Judgment Rajesh H. Shukla, J.—The Present Second Appeal has been filed by the appellant-original plaintiff posing the following substantial questions of law. (A) Whether, the appellant has been proved guilty of anything culpable for suppressing the truth or suggesting a falsehood, withholding any documents which he should have been produced or failed in obligation cast upon him in the process of selection? (B) Whether once the equity is created, the appointing authority can pass the order of dismissal after such long time of 7 years. (C) Whether the detailed procedure provided under the Rules, more particularly Rule 7, Sub-rules (1) to (14) of the Gujarat Panchayat Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1964 was followed as it is mandatory? (D) Whether the action of the respondent authority in terminating the service of the appellant without following statutory rules is in violation of Article 311 of the Constitution of India? 2. The short facts of the case, briefly stated, are that the appellant-original plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit No. 5 of 1995 before the learned Joint Civil Judge (Senior Division), Porbandar. After considering the material and evidence, the Trial Court dismissed the suit vide judgment and order dated 19th July, 2002. Thereafter, Regular Civil Appeal No. 21 of 2002 came to be preferred against the judgment of the Trial Court before the learned Assistant Judge, Porbandar, which also came to be dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Porbandar vide judgment and order dated 30th November, 2010 and, therefore, the present Second Appeal has been filed posing the aforesaid substantial questions of law. 3. As discussed in detail by both the Courts below, the plaintiff appeared for selection for the post of Primary Teacher and had submitted the mark-sheet with regard to passing the examination of PTC. The said mark-sheet was sent to the concerned authority for verification and the State Examination Board has found it to be fabricated and, therefore, the notice was issued. The case of the appellant-original plaintiff has also been discussed by the Lower Appellate Court and has very specifically stated that the appellant-original Plaintiff had passed the said examination in the year 1985, for which the mark-sheet has been produced at Exh.37 bearing No. 2666. Another mark-sheet is also produced at Exh.52, wherein he is said to have passed in the year 1986. Another mark-sheet is also produced at Exh.52, wherein he is said to have passed in the year 1986. Therefore, the Lower Appellate Court has specifically observed that if he had passed the examination in the year 1986, then why did he attach the mark-sheet of 1985 of the second year examination which has been produced at Exh.37. This aspect has been considered by both the Courts below and both the Courts below have given the concurrent findings which has been assailed by posing aforesaid substantial questions of law. 4. Learned advocate Mr. H.M. Prachchhak has referred to the deposition of Bhanbha Sarvaiya at Exh.62 who was the District Primary Education Officer and has tried to submit that the finding arrived at by the Courts below is contrary to the evidence/deposition of the witness examined by the defendants. Though these submissions have been made, it is not possible to accept the same in view of the fact that if the entire evidence at Exh.62 is read, it mixed more than three years. The mark-sheet at Exh.37 which has been produced bearing No. 2666 has been found and confirmed by the Board that it is not genuine and admittedly the appellant-original plaintiff has produced a mark-sheet for the year 1986 bearing No. 2870 which is another mark-sheet for the exam of the subsequent year. Further, if there was any mistake or correction to be made, then the mark-sheet of the year 1985 itself would have been corrected and it would not be of the subsequent year. 5. Another facet of the argument made by learned advocate Mr. Prachchhak is that he has been working since seven years and, therefore, the procedure under Rule 7(1) to (14) of the Gujarat Panchayat Services (Discipline & Appeal)Rules is required to be followed and without holding inquiry the services could not have been terminated. He has also raised the contention with regard to the protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Learned advocate Mr. Prachchhak has also relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Manat Khemraj Somaji vs. District Primary Educatiion Officer reported in 2003 (2) GLH 523 and submitted that when the termination is on the ground that appointments have been secured by committing fraud, regular departmental inquiry ought to be initiated before termination of services. Learned advocate Mr. Prachchhak has also relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Manat Khemraj Somaji vs. District Primary Educatiion Officer reported in 2003 (2) GLH 523 and submitted that when the termination is on the ground that appointments have been secured by committing fraud, regular departmental inquiry ought to be initiated before termination of services. Similarly he has also relied upon another judgment reported in 1997 (2) GLH 618 in the case of B.M. Shah Education Society vs. Shilpaben B. Chauhan to emphasise the submissions. However, the facts in that case were different inasmuch as observed in this judgment in Para-2, it was not the case that the petitioner therein was a beneficiary of the fraudulent or clandestine conduct of securing appointment which could be said to be void ab initio. It is specifically observed that the applicant had not obtained appointment by fraud and or by suppressing some facts or by expressing falsehood or by misleading anyone. It is not the case in the present appeal. As it transpires from the judgment of both the Lower Courts, the Mark-sheet which was submitted of the year 1985 bearing No. 2666 was found to be not genuine. The notice had also been served to the appellant and he was called upon to appear before the committee to give his explanation. After considering the explanation, the order came to be passed by the committee. 6. Another facet of the argument is that Gujarat Panchayat Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1964 have not been followed and the inquiry has also not been made. This submission is required to be considered in light of the provisions of the statute as well as Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Protection under Article 311 would be available only when the person is an employee appointed by the regular procedure. In the present case, the appointment itself is void ab initio which was secured by fraud and by misrepresentation. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a judgment reported in (2008) 13 SCC 170 clearly observed that any such appointment obtained by misrepresentation or fraud would be void ab initio and, therefore, the protection under Article 311 would not be attracted. Therefore, petitioner cannot claim that departmental inquiry under the Gujarat Panchayat Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1964 was required to be followed. Therefore, petitioner cannot claim that departmental inquiry under the Gujarat Panchayat Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1964 was required to be followed. Therefore, the submissions made by the learned Counsel cannot be accepted. He has also referred to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in 2010 (2) GLR (NOC) SC 45 in the case of Dineshkumar vs. Yusuf Ali and submitted that in the second appeal relevant evidence could be considered if the findings recorded by the Court below are perverse. There cannot be any quarrel with regard to the finding. However, it is very clear that if the findings recorded by the Court below are perverse based on no evidence then certainly it could be examined. However, it is not the case here in light of the evidence which has been discussed by both the Courts below. However, in the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gurudev Kaur & Ors. vs. Kaki & Ors., reported in (2007) 1 SCC 546 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has clearly observed that the High Court can interfere only when there is a substantial question of law involved. Therefore, in light of the aforesaid discussion and the finding recorded by the two Courts below, there is no substantial question of law which can be said to have been involved, which would call for any interference by this Court. 7. Therefore, considering the scope of exercise of discretion under Section100 of CPC in the Second Appeal as laid down in catena of judicial pronouncement including the judgment reported in (2007) 1 SCC 546 , the present second appeal cannot be entertained and deserves to be dismissed and accordingly stands dismissed. 8. After the order was pronounced, learned advocate Mr. H.M. Prachchhak has requested that the order may be stayed for a period of six weeks to enable the appellant to approach the higher forum. The request is granted. The operation of this order is stayed up to 15th February, 2011. 9. In view of the dismissal of Second Appeal, the civil application filed for stay does not survive and stands disposed of accordingly. P P P P P