Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 622 (GUJ)

Baldevbhai Dhanabhai Valand v. State Of Gujarat

2010-12-30

K.M.THAKER, SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA

body2010
JUDGMENT K.M. THAKER, J. 1. PRESENT appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is directed against the order dated 3.7.2009 passed by the learned Single Judge whereby the petition challenging the order passed by the Urban Land Ceiling Tribunal (ULC Tribunal) has been rejected. The appellant also challenged the order declaring certain parcel of land as excess vacant land and also the entry in the revenue record inserting the name of Gujarat Housing Board ("GHB" for short) in respect of the land in question. 2. MR. Mihir Thakore, learned Senior Advocate has appeared for the appellant-petitioner and MR. Jaswant K. Shah learned AGP has appeared for the opponents. Heard the learned Counsel for the respective parties. Rule. The learned AGP MR.J.K. Shah has waived service of Rule. With the consent of the learned Advocates, the appeal is heard for final decision. The facts involved in and relevant for present appeal are:- 3.1 One Mr. D.B. Valand, who died on 8.6.1979 (hereinafter referred to as "the deceased" or "the declarant") owned lands bearing Survey No.881 (admeasuring 6475 sq. mtr.) Survey No.534 (admeasuring 59 sq. mtrs.) and survey No.840/2 (admeasuring 4350 sq. mtrs.). The deceased is survived by the petitioner, and his widow and two daughters who came into the ownership of his properties, including the above referred parcels of land. 3.2 The deceased had filed Form No.1 under Section 6 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the "ULC Act") in pursuance of which the proceedings under the ULC Act were initiated and culminated into the order dated 5.10.1987 whereby land admeasuring 4534 sq. mtrs. was declared excess vacant land. 3.3 The said order dated 5.10.1987 was taken in review by the Deputy Secretary and by the said order dated 12.12.1988, the matter was remanded to the Competent Authority for fresh consideration. 3.4 Thereafter, the Competent Authority issued notice and heard the appellant in the said remand case and passed the order dated 1.1.1990 whereby land admeasuring 4534 sq. mtrs. was declared surplus holding. 3.5 According to the details mentioned in the uncotroverted reply affidavit, in pursuance of the said order, final statement under Section 9 was drawn on 31.3.1990/12.4.1990 which was followed by notification dated 31.5.1990 under Section 10 (1) of the ULC Act (issued on 27.6.1990) and the notification dated 31.12.1990 under Section 10(3) of the ULC Act (issued on 28.1.1991). 3.5 According to the details mentioned in the uncotroverted reply affidavit, in pursuance of the said order, final statement under Section 9 was drawn on 31.3.1990/12.4.1990 which was followed by notification dated 31.5.1990 under Section 10 (1) of the ULC Act (issued on 27.6.1990) and the notification dated 31.12.1990 under Section 10(3) of the ULC Act (issued on 28.1.1991). The notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act was served on the appellant on 19.7.1991 and thereafter on 9.12.1991 the possession of the land in question was taken over by drawing a panchnama. The excess land vested in the State Government. The land in question was simultaneously alloted to Gujarat Housing Board (hereinafter referred to as "G.H.B." or Housing Board"). 3.6 It also emerges from the record that at one stage the declarant had submitted an application seeking exemption under Section 20 of the ULC Act and the said application was, as claimed by the appellant, granted by order dated 24.8.1979. 3.7 Against the above referred order dated 1.1.1990, the appellant had preferred an Appeal being Appeal No. 189 of 1991 before the ULC Tribunal which was rejected by the Tribunal by order dated 29.6.1992 on ground of delay. 3.8 It appears that the said order dated 29.6.1992 rejecting the appeal was brought on record of the SCA No.7991 of 1992. The said petition was subsequently partly allowed by order dated 2.3.1994 and the Tribunal's order dated 29.6.1992 was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Tribunal for decision on merits. 3.9 After the remand, the appeal proceedings came to be registered under new number being Appeal No. 182 of 1994. According to the reply affidavit, the Tribunal had issued several notices however, no one appeared before the Tribunal. Thus, by order dated 22.8.1995, the appeal came to be dismissed. It is pertinent that the aforesaid order dated 22.8.1995 has not been challenged. 3.10 Subsequently, almost 8 years after, in June 2003, the appellant- petitioner submitted a representation dated 4.6.2003 to the Secretary, Revenue in which the appellant, made reference about the application (without mentioning relevant details e.g. the date of the application or number etc. about the said application) claimed to have been made under Section 20 of the ULC Act. Any details about the alleged application are not placed on record of the petition or present appeal. about the said application) claimed to have been made under Section 20 of the ULC Act. Any details about the alleged application are not placed on record of the petition or present appeal. 3.11 The said representation dated 4.6.2003 was followed by another representation dated 17.4.2006 which came to be rejected by the authority by the order dated 3.10.2006. 3.12 After the said order dated 3.10.2006, the appellant preferred captioned petition being SCA No. 1186 of 2009 wherein the impugned order dated 3.7.2009 came to be passed by which the appellant is aggrieved. Hence, this appeal. 3. THE only contention raised before us is that once the application under Section 20 of the ULC Act is made before the Repeal Act came into force, then a right would accrue in favour of the applicant (appellant in present case) and such accrued right would not be extinguished and it would survive even after the Repeal of the Act. Mr.Thakore, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant referred to Section 3 and Section 4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 ("Repeal Act" for short) and Section 6 of General Clauses Act 1897 ("G.C. Act" for short) and Section 20 of the ULC Act and submitted that the authority is under obligation to decide the application made under Section 20 of ULC Act and that the Repeal Act did not obliterate or extinguish the said obligation. He also relied on the judgments in the case between Darothi Clare Parreira (smt) and others v. State of Maharashtra and others [ 1996 (9) SCC 633 ] and in the case between Her Highness Maharani Shantidevi P. Gaikwad v. Savjibhai Haribhai Patel and others ('2001 SC 1462) as well as in case between Rameshchandra Shamjibhai Raniga v. State of Gujarat and others [ 2000 (4) GLR 2777 ]. 4.1 Mr. J.K. Shah learned AGP has opposed the appeal and has submitted that after the commencement of the Repeal Act, the so-called application under Section 20 of the Act abated. He submitted that the appellant had, on his own volition opted and sought exemption which was granted by order dated 24.8.1979. He submitted that the ULC Act was repealed in March 1999 and if on the date of repeal of the ULC Act (31.3.1999 hereinafter referred to as the "relevant date") any order was not passed, then such application would abate. He submitted that the ULC Act was repealed in March 1999 and if on the date of repeal of the ULC Act (31.3.1999 hereinafter referred to as the "relevant date") any order was not passed, then such application would abate. He further submitted that, the land which was declared excess has been allotted and its possession has been handed over as back as in 1991 to the Housing Board for construction of houses for weaker Section. Besides this, Mr. Shah, learned AGP also submitted that the applicant has only made bare allegations about the application allegedly made under Section 20 of the ULC Act. He relied upon the judgment in case between Kanaya Ram and others v. Rajender Kumar and others ( 1985(1) SCC 436 ) and G. Sekar v. Geetha and others [ 2009 (6) SCC 99 ] to support his submission that alleged pendency of the application did not confer (or create) any accrued right. 4. THE entire controversy is about the application claimed to have been under Section 20 of the ULC Act which reads thus:- "20. Power to exempt. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any of the foregoing provisions of this Chapter,- (a) where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and the State Government is satisfied, either on its own motion or otherwise, that, having regard to the location of such land, the purpose for which such land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do, that Government may, by order, exempt, subject to such conditions, if any' as may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of this Chapter; (b) where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling Emit and the State Government, either on its own motion or otherwise, is satisfied that the application of the provisions of this Chapter would cause undue hardship to such person, that Government may, by order, exempt, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of this Chapter; Provided that no order under this clause shall be made unless the reasons for doing so are recorded in writing. (2) If at any time the State Government is satisfied that any of the conditions subject to which any exemption under clause (a), or clause (b) of sub-Section (1) is granted is not complied with by any person, it shall be competent for the State Government to withdraw, by order, [such exemption after giving a reasonable opportunity to such person for making a representation against the proposed withdrawal and,thereupon the provisions of this Chapter shall apply accordingly." 5 (a) THE contention has been raised in light of Sections 3 and 4 of the Repeal Act and on the strength of Section 6(c) of the G.C. Act, which read thus:- "3. Saving:- (1) THE repeal of the principal Act shall not affect- (a) the vesting of any vacant land under sub-Section (3) of Section 10. possession of which has been taken over the State Government or any person duly authorised by the Stave Government in this behalf or by the Competent Authority; (b) the validity of any order granting exemption under sub-Section (1) of Section 20 or any action taken thereunder, notwithstanding any judgment of any Court to the contrary; (c) any payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under sub-Section (1) of Section 20. (2) Where- (a) any land is deemed to have vested in the State Government under sub-Section (3) of Section 10 of the principal Act but possession of which has not been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the Competent Authority; and (b) any amount has been paid by the State Government with respect to such land. Then, such land shall not be restored unless the amount paid, if any, has been refunded to the State Government. 4. Abatement of legal proceedings.- All proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the principal Act pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, before any Court, Tribunal or other authority shall abate. Provided that this Section shall not apply to the proceedings relating to Sections 11,12,13 and 14 of the principal Act in so far as such proceedings are palatable to the land, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the Competent Authority." "6. Effect of repeal. Effect of repeal. Where this Act or any [Central Act| or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made. then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not- (a)..... (b)..... (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. (d)..... (e)....." It emerges from the facts of the case that:- (1) the Tribunal's order dated 22.8.1995 was not and has not been challenged. (2) The action of taking over possession on 9.10.1991 also was not and has not been challenged (since 1991) for almost 18 years. (3) An application seeking exemption under Section 20 of the ULC Act in respect of the land covered under the declaration made by the declarant was granted by order dated 24.8.1979. (4) The land in question was (after possession having been taken - over in October 1991) simultaneously alloted to G.H.B. for weaker Section and such allotment to G.H.B. also was not and has not been challenged during past 18 years. (5) Likewise until now, for all these 18 years even the mutation entry also was not and has not been challenged. 5. DESPITE the fact that the appellant's application under Section 20 of he ULC Act was decided and granted by 24.8.1979 the appellant has claimed and asserted (without placing on record any details e.g. the date or number of the application or copy) that the application seeking exemption under Section 20 of ULC Act was made and it was pending on the relevant date. 7.1 If at all any application, other than the application which was granted by the order dated 24.8.1979, was made under Section 20 of the ULC Act (after the said order dated 24.8.1979 was passed) then such allegedly made application could probably be second or another application (i.e. an application other than the one which was disposed/allowed by order dated 24.8.1979) made under Section 20 of the ULC Act. Though any copy or details of such application are not placed on record, we have, for considering the submissions on merits assumed that an application under Section 20 of ULC Act was made and was pending on relevant date, as claimed. 6. Though any copy or details of such application are not placed on record, we have, for considering the submissions on merits assumed that an application under Section 20 of ULC Act was made and was pending on relevant date, as claimed. 6. THE issue which arises in the aforesaid factual backdrop is whether mere submission/pendency of an application under Section 20 of the ULC Act would tantamount to or would give birth to any "accrued right" in favour of the applicant landowner; and, whether the provisions under Sections 3 and 4 of the Repeal Act would save the application from abatement upon repeal of the ULC Act. The answer to the said questions would flow from above noted provisions. We shall, therefore, first examine Section 20 of the ULC Act. 9.1 The said Section confers power on the State Government, to grant exemption "on its own motion or otherwise" and subject to such condition as may be specified in respect of excess vacant land, from the provisions under Chapter 3 of the ULC Act. The said provision also confers discretion on the Government to exercise such power to exempt or to refuse exemption and also to "specify condition" applicable to the exemption (if granted). Furthermore, sub-Section 2 of Section 20 of the ULC Act also empowers the State Government to withdraw, by order, the exemption if it is satisfied that the conditions subject to which exemption was granted are not complied with or are violated. 9.2 It also provides that the power can be exercised by the State Government on its own motion or otherwise. The words "or otherwise" would take in its sweep "application by the landowner". The "application by a landowner" is one of the modes or base in view of which the State Government may exercise, if not done on its own motion, the power and the discretion conferred by Section 20 of the ULC Act. 9.3 Thus, the State Government derives the power and discretion to grant exemption only from and by virtue of the said provision. From the reading of the scheme of the ULC Act it becomes abundantly clear that but for the said Section 20 of the ULC Act, the State Government would not be competent to exercise the power and discretion of granting exemption to the landowner from the rigours of the provision under Chapter III of the ULC Act. 7. From the reading of the scheme of the ULC Act it becomes abundantly clear that but for the said Section 20 of the ULC Act, the State Government would not be competent to exercise the power and discretion of granting exemption to the landowner from the rigours of the provision under Chapter III of the ULC Act. 7. ON the strength of the said provision under Section 20 of the ULC Act, the appellant had, as claimed in the petition, made an application seeking exemption, which was granted vide order dated 24.8.1979. 10.1 Now the appellant has claimed that his application, preferred and filed under Section 20 of the ULC Act, was not decided and it remained pending before the Competent Authority on the relevant date. 8. EVEN if it is assumed, for the sake of testing the appellant's contention, that (a) more than one applications under Section 20 of the ULC Act can be made/would be maintainable and that (b) after the earlier order dated 24.8.1979 granting the previous application, another application was (as is now being claimed) actually made, then also the following aspects would stare in appellant's face and they need to be taken into account:- (i) When on one hand the application seeking exemption from the rigours of the Act is not granted for long time and on the other hand the landholder seeking exemption does not not actively pursue it for long time, then such inaction on the part of the landholder would tantamount to abandonment of the application. Hence, in present case there is strong reason, flowing from the conduct of the appellant, to believe that the appellant had abandoned the application (allegedly pending on the relevant date). (ii) Besides this, when the application is not granted for long time, then in absence of any deeming provision (to the effect that the application will be deemed to have been granted if not rejected within specified time), the application would be deemed to have been rejected (if not granted for long time). Thus, in view of the lapse of long time after the appellant allegedly made the second application, the same is deemed to have been rejected. (iii) Furthermore, in present case the lapse of long time is coupled with the action of handing over the possession of the land in question to the Housing Board. Thus, in view of the lapse of long time after the appellant allegedly made the second application, the same is deemed to have been rejected. (iii) Furthermore, in present case the lapse of long time is coupled with the action of handing over the possession of the land in question to the Housing Board. Thus, if the application in question was actually made and if it was made prior to the allotment to G.H.B. then the application would be deemed to have been rejected on the date of allotment of the land to G.H.B. (iv) On the other hand if the application in question was not made until the possession was taken over in December 1991 and was simultaneously handed over to G.H.B. then in that event before the application came to be made, equity in favour of the third party i.e. Housing Board and/or weaker Section was already created. (v) EVEN otherwise when equity in favour of the third party is created and when the appellant, by his own conduct has allowed long time to pass, he cannot be allowed to raise contention on the ground of pendency of the application under Section 20 of the ULC Act, more so when an application made under Section 20 is already granted in favour of the landholder. (vi) What is more pertinent to note is the fact that after having made the application under Section 20 of the ULC Act. the appellant never sincerely and seriously pursue the said application and allowed the application to remain dormant until 4.6.2003. 11.1 Thus, from the above noted and discussed facts and circumstances it emerges that the application claimed to have been made by the appellant stands disposed off as rejected or is deemed to have been rejected or is deemed to have been abandoned. Hence the contention about alleged pendency of the application on the relevant date, is not tenable. We may however examine the contentions raised by the appellant, on merits. Re:- "Accrued Right" on submitting Application for exemption. Hence the contention about alleged pendency of the application on the relevant date, is not tenable. We may however examine the contentions raised by the appellant, on merits. Re:- "Accrued Right" on submitting Application for exemption. Now, so far as the appellant's contention on the ground that upon submission of the application seeking exemption under Section 20 of the ULC Act a right accrued in his favour is concerned, it is trite to say that mere submission or mere pendency of application does not translate into or does not ripen into accrual of any right and it does not create any "vested right" or "accrued right". 12.1 As such the provision under Section 20 of the ULC Act allows the landowner to take advantage of the provision (and make application for that purpose). It is settled position that conferment of a right to claim the benefit offered or granted by the statute is not a vested right and such right, not being a vested right, could be withdrawn by the legislature. 12.2 Even if the said provision is taken as creating or granting a right, then also mere submission of application will not confer any vested right on the applicant. It is settled position that there is difference between a mere right and "accrued right". Such provision, as observed by the Apex Court, is merely "settled expectation" but does not create any vested right. 12.3 It is pertinent that in the cases such as the present one, on receipt of the application the Competent Authority has to satisfy itself about the correctness of the factual details stated therein and/or about the compliance of various preconditions, if any," and the Competent Authority may also have to examine the eligibility of the applicant as well as the history, if any, about prior applications. The authority would also be required to consider, having regards to the peculiar facts of the case on hand, whether the exemption should be granted or not and if yes, to what extent and whether any condition should be prescribed or not. The Competent Authority has to decide such application in light of the applicable provisions prevailing at the relevant time and also upon taking into account the justification urged by the applicant: in support of his request. The Competent Authority has to decide such application in light of the applicable provisions prevailing at the relevant time and also upon taking into account the justification urged by the applicant: in support of his request. The examination of the application and the action of granting or rejecting the application is not a mere mechanical exercise or a formality. It deserves to be noted that an inquiry into the right is different and distinct from the inquiry to determine as to whether the right should be granted or not. Therefore, to contend that mere submission of application gives birth to an accrued or vested right is misconceived and unacceptable. 12.4 In this context reference may be made (a) the decision in the case of Director of Public Works and another v. Ho Po Sang and others (1961 (2) All England Reporter 721- (1961) AC 901) privy council observed while considering the case where the application remain pending and the provisions were repealed, that:- "In summary, the application of the second appellant for a rebuilding certificate conferred no right on him which was preserved after the repeal of Sections 3A-E. but merely conferred hope or expectation that the Governor in Council would exercise his executive or ministerial discretion in his favour and the first appellant would thereafter issue a certificate. Similarly, the issue by the first appellant of notice of intention to grant a rebuilding certificate conferred no right on the second appellant which was preserved after the repeal, but merely instituted a procedure whereby the matter could be referred to the Governor in Council. The repeal disentitled the first appellant from thereafter issuing any rebuilding certificate where the matter has been referred by petition to the Governor in Council but had not been determined by the Governor" (emphasis supplied) Relying on the judgment in the leading case of Abbott v. Minister for Lands, the Apex Court, in the case between Kanaya Ram and others v. Rajender Kumar and others ([ 1985 (1) SCC 436 ], has observed in paragraph No. 10 of the judgment that :- "10.... when he made the application for purchase under Section 18(1) of the Act, had a mere "hope or expectation of, or liberty to apply for, acquiring a right" and not a "right acquired or accrued" under Section 18(1). when he made the application for purchase under Section 18(1) of the Act, had a mere "hope or expectation of, or liberty to apply for, acquiring a right" and not a "right acquired or accrued" under Section 18(1). It has been held ever since the leading case of Abbott V. Minister for Lands that a mere right to take advantage of the provisions of an Act is not an accrued right. Abbott case has been followed by this Court in a number of decision..."(emphasis supplied) (b) In case of S.B. International Limited v. Asst. Director of General of F.T. And ors ( AIR 1996 SC 2921 ) the Apex Court has observed that:- "..Mere making of an application does not create any right in the applicant since he has no pre-existing right to such licence. His right is only that which is given by the Policy...." (c) Subsequently the question was considered by the Apex Court in the case between Howrah Municipal Corporation v. Ganges Rope Company Limited [ 2004 (1) SCC 663 ] wherein the Apex Court observed:- "The context in which the respondent Company claims a vested right for sanction and which has been accepted by the Division Bench of the High Court, is not a right in relation to ownership or possession of any property for which the expression vest is generally used. What we can understand from the claim of a vested right set up by the respondent company is that on the basis of the Building Rules, as applicable to their case on the date of making an application for sanction and the fixed period allotted by the Court for tis consideration, it had a legitimate or settled expectation to obtain the sanction. In our considered opinion. such settled expectation, if any, did not create any vested right to obtain sanction. True it is, that the respondent Company which can have no control over the manner of processing of application for sanction by the Corporation cannot be blamed for delay but during pendency of its application for sanction, if the State Government, in exercise of its rulemaking power, amended the Building Rules and imposed restrictions on the heights of buildings on G.T. Road and other wards, such settled expectation has been rendered impossible of fulfillment due to change in law. The claim based on the alleged vested right or settled expectation cannot be set up against statutory provisions which were brought into force by the State Government by amending the Building Rules and not by the Corporation against whom such vested right or settled expectation is being sought to be enforced..." (emphasis supplied) (d) In the case between Viswant Kumar v. Madanlal Sharm'a [ AIR 2004 SC 1887 ] the Apex Court has, observed that:- "'4. We do not find merit in the above arguments. There is a difference between a mere right and what is right acquired or accrued. We have to examine the question herein with reference to Sections 4, 6 and 9 of the Act. It is correct that under Section 4 of the Rent Act, the tenant is not bound to pay rent in excess of the standard rent, whereas under Section 9 he has a right to get the standard rent fixed. Such a right is the right to take advantage of an enactment and it is not an accrued right. In the case of D.C. Bhatia v. Union of India reported in [ (1995) 1 SCC 104 ], it has been held that right of a statutory tenant to pay standard rent is a right to be governed by the Act and if the legislature repeals the Act or a part of it, the statutory tenant can do nothing about it. It is a mere right and not a vested right. To the same effect is the judgment of this Court in the case of Thyssen Stahlunion GMBH v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. reported in [ (1999) 9 SCC 334 ], in which it is held that right to be governed by the Act is not a right of an enduring nature. What is unaffected by repeal is a right acquired or accrued under the Act. That till the decree is passed, there is no accrued right. The mere right existing on date of repeal to take advantage of the repealed provisions is not a right accrued within Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act....." (emphasis supplied) (e) In the case between Union of India and others v. Indian Charge Chrome and another [ 1999 (7) SCC 314 ] the Apex Court has observed:- "17. The mere right existing on date of repeal to take advantage of the repealed provisions is not a right accrued within Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act....." (emphasis supplied) (e) In the case between Union of India and others v. Indian Charge Chrome and another [ 1999 (7) SCC 314 ] the Apex Court has observed:- "17. Corning to the fourth point, in so far as the refusal to register the contract with M/s. Asea Stai is concerned, no fault can be found therewith. Mere making of an application for registration does not confer any vested right in the applicant. The application has to be decided in accordance with the law applicable on the date on which the authority granting the registration is called upon to apply its mind to the prayer for registration... (emphasis supplied) (f) In a case where the dispute pertained to sanctioning building plan and the issue arose as to whether the temporary fees of development activities would apply in relation to the cases where the building plan had been approved the Apex Court, observed in the case between Commissioner of Municipal Corporation, Shimla v. Prem Lata Sood and ors [AIR 2007 SC (supp) 272] that:- "39. It is well-settled that where a statute provides for a right, but enforcement thereof is in several stages. unless and until the conditions precedent laid down therein are satisfied, no right can be said to have been vested in the person concerned. The law operating in this behalf, in our opinion is no longer res integra." (emphasis supplied) 9. ON examination of the position emerging from the above referred decisions, the principle which can be culled out is that mere submission or mere pendency of the such application would not ripen into accrual of any right. The contention on the ground of "accrued right", therefore, must fail. The said contention being unsustainable deserves to be rejected and is hereby rejected. . Re:- Right of "consideration" of Application after Repeal of the Act 10. UPON being confronted with the situation emerging from the provision under Section 20 of the ULC Act, Mr. The contention on the ground of "accrued right", therefore, must fail. The said contention being unsustainable deserves to be rejected and is hereby rejected. . Re:- Right of "consideration" of Application after Repeal of the Act 10. UPON being confronted with the situation emerging from the provision under Section 20 of the ULC Act, Mr. Thakore for the appellant submitted that the appellant may not, and rather he does not, pitch his case so high as to contend that the landowner has an "accrued right" to claim exemption but what the appellant would contend is that the right of "consideration" of the application under Section 20 of the ULC Act is available to the appellant and that upon submission of the application such right accrues and while the application is pending consideration (i.e. until it is allowed or rejected) the right continues to survive unaffected by the repeal of the ULC Act. The purport of the appellant's submission is that if on the relevant date the application remained pending before the authority, then even after the Repeal Act came into force, the right of "consideration" of the application would survive, hence the application should be considered and decided by the authority. We are of the view that for the reasons noted hereinafter, the contention is misconceived and is not sustainable. The first reason which ought to be recalled and mentioned at the outset is that actually in view of the facts and circumstances attached to the application allegedly made by the appellant, as noted earlier, it stood disposed off as rejected and/or abandoned or is deemed to have been rejected 15.1 Furthermore, the power to grant (or refuse) exemption was created (in favour of the Government) under and conferred by virtue of Section 20 of the ULC Act. In absence of such power after Repeal Act came into force, there would not be any authority with the Government to consider and decide such application. When there is no power to grant exemption or when the State Government is divested of the power to exempt then any occasion or possibility for the Government to take-up an application for consideration and to even "consider" the application seeking exemption would not survive or cannot arise. When there is no power to grant exemption or when the State Government is divested of the power to exempt then any occasion or possibility for the Government to take-up an application for consideration and to even "consider" the application seeking exemption would not survive or cannot arise. When the power to grant exemption has been taken away mere pendency of the application cannot breathe life in the extinguished power to grant exemption and resurrect it and/or cannot confer or continue the power taken away by the legislature. Once the power to grant or deny exemption is repealed and does not survive, as a corollary, the power to allow or reject the application seeking exemption would cease to exist. Consequently the Authority with the Government flowing from the power to grant or refuse the request for exemption to take up any application "for consideration" would also terminate. 11. SO as to overcome this situation, the appellant's Counsel has attempted to draw support from Sections 6(c) of the G.C. Act read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Repeal Act. The appellant has claimed that in view of the provisions contained under Section 3 and 4 of the Repeal Act read with Section 6 (c) of the G.C. Act, the appellant's right under Section 20 of the ULC Act is saved and will not get extinguished after the Repeal Act came in force. Re:- "Saving" of the Action or Repeal of ULC Act. 12. ON plain reading of the provision under Section 3 of the Repeal Act it comes out that said Section has saved only:- (i) the vesting of the vacant land of which possession is already taken over; (ii) validity of an "order" under Section 20(1) granting exemption i.e. the order granting exemption under Section 20(1) which has already been passed; and (iii) the payment made to the state Government for granting exemption. However any "proceedings" arising from or related to an application seeking exemption under Section 20 of the Act are not saved. Only "concluded" actions are intended to be saved. Thus either the action which reached finality by "taking" possession of the vacant land; or the "exemption" which had been "already granted" upon the authority having passed the order, are saved. Section 3 of the Repeal Act which is the "saving provision" does not save from abatement any pending application/proceedings under Section 20 of the ULC Act. Thus either the action which reached finality by "taking" possession of the vacant land; or the "exemption" which had been "already granted" upon the authority having passed the order, are saved. Section 3 of the Repeal Act which is the "saving provision" does not save from abatement any pending application/proceedings under Section 20 of the ULC Act. 17.1 Differently put the legislature intended to put an end to the "in future" actions i.e. to put an end to the power to take possession even where it was already not taken over before the relevant date and/or to grant exemption where it was already not "granted" before the relevant date which is clear from the plain reading of Sections 3 and 4 of the Repeal Act inasmuch as the words used are "order made" and "action taken" and only an "order made" under Section 20(1) and the action "taken", have been saved. From the provision under Section 3 and/or 4 under the Repeal Act, even any intention to save the proceedings related to application under Section 20 does not appear. Upon conjoint reading of Sections 3 and 4 it also becomes clear that the legislature never intended to salvage any "pending" application(s) which might have been submitted (under Section 20 of the ULC Act) but was not decided either way. Re:- Section 6(c) of General Clauses Act True it is that so far as, Section 6(c) is concerned, plain reading of the provision makes it clear that only "accrued or acquired right" or "privilege" are saved and unless different intention appear, the accrued or incurred privilege or liability are not to be affected. However, as noted earlier mere submission or pendency of the application seeking exemption under Section 20 of the ULC Act does not ripen or get converted into "'accrued right". On the other hand, after the Repeal Act came into force the state Government is divested of the power to grant exemption. Hence, the question or occasion and for that matter the "right" for "consideration" of the application would not survive because the power to exempt does not survive. On the other hand, after the Repeal Act came into force the state Government is divested of the power to grant exemption. Hence, the question or occasion and for that matter the "right" for "consideration" of the application would not survive because the power to exempt does not survive. 18.1 It also becomes clear on perusal of the provision that not only the power to pass (after the Repeal Act came in force) order granting exemption has not been saved but any intention to save the said power does not even emerge or appear from Section 3 and/or Section 4 of the Repeal Act. Had it been the intention of the legislature then it would have expressly saved the power of the State Government to grant exemption or the intention to save such power would clearly appear from the provisions. 13. EVEN if the provision permitting the landowner to avail advantage of the Act/the provision, by making application for extension, is considered and treated as a "right", it would not get converted into and would not get the status of "vested right", or "accrued right" for the purpose of Section 6(c) of the G.C. Act since even the "right" (existing on date of repeal) to take advantage of the repealed provisions is not a "right accrued" within the purview of Section 6(c) of the G.C. Act. It may be recalled that in the case of Viswant Kumar v. Madanlal Sharma (supra) the Apex Court has observed:- "4.....That till the decree is passed. there is no accrued right. The mere right existing on date of repeal to take advantage of the repealed provisions is not a right accrued within Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act....." (emphasis supplied) Therefore, the so-called application, if at all it was submitted and, as claimed, it did remain pending on the relevant date, shall abate upon coming into force of the Repeal Act and would not be saved by virtue of Section 6(c) of the G.C. Act. EVEN the object and scope of Section 20 of the ULC Act and Section 3 and 4 of the Repeal Act do not contemplate or permit such construction. EVEN the object and scope of Section 20 of the ULC Act and Section 3 and 4 of the Repeal Act do not contemplate or permit such construction. In the facts of present case the provision under Section 6(c) of the G.C. Act will not be attracted and the appellant is not entitled to take recourse under or to take aid of the provision under Section 6(c) of the G.C. Act, in absence of any accrued or vested right and the contention raised on the strength of Section 6(c) of the G.C. Act read with Section 3 and 4 of the Repeal Act is not sustainable and it cannot be accepted. The said contention also fails. 14. SO as to support his submissions that a landholder has right to ask that his application seeking exemption under Section 20 of the ULC Act should be considered even after the Repeal of the ULC Act. Mr. Thakore. learned Advocate for the appellant has relied upon the judgment in the case of Smt. Daroihi Clare Parreira and others v. State of Maharashtra and others ( AIR 1996 SC 2553 ) wherein the Apex Court has held that the very language of Section 20 and 21 suggest that the occasion to exercise the power under the said provisions would arise only when the land stands vested in the Government, is not applicable in the facts of the present case or is not of any assistance to the appellant in taking his case further inasmuch as in the said case the apex Court was considering the issue as to whether the Competent Authority can proceed to publish/issue notification under Section 10(3) while application under Section 20 or Section 21 is pending. In the said case the issue as to whether mere submission or pendency of application under Section 20 creates a vested right or not and whether the right, if any, of the landowner would survive even after the Repeal of the ULC Act even though any order in respect of such application is already not passed, was not under consideration before the Apex Court. Mr. Thakore, in support of his submissions that the accrued rights are not affected by the repeal of the ULC Act also relied upon the judgment in the case of Her Highness Maharani Shantidevi P. Gaikwad v. Savjibhai Haribhai Patel and others ( AIR 2001 SC 1462 ). Mr. Thakore, in support of his submissions that the accrued rights are not affected by the repeal of the ULC Act also relied upon the judgment in the case of Her Highness Maharani Shantidevi P. Gaikwad v. Savjibhai Haribhai Patel and others ( AIR 2001 SC 1462 ). In the facts of present case, the said decision also would not assist the appellant's case. The issue under consideration before the Apex Court in the said case was different than the issue involved in present case. Whether the proceedings pertaining to application seeking exemption, submitted under Section 20 of the ULC Act, and its pendency (i.e. pendency of application submitted under Section 20) are saved from abatement upon repeal of the Act and whether mere submission of such application amounts to vested or accrued right for the purpose of Section 6(c) of the G.C. Act was not under consideration before the Apex Court. Furthermore, even in the said decision the Apex Court has observed that "admittedly the land has not vested with the Government under Section 10(3). Possession continues to be with the appellants.....", whereas in present case admittedly the notification under Sections 10 (3) and 10(5) have been issued and land in question has not only vested in the Government but even the possession had been taken over and even allotment in favour of the Housing Board has already taken place. Besides the aforesaid aspect, the issue and the fact on hand are different from the facts involved in the cited case. The said decision, therefore, does not help the appellant. In the said case actually the Apex Court has, also observed that:- It cannot be held, on the facts of the case, that any rights accrued in favour of the plaintiff only on execution of the agreement. Assuming any rights accrued in favour of the plaintiff on passing of order dated 20th June. 1998. the same would fall on our view that the said order dated 20th June, 1998 was passed erroneously. Assuming any rights accrued in favour of the plaintiff on passing of order dated 20th June. 1998. the same would fall on our view that the said order dated 20th June, 1998 was passed erroneously. There is no substance in the contention that any rights had accrued in favour of the plaintiff which have the protection of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act." (emphasis supplied) The submission that once the application is made, it creates a right for consideration of his application might have been plausible and probably could have been sustained prior to the Repeal of the ULC Act, but after the Repeal Act came into force, the submission does not hold good. The contention is not sustainable in law and cannot be accepted. 15. IN light of the provisions under Section 3 and 4 of the Repeal Act, even if it is assumed that upon submission of an application under Section 20 of the ULC Act a right accrues in favour of the applicant then also after the Repeal of ULC Act it would not stand protected by the shield of Section 6(c) of the G.C. Act read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Repeal Act. 16. IN view of the foregoing discussion the contention raised by the appellant fails. Consequently the appeal also fails. The appeal is not accepted and is hereby rejected and it stands disposed off accordingly. IN the facts of the case there shall be no order as to costs. IN view of the order passed in the main appeal the civil application stands disposed off. (UPV) (Appeal dismissed)