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2010 DIGILAW 620 (GAU)

Abdul Rejjak v. State of Tripura

2010-08-19

C.R.SARMA, I.A.ANSARI

body2010
JUDGMENT C.R. Sarma, J. 1. By judgment and order, dated 30.6.2000, passed in case No. ST 95(W/T/S)/97, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge No. 3, West Tripura, Agaitala convicted the Appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter called, 'IPC') and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life for his conviction under Section 302 and pay fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default, suffer rigorous imprisonment for a further period of three months. Being aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence, the Appellant has carried this appeal challenging the said judgment and order of conviction and sentence. 2. This case stands on the allegation that the Appellant had killed his wife by strangulation. 3. The prosecution case, in brief, may be stated as follows: Smt. Rosana Khatun (hereinafter called 'the deceased'), the younger sister of Mr. Nazim Mia (P.W. 1) was married by Abdul Rejjak (hereinafter called 'the accused-Appellant'). The said couple, after their marriage, used to live together as husband and wife to the exclusion of Ors. The accused-Appellant during the subsistence of the said marriage, desired to contract second marriage. On 11-7-96, in the evening, Mr. Muktal Hussain (P.W. 10), who was the next door neighbour of the accused-Appellant, heard a sound of cry corning from the house of the accused-Appellant and following the said cry, he proceeded to the house of the Appellant, wherein he saw the deceased lying dead in the room of the accused-Appellant. The accused-Appellant was also found in the said room, standing near the dead body of his deceased wife. On being asked, by P.W. 10 as to how the death was caused to the deceased, the accused-Appellant, without giving any reply, fled his house and returned to the village after about one year. Mr. Mohan Mia (P.W. 11), on the fateful evening, at about 7 p.m., while returning home from the market, heard hue and cry towards the house of the accused-Appellant and found the accused-Appellant coming out from his house. This witness also had asked the accused-Appellant as to what had happened in his house, but the accused-Appellant, without giving any reply fled away. Mr. Mohan Mia aforesaid went into the house of the accused-Appellant and found the dead body of the deceased lying therein. Both P.W. 10 and P.W. 11 saw marks of strangulation on the throat of the dead body. Mr. Mr. Mohan Mia aforesaid went into the house of the accused-Appellant and found the dead body of the deceased lying therein. Both P.W. 10 and P.W. 11 saw marks of strangulation on the throat of the dead body. Mr. Najim Mia (P.W. 1), younger brother of the deceased, coming to know about this incident went to the marital house of his sister i.e. the deceased and found her lying dead in the courtyard. He came to know that his sister was killed by throttling by her husband due 10 family disturbance. P.W. 2 lodged an FIR (Exbt. P/1), with the O.C., Sonamura PS, informing the police about the said occurrence. SI Milan Chandra Datta (P.W. 15) who was entrusted with the investigation of the said matter, by the O.C. of Sonamura PS, proceeded to the place of occurrence, which he reached at about 10-40 p.m. The Investigating officer prepared the inquest report (Exbt. P/2), arranged to take photograph of the dead body and forwarded the same for post-mortem examination. During the investigation, police recorded the statement of witnesses, seized wearing apparels of the deceased and collected the autopsy report in respect of the dead body. As the accused-Appellant had absconded, he could not be arrested by the police during the investigation and according, at the close of the investigation, the Investigating officer submitted charge sheet under Section 302 IPC against the accused-Appellant, showing him as an absconder. After filing of the charge sheet, as revealed from the record, the accused-Appellant appeared before the learned SDJM, Sonamura, West Tripura and on being prayed for, he was allowed to go on bail. The offence being exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned SDJM, Sonamura vide his order, dated 7.2.97, passed in G.R. case No. 150/96 committed the case to the Sessions for trial and directed the accused-Appellant to appear before the learned Sessions Judge to face trial. The learned Sessions Judge framed charge under Section 302 IPC to which, on being explained, the accused-Appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution, in order to prove the case against the accused-Appellant examined 15 witnesses including the Medical officer (P.W. 14), who performed the autopsy, and the Investigating officer (P.W. 15). At the conclusion of the evidence for the prosecution, the accused-Appellant was examined under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure. 4. The prosecution, in order to prove the case against the accused-Appellant examined 15 witnesses including the Medical officer (P.W. 14), who performed the autopsy, and the Investigating officer (P.W. 15). At the conclusion of the evidence for the prosecution, the accused-Appellant was examined under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure. He denied the allegations, brought against him and pleaded that on the date of the incident, he was not present in his house and that his belongings were looted by Ors. He specifically stated that he did not know who had killed his wife. 5. Considering the evidence on record, the learned Sessions Judge found the accused-Appellant guilty of the offence under Section 302 IPC and recorded his conviction and sentence as indicated above. Hence, this appeal. 6. We have patiently heard Mr. M.K. Roy, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant and Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor for the State and carefully perused the evidence on record. 7. Mr. M.K. Roy, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant, submitted that there is no reliable and cogent evidence and that the conviction recorded against the Appellant was bad for want of sufficient substantive evidence. It is further contended that the recording of the statement of the accused-Appellant; under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, was not proper and that the conviction and sentence is liable to be set aside for improper examination under Section 313Code of Criminal Procedure. On behalf of the Appellant, it is submitted that this being a case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution failed to establish the events of the circumstances and conclusively prove that none except the accused-Appellant had caused the death of the deceased. 8. Refuting the said argument advanced on behalf of the Appellant, Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Addl. On behalf of the Appellant, it is submitted that this being a case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution failed to establish the events of the circumstances and conclusively prove that none except the accused-Appellant had caused the death of the deceased. 8. Refuting the said argument advanced on behalf of the Appellant, Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor strenuously argued that though there is no eye-witness, considering the circumstances that the deceased and the Appellant used to live in the same house to the exclusion of Ors., that the accused wanted to contract a second marriage, that P.W. 10 and P.W. 11 had heard hue and cry just prior to the death of the deceased, that the P.W. 10 found the deceased lying dead with mark of strangulation on her throat, that the accused-Appellant who was found standing near the dead body, on being asked by P.W. 10 regarding the cause of the death had left his house without giving any reply, that the accused person who was found by P.W. 11 on road, on being asked regarding the hue and cry had fled away without giving any reply, that the Medical officer found the mark of finger nail on the right side of the trachea and the opinion of the Medical officer, who performed the autopsy, that the cause of the death of the deceased was cardio respiratory failure as a result of throttling and that the subsequent absconding of the accused person, immediately after the occurrence, are sufficient, cogent and reliable circumstances forming a complete chain convincingly that none other than the accused-Appellant had caused the death of his wife. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor submitted that the learned trial Judge rightly convicted and sentenced the Appellant and that the same do not warrant interference. 9. In order to appreciate the arguments, advanced on behalf of both the parties and to examine the correctness of the impugned judgment and order, we feel it proper to, briefly, re-capitulate the evidence on record as follows: 10. Smt. Jafala Khatun, who was the sister-in-law of the deceased, deposing as P.W. 2, stated that none used to live with the accused-Appellant in their house. 11. Mr. Mohan Mia (P.W. 11) supporting the evidence of P.W. 2 stated that the accused-Appellant and the deceased used to reside in their house. Smt. Jafala Khatun, who was the sister-in-law of the deceased, deposing as P.W. 2, stated that none used to live with the accused-Appellant in their house. 11. Mr. Mohan Mia (P.W. 11) supporting the evidence of P.W. 2 stated that the accused-Appellant and the deceased used to reside in their house. Though the said witnesses were duly cross-examined on behalf of the defence, they were not cross-examined. The said witnesses were duly cross-examined on behalf of the defence. Their evidence regarding living of the accused-Appellant and the deceased in their marital house, to the exclusion of Ors. remained unchallenged. Though the accused-Appellant in his examination, under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, in reply to the question No. 8 stated that his niece Ms. Amana Khatun also used to live with them, no evidence was adduced, on behalf of the defence, to substantiate the said plea. Even Ms. Amana Khatun was also not examined. Therefore, from the unshaken evidence of P.W. 2 and P.W. 11 it stood established that during the relevant period, the accused-Appellant and the deceased used to reside in their house, to the exclusion of Ors. In the backdrop of the said established fact, we are required to appreciate the evidence on record. 12. Mr. Mokhtal Hussain, who deposed as P.W. 10, was the next door neighbourer of the deceased. He stated that hearing a sound of cry, coming from the house of the accused-Appellant, he went to the latter's house and found the dead body of the deceased lying in the room. The witness found the accused-Appellant in his said room and on being asked by him (P.W. 10) regarding the cause of the death of the deceased, the accused-Appellant, without giving any reply, fled the house. Mr. Muktal Hussain (P.W. 10) clearly stated that the accused-Appellant had returned to the village after about one year. He further stated that he could notice mark of strangulation on the throat of the deceased. In his cross-examination, he stated that he was accompanied by his wife to the house of the deceased. He also stated that he met the Investigating officer, after the incident, who had visited his house and that he had accompanied the Investigating officer to the house of the deceased. In his cross-examination, he stated that he was accompanied by his wife to the house of the deceased. He also stated that he met the Investigating officer, after the incident, who had visited his house and that he had accompanied the Investigating officer to the house of the deceased. He denied the suggestion that he did not see the dead body of the deceased inside the room of the accused-Appellant and that the accused-Appellant did not flee from his house. He also denied the suggestion that the accused-Appellant was not absconding for about one year. Though this witness was duly cross-examined on behalf of the defence, no material contradiction could be elicited to render his evidence unbelievable. His evidence, that he found the accused-Appellant near the dead body immediately after hearing the cry, that the accused-Appellant, on being asked by him regarding the cause of the deceased, had fled the house and that he had seen the mark of strangulation on the throat of the deceased remained un-demolished. There is nothing on record to find that this witness had any enmity or grudge against the accused-Appellant prompting to depose falsely against the accused-Appellant. The evidence of this witness that the accused-Appellant was absconding for about one year is supported by the evidence of the Investigating officer who submitted the charge sheet showing the accused-Appellant as absconder and the record of the G.R case No. 150/96, which reveals that the accused-Appellant had appeared before the court after filing of the charge sheet. 13. Mr. Mohan Mia, Anr. independent witness deposing as P.W. 11, stated that while he was returning from market on the fateful day at about 7 p.m., he heard hue and cry towards the house of the accused-Appellant. According to this witness, hearing the hue and cry, he proceeded towards the house of the accused-Appellant and found the latter coming out from his house. This witness further stated that finding the accused-Appellant, he had asked him as to what had happened in his house, but, according to this witness, the accused-Appellant, without giving any reply, fled away. Thereafter, P.W. 10 went to the house of the accused Appellant and found the dead body of the deceased, inside the house, bearing mark of strangulation on her throat. Supporting the evidence of P.W. 10, this witness also stated that the accused-Appellant was absconding for about one and a half years. P.Ws. Thereafter, P.W. 10 went to the house of the accused Appellant and found the dead body of the deceased, inside the house, bearing mark of strangulation on her throat. Supporting the evidence of P.W. 10, this witness also stated that the accused-Appellant was absconding for about one and a half years. P.Ws. 10 and 11 were duly cross-examined on behalf of the defence. From the cross-examination of P.W. 11, it appears that he used to reside in the neighbourhood of the Appellant and after arriving therein he found about 20 to 50 villagers including Mr. Moktal Hussain (P.W. 10) Mr. Humayoon Mia (P.W. 6) and Ors. He further supported the evidence of P.W. 10 saying that P.W. 10 had visited the place of occurrence along with police. He denied the suggestion that he did not see the accused-Appellant running away from his house and that he did not meet the Investigating officer. Both P.W. 10 and P.W. 11 being the neighbourers and independent witnesses, there is nothing on record to indicate that they had any reason to make false statement. 14. A careful reading of the evidence of P.W. 10 leads to find that he visited the place of occurrence twice. Firstly, after hearing the cry he went alone, as the first person to visit the place of occurrence where he found the deceased and the accused-Appellant in the room from where the Appellant had fled away. Secondly, after the arrival of the Investigating officer, he accompanied him and visited the place of occurrence and his second visit was noticed by P.W. 11. 15. Smt. Golap Banu, the wife of P.W. 10, deposing as P.W. 9, stated, in her cross-examination that she had seen the dead body after two hours of the incident. 16. Mr. Humayoon Mia who deposed as P.W. 6 stated that hearing about the incident, he rushed to the place of occurrence and saw the dead body of the deceased in the courtyard. In his cross-examination, this witness stated that he found about 50 to 60 villagers in the place of occurrence. 17. P.W. 5 Abul Kalam did not know anything about the incident. However, he stated that wearing apparels of the deceased was never seized by Police in his presence. 18. Mr. In his cross-examination, this witness stated that he found about 50 to 60 villagers in the place of occurrence. 17. P.W. 5 Abul Kalam did not know anything about the incident. However, he stated that wearing apparels of the deceased was never seized by Police in his presence. 18. Mr. Nazim Mia, the elder brother of the deceased, deposing as P.W. 1, stated that coming to know from the villagers about the death of his sister, he rushed to the house of the latter and found her dead body with injury mark on her throat. He further stated that the deceased had told his wife that her husband wanted to contract a second marriage. He further stated that he had lodged the FIR with the police and exhibited the same as Exbt. No. 1. He was a witness to the inquest report prepared by the police in respect of the dead body and he exhibited his signature in the inquest report as Exbt. P/2. He further stated that he did not know as to who had informed the police and that he and Mr. Sundar Ali (P.W. 8), the scribe of the said ejahar accompanied the police to the police station, where Mr. Sundar Ali had written the ejahar which was signed by him. From the evidence of this witness, it appears that police had arrived in the place of occurrence before filing of the Exbt. P/1. Therefore, it appears that machinery of investigation was already moved and Exbt. P/1 was subsequently lodged by the said informant. Therefore, the Exbt. P/1 can, at best, be treated as written statement made by the said informant. This witness was duly cross-examined on behalf of the defence, but nothing could be elicited to render his evidence unbelievable. Therefore, his evidence that he saw mark of injury on the throat of the dead body remained unshaken. His evidence regarding the injury finds support from the evidence of P.W. 10. 19. Smt. Jafala Khatun, the wife of P.W. 1, deposing as P.W. 2 stated that receiving the information about the death of the deceased she visited the latter's house and found the dead body of the deceased lying in the courtyard. She also stated that she saw mark of violence on the throat of the deceased. 19. Smt. Jafala Khatun, the wife of P.W. 1, deposing as P.W. 2 stated that receiving the information about the death of the deceased she visited the latter's house and found the dead body of the deceased lying in the courtyard. She also stated that she saw mark of violence on the throat of the deceased. She further stated that the relation between the said couple was not cordial and that the husband of the deceased wanted to contract second marriage. She clearly stated that none except the said couple used to reside in their house. This witness was also duly cross-examined on behalf of the defence, but her evidence, that she could notice mark of violence on the throat of the deceased and that the relation between the said couple was not good, could not be demolished. 20. Mr. Ahid Mia, who deposed as P.W. 4, stated that noticing the villagers proceeding to the house of the accused-Appellant, he also followed them and saw the dead body of the deceased lying in the courtyard. In tune of the evidence of the P.Ws. 1, 2, 10 and 11 he stated that he saw the mark of violence on the throat of the deceased. The defence declined to cross-examine this witness. Therefore, his evidence that there was mark of violence in the throat of the deceased remained uncontroverted. 21. P.W. 7 Mr. Nurul Haque was a witness to the seizure of the wearing apparels of the deceased. P.W. 8 Mr. Sundar Ali was the scribe of the ejahar lodged by P.W. 1. He exhibited the said ejahar as Exbt. No. P/1 and his signature thereon as P/1/2. He further stated that he was present at the time of conducting the inquest by the police. He exhibited the inquest and his signature thereon as P/2/1. The defence declined to cross-examine this witness. 22. Sri Harimohan Das (P.W. 12), O.C. of Sonamura PS stated that he had entrusted the case to SI Milan Datta (P.W. 15) for investigation. Mr. Nantu Das, a constable of police deposing as P.W. 13 stated that, on being directed by the I.O. (P.W. 15) he had carried the dead body of the deceased to Sonamura hospital for post-mortem examination and that he identified the dead body before the Medical officer performing the autopsy. Mr. Nantu Das, a constable of police deposing as P.W. 13 stated that, on being directed by the I.O. (P.W. 15) he had carried the dead body of the deceased to Sonamura hospital for post-mortem examination and that he identified the dead body before the Medical officer performing the autopsy. He further stated that after the autopsy he had handed over the dead body to the relative of the deceased. 23. The Medical officer, who performed the autopsy of the dead body of the deceased deposed as P.W. 14. He stated that he examined the dead body and found that rigor mortis in respect of the dead body had already started. The said Medical officer found mark of fingernails over the neck 1 cm long over the right side of trachea. He stated that, after performing the post-mortem he came to the conclusion that the death of the deceased was caused due to cardio respiratory failure as a result of throttling. He has exhibited the post-mortem report as Exbt. P/5 and his signature thereon as P/5/1. He further stated that he could notice the fracture of trachea cartilage, hyoid bone and thyroid cartilage. He denied the suggestion that in case of throttling, the eye ball of the deceased would come out. He also denied the suggestion that he did not perform the post-mortem of the deceased as per medical jurisprudence. From the evidence of the said Medical officer, it transpires that the performance of post-mortem examination in respect of the dead body of the deceased was not controverted. What was controverted was that the post-mortem was not done as per the medical jurisprudence. The Medical officer was duly cross-examined on behalf of the defence. But nothing was elicited to indicate as to what procedure, if any, as prescribed by medical jurisprudence was not followed in performing the said post-mortem The evidence of the Medical officer that he noticed injury on the neck towards right side of the trachea, fracture of trachea cartilage, hyoid bone and thyroid cartilage and his opinion that the cause of death was cardio respiratory failure due to throttling remained unshaken. Even no suggestion was put to the said medical officer controverting his said findings. The evidence given by the said Medical officer lends sufficient supports to the ocular evidence given by P.W. Nos. Even no suggestion was put to the said medical officer controverting his said findings. The evidence given by the said Medical officer lends sufficient supports to the ocular evidence given by P.W. Nos. 1, 2, 4, 10 and 11 that there was mark of strangulation on the throat of the deceased. The Medical officer clearly opined that the primary cause of the death was throttling. Considering the unimpeachable evidence of above mentioned witnesses and the evidence of the Medical officer, we have no hesitation in holding that the deceased died as a result of throttling to death. The medical evidence that there was fracture in respect of the trachea cartilage, hyoid bone and thyroid cartilage clearly suggest that certain extra force was applied in causing the said injuries/fractures and forceful throttling suggests use of such extra force. Therefore, the injuries aforesaid that force was applied causing throttling and that the deceased died due to the said throttling. 24. Now the question is as to who had caused the said throttling in respect of the deceased. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses, more particularly the evidence of P.W. 2 and the P.W. 11 reveal that said couple resided in their house i.e. the place of occurrence to the exclusion of Ors. Therefore, presence of any third person stood ruled out. 25. As discussed above, P.W. 10, who was the next door neighbour of the deceased and P.W. 11, who lived in the said neighbourhood, were the independent witnesses. We have already noticed they had no grudge or reason to make false statement implicating the accused-Appellant. Therefore, in view of absence of any contradiction in respect of their evidence, there is no reason to disbelieve the statements made by them on oath before the court. According to P.W. 10, he heard a cry from the house of the accused-Appellant and immediately after hearing the cry he rushed to the house of the Appellant and found the deceased lying in the room. He noticed mark of strangulation on her throat and asked the accused-Appellant, who was found near the deceased as to what had happened to his wife. But the accused-Appellant without giving any reply, fled the house. Corroborating the evidence of P.W. 10, P.W. 11 also stated that he heard hue and cry towards the house of the accused-Appellant and found the latter coming from his house. But the accused-Appellant without giving any reply, fled the house. Corroborating the evidence of P.W. 10, P.W. 11 also stated that he heard hue and cry towards the house of the accused-Appellant and found the latter coming from his house. On being asked by this witness as to what had happened, the Appellant fled away without giving any reply. The said evidence of P.W. 10 and P.W. 11 could not be demolished. Even no suggestion was given to P.W. 10 that he did not find the accused-Appellant along with the dead body of the deceased in the room. Further, no suggestion was put to P.W. 10 suggesting that he did not ask the accused-Appellant as to how the death of the deceased was caused and that on being asked, the Appellant did not give any reply also. Similarly, no suggestion was put to P.W. 11 denying his evidence that on being asked by P.W. 11, the Appellant did not give any reply. The evidence given by P.W. 10 leaves no doubt to believe that the accused-Appellant was found by him in the room where the dead body of the deceased was lying. The evidence of P.W. 10 that the accused-Appellant had fled the house immediately after the death of the deceased stood corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 11. 26. In view of above evidence, it is found to be proved that there was none except the Appellant in the house/room of the Appellant wherein the dead body of the deceased was found by P.W. 10 and that he had fled his house leaving the village immediately after the said occurrence. The fact that the accused-Appellant was found near the dead body of his wife to the exclusion of Ors. and his refusal to give any answer to the question put by P.W. 10 regarding the cause of the death of the deceased and the fact that he had fled the place of occurrence immediately thereafter lead to the irresistible conclusion regarding involvement of the Appellant in causing the death of the deceased. We may pause here to point out that according to P.W. 10, whose evidence remained unshaken, he heard a sound of cry coming from the house of the accused-Appellant and immediately after hearing the said cry, he rushed to the Appellant's house and found the Appellant and the deceased in the same room. We may pause here to point out that according to P.W. 10, whose evidence remained unshaken, he heard a sound of cry coming from the house of the accused-Appellant and immediately after hearing the said cry, he rushed to the Appellant's house and found the Appellant and the deceased in the same room. This evidence of P.W. 10 points the guilt to the accused-Appellant, who was found near the dead body immediately after the said cry. Admittedly, there was no eye witness to the occurrence. The entire prosecution case is based on the circumstantial evidence revealed by the witnesses. The learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant, relying on the decision held in the case of C. Chenga Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in AIR 1996 SC 3390 , Ajay Singh v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 2007 SC 2188 and Asraf Ali v. State of Assam, reported in 2008 CRI. L.J. 4338, has submitted that the facts revealed by the prosecution witnesses are not sufficient to establish beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused-Appellant had committed the alleged offence. The learned Counsel further submitted that the examination under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure was not properly done by putting the relevant circumstantial evidence to the accused-Appellant and that in view of the prejudice caused to the Appellant, due to improper examination under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, the conviction, recorded against him is liable to be set aside and quashed. The learned Counsel further contended that there was contradiction in the evidence of witnesses regarding the place of occurrence. According to the learned Counsel, some of the witnesses said that the dead body was inside the room where some of the witnesses said that the dead body was seen in the courtyard and as such in view of the above contradictions regarding place of occurrence, the accused-Appellant was entitled to benefit of doubt. 27. Regarding contradiction in respect of the place of occurrence, it is noticed that Mr. Nazim Mia (P.W. 1), his wife Smt. Jafala Khatun (P.W. 2), Md. Ahid Mia (P.W. 4) and Mr. Humayoon Mia (P.W. 6) found the dead body of the deceased lying in the courtyard whereas, Mr. Muktal Hussain (P.W. 10) and Mr. Mohan Mia (P.W. 11) found the dead body inside the room of the house. Nazim Mia (P.W. 1), his wife Smt. Jafala Khatun (P.W. 2), Md. Ahid Mia (P.W. 4) and Mr. Humayoon Mia (P.W. 6) found the dead body of the deceased lying in the courtyard whereas, Mr. Muktal Hussain (P.W. 10) and Mr. Mohan Mia (P.W. 11) found the dead body inside the room of the house. A careful reading of the evidence of the said witnesses lead to find that P.W.10 was the first person to visit the place of occurrence and in his first visit, he found the deceased and the Appellant inside the room. As the P.W. 10 was the first person to visit the place of occurrence, that too, immediately after hearing a sound of cry, it was quite natural that he could notice the dead body inside the house. He was the only witness, who found the Appellant also inside the room. Thereafter, P.W. 11, who was returning from the market met the accused-Appellant on the road and this witness, after arriving in the house of the Appellant, found the dead body inside the room. All the above mentioned P.Ws. 1, 2, 4 and 6 reached the place of occurrence subsequent to P.W. 10 and P.W. 11. Therefore, finding of the dead body in the courtyard by some of the witnesses, who reached the place of occurrence after some delay, is not a material discrepancy raising doubt about the veracity of their evidence. Fact remains that the dead body of the deceased was found in the courtyard/in the premises of the accused-Appellant. The evidence of P.W. 10 clearly indicates that he found the accused-Appellant and the deceased inside the room and his evidence remained unshaken. 28. As revealed from the medical evidence aforesaid, there is no dispute that the deceased, on the fateful evening, died due to strangulation/throttling. In view of the above, the evidence that some of the witnesses found the dead body in the court yard and some of the witnesses i.e. P.Ws. 3, 10 and 11 found the dead body inside the room does not create any suspicion regarding the death of the deceased in the alleged manner. 29. The second point raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that the accused person was not duly examined. 3, 10 and 11 found the dead body inside the room does not create any suspicion regarding the death of the deceased in the alleged manner. 29. The second point raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that the accused person was not duly examined. We have carefully perused the questions put to the accused person during his examination under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, and the answers given by him. The circumstances that the deceased and the Appellant were residing in the said house to the exclusion of Ors., that P.W. 10 after hearing a cry rushed to the house of the Appellant and saw the dead body of the deceased lying in his room, that the Appellant was also present in the said room, that P.W. 10 had asked him as to how the death of his wife was caused, that the Appellant without giving any reply to the said question had fled the house, that P.W. 11 finding the accused-Appellant on the road asked him as to what had happened in his house, that he without giving any reply fled away, that the accused Appellant after the death of his wife had fled the village and returned after about one year, the medical evidence that the cause of death of the deceased was cardio respiratory failure as a result of throttling, that the witnesses, more particularly, P.W. 1, 2, 3, 10 and 11 had seen the mark of injury on the throat of the deceased, were brought to the notice of the accused-Appellant by putting separate questions and his answers to the said questions were duly recorded. In answer to the allegation that the said couple had resided in their house to the exclusion of Ors., the accused-Appellant stated that his niece Ms. Aman Khatun used to live with him. In respect of other evidence, which were brought to his notice, the accused-Appellant simply expressed his ignorance stating that those allegations were false. 30. In view of the above, it transpires that all the relevant and incriminating circumstances/evidence reveals by the P.W. s which were used against the accused-Appellant were brought to his notice and his answers were duly recorded. In the case of Ajoy Singh (supra), the Supreme Court discussed the purpose and object of recording statement under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure. In the case of Ajoy Singh (supra), the Supreme Court discussed the purpose and object of recording statement under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure. The Apex court observed, The object of examination under this Section is to give the accused an opportunity to explain the case made against him. This statement can be taken into consideration in judging his innocence or guilt. Where there is an onus on the accused to discharge, it depends on the facts and circumstances of the case if such statement discharges the onus. The word 'generally' in Sub-section (1)(b) does not limit the nature of the questioning to one or more questions of a general nature relating to the case, but it means that the question should relate to the whole case generally and should also be limited to any particular part or parts of it. The question must be framed in such a way as to enable the accused to know what he is to explain, what are the circumstances which are against him and for which an explanation is needed. The whole object of the section is to afford the accused a fair and proper opportunity of explaining circumstances which appear against him and that the questions must be fair and must be couched in a form which an ignorant or illiterate person will be able to appreciate and understand. A conviction based on the accused's failure to explain what he was never asked to explain is bad in law. The whole object of enacting Section 313 of the Code was that the attention of the accused should be drawn to the specific points in the charge and in the evidence on which the prosecution claims that the case is made out against the accused so that he may be able to give such explanation as he desires to give. The importance of observing faithfully and fairly the provisions of Section313 of the Code cannot be too strongly stressed. It is not sufficient compliance to string together a long series of facts and ask the accused what he has to say about them. He must be questioned separately about each material substance which is intended to be used against him. The questionings must be fair and couched in a form which an ignorant or illiterate person will be able to appreciate and understand. He must be questioned separately about each material substance which is intended to be used against him. The questionings must be fair and couched in a form which an ignorant or illiterate person will be able to appreciate and understand. Even when an accused is not illiterate, his mind is apt to be perturbed when he is facing a charge of murder. Fairness, therefore, requires that each material circumstance should be put simply and separately in a way that an illiterate mind, or one which is perturbed or confused, can readily appreciate and understand. 31. In the case of Asraf Ali (supra), referring to the following observation of a decision rendered by a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra ( 1973 (2) SCC 793 ), it was observed- Contextually we cannot bypass the decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bodade v. State of Maharashtra ( 1973 (2) SCC 793 ) as the bench has widened the sweep of the provision concerning examination of the accused after closing prosecution evidence. Learned Judges in that case were considering the fallout of omission to put to the accused a question on a vital circumstance appearing against him in the prosecution evidence. The three-Judge bench made the following observations therein: It is trite law, nevertheless fundamental, that the prisoner's attention should be drawn to every inculpatory material so as to enable him to explain it. This is the basic fairness of a criminal trial and failures in this area may gravely imperil the validity of the trial itself, if consequential miscarriage of justice has flowed. However, where such an omission has occurred it does not ipso facto vitiate the proceedings and prejudice occasioned by such defect must be established by the accused. In the event of evidentiary material not being put to the accused, the court must ordinarily eschew such material from consideration. However, where such an omission has occurred it does not ipso facto vitiate the proceedings and prejudice occasioned by such defect must be established by the accused. In the event of evidentiary material not being put to the accused, the court must ordinarily eschew such material from consideration. It is also open to the appellate court to call upon the counsel for the accused to show what explanation the accused has as regards the circumstances established against him but not put to him and if the accused is unable to offer the appellate court any plausible or reasonable explanation of such circumstances, the court may assume that no acceptable answer exists and that even if the accused had been questioned at the proper time in the trial court he would not have been able to furnish any good ground to get out of the circumstances on which the trial court had relied for its conviction. What is the object of examination of an accused under Section 313 of the code? The section itself declares the object in explicit language that it is "for the purpose of enabling the accused personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. In Jai Dev v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1963 SC 612 ) Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) speaking for a three-Judge Bench has focused on the ultimate test in determining whether the provision has been fairly complied with. He observed thus: The ultimate test in determining whether or not the accused has been fairly examined under Section 342 would be to inquire whether, having regard to all the questions put to him, he did get an opportunity to say what he wanted to say in respect of prosecution case against him. If it appears that the examination of the accused person was defective and thereby a prejudice has been caused to him, that would not doubt be a serious infirmity. Thus, it is well settled that the provision is mainly intended to benefit the accused and as its corollary to benefit the court in reaching the final conclusion. At the same time it should be borne in mind that the provision is not intended to nail him to any position, but to comply with the most salutary principle of natural justice enshrined in the maxim audi alteram partem. At the same time it should be borne in mind that the provision is not intended to nail him to any position, but to comply with the most salutary principle of natural justice enshrined in the maxim audi alteram partem. The word "may" in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) in Section 313 of the Code indicates, without any doubt, that even if the court does not put any question under that clause the accused cannot raise any grievance for it. But if the court fails to put the needed question under Clause (b) of the Sub-section it would result in a handicap to the accused and he can legitimately claim that no evidence, without affording him the opportunity to explain, can be used against him. It is now well settled that a circumstance about which the accused was not asked to explain cannot be used against him. 32. Carefully perusing the evidence on record and the questions put to the accused-Appellant, at the time of his examination under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, we find that all the incriminating materials as well as the circumstances revealed against the accused-Appellant were brought to his notice affording him sufficient opportunity to explain and defend himself The Defendant-Appellant, who denied the allegations brought against him, failed to adduce any evidence. Taking the plea that his niece Ms. Amana Khatun was also staying with him, the Appellant failed to substantiate the said plea by adducing any evidence. In view of the above, we find no material irregularity in the examination of the accused-Appellant. Therefore, we find no force in the contention of the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant, regarding improper examination of the accused-Appellant. 33. It needs to be noted that when conviction if it is based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances, on the basis of which the conclusion of guilt is drawn, must be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. The circumstance must be complete and there should be no gap in the chain of the events. The circumstances must conclusively point to the guilt of the accused. The proved circumstances must not only be consistent with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused but should also be inconsistent with the hypothesis of the innocence of the accused. 34. The circumstance must be complete and there should be no gap in the chain of the events. The circumstances must conclusively point to the guilt of the accused. The proved circumstances must not only be consistent with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused but should also be inconsistent with the hypothesis of the innocence of the accused. 34. It is settled law that conviction can be based on the basis of circumstantial evidence if the same is found to be reliable and conclusively pointing to the guilty of the accused person, to the exclusion of the hypothesis regarding his/their innocence. The circumstances from which inferences as to the guilt of the accused can be drawn should be proved beyond all reasonable doubt and the same should conclusively connect the accused with the alleged crime. 35. In the case of Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1954 SCC 21, it has been laid down that, where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances, the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negate the innocence of the accused and bring home the offences beyond any reasonable doubt. The Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Satish (Supra) referred to the following observation made by the Supreme Court in the case of C. Chenga Reddy v. State of A.P., reported in 1996 (10) SCC 193 : 21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence. 36. The Apex Court in the case of Padala Veer a Reddy v. State of A.P., reported in 1989 Supp. (2) SCC 706, laid down that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests: (SCC pp. 36. The Apex Court in the case of Padala Veer a Reddy v. State of A.P., reported in 1989 Supp. (2) SCC 706, laid down that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests: (SCC pp. 710-11, Para 10) 10.(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. 37. In the case of Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.R, reported in AIR 1952 SC 343 it was observed thus: It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 38. In the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, reported In AIR 1984 SC 1622 , while dealing with circumstantial evidence, the Supreme Court laid down that the following conditions precedent must be fully established before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence. The conditions are: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The conditions are: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned must or should and not may be established; (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 39. In the case of State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar and Ors., reported in (2000) 8 SCC 382 , the Apex Court dealt with a case of abduction and murder. In the said case, deceased Mahesh was abducted by the accused persons and subsequently he was found dead. The trial Judge convicted them under Section 364 read with Section 34 IPC but not for murder. The acquittal of the accused persons of the charge of murder, was challenged before the High Court. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court rejected the State's appeal against the acquittal in the murder and reduced the sentence to a short term. The State as well as the convicted persons filed appeals before the Supreme Court. The appeal filed by the State was against the acquittal in the murder charge, while the convicted persons challenged the conviction recorded against them. The Supreme Court, while allowing the appeal, preferred by the State, and maintaining the conviction under Section 364/34 IPC, convicted the Appellant-accused of the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 too and imposed on each of them a sentence of imprisonment for life. In the above referred case, Apex Court observed: The pristine rule that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused should not be taken as a fossilised doctrine as though it admits no process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it impair the temper of the rule. The doctrine of presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it impair the temper of the rule. On the other hand, if the traditional rule relating to burden of proof of the prosecution is allowed to be wrapped in pedantic coverage, the offenders in serious offences would be the major beneficiaries and the society would be the casualty. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercised a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process the court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case. When it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that Mahesh was abducted by the accused and they took him out of that area, the accused alone knew what happened to him until he was with them. If he was found murdered within a short time after the abduction the permitted reasoning process would enable the Court to draw the presumption that the accused have murdered him. Such inference can be disrupted if the accused would tell the Court what else happened to Mahesh at least until he was in their custody. 40. Referring to the decision held in the case of Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer, reported in AIR 1956 SC 404 , the Apex Court quoted in the State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar (supra), the following observation made in the case of Sambhu Nath Mehra (supra): This lays down the general rule that in criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts which are 'especially' within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The word 'especially' stresses that. It means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. 41. The Supreme Court, in the case of Zahira Habullah and Ann v. State of Gujarat and Ors. (2006) 3 SCC 374 observed: This Court has often emphasized that in a criminal case fate of the proceedings cannot always be left entirely in the hands of the parties, crime being public wrong its breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affects the whole community as a community and are harmful to society in general. The concept of fair trial entails familiar triangulation of interests of the accused, the victim and the society and it is the community that acts through the state and prosecuting agencies. Interest of society is not to be treated completely with disdain and as persona non grata. Courts have always been considered to have an over-riding duty to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice often referred to as the duty to vindicate and uphold the majesty of the law. Due administration of justice has always been viewed as a continuous process, not confined to determination of the particular case, protecting its ability to function as a court of law in the future as in the case before its. If a criminal court is to be an effective instrument in dispensing justice, the Presiding Judge must cease to be a spectator, a mere recording machine by becoming a participant in the trial evincing intelligence, active interest and elicit all relevant materials necessary for reaching the correct conclusion, to find out the truth, and administer justice with fairness and impartiality both to the parties and to the community it serves. Courts administering criminal justice cannot turn a blind eye to vexatious or oppressive conduct that has occurred in relation to proceedings, even if a fair trial is still possible, except at the risk of undermining the fair name and standing of the judges as impartial and independent adjudicators. Courts administering criminal justice cannot turn a blind eye to vexatious or oppressive conduct that has occurred in relation to proceedings, even if a fair trial is still possible, except at the risk of undermining the fair name and standing of the judges as impartial and independent adjudicators. The Apex court further observed: Since the object is to meet out justice and to convict the guilty and protect the innocent, the trial should be a search for the truth and not about over technicalities, and must be conducted under such rules as will protect the innocent, and punish the guilty. The proof of charge which has to be beyond reasonable doubt must depend upon judicial evaluation of the totality of the evidence, oral and circumstantial, and not by an isolated scrutiny. 42. In the backdrop of the above position of law with regard to the circumstantial evidence, looking to the facts of the present case, we find that it has been clearly established that on the fateful evening the accused-Appellant and the deceased were living together, to the exclusion of Ors. The P.W. 10, who was the next door neighbour had heard a sound of cry coming from the house of the accused-Appellant and on hearing the said cry, he had rushed to the house of the accused-Appellant. On his arrival therein, he found the dead body of the deceased lying in the room and the accused-Appellant therein. On being asked by P.W. 10 as to how the death of the deceased was caused, the accused-Appellant without giving any reply fled the house. The Appellant's conduct in such a situation speaks volume against him. The P.W. 11, who was returning home from market met the accused-Appellant on the road and on being asked by this witness as to what had happened in his house, the accused-Appellant, without giving any reply fled the house. The accused-Appellant was found absconding after the said occurrence for about one year. The evidence that the Appellant fled away leaving the dead body of his wife in his house and thereafter absconded till the submission of the charge sheet leads to draw adverse inference against him. All the witnesses, who noticed the dead body saw mark of injury on the neck/throat of the deceased. The evidence that the Appellant fled away leaving the dead body of his wife in his house and thereafter absconded till the submission of the charge sheet leads to draw adverse inference against him. All the witnesses, who noticed the dead body saw mark of injury on the neck/throat of the deceased. The Investigating officer, who prepared the inquest in respect of the dead body, found mark of injury on eye, on either side of the throat suggesting throttling to death. The Medical officer (P.W. 14) found mark of fingernails over the neck 1 cm long on either side of trachea. After performing the post-mortem examination, the Medical officer opined that there was fracture of trachea cartilage, hyoid bone and thyroid cartilage and that the cause of death was cardio respiratory failure due to throttling. Therefore, the primary cause of death being throttling it was a case of culpable homicide with intention to cause death. The various pieces of evidence i.e. from the point of hearing the cry till the running away of the accused-Appellant from his house, wherein the dead body was lying, without giving any reply to the questions put to him by P.W. 10 and P.W. 11 and finding of marks of throttling which was the primary cause of death are not only convincing, but when linked with each other all the said events also forms a complete chain of events, conclusively and convincingly pointing the guilt to none other than the accused-Appellant. Therefore, the circumstantial evidences, surfaced from the evidence on record are found to have a formed chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that in all human probability, the crime was committed by none other than the accused-Appellant. In the facts and circumstances, of this case, as revealed from the record, the charge brought against the accused-Appellant stood proved beyond all reasonable doubt. 43. In view of the reasons of the reasons discussed above, we maintain the conviction and the sentence recorded against the accused-Appellant. Accordingly, we uphold and affirm the impugned judgment and order. 44. The appeal, therefore, fails and same is dismissed. 45. Send back the lower courts records. Appeal dismissed.