C.Commission renders the report of the B.C.Commission illegal being contrary to provisions of B.C.Commission Act and principles of fairness.” In view of the aforesaid judgment emanated from a coordinate bench of five judges of this Court and in the absence of any provision in the statute for publication of the criteria whether this Court can supplant the provisions of the Act and the Rules by making publication mandatory as per the observations as contained in paras stated supra and other observations made by the coordinate bench, are contrary to the observations made by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney Vs Union of India, where it was left open for the concerned authorities to lay down the criteria, apart from contrary to principles laid down in regard to strict scrutiny approach, as laid in Sauraabh Chandra Vs Union of India and the principles laid down in other decisions of the Apex Court. After hearing the counsel on either side appearing on behalf of respondents, we are of the view that the matters are required to be heard and reconsidered by a 7-Judge bench. Accordingly, we direct the registry to place these matters before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for passing appropriate orders.” In view of the above, in my view, this Special Bench of Seven Judges, shall confine its consideration only to the issues referred and shall have to remit the matter back to the Five Judges bench for consideration of the case on merits. On the issue of providing reservation to muslims in the earlier round of litigation, this Court through bench of Five Judges on two occasions in MURALIDHAR RAO VS. STATE OF A P 2004 ALT (5) 634 and in ARCHANA REDDY VS.STATE OF A. P 2005 (6) ALD 582 (5 J LB) pronounced its verdict and struck down the provision. Thereafter, initially by an executive order, subsequently through a legislation, the State had undertaken its affirmative action once again. The said Act has been impugned in this batch of writ petitions. Thereafter, initially by an executive order, subsequently through a legislation, the State had undertaken its affirmative action once again. The said Act has been impugned in this batch of writ petitions. This matter has on reference in the process has come up before Five Judges Bench . In the midst of hearing, apart from other issues, the question arose, if the findings of the earlier bench of Five Judges in Archana Reddy are contrary to the findings of the Apex Court. In these circumstances, the bench of Five Judges realizing the difficulty in going ahead with the hearing in view of the doubts expressed about the correctness of the findings in Archana Reddy case of a Coordinate Bench, in its wisdom thought it fit to refer the matter to Special Bench of Seven Judges. At any rate, the reference order itself would clinch the issue that the scope of consideration by the Seven Judges bench shall have to be confined only to the issues referred to and cannot have a final word, not being a Court, with original jurisdiction. It is explicit to note that though all the counsel argued on merits on all the counts, and requested this Court to dispose off the main case in its entirety on merits rather than the question referred, it is to be seen, how far this Court, on such reference, can traverse beyond. I am conscious of the order at the preliminary stage dated 19.8.2008, on this Count. The Apex Court in T A HAMEED VS M VISWANATHAN CASE 2008 (3) SCC 243 wherein a Full Bench of Kerala high Court, in response to a reference made by a Division Bench on a question of law, proceeded to dispose of on merits, noting that; "in para 19 of the impugned order the learned full Bench asked counsel for both the parties to advance arguments on merits also as the proceedings were initiated about a decade back and asked counsel for the parties for disposing of the revision petition itself and accordingly arguments were heard on merits of the Revision Petition also and Revision petition was disposed of by dismissing the same and directing the appellant-tenant to surrender possession within six months and directing the appellant to file an affidavit of undertaking to that effect. On the objection taken against such procedure, the Apex Court, referring to earlier decision in KESHONATH CASE KHURANA VS UNION OF INDIA 1981 Supp.SCC 38 on a similar situation, wherein it was held that; “THIS Court held that it is obvious that since only the aforesaid question of law was referred by the single Judge to the Division Bench, the division Bench should have sent the matter back to the Single Judge after deciding the question of law referred to them. But instead the Division Bench proceeded to dispose of the second appeal on merits and dismissed it with costs. This Court further observed that, "we think that the Division Bench was in error in following this procedure. The Division bench ought to have sent the appeal back to the single Judge with the answer rendered by them to the question referred by the single judge and left it to the single Judge to dispose of the second appeal according to law. " And same being reiterated in Kerala STATE SCIENCE & TCHNOLOGY MUSEUM VS RAMBAL CO 2006 (6) SCC 258 holding that; Same view was reiterated by this Court in the case of Kerala State Science (supra). In that case this Court after referring to earlier decisions in para 8 held as under:- "it is fairly well settled that when reference is made on a specific issue either by a learned Single Judge or Division Bench to a larger Bench, i. e. , Division Bench or Full bench or Constitution Bench, as the case may be, the larger bench cannot adjudicate upon an issue which is not the question referred to. " And then, proceeded to hold that ; “In the case at hand also, almost an identical situation had taken place that a reference was made by the learned Division bench of the Kerala High Court to the Full bench and the Full Bench after answering the reference went on to decide the revision petition itself on merits, which the Full Bench had no jurisdiction to do as the revision petition was not referred to the Full Bench for decision. Since, only reference was made to the Full bench, the Full Bench should have answered the question referred to it and remitted the matter to the Division Bench for deciding the revision petition on merits. Consequently, we set aside that part of the impugned order dated 31. 1. Since, only reference was made to the Full bench, the Full Bench should have answered the question referred to it and remitted the matter to the Division Bench for deciding the revision petition on merits. Consequently, we set aside that part of the impugned order dated 31. 1. 2003 whereby the Full Bench has dismissed the revision petition filed by the appellant herein.” From the above, it is seen that in the case of reference, the reference Court should restrict only to the extent of answering the question referred, but not enter into merits and dispose off the main case either way. It is apt to note that in the above case, such argument is sought to be negatived by the Apex Court though the counsel on all sides agreed and gave consent for such final disposal. However, in view of the candid observations and findings of the Apex Court, the Seven Judge Bench or Full Bench to which it has been referred, can safely said that has no jurisdiction to go on the merits, except the referred questions. It reiterates the principle that the consent would not confer jurisdiction, where it does not have. Nor, any such approach is valid. There has been an attempt on some of the sides to have a final say, on merits, I regret that I cannot accept the mode suggested and adopted by the other members of this Bench. On the principle, as laid by the Apex Court, no other authoritative pronouncement contra have been placed on records nor justified on any other validity sustainable ground. In the absence of any other binding decision approving other departed course, it has a non-escaping binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. As far as the orders passed by this Bench at the inception on whereunder it was explicit to take the course in its entirety on merits, it is only an interlocutory at the first blush, before the matter was heard from all sides fully and thus does not come against while considering the correctness of the approach at final stage. It is well established that any interlocutory aspect would not be a bar nor constitute a resjudicata. In Arjun Singh Vs Mahindra Kumar ( AIR 1964 SC 993 ) it was held that the principles of resjudicata are not applicable on interlocutory proceedings or orders. It is well established that any interlocutory aspect would not be a bar nor constitute a resjudicata. In Arjun Singh Vs Mahindra Kumar ( AIR 1964 SC 993 ) it was held that the principles of resjudicata are not applicable on interlocutory proceedings or orders. Further it is trite to note that there is a clear distinction on the parameters of jurisdiction and scope between a Court on reference and Courts on regular known remedies by an original or appeal or revision. Therefore, the judicial propriety at all its command restrict the boundaries in a reference and bound to answer back to the Court, which referred. The original powers of which to deal the matter cannot be usurped or in any way interdicted. As bound by the dicta of the Apex Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, it would be therefore appropriate to confine consideration to the issues that have been referred by the bench of the five Judges, after a detailed account, which briefly stated reads as under; 1. Whether the concept of strict judicial scrutiny in the matter of affirmative action of the State under equality doctrine as propounded in Archana Reddy case, is contrary to the dicta laid down by the Apex Court in Sourabh and other decisions on the subject. 2. Whether the concept of publication of criteria evolved by B.C Commission, and data collected in that regard in the matter of identification of socially and educationally backwardness as propounded in Archana Reddy case is contrary to the dicta laid down in Indira Sawhney case and also contrary to the provisions of the Act 1993 ? Interesting to note that reservation for Backward Classes in educational institutions and in public services has been in existence even before the State of Andhra Pradesh had been formed. The erstwhile Hyderabad State under Nizam had issued G.O.Ms.No.110 dated 30th May, 1953 providing for reservation to backward classes. Similarly, Backward Classes in the Andhra region in the erstwhile Madras Presidency had such reservation benefits under similar Orders of the composite State of Madras. After the formation of the Andhra State on 1st October, 1953, the list maintained by the Composite State of Madras was continued in the Andhra State with some modifications. When the State of AP was formed in 1956, it inherited the list of Backward Classes maintained by the former Government of Hyderabad. After the formation of the Andhra State on 1st October, 1953, the list maintained by the Composite State of Madras was continued in the Andhra State with some modifications. When the State of AP was formed in 1956, it inherited the list of Backward Classes maintained by the former Government of Hyderabad. The State Government vide G.O.Ms.No.1886 Health dated 21st June 1963 made reservations of seats in Government medical colleges in favour of these listed backward classes. However in Sri Sukhadev and others Vs. the Government of Andhra Pradesh (1996 1 An. W.R. 294) this Court struck down the G.O as being violative of Articles 15 and 29 (2) of the Constitution, since based solely on caste without applying the criteria propounded by the Supreme Court in Balaji’s case ( AIR 1963 SC 649 ). The Government then scrapped the then existing list of Backward Classes and issued GO.Ms.No.1880, Education dated 29th July, 1966 listing 112 communities as backward, making them eligible for certain concessions in regard to scholarships, admission to professional colleges and reservation of posts in Government services, which was challenged again in P.Sagar Case on the ground that the list was prepared solely on the basis of caste and violated the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens, and this Court allowed writ petitions and struck down the reservations made in professional colleges for the backward classes mentioned in the GO. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the above decision in the State of AP and another Vs. P.Sagar ( AIR 1968 SC 1379 ). In April, the State Government appointed Backward Classes (Anantaraman) Commission, which gave its Report in 1970, recommending 92 castes/communities as backward classes. Thereupon the State Government issued G.O.No.1793/Education dated September 23, 1970 providing reservation of 25% of the seats in the MBBS Course for candidates belonging to the backward classes enumerated in the GO. In April, the State Government appointed Backward Classes (Anantaraman) Commission, which gave its Report in 1970, recommending 92 castes/communities as backward classes. Thereupon the State Government issued G.O.No.1793/Education dated September 23, 1970 providing reservation of 25% of the seats in the MBBS Course for candidates belonging to the backward classes enumerated in the GO. On challenge in U.S.V. Balram case on the ground that the classification and reservation of seats was violative of article 14 of the Constitution, this Court allowed the writ petitions inter alia holding that the enumeration of Backward Classes and reserving 25% seats in the GO violates Article 15 (1), read with Article 29 and that the reservation was not saved by Article 15 (4) and held that proper investigation and collection of data have not been done by the Anantaraman Commission and it merely enumerated the various persons belonging to a particular caste as Backward Classes. However, on appeal in State of aP v. U.S.V. Balram ( 1972 1 SCC 660 ) the Supreme Court in its judgment dated January 28, 1972 set aside the judgment and orders of the High Court opining that “the list of Backward Classes, as well as the reservation of 25% of seats in Professional Colleges for the persons mentioned in the said list is valid and is saved by Article 15 (4) of the Constitution.” While it was observed therein that “ A perusal (of the list) shows that the traditional occupations of the persons enumerated as backward were of a very low order such as beggars, washermen, fishermen, watchmen at burial grounds, etc.” In 1982 the Government of Andhra Pradesh appointed Sri N.K.Muralidhara Rao, IAS, as One Man Commission of Inquiry inter alia to review the existing list of backward classes and also to make other recommendation with regard to the welfare of backward classes. He submitted his report on 31-08-1982, recommending increase of reservations to backward classes. Accepting these recommendations Government issued three orders. Of them G.O.Ms.No.166 dated 15-7-1986 was the main order which included 9 new castes in BCs list. One other recommendation which has bearing on the present case is that, the Muralidhara Rao Commission recommended to delete “Mehtar” (Muslim scavenger)” from the existing list. But Government did not accept N.K.Muralidhara Rao’s recommendation to delete Mehtar (Muslim scavenger) Community from the list. Of them G.O.Ms.No.166 dated 15-7-1986 was the main order which included 9 new castes in BCs list. One other recommendation which has bearing on the present case is that, the Muralidhara Rao Commission recommended to delete “Mehtar” (Muslim scavenger)” from the existing list. But Government did not accept N.K.Muralidhara Rao’s recommendation to delete Mehtar (Muslim scavenger) Community from the list. The Government issued orders in G.O.Ms.No.167 and 168, both dated 15-7-1986, for raising the percentage of reservation and including the new 9 new castes in the list. On challenge, a Full Bench of this Court quashed only a part of the G.O.Ms.No.166 which enhanced the reservation from 25% to 44% in V.Narayana Rao Vs. State of A.P AIR 1987 A.P page 53. But the Government chose to maintain the status-quo ante that existed prior to 15-7-1986. In exercise of power under Article 340 of the Constitution, the President of India appointed the second Backward Classes Commission under the chairmanship of Sri. B.P.Mandal, which recommended inclusion of 292 castes in the list of BCs for the State of Andhra Pradesh. The orders of Government of India implementing the recommendations of Mandal Commission were challenged in the landmark Indira Sawhney case. As per the direction of the Supreme Court in this case, the Government of Andhra Pradesh enacted the Andhra Pradesh Commission for Bakcward Classes Act in 1993 (APCBC Act, 1993). Subsequently, under G.O.Ms.No.9 dated 26-01-1994 Government constituted the AP Commission for Backward Classes (APCBC), first under the chairmanship of Justice K.S.Puttaswamy, to examine requests for inclusion in the list of Backward Classes and to hear complaints of over-inclusion and under-inclusion in the list. In 1994, the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.30 dated 25-8-1994 including 14 castes/communities in list of BCs. “Muslim” was one of the 14 communities. This order was challenged in this Court. Relying on the assurance given by the Advocate General on behalf of the State Government, that the G.O.Ms.No.30 will not be given effect to until receipt of a report from the BC Commission, the High Court instructed the Government not to give effect to G.O.Ms.No.30. In G.O.Ms.No.15 dated 4-6-2004, the State Government directed Commissioner of Minorities Welfare to examine the social, economic and educational backwardness of the Muslim Community in the State. The Commissioner submitted his report on 5-7-2004 recommending reservation of 5% seats to Muslim minorities in educational institutions and employment. In G.O.Ms.No.15 dated 4-6-2004, the State Government directed Commissioner of Minorities Welfare to examine the social, economic and educational backwardness of the Muslim Community in the State. The Commissioner submitted his report on 5-7-2004 recommending reservation of 5% seats to Muslim minorities in educational institutions and employment. Accepting this recommendation, the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.33 dated 12-7-2004 providing 5% reservation for Muslim minorities in education and employment by creating a fifth group called ‘E’ in the existing list of BCs which already had four groups. A Full Bench of the AP HighCoourt in T.Muralidhar Rao Vs. State of AP, 2004 struck down this order and directed the Government to reconstitute the BC Commission. In pursuance of the said direction the Government of Andhra Pradesh constituted the present Andhra Pradesh BC Commission in G.O.Ms.No.57 BC welfare (C2) dated 18-11-2004 to examine the request for inclusion of any class or classes of citizens as BCs in the list and to hear complaints of over inclusion and under inclusion of BCs in the list of the APCBC Act, 1993. The Commission sent a report to the Government and the State Government, on the basis of the said report of the BC Commission enacted A.P. Reservation of seats in the Educational Institutions and of appointments in the Public Services under the State to Muslim Community Act 2005. This was challenged in B.Archana Reddy Vs. State of A.P. ( 2005 (6) A.L.T 364 ). A bench of five judges declared this Act as unconstitutional. The bench inter alia held that “there is no prohibition to declare Muslim as a community, socially and educationally backward for the pruposes of Article 15 (4) and 16 (4) of the Constitution of India provided they satisfy the rest of social backwardness as stated in the judgment”. Status-quo orders were given regarding the admission already made in the Government colleges. The Government filed Civil Appeal in Supreme Court against the orders of the High Court and the same is pending. In view of the High Court striking down Ordinance No.13/2005 and Act No.21/2005 and for the reasons stated in the judgment, the Govt. Status-quo orders were given regarding the admission already made in the Government colleges. The Government filed Civil Appeal in Supreme Court against the orders of the High Court and the same is pending. In view of the High Court striking down Ordinance No.13/2005 and Act No.21/2005 and for the reasons stated in the judgment, the Govt. of A.P. made a reference to the A.P. Commission for Backward Classes vide Lr.No.5488/C2/2004-12, dated: 17-4-2007 to identify classes/communities /groups among the Muslim population in the State that can be classified as Socially and Educationally Backward Classes in the light of the judgment of the High Court in W.P.No.13832 of 2005 and the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Mandal (Indira Sawhney) case dated 16-11-1992 and submit a report with clear recommendations of the Commission. Meanwhile the Government appointed Sri P.S.Krishnan, IAS, former Secretary to Ministry of Welfare, Government of India, as Advisor to Government of Andhra Pradesh, Backward Classes Welfare Department to advise, inter alia, on the issue of identifying socially and educationally backward classes in the Muslim population in the State. Sri Krishnan submitted his report to the Government on 11-06-2007. The Government referred his report to this Commission for examination, recommendation and advice. The Backward Classes Commission in its report identified 14 social groups and a residuary group (15) in the Muslim community as socially and educationally backward classes and recommended reservation of 4% in their favour and to place them as a separate group in addition to the existing four groups. The State Government accepted the said recommendation and notified the said social groups in the Muslim community as socially and educationally backward classes and placed them in group ‘E’ and provided 4% reservation in their favour. To this effect, initially an Ordinance was issued which was subsequently replaced by the present impugned Act. A five-judge Bench of this High Court considered a batch of petitions and after detailed hearing of counsels of petitioners and respondents, being of the view that certain aspects of judgment and directions of the earlier five-Judge Bench in B.Archana Reddy case require consideration by a larger Bench to see whether they are in contradiction with the Supreme Court decisions in the Mandal case (Indira Sawhney) and Saurabl Chaudri Cases, by its order dated 24-1-2008, referred the matter to the present seven Judge Bench. In ASHOK KUMAR THAKUR (2008) 6 SCC 1 case, the Apex Court was specifically required to answer whether strict scrutiny principle as laid down by the American Supreme Court in various judgments in the matter of protective discrimination can be applied in the Indian context. In Ashok Kumar, the Chief Justice Sri Balakrishnan speaking for himself and for Justice Sri Ravindran, observed as follows: 209. The aforesaid principles applied by the Supreme Court of the United States of America cannot be applied directly to India as the gamut of affirmative action in India is fully supported by constitutional provisions and we have not applied the principles of “suspect legislation” and we have been following the doctrine that every legislation passed by Parliament is presumed to be constitutionally valid unless otherwise proved. We have repeatedly held that the American decisions are not strictly applicable to us and the very same principles of strict scrutiny and suspect legislation were sought to be applied and this Court rejected the same in Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of India626. Speaking for the Bench, V.N. Khare, C.J., said: (SCC p. 164, para 36) “36. The strict scrutiny test or the intermediate scrutiny test applicable in the United States of America as argued by Shri Salve cannot be applied in this case. Such a test is not applied in Indian courts. In any event, such a test may be applied in a case where a legislation ex facie is found to be unreasonable. Such a test may also be applied in a case where by reason of a statute the life and liberty of a citizen is put in jeopardy. This Court since its inception apart from a few cases where the legislation was found to be ex facie wholly unreasonable proceeded on the doctrine that constitutionality of a statute is to be presumed and the burden to prove contra is on him who asserts the same.” Whereas, Justice Sri Pasayat, speaking for himself and for Justice Sri C K Thakker, in paras 251 observed that “……. American cases which have been highlighted by the petitioners relate essentially to strict classification, strict scrutiny and narrow tailoring. This issue is of considerable importance when so much debate is taking place about respect being shown by Courts of a country to a decision of another country. American cases which have been highlighted by the petitioners relate essentially to strict classification, strict scrutiny and narrow tailoring. This issue is of considerable importance when so much debate is taking place about respect being shown by Courts of a country to a decision of another country. The factual scenario and the basic issues involved in the cases sometimes throw light on the controversy. Further at para 268 it is observed that much assistance is not available to the petitioners from the modern decisions’. In para 269, it is further held that what really appears to be intention for the use of expression is careful and deeper scrutiny and not a strict scrutiny of the provisions as is prevalent in the American jurisprudence. Justice Dalvir Bhandari at para 640 held that “the principles enunciated by the American Supreme Court such as ‘suspect legislation, narrow tailoring, strict scrutiny and compelling state necessity are not strictly applicable for challenging the impugned legislation. As per the above, it is clear that Apex Court in Ashok Kumar Thakur reiterated the view taken by it in Sourab Chowdary case (cited supra) which in effect means a law made by the legislature in the country will be tested on the well laid down parameters of lack of legislative competence and violation of fundamental rights or other constitutional rights. It has been held by Apex Court in STATE OF A P VS MC.DOWELL 1996 (3) SCC 709 that only two grounds available for striking down a legislative action i.e., lack of legislative competence and violation of fundamental rights and other constitutional rights. Same was reiterated in STATE OF BIHAR VS. BIHAR DISTILLERY LTD 1997(2) SCC 453 as follows: (17) WE have already set out the substance of the minutes of the meeting held on 15-12-89, the letter dated 19-2-90 (which was issued on the basis of the discussion held at the said meeting) as well as to the letter of the Commissioner dated 20-2-90. The minutes of the meeting dated 1 5/12/1989 speak of fixation of the cost price of country liquor. The letter dated 19/02/1990 speaks of "cost price of rectified spirit to be supplied as country spirit/liquor from the country spirit warehouses" while the letter dated 20/02/1990 speaks of "cost price of country liquor supplied from the warehouses. The minutes of the meeting dated 1 5/12/1989 speak of fixation of the cost price of country liquor. The letter dated 19/02/1990 speaks of "cost price of rectified spirit to be supplied as country spirit/liquor from the country spirit warehouses" while the letter dated 20/02/1990 speaks of "cost price of country liquor supplied from the warehouses. " This mix up of the expressions of "rectified spirit to be supplied as country spirit/liquor" and "country liquor" in the said proceedings/letters may perhaps be for the reason that all that it takes to convert the rectified spirit into country spirit, it is said, is adding to water to rectified spirit. May be or may not be. That is not material for our purposes. What is material is that the price of Rs. 3. 42 per L. P. L. said to have been agreed upon at the meeting held on 15/12/1989, and referred to in the said letters and which cost price has now been legislatively validated, all give the break-up of the said price which includes the figure of 70 paise per L. P. L. on account of "warehouse maintenance charges". Now, it is admitted - indeed, it is the positive case of Mr. Y. V. Giri - that the distilleries have nothing to do with maintenance of warehouses and that they were being maintained by the Government itself during the said period. The preamble to the Amending Act and the amended provisions expressly speak of the said cost price and its break-up. The Amending Act further provides expressly for deduction of the said 70 paise per L. P. L. component for being credited to the Governments account. In the face of all these facts, it is difficult to understand on what basis can the distilleries say that the said component of 70 paise should not be deducted. The Amending Act is not taking away anything from the distilleries; it is merely affirming and validating the acts and orders already issued in view of, and with a view to remove, the defect pointed out by the High Court in its first judgment. It cannot be disputed, at this stage, by the distilleries that they were not parties to the meeting held on 15/12/1989 or that they did not receive the letter of the Commissioner dated 19/02/1990. It cannot be disputed, at this stage, by the distilleries that they were not parties to the meeting held on 15/12/1989 or that they did not receive the letter of the Commissioner dated 19/02/1990. If this were so, it is understandable on what basis and at whose request or order, they were supplying the spirit to the distilleries. It cannot but he held in the circumstances that the distilleries accepted the offer contained in the Commissioners letter dated 1 9/02/1990 and were making supplies on the basis of the said letter and the orders placed pursuant to that letter and their acceptance of it. And IN DHARAM DUTT VS, UNION OF INDIA 2004(1) SCC 712 it was held as follows: (16) Though the petition alleges the impugned Act (with the history of preceding Ordinances) to be the outcome of political malice, no particulars thereof have been given by the writ petitioner. However, that aspect need not be deliberated upon any further in view of two Constitution Bench decisions of this Court. It has been held in K. C. Gajapati Narayan Deo and Ors. v. State of Orissa, (1954) SCR 1, and in Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi v. State of Delhi (Now Delhi Administration) and Anr. , 1962 Supp. (1) SCC 156, that the doctrine of Colourable Legislation does not involve any question of bona fides on the part of the legislature. The whole doctrine resolves itself into the question of the competency of a particular legislature to enact a particular law. If the legislature is competent to pass a particular law, the motives which Impelled it to act are really irrelevant. On the other hand, if the legislature lacks competency, the question of motive does not arise at all. We will, therefore, concentrate on the legislative competence of Parliament to enact the impugned legislation. If the Parliament has the requisite competence to enact the impugned Act, the enquiry into the motive which persuaded the Parliament into passing the Act would be of no use at all. Gist of the impugned Act It is therefore clear that the case in Archana Reddy, which adopted strict scrutiny principle as enunciated by the American Supreme Court , that the attendant principles of compelling state necessity and narrow tailoring cannot be applied in the Indian Context. Gist of the impugned Act It is therefore clear that the case in Archana Reddy, which adopted strict scrutiny principle as enunciated by the American Supreme Court , that the attendant principles of compelling state necessity and narrow tailoring cannot be applied in the Indian Context. Even in Indira Sawhney case 1992 Suppl.(3) SCC 217, Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy, speaking for majority held as under: “798. This can be formed by the State on its own, i.e., on the basis of the material it has in its possession already or it may gather such material through a Commission/Committee, person or authority. All that is required is there must be some material upon which the opinion is formed. Indeed, in this matter the court should show due deference to the opinion of the State, which in the present context means the Executive. The Executive is supposed to know the existing conditions in the society, drawn as it is from among the Representatives of the people in Parliament/Legislature. It does not however mean that the opinion formed is beyond judicial scrutiny altogether. The scope and reach of judicial scrutiny in matters within subjective satisfaction of the Executive are well and extensively stated in Barium Chemicals Vs. Company Law Board ( AIR 1967 SC 295 ) Vol.I page 147, which need not be repeated here. Suffice it to mention that the principles apply equally in the case of Constitutional provision like Article 16 (4), which expressly places the particular fact (inadequate representation) within the subjective judgment of the State/Executive”. 842. It is enough to say on this question that there is no particular or special standard of judicial scrutiny in matters arising under Article 16(4) or for that matter, under Article 15 (4). The extent and scope of judicial scrutiny depends upon the nature of the subject-matter, the nature of the right affected, the character of the legal and constitutional provisions applicable and so on. The acts and orders of the State made under Article 16 (4) do not enjoy any particular kind of immunity. At the same time, we must say that court would normally extend due deference to the judgment and discretion of the executive — a co-equal wing — in these matters. The acts and orders of the State made under Article 16 (4) do not enjoy any particular kind of immunity. At the same time, we must say that court would normally extend due deference to the judgment and discretion of the executive — a co-equal wing — in these matters. The political executive, drawn as it is from the people and represent as it does the majority will of the people, is presumed to know the conditions and the needs of the people and hence its judgment in matters within its judgment and discretion will be entitled to due weight. More than this, it is neither possible nor desirable to say. It is not necessary to answer the question as framed. 857. Before parting with this aspect, we must say that identifying the impugned Office Memorandums with the Mandal Commission Report is basically erroneous. Such an identification is bound to lead one into confusion. He would be missing the wood for the trees. Instead of concentrating on the real issues, he would deviate into irrelevance and imbalance. Mandal Commission Report may have led to the passing of the impugned Office Memorandum dated August 13, 1990; it may have acted as the catalytic agent in bringing into existence the reservation in favour of OBCs (loosely referred to as SEBCs in the O.M.) but the Office Memorandum dated August 13, 1990 doesn’t incorporate the Mandal lists of OBCs as such. It incorporates, in truth and effect, the State lists as explained hereinabove. In a social measure like the impugned one, the court must give due regard to the judgment of the Executive, a co-equal wing of the State and approach the measure in the spirit in which it is conceived. This very idea is put forcefully by Joseph Raz (Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford) in his article “The Rule of Law and Its Virtue”148 in the following words: “ ... one should be wary of disqualifying the legal pursuit of major social goals in the name of the rule of law. After all the rule of law is meant to enable the law to promote social good, and should not be lightly used to show that it should not do so. one should be wary of disqualifying the legal pursuit of major social goals in the name of the rule of law. After all the rule of law is meant to enable the law to promote social good, and should not be lightly used to show that it should not do so. Sacrificing too many social goals on the altar of the rule of law may make the law barren and empty.” Justice Ratnavel pandian in separate but concurring judgment opined as follows: 174. The expression “in the opinion of the State” would mean the formation of opinion by the State which is purely a subjective process. It cannot be challenged in a Court on the grounds of propriety, reasonableness and sufficiency though such an opinion is required to be formed on the subjective satisfaction of the Government whether the identified ‘backward class of citizens’ are adequately represented or not in the Services under the State. But for drawing such requisite satisfaction, the existence of circumstances relevant to the formation of opinion is a sine quo non. If the opinion suffers from the vice of non-application of mind or formulation of collateral grounds or beyond the scope of Statute, or irrelevant and extraneous material then that opinion is challengeable. See (1) Dr N.B. Khare v. State of Delhi AIR 1969 SC 1 (para 4); (2) Govindji Vithaldas & Co. v. Municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad 1994 Supp. (1) SCC 324 (para 137); (3) Virendra v. State of Punjab 2005(6) ALD 582 (LB); (4) Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board 1992 Supp.(3) SCC 217 and (5) Rohtas Industries v. S.D. Agarwa 2004(6) ALD 1 . 176. The action of the Government in making provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any ‘backward class of citizens’ is a matter of policy of the Government. What is best for the ‘backward class’ and in what manner the policy should be formulated and implemented bearing in mind the object to be achieved by such reservation is a matter for decision exclusively within the province of the Government and such matters do not ordinarily attract the power of judicial review or judicial interference except on the grounds which are well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. Reference may be made to: (1) Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. A.P. State Electricity Board 2007(4)SCC 1; (2) Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Reference may be made to: (1) Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. A.P. State Electricity Board 2007(4)SCC 1; (2) Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (1973) 4 SCC 225 ;(3) Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. S. Paramjit Singh AIR 1951 SC 226 ; (4) Minerva Talkies v. State of Karnataka AIR 1958 SC 731 ; (5) State of Karnataka v. Ranganath Reddy (1984) 3 SCC 654 ;(6) Kerala State Electricity Board v. S.N. Govinda Prabhu and Bros. (1986) 2 SCC 249 ;(7) Prag Ice and Oil Mills v. Union of India (1976) 2 SCC 310 ;(8) Saraswati Industries Syndicate Ltd. v. Union of India (1993) 1 SCC 645 ; (9) Murthy Match Works v. Assistant Collector, Central Excise AIR 1968 SC 1379 ; (10) T. Govindaraja Mudaliar v. State of T.N. (1972) 1 SCC 660 and (11) Narender Kumar v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC 649 . To what extent can the reservation be made? Justice Sawant in separate concurring judgment held as follows: 529. The answer to the question lies in the question itself. There are no special principles of judicial review nor does the scope of judicial review expand when the identification of backward classes and the percentage of the reservation kept for them is called in question. So long as correct criterion for the identification of the backward classes is applied, the result arrived at cannot be questioned on the ground that other valid criteria were also available for such identification. It is possible that the result so arrived at may be defective marginally or in marginal number of cases. That does not invalidate the exercise itself. No method is perfect particularly when sociological findings are in issue. Hence, marginal defects when found may be cured in individual cases but the entire finding is not rendered invalid on that account. 530. The corollary of the above is that when the criterion applied for identifying the backward classes is either perverse or per se defective or unrelated to such identification in that it is not calculated to give the result or is calculated to give, by the very nature of the criterion, a contrary or unintended result, the criterion is open for judicial examination. 537. 537. To sum up, judicial scrutiny would be available (i) if the criterion inconsistent with the provisions of Article 16 is applied for identifying the classes for whom the special or unequal benefit can be given under the said article; (ii) if the classes which are not entitled to the said benefit are wrongly included in or those which are entitled are wrongly excluded from the list of beneficiaries of the special provisions. In such cases, it is not either the entire exercise or the entire list which becomes invalid, so long as the tests applied for identification are correct and the inclusion or exclusion is only marginal; and (iii) if the percentage of reservations is either disproportionate or unreasonable so as to deny the equality of opportunity to the unreserved classes and obliterates Article 16(1). Whether the percentage is unreasonable or results in the obliteration of Article 16 (1), so far as the unreserved classes are concerned, it will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and no hard and fast rule of general application with regard to the percentage can be laid down for all the regions and for all times. Justice B P Jeevan Reddy, after referring to various judgment of the Apex Court with regard to Article 15 and 16 to show that evolution in the thinking process by the Apex Court, with regard to the said articles, went on to refer the decisions of U S Supreme Court in paras 715 and 733. In para 732 it was held as follows; “We have examined the decision of U S Supreme Court at some length only with a view to notice how another democracy is grapping with a problem similar in certain respects to the problem facing this Country” At para 733, it is observed that “No single uniform thought can be discern from these decisions, ideas appear to be in the process of evolution”. The above statement is with regard to fluid situation pertaining to U S decisions and U S jurisprudence context. Such a caution was incorporated to clarify that reference to U S decisions cannot be construed to mean to apply the essence of the said judgments while dealing with judicial scrutiny by the Indian Courts in the matters of social justice measure. Such a caution was incorporated to clarify that reference to U S decisions cannot be construed to mean to apply the essence of the said judgments while dealing with judicial scrutiny by the Indian Courts in the matters of social justice measure. From the above pronouncements, it follows that; the citizens of this country were and are being treated unequally because of caste system which is prevalent and haunting our country for the last several centuries, which is unique. That this is not confined only to Hindu society, but has percolated to societies of other egalitarian religions also. Which is recognised by the drafters of the Constitution and provides for and aims at equality amongst its citizens mandating the State to take social justice measures including reservation for SCs, STs and BCs to attain the said goal. Such social justice measured either by executive or by legislature are subject to judicial scrutiny to determine whether the same are Constitutionally valid. There exist no special standards of judicial scrutiny of such justice measures and Courts are bound by normal standards laid down by the judiciary for judicial scrutiny of any administrative action/legislative action as the case may be. The Courts will only examine the process of decision making, but not the decision itself. The Court will examine whether there is no material at all or there is some relevant material. Sufficiency of the material cannot be the basis of judicial scrutiny. The burden of proof is on the objecting citizen to demonstrate that such social justice action was not in tune with the Constitutional mandate on the State vis-à-vis the fundamental rights of the citizens. The Courts would not pick holes in the process of decision making and would give due weightage to such policy decision in the path of social justice action by co-equal wings ie., executive or legislature. Though the decisions of U.S. Supreme Court were referred and discussed, the said exercise was undertaken by Hon’ble Apex Court only to discuss about a similar situation in U.S.A. in some respects, i.e., racial discrimination against Blacks. Though the decisions of U.S. Supreme Court were referred and discussed, the said exercise was undertaken by Hon’ble Apex Court only to discuss about a similar situation in U.S.A. in some respects, i.e., racial discrimination against Blacks. In view of the above, it is clear that the opinions expressed by Justice Goda Raghuram and Justice V V S Rao, about the applicability of the concept of strict scrutiny, narrow tailoring and compelling state necessity, suspect legislation etc are not available to Indian Courts while examining the aspect of providing social justice measure. Thus, it has to be held that said opinions as accepted by five Judges in Archana Reddy case is not a good law, the same being contrary to the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court and I hold that the Archana Reddy case was not correctly decided on the question of application of whip of strict scrutiny principle as enunciated by the American Courts and is contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions referred above. Accordingly, I answer the first issue referred. In fact, the Supreme Court in Barium Chemicals Vs Company Law Board AIR 1963 SC 649 held that any executive action for taking such measures would be tested on the anvil of principles laid down in the said case, nothing more nothing less. The learned senior counsel Sri K Ramakrishna Reddy, appearing for the writ petitioners vehemently contended inter-alia that appointment of Sri P.S.Krishnan, IAS as Advisor to the Government of A P Backward Classes Welfare for advising the state vide G O Ms No. 21 dated 18.1.2007 who in turn submitted his report to the State Government on the existence of insular groups within the muslim community is invalid, for the reason that it runs counter to the provisions of A P Backward Classes Commission Act and the Government could not have appointed him as Advisor under its executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. It was contended that Sri P S Krishnan, has no expertise in the matter and at any rate his appointment is illegal, contrary to the provisions of the Act. It was contended that Sri P S Krishnan, has no expertise in the matter and at any rate his appointment is illegal, contrary to the provisions of the Act. It was argued that Sri P S Krishnan’s report could not have been relied by the A P Commission for Backward Classes and by relying extensively on the contents of the said report, the A P Commission for Backward Classes, has abdicated its functions, thus negating the requirement of submission of the report by the Commission as laid down by the Apex Court in Indira Sawhney case. However, the learned Senior Counsel Sri Ramakrishna Reddy, failed to show any provision under A P Commission for Backward Classes Act, which prohibit the government from appointing an advisor for reporting on the status of the backward classes in the state and in the absence of such a provision, it cannot be contended that the appointment of Sri P S Krishnan, as advisor to the State was illegal and in violation of the provisions of the Act. It is to be seen that G O Ms no. 21 Backward Classes Welfare (C2) Department was in fact, issued under the seal of the Governor of the State of A P, exercising powers under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. It is well established principle of law that under Article 162, the State can issue administrative orders, which its legislature is competence to deal with. That apart, having regard the nature of exercise and with all its own powers in the process, there cannot be fixed norms for the purpose of mode of identification. In the process, first as the procedure is left its own discretion, the Commission can have the material as can be made available from different expertise. In what way, the expertise is sought is not crucial factor as long as there is nothing to make any adverse attribution. Therefore, it is open for the concerned provide the necessary expert assistance and it is for the Commission to consider and either reject or rely on. Nothing has been found fault with the report or material assistance given by Mr P.S. Krishnan. Therefore, it is open for the concerned provide the necessary expert assistance and it is for the Commission to consider and either reject or rely on. Nothing has been found fault with the report or material assistance given by Mr P.S. Krishnan. In the absence of any prohibition in the Act and in view of powers under Article 162 of Constitution of India, it cannot be said that appointment of Sri P S Krishnan, as Advisor to the State Government, is illegal or unconstitutional. Now coming to the question as to whether the report of Sri P S Krishnan, could have been forwarded to the State Government for B.C. Commission and whether B C Commission could have relied on the contents of the said report for its recommendations, it is to be seen that under the Act, 1993, the State Government as already stated above is not bound by the recommendations of B C Commission and it can take an independent view of the matter. In fact, in Indira Sawhney case, the Apex Court has made it clear, that recommendations of Commission are not binding on the Government. The Government is entitled to consider of the report of the B C Commission and arrive at its own conclusions, either rejecting or accepting the same. The Government is entitled to examine the report of the Commission with the material available with it or gathered from various sources and come to an independent conclusion to achieve the constitutional goals. In that view of the matter, Government has referred the matter to the B C Commission, identifying the insular groups in muslims and to find out whether such insular groups are socially and educationally backward, Sri P S Krishnan’ report which is exhaustive and deals with all aspects of muslims in this country, emergence and expansion of Islam over a period of time by conversion of Hindu population and in the process of conversions continuance of their own occupations and consequent creation of insular occupational groups which are also endogamous in nature would be of great help to the Commission in coming to a proper conclusion and make its recommendations. In fact, a Full Bench of this Court in Muralidhar Rao case (supra) observed as follows: (25) THE Central Government ultimately took a decision that no all India list of backward classes should be drawn up, nor any reservation be made in the Central government Service for any group of backward classes other than the Scheduled castes and Scheduled Tribes. Consequently, on 14th August, 1961, the ministry of Home Affairs addressed all the state Governments stating, "while the State governments have the discretion to choose their own criteria for defining backwardness, in the view of the Government of India it would be better to apply economic tests than to go by caste. " Regarding the preparation of backward classes list, it was observed, "even if the Central Government were to specify under Article 338 (3) certain groups of people as belonging to other backward classes, it will still be open to every State government to draw up its own lists for the purposes of Articles 15 and 16. As, therefore, the State Governments may adhere to their own lists, any all-India list drawn up by the Central Government would have no practical utility". Similar is the observation made in Archana Reddy’s case at para 269. Both the above judgments rendered by larger benches felt that Commission can rely on any material that it receives from any sources which includes Government. In view of the same, it cannot be said that appointment of Mr P S Krishnan, as advisor to the government and government forwarding the report of Sri P S Krishnan to B C Commission for its use cannot be found fault with, in the absence of any statutory prohibition. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that B C Commission has not evolved any criteria or guidelines in identifying the social and educational backwardness of insular groups in muslim community for inclusion in the backward classes list. It is also the contention of the petitioners that B C Commission has not followed the criteria adopted by earlier commissions and/or the criteria adopted by the Mandal Commission. In Indira Sawhney case, held at as follows: 782. Coming back to the question of identification, the fact remains that one has to begin somewhere — with some group, class or section. There is no set or recognised method. There is no law or other statutory instrument prescribing the methodology. In Indira Sawhney case, held at as follows: 782. Coming back to the question of identification, the fact remains that one has to begin somewhere — with some group, class or section. There is no set or recognised method. There is no law or other statutory instrument prescribing the methodology. The ultimate idea is to survey the entire populace. If so, one can well begin with castes, which represent explicit identifiable social classes/groupings, more particularly when Article 16(4) seeks to ameliorate social backwardness. What is unconstitutional with it, more so when caste, occupation poverty and social backwardness are so closely intertwined in our society? [Individual survey is out of question, since Article 16(4) speaks of class protection and not individual protection]. This does not mean that one can wind up the process of identification with the castes. Besides castes (whether found among Hindus or others) there may be other communities, groups, classes and denominations which may qualify as backward class of citizens. For example, in a particular State, Muslim community as a whole may be found socially backward. (As a matter of fact, they are so treated in the State of Karnataka as well as in the State of Kerala by their respective State Governments). Similarly, certain sections and denominations among Christians in Kerala who were included among backward communities notified in the former princely State of Travancore as far back as in 1935 may also be surveyed and so on and so forth. Any authority entrusted with the task of identifying backward classes may well start with the castes. It can take caste ‘A’, apply the criteria of backwardness evolved by it to that caste and determine whether it qualifies as a backward class or not. If it does qualify, what emerges is a backward class, for the purposes of clause (4) of Article 16. The concept of ‘caste’ in this behalf is not confined to castes among Hindus. It extends to castes, wherever they obtain as a fact, irrespective of religious sanction for such practice. Having exhausted the castes or simultaneously with it, the authority may take up for consideration other occupational groups, communities and classes. The concept of ‘caste’ in this behalf is not confined to castes among Hindus. It extends to castes, wherever they obtain as a fact, irrespective of religious sanction for such practice. Having exhausted the castes or simultaneously with it, the authority may take up for consideration other occupational groups, communities and classes. For example, it may take up the Muslim community (after excluding those sections, castes and groups, if any, who have already been considered) and find out whether it can be characterised as a backward class in that State or region, as the case may be. The approach may differ from State to State since the conditions in each State may differ. Nay, even within a State, conditions may differ from region to region. Similarly, Christians may also be considered. If in a given place, like Kerala, there are several denominations, sections or divisions, each of these groups may separately be considered. In this manner, all the classes among the populace will be covered and that is the central idea. The effort should be to consider all the available groups, sections and classes of society in whichever order one proceeds. Since caste represents an existing, identifiable, social group spread over an overwhelming majority of the country’s population, we say one may well begin with castes, if one so chooses, and then go to other groups, sections and classes. We may say, at this stage, that we broadly commend the approach and methodology adopted by the Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy Commission in this respect. 783. We do not mean to suggest — we may reiterate — that the procedure indicated hereinabove is the only procedure or method/approach to be adopted. Indeed, there is no such thing as a standard or model procedure/approach. It is for the authority (appointed to identify) to adopt such approach and procedure as it thinks appropriate, and so long as the approach adopted by it is fair and adequate, the court has no say in the matter. The only object of the discussion in the preceding para is to emphasise that if a Commission/Authority begins its process of identification with castes (among Hindus) and occupational groupings among others, it cannot by that reason alone be said to be constitutionally or legally bad. The only object of the discussion in the preceding para is to emphasise that if a Commission/Authority begins its process of identification with castes (among Hindus) and occupational groupings among others, it cannot by that reason alone be said to be constitutionally or legally bad. We must also say that there is no rule of law that a test to be applied for identifying backward classes should be only one and/or uniform. In a vast country like India, it is simply not practicable. If the real object is to discover and locate backwardness, and if such backwardness is found in a caste, it can be treated as backward; if it is found in any other group, section or class, they too can be treated as backward. 796.-797. We may now summarise our discussion under Question No. 3. (a) A caste can be and quite often is a social class in India. If it is backward socially, it would be a backward class for the purposes of Article 16(4). Among non-Hindus, there are several occupational groups, sects and denominations, which for historical reasons are socially backward. They too represent backward social collectivities for the purposes of Article 16(4). (b) Neither the constitution nor the law prescribe the procedure or method of identification of backward classes. Nor is it possible or advisable for the court to lay down any such procedure or method. It must be left to the authority appointed to identify. It can adopt such method/procedure as it thinks convenient and so long as its survey covers the entire populace, no objection can be taken to it. Identification of the backward classes can certainly be done with reference to castes among, and along with, other groups, classes and sections of people. One can start the process with the castes, wherever they are found, apply the criteria (evolved for determining backwardness) and find out whether it satisfies the criteria. If it does — what emerges is a “backward class of citizens” within the meaning of and for the purposes of Article 16 (4). Similar process can be adopted in the case of other occupational groups, communities and classes, so as to cover the entire populace. The central idea and overall objective should be to consider all available groups, sections and classes in society. Similar process can be adopted in the case of other occupational groups, communities and classes, so as to cover the entire populace. The central idea and overall objective should be to consider all available groups, sections and classes in society. Since caste represents an existing, identifiable social group/class encompassing an overwhelming majority of the country’s population, one can well begin with it and then go to other groups, sections and classes. (c) It is not necessary for a class to be designated as a backward class that it is situated similarly to the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes. (d) ‘Creamy layer’ can be, and must be, excluded. (e) It is not correct to say that the backward class contemplated by Article 16(4) is limited to the socially and educationally backward classes referred to in Article 15(4) and Article 340. It is much wider. The test or requirement of social and educational backwardness cannot be applied to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, who indubitably fall within the expression “backward class of citizens”. The accent in Article 16(4) appears to be on social backwardness. Of course, social, educational and economic backwardness are closely intertwined in the Indian context. The classes contemplated by Article 16(4) may be wider than those contemplated by Article 15(4). Therefore, in the matter of identification of the backward classes, there cannot be one single or uniform procedure that can be adopted by any Commission or authority entrusted with such task. It is for the body entrusted with such task to adopt such approach and procedure as it deems appropriate. The Apex Court recognizing the need for the Commission/Body to have discretion in adopting its own methods, did not choose to prescribe any particular procedure and categorically held that it is for the Commission to evolve its own procedure. Under Section 8 (2) of the Act it is for the Commission to regulate its own procedure. It is always open for the Commission to adopt its own procedure and it is not necessary for the Commission to adopt any procedure or criteria adopted by earlier commissions or to follow a particular criteria for all times to come and for all dispensations in this regard. It is always open for the Commission to adopt its own procedure and it is not necessary for the Commission to adopt any procedure or criteria adopted by earlier commissions or to follow a particular criteria for all times to come and for all dispensations in this regard. What is important in the matters of this nature is to have a rational criteria and as long as the Commission has evolved a rational criteria it is not open for the Courts to scrutinize the criteria in minute detail. The criteria/methodology is bound to differ from time to time, region to region claim to claim and from one exercise to other. The Courts would not interfere with the recommendations of the Commission only on the ground that the Commission could have adopted a different or better criteria/procedure. The Commission in fact has followed a particular criteria and the same is discernable from the very report of the Commission. In Chapter III of B C Commission report, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the Commission has taken note of and kept in view the guidelines/procedure/questions evolved by National Commission for Backward Classes (for short NCBC) especially the guidelines, questions pertaining to “fast track” method and that the Commission has also followed rough and ready method which was evolved and adopted by Mandal Commission. The NCBC guidelines which are appended to B C Commission report in juxtaposition with the questions prepared by B C Commission show that B C commission followed NCBC guidelines to a large extent. A reading of NCBC guidelines would indicate that the said guidelines were evolved by NCBC after taking into account the criteria and indicators framed by mandal Commission and other Commissions set up for the purpose by different state Governments and based on relevant material. It is also clear from certain clarifications given on the said guidelines that said guidelines are issued by NCBC only to aid the Commissions to identify the groups but would not fetter due exercise or discretion by the concerned Commissions entrusted with the tasks. On a totality, this would show that NCBC has evolved a broad and universal criteria/guidelines but did not take away the discretion of the Commission to evolve its criteria, keeping in view the need to evolve its own criteria for different situations. On a totality, this would show that NCBC has evolved a broad and universal criteria/guidelines but did not take away the discretion of the Commission to evolve its criteria, keeping in view the need to evolve its own criteria for different situations. The NCBC having regard to the fact that certain castes/communities can be straightaway be brought under the definition of social and educational backwardness, evolved a procedure called “fast track”. The NCBC realizing the need to identify such socially and educationally backward classes who are denied such dispensation though they are otherwise entitled to under the constitutional dispensation, introduced the concept of fast track to avoid any further delay in identifying such groups. As per the said fast track procedure, if a particular group fulfills certain guidelines/criteria, the Commission may take it as adequate evidence of backwardness of that group and that the Commission besides such positive adequate evidence of the backwardness may also take note of other information which may come to its notice before submitting its recommendations. It was further stated that if the Commission is satisfied that there is no contra evidence against holding a particular fast track category/group to be backward, having regard to the fact that the said group falls under fast track method, the Commission may conclude that said group falls under backward class. The NCBC with its experience, evolved a procedure by which a group can be identified as socially backward group and in the present dispensation the Commission has followed the said criteria and also conducted its own survey and having found no contra material, recommended the said social groups to be identified as socially and economically backward classes. In effect, it is his contention that while dealing with certain groups, there is no necessity for an elaborate enquiry/probe and that such elaborate enquires may be required only in broader line cases and that the groups identified now are those which straightaway fall under the fast track method introduced by NCBC and adopted by the Commission. We have gone through the criteria evolved by NCBC and the questionnaire prepared. The communities which are identified with hereditary occupations which are considered to be low and undignified/stigmatized and are straightaway considered as backward classes. Similarly nomadic and semi-nomadic communities and identified ‘vimukthajati’ communities are also straightaway considered as backward classes. We have gone through the criteria evolved by NCBC and the questionnaire prepared. The communities which are identified with hereditary occupations which are considered to be low and undignified/stigmatized and are straightaway considered as backward classes. Similarly nomadic and semi-nomadic communities and identified ‘vimukthajati’ communities are also straightaway considered as backward classes. The NCBC guidelines in general and fast track procedure in particular has been evolved by NCBC in view of its expertise on the subject. APCBC taking note of NCBC guidelines which has taken note of the earlier criteria indicators of earlier commissions and authorities fast track method was adopted to avoid any delay in providing dispensation under Article 15 and 16 of the Constitution. Such a procedure is quite reasonable and rationale. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is no criteria evolved by the Commission in the present dispensation. At any rate petitioners have not chosen to challenge the validity of the guidelines evolved by NCBC. The Commission had followed rough and ready method evolved and adopted by mandal commission. As per rough and ready method untouchables converted to any non-hindu religion and such occupational communities which are known by name of the traditional hereditary occupation and whose Hindu counter-parts have been included in the list of Hindu Other Backward Classes, such as ‘Dhobi, Teli, Nai, Darji etc, can straightaway be identified as backward classes. The commission has followed fast track method evolved by NCBC and rough and ready method evolved and adopted by Mandal Commission, which was referred and approved by the Apex Court in Indira Sawhney case, the contention of the petitioners that Commission has not evolved any criteria whatsoever is factually incorrect and as the Commission has not only adopted a time tested criteria/method and also conducted survey on its own to find out any contra evidence and only then submitted its recommendations, would show that there is no requirement of interference by this Court on this ground. A careful perusal of the guidelines issued by NCBC including the fast track method which guidelines are based on the experience gained by NCBC over a long period of time, are rational and any conclusions arrived at based on such guidelines cannot be found fault with. A careful perusal of the guidelines issued by NCBC including the fast track method which guidelines are based on the experience gained by NCBC over a long period of time, are rational and any conclusions arrived at based on such guidelines cannot be found fault with. In fact, most of the insular groups of muslims recommended for inclusion as backward classes fall into rough and ready criteria adopted by the Mandal Commission, since their counter parts amongst Hindus are already included in the list of backward classes. Therefore, all the insular groups in muslims identified known as socially and educationally backward classes, prima facie, without any rebuttal would satisfy the requirement of guidelines recommending them for inclusion in the list of backward classes under fast track method. One of the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners is that most of the communities as stated in the survey conducted by the BC Commission, majority of those insular groups are no longer practicing and moved out of their traditional occupation, hence it is contended that those insular groups cannot be identified as backward classes as they are no longer profess/practice the traditional occupations. However, it is to be noted that as society evolve and gets urbanized, people practicing a particular occupation or profession tend to move out of that profession in view of the stigma attached to the profession or because such profession may become redundant in view of changed times. However, such social mobility can be in three directions, i.e., 1) upward mobility, 2) Practicing unstigmatised profession and 3) downward mobility. It is clear from the answers to the questionnaire for each of the communities recommended to be included in the backward classes that though majority of them have left their traditional occupation and then moved to become agricultural labourers or some other menial occupations, however, the stigma attached to their traditional occupations continues to haunt them, since those communities have not moved into any better or more respectable occupations. They continue to live in penury as agricultural labourers or as manual labour. While issuing guidelines the NCBC has taken note of the fact that people are likely to move out of their traditional occupations and such people, if they continue to eek-out their livelihood as agricultural labour or other manual labour would be automatically entitled for inclusion in the list of backward classes. While issuing guidelines the NCBC has taken note of the fact that people are likely to move out of their traditional occupations and such people, if they continue to eek-out their livelihood as agricultural labour or other manual labour would be automatically entitled for inclusion in the list of backward classes. The exercise by the APCBC and the statistical data collected would show that those who have moved out of the traditional occupations have remained agricultural labours or as manual labour. I will be failing in my duty, if I do not express my displeasure over the manner in which APCBC has conducted its survey. The APCBC could have conducted a better survey, could have collected more data, however, lack of more extensive data and better exercise by the Commission would not make the report unreliable and would not make it unscientific or irrational. The Commission obviously felt satisfied that there is no contra material from the data collected by its officers and that requirement was sufficient for inclusion of those communities in the list of backward classes. At any rate, sixty years after independence, groups of communities within muslim who in spite of Islamic religious belief of non discrimination and brotherhood among muslims have carried the traditional occupations and along with that the prejudices and stigmas and the low and high amongst them based on such occupations, as noted by plethora of historians in the historical background of Islamic society in this country. Sixty years after independence and nearly fifty of their Hindu counter parts are included in the backward classes. The muslim society by and large has been ignored by all sections of society, in view of the popular belief that there is no discrimination and concept of high and low in the Islamic society which fact is belied by various studies referred to by Mr P S Krishnan as well as the Commission. It is sad that due to ignorance of the ground reality and misconception about the Indian Muslim society, amongst muslim society a large percentage, nearly 80% of the muslim population who are entitled to be treated as socially and educationally backward classes, on the same basis as their counter parts amongst Hindus were treated, have not got the benefit of affirmative action mandated by Constitution. One of the contentions of the learned counsel for petitioners is that the sample survey conducted by the Commission is inadequate, cannot lead to any accurate results or rational conclusions and therefore the report of the Commission, could not have been relied by the State for the legislation. It is true that Commission could have done a better job, conducted a better survey, collected some more statistical data, however, lack of efforts on the part of the Commission in this regard would not make the report rational or un-scientific. As already pointed out the Commission has followed the guidelines issued by NCBC and rough and ready method of Mandal Commission and was only looking for contra material to find out if any of the insular groups, occupational groups within muslims have moved socially upward so as to be discriminated against and have joined the main stream of Islamic society, but in vain. In AHMEDABAD MILLOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION VS. TEXTILE LABOUR ASSOCIATION AIR 1966 SC 497 held as follows; 32. The first point which we must now consider is whether the appellants are justified in contending that the Industrial Court erred in overruling, their contention that the new survey suffered from two major infirmities — inadequacy of the sample size, and impropriety of the method, of interview adopted by the Investigators. In support of this plea, the appellants examined Mr Gokhale as an expert witness. Mr Gokhale who served in the Labour Office at Bombay from 1926 to 1937, was directly associated with the family budget inquiries, compilation of cost of living index numbers, and with the first General Wage Census conducted by the Labour Office in Bombay. He also worked as Assistant Secretary of the Bombay Textile Labour Enquiry Committee. Later, he joined the Millowners, Association, Bombay, as their Labour Officer on 1st January, 1938 and served in that capacity until he retired on 1st November, 1962. He was deputed on a study tour to Lancashire in 1951 and attended the International Labour Conference at Geneva. He has also been a member of the ILO Committee on Women’s Employment. According to Mr Gokhale the new survey was not as scientific as it might have been. He was inclined to take the view that the sample selected in the Ahmedabad inquiries was very inadequate. He has also been a member of the ILO Committee on Women’s Employment. According to Mr Gokhale the new survey was not as scientific as it might have been. He was inclined to take the view that the sample selected in the Ahmedabad inquiries was very inadequate. He commented on the fact that the choice of the size of sample was determined, inter alia, on the ground of the workload manageable by the investigator, and he said that it was difficult for him to understand as to why in deciding the sample size “workload manageable by the investigator” had to be considered as a relevant factor. He then produced a chart showing the ratio of the size of the universe with the size of sample, and said that nowhere had he found such a low size of the sample as in the impugned inquiry. The size of the sample, according to him, in the impugned inquiry was less than even half a per cent of population group which was intended to be covered. 33. Mr Gokhale was cross-examined by the respondent. It was put to him that his experience in the matter of ample survey was somewhat limited and that the said experience had now become antiquated in view of the great strides of progress which had been made in the science of sample survey after 1926. He agreed that sampling technique involves knowledge of statistics and statistics involves mathematics, and he did not make any claim to be an expert either in statistics or in mathematics. In his examination-in-chief, Mr Gokhale appeared to criticise the extent of imputation which was evident in the preparation of the new series; but in his cross-examination, he fairly conceded that imputations have always got to be done in compiling consumer price index. It had been done in the past, he said, as also in the case of the present series. When he was asked whether he knew what the percentage of imputation was in the compilation of the consumer price index of 1926-27, he admitted that he did not know. He was, however, reluctant to agree with the Labour Bureau insofar as application of their reasons to individual items was concerned, and in support of his theory he relied upon the illustrations given by him in the affidavit which he had filed before he gave evidence. 34. He was, however, reluctant to agree with the Labour Bureau insofar as application of their reasons to individual items was concerned, and in support of his theory he relied upon the illustrations given by him in the affidavit which he had filed before he gave evidence. 34. The statements made by Mr Gokhale in his affidavit were disputed by the respondent and the accuracy and the validity of the views expressed by him were seriously challenged by Mr Vasavada who filed a reply on behalf of the respondent (Item 19). In his reply, Mr Vasavada referred to clause 14 of the Resolution as reported at p. 403 of the International Labour Code — 1951 Vol. II; and emphasised the fact that the main distinguishing feature of the new survey was that it was carried out under the technical guidance of professional statisticians not only with adequate knowledge of sampling theory but also with actual experience in sampling practice, and with the help of a properly trained field and computing staff. This was the requirement laid down by the publications issued by the ILO and the United Nations as a very important test, and the impugned survey fully satisfies the said test. Mr Vasavada also referred to the opinion expressed by Dr Basu who is at present the ILO Expert on the subject, that the size of the sample should be determined in the light of the permissible margin of error in the resulting Series of consumer price index numbers. In our country, the permissible margin of error in the index has been broadly set at 2 per cent; and so, the case set out by Mr Vasavada on behalf of the respondent was that when the permissible margin of error in the index is 2 per cent, the number of families viz. 722 taken at Ahmedabad, is highly satisfactory. 35. Mr Vasavada then questioned the accuracy of Mr Gokhale’s statement that such a small percentage of the universe had never been adopted before in any other inquiry. He urged that the present techniques have advanced so far that a small sample size can achieve the best results; and he cited the example of a survey carried out in the United Kingdom where the proportion of 13,000 households surveyed to the total households which constituted the universe came to 0.1 per cent. He urged that the present techniques have advanced so far that a small sample size can achieve the best results; and he cited the example of a survey carried out in the United Kingdom where the proportion of 13,000 households surveyed to the total households which constituted the universe came to 0.1 per cent. The Industrial Court has considered the evidence given by Mr Gokhale and has taken into account the arguments urged on behalf of the respondent, and it has held that the size of the sample selected for the impugned survey cannot be said to introduce any infirmity in the survey. The question which we have to decide is whether the Industrial Court was right in coming to this conclusion. 36. In dealing with this question, it is necessary to refer briefly to the genesis and growth of the science of Social Survey. “In its broadest sense”, says the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, “a social survey is a first hand investigation, analysis and co-ordination of economic, sociological, and other related aspects of a selected community or group. Such a survey may be undertaken primarily in order to provide material scientifically gathered, upon which social theorists may base their conclusions; or its chief purpose may be to formulate a programme of amelioration of the conditions of life and work of a particular group or community”. 2 Wells defines a social survey as a “fact-finding study dealing chiefly with working-class poverty and with the nature and problems of the community”. 3 As Moser has, however, pointed out, “this definition might have covered the classical community and poverty studies but would hardly be adequate, the first part at any rate, to the modern forms of survey 4”. 37. The history of social survey in England can be said to have begun with the publication of Mayhew’s book London Life and the London Poor published in 1851; and Booth made a very significant contribution to the scientific development of social survey by publishing his book Labour and Life of the People of London (1889-1902). Rowntree followed with his book Poverty: A Study of Town Life. Thereafter, a number of studies have been made by social scientists, and the subject of the theory and practice of social surveys has been the subject-matter of valuable and extensive literature all over the civilized world. Rowntree followed with his book Poverty: A Study of Town Life. Thereafter, a number of studies have been made by social scientists, and the subject of the theory and practice of social surveys has been the subject-matter of valuable and extensive literature all over the civilized world. During the First World War and thereafter, social scientists devoted their attention to the problem of family living studies mainly from the point of view of the impact of price changes on consumers’ economic situation. The development of reliable consumer price indices naturally involved the use of weights that would properly reflect the consumption expenditure of the population. This led to further extension of family living studies in different countries and for different periods, mainly to secure information on patterns of consumption expenditure 5. 38. The Second World War and the conditions that flowed from it made it necessary to carry on investigations on a wide range of inquiry relating to all aspects of living conditions, e.g., nutrition, health, education and employment. The whole question of family living survey came up for consideration in the Seventh International Conference of Labour Statisticians in 1949. This Conference adopted a resolution defining the objectives of family living studies and setting new international standards as regards the organisation of enquiries and the analysis and presentation of the results that flowed from it5-(B). 39. In India, a standardised statistical type of family living study was first initiated in Bombay in 1921. Such enquiries were also conducted in Sholapur in 1925, in Ahmedabad in 1926 and in some centres in Bihar in 1923. While reviewing the position of social surveys in India, the Royal Commission on Labour pointed out the great paucity of statistical material in this country for judging the standard of living of the workers and recommended conduct of socio-economic enquiries of the type of family living surveys. This report naturally gave an impetus to the conduct of family budget enquiries. In all the surveys that followed, sampling and interviewing techniques were adopted, though, of course, not of a much advanced nature. A statistical analysis of the data collected was also attempted5-(C). 40. The Second World War saw the appointment of the Rau Court of Enquiry constituted under the Trade Disputes Act, 1929. In all the surveys that followed, sampling and interviewing techniques were adopted, though, of course, not of a much advanced nature. A statistical analysis of the data collected was also attempted5-(C). 40. The Second World War saw the appointment of the Rau Court of Enquiry constituted under the Trade Disputes Act, 1929. One of the recommendations made by the said Court was that the Central Government should take up responsibility for maintaining up-to-date cost of living index numbers for important areas and centres. The Government of India accepted this recommendation and set up a special organisation called the “Directorate of Cost of Living Index Numbers” and family budget enquiries among industrial workers were conducted at 28 centres during 1944-45 in the course of which 2700 budgets were collected. A remarkable feature of these enquiries was that for the first time in this country, an attempt was made to conduct such enquiries simultaneously at a large number of centres under more or less uniform techniques. During the same period, the Labour Bureau of the Government of India and some of the Organisations of State Governments continued to conduct family budget enquiries from time to time at specific areas or centres, either for deriving weighting diagrams for consumer price index numbers or for collection of data required for fixation of minimum wages5-(D). 41. It was in the background of these events that the Second Five Year Plan made a significant recommendation. The Plan said that: “The existing wage structure in the country comprises, in the main, a basic wage and a dearness allowance. The latter component in a majority of cases has relation to cost of living indices at different industrial centres. These indices have not been built up on a uniform basis; some of them are worked out on primary data collected about 20 to 25 years ago and are therefore, not a true reflection on the present spending habits of workers. Since one of the questions which the wage commission will have to take into account is the demand made by the workers’ organisations for merging a part of dearness allowance with the basic wage, evolving recommendations for such a merger will not be sufficiently scientific if cost of living indices at different centres do not have a uniform basis. Since one of the questions which the wage commission will have to take into account is the demand made by the workers’ organisations for merging a part of dearness allowance with the basic wage, evolving recommendations for such a merger will not be sufficiently scientific if cost of living indices at different centres do not have a uniform basis. Steps will therefore have to be taken simultaneously with the undertaking of a wage census, to institute enquiries for the revision of the present series of cost of living indices at different centres.” It is in pursuance of this recommendation that the impugned survey was made. 42. Let us now see on what principles and methods the impugned survey was made. It is necessary to begin the discussion of this question with the observation “that the consumer price index number measures nothing but changes in prices, as they affect a particular population group; and so, it is really a price index number as distinct from a cost of living index number. In fact, these indices used to be termed as cost of living index numbers in the past, but in order to make their meaning clear, it was decided by Government to change the name to consumer price index numbers in accordance with international recommendations and growing practice in other countries. Most of the State Governments compiling such index numbers have also adopted this usage 6”. This index number is intended to show over a period of time the average percentage change in the prices paid by the consumers belonging to the population group proposed to be covered by the index for a fixed list of goods and services consumed by them. The average percentage change, measured by the index, is calculated month after month with reference to a fixed period. This fixed period is known as the “base-period” of the index; and since the object of the index is to measure the effect of price-changes only, the price-changes have to be determined with reference to a fixed list of goods and services of consumption which is known as a fixed “basket” of goods and services. 43. The index does not purport to measure the absolute level of prices but only the average percentage change in the prices of a fixed basket of goods and services at different periods of time. 43. The index does not purport to measure the absolute level of prices but only the average percentage change in the prices of a fixed basket of goods and services at different periods of time. There are certain preliminary considerations which are relevant in the construction of consumer price index numbers. The first consideration is the purpose which the index is intended to serve; and that necessarily involves the definition of the group of consumers to which the index is intended to relate. Then it is necessary to determine the consumption level and pattern of the population group at a period of time which generally becomes the base-period of the index numbers. For that purpose, a list of commodities and services has to be made. Usually, this list would contain items of food, fuel and light, clothing, and others; items of services, such as barbar charges, bus fare, doctor’s fee, etc., have also to be selected. It is the combined total of the items of commodities and services that constitutes the basket. Then follows a description of the quality of each commodity and service through which price changes have to be measured. Generally, one quality which is popularly consumed by the population group is selected for each commodity and service. The importance or weight which has to be attached to each commodity or service is also a material factor. For instance, if rice is considered to be twice as important as wheat in the consumption pattern, the weight of rice will be 2 in relation to 1 of wheat. 44. Having determined the consumption level and the pattern of the population group, the next task to attempt is to arrange for the regular collection of price data for the various qualities of commodities and services which enter the basket. With this material, the consumer price index has to be compiled from month to month subsequent to the base period. That, shortly stated, is the nature of the preliminary considerations which have to be borne in mind while constructing the consumer price index numbers. 45. We have just noticed the theory of weights on which weighting diagrams are prepared. Weights are intended to indicate the importance attached to the percentage changes in the prices paid by consumers for different items (commodities and services) of consumption. 45. We have just noticed the theory of weights on which weighting diagrams are prepared. Weights are intended to indicate the importance attached to the percentage changes in the prices paid by consumers for different items (commodities and services) of consumption. Accordingly, each item in the index is given, what is called in technical language, a “weight” to represent the relative importance of the price changes recorded for that item. This weight means nothing more than the percentage of expenditure on each item of goods and services in relation to the total expenditure. It will thus be seen that the main basis for determining the weights of respective commodities and services is the investigation of the family budget; and that emphasises the importance and significance of a proper investigation. During the course of investigation, data are collected on all items, on which money has been defrayed by families; but only such items as involve consumption expenditure are included in the average budget. Even so, it is only selected items which find a place in the index calculations, because it is obviously neither practicable nor necessary to include all items featuring in the average budget. Since only a sample of items from each group is included in the index, it becomes necessary to enquire as to what happens to other items featuring in the average budget but not included in the index. Their weights are added or distributed to the items included in the index, so that the total expenditure of the average budget is fully taken into account in the weights adopted for the index. This process is known as “imputation” of weights. Besides the weights the other set of primary data which enter into the compilation of a series of consumer price index numbers are the prices; and that emphasises the importance of collecting material data in respect of prices. The Investigator, therefore, has to bear in mind all the relevant factors that ultimately go to the construction of the index, and has to carry on his investigation in a proper and scientific way. 46. Having thus briefly reviewed the theoretical aspects of the factors that govern the construction of consumer price index numbers, let us now proceed to see how the impugned inquiry was in fact held. 46. Having thus briefly reviewed the theoretical aspects of the factors that govern the construction of consumer price index numbers, let us now proceed to see how the impugned inquiry was in fact held. The material evidence which will assist us in this part of our inquiry is furnished by the Report on Family Living Survey among Industrial Workers at Ahmedabad, 1958-59. From this report it appears that the organisation of the survey was based on the cooperation of several institutions. The survey was sponsored by the Labour Bureau, Ministry of Labour & Employment, Government of India; and its technical details were worked out under the guidance of a Technical Advisory Committee on Cost of Living Index Numbers consisting of the representatives of the Ministries of Labour and Employment, Food and Agriculture, Finance, Planning Commission, the National Sample Survey Directorate, the Department of Statistics (C.S.O.), the Indian Statistical Institute and the Reserve Bank of India. The field work was entrusted to the Directorate of National Sample Survey, and processing and tabulation of data collected in Schedule ‘A’ (Family Budget) to the Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta. The tabulation of data collected in Schedule ‘B’ which dealt with Level of Living was done in the Labour Bureau. It was a multi-purpose survey; and so, the investigation conducted under it covered both the Family Budget, and the Level of Living. Ultimate analysis of the data, publication of reports on the results of the surveys and construction and maintenance of new series of consumer price index numbers were the responsibilities of the Labour Bureau. 47. The first thing that the Organisation did was to define a “working class family,” because this definition determined the size of the universe. A working class family which was the basic unit of the survey, was defined in terms of sociological and economic considerations as consisting of persons: (i) generally related by blood and marriage; or adoption; (ii) usually living together and or served from the same kitchen: and (iii) pooling a major part of their income and/or depending on a common pool of income for a major part of their expenditure. 48. Then followed the delimitation of area. The geographical area to be covered during the survey was decided in consultation with local organisations both official and nonofficial. 48. Then followed the delimitation of area. The geographical area to be covered during the survey was decided in consultation with local organisations both official and nonofficial. At the Ahmedabad centre, 46 localities were selected for the purpose of the survey; they consisted of 16 Chawls, 21 Labour Colonies (Housing Societies) and 9 Villages. Before settling the ultimate units of the family living survey viz. the families, two types of sampling methods were adopted; they were the tenement sampling and the pay-roll sampling. The sample size for a centre was determined on the basis of the number of industrial workers, the type of sampling followed, the work-load manageable by an Investigator and the required precision of weights to be derived from Schedule ‘A’ for consumer price index numbers. The sample size for Ahmedabad was 720 families to be canvassed for Schedule ‘A’. The number of schedules finally collected and tabulated was 722 for Schedule ‘A’. The two samples drawn for Schedules ‘A’ and ‘B’ were, however, mutually exclusive, because canvassing for both the schedules from the same sampled families would have caused fatigue both to the Investigators and the informants. The whole sample was staggered over a period of 12 months evenly so as to eliminate the seasonal effects on the consumption pattern. The selection of sample was done in two stages. In the first stage, the chawls within each of the wards were grouped to form blocks of about 150 households each and these blocks along with the “labour” colonies (housing societies) were grouped to form clusters of about 450 households each, so that each cluster had blocks from different wards. From the list of these clusters and villages, 4 independent simple systematic samples of 12 clusters or villages each were selected for survey. Each of the 12 clusters sampled for an Investigator was assigned to a particular month for enquiry by a random process. That is how the first stage was arranged. 49. The second stage unit for selection was a working class family. Each month, the Investigator listed all the families in the cluster allotted to that month by house-to-house visit and classified them as working class familiar and others. While listing, information was also collected on the family size, the expenditure class to which it belonged and the State of origin of the head of the family. Each month, the Investigator listed all the families in the cluster allotted to that month by house-to-house visit and classified them as working class familiar and others. While listing, information was also collected on the family size, the expenditure class to which it belonged and the State of origin of the head of the family. This information was utilised to arrange the working class families in the cluster, first by family size and within these classes by expenditure class and within these by the State of origin. A simple systematic sample of 20 working class families was drawn from this arranged list. Every fourth family in this sample was contacted for filling Schedule ‘B’ (on Level of Living) and the remaining three were for Schedule ‘A’ (on Family Budget). That is the nature of the procedure adopted in selecting the families for sample survey and determining the size of the sample. The sample survey was designed to cover a period of 12 months at each centre. At Ahmedabad centre, the work was carried on between August 1958 and July, 1959. The method of survey was the “interview method”. The questionnaire which each Investigator adopted covered a wide range of subjects, accurate replies to some of which could not be had without explaining the significance of the questions to the persons concerned. 50. The population of Ahmedabad is about 11.5 lakhs. The working class population in Ahmedabad was reported to be concentrated in 13 localities. The markets predominantly patronised by the working class population in Ahmedabad were 6 and it is these markets that were selected for the collection of retail prices for the new series of consumer price index number for Ahmedabad centre. 51. This summary of the Report gives us a broad idea as to the manner in which and the method by which the investigation was made which ultimately led to the construction of the consumer price index number. 52. Reverting then to the objections raised by the appellants that the size of the sample was inadequate and the method of investigation was in appropriate, can it be said that the Industrial Court was in error in holding that these objections were not valid? 52. Reverting then to the objections raised by the appellants that the size of the sample was inadequate and the method of investigation was in appropriate, can it be said that the Industrial Court was in error in holding that these objections were not valid? In dealing with this question, it is necessary to bear in mind that the size of the sample has to be determined in the light of the permissible margin of error in the resulting series of consumer price index numbers. As Dr Basu has observed: “In our country, this permissible margin of error in the index has been broadly set at 2 per cent”; and that is not contradicted by the opinion of any other Expert. The sample of consuming units has to be selected by the application of scientific sampling techniques; and there is no doubt whatever that during the last 40 years, this branch of human knowledge has made remarkable progress. The optimum sample design is now worked out by competent statisticians in the light of the available material and requirements in each case, and as Dr Basu has observed, “the desired data are secured at minimum cost and at an evaluation of sampling errors in the estimated data obtained from the survey”. It is the quality of the survey that is more important, not so much the size of the sample or the number of families with whom investigation was made. 53. On the question about the adequacy of the sample size selected for investigation on the present occasion, it would be material to refer to the opinion expressed by Moser on this subject. Says Moser: “Most people who are unfamiliar with sampling probably averest the importance of sample size as such, taking the view that ‘as long as the sample is big enough, or a large enough proportion of the population is included, all will be well. The fallacy in this is clear as soon as one looks’ at any standard error formula, say (5.1) on p. 61 above. If the population is large, the finite population correction N — n/N — 1 practically vanishes and the precision of the sample result is seen to depend on n, the size of the sample, not on n/N, the proportion of the population included in the sample. If the population is large, the finite population correction N — n/N — 1 practically vanishes and the precision of the sample result is seen to depend on n, the size of the sample, not on n/N, the proportion of the population included in the sample. Only if the sample represents a relatively high proportion of the population (say, 10 per cent or more) need the population size enter into the estimate of standard error 8.” Mr Kolah for the appellants has not cited before us the opinion of any Expert to the contrary. 54. Considering the question from a commonsense point of view, it seems to us reasonable to hold that if the quality of investigation has improved, and the method of working out the sample survey has made very great progress, then it would not be correct to say that because the size of the sample in the present case was smaller as compared to the size of the sample taken in 1926-27, the inadequacy of the size on the subsequent occasion introduces an infirmity in the investigation itself. That is the view which the Industrial Court has taken, and we see no reason to differ from it. 55. At this stage, it would be interesting to consider the comparative contents of the basket as it was devised in the two respective enquiries, on held in 1926-27, and the other in 1958-59. The former enquiry reflects the consumption pattern of the working class as it existed in 1926. The index number then devised was composed of five groups viz. (1) Food, (2) Fuel and Lighting, (3) Clothing, (4) House rent, and (5) Miscellaneous. The food group in its turn consisted of 16 items; the fuel and lighting group of 4 items; the clothing group of 7 items; the house rent group of the item of house rent; and the miscellaneous group of two items viz. bidis and soap. Thus, in all, 30 items were included. These items represent 82.82 per cent of the average monthly expenditure, and they were respectively assigned 58, 7, 10, 12 and 4 weights which together aggregate 91. At the time of this enquiry, the items included in the investigation totalled 49; out of them, 30 were priced and 19 were unpriced; and in respect of the latter, the method of imputation was adopted. At the time of this enquiry, the items included in the investigation totalled 49; out of them, 30 were priced and 19 were unpriced; and in respect of the latter, the method of imputation was adopted. This series was prepared after collecting the budgets of 985 families when the estimated population of the city of Ahmedabad was 2,90,000. 56. The new series is based on the enquiry into 722 working class families conducted in 1958-59 when the total population of the city was about 11 lakhs. The total working class families at this time were estimated to be 51.5 thousand; and so, the percentage of the sample size in relation to the universe of the working class families would come to about 1.4 and not less than .5 as appears to have been assumed by Mr Gokhale. The weighting diagram for the new series is based on 110 articles divided into the main groups of food, fuel and lighting, housing, clothing, and miscellaneous. The important groups in this enquiry carried respectively the weights of 64.41, 6.22, 5.05, 9.08, and 15.24 which aggregate to 100. The total number of items included in the basket was 239. Of these, 89 were priced items and 150 unpriced, and in respect of the latter, the method of imputation was adopted. It is true that in the new series, the unpriced items are considerably more than in the earlier one; but it must be remembered that it is not so much the number of items that makes the difference, but the percentage of expenditure on unpriced items to priced items. The total expenditure of all items in the 1926-27 enquiry was Rs 36.01 of which Rs 32.35 was the expenditure on priced items and Rs 3.66 was the expenditure on non-priced items. In terms of percentage, the expenditure on priced items to total expenditure was 89.8 per cent and expenditure on non-priced items to total expenditure was 10.2 percent. In the latter enquiry of 1958-59, the total expenditure on all items was Rs 139.06. Of this, Rs 124.91 was the expenditure on priced items and Rs 14.15 was the expenditure on non-priced items. In terms of percentage, the first expenditure was 89.8 per cent and the second is 10.2 per cent. Thus, it is clear that the expenditure on unpriced items in the present enquiry is not larger than in the former enquiry at all. In terms of percentage, the first expenditure was 89.8 per cent and the second is 10.2 per cent. Thus, it is clear that the expenditure on unpriced items in the present enquiry is not larger than in the former enquiry at all. The fact that the components of the basket have considerably increased, cannot be a matter of surprise, because with the growth of Indian economy and the change in the standard of living of all citizens, the requirements of the working class have also increased and the components of the basket which was devised in 1926-27 have now become completely obsolete. It is in the light of this position that we have to consider whether the appellants are justified in contending that the inadequacy of the size of the sample vitiates the enquiry. In our opinion, the answer to this question must be against the appellants. In view of the guidelines of NCBC the commission was perfectly justified in coming to the conclusion that these insular occupational groups are backward socially and educationally. Mr Anantaram, who was to survey the entire population of the State and identify the backward classes amongst them, collected statistics only, whereas APCBC has interviewed and collected data from so many house-holders, compared to the population of the State. The data collected by Mr Anantaram, was held to be adequate. The sample survey conducted by APCBC and data collected by it can be said to be adequate, when nothing contra forthcoming. It is well to remember the observations of the Supreme Court in Indira Sawhney case wherein the Apex Court refused to go into the question of adequacy or otherwise of survey and in fact held that so long as the criteria adopted by a Commission appointed for identifying the backward classes adopts a rational criteria and procedure, Courts cannot find fault with the same on the ground that there could have been better criteria. The Apex Court also held in the said case that adequacy of material will not be looked into by the Courts, so long as material is available, which points to the backwardness of the communities so identified, the same would be good enough. The Apex Court in Indira Sawhney case held that the test for undertaking a judicial review of such actions, is the test as laid down in Barium Chemicals (cited supra). The Apex Court in Indira Sawhney case held that the test for undertaking a judicial review of such actions, is the test as laid down in Barium Chemicals (cited supra). Applying the principle in Barium Chemicals case, I find it difficult to accept the contention of the learned counsel for petitioners that the guidelines evolved by NCBC as adopted by APCBC was not rational and data collected is too meagre to give any indication of backward classes of the groups identified. One another contention of the learned counsel for petitioner is that the method adopted by the Commission shall be scientific and error-proof. In my considered view, this aspect is no more res-integra, inasmuch as the Apex Court in Indira Sawhney case approved the findings of the judgment in U.S.V Balaram’s case (cited supra) that despite all the efforts, the Commission while collecting the material and data in matters of this nature, the conclusions cannot be scientifically accurate and the proper approach would be only to see whether the relevant data and material referred in the report of the Commission justify its conclusions. The Apex Court in Indira Sawhney case dealt with the alleged draw backs and flaws in the survey conducted by the Mandal Commission and held at para 857 that the rule of law is meant to enable the law to promote social goal and should not be lightly used to nullify the social justice and that sacrificing too many social goals on the alter of rule of law, may make the law barren and empty. The Apex Court, realized and recognized in Indira Sawhney case, that there cannot be an exercise of identifying backward classes with mathematical precession and scientific. In view of the task entrusted to Commission the emphasis of the Apex Court in Indira Sawhney case (see para 857) was that the Courts while dealing with the dispensation of social justice measure, may not entertain trivial and technical pleas, which may look attractive, as entertaining such trivial grounds would mean to ignore the State’s constitutional obligations to achieve the goal of equality. Yet another contention of the learned counsel for petitioners is that B C Commission has undertaken no exercise whatsoever except relying on Mr P S Krishnan’s report. A reading of B C Commission report, would definitely show that B C Commission extensively relied on Mr P S Krishnan’s report. Yet another contention of the learned counsel for petitioners is that B C Commission has undertaken no exercise whatsoever except relying on Mr P S Krishnan’s report. A reading of B C Commission report, would definitely show that B C Commission extensively relied on Mr P S Krishnan’s report. However, it is not correct to contend so inasmuch as the Commission has followed fast track and rough and ready methods and in fact conducted its own survey, besides relying on the report of M.V.Krishnan. Further, I see no illegality in B C Commission relying on the report of Mr P.S.Krishnan, which is a report furnished after through study on the subject. The Commission cannot be found fault within relying on the said report, as what is made is important is to find out and identify the backward classes amongst social groups of muslims and to do so and report on material which has direct bearing on the subject can be relied on. When the purpose, goal and object of the said dispensation in this regard is to identify such social groups of Muslims who would answer the description of social and educational backward classes who were denied such dispensation for all these years, the Commission can rely on the material supplied by Government and the survey conducted by itself. As long as the Commission has taken note of relevant material by adopting a rational criteria, by conducting reasonable survey, it is not open for the petitioners to contend as to what material should be considered and what material to be ignored by the Commission and how much material would be sufficient. It is also relevant to note that the government upon receiving the report from Mr Krishnan, forwarded the same to B C Commission for its consumption. The government has not thrust Mr P S Krishnan’s report on B C Commission, directing the Commission to follow the same. This would show that it was not the intention of the Government to influence the commission by supplying the copy of Mr Krishnan’s report. The B C Commission upon receipt of the report of Mr P S Krishnan from the Government, conducted its own enquiries and after through study of all the material available with it, and after being satisfied that the identified groups deserve to be included in the backward classes submitted its report to the government, recommending the same. The B C Commission upon receipt of the report of Mr P S Krishnan from the Government, conducted its own enquiries and after through study of all the material available with it, and after being satisfied that the identified groups deserve to be included in the backward classes submitted its report to the government, recommending the same. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Commission has no other material in support, except that of Mr P S Krishnan’s report. Yet another ground of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that Mr P S Krishnan wholly relied on the report of the Anthropological Survey of India (for short ASI) and material from other sociological and anthropological experts and that there was no independent survey conducted by Mr P S Krishnan and therefore no credence can be given to Mr P S Krishnan’s report and consequential report of B C Commission on which the whole reliance was placed on. Therefore, it was contended that Mr Krishnan’s report, cannot be the basis for enacting impugned legislation. Mr P S Krishnan is bound to rely on the earlier studies made by other sociological and anthropological experts which is not only relevant but has a material bearing. Mr Krishnan was to discover whether various social groups of muslims answer the description of socially and educationally backward classes having regard to their historical and sociological background and their present position in society. A reading of Mr Krishnan’s report would show that though he relied on the information of experts on the subject and the report of ASI, it is also based on personal interaction by the members of the communities regarding whom there is a discussion. He submitted his comprehensive report after undertaking proper assessment of the material gathered by him. It is not as if Mr Krishnan is inventing a new theory and has to necessarily rely on historical, sociological and anthropological studies which were conducted by eminent sociologists and anthropologists to come to the conclusions he has arrived at. The studies conducted by the sociologists and anthropologists are based on the ground realities which have not changed even after sixty years of independence as this particular segment of the society was totally ignored all these years, though, their counter parts amongst the Hindus were getting the benefit of affirmative action under the constitution. The studies conducted by the sociologists and anthropologists are based on the ground realities which have not changed even after sixty years of independence as this particular segment of the society was totally ignored all these years, though, their counter parts amongst the Hindus were getting the benefit of affirmative action under the constitution. It is well to remember that though ASI in Peoples of India series was not prepared in the context of Articles 15 and 16, as the very study is based on anthropological survey dealing with social status of various groups and would throw light as to how the concerned social groups were socially backward, the said report has direct nexus in the matter of identification of socially and educationally backward classes amongst the muslims. The ASI reports deals with the social conditions prevailing in social groups leading to social stratification and therefore reliance placed on ASI report by Mr Krishnan to the extent of identifying the existence of such backward classes homogeneous groups in muslim community cannot be found fault with. It has been uniformly held by the Apex Court and reaffirmed in Indira Sawhney case that social backwardness leads to economical backwardness and economical backwardness leads to social backwardness and that it is a vicious circle. A group of persons or community which is socially backward and stigmatized cannot be expected to move forward and become educationally and economically forward. This is a fact of life cannot be lost sight of and of which judicial notice can be taken note. As ASI report gives material about the social conditions of known identified groups and therefore that the said material is taken note of and in the absence of any contra evidence to the existing ground realities and the indicators to find out about social backwardness, what emerges is a socially and educationally backward classes answering the description of socially and educationally backward classes who are entitled for affirmative action by the State. It is necessary to understand that the present case deals with that affirmative action of the State in discharge of its constitutional obligations for those who are denied all these years the dispensation in this regard and therefore, what is relevant for the State is to arrive at a conclusion that an particular group deserve dispensation under Article 15 and 16 and in the process the State is obligated, under the Act of 1993 to take recommendations from the B C Commission and gather necessary information and material from various sources and the effort of various authorities involved in the said process is to identify and determine the existence of a particular socially and educationally backward classes. In this view of the matter, the contention of the petitioners that a particular material cannot be relied on in the present case the ASI report, though it has direct nexus to the above said exercise, is not only untenable but trivial. In Archana Reddy case, a bench of five Judges of this Court, in fact, referred to Peoples of India series and felt that the Commission ought to have referred to the said report for coming to a proper conclusion as to the existence of insular groups within Muslim society. It is true that Mr P S Krishnan has not done any statistical survey but the same does not in any way make the report irrational or unreliable. He was only identifying the existence of insular groups in Muslim community which are socially backward in the Muslim community and type of their educational backwardness or inadequate representation of those groups in public employment, re-emphasizing the existence of backward classes. Before submitting his report, he has gathered enough material from unimpeachable evidences and made his own study. One of the contentions of the petitioners is that the effort of the State in requesting APCBC to submit a report on socially and educationally backward classes, about insular groups amongst Muslims is religion specific in the context of the fact that the number of communities and groups who have filed representations before APCBC since 1994 are pending consideration. One of the contentions of the petitioners is that the effort of the State in requesting APCBC to submit a report on socially and educationally backward classes, about insular groups amongst Muslims is religion specific in the context of the fact that the number of communities and groups who have filed representations before APCBC since 1994 are pending consideration. It is contended that act of the State in including socially and educationally backward groups in separate group as B.C.-E instead of putting them in the already existing A,B,C,D groups of backward classes in the State, shows that the said action is aimed at a particular religion and therefore religion specific. It is the contentions of the petitioners that it is in violation of Article 16 (1 ) 16 (2) and 15 (1) of the Constitution of India. A careful reading of Article 15 and 16 of Constitution of India, would clarify that the said articles prohibit discrimination ‘only’ on the ground of religion, caste etc. Though, it might look in the first blush that the present State affirmative action is aimed at considering only Muslims. The reason behind is not to make the said State affirmative action only based on religion but having regard to the historical background of the said religion and the way in which they were denied the benefits under the Constitution in this regard. It is not in dispute that Muslims in the country in general and in the State in particular have not received the same attention as their Hindu counter parts. A reading of the earlier reports would show that they were denied the said benefits with wrong impression that no caste stratification exists in Muslims. However, the Apex Court, categorically held in Indira Sawhney case that even the other religions including Islam suffer the malady of caste stratification. In other words, till recently occupational and social groups in Muslims were denied the benefit, all these years and now that it is judicially recognized that muslims have the caste stratification, it has become necessary to have a proper look into their claims and therefore confining the consideration only to muslims cannot be said to be discriminatory and violative of Articles 16 (1), 16 (2) and 15 (1) of Constitution. Delaying and denying the claim of the muslims any further, as the matter of fact, would be unconstitutional as their rightful claims or rights have been denied all these years, while their counter parts are enjoying the said benefits. Therefore, the contention that the present action is religion specific is untenable. The further contention that while other claims are pending, considering the claims of certain groups of muslims alone, as violative of Article 14 and is also would amount to religious specific, cannot be countenanced. In fact, this contention was rejected by this Court in Archana Reddy case. It has been pleaded for the petitioners that carving out a separate groups for muslims i.e., B C –E instead of adjusting now identified groups into already existing groups i.e., BC-A, BC-B, BC-C and BC-D, is religious specific. If newly identified groups are now included in the existing backward class groups, it would unnecessarily create unrest among already existing groups and lead to spate of litigation, thereby again delaying the affirmative action for those who are deprived the same all these years. If newly identified groups are added with already existing groups, the newly identified groups cannot compete with the persons/citizen who are already enjoying the benefit of reservation as they would have moved upward when compared to now identified groups. Therefore, providing affirmative action for certain social groups of muslims and carving out a separate group for them is in the best interests of all the sections and to avoid any further delay for such of the groups who were denied the benefit all these years is well founded, and the said plea that the present State affirmative action is religion specific, on that count is liable to be rejected. It is contented by the petitioners that when the earlier commissions have not identified the now identified groups as backward classes, there is no justification for B C Commission to identify and for the State Government to accept such recommendations. The earlier Commissions appointed by Government of A P like Mr Anantaraman Commission and Mr Muralidhar Rao Commission did not identify any insular groups within muslim community, it cannot be treated as socially backward, therefore identification done by the B C Commission, cannot be considered to be valid. The earlier Commissions appointed by Government of A P like Mr Anantaraman Commission and Mr Muralidhar Rao Commission did not identify any insular groups within muslim community, it cannot be treated as socially backward, therefore identification done by the B C Commission, cannot be considered to be valid. In this connection, the predominant view of both the earlier commissions, is that Islam is a religion based on brotherhood and no discrimination is practiced based on their occupation or profession which they have carried from their erstwhile religion i.e., Hinduism. This was due to lack of in-depth understanding of the present state of islam and historical fact of conversion in this country, particularly in this state and the continuity of low profession and consequential stigma which they carried into Islamic society. On the other hand, sociologists, anthropologists and historians of the Islamic origin of Islam in this country, its development, conversions etc have always pleaded based on their research that there is stratification in Islamic society and stratification is based on occupations which they were into prior to their conversions which were looked down upon by the then Hindu society, and that Islamic society nevertheless stratified in this country and stigmas continue, if not with the same vigor as in the Hindu society. The stigmas are evident and compounded by the fact that such insular groups remain in endogamous in nature which fact was taken note by the Apex Court long back and reaffirmed in Indira Sawhney case. In fact, contra, this Court in Archana Reddy case struck-down the Act on the basis that no effort is made to find out that there are insular groups in the Islamic society and the efforts would have revealed the existence of stratification and occupational groups within Islamic society. The Government of A P also recognized the fact that in view of the information that it had that the social stratification in Islam society in the state exists quite similar to that of Hindu Society and such stratification has resulted in some occupational groups remain socially and educationally backward, therefore sought opinion from the APCBC. The lack of in-depth knowledge of Islamic society has caused greater injustice for over 60 years though they suffered from same inequalities and backwardness as their counter parts in Hindu society. The lack of in-depth knowledge of Islamic society has caused greater injustice for over 60 years though they suffered from same inequalities and backwardness as their counter parts in Hindu society. A reading of Mr Anantaraman and Mr Muralidhar Rao reports show that the said two commissions did not go by any ground realities and indepth reading of the Islamic society. APCBC and Mr P S Krishnan have carried out an indepth study of Islamic society and have identified social groups within the said society which are backward both educationally and socially. Therefore, the same cannot be found fault with on the ground that the earlier Commissions did not identify such social groups, more so, when the identification done by APCBC is in consonance with writings of scholars of Islamic society. The identification of social and educational backwardness is a continuous process and the indicators or the parameters to identify such classes of citizens vary from time to time. What is important is to identify the socially and educationally backward classes at the relevant period of time while identifying the backward classes the commission is not expected to make comparative assessment between the identified groups or groups which are to be identified and other groups. What is required to be identified is whether by virtue of vocation or profession that they are carrying, do they suffer any stigma or looked down upon by the society in general. If it is established that the vocation or profession that they are practicing has resulted in being looked on as an unclean profession of undignified profession , it is good enough to identify the class of persons carrying on that particular profession as socially backward. The educationally backwardness of the representation of the public servants is a different question altogether, for which finding an empirical exercise can be carried out. On the contention of the petitioners that B C Commission conducted a survey at irrelevant places it is seen that the survey teams visited various places and found no contra evidence that the now identified groups are forward. It is not the contention of the petitioners that no survey was conducted and that the report based on such survey is a fabricated one. It is not the contention of the petitioners that no survey was conducted and that the report based on such survey is a fabricated one. The petitioners have also not produced any material to show that if the survey teams visited the places where groups are generally inhabited, the survey would have revealed that the identified groups are forward or does not satisfy the criteria. It is not even the case of the petitioners that the places where the teams visited, the concerned identified groups are absent and as per the survey the survey teams could meet the people belonging to concerned group in which the survey was conducted and only upon interacting with them and gathering information, keeping in view the indicators and questionnaire, the B C Commission recommended the said groups to be included in the list of backward classes. Merely on the ground that the survey team could have visited the places where the people belonging to now identified groups normally reside, the survey conducted cannot be ignored, more so, when there is no contra material produced by the petitioners and when it is not even the case of the petitioners that the survey conducted was only a make believe survey without actually conducting a survey. The survey that was conducted yielded certain results and it is not open for the petitioners to find fault with such survey and recommendations of the B C Commission based on said survey by examining it under a microscope. As held by the Apex Court in Indira Sawhney case, in-sufficiency and inadequacy of material gathered in the survey cannot be the basis for the Courts to interdict the State affirmative action, therefore this contentions is liable to be rejected, and hereby rejected. Similarly, the contention that the present survey was not conducted by the members of B C Commission but was conducted by staff of B C Commission and therefore no reliance can be placed on such survey by B C Commission for arriving at its conclusion, need to be rejected, inasmuch as the petitioners have not brought to the notice of this Court, any provision to the effect that the survey has to be conducted only by the members of B C Commission themselves. At any rate, in the matter of this nature, it is not possible to accept the contention of the petitioners that the survey has to be conducted only by the members of the B C Commission without any assistance or delegation. Accepting such contention would lead to delay in State affirmative action. If the Commission has though it fit to take the services of its staff by providing them necessary indicators and questionnaire to conduct the survey, so that the Commission can finally evaluate the same and submit its recommendations, the same cannot be found fault with. What is necessary in the whole process is whether the Commission has taken relevant material into consideration before arriving at its conclusions. The Apex Court in Indira Sawhney case held that the State’s affirmative action in this regard shall not be interfered or interdicted on trivial grounds and by picking the wholes in the process of identification of the backward classes. It is contended by the learned counsel for petitioners that the enquiry conducted by APCBC is not sufficient to find out the social backwardness of the classes of people recommended for inclusion in the B C List and insofar as social backwardness is concerned, apart from the report of Mr P S Krishan, there is no other material available with APCBC. In the absence of any material to judge the social backwardness of the classes of people, the whole report is illegal and could not have been relied on by the State to pass the impugned legislation. It is needless to address that the social backwardness is a concept which may not come out with empirical data which is historical in nature and has to be done by an in depth analysis. It is seen that Mr P S Krishnan, has studied elaborately the historical counts of Islamic society in the state , development and the social stratification that has taken place. One would see from the classes that are now identified that most of the classes are from Hindu society, practicing low and undignified professions, suffering from social stigma, though not being untouchable, of being looked down upon and they carried the same profession and continue with the new religion suffering the same disadvantages. It can be automatically said by various books referred by Mr P S Krishnan in its report and by the Commission that these classes are socially backward. It can be automatically said by various books referred by Mr P S Krishnan in its report and by the Commission that these classes are socially backward. The Apex Court in U S V Balaram’s case (cited supra) (see para 75), in K C Vasantha Kumar case (cited supra) and in Indira Sawhney case took judicial notice of the fact that a certain class of persons practicing a particular profession or avocation can be readily said to be without any further enquiry as socially backward as the profession which they practice under the name by which they are known itself evokes social backwardness. It is an accepted fact that for the purpose of identifying a class of persons like belonging to the profession of Dhobi, Nai or Stone Cutter, one need not search for social backwardness. The social backwardness is crystal clear in the context of the Indian society which has inherited by the social background. I have perused the report of Mr P S Krishnan and the report of the APCBC and some of the books referred and relief on by them as well as the ASI People of India series. It is clear from the reading of these reports that the communities now identified as socially backward can be identified as socially backward. Keeping these factors in view, NCBC has evolved a criteria for identification of socially backward classes of people. The queries posed to the individuals and the answers that they received from such individuals, would clearly support the conclusion of the learned authors as well as Mr P S Krishnan and APCBC that these communities are socially backward and cannot be treated as anything over that. It is significant to note that none of the writ petitioners have in their pleadings stated or produced any material to show that any of the classes of people now included in the list of backward classes could not have been considered as socially backward. It is true that B C Commission could have carried out a larger exercise for a longer period of time but the question is as to what purpose, more so, when these classes were denied the benefit for over sixty years and any delay would only cause further injustice to those classes. These classes of people have been ignored for so long, merely because of the general or popular perception that Islamic society is egalitarian. These classes of people have been ignored for so long, merely because of the general or popular perception that Islamic society is egalitarian. The historical aspect of advent of Islam in the country and its large scale conversion that have been taken place over the century from lower strata of the society and the sociological aspect of the question as to by more conversion whether one would attain a higher status in the society or whether one would continue to suffer the same inequalities in spite of such conversion was totally ignored and lost sight of. Therefore the contention of the petitioners that as already pointed out supra, the questionnaire of NCBC which was prepared by expert body and which has formulated those questions after studying various judgments of the Supreme Court and study of various reports and out of its own experience and the answers to such questionnaire read with authoritative accounts of Islamic society in the country , could clearly establish that the classes presently identified are backward classes. Further the Apex Court in Indira Sawhney case held that there is a direct nexus between caste, occupation and poverty (para 779). It was also held that social backwardness and educational backwardness would lead to poverty and three of them go hand in hand (para 788). Justice Sawanth in his concurring opinion at para 482 expressed the same view. Now identified groups are such who can be identified as socially backward classes straightaway but it is seen from the record that instead of identifying them as socially backward straightaway, necessary studies have been conducted and necessary material was gathered by the Commission before submitting its report to the Government. After being satisfied that such groups require affirmative action by the State, the State Legislature in its wisdom though it fit to enact the impugned legislation. It is contended by the petitioners that there was no proper consideration of the educational backwardness of the identified groups inasmuch as no material was gathered by the Commission from the schools with regard to the said identified groups of muslims community failing to appreciate that no mention would be made, about their occupational group in the school record, inasmuch as there was no identification of such social groups earlier. As mentioning of their social groups would only not be of any use, the concerned individuals would mention that they profess religion of Islam without giving details about to which social group they belong. In this view of the matter, the school records would not give any information or material with regard to the said groups and therefore, the contention of the petitioners that the Commission could have taken the information from the schools to find out about their educational backwardness is like asking the Commission to do an impossible task. It may be relevant to note that as per NCBC guidelines which were adopted by B C Commission, with regard to education gathering information about SSC is only one of the considerations and as clarified by NCBC guidelines, the criteria evolved and questions framed by NCBC need not be cumulative and therefore even in the absence of information with regard to SSC as long as the other relevant material is gathered, as per NCBC guidelines, non availability of SSC records cannot be construed as fatal. It is necessary to note that the now identified groups fall under fast track and rough and ready methods and as they are found to be socially backward and as the material gathered during the survey corroborate justified that they are backward, it cannot be contended that educationally backwardness of the now identified groups was not properly considered. The information gathered with regard to literacy levels of the identified groups would fall within the criteria prescribed by NCBC. In Ashok Kumar case ( cited supra) the Apex Court held that for determination of the educational backwardness the relevant stage now is graduation (para 212). The apex Court was of the view that after several years of independence, the educational backwardness cannot be determined based on primary and secondary education. The report of B C Commission would show that the drop out level of now identified groups even before completing SSC is very high and therefore they cannot be considered that they are educationally forward. It is held by the Apex Court in Mandal Case that social backward ness leads to educational backwardness and therefore, if a group is identified as socially backward the natural corollary to that is that they would be backward educationally also. It is held by the Apex Court in Mandal Case that social backward ness leads to educational backwardness and therefore, if a group is identified as socially backward the natural corollary to that is that they would be backward educationally also. I have already held above that the now identified groups are socially backward having regard to the material gathered and by application of indicators /criteria adopted by NCBC and the mandal commission i.e. fast track method and rough and ready method respectively. It is reiterated that the Apex Court in Indira Sawhney case held that socially backward classes invariably leads to educational backwardness and once the now identified groups are held to be socially backward, by no stretch of imagination they can be treated as educationally forward. The Commission has not ignored the need to survey about the educational backwardness though the identified groups can straightaway be considered as socially backward classes. It is not even the case of the petitioners that the Commission has not conducted any survey with regard to the educational backwardness and the report of the B C Commission would clearly show that the material was gathered to show that identified groups are not only backward socially and educationally. It is also reiterated that how much material would be sufficient to arrive at a particular conclusion, cannot be undertaken by this Court and it is not open for the petitioners to find fault with the exercise of the Commission at every step on trivial and technical grounds. Therefore, it can in no terms be accused of that there was no material to identify the now identified groups as educationally backward. It is further contended by the counsel for petitioners that B C Commission has not taken note of the student’s strength in muslim minority in the professional colleges while assessing the educational backwardness of the now identified groups, therefore the process undertaken by B C Commission is vitiated. For the very same reason given with regard to not gathering the information as to SSC, the muslim minority institutions also would not have the details of the students as to which particular occupational group of muslims they belong. Therefore, the question of gathering information as to how many students of now identified muslim groups are studying in muslim minority institutions, would not arise. Therefore, the question of gathering information as to how many students of now identified muslim groups are studying in muslim minority institutions, would not arise. The petitioners are expecting the B C Commission to undertake a task which is not possible to perform in the first place. The data collected in the survey by the B C Commission would show that the percentage of drop outs even before reaching SSC level is high, therefore the question of candidates of such groups reaching the stage of professional studies is a far fetched argument. This court can take judicial note of the fact that only well to do students alone can enter into the professional colleges and therefore most of the muslim students entering into muslim minority institutions are bound to be from affluent sections of muslim community and it is highly improbable that candidates from now identified groups who are socially backward could have joined such muslim minority institutions. Therefore, this contention cannot be accepted and is rejected. Yet another contention of the petitioners is that there was no information with regard to seven groups out of 14 identified groups about inadequacy of representation in public employment under Article 16 (4). It is true that with regard to seven groups, there was no information as alleged. The Commission has taken note of the fact that the muslims as a whole in public employment is much less in comparison with their population, this has remained unrebutted. When that is the situation, it is highly improbable that now identified muslims who are socially backward are more in number in public employment. When the very percentage of muslims in public employment which includes forward class muslims is less than their population, the question of now identified occupational groups adequately representing in public employment would not arise. As already observed above, the drop out level at high school level for the now identified groups is so high and therefore it is beyond imagination that the candidates belonging to such socially backward classes are adequate by representing in public employment. Further this Court can take note of the fact that muslims are mostly employed in lower echelons of public services and very small extent of persons only occupy class I and Class II group jobs. Further this Court can take note of the fact that muslims are mostly employed in lower echelons of public services and very small extent of persons only occupy class I and Class II group jobs. The Apex Court in Ashok Kumar case held that adequate representation in public employment means quantitative representation but not qualitative inasmuch as public employment in lower echelons would not make a group to move forward. The petitioners also did not produce any contra material before this Court to show that the above referred seven groups are adequately represented in the public employment, therefore, this ground does not merit consideration and cannot be accepted. The further contention of the petitioner that two out of 15 identified groups viz., Guddiyelugulavallu and Gosangi, there was no survey at all by the B C Commission and therefore in the absence of any data whatsoever, identifying those two groups as backward classes is irrational and therefore vitiated. In this regard, those two groups fall under fast track and rough and ready methods. It is now judicially recognized that certain castes are such that they can be straightaway to be included by the very mention of their occupation. In view of the fact that the said two groups amply answer the parameters of socially and educationally backward classes, no further enquiry is required and it is for the Commission to decide whether to conduct any further enquiry and if it has to be conducted, to what extent. It is true that most of the other identified groups also would fall either under fast track method or under rough and ready or under both. It is for the Commission to see whether a further enquiry is required though it falls under fast track and rough and ready methods. The Commission has not come across any contra evidence/material against the above said two groups and therefore recommended their inclusion in the backward classes. It is relevant to note here that the petitioners have also not produced any material before this Court to substantiate that these two groups are forward socially and educationally. It is pertinent to note that Gosangi is a small community living around muslim grave yards and eking out their livelihood by begging for alms from those who come to burial grounds. It is pertinent to note that Gosangi is a small community living around muslim grave yards and eking out their livelihood by begging for alms from those who come to burial grounds. The counter parts of Gosangi amongst Hindu community also known as Gosangi are included in the list of Schedule Caste. It is pathetic that 60 years after independence persons whose traditional occupation is continued in spite of their conversion to Islam, are not treated even as backward classes. It is seen from the report that the BC Commission has taken note of the background of the community and recommendations of Mr P S Krishnan and recommended in favour of Gosangi-muslims for inclusion in backward classes. Similarly, Guddelugulavallu is a nomadic community eking their livelihood with the help of tamed bears. As per the guidelines of NCBC, they can be treated as socially and educationally backward without any further enquiry. It may be noticed here that entertaining people with the help of wild animals is prohibited in this Country and therefore they have lost their livelihood. Hence, in my view it is not necessary for the BC Commission to conduct any sort of enquiry in such cases as by very mentioning of their profession, they can be treated as backward classes as has been held by Apex Court in K C Vasantha Kumar case (cited supra). It is contended by the petitioners that item no. 15 in the list recommended by APCBC there is no rational and no legal basis for such inclusion. It is further contended that inclusion of all muslims excluding those who are found to be socially and educationally advanced would lead to conversion to muslim religion to avail the benefit of such reservation. The B C Commission having conducted a survey identified 14 homogeneous groups as socially and educationally backward but also identified groups which are considered advanced and do not require the benefit of affirmative action. The B C Commission having conducted a survey identified 14 homogeneous groups as socially and educationally backward but also identified groups which are considered advanced and do not require the benefit of affirmative action. It is recommended that the B C Commission took note of the fact that there could be number of such similar groups which have not come to its notice carrying on traditional occupations inherited from the previous professions who have not come forward for requesting the commission for inclusion of their class into backward classes list and some of such groups mentioned in the District Gazetteer and in some of the provinces, keeping the same in view and to help such similar classes of people who are homogeneous in nature of other muslims excluding those identified as socially and educationally as advanced, are given the benefit of inclusion in the list of backward classes. It is necessary to point out that petitioners have not come forward with a plea that there are no such groups socially and educationally forward. At any rate if any community or homogeneous class is given the benefit by virtue of entry 15 in the list, it is always open for the petitioners or any other interested to approach the B C Commission for exclusion of such classes of persons and B C commission will have to look into such complaints and adjudicate the matter. It is necessary to note that Kerala state has been having reservation for muslims as a whole in one part of the State and Mappilas (muslims) in another part of the state from early 1930 onwards. It is the duty of the state as held by Apex Court in Indira Sawhney case to cover the entire population so that no group is left without a proper insight into their claim. Similarly in Karnataka state, there is reservation for muslims as a whole. The contention of the petitioners that there is likelihood of mass conversion by unscrupulous elements by reservation given under the category 15, is only stated to be rejected. At any rate, it is settled law that likelihood of a statute being misused cannot be a ground for striking down the Act. The contention of the petitioners that there is likelihood of mass conversion by unscrupulous elements by reservation given under the category 15, is only stated to be rejected. At any rate, it is settled law that likelihood of a statute being misused cannot be a ground for striking down the Act. It is necessary to point out that if such conversions took place, I am sure the petitioners or any such other interested citizen can point out the same to the State Government and on such complaints, the State would take notice of such conversions and take appropriate remedial action. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention of the petitioners on either of the grounds with reference to entry 15, on mere apprehensions. Now the further contention of the petitioners that there is no basis or justification for providing 4 % reservation to BC –E category. In this regard, it is not in dispute to state that the population of muslims of the state isabout 9.17 %, and the SC/ST and OBC put together among the Hindu community constitute 75.8 % of the total Hindu community. On comparison, 75.8 % of the muslims would work out to 6.97 % of the total state population of muslims. The muslim social groups which are already included in the BC list prior to impugned Act would worked out to be 1.79% as per Sachar Committee report, therefore Group-E social groups would constitute atleast 5.18 % of the total population, hence providing 4 % reservation cannot be construed as irrational. Viewed from the percentages referred above, I see no reason to hold that 4 % reservation for BC-E category is irrational. The report of A.P.Commission for backward classes consists of six chapters, which are as under; 1. Introduction 2. Constitutional provisions 3. Methodology of the Commission’s Report 4. Statistics regarding Muslim communities 5. Survey and analysis of the identified social groups 6. Recommendations. In chapter 1, the Commission dealt with the constitutional obligation of the State and the earlier litigation before this Court in Archana Reddy case and about appointment of Mr P S Krishnan, as adversorial . It referred to the fact of submission of report by Mr P S Krishnan, which in-turn was communicated by the Government to B C Commission for its examination. It referred to the fact of submission of report by Mr P S Krishnan, which in-turn was communicated by the Government to B C Commission for its examination. The Commission acknowledged the work undertaken by Mr P S Krishnan and it was further stated that B C Commission conducted its own survey, besides taking note of the data available in Anthropoligical Survey of India Series published in the year 2003. In chapter 2, the Commission referred to the relevant articles of Constitution of India i.e., Articles 15 and 16 and their scope. The consequence of socially backward classes for providing the benefit under Article 15 and 16 was also discussed and stated that socially backwardness is the ‘outcome of socio-historical process over the centuries’. The impact of traditional occupations on the socially backward classes was also discussed by the Commission. The judicially recognized fact that the social backwardness leads to educational backwardness which in turn leads to poverty and that all the three support each other in a downward spiral and the fact that the socially backwardness automatically leads to educational backwardness. The Commission referred and recognized various principles laid down by the Apex Court in Indira Sawhney case, which has nexus to the task undertaken by it. A careful reading of chapter 2 of Commission would show that the Commission was well informed about the legal principles as enshrined by the Apex Court in Indira Sawhney case and that it is aware of the functions entrusted to it. The Commission stated in chapter 2 that the Commission has arrived at the findings based on the data collected and keeping in view various reports and the legal principles evolved by the Apex Court in this regard. In chapter 3, the Commission dealt about the methodology and noticed that in view of the reference of the Government dated 17.4.2007 with regard to all the Muslim groups which are identical as social and educational backward classes, the exercise has become larger and need not be confined only to the pending claims of seven occupational muslim groups. The Commission then referred to various dates upon which public hearings were held and about keeping Mr Krishnan’s report on the website for public information and seeking for views and suggestions from the concerned. Then discussed about the second round of public hearing. The Commission then referred to various dates upon which public hearings were held and about keeping Mr Krishnan’s report on the website for public information and seeking for views and suggestions from the concerned. Then discussed about the second round of public hearing. The Commission categorically referred that NCBC guidelines were kept in view, with regard to the guidelines and questionnaire etc, especially with regard to fast track method and also shift and ready method evolved and adopted by the Mandal Commission. The B C Commission clarified that it relied on the reports of Mr P S Krishnan, Sachar Committee and Ranganatha Misra commission. The Commission has recorded that the whole atmosphere was charged with pro-reservation groups which wanted muslims to be considered as a whole and anti-reservation groups who did not want muslims to be included in the reservation on the ground that it would upset the status-quo. The Commission pointed out that hearings were disturbed and interrupted by the socially advanced communities of both Hindus and Muslims, as they were against the task undertaken by the Commission. In chapter 4, the Commission dealt with the statistics regarding muslim community in A P and pointed out that in almost all states occupational groups and other social groups have been identified for inclusion in OBC list. The Commission referred to the statistics which would show that the percentage of muslims is substantially low to very low in public employment and in professional courses. The Commission has noticed negligible presence of various occupational groups and other social groups working in Government of A P and though the data available is for all the muslims put together, the Commission has drawn a logical and reasonable deduction with the figures and percentage would be less than the figures of all muslims pertaining to unidentified B C social groups. In Chapter 5, Commission dealt with each of the identified groups separately, which would be dealt with separately later. In Chapter 6, the Commission submitted its recommendations for inclusion of 14 muslim groups. The justification for incorporating item no.15 was also discussed in this chapter. The Commission referred to the fact that the Commission is recommending class Achukantlavandlam, though same was not part of the recommendations of Mr P S Krishnan. The Commission also excluded certain muslim groups as they are forward. The justification for incorporating item no.15 was also discussed in this chapter. The Commission referred to the fact that the Commission is recommending class Achukantlavandlam, though same was not part of the recommendations of Mr P S Krishnan. The Commission also excluded certain muslim groups as they are forward. The Commission recommended 4 % reservation for the identified groups for pension and public employment. Insofar as Chapter 5, wherein the Commission has dealt and discussed about each of the now identified groups, it may be noticed that the data collected has direct nexus with the time tested guidelines issued by NCBC in identifying socially, educationally and economically backward classes and also with regard to the inadequacy of representation in public employment. The statistics gathered and enumerated of each of the identified groups in our considered opinion justified the recommendations of BC Commission, though the petitioners are insisting that this Court may examine the exercise undertaken by the Commission and data collected by it under a microscope on various counts, keeping in view the observations of the Apex Court in Indira Sawhney case that in exercise of this nature of cases, there bound to be certain errors and that the said exercise should not be scientific, in my considered view, I do want not venture to go into minute details especially where no perversity is writ large. We may refer here that the observations of the Apex Court in Indira Sawhney case that sacrifice in too many social goals on the alter of rule of law, may make the law barren and empty (see para 857), So long as the Commission have adopted a criteria which is relevant and rational and collected some data to justify their recommendations, it is not open for this Court to interfere with the recommendations of B.C. Commission and/or the States affirmative legislation. In that regard, it is true that judiciary has a role to play to avoid State’s mischief in providing the affirmative action to those who do not deserve, however, by no stretch of imagination, would fall under such category. The judiciary can take note of fact that the groups now considered are such that they deserve the benefit of State’s affirmative action. The judiciary can take note of fact that the groups now considered are such that they deserve the benefit of State’s affirmative action. When it is a recognizable and conceivable fact that now identified groups would straight away fall under socially and educationally backward groups/class and that they are entitled for inclusion in the list straightaway, it is not as if the Commission and State has straightaway included them in the list of backward classes and the material on record would show that there was proper exercise in arriving at that conclusion. In the absence of any contra material gathered either available with the B C Commission or with the State and in view of the failure on the part of the petitioners to justify their claim that now identified groups do not deserve said affirmative action, we do not feel it necessary to interdict the said affirmative action. Here we may add that the petitioners have not discharged their duty of burden of proof and the petitioners have not chosen to produce any material to justify their claim that the now identified backward classes are in fact forward. With regard to the burden of proof, the Apex Court in Indira Sawhney case (see para 705 and 706) that the burden of proof that the State’s action as unconstitutional lies on the petitioners. In the present case, though the petitioners are repeatedly contending that the present impugned State action is unconstitutional, they have not chosen to file any material to show that the now identified groups do not deserve State’s affirmative action. The view expressed by this Court in Archana Reddy case, to the extent that the burden lies on the State, is not correct law in view of the dicta laid down by the Apex Court in in Indira Sawhney case. Whether the findings in Archana Reddy that when the B C Commission undertakes the task of identifying socially and educationally backward classes, it is required to make publication of the criteria and undertake its exercise fairly and transparently in the manner stated therein, are contrary to the findings of the Apex Court in Mandal case, would amount to supplanting the provisions of Act, 1993, in view of the absence of provision in the statute. It is contended by the petitioner that in view of the findings recorded by the Five Judges bench of this Court in Archana Reddy case that publication is mandatory, the B C Commission ought to have published the report. Non publication of the same vitiate the entire exercise by the Commission and any reliance sought to be placed by the first respondent on the report of the Commission and the consequential legislation made by the State becoming illegal. It is contended by the counsel for petitioner that publication of the report would enable the objectors to make suggestions for changing the criteria if they felt that the criteria evolved by the B C Commission is irrational or will not lead to proper enquiry, apart from enabling them to collect their own data and place the same before the B C Commission for coming to an appropriate conclusion. Thus, they urge, that they are denied of opportunity and the enquiry conducted by the Commission is vitiated by non transparency which is sine-qu-non in the matter of this nature. On these submissions, it is necessary to notice that as A.P. Commission for Backward Classes Act, 1993 (for short the Act) by which the A P Commission for Backward Classes is constituted, it is not required under any provisions for the Commission to make any such publication, on the other hand the Commission is specifically empowered to under Section 8 (2) of the Act to evolve its own procedure. Even the Rules framed under the Act, mandate or provide for any such publication. The Apex Court did not favour in Indira Sawhney case or in any of the earlier cases, requirement of publication of criteria as a necessity or a pre-requisite before submitting a report. Earlier Commissions in the State appointed by State of A P i.e., Mr Anantharam Commission and Mr Murlidhar Rao Commission or under Act 1993 headed by Justice Sri Puttuswamy, undisputedly was there any publication criteria. Mr Anantharam commission and Mr Muralidhar Rao Commission, in the process circulated questionnaire prepared by them for eliciting answers to the questionnaire and the Anantharam Commission seems to have asked for suggestions on the questionnaire prepared by it. Section 8 (2) of the Act reads as under; (2).The Commissioner shall regulate its own procedure. Mr Anantharam commission and Mr Muralidhar Rao Commission, in the process circulated questionnaire prepared by them for eliciting answers to the questionnaire and the Anantharam Commission seems to have asked for suggestions on the questionnaire prepared by it. Section 8 (2) of the Act reads as under; (2).The Commissioner shall regulate its own procedure. As per the language used in Section 8(2) of the Act, 1993, it is clear that the State Legislature did not want to place any fetter on the procedure to be adopted by the Commission, even in regard to publication of criteria. The intention of the legislature seems to my mind to be that being an independent expert body, it has to evolve its own procedure that suits the exercise that it proposes to indicate at any given point of time. More over, insofar as reference seeking inclusion of the classes of people in the list of backward classes is not adversarial in nature, the entire exercise is for the purpose of coming to an objective conclusion and identifying whether a particular class of people is socially and educationally backward or not. It is not meant to create a adjudicative between classes of people before the A P Commission for Backward Classes on any dispute or lis. Otherwise, the whole exercise by B C Commission would become victim of endless delays at the instance people representing conflicting opinions, seeking time , seeking examination and cross examination of the witnesses , seeking further clarifications, marking documents, contest on evidential value of those document etc. Neither there would be an early remedy for social maladies nor to cater to the very object. That was not the indication by the Apex Court in Indira Sawhney case, when their Lordships directed constitution of Commission by States and Union of India for the purpose of identifying backward class people, for creation of the body. Delaying tactics and other protractive methods would be adopted by the objectors in order to protect their own self interest as any inclusion in the list of backward classes would only eat away their vested rights and thus would like to drag on the matter as long as possible. Delaying tactics and other protractive methods would be adopted by the objectors in order to protect their own self interest as any inclusion in the list of backward classes would only eat away their vested rights and thus would like to drag on the matter as long as possible. It is contended by the learned counsel for petitioners by placing strong reliance on section 9 (1) of the Act, 1993 that language used therein would mandate a comprehensive hearing, which in effect means publication of the criteria to enable the objectors to know and understand the mind of the Commission and scope of the enquiry by the Commission and giving a fair opportunity to them to effectively participate in the enquiry conducted by the Commission. Strong reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Archana Reddy case that publication and fair hearing by giving opportunity to adduce evidence is mandatory. That the scope of enquiry under section 9 (1) insofar as request for inclusion and for request and complaints of over inclusion or under inclusion are totally different and in the first case it is not adversarial in nature and in the second case since vested rights will be taken away, persons to be effected by a finding on such compliance have to be put on notice and effective hearing should be made. The words used in section 9 (1) of the Act, 1993 by referring to various dictionary meanings would show the distinction between the words ‘hear’ and ‘examine’. Two different expressions used in section 9 (1) connote two different meanings and legislature intended both to have different meaning and scope. In S.P. GUPTAvs UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER AIR 1987 AP 53 it was held as follows: 288. It may also be pointed out that whenever a legislature or constituent assembly uses a particular phrase in contradistinction to another phrase it is not possible to read the two phrases so as to indicate the same purpose. In the instant case, the Constitution has used the word “appointed” in the case of a Judge of the Supreme Court and “transfer” in the case of a Judge of a High Court. A perusal of the language of Article 217(1) proviso (c) leads to the irresistible conclusion and logical inference that the Founding Fathers have made a clear distinction between transfer and appointment. A perusal of the language of Article 217(1) proviso (c) leads to the irresistible conclusion and logical inference that the Founding Fathers have made a clear distinction between transfer and appointment. It is true that in both cases the office held by a Judge is vacated in a fictional sense because there is a complete change in the life of the Judge but that does not mean that the incidents of both these appointments are the same. A Judge of the High Court when appointed as a Judge of the Supreme Court cannot be equated in any respect with a Judge of the High Court who is transferred to another High Court and continues to possess the same status, position and emoluments which is essentially different from a Judge of the Supreme Court. Mr Seervai, however, submitted that both Article 124 which relate to the appointment of a Supreme Court Judge and Article 217 which provide for the appointment of a High Court Judge do not mention anything about obtaining the consent of a Judge which has to be implied in both the cases. On a parity of reasoning it was submitted that where a Judge is appointed in a High Court or transferred to another Court, every time it is a new appointment as a result of which the Judge of the High Court on being transferred to another court has to take a fresh oath because he ceases to be a Judge in the Court of its origin. It is true that on being transferred to another High Court a Judge ceases to be a Judge but then he ceases to be a Judge of the transferor court only and does not cease to be a Judge for all times to come so as to make his transfer in the transferee court a fresh appointment. This is clear from para 11(b)(iii) to the Second Schedule to the Constitution which runs thus: “Joining time on transfer from a High Court to the Supreme Court or from one High Court to another.” In ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD vs HANSRAJBHAI V.KODALA AND OTHERS (1976) 3 SCC 730 : (1977) 1 SCR 194 wherein it was held as follows: 19. LTD vs HANSRAJBHAI V.KODALA AND OTHERS (1976) 3 SCC 730 : (1977) 1 SCR 194 wherein it was held as follows: 19. The learned counsel for the claimants submitted that the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 140 would mean that even in case where compensation is determined under the structured-basis formula under Section 163-A, the claimant is entitled to claim compensation on the basis of fault liability and if he gets higher amount on the basis of fault liability then from that amount compensation which is paid under Section 163-A is to be reduced. At the first blush the argument of the learned counsel appears to be attractive as the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 140 is to some extent ambiguous and vague. It may mean that amount of compensation given under any other law may include the amount payable on the basis of fault liability, therefore, in view of the said proviso compensation amount payable under any other law is to be reduced from the compensation payable under Section 140 or 163-A. For appreciating this contention and for ascertaining appropriate meaning of the phrase “compensation under any other law for the time being in force”, the proviso to sub-section (5) is required to be considered along with other provisions. The Scheme of other provision in Section 167 indicates that the aforesaid phrase is referable to compensation payable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 or any other law which may be in force but not to the determination of “compensation under the Act”, and would not include the compensation which is determined “under the provision of the Act”. This Section 167 in terms provides that where death of, or bodily injury to, any person gives rise to claim compensation under the Act and also under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, such person cannot claim compensation under both the Acts. Further, in Section 140(5), the legislature has used the words “under any other law for the time being in force” and “under any other law”. In Section 141(1), the legislature has used the phrase “under any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force”. Further, in Section 140(5), the legislature has used the words “under any other law for the time being in force” and “under any other law”. In Section 141(1), the legislature has used the phrase “under any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force”. In sub-section (2), the legislature has specifically provided that a claim for compensation under Section 140 shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and where compensation is also claimed in pursuance of any right on principle of fault, the application under Section 140 is to be disposed of in first place. Whereas, there is no such reference for payment of compensation under Section 163-A. Further, in Section 161(2), the legislature has used the phrase “any other law for the time being in force” and “provisions of this Act”. Similarly, in Section 162, the legislature has used the words “under any other provisions of this Act” or “any other law or otherwise”. As against this, in Section 163-A, the legislature has used the phrase “notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force”. When the legislature has taken care of using different phrases in different sections, normally different meaning is required to be assigned to the language used by the legislature, unless context otherwise requires. However, in relation to the same subject-matter, if different words of different import are used in the same statute, there is a presumption that they are not used in the same sense (Member, Board of Revenue v. Arthur Paul Benthall AIR at p. 38). In this light, particularly Section 141 which provides for right to claim compensation “under any other provision of this Act” or of “any other law for the time being in force”, proviso to subsection (5) of Section 140 would mean that it does not provide for deduction or adjustment of compensation payable under the Act, that is, on the principle of fault liability which is to be determined under Section 168. In HIS HOLINESS KESAVANANDA BHARAT SRIPADAGALVARU VS. STATE OF KERALA AND ANOTHER 1985 Supp SCC 714: 1985 Supp 1 SCR 352 it was held as follows: 627. We shall now examine the contention of Mr Palkhivala based on Articles 4 and 169, para 7 of Schedule V and para 21 of Schedule VI. In HIS HOLINESS KESAVANANDA BHARAT SRIPADAGALVARU VS. STATE OF KERALA AND ANOTHER 1985 Supp SCC 714: 1985 Supp 1 SCR 352 it was held as follows: 627. We shall now examine the contention of Mr Palkhivala based on Articles 4 and 169, para 7 of Schedule V and para 21 of Schedule VI. He contended—and we have no doubt that he did so rightly— that the Constitution can be amended not only under Article 368 but also under Articles 4 and 169, para 7 of Schedule V and para 21 of Schedule VI. Amendments under these provisions can be effected by Parliament by a simple majority vote of the members present in the House and voting, if the prescribed quorum is there. If the two Houses do not agree on any amendment under those provisions, the same has to be decided by a joint sitting of the two Houses as provided in Article 108. That is because of the express exclusion of the application of Article 368 to the amendments made under those provisions. According to Mr Palkhivala, by the exercise of its power under the aforementioned provisions, Parliament can in certain respects take way or abridge the Fundamental Rights of a section of the people of this country. He painted a gloomy picture as to what can happen by the exercise of power by Parliament under those provisions. It is true that the power conferred under the aforementioned provisions is amending power but those provisions make it clear that the exercise of the power under those provisions shall not be “deemed to be the amendment of the Constitution for the purpose of Article 368”. 628. This brings up to a consideration, what exactly is the intent of the expression “No such law as aforesaid shall be deemed to be an amendment of this Constitution for the purpose of Article 368”. There can be little doubt that these words merely mean that the form and manner prescribed in Article 368 need not be complied with. Once this position is accepted, any law made under those provisions takes the character of an ordinary law and that law becomes subject to the other provisions of the Constitution including Article 13(2). 640. In our Constitution unlike in the Constitution of the United States of America the words “amendment” and “amend” have been used to convey different meanings in different places. 640. In our Constitution unlike in the Constitution of the United States of America the words “amendment” and “amend” have been used to convey different meanings in different places. In some Articles they are used to confer a narrow power, a power merely to effect changes within prescribed limits— see Articles 4, 107(2), 111, 169(2), 196(2), 197(2) and 200. Under para 7 of the Fifth Schedule as well as para 2 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, a much larger power to amend those Schedules has been conferred on Parliament. That power includes power to amend “by way of addition, variation or repeal”. Similar is the position under the repealed Article 243(2), Articles 252(2) and 350(5). It is true that the power to amend conferred under the Fifth and Sixth Schedules is merely a power to amend those schedules but if the Constitution-makers were of the opinion that the word “amendment” or “amend” included within its scope, unless limited otherwise, a power to add, vary, or repeal, there was no purpose in mentioning in those Articles or parts “amend by way of addition, variation or repeal”. In this connection it may also be remembered that the Constituent Assembly amended Section 291 of the Government of India Act, 1935 of August 21, 1949, just a few days before it approved Article 368 i.e. on September 17, 1949. The amended Section 291 empowered the Governor-General to amend certain provisions of the 1935 Act “by way of addition, modification or repeal”. From these circumstances, there is prima facie reason to believe that our Constitution-makers made a distinction between a mere power to amend and a power to amend by way of “addition, modification or repeal”. It is one of the accepted rules of construction that the courts should presume that ordinarily the Legislature uses the same words in a statute to convey the same meaning. If different words are used in the same statute, it is reasonable to assume that, unless the context otherwise indicates, the Legislature intended to convey different meanings of those words. This rule of interpretation is applicable in construing a Constitution as well. If different words are used in the same statute, it is reasonable to assume that, unless the context otherwise indicates, the Legislature intended to convey different meanings of those words. This rule of interpretation is applicable in construing a Constitution as well. For convenience sake, the provision, reads as under; “Functions and powers of the Commission:-- (1) The Commission shall examine requests for inclusion of any class of citizens as a backward class in the lists and hear complaints of over-inclusion or under-inclusion of any backward class in such list and tender such advice to the Government as it deems appropriate. (2).The Commission shall examine and make recommendations on any other matter relating to the backward classes that may be referred to it by the Government from time to time. (3).It shall be competent for the Commission at the request of the Government to make an interim report in regard to any Castes or Classes in whose cases urgent action under the Act is, in the opinion of the government necessary. Any action taken by the Government on the basis of such report shall be subject to review with prospective effect as and when the final report of the Commission is received. (4).The Commission shall enquire into specific complaints with respect to then on-observance of the rule of reservation in the admissions into educational institutions and also reservation of appointments to posts/services under the Government and other local authority or other authority in the State, as applicable to the listed Backward Classes and furnish its report to the government.” As evident barely Section 9 of the Act, 1993 contemplates twin functions to be evolved by the Commission, one to examine the request for inclusion of any class of citizens as backward classes in the list and the other to hear complaints of over inclusion or under inclusion. The crucial phrase used in Section 9 of the Act, 1993 is “examine” and “hear”. The legislature used this phrase to distinguish between the nature of enquiry when there is a request for inclusion and a request for exclusion of a particular class from the existing list. The crucial phrase used in Section 9 of the Act, 1993 is “examine” and “hear”. The legislature used this phrase to distinguish between the nature of enquiry when there is a request for inclusion and a request for exclusion of a particular class from the existing list. The request for inclusion is not adversarial in nature and would lead to an objective enquiry to affirmative action of the State, whereas the request of exclusion on the ground of over inclusion would mean that the existing rights of a class of persons are sought to be taken away and such class of persons are entitled to be represented, adduce evidence before the Commission to enable it to come to a proper and objective conclusion and the two functions to be discharged by the Commission are entirely different in their scope, impact approach and effect. The two other phrases used in section 9 (1) of the Act, 1993 by the State Legislature i.e., “Class of citizens and list of backward classes” and note the difference between them. The definition of ‘backward classes’ and ‘lists’ as defined under Section 2 of the Act, 1993, which read as under; (a) “backward classes” means such backward classes of citizens of A P other than the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as may be specified by the State government in the lists; … (d) “lists” means lists prepared by the Government from time to time for the purposes of making provision for the reservation of admissions into educational institutions and of appointment of posts in favour of the backward classes of citizens which, in the opinion of the Government, are not adequately represented in the services under the government and in any local authority or other authority in the State; List as defined under Section 2 (d) means for the purpose of making reservation into the educational institutions and appointment of posts in favour of backward classes which in the opinion of the government is not adequately represented. List means a list which is published as contemplated under the Act, 1993 after recommendations of APCBC after consideration and acceptance by the Government, whereas the claim for inclusion, till the process is completed by a publication under the Act, would not become a backward class. List means a list which is published as contemplated under the Act, 1993 after recommendations of APCBC after consideration and acceptance by the Government, whereas the claim for inclusion, till the process is completed by a publication under the Act, would not become a backward class. Thus, it is clear that the Commission is entrusted with entirely different varied functions is exigency, which in one case will have an adverse impact and in other case, would lead to affirmative action. Keeping in mind the nature of functions to be performed by the Commission under Section 9 (1) of the Act, 1993, in the matter of consideration of the request for inclusion in the list of backward classes, it needs no elaborate enquiry, since not being adversarial in nature, as a fact finding body. In the absence of any provision for publication of criteria this Court can not supplant the provisions of the Act and the Rules by making publication mandatory. Any attempt on these lines would seriously make in-roads into the object and independent exercise to be made by the Commission. On careful consideration, the judgments relied on in Archana Reddy’s case to arrive at the said conclusion apparently are not relevant nor can lead to such a conclusion with the explicit language used in section 9 (1) of the Act, 1993. It does not appear to be the intention of the legislature to buck down the Commission in technicalities and hyper technicalities, thus delaying the whole process befitting the purpose for which the Commission is constituted. It is also contended by the petitioner that non publication of the criteria and not giving effective opportunity by providing with data and other evidence collected by the B C Commission, would amount to violating the principles of natural justice and report was prepared in violation of the principles of natural justice, is non-est in the eye of law and cannot be used for any purpose whatsoever. In this regard the Commission is a fact finding body and no “lis” is being decided and no rights were being taken away. More so, when the recommendations of the Commission is not absolutely binding on the Government and the Government is entitled to reject the same by recording reasons therefor. It is like any other fact finding body under the Commission of inquiries Act or any such enactment. More so, when the recommendations of the Commission is not absolutely binding on the Government and the Government is entitled to reject the same by recording reasons therefor. It is like any other fact finding body under the Commission of inquiries Act or any such enactment. It is always open for the petitioners to attack the findings recorded by the Commission before the Commission itself under Section 9 (1) of the Act or go before the Government with all valid material in rebuttal to show that the Commission has erred in arriving at the conclusion for recommending inclusion of a particular class in the list of backward classes. In KESHAR SINGH Vs. STATE (DELHI ADMN) (2008)6 SCC 1 it was held as follows: 236. It will be clear from these provisions that the Act was intended to cover matters of public importance. In matters of public importance it may be necessary for the government to fix the responsibility on individuals or to kill harmful rumours. The ordinary law of the land may not fit in such cases apart from it being time-consuming. 237. The Commission under our Act is given the rower to regulate its own procedure and also to decide whether to sit in camera or in public. A Commission appointed under the Act does not decide any dispute. There are no parties before the Commission. There is no lis. The Commission is not a court except for a limited purpose. The procedure of the Commission is inquisitorial rather than accusatorial. The Commission more often may have to give assurance to persons giving evidence before it that their statements will not be used in any subsequent proceedings except for perjury. Without such an assurance, the persons may not come forward to give statements. If persons have got lurking fear that their statements given before the Commission are likely to be used against them or utilised for productive use on them in any other proceeding, they may be reluctant to expose themselves before the Commission. Then the Commission would not be able to perform its task. The Commission would not be able to reach the nuggets of truth from the obscure horizon. The purpose for which the Commission is constituted may be defeated. Therefore the principles of natural justice are not static but are flexible. Then the Commission would not be able to perform its task. The Commission would not be able to reach the nuggets of truth from the obscure horizon. The purpose for which the Commission is constituted may be defeated. Therefore the principles of natural justice are not static but are flexible. The larger public interest is paramount and accordingly, the principles of natural justice should be moulded to suit in the exigency. It is always open to the petitioners to go before the Commission with whatever material they have on the ground of over inclusion or for deleting such class from the list of backward classes. Such a decision is not adjudicatory disposition. Therefore, all the niceties may not have a place in the process of Judicial Scrutiny, except to the extent the parameters laid down. Coming to the grass-root level enquiry which is stated to have been conducted by the Commission, there has been a serious attack from various facets as to the manner in which it has been conducted and the hastiness with which it is processed through and completed, which according to the petitioners is contrary not only to the principles of natural justice in a situation of this nature and also under the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. Therefore, this question dehorce the other legal aspects, which have been focussed, needs to be considered. The Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (Act 60 of 1952) provides for the Commission of appointment for the purpose of enquiry and for vesting with the powers for such Commission. The source for such appointment can be traced to Section 3 thereof. There is a distinction in regard to the procedure contemplated under the English Act and the Indian Legislation. Whereas the English Legislation empowers and contemplates for the Tribunal itself to regulate its own procedure. Further, the aforesaid provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act contemplate the Central Government to make rules to regulate the procedure. Accordingly, the rules have been framed under the Act, which depict the manner and the procedure. Ultimately, even on an entire reading of the Rules there-under tells the induction of principles of natural justice in the process with a view to safeguard the individual rights and for a comprehensive due consideration. Accordingly, the rules have been framed under the Act, which depict the manner and the procedure. Ultimately, even on an entire reading of the Rules there-under tells the induction of principles of natural justice in the process with a view to safeguard the individual rights and for a comprehensive due consideration. That apart, there is no dispute in regard to the well established attributes that govern such appointment and the Commission can evolve its own procedure on the exigency of the intent and the object for which it has been constituted. There is no hard and fast rule to follow any specific procedure contemplated under any of the procedural laws or otherwise. Further, it cannot however be said that though the statute is silent as to the mode of such procedure for all such Commissions in one breath or from different exigencies, the basic principles of natural justice do certainly have a decisive bearing. Therefore, these tenets have to be kept in the back of the mind and see, if followed with its due compliance. In the present case, there is no serious dispute with regard to the chequered events, which have taken place during the process of enquiry by the Commission. Admittedly, the reference was made on 17-4-2007 (Tuesday). The notification was issued on 26-4-2007 (Thursday) contemplating for the submission of objections, representations and claims of whatsoever nature, for which the last day prescribed, was 12-5-2007 (Saturday). Not referring to the number of representations and objections received, the Commission started to have its sittings on 14-5-2007 (Monday) this was followed up on the next dates of hearing i.e., on 16-5-2007 (Wednesday), 22-5-2007 (Tuesday), 28-5-2007 (Monday), 1-6-2007 (Friday). Thereafter, the Commission stated to have made a local visits in the muffossil areas commencing from 23-6-2007 (Saturday), on which day it is stated to have held a meeting at Cuddapah. On 24-6-2007 (Sunday) the sitting was at Kurnool and also at Mahaboobnagar, both the districts covering. On 25-6-2007 (Monday), the Commission stated to have had sittings at Guntur and Prakasham, both the districts covering. Ultimately, on 26-6-2007 (Tuesday), the Commission held its sitting at Hyderabad. Immediately thereafter, the Commission delivered its report on 2-7-2007 (Monday) which is followed by the issuance of the impugned notification in G.O.No.723 dated 7-7-2007 (Sunday). Further, the legislation was brought in as Act 26 of 2007 and it was gazetted on 13-8-2007. Ultimately, on 26-6-2007 (Tuesday), the Commission held its sitting at Hyderabad. Immediately thereafter, the Commission delivered its report on 2-7-2007 (Monday) which is followed by the issuance of the impugned notification in G.O.No.723 dated 7-7-2007 (Sunday). Further, the legislation was brought in as Act 26 of 2007 and it was gazetted on 13-8-2007. Therefore, from the above, the dates on which the exercise was made in respect of or by the Commission commenced from 17-4-2007 and ultimately ending with the notification in G.O.723 dated 7-7-2007 and notifying in the Gazette for Act 26 of 2007 on 13-8-2007. All this period and the duration which it has taken place thus hardly can be seen to run within 3 or 4 months maximum. It cannot be lost to sight that the Government’s endeavour in respect of such reservations for the backward classes in the State has been in vogue all along for years. Whereas this last exercise as it appears from the above dates is quite, ex facie is having a more finishing haste. We are of the view that no doubt what could have happened if really such exercise is done in the normal manner in which it is expected to have been done by providing opportunities and giving a hearing with the sittings at different places throughout the state and almost at every district headquarters if not other interior places in stead of resting it to few, certainly it should have taken a much longer time. Even for sittings at district headquarters, it could not have been carried through to complete within 4 days covering six districts alone. Even in between such sittings with at different headquarters of the districts, one does not know what sort of publicity has been given so as to invite the claims or objects. Nothing has come out as to why headquarters of other districts were left out nor there is any specific reason given to pick only such headquarters of the district where it has been held. Nothing has come out as to why headquarters of other districts were left out nor there is any specific reason given to pick only such headquarters of the district where it has been held. However, dehorce such process which is glaringly appears to be not an exhaustive exercise, in view of the findings which we have already given as to the existence, sufficiency of the material available for the Commission to come to a conclusion in regard to identifying the backward classes and there being no further material having been pointed out by the petitioners, which could have formed part of consideration before the Commission or to say that the caste which has been recognised as backward class could not possibly have been held to be so. Therefore, we do not find any justification to invalidate or set at naught the ultimate say in identifying the backward classes in the impugned notification or the legislation. However, we do make it clear that since the very object and the exercise of identifying the backward classes is always a continuous process and open for all such reviews in appropriate manner either for inclusion or for taking them out of the list, we leave it to the liberty of the Government or such authorities including the Commission, to make a post facto re-exercise for the purpose of identification of castes as backward classes and to take appropriate decision either way. In view of the above reasons, it follows that there is no requirement or mandate as contemplated in Archana Reddy’s case nor there is any such flagrant violation or perversion in the process behind the impugned action. Hence, I hold that the findings in this regard in Archana Reddy were not arrived at correctly since they are quite contrary to the principles laid down by the Apex Court. Accordingly, I answer the second issue referred. In view of the discussion and the reasons given, we are of the opinion that the questions which have been referred in the reference order by the Larger Bench of Five Judges as per order dated 24-01-2008 needs to be answered in the following manner: 1. Accordingly, I answer the second issue referred. In view of the discussion and the reasons given, we are of the opinion that the questions which have been referred in the reference order by the Larger Bench of Five Judges as per order dated 24-01-2008 needs to be answered in the following manner: 1. Whether the concept of strict judicial scrutiny in the matter of affirmative action of the State under equality doctrine as propounded idn Archana Reddy case, is contrary to the dicta liad down by the Apex Court in Sourabh and other decisions on the subject – Answerd-Yes 2. Whether the concept of publication of criteria evolved by B.C Commission, and data collected in that regard in the matter of identification of socially and educationally backwardness as propounded in Archana Reddy case is contrary to the dicta laid down in Indira Sawhney case and also contrary to the provisions of the Act 1993 ? Answered – yes 3. In view of the discussion and the reasons as given within the parameters of Judicial Review available, we do not find the impugned notification and the legislation as unconstitutional, and since the Commission did have some material before it while making the exercise identified the backward classes and, especially, in the absence of any contra material against those castes. 4. However, since we are of the view that no doubt the enquiry before the Commission appears to have been done in a very short period giving scope for the parties aggrieved or various groups complaining not given proper opportunity, which itself though cannot be a ground for setting at naught the identification of the castes for declaring them as backward classes for the reasons already given above. However, holding that the impugned action being valid, we leave it open for the Government and the Commission and all other parties concerned to make a post facto re-exercise in this process and come to a conclusion afresh and accordingly take further action either for confirming the caste which have been declared as backward class or for any expedient variation in this regard. Having answered the questions referred by the Larger Bench of Five Judge as stated above, we direct the Registry to place the matter before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for posting these matters before the said Bench for appropriate orders. Having answered the questions referred by the Larger Bench of Five Judge as stated above, we direct the Registry to place the matter before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for posting these matters before the said Bench for appropriate orders. D.S.R. Varma, J. I had the privilege of going through the judgment of the Hon’ble Sri Anil R.Dave, the Chief Justice, rendered for himself and for Hon’ble Sri Justice A.Gopal Reddy, Hon’ble Sri Justice Goda Raghuram, and the judgments of Hon’ble Smt. Justice T.Meena Kumari, broadly concurring with the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice, on one hand, and also the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Sri Justice B.Prakash Rao not agreeing with the views expressed by the other Hon’ble Judges, on the other. 2. Though on many vital issues, I broadly agree with the views expressed by Hon’ble Sri Justice B.Prakash Rao, since I am unable to agree with his Lordship’s view on certain issues marginal extent, I prefer to put on record my own reasons, separately. Hence I venture to do so. 3. The undisputed historical background as regards reservation in general and with regard to the litigation in particular was already narrated in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice. Therefore, I avoid repetition of the same. 4. Basing on the recommendations by the Commission, the State Government had issued an Ordinance, dated 20-6-2005, viz., A.P. Reservation of Seats in the Educational Institutions and of appointments/posts in Public Services under the Muslim Community Ordinance, 2005, declaring the whole Muslim Community as Backward Class and providing 5% reservation to them in educational institutions and public employment. The said Ordinance again was subjected to challenge before this Court in B. Archana Reddy and others vs. State of A.P. and others 2008(6) SCC 1 and the same was declared as unconstitutional being violative of Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India on the ground that the Muslim community on the whole based on religion was declared as backward class, without there being any identification of social backwardness of the Muslims by the community. The said judgment is now the subject matter in SLP (Civil) Appeal No.7513 of 2005 before the Supreme Court and the same is pending. 5. The said judgment is now the subject matter in SLP (Civil) Appeal No.7513 of 2005 before the Supreme Court and the same is pending. 5. After the action or effort of the State Government in the direction of affirmative action in favour of Muslim community, not once but twice by an administrative instrument and later vide legislative enactment was interdicted in this Court in the cases of T.Muralidhar Rao and Archana Reddy, respectively. The State has again referred the matter to the Commission for identifying the socially and educationally backward class Muslims and basing on the recommendations received from the Commission, the Legislature enacted the present Act under controversy i.e., Andhra Pradesh Reservation in favour of Socially and Educationally Backward Classes of Muslims Act, 2007 (for brevity “Act No.26 of 2007”) and consequently added such groups as recommended by the Commission to the existing list of Backward Classes as group ‘E’. 6. After hearing at considerable length Sri K.Ramakrishna Reddy, Sri D.Prakash Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, other learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and also the party-in-person, in view of certain observations made in Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra), the Larger Bench consisting of 5-Judges felt that it is expedient that the matter be heard and reconsidered by a Bench of 7-Judges and that is how this batch of writ petitions were heard by this 7-Judge Bench. 7. In that view of the matter, the Hon’ble the Chief Justice, speaking for himself and other 2 Judges and Hon’ble Smt. Justice T.Meena Kumari in a separate judgment decided all the issues but whereas Hon’ble Sri Justice B.Prakash Rao took the view that in the light of the judgments rendered by the Supreme Court in T.A.Hameed vs. M.Viswanathan AIR 1973 SC 930 , Kesonath Khuran vs. Union of India (2008) 6 SCC 1 and Kerala State Science & Technology Museum vs. Rambal Co. (1968) 3 SCR 595 : AIR 1968 SC 1379 expressed the view that the writ petitions be remitted back to the 5Judge Bench after answering the reference. 8. In this connection, I feel is inexpedient to re-extract the views expressed by two Hon’ble Judges in Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra) in paras-293, 378 and 379, since they were already extracted by Hon’ble Sri Justice B.Prakash Rao and also Hon’ble Smt. Justice T.Meena Kumari. 8. In this connection, I feel is inexpedient to re-extract the views expressed by two Hon’ble Judges in Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra) in paras-293, 378 and 379, since they were already extracted by Hon’ble Sri Justice B.Prakash Rao and also Hon’ble Smt. Justice T.Meena Kumari. However, it is relevant to have a glance at the operative portion of the order of reference, which is as under: “In view of the aforesaid judgment emanated from a coordinate bench of five judges of this Court and in the absence of any provision in the statute for publication of the criteria whether this Court can supplant the provisions of the Act and the Rules by making publication mandatory as per the observations as contained in paras stated supra and other observations made by the coordinate bench, are contrary to the observations made by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, where it was left open for the concerned authorities to lay down the criteria, apart from contrary to principles laid down in regard to strict scrutiny approach, as laid in Saurabh Chandra v. Union of India and also the principles laid down in other decisions of the Apex Court. After hearing the counsel on either side appearing on behalf of the respondents, we are of the view that the matters are required to be heard and reconsidered by a 7-Judge Bench.” 9. From the above, it is obvious that the 5-Judge Bench did not frame any issue or issues, in specific, to be addressed by 7-Judge Bench. It is explicit from the above order that the said Bench was of the view that the matters were required to be heard and reconsidered by 7-Judge Bench in view of certain observations made by the learned Judges in Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra). 10. Virtually, by virtue of the above order of reference, the present 7-Judge Bench had to reconsider the whole issue, comprehensively. Therefore, I cannot, with respect, agree with the view expressed by my learned brother Hon’ble Sri Justice B.Prakash Rao that the matter has to be referred back to 5-Judge Bench. However, as I am in agreement with the views expressed by Hon’ble Sri Justice B.Prakash Rao on various issues discussed by him, broadly, and respectfully disagree with the view expressed by Hon’ble Chief Justice and Hon’ble Smt. Justice T.Meena Kumari, I place on record my views. 11. However, as I am in agreement with the views expressed by Hon’ble Sri Justice B.Prakash Rao on various issues discussed by him, broadly, and respectfully disagree with the view expressed by Hon’ble Chief Justice and Hon’ble Smt. Justice T.Meena Kumari, I place on record my views. 11. The prime contentions on behalf of the writ petitioners are— (i) that the Commission had conducted the enquiry with undue haste regarding exclusion of certain groups of Muslim community in the list of Backward Classes, (ii) that neither the required amount of care was taken nor proper survey was conducted in collecting the data in order to include the groups among the Muslims in the list of Backward Classes as belonging to socially and educationally backward classes, (iii) that the Commission had placed undue reliance upon the data collected by one Sri P.S.Krishnan, who was appointed by the Government to assist the Commission. Therefore, the Commission had got simply swayed away with the views, data and the experience of Sri P.S.Krishnan before arriving at the conclusion that certain sections of Muslims were socially and educationally backward, (iv) that the impugned act is religion specific and there is every likelihood that the people belonging to other religion may get lured to embrace Islam as a religious faith, which is contrary to the concept of secularism. In order to substantiate this contention, several instances and excerpts from the report of the Commission were relied on, which will be dealt with separately, (v) that the identification of backward classes is an objective process and should be based on objective material as held in Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India AIR 1973 SC 689 . In order to substantiate this contention, several instances and excerpts from the report of the Commission were relied on, which will be dealt with separately, (v) that the identification of backward classes is an objective process and should be based on objective material as held in Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India AIR 1973 SC 689 . Any such exercise, in this regard, should be subjected to in-depth scrutiny as mandated in Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India 2005(6)ALD 582 (LB), (iv) that the views expressed by Hon’ble Sri Justice Goda Raghuram and Hon’ble Sri Justice V.V.S. Rao in Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra) while holding that strict scrutiny standard is the appropriate standard of judicial review, it is contended that those observations should be understood not in the context of United States and the said views are to be understood as ‘in-depth scrutiny’, ‘careful scrutiny’ and ‘extreme caution and care’ as was pointed out in Ashoka Kumar Thakur’s case (6 supra), (vii) that there is a difference between the reservation programme under challenge in Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra) and the reservation under challenge in Ashoka Kumar Thakur’s case (6 supra) ‘religion specific classification’ is a subject matter in the former and ‘caste based classification’ is involved in the latter, (viii) that the limitations of Articles 15(4), 15(5) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India are applicable to a Legislative identification of backwardness. Though the said provisions enable the State to provide reservation for socially and educationally backward class citizens, which cannot be treated as blanket power and the exercise of such power is subject to certain limitations. The guiding ruling on this is that of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney’s case (5 supra). Reliance is placed on M.Nagaraj v. Union of India (1983) 2 AC 570 (CA). The guiding ruling on this is that of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney’s case (5 supra). Reliance is placed on M.Nagaraj v. Union of India (1983) 2 AC 570 (CA). (ix) that if the Legislators declare a group as ‘Backward Class’, when the identification process was constitutional and incompatible, the Court can declare such legislation as unconstitutional, and the B.C. Commission simply based on the report of Sri P.S. Krishnan, which demonstrates the lack of application of mind by it, (x) that the identification of backward classes should be preceded by (a) formulation of objective criteria, (b) fair and adequate investigation, (c) presence of adequate material regarding backwardness, inadequacy of representation and efficiency of administration, (xi) that the burden of proof challenging the formative action programme is on the State. Reliance is placed on Ramakrishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar (2002) 2 SCC 333 = AIR 2002 SC 350 . Further that the burden is on the State because the State has the exclusive knowledge of the material which forms the basis for reservation (see S.R.Bommai v. Union of India – (1994) 3 SCC 1 ). (xii) that in the context of affirmative action, the State cannot use the religion as the basis for classification of Backward Classes. 12. On the other hand, the learned Advocate General as well as Sri Anoop G.Chaudhary, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents-State, relying on various powers of the Government and while placing reliance on various judgments of the Supreme Court refuted the contentions raised by the petitioners. 13. Basing on the above contentions, the prime issues that fall for consideration are — 1) Scope of Judicial Review: The scope of judicial review of an Act passed by the legislature more particularly if it is enacted in the context of affirmative action of the State in the context of Articles 14, 15 and 16 read with Article 46 of the Constitution is no more res integra. However the question -- whether American jurisprudential concepts of ‘suspect legislation’, ‘strict scrutiny’, ‘compelling State necessity’, ‘narrow-tailoring’ and the like are applicable in judicial scrutiny of legislations in India, has been generated because of the views expressed by a coordinate Bench in Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra), which prima facie appears to be in conflict with the views expressed by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney’s case (5 supra). This was one of the reasons/issues for the reference to this bench. 14. Learned Senior Counsel Sri K.Ramakrishna Reddy argued that the standard of judicial review laid down in Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra) is consistent with dictum of the apex Court in Ashoka Kumar Thakur’s case (6 supra) and not based on Amarican doctrine of strict scrutiny. It is his further contention that the impugned legislation would be subject to a close scrutiny, as it is based on religion and discriminates on the basis of religion. Therefore, the Court should scrutinize whether the identification of backward classes is preceded by (a) formulation of objective criteria for identification of backward classes, (b) fair and adequate investigation, and (c) presence of adequate material to see as to whether the constitutional requirements of identification of backward class, inadequacy of representation of such class in public employment was properly looked into. 15. In this regard, reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in M. Nagaraj’s case (7 supra). “Equality in Article 16(1) is individual-specific whereas reservation in Article 16(4) and Article 16(4-A) is enabling. The discretion of the State is, however, subject to the existence of ‘backwardness’ and ‘inadequacy of representation’ in public employment. Backwardness has to be based on objective factors whereas inadequacy has to factually exist. This is where judicial review come in.” (Para 49) “The State concerned will have to show in each case the existence of the compelling reasons, namely, backwardness, inadequacy of representation and overall administrative efficiency before making provision for reservation. As stated above, the impugned provision is an enabling provision. The State is not bound to make reservation for SCs/STs in matters of promotions. However, if they wish to exercise their discretion and make such provision, the State has to collect quantifiable data showing backwardness of the class and inadequacy of representation of that class in public employment in addition to compliance with Article 333.” (Para 123) 16. The State is not bound to make reservation for SCs/STs in matters of promotions. However, if they wish to exercise their discretion and make such provision, the State has to collect quantifiable data showing backwardness of the class and inadequacy of representation of that class in public employment in addition to compliance with Article 333.” (Para 123) 16. It is the elaborate contention of the learned Advocate General that unless justice of social, economic and political is achieved, fraternity cannot be achieved (see Keshavananda Bharati’s case paras 15, 91, 94 to 98, 116, 486, 506, 511, 513, 533, 1301, 1473 and 1475) (see also the judgment in Minerva Mills case), wherein it was pointed out by the apex Court that Preamble is not outside the Constitution, but is an integral part of the basic structure of the Constitution and it is, in fact, the foundation on which the entire edifice of the Constitution is built. 17. It is pertinent to note that the judicial scrutiny of an administrative action or legislative action is part of the basic structure of the Constitution of India. Neither the expression ‘judicial scrutiny’ nor its extent is defined in the Constitution. The Courts have to evolve certain principles on the scope of strict scrutiny subject to certain restrictions. Both the Executive and the Legislature consisting of individuals or representatives of the people, as the case may be, who are in close proximity to the people and their requirements, and basing on such requirements of various sections/groups/classes of people, the said two wings of the State will have to respond in a pro-active manner. Any conflicts in interest among various sections/groups/classes in such process is inexecutable and the State shall try to remove the same to the extent possible and merely because of one section of people are aggrieved in extending the State affirmative action, that can never be a reason for the State not to exercise its constitutional obligation and at the most the State can only minimize the disharmony to the lowest extent possible. 18. Sri Jeevan Reddy, J has expressed his opinion in Indra Sawhney’s case (5 supra), which is as under: “This can be formed by the State on its own, i.e., on the basis of the material it has in its possession already or it may gather such material through a Commission/ Committee, person or authority. 18. Sri Jeevan Reddy, J has expressed his opinion in Indra Sawhney’s case (5 supra), which is as under: “This can be formed by the State on its own, i.e., on the basis of the material it has in its possession already or it may gather such material through a Commission/ Committee, person or authority. All that is required is there must be some material upon which the opinion is formed. Indeed, in this matter the court should show due deference to the opinion of the State, which in the present context means the Executive. The Executive is supposed to know the existing conditions in the society, drawnas it is from among the Representatives of the people in Parliament/ Legislature. It does not however mean that the opinion formed is beyond judicial scrutiny altogether. The scope and reach of judicial scrutiny in matters within subjective satisfaction of the Executive are well and extensively stated in Barium Chemicals Vs. Company Law Board ( AIR 1967 SC 295 ) Vol.I page 147, which need not be repeated here. 19. At para-842, it has been further observed as regards the scope of judicial scrutiny, which is as under: “It is enough to say on this question that there is no particular or special standard of judicial scrutiny in matters arising under Article 16 (4) or for that matter, under Article 15 (4). The extent and scope of judicial scrutiny depends upon the nature of the subject matter, the nature of the right affected, the character of the legal and constitutional provisions applicable and so on. The acts and orders of the State made under Article 16 (4) do not enjoy any particular kind of immunity. At the same time, we must say that court would normally extend due deference to the judgment and discretion of the Executive – a co-equal wing – in these matters. The political executive, drawn as it is from the people and represent as it does the majority will of the people, is presumed to know the conditions and the needs of the people and hence its judgment in matters within its judgment and discretion will be entitled to due weight. More than this, it is neither possible nor desirable to say. It is not necessary to answer the question as framed.” 20. More than this, it is neither possible nor desirable to say. It is not necessary to answer the question as framed.” 20. Sri Pandian, J. in Indra Sawhney’s case (5 supra) put on record his views in this regard which are as under: “The action of the Government in making provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any ‘backward class of citizens’ is a matter of policy of the government. What is best for the ‘backward class’ and in what manner the policy should be formulated and implemented bearing in mind the object to be achieved by such reservation is a matter for decision exclusively within the province of the Government and such matters do not ordinarily attract the power of judicial review or judicial interference except on the grounds which are well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court.” (para 176) 21. The further observations of Sri Pandian, J., in Indra Sahwney’s case (5 supra) at para 176 also are relevant in this regard, for ready reference extracted, which are thus: “… … … What is best for the ‘backward class’ and in what manner the policy should be formulated and implemented bearing in mind the object to be achieved by such reservation is a matter for decision exclusively within the province of the Government and such matters do not ordinarily attract the power of judicial review of judicial interference except on the grounds which are well settled by a catena of decision of this Court.” 22. In Indra Sawhney’s case (5 supra), Sri Sawant, J has pointed out as under: “The answer to the question lies in the question itself. There are no special principles of judicial review nor does the scope of judicial review expand when the identification of backward classes and the percentage of the reservation kept for them is called in question. So long as correct criterion for the identification of the backward classes is applied, the result arrived at cannot be questioned on the ground that other valid criteria were also available for such identification. It is possible that the result so arrived at may be defective marginally or in marginal number of cases. That does not invalidate the exercise itself. No method is perfect particularly when sociological findings are in issue. It is possible that the result so arrived at may be defective marginally or in marginal number of cases. That does not invalidate the exercise itself. No method is perfect particularly when sociological findings are in issue. Hence, marginal defects when found may be cured in individual cases but the entire finding is not rendered invalid on that account.” (para-529) “The corollary of the above is that when the criterion applied for identifying the backward classes is either perverse or per se defective or unrelated to such identification in that it is not calculated to give the result or is calculated to give, by the very nature of the criterion, a contrary or unintended result, the criterion is open for judicial examination.” (para 530) “To sum up, judicial scrutiny would be available (i) if the criterion inconsistent with the provisions of Article 16 is applied for identifying the classes for whom the special or unequal benefit can be given under the said article; (ii) if the classes which are not entitled to the said benefit are wrongly included in or those which are entitled are wrongly excluded from the list of beneficiaries of the special provisions. In such cases, it is not either the entire exercise or the entire list which becomes invalid, so long as the tests applied for identification are correct and the inclusion or exclusion is only marginal; and (iii) if the percentage of reservations is either disproportionate or unreasonable so as to deny the equality of opportunity to the unreserved classes and obliterates Article 16 (1). Whether the percentage is unreasonable or results in the obliteration of Article 16 (1), so far as the unreserved classes are concerned, it will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and no hard and fast rule of general application with regard to the percentage can be laid down for all the regions and for all times.” (para 537) 23. Further, Jeevan Reddy, J having referred to certain decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court observed as under: “We have examined the decisions of U.S. Supreme Court at some length only with a view to notice how another democracy is grappling with a problem similar in certain respects to the problem facing this country.” 24. Further, Jeevan Reddy, J having referred to certain decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court observed as under: “We have examined the decisions of U.S. Supreme Court at some length only with a view to notice how another democracy is grappling with a problem similar in certain respects to the problem facing this country.” 24. The above observations were made in the context of the problems being faced by the minorities, including blacks in United States and the backward classes, including Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in this country. 25. The above expression of His Lordship would only show that the reference of the judgments of the foreign Court was only to the extent of having a better comprehension. 26. Now, it is necessary to consider the observations made by Goda Raghuram, J and V.V.S.Rao, J in Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra). In fact, as already pointed out, it is those observations which prompted the 5-Judge Bench to refer the matter to the 7Judge Bench for adjudication. Those observations were made in the context of rationality in arriving at the conclusion that all Muslims, as a whole, are socially backward and the validity or otherwise of recording such social backwardness of Muslims by a body like Backward Class Commission is for want of evolving relevant criteria for the purpose of ‘caste test’, ‘occupation test’ and ‘means test’. 27. Sri V.V.S.Rao, J in Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra), while referring to various judgments of the U.S. Supreme Court, opined as under: “Indeed, in the leading opinion, Jeevan Reddy, J., held that the extent and scope of judicial review depends on the nature of the subject-matter, the nature of the right affected, the character of legal and constitutional provisions applicable and so on. In the light of this, we have examined the leading cases which arose under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of Constitution of India. After giving deep and anxious consideration, we have come to the conclusion that when a policy of affirmative action providing reservations in educational institutions and public employment is brought before the Court for judicial review, the Court should apply strict scrutiny test while taking up primary review of the matter. After giving deep and anxious consideration, we have come to the conclusion that when a policy of affirmative action providing reservations in educational institutions and public employment is brought before the Court for judicial review, the Court should apply strict scrutiny test while taking up primary review of the matter. But when the policy is tested on the ground of arbitrariness and reasonableness that is to say secondary review; the Court should stick to intermediate scrutiny or deferential standard scrutiny compelling the State to show the minimum rationality in such action.” 28. From the above, it appears that reservations in educational institutions and public employment, being a policy of affirmative action, should be subjected to strict scrutiny and when a policy is tested on the ground of arbitrariness and reasonableness, the Court shall confine to the extent of intermediate scrutiny only from the perspective of rationality in such action. 29. In this regard, it is essential to note that at para-860, Jeevan Reddy, J, while summing up the answers at item-7, had pointed out as under: “No special standard of judicial scrutiny can be predicated in matters arising under Article 16(4). It is not possible or necessary to say more than this under this question.” 30. Sri Goda Raghuram, J, in Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra) at para-146, observed as under: “The most rigorous standard of judicial review, the Strict scrutiny standard is satisfied only if the Governmental action satisfies two tough requirements (a) compelling objective; this means that the interest being pursued by the Government must be compelling, not just legitimate or even important and (b) least restrictive means; this requirement implies that the means chosen by the Government must be "necessary" to achieve that compelling objective. Thus the "fit" between the means and the ends must be extremely tight. It is not sufficient that there is a "rational relation" or "substantial relation". In operation and practice this requirement is met only by showing that there are no less restrictive means of accomplishing the compelling Governmental objective.” 31. From the above observations, it is obvious that the learned Judge had tried to define strict scrutiny standard and in this process two requirements were identified viz., (1) compelling objective of the Government, but not mere legitimate or even important, and (2) least restrictive means. From the above observations, it is obvious that the learned Judge had tried to define strict scrutiny standard and in this process two requirements were identified viz., (1) compelling objective of the Government, but not mere legitimate or even important, and (2) least restrictive means. It further appears, at a glance, that compelling Government objective appears to have been a little more thrust. 32. The learned Judge, after referring to several judgments of U.S. Supreme Court, had noticed the summarized part of the judgment, in this regard, by Jeevan Reddy, J in para-73 of Mandal case as “No single uniform pattern of thought can be discerned from these decisions. Ideas appear to be still in process of evolution.” 33. The learned Judge, having taken into account the observations made by Pandian, J in Mandal’s case, concluded that the action of the government in making provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens is a matter of policy of the Government. What is best for the backward class and in what manner the policy should be formulated and implemented bearing in mind the object to be achieved by such reservation is a matter for decision, exclusively within the province of the Government and such matters do not ordinarily attract the power of judicial review except on settled grounds (perversity and the like). 34. The observations of Thommen, J are also taken note of by Goda Raghuram, J in Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra) at para-286. The views of Sahay, J and Sawant, J were also taken into consideration. 35. From the above views expressed by their Lordships in (Mandal’s case), it appears that the affirmative action of the State can be subjected to challenge in circumstances like -- if any conflict with the Constitution or the general principles of land or arbitrariness and unreasonable or perverse etc., and like. 36. However, Goda Raghuram, J, in Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra) at para-155, had pointed out as under: “From an analyses of the several opinions in Mandal, as to the appropriate standards of judicial review in matters pertaining to affirmative action, it appears to us that the area is broadly left open. What is clear however is that the extent and level of scrutiny is relative to the legal or constitutional right and interest involved in a specific claim, presented before the Court.” 37. What is clear however is that the extent and level of scrutiny is relative to the legal or constitutional right and interest involved in a specific claim, presented before the Court.” 37. Sri G.Raghuram, J. at para 159, further observed as under: “Under our constitutional scheme explicit and dominantly religion or caste-based classification is prohibited. Therefore, an explicit religion-specific classification of our plural and composite social fabric, to identify a class of citizens for extending to them “set aside” benefits for educational and public employment opportunities, would constitute a suspect classification. Such classifications must be subjected to the most exacting judicial examination and the State must establish that though its policy is facially religion-explicit, is in reality a benign programme within constitutional limits.” 38. The above observations in my considered view would run quite contrary to the spirit of the observations made by Jeevan Reddy, J in Indra Sahwney’s case (5 supra) at paras 782, 783 and 788. 39. From the above, what appears from the views expressed by Goda Raghuram and V.V.S.Rao, JJ., is, notwithstanding the views expressed in Indra Sawhney’s case (5 supra) in different words are emphatic either indirectly or directly, the test of strict scrutiny has to be applied. 40. The apex Court in Indra Sahwney’s case (5 supra) in its final conclusions, while summing up the discussion under Question No.3(f), held at para 798, which is extracted for ready reference, as under: “(f) Adequacy of Representation in the Services under the State Not only should a class be a backward class for meriting reservations, it should also be inadequately represented in the services under the State. The language of clause (4) makes it clear that the question whether a backward class of citizens is not adequately represented in the services under the State in a matter within the subjective satisfaction of the State. This is evident from the fact that the said requirement is preceded by the words “in the opinion of the State”. This opinion can be formed by the State on its own, i.e., on the basis of the material it has in its possession already or it may gather such material through a Commission/ Committee, person or authority. All that is required is, there must be some material upon which the opinion is formed. This opinion can be formed by the State on its own, i.e., on the basis of the material it has in its possession already or it may gather such material through a Commission/ Committee, person or authority. All that is required is, there must be some material upon which the opinion is formed. Indeed, in this matter the court should show due deference to the opinion of the State, which in the present context means the executive. The executive is supposed to know the existing conditions in the society, drawn as it is from among the representatives of the people in Parliament/Legislature. It does not, however, mean that the opinion formed is beyond judicial scrutiny altogether. The scope and reach of judicial scrutiny in matters within subjective satisfaction of the executive are well and extensively stated in Barium Chemicals v. Company Law Board (1966 Supp SCR 311 : AIR 1967 SC 295 ) which need not be repeated here. Suffice it to mention that the said principles apply equally in the case of a constitutional provision like Article 16(4) which expressly places the particular fact (inadequate representation) within the subjective judgment of the State/executive.” 41. From the above, it is to be construed that the expression ‘subject to satisfaction’ is primarily that of the State and not for the courts to look into that aspect by applying the strict scrutiny principles. 42. The learned Advocate General, while arguing on this aspect, cited Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of India 2004 ALT (5) 634, wherein it is observed as under: “that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation;…” 43. It was further observed at para-35: “that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation.” 44. It was also observed at para-36 as under: “The strict scrutiny test or the intermediate scrutiny test applicable in the united States of America as argued by Shri Salve cannot be applied in this case. Such a test is not applied in Indian courts. In any event, such a test may be applied in a case where a legislation ex facie is found to be unreasonable. Such a test may also be applied in a case where by reason of a statute the life and liberty of a citizen is put in jeopardy. This Court since its inception apart from a few cases where the legislation was found to be ex facie wholly unreasonable proceeded on the doctrine that constitutionality of a statute is to be presumed and the burden to prove contra is on him who asserts the same. The courts always lean against a construction which reduces the statute to a futility. A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative "on the principle expressed in the maxim : utres magis valeat quam pereat". [see CIT v. Teja Singh and Tinsukhia Electric supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam] 45. In the recent Ashoka Kumar Thakur’s case (6 supra), the apex Court had reaffirmed the views expressed in Saurabh Chaudri’s case (9 supra) and pointed out that neither the strict scrutiny test nor the intermediate scrutiny test, as referred to in Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra), applicable in United States, can be applied in the Indian context. Such test or tests is/are only available in cases where legislation is ex facie found to be unreasonable and went ahead by holding that the doctrine of constitutionality of a statute is to be presumed and the burden to prove contra is on the person who asserts the same. (See also M.Nagaraj’s case (7 supra) and Nair Service Society v. State of Kerala (2007) 4 SCC 1 ). 46. Learned Senior Counsel Sri Anoop G.Chaudhury, representing one of the respondents, which is a religious organisation, contended that the challenge to the constitutionality of Act No.26 of 2007 cannot be sustained in the absence of necessary pleadings/averments and in view of the judgment of the apex Court in Ramakrishna Dalmia’s case (8 supra) and Saurabh Chaudri’s case (9 supra). 46. Learned Senior Counsel Sri Anoop G.Chaudhury, representing one of the respondents, which is a religious organisation, contended that the challenge to the constitutionality of Act No.26 of 2007 cannot be sustained in the absence of necessary pleadings/averments and in view of the judgment of the apex Court in Ramakrishna Dalmia’s case (8 supra) and Saurabh Chaudri’s case (9 supra). He pointed out that in P.Ranendran vs. State of Madras 2005 (6) ALD 582 (5 J LB) it was held that the contention of the writ petitioners fails if the explanation given by the State was not controverted by a rejoinder, nor any attempt was made by the petitioners in order to show that the caste/castes mentioned in the list were not educationally and socially backward. In such circumstances, the apex Court arrived at the conclusion that the castes included in the list were backward, both educationally and socially, and the list was not violative of Article 15(1) of the Constitution of India. 47. In the present case, no specific pleadings were made in the writ petitions. He also relied on the principles laid down in Saurabh Chaudri’s case (9 supra) and contended that in view of the said principles Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra) is per incurium on the point of burden of proof, holding that that the burden of proof is on the State to prove the Act as ‘intra vires’. He relies on Ramakrishna Dalmia’s case (8 supra), wherein it was held that there is a presumption of validity in favour of the legislation and, therefore, it is for the petitioners to specifically allege and prove beyond doubt that the other persons or companions similarly situated have been left out and the petitioners and their companions have been singled out for discriminatory and hostile treatment. It is on record that the petitioner Ramakrishna Dalmia failed to discharge that onus (See also State of Kerala v. T.P. Roshana (1979) 1 SCC 572 , at page 579). 48. In Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra) V.V.S.Rao, J had specifically recorded that “if a legislation is challenged as violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India (for that matter Article 15 and 16), it is for the State to show that the classification satisfies the axiomatic twin test of rationality and nexus. 48. In Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra) V.V.S.Rao, J had specifically recorded that “if a legislation is challenged as violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India (for that matter Article 15 and 16), it is for the State to show that the classification satisfies the axiomatic twin test of rationality and nexus. Be it noted that the burden lies on the State that classification by legislation survives the tests of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.” 49. It is to be noted that prior to 1976, before N.M.Thomas’s case [ (1976) 2 SCC 310 : 1976 SCC (L & S) 227], the law was that Articles 16(4) and 15(4) of the Constitution of India were exception to Articles 16(1) and 15(1) of the Constitution of India. After 1976, Articles 16(4) and 15(4) of the Constitution of India are no longer considered to be exceptions to Articles 16(1) and 15(1) of the Constitution of India and the Supreme Court had explained how to achieve the Constitutional mandate. In any event, after Indra Sawhney’s case (5 supra) the law underwent drastic change. 50. After Indra Sawhney’s case (5 supra), many questions were answered that arose in the context of Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India. Further, there appears to be an explicit conflict in the view expressed in Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra) with regard to the applicability of strict scrutiny. The exceptions and views expressed therein were either self-conflicting or contrary to the principles laid down in Indra Sawhney’s case (5 supra). It may be relevant to mention here that, earlier bench of 5 Judges in T.Muralidhar and others vs. State of A.P. and others 2008 (3) SCC 243 followed the law laid down by the apex Court in Indra Sawhney’s case (5 supra) and rightly so, with regard to standard judicial scrutiny. In my considered opinion, the concepts evolved and introduced in Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra), drawn from U.S. Laws and U.S. jurisprudence are inapplicable in the Indian context, more so in the present context and I hold that there is no special or different standard of judicial scrutiny in the matter of testing the affirmative action of the State under equalities doctrine. 51. 51. Burden of Proof:- As regards the issue of ‘burden of proof’, it has been argued by the learned Senior Counsel as well as other Counsel appearing for the petitioners that the entire material would be available with the Government only and in such an event, it is rather unfair to cast the burden on the petitioners to prove that certain classes among Muslims were socially and educationally backward. In other words, it is their contention that the imperativeness and the adequacy of classifying certain classes of Muslims as socially and educationally backward is entirely on the Commission and the State. 52. In order to repel this contention, the learned Advocate General had drawn our attention to the observations made by the Supreme Court in Indra Sahwney’s case (5 supra). 53. For ready reference, the said observations are extracted as under: “… … … … … It is true that in the present cases the list of socially and educationally backward classes has been specified by caste. But that does not necessarily mean that caste was the sole consideration and that person belonging to these castes are also not a class of socially and educationally backward citizens….. As it was found that members of these castes as a whole were educationally and socially backward, the list which had been coming on from as far back as 1906 was finally adopted for purposes of Article 15(4)’ In view however of the explanation given by the State of Madras, which has not been controverted by and rejoinder, it must be accepted that though the list shows certain castes, the members of those castes are really classes of educationally and socially backward citizens. No attempt was made on behalf of the petitioners/appellant to show that any caste mentioned in this list was not educationally and socially backward. In this state of the pleadings, we must come to the conclusion that though the list is prepared caste-wise, the castes included therein are as a whole educationally and socially backward and therefore the list is not violative of Article 15. The challenge to Rule 5 must therefore fail.” [Para 705] “The shift in approach the emphasis is obvious. In this state of the pleadings, we must come to the conclusion that though the list is prepared caste-wise, the castes included therein are as a whole educationally and socially backward and therefore the list is not violative of Article 15. The challenge to Rule 5 must therefore fail.” [Para 705] “The shift in approach the emphasis is obvious. The Court now held that a caste is a class of citizens and that if a caste as a whole is socially and educationally backward, reservation can be made in favour of such a caste on the ground that it is a socially and educationally backward class of citizens within the meaning of Article 15(4). Moreover the burden of proving that the specification/identification was bad, was placed upon the petitioners. In case of failure to discharge that burden, the identification made by the State was upheld. The identification made on the basis of caste was upheld inasmuch as the petitioner failed to prove that any caste mentioned in the list was not socially and educationally backward.”[Para 606].” 54. From the above observations, it is implicit that mere allegation that the specification/identification of a caste or class of citizen are socially and educationally backward is unconstitutional without furnishing sufficient and necessary material in the sense of responsibility as otherwise the affirmative action of the State in initiating action of identification of classes among the Muslims in the present case as socially and educationally backward by getting examined the entire gamut of the situation through different sources by the Backward Classes Commissions would be redundant. 55. In U.S.V.Balram’s case (supra) it was observed by the Supreme Court at para 35 as under: .“… … … … … It may be that something more could have been done and some further investigation could have been carried out. But, in our opinion, the question is whether on the materials collected by the Commission and referred to in its report, can it be stated that those materials are not adequate or sufficient in support of its conclusion that the persons mentioned in the list as Backward Classes are socially and educationally backward ? But, in our opinion, the question is whether on the materials collected by the Commission and referred to in its report, can it be stated that those materials are not adequate or sufficient in support of its conclusion that the persons mentioned in the list as Backward Classes are socially and educationally backward ? We may mention in passing that we have not been able to find any definite averment in the affidavits filed by the writ petitioners that any particular groups or class included in the list by the Commission is not really socially and educationally backward. In our opinion, the Commissioner has taken considerable pains to collect as much relevant material as possible to judge the social and educational backwardness of the persons concerned … … …” [Para 83-A] (emphasis supplied). 56. I will discuss later about my satisfaction as regards the issue of adequacy of the exercise and the criteria done and laid down by the Backward Classes Commission. However, though the learned Counsel for petitioners contend that the impugned action of the State as unconstitutional, by picking holes from the process, they could not discharge the duties to demonstrate through and material to show that groups identified, in fact, are forward. 57. Krishnan’s Report:- It was the contention of the learned Senior Counsel Sri K.Ramakrishna Reddy, appearing for the writ petitioners, that the appointment of one Sri P.S.Krishnan as Advisor, almost in the capacity of a parallel Commission, is not proper and his report placed before the Commission was unauthorized. It is further argued that it is not open to the Government to consult anyone other than the Commission. In other words, it was his contention that as long as the Commission is in existence, no other body can be appointed to perform the same function as that of the Commission. The learned Senior Counsel further made scathe remarks against the appointment of Sri P.S.Krishnan as Advisor to the Commission, mainly on the allegation that his appointment was as a parallel Commission, and his comment was that Sri P.S.Krishnan was frustrated upon the Commission and the Government asked the Commission to copy the report of Sri P.S.Krishnan. He further argued that there was no basis or reason for choosing Sri P.S.Krishnan as an expert to express his opinion. He further argued that there was no basis or reason for choosing Sri P.S.Krishnan as an expert to express his opinion. He further points out that even in the judgment of T.Muralidhar’s case (supra), his recommendations were treated as totally incorrect and he did not use any criteria. On this aspect the reasoning assigned by Sri B.Prakash Rao, J., is quite elaborate and I am in total agreement with the views expressed by him in this respect. 58. However, I only add the following: That the works of various authors prepared in the past about various classes in the Muslims and the history in that regard cannot be ignored. Sri P.S.Krishnan, being a senior retired bureaucrat, had obviously done a great deal of research on this subject and also had taken into account various facts basing on the literary works of various authors. Incidentally, he also gave certain illustrations relating to his personal experience also. But that does not mean that he had arrived at a specific conclusion merely basing on some occasional or personal experiences. He quoted such personal experiences, which are in the nature of mere incidental, and that itself would not and cannot render his over all research work as ridiculous and baseless. A perusal of his report makes it abundantly clear that he had drawn inspiration and information from various works of renowned authors and anthropologists and reports of Survey of India. All those are the sources for acquiring knowledge in order to put it in the form of a report. The Commission, having gone through the entire report, appreciated the exercise done by Sri P.S.Krishnan. 59. The report of Sri P.S.Krishnan, in my view, has to be considered as information, inasmuch as, such information has been raised on various literary works, coupled with historical facts and circumstances. 60. In fact, as per the Act of 1993, the A.P. Commission has the power to regulate its own procedure and while exercising that power, it is for the Commission to take into account any information obtained from any source, while discarding and making recommendations to the Government on the subject referred to it. 61. Further, the report of the Commission is neither conclusive nor binding on the Government. 61. Further, the report of the Commission is neither conclusive nor binding on the Government. It is the prerogative of the Government either to return the report to the Commission for raising objections or to accept or reject in full or a portion thereof and the decision of the Government would be final on any issue, as provided under Rule 8 of the A.P. Commission for Backwardness Rules, 1993. 62. What is deducible from the above is that – (a) The Government or group of individuals or an individual can make a representation or reference to the Commission; (b) The Commission can adopt its own procedure in order to submit a report on the matter referred to it; (c) It can gather information from various sources; (d) The Commission need not rely on any report of any person or officer of the Government. However, it can take into consideration such information furnished by either of the parties or the representative of the Government; (e) There is no specific embargo either in the Act or the Rules that the Commission shall not look into any material presented/ submitted to it made by the Government. 63. Therefore, the appointment of Sri P.S.Krishnan in order to file a report/recommendation can, at best, be termed as an Advisor to the Department of Backward Classes for identifying BCs among the Muslim Communities. I am of the further view that there is nothing wrong for the Commission either to rely on the information furnished by the report of Sri P.S.Krishnan prepared on the basis of his own knowledge collected from various sources, including that of the Anthropological Survey of India (ASI). 64. In this context, it is necessary to see that the ASI published a set of books (People of India) in respect of all the States. It is known fact that the ASI is a Governmental Institution and I do not find any reason to ignore or brush aside the information furnished by it about various groups in the Muslim Community. Sri P.S.Krishnan also taking cue from the information from various publications and ASI reports made an attempt to identify the social and educational backward sections among the Muslims. 65. After all, knowledge and experience gained by anybody from any source is meant for dissemination and to be passed on to others for a good cause. Sri P.S.Krishnan also taking cue from the information from various publications and ASI reports made an attempt to identify the social and educational backward sections among the Muslims. 65. After all, knowledge and experience gained by anybody from any source is meant for dissemination and to be passed on to others for a good cause. The utility of the works of various authors, institutions or agencies, on any subject, has to be received to the acceptable extent. It is to be further seen that the report furnished by Sri P.S.Krishnan to the Commission was put on Website and there were no objections offered from any quarter and, therefore, it is too late for anyone to make any comment about the report of Sri P.S.Krishnan so long as it is to the satisfaction of the B.C. Commission. 66. The comment about the report/recommendation/ submission of Sri P.S.Krishnan was not based on any survey, socio-economic criteria, representative sample collection, data analysis on the basis of the evolved criteria and therefore, the State cannot base on such report to evolve an affirmative action is untenable. The job entrusted to Sri P.S.Krishnan was to identify the Backward Classes among the Muslims. While performing that duty, he need not undertake the exercise like B.C. Commission. His job was primarily to advise the Government. He was expected to utilize his knowledge in the subject, make further study and submit a report after proper analysis and assessment. Therefore he was not expected to evolve a criteria and conduct survey and collect data. At any rate a perusal of his report shows that he undertook his assignment in a particular method and manner and thereafter it cannot be contended that there was no criteria followed by him. 67. As already pointed out, the material like Gazettes of Telangana, Andhra and Rayalaseema regions and thesis reports of some scholars and the data of ASI have been compiled from the anthropological perspective in the report of Sri P.S.Krishnan, I do not find any force in the submission made by the learned Senior Counsel as well as the other learned Counsel appearing for petitioners in this regard, because on each and every detail in preparing the report to the Government by the Commission, it may not always be possible for the Commission to undertake the exercise in every minute area. Broadly, the Commission has to take into account the historical background of the Muslim community and various classes, which have been subjected to social and educational backwardness. There were certain classes of people who originally were not the Muslims embraced Islam as their religious faith for various reasons and some of those sections of people are still identified predominantly by their occupation. Such identification of classes based on occupation are also recognized in non-Muslim groups/classes/castes. 68. These aspects, to a great deal, have been pointed out and dilated by Sri P.S.Krishnan by his knowledge gained from the knowledge of others gained from various other sources. 69. Therefore, I do not agree with the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners that the appointment of Sri P.S.Krishnan as Advisor and the recommendations of the Commission basing on the report of Sri P.S.Krishnan and other reports like ASI etc., cannot be accepted. Elaborate reasons in this regard, have already been given by Sri B.Prakash Rao, J. Hence, this issue is to be answered against the petitioners. 70. Yet, another argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioners was that ASI report, which was relied on by Sri P.S.Krishnan, was not prepared in the context of Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India. But, it is to be noticed that though ASI report was prepared in a different context, still the same can be relied on for the purpose of dealing with social strata of various groups, since it has direct nexus to the study of identification of existence of backward classes in our society. Mr. P.S.Krishnan had taken the ASI report only in the context of identification of backward class homogeneous groups in Muslim community. When the answer – now identified groups can be considered as backward, keeping in view the ASI Repot, and the description of backwardness in relation to Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India relying on the said report and analyzing the same independently either by Sri P.S.Krishnan thereafter by B.C. Commission cannot be found falt with. 71. Further, a perusal of the record would only indicate that the Government did not thrust Sri P.S.Krishnan’s report on B.C. Commission with a direction to follow the same. I am unable to find anywhere such a direction either to Mr. P.S.Krishnan or to the Commission. 71. Further, a perusal of the record would only indicate that the Government did not thrust Sri P.S.Krishnan’s report on B.C. Commission with a direction to follow the same. I am unable to find anywhere such a direction either to Mr. P.S.Krishnan or to the Commission. On the contrary, the Commission had made some independent enquiry, as could be seen from the report of the B.C. Commission. Of course, the adequacy of exercise so done by the Commission is yet another thing to be discussed. 72. As already pointed out, the Act of 1993 gives ample liberty to the Commission to carve out its own procedure in connection with the investigation of identification of backward classes for the purpose of Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India. The provisions of the said Act would only indicate that the report of the Commission is only recommendatory in nature and not binding, nor there is anything that could be seen from the provisions of the said Act that the Government has any power to guide the Commission. Any information furnished by the Government through an officer of its own, like Mr. Krishnan or any other authority, has to be essentially treated as only the information furnished on behalf of the Government before the Commission for the purpose of proper evaluation of the subject matter of the reference and arrive at the conclusions independently. 73. It is further borne out from the record that earlier in T.Muralidhar Rao’s case (supra), the B.C. Commission was non-functional and, therefore, there was no reference to the Commission at all. Instead, the Government acted on the recommendations of the Commissionerate of Minorities Welfare. In other words, the said action on the part of the Government amounts to supplanting the statutory authority like the B.C. Commission, by a different body and that was a valid ground for this Court to strike down the earlier recommendations. As per the Supreme Court, in Mandal’s case (supra), the State has to mandatorily take the opinion and recommendations of the APCBC. The appointment of Sri P.S.Krishnan was only as an advisor and it is the prerogative of the State Executive to gather the material/information on its own because finally it is for the State Government to take a final decision/view in the matter. The appointment of Sri P.S.Krishnan was only as an advisor and it is the prerogative of the State Executive to gather the material/information on its own because finally it is for the State Government to take a final decision/view in the matter. Even if the said information gathered by it is furnished to the B.C. Commission for its consideration no exception can be taken to such procedure. This Court in earlier decisions held that it is always open for the Government to furnish whatever material it has entrusted with work. What is important is to achieve the constitutional goal and to achieve that the Government is well within its competence to take all steps in that direction as long as the same is not in violation of any standard provision and/or the dicta of the apex Court/this Court. Hence, the appointment of Mr. Krishnan cannot be challenged, nor the report/submissions made by Mr. Krishnan deserve to be totally ignored. 74. In fact, the report of Mr. Krishnan, or for that matter, the statistics and other material particulars by ASI and other sources have got to be essentially taken into consideration by the Commission in order to arrive at a just conclusion. 75. After all, from the profile of Mr. Krishnan, as was demonstrated by the learned Advocate General, he has been associated with the tasks pertaining to identification and welfare of backward classes since many decades. 76. In my view, it is not an easy task for anyone to gather the relevant information from a huge and enormous material available to any inquisitive reader and that task appears to have been successfully and to a great deal was done by Mr. Krishnan and it is for the Commission either to receive or reject to the extent relevant. Further, such acceptance or rejection of the recommendations of the Commission, either in part or wholly, is again subject to satisfaction of the Government. 77. Therefore, the Government would also be essentially a party before the Commission, while dealing with the matters like this. In such an event, it is totally within the domain of the State Executive to appoint an individual having sufficient expertise or knowledge to the present facts not only from social perspective, but also of the State. Therefore, various submissions made on behalf of the petitioners, in this regard, are to be rejected. 78. In such an event, it is totally within the domain of the State Executive to appoint an individual having sufficient expertise or knowledge to the present facts not only from social perspective, but also of the State. Therefore, various submissions made on behalf of the petitioners, in this regard, are to be rejected. 78. Some of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners were critical about the pace at which the Commission proceeded with the enquiry. It was pointed out that all steps have been taken in tremendous hurry within 45 days commencing from 17-4-2007 CRITERIA :- – the date of reference letter from the Government to the Commission and during this short span of time, 2 reports, public hearing, discussions, decisions and the Act have all been completed. 79. Of course, some times the speedy and expeditious action on the part of the functionaries of the State or in the present context the Commission would also be subjected to criticism on various counts. But, this cannot be countenanced, inasmuch as, the State is expected to complete the exercise and arrive at the conclusions with utmost expedition, of course, coupled with due diligence. Unless and until it is demonstrated that such speedy action was either mala fide or resulted in irreparable injustice to other sections of the people, the same cannot be subjected to criticism. After all, much is talked about the inertia on the part of various functionaries of the Government. At this juncture, one should not loose sight of the fact that for decades, the deriving groups of Muslim community were denied of the affirmative action, which their counterparts in Hindu community are recipients of such benefit. Any delay in this regard would be unconstitutional. 80. But, in the present context, since several people are likely to be effected in one way or the other, it is hard for me to make any comment on such expeditious job undertaken by the Government and entrusted to and executed by the Commission. In other words, this Court has to examine only the aspect -- whether the Commission’s report was based on relevant material and the ‘criteria’ adopted by it is reasonable or not ? In other words, this Court has to examine only the aspect -- whether the Commission’s report was based on relevant material and the ‘criteria’ adopted by it is reasonable or not ? In my opinion, in matters of this nature, this Court would not and should not be swayed away under the guise of judicial review, with what even adjectives one may add, based on the contentions of petitioners which may look very attractive at the first blush. As held by the apex Court in Mandal’s case (supra), there cannot be a fool-proof procedure and that courts shall not interdict State’s affirmative actions on trivial and technical grounds and doing so would amount to sacrifying the rule of law at the alter of procedures. 81. I am of the view that the ‘criteria’ that is expected to be adopted by the Commission need not essentially be the one in the nature of exception. Suffice it to say that the ‘criteria’ or ‘adequacy’ of the exercise undertaken by the Commission is rationale and reasonable. 82. The apex Court in Mandal’s case in paras-782, 783, 796 and 797 had pointed out that there cannot be any one single and uniform procedure or approach for the B.C. Commission to adopt in the matter of identification of backward classes. It was specifically pointed out in the said case that it is for the body, like the Commission, to adopt such approach and procedure as it deems appropriate. Further, it could be seen that no particular/uniform procedure was laid down by the apex Court. 83. Further, the scrutiny of such procedure adopted by the Commission cannot be tested on the anvil of strict scrutiny. The scope, relevance and contour of strict scrutiny have already been discussed in the earlier paragraphs. In simple terms, what all required from the criteria and the adequacy for and of the investigation/examination, for the purpose of identification of the classes among the Muslims for the purpose of Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India is prima facie rationality and reasonableness. The in-depth scrutiny of the criteria and the adequacy of enquiry of the Commission may some times render the said object of the State nugatory and the enquiry and the consequential report by the B.C. Commission as superfluous. 84. The in-depth scrutiny of the criteria and the adequacy of enquiry of the Commission may some times render the said object of the State nugatory and the enquiry and the consequential report by the B.C. Commission as superfluous. 84. Incidentally, it may be seen from the judgment in Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra), wherein V.V.S.Rao, J pointed out that when legislation was challenged on the ground of competency of the State, the Court has to insist upon the strict scrutiny test. In this regard, it is to be pointed out that it is not the case of the petitioners, at least in the present case, the State lacks competency. 85. It is the further contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners that the Commission had simply relied on the report of Sri P.S.Krishnan without conducting independent enquiry/survey, but a perusal of the report of the Commission would only that the Commissioner had made use of some sound material as was felt fit from the report of Sri P.S.Krishnan. The Commission had also followed the ‘Fast Track’ and ‘Rough and Ready’ methods and conducted its own enquiry/survey as deemed necessary. 86. To illustrate, the findings of the Commission are totally independent, it is necessary to look at 2 identified groups i.e., ‘Achukattlavandlu’ and ‘Thurka kasha’. There was no reference of these two social groups in the report of Sri P.S.Krishnan. This would show that the B.C. Commission has not copied the report of Sri P.S.Krishnan in toto. 87. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Commission also submitted that the Commission had also consulted the report of the Sachar Committee, the report of the ASI etc., while studying 15 communities with reference to their social and educational backwardness in the report. The Commission had also conducted its own survey and collected the data. The Commission had categorically indicated the methodology of the survey conducted by the B.C. Commission in its report. It was stated therein that the Commission had deputed a survey team, headed by the Deputy Director (Statistics) conducted door-to-door survey. They adopted a questionnaire, for identification of the social and educational backward classes in the Muslim community, which brings out the following factors, which otherwise can be termed as ‘criteria’. It reads as thus: “a) Social status b) Occupation c) Aspects of discrimination with regard to profession, occupation, social situation. They adopted a questionnaire, for identification of the social and educational backward classes in the Muslim community, which brings out the following factors, which otherwise can be termed as ‘criteria’. It reads as thus: “a) Social status b) Occupation c) Aspects of discrimination with regard to profession, occupation, social situation. d) Economic status e) Details of ownership of movable and immovable property etc. f) Status of indebtedness g) Access to amenities like telephone, personal transport h) Details of residence and whether living in a slum i) Literacy and Level of education completed j) Details of employment if any in public services. 88. It is clear from the report of the Commission that the National Commission for Backward Classes (NCBC) Guidelines were kept in mind, which include ‘procedural verifications to guidelines’ and ‘guidelines for filling the questionnaire’ and also questions pertaining to ‘fast track.’ All the social groups among the Muslims, which are considered to be as belonging to socially and educationally backward, have been detailed with reasons and statistics. A broad look at the entire statistics about each group would reveal their occupation, self-perception, social discrimination, illiteracy etc. It has gone into the aspect of the economic activity among the workers in those social groups. 89. The learned Senior Counsel Sri Prakash Reddy and other learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners were again critical about each of the social group. In that process they tried to highlight the aspects of the percentage of social perception of each group, their social status as belong to urban areas. But, I do not find any need to be too incisive about all those aspects. For example, the percentage of the self-perception in some cases about their status is more 50 per cent. In my considered view, that does not mean that they have been commanding reasonable esteem in the society. It is not the question how those social groups are perceiving about themselves. What matters is how the society at large is looking at them. What really matters is to see how they are placed in social strata and to see whether are socially backward. How to identify social backwardness was enumerated in NCBC guidelines which are broadly accepted and followed by B.C. Commission. 90. It further reveals that most of those groups are identifiable with their respective occupations. What really matters is to see how they are placed in social strata and to see whether are socially backward. How to identify social backwardness was enumerated in NCBC guidelines which are broadly accepted and followed by B.C. Commission. 90. It further reveals that most of those groups are identifiable with their respective occupations. It has been pointed out by the learned Advocate General that many of those social groups among the Muslims are practising their traditional occupations just like their counter-parts in non-Muslim groups/classes/castes. For example, a Dhobi (a washerman), a Hajam (a barber) etc. 91. As could be seen from the literature placed before the B.C. Commission by the report of Sri P.S.Krishnan and also the ASI reports, it appears that it is a historical fact that excepting a fraction, the rest of the Muslim population in India are from the low caste Hinds converted owing to the historical background, which fact cannot be ignored. It is an undeniable fact that there is no caste system prevalent among the Muslims. But, there exists classification among themselves for various reasons – their occupation, which is menial in nature in the eye of the society. Here I may add that the malady of caste system though not in its rigid form percolated to Muslim society in India. This aspect has been judicially recognized by the apex Court in Mandal’s case (supra) and by this Court in Archana Reddy’s case (supra). Therefore, identifying the groups of people within Muslims cannot be found fault with and if there are identifiable groups amongst the Muslims answering the description of socially and educationally backward class, they totally driven to be included in Backward Classes list. 92. In Indra Sawhney’s case (5 supra), Jeevan Reddy, J. has observed at paras 782 and 783 thus: “Coming back to the question of identification, the fact remains that one has to begin somewhere - with some group, class or section, There is no set or recognised method. There is no law or other statutory instrument prescribing the methodology. The ultimate idea is to survey the entire populace. If so, one can well begin with castes, which represent explicit identifiable social classes/groupings, more particularly when Article 16 (4) seeks to ameliorate social backwardness. What is unconstitutional with it, more so when caste, occupation poverty and social backwardness are so closely intertwined in our society? The ultimate idea is to survey the entire populace. If so, one can well begin with castes, which represent explicit identifiable social classes/groupings, more particularly when Article 16 (4) seeks to ameliorate social backwardness. What is unconstitutional with it, more so when caste, occupation poverty and social backwardness are so closely intertwined in our society? [individual survey is out of question, since Article 16 (4) speaks of class protection and not individual protection]. This does not mean that one can wind up the process of identification with the castes. Besides castes (whether found among Hindus or others) there may be other communities, groups, classes and denominations which may qualify as backward class of citizens. For example, in a particular State, Muslim community as a whole may be found socially backward. (As a matter of fact, they are so treated in the State of Karnataka as well as in the State of Kerala by their respective State governments). Similarly, certain S. and denominations among Christians in Kerala who were included among backward communities notified in the former princely State of Travancore as far back as in 1935 may also be surveyed and so on and so forth. Any authority entrusted with the task of identifying backward classes may well start with the castes. It can take caste a, apply the criteria of backwardness evolved by it to that caste and determine whether it qualifies as a backward class or not. If it does qualify, what emerges is a backward class, for the purposes of clause (4) of Article 16. The concept of caste in this behalf is not confined to castes among Hindus. It extends to castes, wherever they obtain as a fact, irrespective of religious sanction for such practice. Having exhausted the castes or simultaneously with it, the authority may take up for consideration other occupational groups, communities and classes. For example, it may take up the Muslim community (after excluding those sections, castes and groups, if any, who have already been considered) and find out whether it can be characterised as a backward class in that State or region, as the case may be. The approach may differ from State to State since the conditions in each State may differ. Nay, even within a State, conditions may differ from region to region. Similarly, Christians may also be considered. The approach may differ from State to State since the conditions in each State may differ. Nay, even within a State, conditions may differ from region to region. Similarly, Christians may also be considered. If in a given place, like Kerala, there are several denominations, S. or divisions, each of these groups may separately be considered. In this manner, all the classes among the populace will be covered and that is the central idea. The effort should be to consider all the available groups, S. and classes of society in whichever order one proceeds. Since caste represents an existing, identifiable, social group spread over an overwhelming majority of the countrys population, we say one may well begin with castes, if one so chooses, and then go to other groups, S. and classes. We may say, at this stage, that we broadly commend the approach and methodology adopted by the Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy Commission in this respect. We do not mean to suggest - we may reiterate - that the procedure indicated hereinabove is the only procedure or method/approach to be adopted. Indeed, there is no such thing as a standard or model procedure/approach. It is for the authority (appointed to identify) to adopt such approach and procedure as it thinks appropriate, and so long as the approach adopted by it is fair and adequate, the court has no say in the matter. The only object of the discussion in the preceding para is to emphasise that if a Com- mission/authority begins its process of identification with castes (among Hindus) and occupational groupings among others, it cannot by that reason alone be said to be constitutionally or legally bad. We must also say that there is no rule of law that a test to be applied for identifying backward classes should be only one and/or uniform. In a vast country like India, it is simply not practicable. If the real object is to discover and locate backwardness, and if such backwardness is found in a caste, it can be treated as backward; if it is found in any other group, S. or class, they too can be treated as backward.” 93. In a vast country like India, it is simply not practicable. If the real object is to discover and locate backwardness, and if such backwardness is found in a caste, it can be treated as backward; if it is found in any other group, S. or class, they too can be treated as backward.” 93. It is pertinent to note that in para 788 it was further pointed as under: “…… The Shudras, the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and other similar backward social groups among Muslims and Christians had practically no entry into the administrative apparatus. It was this imbalance which was sought to be redressed by providing for reservations in favour of such backward classes. ……” (emphasis supplied) 94. It was further taken note of in the same para that beside castes (whether found among the Hindus or others), there may be other communities, groups, classes and denominations, which may qualify as backward classes of citizens. It was further taken note of that the Muslim community as a whole may be found socially backward like in the States of Karnataka as well as Kerala. Are those Muslims in those States alone are backward and all the Muslims in the State of Andhra Pradesh do not deserve any classification for the purpose of Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India. If answer is that certain groups of Muslims deserve benefit under Articles 15 (4) and 16 (4) of the Constitution the extension of that benefit shall not be delayed further. 95. One of the issues that fell for consideration in Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra) was whether the dispensation therein was religion specific. The bench observed that the reservation of 5 per cent to the Muslims as a whole was bad in law, inasmuch as, the said benefit conferred upon them was religion based. For the present, I am not entering into that area of controversy. However, the identification of some of the social groups among the Muslims as socially and educationally backward is a well-recognized aspect by the State. The simple reason being, all those social groups are identified with their traditional occupations, which are considered to be very mean/low in the society. For the present, I am not entering into that area of controversy. However, the identification of some of the social groups among the Muslims as socially and educationally backward is a well-recognized aspect by the State. The simple reason being, all those social groups are identified with their traditional occupations, which are considered to be very mean/low in the society. These insular groups are distinct by themselves, have distinct features, may be by virtue of their occupation or other habits or the place in and around they live, their relationship with other sections among the Muslims etc. 96. It was pointed out by various authorities before the Commission as well as the report of Sri P.S.Krishnan that the classes of higher strata even among the Muslims do not prefer to move or have any close proximity with the other socially backward groups. In other words, the common factor between these two broad groups i.e., the higher and low is only religious faith and nothing else. It is no wonder if it is said that there is no area where the higher and lower strata meet together. 97. It is a known fact that mostly in rural areas the persons, who are involved in doing mean jobs or following traditional occupations, normally will be identified by their traditional occupation only, notwithstanding their religious faith. It is the NCBC that has evolved a procedure, called ‘fast track’ method. The questions that were suggested in Part-II (A) of the NCBC guidelines, which relate to the traditional craft, approximate number of persons from the family actually engaged in that craft, or whether such caste/community is either traditional or hereditary occupation and whether such traditional or hereditary occupation is, in terms of the caste system, regarded to be low, undignified unclean or stigmatized etc.? 98. In my view, these questions suggested by NCBC through its guidelines are actually meant for estimating the social strata of various groups/sections even among the Muslims. 99. From the report of the Commission and the other material supplied by the research workers, as well as Sri P.S. Krishnan’s report, it suggests that there are several groups among Muslims, who do not have any permanent place to live, the study and survey and the material/data gathered will show that, in the whole process the B.C. Commission had identified such social groups deserve to be included in B.C. list. 100. 100. In some cases, it is difficult to find out some kind of these social groups at a particular place or District or region in the State, inasmuch as, they will be moving around. Even if an enquiry is conducted in a particular area, incidentally at that point of time, they may not find any one because those people belonging to that particular class might have moved to other places in search of their traditional or hereditary occupation to eke out their livelihood. 101. These ground realities have to be taken into consideration and viewed from the spectacle of pragmatism rather than what actually meets the eye. I am of the view that it is those groups/sections of people from among the Muslim community, who are otherwise insignificant, or for that matter irrelevant to the other stratum of the society, who are expected to be extended the benefits and the rights created and guaranteed under the Constitution of India. If strict scrutiny test, as propounded in Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra), is followed and entertain the technical and trivial contentions raised by the petitioners, then the very exercise will be unfruitful and constitutional duty of the State will become illusory. 102. Here, it is to be noted that, is not such stratification among Hindus was done? The answer would be ‘Yes’. 103. That is the reason why, if put in a simpler manner, various groups in the society, which are very low in many respects, particularly in the context of the Fundamental Rights under Article 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India were identified as either belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes. 104. Among Hindus, it is necessary to classify the groups/classes identifying them on the basis of their caste. The reason is, the division of people among Hindus is primarily based on caste, which is not available to Muslims. It is only their historical back ground, their glory and their standard of living in the past identifiable with their family name, which, over a period of time made them as belonging to a higher class or higher strata among Muslims. It is only their historical back ground, their glory and their standard of living in the past identifiable with their family name, which, over a period of time made them as belonging to a higher class or higher strata among Muslims. But, the other social groups, who according to the renowned historians and as was referred to and presented by Sri P.S.Krishnan in his report, many a people in various parts of the country have chosen to embrace ‘Islam’ since some incentives have been accorded to them in the past, the details of which are not relevant now. 105. But, the fact is that good number of people followed Islamic faith because of their low standard of living and because of the benefits extended by the Rulers or other persons of high esteem. One other reason for such exodus from lower strata of Hindus to Islam was to wriggle out of the discriminations caused due to caste stratification and in search of a faith which professes brotherhood amongst all. In other words, it is the historical truth that several people, who were suffering from either poverty or other social stigmas, in order to get themselves alleviated from the said problems, embraced Islam. Nevertheless, many of them did not give up their traditional occupations. Therefore, it is an undisputed and undeniable fact that even among Muslims, there is social stratification, except the religious faith in Islam. Therefore, it is for the State to take all such steps in the context of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and see that the benefits under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India are also allowed to reach those social groups, which remained all through as insignificant groups in the society with attached social stigmas. 106. A careful glance at various groups of Muslim community that were identified by the Commission in the present case would show that their educational standards are very low, the treatment by others is predominantly ether inferior and occasionally normal and the rate of literacy is also very poor. In some of the groups we could see that the rate of self-perception is high. But the perception of the rest of the society against these groups is very low. Most of them are identified only with their traditional or hereditary occupations and such occupations are considered to be very mean. In some of the groups we could see that the rate of self-perception is high. But the perception of the rest of the society against these groups is very low. Most of them are identified only with their traditional or hereditary occupations and such occupations are considered to be very mean. But, it is to be seen that many of such traditional occupations/services by these social groups are very relevant and essential to the members of the rest of the society. For Eg: ‘Hajam’ means barber; ‘Dhobi’ means washerman etc. Some of the social groups are involved in other occupations which offer entertainment to the people. 107. Now, the question is can those people belonging to such groups ever be thought of in terms of the constitutional goal with special reference to Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India, more particularly Articles 15(4) and 16(4) in the present context. If a question is ever posed from such social groups to the effect that what are their rights guaranteed under the Constitution (we cannot expect such a question being posed by them because they are totally ignorant of their rights guaranteed under the Constitution), no answer, much less satisfactory, would be offered by the State. 108. It has been argued by the learned Advocate General that the present groups of people practice ‘endogamy’. This aspect has been referred to in Sri P.S. Krishnan’s report. In other words, these social groups, which have been considered as very low in the society for centuries, by virtue of their practice and involvement in the traditional occupations or hereditary occupations, not only remained as such, but also contribute their progeny to the society with the same status which they have been suffering from centuries. As a result, barring a stray instance, mostly a barber’s children would remain as barbers and a dhobi’s children would remain as dhobis. Even a perusal of the report of the Commission further shows that there is some considerable employment in these groups of people. But, again the question is -- what is the nature of their employment? The answer is that most of them are involved in very low jobs in any Governmental or non-Governmental organizations. 109. Further, the rate of literacy is also very low. But, again the question is -- what is the nature of their employment? The answer is that most of them are involved in very low jobs in any Governmental or non-Governmental organizations. 109. Further, the rate of literacy is also very low. Of course, it has been pointed out by some of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that many people in Muslim community are literate. But, a close look at this would only show that the level of literacy is only to the extent of 5th standard, 7th standard or 10th standard with minuscule exceptions. In other words, even if they get employment by any chance, such an employment would again keep such person at the lowest level only. 110. The criteria laid down by the Commission has to be looked in a broad perspective, but not in a narrow sense by picking up some stray instances here and there. Further, it has been pointed out by Sri P.S. Krishnan in his recommendations presented before the Commission that even among the Hindus, there are people, who were classified as belonging to backward community, practicing the traditional occupation, like ‘Nayee Brahmin’ (barber), which is equivalent to ‘Hajam’ in Muslim community. Many of the recommendations of Sri P.S. Krishnan, coupled with the statistics furnished by the Commission in its independent investigation, would reveal that such results of the investigation and recommendations of Sri P.S. Krishnan would correlate with the study of ASI. 111. There are some instances pointed out that in some sections the rate of literacy is much lower than the rate of literacy among Scheduled Caste community in Hindus. For Eg: ‘Hajam’ community (barbers). 112. It has been pointed out by the learned Advocate General that the Commission had not only conducted independent investigation, but also followed the guidelines of National Commission i.e., ‘Fast Track method’ and ‘Rough and Ready method’ of Mandal Commission. As already pointed out, adopting of these two methods/guidelines of NCBC and Mandal Commission by the B.C. Commission is in addition to its own independent enquiry. 113. It is the case of the petitioners that B.C. Commission has not evolved any criteria whatsoever. This is factually incorrect. The B.C. Commission has evolved a criteria and based the said criteria from the criteria/indicators evolved by NCBC. The petitioners have not challenged the criteria evolved by NCBC. 113. It is the case of the petitioners that B.C. Commission has not evolved any criteria whatsoever. This is factually incorrect. The B.C. Commission has evolved a criteria and based the said criteria from the criteria/indicators evolved by NCBC. The petitioners have not challenged the criteria evolved by NCBC. Even otherwise I see no reason to find fault with the criteria/indicators/questionnaire prepared by it as the said criteria was evolved based on the experiences of earlier Commissions. There is a great deal of criticism and discussion on the quality and adequacy of such investigation. 114. At the cost of repetition, I may point out that there is nothing wrong committed by the Commission in adopting its own procedure, which was categorically indicated in its report, and also placing reliance on various literary works relating to historical back ground and also the recommendations of the well experienced persons like Sri P.S. Krishnan. In fact, Sri P.S. Krishnan has been associated himself with the problems of these groups since several years. His extensive reading and experience richly deserves to be taken into account by any Commission. Therefore, in my considered view, the Commission, in the present case, had conducted itself on right lines by conducting an independent enquiry and also taken into consideration various works and experience of others by following the guidelines of National Commission. It may be relevant to point out that as per “Fast Track” method evolved by NCBC which was adopted by B.C. Commission, insofar as certain social groups are concerned, there is no necessity to undertake a detailed probe/study /enquiry to determine their social and educational backwardness inasmuch as, there are certain social groups in our society which would fit into that bracket straight away. That is the reason why NCBC, a body well acquainted with the subject, came out with “Fast Track” method and gave the indicators to identify such social groups. This procedure cannot be found fault with as the apex Court recognized the aspect that there are certain social groups which by mere mention of their name would evoke that they are backward. In the present case, almost all social groups, now identified fall under “Fast Track” and/or “Rough and Ready” method. Even then the Commission has conducted survey before submitting its report. Therefore, the B.C. Commission recommendation cannot be held be illegal. 115. In the present case, almost all social groups, now identified fall under “Fast Track” and/or “Rough and Ready” method. Even then the Commission has conducted survey before submitting its report. Therefore, the B.C. Commission recommendation cannot be held be illegal. 115. As already pointed out, this Court has to look at the issue in broader perspective keeping in view the ground realities, instead of pointing out some issues which appear to be the defects in conducting the enquiry and preparing the report. In order to achieve the Constitutional goal, small and stray defects, even if any, ought not to be attached with any significance. In other words, such defects that are pointed out in the report of the B.C. Commission shall fade into insignificance in the interest of securing social justice and marching ahead towards the constitutional goals. 116. As pointed out above, the B.C. Commission in the present case conducted independent survey in consonance with the guidelines issued by the NCBC i.e., ‘Fast Track’ method. In a way, this method implies that identification of groups would be easier and faster. It is in the public knowledge that this issue has been in consideration in various methods on various occasions in different ways and in different words for several years. Therefore, avoidance of avoidable delay is not only acceptable, but also laudable. The expeditious conclusion of enquiry by the Commission is the expectation of the State. Therefore, the Commission cannot be faulted with for observing the guidelines of ‘Fast Track’ method and ‘Rough and Ready’ method and submitting its report in order to meet the expectation of the State and to achieve the purpose for which it was constituted. In the instant case, as already stated above, all the groups identified, except the Shaiks, would fall under ‘Fast Track method’ and/or ‘Rough and Ready method’ as prescribed by the NCBC and Mandal Commission, respectively. 117. Of course, in the report submitted by the Commission, there may be certain areas which may result in some criticism. In the instant case, as already stated above, all the groups identified, except the Shaiks, would fall under ‘Fast Track method’ and/or ‘Rough and Ready method’ as prescribed by the NCBC and Mandal Commission, respectively. 117. Of course, in the report submitted by the Commission, there may be certain areas which may result in some criticism. But, as already pointed out, in the larger interest of identification of Backward Classes among Muslims, it is expedient to look at the issue, in its entirety, in a broader perspective, instead of being too critical than required about some deficiencies/defects that occasioned now and then and here and there, which, in fact, can be sought to be redressed by the Commission either at the instance of the Government or the person aggrieved and hence such deficiencies, if any, by itself are not capable of vitiating the exercise done by the Commission. [See para-850 of Indra Sawhney’s case (5 supra)]. 118. In my considered view, the kind of attack on the Commission’s report is devoid of realistic and holistic approach and, on the other hand, the broader spectrum of the main issue had been made too narrow to look at. 119. After all, the report of the Commission cannot be treated as a complete answer or panacea to all the problems that were placed before it or the task that was entrusted to it and for all times to come. The recommendations made by the Commission cannot be treated as conclusive as such, nor the same are binding on the State. 120. Several other issues may sprout up in future in the process of various changes, like social, economic, political etc. As and when such problems arise, the mechanism to address such problems is already made available in the Act of 1993. In other words, either the Government or individual or group of individuals may approach the Commission seeking Redressal of their grievance and the recommendations of the Commission have to be considered by the Government as prescribed by the Statute. 121. In other words, either the Government or individual or group of individuals may approach the Commission seeking Redressal of their grievance and the recommendations of the Commission have to be considered by the Government as prescribed by the Statute. 121. It has been pointed out incidentally by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Commission that at the time of Ananth Raman Commission, there was no such general guiding criteria as ‘fast track’ and ‘rough and ready’ methods to identify the social and educational backward classes and in such circumstances, Ananth Raman Commission had adopted much wider and longer methods of conducting survey in order to collect data for the purpose of formulating a criteria in order to identify the socially and educationally backward classes. 122. Incidentally it has been further pointed out that it is the Mandal Commission that had evolved 11 indicators and gave appropriate weightage to such indicators only in respect of the Hindu communities and for non Hindu communities, separate criteria has been evolved and such criteria has been reproduced in the report of the Andhra Pradesh Commission for Backward Classes at page 200. 123. The relevant portion from the Commission’s report deserves to be extracted for ready reference, which is thus: “12.18 After giving a good deal of thought to these difficulties the Commission has evolved the following rough and ready criteria for identifying non Hindu OBCs:- (i) All untouchables converted to any non-Hindu religion; and (ii) Such occupational communities, which are known by the name of their traditional hereditary occupation and whose Hindu counterparts have been included in the list of Hindu OBCs. (Examples : Dhobi, Teli, Dheemar, Nai, Gujar, Kumhar, Lohar, Darji, Badhai, etc);” 124. Therefore, I am of the view that the Commission was not wrong in adopting either ‘rough and ready’ method or ‘fast track’ method in identifying the backwardness among some groups of the Muslims by identifying them with their hereditary or traditional occupations. 125. It is common knowledge in rural areas, a person would be addressed not necessarily by his name but by his occupation. In such cases, backwardness has to be attached not only to those people who address people by their occupation, but also to the persons who are addressed by their occupation. In other words, backwardness in perception is much low compared to the social and educational backwardness. In such cases, backwardness has to be attached not only to those people who address people by their occupation, but also to the persons who are addressed by their occupation. In other words, backwardness in perception is much low compared to the social and educational backwardness. If put slightly in a different way, even individuals belonging to non-Hindu groups like Muslims in the present case, would be addressed by their occupation and therefore, the backwardness is identifiable with the traditional or hereditary occupation notwithstanding one’s religious faith. 126. The minds of those sections of people in my opinion have been well tuned that he is being identified with his traditional occupation only but not by his name and that the Society cannot be faulted for the same. In other words, the identity of the individuals belonging to these sections is their occupation and nothing else because they have no other recognized social status by which they will be placed on a higher stratum. It is the obligation on the part of the State to ameliorate and augment the social standards of these social groups belonging to the Muslims. 127. In Ashoka Kumar Thakur’s case (6 supra), the working of the NCBC on grounds including that no guideline or criteria were evolved by the Commission. However, it was noticed by the apex Court various guidelines that were that were prescribed by the NCBC and Sri Balakrishnan, CJI, in his judgment had reasoned that the elaborate questionnaire was prepared by the NCBC and the answers in that questionnaire were considered in detail for inclusion/rejection in the list and concluded by saying that, “it is clear that the lists of socially and educationally backward classes of citizens are being prepared not solely on the basis of the caste and if caste and other considerations are taken into account for determining backwardness, it cannot be said that it would violative of Article 15(1) of the Constitution.” 128. Even in Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra) this Court also had referred to the NCBC guidelines and appreciated the role adopted by it. 129. The above guideline has a direct bearing on the occupation either hereditary or traditional on various social groups, be it the Hindus or the Muslims. Even in Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra) this Court also had referred to the NCBC guidelines and appreciated the role adopted by it. 129. The above guideline has a direct bearing on the occupation either hereditary or traditional on various social groups, be it the Hindus or the Muslims. As already pointed out above, whether it is a Hindu or a non-Hindu whoever is involved in a particular occupation will be identified with that occupation for the purpose of assessing the backwardness. So, if a naibrahmin (barber) in Hindu community belongs to a backward class, how a hajam (barber) can be treated as not belonging to backward class among Muslims. Perhaps that is the reason why the NCBC had formulated the above guideline indicating that the individuals who have no other mark in the society for identification, all shall be treated as having been suffering from the same backwardness as his occupational counterparts. 130. Therefore, what is obvious is – many of the social groups among the Muslims have been involved in the same occupations among the Hindus which were classified as backward. Here comes the role of Article 14 of the Constitution in the context of Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution with regard to socially and educationally backward classes among the Muslims. Whether the APCBC’s Report and Recommendations are vitiated by failure to publish criteria in advance, amounts to lack of transparency and violation of the principles of natural justice ? 131. It was argued by the learned Senior Counsel Sri Ramakrishna Reddy and also the learned Counsel Sri Ravichandran that the APCBC ought to have informed at least to the objectors about the criteria to be adopted and also provided data and material collected by it. The failure of the CBC in this regard is violative of the principles of natural justice. 132. In this regard, as pointed out by the learned Advocate General that the apex Court did not at any time held that the criteria evolved/adopted by the Commission need to be published. The APCBC Act 1993 also would not obligate the Commission to publish the criteria evolved. 132. In this regard, as pointed out by the learned Advocate General that the apex Court did not at any time held that the criteria evolved/adopted by the Commission need to be published. The APCBC Act 1993 also would not obligate the Commission to publish the criteria evolved. In this regard, it has been pointed out by the learned Advocate General that the Commission was entrusted with two different functions under Section 9 (1) of the APCBC Act, 1993 – firstly; to ‘examine’ the requests for inclusion of any class of citizens as ‘backward class’ in the ‘list’ and secondly; to ‘hear’, ‘examine’ the complaints of over-inclusion or under-inclusion of already included ‘Backward Classes’ in the ‘list’. 133. So far as the first function is concerned, the Commission is not expected to finally decide about the rights of class of citizens and on the contrary, it is supposed to submit its recommendation as a fact finding authority. 134. So far as the second function is concerned, the Commission has to deal with the ‘Backward Classes’, which were already included in the ‘list’ and express its view about the excess-inclusion or under-inclusion of any backward class in the ‘list’. The concept of ‘hearing’ as enunciated under Section 9 (1) of the APCBC Act, 1993 and the question of furnishing material to the objectors does not arise, inasmuch as the same is not adversarial litigation. 135. In other words, at the stage of ‘hearing’, it cannot be construed as a ‘lis’ involved. If that is the real intention of the Legislature, the expression ‘examine’ would turn out to be a regular and routine litigation before a court or courts of law and in such an event, it would again turn out to be an unending litigation leading to far reaching consequences in the society and as a consequence thereof, the constitutional obligation on the part of the State in the context of extending the benefits under Articles 15(4) or 16(4) of the Constitution would and could never be achieved and in all probability, may lead to a social disorder or disharmony. In other words, Section 9 (1) of the Act of 2007/1993 would only contemplate ‘examination’ but not ‘hearing, since the Legislature is absolutely clear in its mind in not employing the expression ‘hearing’, was obviously for the above reasons. 136. In other words, Section 9 (1) of the Act of 2007/1993 would only contemplate ‘examination’ but not ‘hearing, since the Legislature is absolutely clear in its mind in not employing the expression ‘hearing’, was obviously for the above reasons. 136. So far as the other limb of Section 9 (1) of the Act is concerned, complaints can always be made by the person or persons aggrieved as and when it was felt that there was an excessive inclusion or under inclusion, as the case may be, of a class in the category of socially and educationally backward classes and in such a case, there would be “hearing” of the aggrieved persons belonging to a particular class. 137. Therefore, in the context of the second limb of Section 9 (1) of the Act, it is not as though the aggrieved persons are denied of the opportunity of ‘hearing’. In the present case, the question before the Commission to address is regarding the first part of Section 9 (1) of the Act of 2007 and therefore, the aspects which have already been covered in the earlier paras would have to be taken note of and accordingly, I am of the considered view that the concept of introducing the ‘hearing’ and grievance that the principles of natural justice are violated cannot be countenanced. 138. In Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra), Sri V.V.S.Rao, J., had made certain observations at para 325, which are as under: “ … … … We may add that mere educational backwardness and political backwardness of a class/group of citizens for different sociological and cultural reasons, by itself would not lead to an inference that the class/group is backward. Such an approach would not only ignore the law laid down by the Supreme Court but also amounts to putting cart before the horse. Be that as it is, as we already noticed, the "absence of social structure, social hierarchy, absence of technology to control the environment, traditional apathy for education on account of such social status, organization in the society to create inducements to uplift people and improve economy, and absence of paraphernalia like enterprise, economic resources for creating social welfare are all indicative of social backwardness". 139. The above observations indicate that mere educational backwardness and political backwardness may not lead to an inference that such class/group is backward. 140. 139. The above observations indicate that mere educational backwardness and political backwardness may not lead to an inference that such class/group is backward. 140. It is indiscernible in this context as to how in the context of Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution the educational backwardness and political backwardness can be mixed. 141. Political backwardness is totally a different subject and certainly not covered by either Articles 15(4) or 16(4) of the Constitution and the above observations are again contrary to the principles laid down in Indra Sahwney’s case (5 supra). 142. Basically the issue before the Court was as to whether the Muslim community as a whole can be declared as socially and educationally backward and political backwardness does not find any place in that context and on that premise, the learned Judge had proceeded, with which I respectfully disagree. 143. Later part of the above observations, in fact, are the views expressed in Pradip Tandon vs. State of U.P. The said case was decided by a 3-Judge bench of High Court of Allahabad. 144. Keeping in view the totality of the circumstances and the context, I am of the view that the observations made by a 3-Judge bench of High Court of Allahabad in Pradip Tandon’s case (supra) cannot be accepted and I am of the further view that Sri V.V.S.Rao, J., in my considered opinion, was totally misplaced in placing reliance on those observations, which are totally not relevant nor binding on this Court in the light of the analysis made by the apex Court in Indra Sahwney’s case (5 supra). 145. In Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra) Sri V.V.S.Rao, J. further pointed out, in paras 276 and 292, that the Commission shall conduct enquiry in a scientific method for the purpose of effective enforcement of Fundamental Rights in Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution. But, again these observations are contrary to the principles laid down in Indra Sahwney’s case (5 supra), wherein it was said that the enquiry need not necessarily be scientific. 146. A good deal of discussion has been made by Sri V.V.S.Rao, J., about the transparency in governance and fair procedure in administration. The learned Judge observes in this connection that the transparency and fair procedure in administration is sine qua non and basic facet of ‘rule of law’ (see para 279). 147. 146. A good deal of discussion has been made by Sri V.V.S.Rao, J., about the transparency in governance and fair procedure in administration. The learned Judge observes in this connection that the transparency and fair procedure in administration is sine qua non and basic facet of ‘rule of law’ (see para 279). 147. In this regard, it is necessary for me to reiterate that the Commission was discharging its functions under Section 9(1) of the Act, 1993, and while discharging such a function, it was not deciding any rights and instead, dealt with only fact finding and discharges the duty of making recommendations only. Therefore, the Commission, while exercising the powers under Section 9(1) of the Act, 1993, cannot deal with the concept of governance or fair procedure in administration. Even otherwise, there is no yardstick to measure the transparency or fair procedure adopted by the Commission. These two aspects are subject to the satisfaction of the government, which is the authority and can take a final decision after considering the recommendations of the Commission. 148. The Commission, as was already pointed out, was not dealing with adversarial litigation and was only performing its duty as a fact finding authority. In fact, the Commission is not expected to conduct the enquiry or investigation or examine (in the present case, ‘examine’ as per Section 9(1) of the Act, 1993) as a regular court deciding a ‘lis’ between the parties. 149. The apex Court in KESHAR SINGH vs. STATE (DELHI ADMN) [ (1988) 3 SCC 609 ] held that the Commission constituted under Commissions of Enquiries Act is not deciding any lis and the process of Commission, in such cases, is inquisitorial rather than adversarial. 150. It has been pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel Sri Satyanarayana Prasad, representing the Commission, that in none of the earlier Commissions, including Anantha Raman’s Commission, made such pre-publication. It is further pointed out that, in fact, in Anantha Raman’s Commission, the criteria was arrived at after collection of its material and the said criteria was not pre-notified or pre-published. Even in Mandal Commission’s report, the Commission did not pre-notify or pre-publish the criteria. 151. In the light of Indra Sahwney’s case (5 supra), it is to be pointed out that nowhere in the said case, the apex Court described that the Commission should publish the criteria in advance. Even in Mandal Commission’s report, the Commission did not pre-notify or pre-publish the criteria. 151. In the light of Indra Sahwney’s case (5 supra), it is to be pointed out that nowhere in the said case, the apex Court described that the Commission should publish the criteria in advance. It is not the intention of the apex Court to tie down the Commission with the conditions which would render the tasks of the Commission more complex or near impossible. 152. Therefore, Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra), in my considered opinion, is not right in giving directions to formulate the publication of criteria and the same are contrary to the Mandal’s case and Ashoka Kumar Thakur’s case (6 supra). 153. The apex Court in Indra Sawhney’s case (5 supra) approved its earlier judgment in U.S.V.Balram’s case (supra) that despite best efforts that any Commission may make in collecting material and data in the matters of this nature, the conclusions cannot always be scientifically accurate and that the proper approach should be to see whether the relevant data and materials referred in the report of the Commission justified its conclusion. 154. Sri Jeevan Reddy, J. in Indra Sahwney’s case (5 supra) had pointed at para 857, which is as under: “… … … In a social measure like the impugned one, the court must give due regard to the judgment of the Executive, a co-equal wing of the State and approach the measure in the spirit in which it is conceived.” 155. The further observations in para 854 are as under: “… … … But in an exercise of such magnitude and complexity, such errors are not uncommon. These errors cannot be made a basis for rejecting either the relevance of the criteria evolved by the Commission or the entire exercise of identification. It is one thing to say that these errors must be rectified by the Government of India by evolving an appropriate mechanism and an altogether different thing to say that on that account, the entire exercise becomes futile. There can never be a perfect report. In human affairs, such as this, perfection is only an ideal – not an attainable goal. … … …” 156. There can never be a perfect report. In human affairs, such as this, perfection is only an ideal – not an attainable goal. … … …” 156. It is the further observation in Indra Sahwney’s case (5 supra), at para 857, that the rules of law are made to enable the law to promote social justice and should not be used to nullify the social justice and that sacrificing the too many social goals on the altar of the rule of law, they make the law barren and empty. 157. While so holding the apex Court was emphasizing that the courts may not entertain trivial/technical pleas, however attractive they may be, while dealing with the matters of social justice, that too, at the behest of those who are opposed to the doctrine of equality and removal of inequality including socially included, which is a constitutional obligation. 158. For the above reasons and in the light of the judgments of the apex Court in U.S.V.Barlam’s case (supra) and in Indra Sahwney’s case (5 supra) at paras 849 and 857, it cannot be held that the argument that the function of the identification of backward classes by the B.C. Commission shall be scientific and error-proof, shall not stand. Are the recommendations of the Commission vitiated by inadequacy of the sample surveyed, or on the ground that survey was conducted not by the Commission but by members of its staff, or the survey at irrelevant places and absence of any survey of sample of two social groups ? 159. In this regard, I have to fall back necessarily upon the reasons assigned in the above paragraphs. 160. At the cost of repetition, I reiterate that the apex Court did not choose to entertain the contention in Indra Sahwney’s case (5 supra) that the survey conducted was inadequate. 161. The learned Advocate General points out that the survey conducted by the Commission was only to find out, whether there is no contra evidence and even then the Commission has conducted survey by making enquiries from more number of persons. At any rate, the sufficiency or otherwise of the material gathered by the Commission would not fall within the ambit of judicial scrutiny of this Court. 162. It is well accepted principle that the quality is more relevant than the quantity. At any rate, the sufficiency or otherwise of the material gathered by the Commission would not fall within the ambit of judicial scrutiny of this Court. 162. It is well accepted principle that the quality is more relevant than the quantity. In fact, there is no requirement of enquiry/survey at all in view of the fast track/rough and ready methods adopted instead of straightaway identifying the groups, the Commission made an additional effort only to find out, if there is any contra evidence against such groups to be identified as Backward Classes. 163. In other words, if this exercise is expected to be undertaken by the Commission and the same is to be subjected to strict scrutiny as was sought in Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra), it may amount to a fault finding exercise instead of being fact finding in the pursuit of achieving the avowed objective of social justice under the Constitution in the context of Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution. 164. Further, I reiterate that no procedure has been prescribed either under the Act or Rules of 1993 in order to conduct the survey of this nature. In such a case, the Commission has to necessarily adopt its own procedure/criteria, while discharging its duty of identifying the Backward Classes in the Muslim community. 165. It was brought to the notice of this Court by the learned Senior Counsel for the Commission that the Commission had surveyed at an average of 183 persons and 43 household per community recommended. Incidentally, it was also pointed out that Anantha Raman’s Commission had taken into account the samples of 9 persons per community recommended. 166. Dealing with the absence of survey of two communities viz., ‘Guddi Eluguvallu’ and ‘Gosangi Muslims’, the learned Advocate General pointed out that the procedure adopted by the B.C. Commission for all the groups is fact track/rough and ready method and in which event, there was no necessity for conducting enquiry as was done by the Commission, at all. 167. Unless there is a palpable arbitrariness, which is capable of defeating the very purpose and object of the Commission, any such lapse cannot be attached with the ability of nullifying the report of the Commission. 168. 167. Unless there is a palpable arbitrariness, which is capable of defeating the very purpose and object of the Commission, any such lapse cannot be attached with the ability of nullifying the report of the Commission. 168. According to the learned Advocate General, in fact, as held in Indra Sahwney’s case (5 supra), there are certain groups/communities, which deserve dispensation under Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution straightaway and that one can identify such group by mere mention of their names. 169. To illustrate – ‘Gosangi Muslims’ are beggars and a mendicant community providing services for corpses at burial-ground. ‘Katikapala’ is a B.C. Community among the Hindus rendering similar services. 170. ‘Guddi Eluguvallu’ is another mendicant community by way of entertaining the public using animals. There are some social groups among the Muslims, which are equivalent to the groups among the Hindus, who are per se leading a human life. 171. If one requires adequate details and particulars in such cases also, social obligation on the part of the Government can never be achieved and on the other hand, any such attempt or expectation in that direction would render such social obligation a myth. A beggar is a beggar regardless of the insular religion. 172. Similarly, some of the insular groups among the Muslims are identifiable as their counterparts among the Hindus by their traditional occupation. 173. For example, ‘Guddi Eluguvallu’ and ‘Gosangi Muslims’, but for their attachment with the religion, they would have been regarded as belonging to the socially and educationally backward classes. 174. Therefore, religion is the date-line between the Hindus and the Muslims in the context of Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution. I may also venture to say that these social groups though eke out their livelihood on the same lines as their counterparts among the Hindus, if not extended the benefits under Articles 15(4) and 16 (4) of the Constitution, the same would be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution and for a naked eye that appears to be totally irrational and a severe dent to the secularism. 175. There are certain groups like ‘Khureshis’, ‘Dhobi Muslims’, whose geographical location is broadly identified as a particular region. But, the services rendered by such classes are almost all pervasive. 176. 175. There are certain groups like ‘Khureshis’, ‘Dhobi Muslims’, whose geographical location is broadly identified as a particular region. But, the services rendered by such classes are almost all pervasive. 176. For example, Khureshis – whose geographical location is identified as ‘Rayalaseema’, their traditional occupation being butchering of animals for meat consumption, are spread everywhere. This caste practice is known both to the Hindus and the Muslims. In other words, butchering is their hereditary or traditional occupation, which they live on. 177. Likewise, ‘Dhobis’. It is hard to imagine in a district or a region where we do not find a Dhobi. If the religious distinction is erased, Dhobis live anywhere in the State. 178. Another example is regarding ‘Garadi’. The geographical location is a village in Karnataka and a village in Andhra Pradesh. But, as per the ASI report, ‘Garadi’ is the name of a class of mendicant in Telugu country and Mysore. Therefore, it is safe to infer that community belongs to Andhra Pradesh also, which is a Telugu country. 179. If I have to deal with each and every community, virtually that amounts to redoing the whole exercise done by the Commission or trying to identifying, if not making, holes to the recommendations of the Commission. 180. It is necessary also to make a few observations on the position of minorities since the presently identified backward classes also belong to a religious minority. 181. The learned Senior Counsel Sri K.G.Kannabiran explained in detail the disadvantages and the plight of minorities internationally as well as nationally and pointed out the danger of the majority overlooking facts and rights pertaining to minorities. Instances of such oversights have already been noticed in respect of the Anantaraman Commission regarding “Mehtar” and in respect of that Commission and Muralidhara Rao Commission generally regarding Muslims. This has been discussed in detail above. 182. In this context, an observation by Sri B.P.Jeevan Reddy, J. in Bommai’s case (supra) delivered on his behalf and on behalf of Justice Agarwal is important. In that judgment, paras 302 to 310 deal with the issue of secularism under the heading “The Constitution of India and the concept of secularism” in para 319 at pages 235-236. 183. 182. In this context, an observation by Sri B.P.Jeevan Reddy, J. in Bommai’s case (supra) delivered on his behalf and on behalf of Justice Agarwal is important. In that judgment, paras 302 to 310 deal with the issue of secularism under the heading “The Constitution of India and the concept of secularism” in para 319 at pages 235-236. 183. This judgment made the following weighty pronouncement: “It is true – as Shri Ram Jethmalani was at pains to emphasise – that India was divided on the basis of religion and that areas having majority Muslim population were constituted into a new entity – Pakistan – which immediately proceeded to proclaim itself as an Islamic Republic, but is equally a fact that even after partition, India contained a sizable population of minorities. They comprised not less than 10 to 12% of the population. Inspired by the Indian tradition of tolerance and fraternity, for whose sake, the greatest son of Modern India, Mahatma Gandhi, laid down his life and seeking to redeem the promise of religious neutrality held forth by the Congress Party, the Founding Fathers proceed to create a State, secular in its outlook and legalitarian in its action. They could not have countenanced the idea of treating the minorities as second class citizens. On the contrary, the dominant thinking appears to be that the majority community, Hindus, must be secular and thereby help the minorities to become secular. For, it is the majority community alone that can provide the sense of security to others. The significance of the 42nd (Amendment) Act lies in the fact that it formalized the preexisting situation. … … …” 184. The bulk of the Muslim backward classes have been kept out of the BC list all these decades, till now. 185. No less regard and, in fact, even more regard needs to be given by the court to the legislature and an Act passed by it because the Executive is recognized as co-equal of the judiciary under our Constitution. CONCLUSIONS:- 186. 185. No less regard and, in fact, even more regard needs to be given by the court to the legislature and an Act passed by it because the Executive is recognized as co-equal of the judiciary under our Constitution. CONCLUSIONS:- 186. In conclusion, I reiterate the following points: (1) The impugned Act is an act of the legislature in furtherance of the Constitutional obligation cast on the State to bring about real equality in society by bringing in the ambit of constitutional provisions under Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution, the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens of Muslim society of Andhra Pradesh; (2) As per law laid down by the Supreme Court in various authoritative judgments including in Saurab Chaudri’s case (9 supra) and Ashoka Kumar Thakur’s case (6 supra), when such actions are challenged the courts have to scrutinize the challenge on the basis of the presumption of Constitutional validity of the legislation and the extent of judicial review of the Act and the circumstances leading to it will be limited to examining whether there has been anything unreasonable on the face of the Act or the surrounding circumstances on which the Act is based; (3) In the present case, on examination of the evidence adduced before us, I am of the view that there is nothing in the circumstances leading to the Act, i.e., the material basis of the Act as laid out in the APCBC’s report and other materials that the State had in its knowledge, which could be termed as either perverse on per se defective or totally unrelated to the identification of backward classes made in the Act. I have no reason at all to hold that the methodology and procedure adopted in the exercise leading to the Act are either distorted or deliberately calculated to give effect to a pre-conceived result as has been made out by the challengers of the Act in this case; (4) I hold that the criteria evident in the APCBC Report are in accordance with the well-tested principles in social enquiry as adopted by the National Commission for Backward Classes, the Mandal Commission and other Backward Classes Commissions in the country since a long time; (5) Irrespective of any inadequacies or deficiencies in the APCBC report and other materials, once a legislation is enacted the judiciary has to take into account the principle of presumption of constitutional validity of any legislation under the Indian Constitution and set it aside only if there is anything in the legislation which strikes the conscience and strikes the eye as totally unreasonable. That is not the position in the present case; (6) The case of the petitioners is only that there could have been better criteria and procedure, which would make the social enquiry more perfect and scientific. In view of the pronouncement of the 9-Member Bench of the Supreme Court in the authoritative Indra Sawhney’s case judgment in so many words including that “the result arrived at cannot be questioned on the ground that other valid criteria were also available for such identification” and “no method is perfect particularly when sociological findings are in issue” and also that even if the result so arrived at may be defective marginally or in marginal number of cases, that does not invalidate the exercise itself and marginal defects when found may be cured in individual cases but the entire finding is not rendered invalid on that account”, I am not in a position to accept the present challenge of the petitioners, which are based merely on procedural and technical grounds. (7) I hold that, in view of the Supreme Court judgment in Saurab Chaudri’s case (9 supra) and the Indra Sawhney’s case (5 supra), my brother judges in Archana Reddy’s case (supra) have not been correct in taking the extent of judicial review to the exacting standards evolved in the American constitutional context where the principles of “suspect legislation”, “strict scrutiny”, Compelling State interest”, “narrow tailoring” have been applied by the American Supreme Court in view of the fact that the American Constitution does not contain a mandatory provision for equality and where it is left to the discretion of individual educational institutions and States to introduce “affirmative action” programmes in favour of individual candidates perceived to be in a disadvantaged position. The Indian Constitution, unlike the American Constitution, clearly casts a mandate on the State to undertake measures for securing social justice, economic justice and political justice as well as equality of status and equality of opportunity, binding the State in all its limbs and all institutions of the State to achieve this goal by appropriate social justice measures including Reservation and they have no need to affirm and no freedom to deny. While adopting these measures the State need to consider the claim of all sections of people, irrespective of differences in religion. The views expressed and conclusions in Archana Reddy’s case (supra) on the above concepts and principles and the consequent view taken in Archana Reddy’s case (1 supra) about burden of proof are per incurium and not applicable to the present case; (8) When the State in A.P., holds the view that coverage under Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution in respect of certain social groups among Muslims have been missed until the impugned Act even while the same coverage in respect of other religious communities have been in existence since long time, the court cannot accept any challenge to the Act on the ground that it is religion-specific. On the contrary, the impugned Act is an act of delayed rectification of injustice done to them all along and extending of justice to the now included social groups who have been identified not on the basis of their religion but on the parameters of social and educational backwardness. On the contrary, the impugned Act is an act of delayed rectification of injustice done to them all along and extending of justice to the now included social groups who have been identified not on the basis of their religion but on the parameters of social and educational backwardness. By including the now identified groups in the BC list the State has not made any discrimination based on religion and no rights of any citizens have been violated; (9) The petitioners’ plea that item 15 in the schedule of the impugned Act will encourage conversions is irrational and unrealistic and is rejected; (10) Importantly, it has to be taken note that while enacting the impugned Act, the State has not only identified socially and educationally backward classes but also taken care to specifically identify, spell out clearly and exclude the socially and educationally advanced social groups from the list of BCs. With such diligent care taken by the State, there is no scope for any socially advanced social groups of Muslims to take advantage of item 15 of the schedule and there is no scope for inferring mala fide intentions on the part of the State to give undue advantage to any class of citizens on the basis of religion only or to deny the rights under Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution to any class or individual citizens. If in addition to the 10 social groups identified as ‘not socially backward’ are excluded, if any citizen has any information to show that there is any other social group of Muslims which is not socially backward, it is open to such citizen to move the NCBC with a complaint of over-inclusion and seeking the removal of such non-backward social groups from the ambit the benefit of the Act and to add such social groups to the list of the excluded social groups; (11) None of the specific inclusion of socially groups recommended by the APCBC and made in the impugned Act and its schedule is unjustified. Provision of 4% reservation for the backward social groups of Muslims now identified is neither unjustified nor excessive; (12) The challenges to the Act by the petitioners merely on the basis of procedural and technical aspects are not substantive and deserve to be rejected and the Act has to be upheld as fully in conformity with the Constitutional provisions and not violative of any fundamental rights of any citizen of India; (13) The appointment of Sri P.S.Krishnan by the State is within the constitutional powers of the State and is legal and from his background, profile, experience and quality as seen from his report, his choice for this task was appropriate. His appointment is not parallel to the APCBC and does not, in any way, affect the APCBC’s role. The APCBC report is not vitiated for failure to publish criteria in advance. The observations in Archana Reddy’s case (supra) requiring such publication is contrary to the Indra Sawhney’s case (supra) judgment and is per incurium. Though I have discussed the merits of the contentions of the petitioners on this and other issues on procedural aspects of identification of BCs, having come to the constitutional validity of the impugned Act on the basis of the content and output of the Act, I hold that these challenges regarding procedural aspects are not adequate to invalidate the impugned Act. 187. In the result, all the writ and PIL petitions are dismissed with the above observations. No costs.