JUDGMENT : This Writ Petition is filed for a Mandamus to declare G.O.Ms.No.18, Industries & Commerce (INF) Department, dated 4-2-2003, issued by respondent No.1 permitting allotment of land admeasuring Ac.31.605 guntas situated at Ramachandrapuram, Medak District, to respondent No.5, as illegal. The petitioners also sought for a declaration that the failure of respondent No.1 to consider their representation, dated 18-8-2003, for re-conveyance of the land admeasuring Ac.9.38 guntas in Survey Nos.267, 268 and 280 to the petitioners, as illegal. I have heard Sri Ch.Ramesh Babu, learned counsel for the petitioners; the learned Government Pleader for Industry representing respondent No.1; and Sri B.P.Mohan, learned Standing Counsel representing respondents 2 and 3. Respondent No.1 acquired huge extents of land for establishment of a factory, buildings, township, schools etc., for Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (for short "the BHEL"). An extent of Ac.30.00 belonging to the father of the petitioners was also acquired for that purpose. Award bearing No.H/386/61 dated 12-2-1963, was passed and compensation was received under the said award by the petitioners' father. According to the petitioners, after utilizing the major portion of the land, acquired for the above mentioned purpose, an extent of Ac.458.00 was left unutilized. Out of the said land, an extent of Ac.235.00 was permitted to be utilized by the BHEL for the purpose of providing houses to its employees, subject to its surrendering the balance extent of Ac.223.00 to respondent No.2 for construction of multi-storied buildings for housing the industrial workers other than the workers of the BHEL. Accordingly, the said land was surrendered to respondent No.2. It is further averred that on a request made by the BHEL, the State Government permitted respondent No.2 to retransfer Ac.140.20 guntas of land on payment of market value of Rs.1,500/-per acre plus 15% additional amount under G.O.Ms.No.420, Industries & Commerce (INF) Department, dated 24-12-1993; and that out of the remaining Ac.82.20 guntas of surplus land available with respondent No.2, it has sold Ac.11.70 guntas in favour of M/s. Brindavan Gas Service, Sri Ganapati Sachitananda Ashram, Sri Vasavi Kanyaka Parameshwari Arya Vysya Sangh and Rythu Bazar, in violation of G.O.Ms.No.278, Industries & Commerce (INF) Department, dated 19-6-1985. It is further averred that respondent No.1 issued G.O.Ms.No.18, dated 4-2-2003, granting permission to respondent No.2 to allot the balance extent of Ac.71.00 of land to the Housing Societies of BDL and BHEL; and that, on the basis of the said allotment, respondent No.3 issued letter, dated 14-5-2003, allotting Ac.31.605 guntas to respondent No.5, while allotting the balance land to the BHEL House Building Society. According to the petitioners, out of the said extent of Ac.31.605 guntas, an extent of Ac.9.38 guntas was acquired from their father and, as such, the said transfer was in violation of the provisions of Section 54 of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli (for short "the 1317 Fasli Act"), Standing Order No.90(32) of the Andhra Pradesh Board Standing Orders (Land Revenue, Settlement and Miscellaneous) (for short "the Standings Orders"), Section 19(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Urban Areas (Development) Act, 1975 (for short "the 1975 Act") and Articles 14, 19(1) (g) and 300-A of the Constitution of India. The petitioners also relied upon the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Syed Akbar 1999 (5) ALT 202 (DB). Separate counter-affidavits have been filed on behalf of respondents 2 and 3 and respondent No.5. In the counter-affidavit of respondents 2 and 3, it is, inter alia, stated that the petitioners do not have any manner of right or claim over the land, which was acquired long back; that once the land was acquired from the father of the petitioners and compensation was paid, the title vests with the Government; and that the owners of the land are not entitled for reconveyance of the lands. It is further averred that on the directions issued by the Government under G.O.Ms.No.18, dated 4-2-2003, respondent No.2 allotted land to an extent of Ac.31.605 guntas in favour of M/s.Bharat Dynamics Bhanur Employees' Mutually Aided Co-operative Housing Society Limited, and another extent of Ac.32.955 guntas in favour of M/s. BHEL Employees' Mutually Aided Cooperative Housing Society Limited, vide: orders dated 14-5-2003, for construction of houses for their members; and that, accordingly, the allotment of land in favour of respondent No.5 for housing purpose was on the direction of the State Government issued under the above mentioned G.O. The contents of the counter-affidavit filed by respondent No.5 need not be discussed as they are not very much relevant for disposal of this case. At the hearing, the learned counsel for the petitioners reiterated the pleas raised in the affidavit and he relied upon Clause 90(32) of the Standing Orders, Section 54 of the 1317 Fasli Act and Section 19(2) of the 1975 Act. The learned Government Pleader for Industries and the learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondents 2 and 3 opposed the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners and submitted that when once the land is acquired for a public purpose, it vests in the Government and the original owner of the land loses all his rights over the land and, therefore, the question of reconveyance of the land on the ground that a part of the land was not utilized for the purpose for which it was acquired, does not arise. They further submitted that allotment of a part of the unutilized land for housing purpose of employees of a public sector undertaking is a public purpose. In support of their submissions, the learned Government Pleader placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh and another Vs. Syed Akbar (2005) 1 SCC 558 and Tamilnadu Housing Board Vs. L.Chandrasekaran (2010) 2 SCC 786 . The case decided by the Supreme Court in Government of A.P., Vs. Syed Akbar case (2 supra) arose from the judgment of this Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Syed Akbar (1 supra), on which the petitioners placed reliance. The facts in these cases are more or less similar to those in the present case. In that case, certain extent of land was acquired by the State for improvement of a road. After completion of acquisition proceedings, possession of the land was taken. Out of the acquired land, 424 Sq. yards was utilized and the rest of the land remained vacant. On coming to know about the said fact, the original owner of the land made representations to the District Collector to reassign the unused land to him and that he was prepared to reimburse the compensation that had been received by him along with interest. As there was no response to the said representations, the erstwhile owner filed Writ Petition No.14062 of 1997 in this Court for a Mandamus to the authorities to reassign the unused land to him, basing his claim on Clause No.90(32) of the Standing Orders. As there was no response to the said representations, the erstwhile owner filed Writ Petition No.14062 of 1997 in this Court for a Mandamus to the authorities to reassign the unused land to him, basing his claim on Clause No.90(32) of the Standing Orders. The said Writ Petition was disposed of with a direction to the District Collector to consider the representation of the petitioner therein. As the representation was rejected by the District Collector, by order, dated 18-10-1997, the land owner again approached this Court by filing Writ Petition No.33171 of 1997. A learned single Judge allowed the said Writ Petition, which was questioned in Writ Appeal by the State. A Division Bench of this Court by its judgment (1 supra), while confirming the order of the learned single Judge, held that apart from Clause No.90(32) of the Standing Orders, Section 54-A of the 1317 Fasli Act also supported the land owner's case. The State filed SLP before the Supreme Court. The Apex Court reversed the judgment of the Division Bench and held that neither Clause No.90(32) of the Standing Orders nor Section 54 of the 1317 Fasli Act has any application to the case. The Supreme Court has taken note of the amendment brought out to para 32 of Clause No.90 under G.O.Ms.No.783, dated 9-10-1998 and held that the said para enables the Government to utilize the land acquired for any other public purpose, if the land was not needed for the purpose for which it was acquired. Similarly, the Supreme Court held that the provisions of Section 54-A of the 1317 Fasli Act "will be attracted only when an agricultural land acquired for public benefit was no longer required not necessarily for the specific purpose for which it was acquired". On this reasoning, the Apex Court rejected the plea based on Clause 90(32) of the Standing Orders. This judgment is a complete answer to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners based on the provisions of Clause No.90(32) of the Standing Orders and Section 54-A of the 1317 Fasli Act. On this reasoning, the Apex Court rejected the plea based on Clause 90(32) of the Standing Orders. This judgment is a complete answer to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners based on the provisions of Clause No.90(32) of the Standing Orders and Section 54-A of the 1317 Fasli Act. As regards Section 19 of the 1975 Act, under the said provision, subject to any directions given by the Government under the said Act, the Authority, or as the case may be, the local authority concerned may dispose of any land acquired by the Government and transferred to it, without undertaking or carrying out any development thereon or any such land after taking or carrying out such development as it thinks fit, to such persons in such manner and subject to such terms and conditions at it considers expedient for securing the development of the area concerned according to plan. In the first place, this provision has no application to the facts of the present case, because it is not the case of the petitioners that their land was acquired under the provisions of the 1975 Act or that the Authority constituted under the said Act was handed over such acquired land. More over, the said provision does not envisage any reconveyance of land to the original owners. In a catena of judgments, the Apex Court, considering the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short "the 1894 Act"), and Section 48B in particular, held that upon acquisition of land title therein vests absolutely in the State or the agency on whose behalf the land is acquired; if the land acquired for a public purpose is not utilized for the purpose for which the same was acquired, it can be utilized for any other public purpose; and that the original owners, from whom the land was acquired, are not entitled for reconveyance on the ground that the land was not utilized for the purpose for which it was acquired. (See: Tamilnadu Housing Board vs. Keeravani Ammal AIR 2007 SC 1691 = (2007) 9 SCC 255 , State of Kerala Vs. M.Bhaskaran Pillai (1997) 5 SCC 432 and Tamil Nadu Housing Board Vs. L. Chandrasekaran-(3) supra). As pointed out by the learned Government Pleader, allotment of land for a Housing Co-operative Society, comprising employees of a public sector undertaking, is certainly for a public purpose. M.Bhaskaran Pillai (1997) 5 SCC 432 and Tamil Nadu Housing Board Vs. L. Chandrasekaran-(3) supra). As pointed out by the learned Government Pleader, allotment of land for a Housing Co-operative Society, comprising employees of a public sector undertaking, is certainly for a public purpose. As such, in my opinion, the petitioners are not entitled for reconveyance of the land either under the provisions pleaded by them or under Section 48B of the 1894 Act. For the above mentioned reasons, I do not find any merit in the Writ Petition and the same is accordingly dismissed.