JUDGMENT : D.N. Patel, J. The present writ petition has been preferred against the detailed reasoned order, passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat, Jamshedpur dated 1st November, 2008 in Permanent Lok Adalat Case No. 458 of 2007 (Annexure-3 to the memo of the present petition). 2. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has never given consent for inviting decision on merits from the Permanent Lok Adalat, on the contrary, there is clear denial to conciliate the case before the Permanent Lok Adalat, Jamshedpur. The respondent has raised a claim for damages arising out of motor vehicle accident. The claim is of Rs. 4,54,049/ - plus interest at the rate of 12% to the damages caused to the vehicle and the Permanent Lok Adalat, Jamshedpur without any power, jurisdiction and authority decided the issue on merits like civil court and allowed the claim of Rs. 2,83,802/ - as damages. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following reported decisions: (a) 2009 (4) JLJR 412 : 2009 (3) JCR 494 (Jhr.) (b) 2008 (3) JLJR. 513 : 2008 (4 JCR) 12 (Jhr.) (c) AIR 1995 SC 1384 and has submitted that unless the consent is given in writing, the Permanent Lok Adalat has no power, jurisdiction and authority to decide the issue on merits. Looking to paragraph No. 4 of the impugned order, the petitioner has denied the conciliation before the Permanent Lok Adalat, Jamshedpur. There is clear breach of Sub Section (7) of Section 22C of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (in short 'the Act, 1987'). Moreover, there is breach of Sub Section (8) of Section 22C of the Act, 1987 and therefore also, the impugned order at Annexure-3 dated 1st November, 2008 deserves to be quashed and set aside. 3. I have heard learned Counsel for the respondent, who has submitted that the order passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat. Jamshedpur is absolutely in consonance with the facts and law. The amount of the damages awarded by the Permanent Lok Adalat Jamshedpur cannot be said to be unreasonable, inaccessible, looking to the damages caused to the vehicle in motor vehicle accident. On the basis of the evidences on record, the claim allowed by the Permanent Lok Adalat, Jamshedpur at Rs. 2,83,802/ - is in consonance with the evidences and hence, this writ petition deserves to be dismissed. On the basis of the evidences on record, the claim allowed by the Permanent Lok Adalat, Jamshedpur at Rs. 2,83,802/ - is in consonance with the evidences and hence, this writ petition deserves to be dismissed. It is also submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondent that looking to Sub Section (8) of Section 22C of the Act, 1987, the Permanent Lok Adalat, Jamshedpur has all power, jurisdiction and authority to decide the case on merits and therefore also, tills petition deserves to be dismissed. 4. Having heard learned Counsel for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and looking to the impugned order, I hereby, quash and set aside the order, passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat, Jamshedpur, dated 1st November, 2008 in Permanent Lok Adalat Case No. 458 of 2007, Annexure-3 to the memo of the present petition, for the following facts and reasons: (i) It appears that the respondent is applicant before the Permanent Lok Adalat, Jamshedpur, who has instituted Permanent Lok Adalat Case No. 458 of 2007 for claiming damages caused to the vehicle in motor vehicle accident. The claim of damages caused to the vehicle was for Rs. 4,54,049/ - plus interest at the rate of 12 % per annum. (ii) It appears that the Permanent Lok Adalat, Jamshedpur has allowed the claim to the tune of Rs. 2,83,802/ - by the impugned order without appreciating the fact that the present petitioner has never given any consent for Inviting the decision on merits under Sub Section (8) of Section 22C of the Legal Services Authorities Act. 1987. (iii) It has been held by this Court in the case of National Insurance Company v. Kartik Gorain and Ors. as reported in 2009 (4) JLJR 412 , especially in paragraph 4, which reads as under: “4. It has been held in the aforesaid decisions that it is a duty vested in the Permanent Lok Adalats that by using their wisdom, knowledge and experience, terms of settlement ought to have been offered by the Permanent Lok Adalat on its own to the parties to the dispute. Thereafter, sometime ought to be granted to the parties to the dispute. Thereafter, sometime ought to be granted to the parties to the dispute. If they are offering their terms of settlement, it can be accepted by the Permanent Lok Adalat and if they are accepting the terms of settlement, offered by Permanent Lok Adalat, then only, an award can be passed. But, directly, the Permanent Lok Adalat cannot take a decision, on merits. Still there is an intervening stage. There must be a written consent by the parties to the dispute, given to the Permanent Lok Adalat for deciding the dispute, on merits. Unless there is a written consent by the parties to the dispute, given to the Permanent Lok Adalat, for deciding the dispute, on merits, the Permanent Lok Adalat shall have no power to decide the issues, on merits, as has been held in the aforesaid decision, rendered by this Court dated April 9, 2009 in W.P.(C) No. 1449 of 2008. (Emphasis Supplied) In view of the aforesaid decision, the predominant role of the Permanent Lok Adalat is of a conciliator and not of an adjudicator. Permanent Lok Adalat should not wear robe of the Court. They may be retired Judges of a District Court, but, they may not venture into and decide the issue on merits like a civil court. Permanent Lok Adalat is not a Court, at all. Their experience and wisdom ought to be utilised more in conciliation. Unless the consent is given in writing as stated hereinabove by both the parties, the Permanent Lok Adalat has no power, jurisdiction and authority to decide the issue on merits, under Sub Section (8) of Section 22C of the Act, 1987. (iv) It appears that looking to the facts of the present case, there is no consent given by the present petitioner for inviting decision on merits. It has been stated in paragraph No. 4 of the impugned order that even the present petitioner is not ready for any conciliation at all. In these set of circumstances, It was a bounden duty of the Permanent Lok Adalat to relegate the parties to the Civil Court or to the concerned Tribunal under the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, if at all, the said Tribunal is having any jurisdiction. In short whenever a conciliation fails and if there is no consent by the parties to the dispute, the Permanent Lok Adalat ought not to have been decided the issue on merits. In short whenever a conciliation fails and if there is no consent by the parties to the dispute, the Permanent Lok Adalat ought not to have been decided the issue on merits. If the consent is given by both the parties to the dispute then only the Permanent Lok Adalat can decide the disputes on merits and thereafter, the role of the Permanent Lok Adalat is like an Arbitrator. An Arbitrator is a Judge privately appointed by the parties and the decision, rendered by the Arbitrator is known as an 'award'. As per the provisions of Sections 22D and 22E of the Act, 1987, provisions of the CPC and provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 are not applicable nor even award, passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat is an appeal able. Parties must be informed about these aspects of the matter prior to inviting their consents in writing. Nothing has happened in this matter, as stated hereinabove and abruptly, the Permanent Lok Adalat has decided the whole issue on merits like a civil court, which is thoroughly beyond the power, jurisdiction and authority of the Permanent Lok Adalat under the Act, 1987. (v) It has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. State of Jharkhand and Anr. as reported in 2008 (3) JLJR 513 , at paragraph No. 18, which reads as under: “…....In our opinion, instead of exercising adjudicatory role, the Permanent Lok Adalat ought to have acted in such a manner to bring the parties into a settlement The duty of the Permanent Lok Adalat is to bring the parties to a settlement and to pass award instead of adjudicating a dispute and pass an award without taking notice of the Act and the Rules under which claim was entertainable. In our considered opinion, Permanent Lok Adalat has no jurisdiction to directly invoke the provision of Sub-section (8) of Section 22C and decide the dispute on merit against the will of the party. As the basic object and power of enacting Chapter VTA is to get the disputes settled at the pre-litigation stage the provision of Sub-section (8) become redundant where the Permanent Lok Adalat failed to apply the provisions of Sub-section (4) to (7) of Section 22C of the Act. As the basic object and power of enacting Chapter VTA is to get the disputes settled at the pre-litigation stage the provision of Sub-section (8) become redundant where the Permanent Lok Adalat failed to apply the provisions of Sub-section (4) to (7) of Section 22C of the Act. In view of the aforesaid decision also, it is bounden duty of the Permanent Lok Adalat to offer terms of settlement under Sub Section (7) of Section 22C of the Act, 1987. No such terms of settlement has ever been offered by the Permanent Lok Adalat under Sub Section (7) of Section 22C of the Act, 1987 and hence also, the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside. (vi) Looking to the provisions of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, is already in existence, which is fully empowered to decide the motor accident claims. Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 is a Central Act, which is a special Act, meant for these types of accident claims. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chairman, Thiruvalluvar Transport Corporation v. Consumer Protection Council as reported in AIR 1990 SC 1384, especially in paragraph 6 thereof reads as under “6. The question which then arises for consideration is whether the National Commission had jurisdiction to entertain the claim application and award compensation in respect of an accident involving the death of Shri K. Kumar caused by the use of a motor vehicle. Clearly the Claims Tribunal constituted for the area in question, had jurisdiction to entertain any claim for compensation arising out of the fatal accident since such a claim application would clearly fall within the ambit of Section 165, of the 1988 Act. The 1988 Act can be said to be a special Act in relation to claims of compensation arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. The 1986 Act being a law dealing with the question of extending protection to consumers in general, could, therefore, be said to be a general law in relation to the specific provisions concerning accidents arising out of the use of motor vehicles found in Chapter-XII of the 1988 Act. Ordinarily the general law must yield to the special law. The 1986 Act being a law dealing with the question of extending protection to consumers in general, could, therefore, be said to be a general law in relation to the specific provisions concerning accidents arising out of the use of motor vehicles found in Chapter-XII of the 1988 Act. Ordinarily the general law must yield to the special law. Besides, the complaint in question cannot be said to be In relation to any goods sold or delivered or agreed to be sold or delivered or any service provided or agreed to be provided to the deceased. The expression "service" as defined by the 1986 Act means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes the provision of facilities Inter alia in connection with transport. The accident that occurred had nothing to do with service provided to the deceased. This becomes obvious when one reads the provision along with the definition of complaint in Section 2(c), and service in Section 2(o), of the 1936 Act. Complaint according to Section 2(c), means any application in writing in relation to an unfair trade practice or as a restrictive trade practice adopted by any trader or in relation to goods bought by him or agreed to be bought by him. Both these clauses have no application whatsoever. The third clause relates to the services hired or availed of or agreed to be hired or availed of by a consumer. Therefore, at best it can be said the complaint in question related to the service hired or availed of by the deceased. The complaint in the instant case cannot be said to be in relation to any service hired or availed of by the consumer because the injury sustained by the consumer had nothing to do with the service provided or availed of by him but the fatal injury was the direct result of the accident on account which he was thrown out of his seat and dashed against an iron handle of the seat in front of him. We have, therefore, no manner of doubt that this case squarely fell within, the ambit of Section 165 of the 1988 Act and the Claims Tribunal constituted thereunder for the area in question had jurisdiction to entertain the same, As pointed out earlier, the 1988 Act and, in particular, the provisions in Chapter XII thereof creates a Forum before which the claim can be laid if it arises out of an accident caused by the use of a motor vehicle. That being a special law would prevail over the relevant general law such as the 1986 Act but in the instant case even that question does not arise for the simple reason that the dispute in question did not attract the jurisdiction of the National Commission, whatsoever, and the National Commission has not shown how it had jurisdiction. The issue was pointedly raised and for reasons best known to the National Commission it failed to come to grip with it. Surprisingly, there is no discussion whatsoever in the order" of the National Commission in this behalf. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the National Commission did not have jurisdiction and as counsel for the appellant put it this was a case of unwarranted exercise of jurisdiction.” (Emphasis Supplied) Thus in the aforesaid decision, National Consumer Commission has no power, jurisdiction and authority to decide an issue on merits, as there is an existence of Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal. Applying this ratio decidendi to the facts of the present case, whenever the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal is in existence, the Permanent Lok Adalat ought not to have been decided the issue on merits for damages to be paid to the claimant due to the motor vehicle accident. 5. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, the order passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat, Jamshedpur on merits in Permanent Lok Adalat Case No. 458 of 2007 dated 1st November, 2008 at Annexure-3 to the memo of the present writ petition is, hereby, quashed and set aside. Respondent is at liberty to take recourse, in accordance with law, before appropriate Forum to ventilate his grievances. 6. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed. Petition allowed.