Judgment Smt. Abhilasha Kumari, J.—This petition has been preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inter alia with a prayer to quash and set aside order dated 30.11.2009, whereby the petitioner has been made to retire voluntarily without considering her request for withdrawal of voluntary retirement before the effective date. It is further prayed that the respondent-authorities may be directed to allow the petitioner to continue in active service till her actual date of superannuation on 30-9-2010, with salary and other consequential benefits. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the petitioner initially joined services as English Typist in the year 1973. She was promoted as Senior Clerk in the year 1991 and since then, the petitioner has been working on that position. As the petitioner had completed more than 36 years of service, she was entitled for voluntary retirement under the Gujarat Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 2002, hence, she made an application for voluntary retirement on 12.08.2009 to Respondent No. 3, requesting that she may be permitted to retire voluntarily, with effect from 30-9-2009. However, upon re-consideration the petitioner changed her mind and gave another application dated 7.11.2009 to Respondent No. 3, stating therein that she is withdrawing her application for voluntary retirement dated 12.08.2009, as she is now not desirous of taking voluntary retirement due to a change in her personal circumstances. However, Respondent No. 3 passed order dated 30.11.2009, accepting the application of the petitioner dated 12.08.2009, and directing that the second application of the petitioner dated 7.11.2009 withdrawing the earlier application, be filed. Aggrieved by this action of Respondent No. 3, the petitioner has approached the Court by filing the present petition. 3. Mr. Paresh Upadhayay, learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner had sought voluntary retirement with effect from 30.11.2009, by application dated 12.08.2009. Before the effective date, i.e. 30.11.2009, the petitioner had made the second application dated 7.11.2009 withdrawing the earlier application dated 12.08.2009. Respondent No. 3 has taken into consideration both the applications of the petitioner dated 12.08.2009 and 7.11.2009, respectively, while passing the impugned order dated 30.11.2009, but instead of passing any order on the latter application withdrawing the earlier application for voluntary retirement, the earlier application has been accepted and the latter application has been directed to be filed.
Respondent No. 3 has taken into consideration both the applications of the petitioner dated 12.08.2009 and 7.11.2009, respectively, while passing the impugned order dated 30.11.2009, but instead of passing any order on the latter application withdrawing the earlier application for voluntary retirement, the earlier application has been accepted and the latter application has been directed to be filed. It is forcefully contended by the learned advocate for the petitioner that, it is a settled position of law that the application for voluntary retirement can be withdrawn at any time before it becomes effective. As the petitioner has withdrawn the application for voluntary retirement before 30.11.2009, the date on which the voluntary retirement would have become effective, the action of the respondent in thrusting voluntary retirement upon the petitioner, without considering the application for withdrawal, is illegal, arbitrary and against the settled position of law. It is further urged that in the impugned order, Respondent No. 3 has merely stated that the petitioner is permitted to retire voluntarily with effect from 30.11.2009, in spite of the fact that on the date of passing of the impugned order, the subsequent application for withdrawal of voluntary retirement had already been received by the said respondent, as is clear from the said order, itself. Without passing any order thereupon, the application dated 7.11.2009 for withdrawal of voluntary retirement has been directed to be filed, which action is against the authority of law. In support of the above submissions, the learned advocate for the petitioner had placed reliance upon the following judgments: 1. Union of India vs. Gopal Chandra Misra, AIR 1978 SC 694 2. Balram Gupta vs. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 2354 3. Punjab National Bank vs. P.K. Mittal, AIR 1989 SC 1083 4. Shambhu Murari Sinha vs. Project and Development India Ltd., AIR 2002 SC 1341 5. Special Civil Application No. 9519 of 2009 decided on 23-7-2010 6. Letters Patent Appeal No. 1539 of 2004 in Special Civil Application No. 996 of 2003 decided on 18-1-2010 7. Purshottam A. Vadher vs. Physical Research Laboratory, 2005 (2) GLR 1325 4.
Shambhu Murari Sinha vs. Project and Development India Ltd., AIR 2002 SC 1341 5. Special Civil Application No. 9519 of 2009 decided on 23-7-2010 6. Letters Patent Appeal No. 1539 of 2004 in Special Civil Application No. 996 of 2003 decided on 18-1-2010 7. Purshottam A. Vadher vs. Physical Research Laboratory, 2005 (2) GLR 1325 4. It has been fairly stated by the learned advocate for the petitioner that he would not press the prayer for grant of arrears of salary, however, the retiral benefits of the petitioner, who would have retired on 30.9.2010 in the normal course of service, may be directed to be paid to her by treating her to be in continuous service, till 30.9.2010. 5. Opposing the petition, Ms. Moxa Thakkar, learned Assistant Government Pleader has submitted that the petitioner, who had been working at the Head Office of the respondent-Department for the last 36 years, had been apprehending her transfer to another place, therefore, she had thought it fit to submit the application dated 12.08.2009 for voluntary retirement, in view of her impending superannuation. However, as the petitioner was not transferred, she decided to withdraw the application dated 12.08.2009, by making application dated 7.11.2009. The learned Assistant Government Pleader has further submitted that as per Rule 47(2) of the Gujarat Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 2002 (“GCS (Pension) Rules” for short) the employee, opting for voluntary retirement cannot be allowed to withdraw his/her request except with the approval of the appointing authority. As the petitioner has not sought the approval of the appointing authority by filing a separate application, her subsequent application for withdrawal has rightly not been considered, therefore, the petition may be rejected. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties, perused the averments made in the petition, and documents annexed thereto. The issues that arise for consideration of the Court are confined in a narrow compass, that is, whether an employee has a right to withdraw his/her voluntary retirement before the effective date. Before arriving at a decision regarding the legal issues arising for consideration, it would be necessary to advert to the Rules that are applicable to the case in hand, as also the judicial pronouncements in this regard. 7. Insofar as the Rules are concerned, the petitioner had rendered over 36 years of service before making the application for voluntary retirement on 12.08.2009.
7. Insofar as the Rules are concerned, the petitioner had rendered over 36 years of service before making the application for voluntary retirement on 12.08.2009. Rule 47 of the GCS (Pension) Rules would, therefore, be applicable and is reproduced herein-below: “47. Retirement on completion of thirty years’ qualifying service: (1) A Government employee may retire at any time after completion of thirty years’ qualifying service, or he may be required by the appointing authority not lower in rank than that of appointing authority to retire in the public interest: Provided that— (a) a Government employee shall give a notice of at least three months in writing to the appointing authority before the date on which he intends to retire; or (b) the appointing authority shall give a notice of at least three months in writing to a Government employee before the date on which he is required to retire in the public interest. (2) A Government employee, who has elected to retire under this rule and has given the necessary notice to that effect to the appointing authority, shall not be allowed to withdraw his voluntary retirement subsequently except with the approval of the appointing authority: Provided that the request for withdrawal shall be made before the intended date of his retirement. Explanation:—Qualifying service of thirty years referred in Sub-rule (1) means qualifying service excluding extra ordinary leave sanctioned in the entire service of an employee.” 8. Rule 49 is quoted by Respondent No. 3 in the impugned order and reads thus: 49. Voluntary retirement on completion of twenty five years’ qualifying service:—(1) A Government employee at any time after completion of twenty-five years’ qualifying service, may, by giving notice of not less than three months in writing to the appointing authority, retire from service; (2) The notice of voluntary retirement given under Sub-rule (1) shall require acceptance by the appointing authority: Provided that where the appointing authority does not refuse to grant the permission for retirement before the expiry of the period specified in the said notice, the retirement shall become effective from the date of expiry of the said period.
(3) The qualifying service as on the date of intended retirement of the Government employee retiring under this rule shall be increased by a period not exceeding five years, subject to the condition that the total qualifying service rendered by the Government employee does not in any case exceed thirty three years: Provided that the total qualifying service after allowing the increase under this Sub-rule shall not exceed the qualifying service which the Government employee would have had, if he had retired on reaching the age of superannuation as prescribed under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 10. (4) (a) A Government employee referred to in Sub-rule (1) may make request in writing to the appointing authority to accept notice of voluntary retirement of less than three months by giving reason therefore; (b) On receipt of a request under Clause (a), the Head of Department in case of Class-IV employee and the head of Administrative Department concerned in case of other employees, subject to the provisions of Sub-rule (2), may consider such request for the curtailment of the period of notice of three months on merits and if it is satisfied that there is no departmental inquiry pending or contemplated against the Government employee, may relax the requirement of notice of three months on the condition that the Government employee shall not apply for commutation of a part of his pension before the expiry of the period of notice of three months. (5) A Government employee, who has elected to retire under this rule and has given the notice to that effect as required under these rules to the appointing authority, shall not be allowed to withdraw such notice except with approval of the appointing authority; Provided that the request for withdrawal of notice shall be made before the intended date of his retirement. 9. At this stage, it would be useful to advert to the judicial pronouncements which have a direct bearing on the issues arising in the present petition. 10. In Union of India vs. Gopal Chandra Misra (Supra), the Supreme Court has held that the employee can seek withdrawal of the notice of voluntary retirement at any time before the date on which the retirement becomes effective, and it becomes effective when it operates to terminate the employment or office-tenure of the resignor. 11.
10. In Union of India vs. Gopal Chandra Misra (Supra), the Supreme Court has held that the employee can seek withdrawal of the notice of voluntary retirement at any time before the date on which the retirement becomes effective, and it becomes effective when it operates to terminate the employment or office-tenure of the resignor. 11. Following the principles laid down in Union of India vs. Gopal Chandra Misra (Supra), the Supreme Court, in Balram Gupta vs. Union of India, has observed that : “What is important in this connection to be borne in mind is not what prompted the desire for withdrawal but what is important is what prompted the government from withholding the withdrawal.” (Para 9) With regard to Rule 48(A) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, the Supreme Court observed in the said judgment that: “11. . . . . . . . It may be a salutary requirement that a Government servant cannot withdraw a letter of resignation or of voluntary retirement at his sweet will and put the Government into difficulties by writing letters of resignation or retirement and withdrawing the same immediately without rhyme or reasons. Therefore,for the purpose of appeal we do not propose to consider the question whether Sub-rule (4) of Rule 48-A of the Pension Rules is valid or not. If properly exercised the power of the government may be a salutary rule. Approval, however, is not ipse dixit of the approving authority. The approving authority who has the statutory authority must act reasonably and rationally. The only reason put forward here is that the appellant had not indicated his reasons for withdrawal. This, in our opinion, was sufficiently indicated that he was prevailed upon by his friends and the appellant had a second look at the matter. This is not an unreasonable reason.” In Paras 12 and 13, the following observations have been made by the Apex Court: “12. In this case the guidelines are that ordinarily permission should not be granted unless the Officer concerned is in a position to show that there has been a material change in the circumstances in consideration of which the notice was originally given. In the facts of the instant case such indication has been given. The appellant has stated that on the persistent and personal requests of the staff members he had dropped the idea of seeking voluntary retirement.
In the facts of the instant case such indication has been given. The appellant has stated that on the persistent and personal requests of the staff members he had dropped the idea of seeking voluntary retirement. We do not see how this could not be a good and valid reason. It is true that he was resigning and in the notice for resignation he had not given any reason except to state that he sought voluntary retirement. We see nothing wrong in this. In the modern age we should not put embargo upon people’s choice or freedom. If, however, the administration had made arrangements acting on his resignation or letter of retirement to make other employee available for his job, that would be another matter but the appellant’s offer to retire and withdrawal of the same happened in so quick succession that it cannot be said that any administrative set up or arrangement was affected. The administration has now taken a long time by its own attitude to communicate the matter. For this purpose the respondent is to blame and not the appellant. 13. We hold, therefore, that there was no valid reason for withholding the permission,by the respondent. We hold further that there has been compliance with the guidelines because the appellant has indicated that there was a change in the circumstances, namely, the persistent and personal requests from the staff members and relations which changed his attitude towards continuing in Government service and induced the appellant to withdraw the notice. In the modern and uncertain age it is very difficult to arrange one’s future with any amount of certainty, a certain amount of flexibility is required, and if such flexibility does not jeopardize Government or administration, administration should be graceful enough to respond and acknowledge the flexibility of human mind and attitude and allow the appellant to withdraw his letter of retirement in the facts and circumstances of this case. Much complications which had arisen could have been thus avoided by such graceful attitude. The court cannot but condemn circuitous ways “to ease out” uncomfortable employees. As a model employer the government must conduct itself with high probity and candour with its employees.” 12.
Much complications which had arisen could have been thus avoided by such graceful attitude. The court cannot but condemn circuitous ways “to ease out” uncomfortable employees. As a model employer the government must conduct itself with high probity and candour with its employees.” 12. In Shambhu Murari Sinha vs. Project and Development India Ltd. (Supra), after noticing the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Gopal Chandra Misra (Supra), and other decisions of the Supreme Court, it was held that : “In the absence of a legal, contractual or constitutional bar a ‘prospective’ resignation can be withdrawn at any time before it becomes effective, and it, becomes effective when it operates to terminate the employment or the office-tenure of the resignor.” 13. If the case of the petitioner is examined in the backdrop of the above legal position, it is found that the initial application of the petitioner requesting for voluntary retirement was given on 12.08.2009, wherein it has been stated that she should be retired voluntarily with effect from 30.11.2009. It was stated in the said application that the petitioner was desirous of taking voluntary retirement due to several personal reasons. However, much before the effective date i.e. 30.11.2009, the petitioner made the subsequent application dated 7.11.2009, stating therein that as her personal circumstances had undergone a change, she would not like to retire voluntarily, as stated in application dated 12.08.2009, and she thereby withdraws the application for voluntary retirement. 14. A perusal of the impugned order dated 30.11.2009 reveals that Respondent No. 3 was very much in the receipt of the subsequent application of the petitioner dated 7.11.2009, whereby the request for voluntary retirement has been withdrawn. This is clear from the very order itself, which states that it has been passed after considering the earlier application dated 12.08.2009, as well as the subsequent application dated 7.11.2009. It is stated in the impugned order that the Certificate of the Director, Pension and Provident Fund, Gandhinagar stating that the petitioner has completed her pensionable service, had been received, and in view of Rule 47(2) and Rule 49(5) of the Gujarat Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 2002, the application for voluntary retirement of the petitioner dated 12.08.2009, is accepted and the application for withdrawal of voluntary retirement dated 7.11.2009 is directed to be filed.
By this order the petitioner has been made to retire with effect from 30.11.2009, which is the date of the impugned order, as also the date on which her voluntary retirement would have taken effect as per the earlier application dated 12.08.2009. 15. The stand taken by the respondents in the affidavit-in-reply filed by Respondent No. 3 is that, the petitioner had sought voluntary retirement as she apprehended her transfer from the respondent-Department to another place which, according to the said respondent, deserves to be “condemned”. It is also stated that the petitioner has not taken the approval of the appointing authority for withdrawal of her application for voluntary retirement, therefore, her earlier application for voluntary retirement has rightly been accepted. 16. Insofar as the Rules are concerned, Rule 47(2), which is reproduced hereinabove, provides that a Government employee, who has elected to retire under this Rule and has given the necessary notice to this effect to the appointing authority, shall not be permitted to withdraw his/her voluntary retirement except with the approval of the appointing authority, provided that the request for withdrawal is made before the intended date of retirement. Rule 49(5) is also to the same effect. In the case of the petitioner the application for withdrawal has been made to the appointing authority, before the intended date of retirement. 17. A similar situation arose for consideration in the case of Balram Gupta vs. Union of India (Supra), wherein the Supreme Court has discussed Rule 48(1) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, wherein a similar provision existed. In that case, there was a challenge to the said Rule which the Supreme Court did not think proper to go into, at that stage. However, as has been quoted hereinabove, it has categorically been held in the said judgment that the approval for making the application for withdrawal of voluntary retirement is not the ipse dixit of the approving authority, and that the approving authority is bound to act reasonably and rationally. It has further been held by the Supreme Court in the said decision, that what is important is not what prompted the desire for withdrawal but what is important is what prompted the Government from withholding the withdrawal. 18. In the present case, the affidavit-in-reply does not throw any light upon this aspect.
It has further been held by the Supreme Court in the said decision, that what is important is not what prompted the desire for withdrawal but what is important is what prompted the Government from withholding the withdrawal. 18. In the present case, the affidavit-in-reply does not throw any light upon this aspect. Much emphasis has been laid upon the purported reason that led the petitioner to opt for voluntary retirement, namely, her apprehended transfer. However, this is not the reason stated in the application of the petitioner dated 12.08.2009. It is clearly stated therein that the petitioner is seeking voluntary retirement for several personal reasons. How, and in what manner, the respondents have arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner has sought voluntary retirement due to her apprehended transfer, is not explained in the reply affidavit. The reason for withdrawal of the voluntary resignation is also clearly stated in the application dated 7.11.2009, which is, a change in the personal circumstances of the petitioner. The impugned order dated 30.11.2009 is absolutely silent regarding the subsequent application of the petitioner dated 7.11.2009. No reason, whatsoever, for refusal of the request for withdrawal, has been stated in the impugned order. In fact, the subsequent application for withdrawal is not discussed at all in the body of the order itself, as though the same was never made and does not exist. The petitioner has clearly stated that there is a change in her personal circumstances which has prompted her to withdraw the earlier application for voluntary retirement. However, the impugned order does not contain any valid reason for accepting the earlier application and rejecting the subsequent application dated 7.11.2009. The subsequent application for withdrawal has been made on 7.11.2009, much before the date from which the earlier application was to become effective, but this aspect has not been referred to at all, in the impugned order. In short, Respondent No. 3 has totally ignored the subsequent application dated 7.11.2009, and it is clear from the impugned order that there is no application of mind on this application at all. 19. From the judicial pronouncements referred to herein-above, it emerges that the Supreme Court has taken a consistent view that it is open for the employee to seek withdrawal of the notice for voluntary retirement before the actual date on which the retirement becomes effective.
19. From the judicial pronouncements referred to herein-above, it emerges that the Supreme Court has taken a consistent view that it is open for the employee to seek withdrawal of the notice for voluntary retirement before the actual date on which the retirement becomes effective. Though such a request would be governed by the Service Regulations in this regard and the notice for voluntary retirement can be withdrawn with the permission of the employer if so provided under the Rule, even then, the employer is bound to act reasonably and rationally and the discretion vested in him cannot be exercised in an arbitrary manner. In the light of the judicial pronouncements referred to hereinabove, it is evident that the petitioner had the locus poenitentiae to withdraw the notice for voluntary retirement before the effective date i.e. 30.11.2009, which she did by application dated 7.11.2009. Till the effective date i.e. 30.11.2009, Respondent No. 3 had neither accepted, nor rejected, the subsequent application of the petitioner. On the effective date, Respondent No. 3 accepted the earlier application for voluntary retirement, while directing the subsequent application, withdrawing the voluntary retirement, to be filed. The petitioner had given notice of withdrawal much before the intended date of retirement, but the said application was kept pending by Respondent No. 3 till 30.11.2009, for reasons best known to the said respondent. This, in itself, smacks of arbitrariness. In this view of the matter, the stand taken by the respondents to the effect that the petitioner did not take the permission of the appointing authority before withdrawing the notice for voluntary retirement, cannot hold good. Ignoring the subsequent application for withdrawal of voluntary retirement and accepting the earlier application, as though second application does not exist, amounts not only to a total non-application of mind, but is also an arbitrary exercise of power, on the part of the concerned respondent. 20. In Balram Gupta vs. Union of India (Supra) the Supreme Court has held that “The court cannot but condemn circuitous ways “to ease out” uncomfortable employees. As a model employer the government must conduct itself with high probity and condour with its employees”. These observations are extremely apt and apply squarely to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
In Balram Gupta vs. Union of India (Supra) the Supreme Court has held that “The court cannot but condemn circuitous ways “to ease out” uncomfortable employees. As a model employer the government must conduct itself with high probity and condour with its employees”. These observations are extremely apt and apply squarely to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Therefore, in view of the settled position of law, as applicable to the factual scenario obtaining in the present case, in my considered view, the respondents could not have refused to accept the subsequent application for withdrawal of voluntary retirement made by the petitioner, well before the jural relationship of employee and employer came to an end. Consequently, the impugned order dated 30.11.2009 deserves to be quashed and set aside. It is hereby quashed and set aside, being arbitrary and illegal. The petitioner is treated as in active service with effect from 30-9-2009 upto 30-9-2010, on which date, she would have superannuated in the normal course of service. In view of the statement made by the learned advocate for the petitioner and as she has not actually worked with effect from 30.11.2009 to 30-10-2010, the salary for that period will not be paid to her. However, the said period shall be treated as on duty and the salary be counted notionally, for the purposes of pension and other retiral benefits. The pension and other retiral benefits shall be paid to the petitioner within a period of one month from today. In case the needful is not done within the stipulated period of time, the respondents shall pay interest at the rate of 8% per annum with effect from 30.9.2010 till the date of actual payment. 21. The petition is partly-allowed, as above. Rule is made absolute, to the above extent. There shall be no orders as to costs. In view of the order passed in the main matter, Civil Application No. 14271 of 2010 does not survive and stands disposed of, accordingly. P P P P P