1. The opposite party No.1 herein has filed on election petition under section 80, read with section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 ('the RP Act, 1951'), calling in question the election of the present applicant (who stands impleaded, in the election petition, as respondent No.1) to the Legislative Assembly of Arunachal Pradesh front 16th Yachuli (ST) Constituency, his case being, in brief, thus : In the election, in question, while the election petitioner got, in all, 5596 votes, the respondent No. 1 (i.e., the returned candidate) received as many as 5638 votes. The respondent No.1 was accordingly declared elected by a margin of 42 votes. In the election, in question, as many as 376 votes were cast by means of 'postal ballot's and, out of the total votes, so cast, while 197 votes were found to have been cast in favour of respondent No.1 (i.e., the returned candidate), the election petitioner (i.e., opposite party No. 1 in the present application) got 125 votes and the remaining candidate, namely, opposite party No. 2,-received 34 votes. However, none of the said 376 persons, who had cast their votes through 'postal ballot', falls in any of the categories of voters, who are eligible to cast their votes through 'postal ballot', and, hence, the votes of all these 376 voters were invalid and ought not to have beers counted in the election. 2. Thus, all the said 376 votes, cast through "postal ballot", are, according to the election petitioner, liable to be deducted, and, on doing so, the election petitioner having received 30 votes more than the present applicant, who is the returned candidate, the election petitioner becomes entitled to be declared, and be accordingly declared, by this court, elected from the 16th Yachuli (ST) Legislative Constituency. 3. The above election petition has given rise to Election Petition No. 5/2009 and it is in this election petition that the present application has been made by the returned candidate, who stands impleaded, as already indicated above, as respondent No. 1 in the election petition. 4. I have heard Mr. B.C. Das, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant, who is respondent No.1 in Election Petition No. 5/2009, and Mr. S.S. Dey, learned counsel, for the opposite party No.1, who is petitioner in the Election Petition No. 5/2009. 5. 4. I have heard Mr. B.C. Das, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant, who is respondent No.1 in Election Petition No. 5/2009, and Mr. S.S. Dey, learned counsel, for the opposite party No.1, who is petitioner in the Election Petition No. 5/2009. 5. By making this application under order VI, rule 16 and order VII, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ('the Code'), respondent No. 1, namely, the returned candidate, has prayed for striking out the pleadings, in the election petition, by taking resort to order VT, rule 16 of the Code and also for rejecting the election petition itself in exercise of this court's power under order VII, rule 11 of the Code on the ground that the election petition does not disclose any cause of action. 6. With the help of the present application, made under order VI, rule 16, and order VII, rule 11, the applicant (i.e., the returned candidate), who stands impleaded in the election petition as the respondent No.1 contends that the election petition lacks concise statement of material facts, as were required and ought to have been mentioned, in the election petition, in terms of the provisions of section 83 of the RP Act, 1951 and that the pleadings, made in the election petition, are vexatious, unnecessary, baseless, vague and ore an abuse of the process of the court. The averments, therefore, made in the election petition, which fall within the ambit of order VI, rule 16, need to be struck out and, in consequence thereof, as the election petition would have no cause of action to disclose, the election petition deserves dismissal. 7. Before I deal with the pleadings in the election petition, which the returned candidate seeks to get struck out, it is imperative, at the very outset, to take note of those aspects of law, which have material bearing on the present application made by the returned candidate. 8. While considering the present application, it needs to be noted that under section 81 of the RPAct, 1951, an election petition, calling, in question, any election may be presented, on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-section (1) of section 100 and section 101 of the RPAct. 1951. 9. 8. While considering the present application, it needs to be noted that under section 81 of the RPAct, 1951, an election petition, calling, in question, any election may be presented, on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-section (1) of section 100 and section 101 of the RPAct. 1951. 9. Considering the fact that sub-section (1) of section 100 is material for the purpose of this election petition, the relevant portion of section 100(1) is reproduced below : "100. Grounds for declaring election to be void. - (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) if the High Court is of opinion - (a) that on the date of his election a returned candidate was not qualified, or was disqualified, to be chosen to fill the seat under the Constitution or this Act or the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 (20 of 1963); or (b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by a returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent of a returned candidate or his election agent; or (c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected; or (d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected - (i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination, or (ii) by any corrupt practice committed in the interests of the returned candidate by an agent other than his election agent, or (iii) by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void, or (iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of this Act or of any rules or orders made under this Act the High Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void." 10. Close on the heels of section 100(1) is section 101, which too is relevant for the purpose of effective disposal of this miscellaneous application. Section 101 is, therefore, reproduced below : "101. Grounds for which a candidate other than the returned candidate may be declared to have been elected. Close on the heels of section 100(1) is section 101, which too is relevant for the purpose of effective disposal of this miscellaneous application. Section 101 is, therefore, reproduced below : "101. Grounds for which a candidate other than the returned candidate may be declared to have been elected. - If any person who has lodged a petition has, in addition to calling in question the election of the returned candidate, claimed a declaration that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected and the High Court is of opinion - (a) that in fact the petitioner or such other candidate received a majority of the valid votes; or (b) that but for the votes detained by the returned candidate by corrupt practices the petitioner or such other candidate would have obtained a majority of the valid votes. The High Court shall after declaring the election of the returned candidate to be void declare the petitioner or such other candidate, as the case may be, to have been duly elected." 11. A combined reading of the provisions of section 100(1) read with section 101 of the RP Act, 1951, what transpires is that the High Court is competent to declare election of a returned candidate to be void if any of the grounds, which have been enumerated in section 100(1), is satisfied, one of such grounds, in the light of section 100(1)(d)(iv), being that when the High Court is satisfied that there has been non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of the RP Act, 1951, or any Rules or Orders made thereunder provided that the High Court is also satisfied that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns the returned candidate, has been materially affected by such non-compliance. Similarly, reception of void votes, for example, votes cost by persons, who are not qualified to cast vote, can be a ground for challenge of the result of the election and if such reception of void vote materially affects the result of the election, the result can be interfered with in exercise of the court's power under section 100(1)(d)(iii). 12. Unless, therefore, the non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of the RP Act, 1951, or any Rules or Orders made thereunder has materially affected the result of the election, the result of the election cannot be interfered with. 12. Unless, therefore, the non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of the RP Act, 1951, or any Rules or Orders made thereunder has materially affected the result of the election, the result of the election cannot be interfered with. Extended logically, what it would mean is that an election petition must not only prove that there was reception of void vote or that there had been non-compliance, as indicated hereinbefore, but that the result of the election has been materially affected, because of such reception of void vote or due to non-compliance, as the case may be. In the absence of these twin conditions being satisfied, the result of the election cannot be interfered with. 13. In the present case, the election petitioner contends that persons, who were not eligible to cast votes, by means of 'postal ballot's, have cast their votes and allowing them to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot's has materially affected the result or the election. The allegation, therefore, if supported by material facts, would make the election petitioner's case fall under section 100(1)(d)(iii), which makes improper reception of void vote, a ground to challenge the result of the election provided that the result of the election, in so far as it is concerns the returned candidate, has been materially affected on reception of such void votes. The allegation of ineligible persons having been allowed to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot's can also be treated as non-compliance with the provisions of the RPAct, 1951, and the Rules made thereunder. If the election petitioner's allegations is taken to be the non-compliance with the provisions of RPAct, 1951, and/or the Rules made thereunder, then, the election petitioner's case would fall under section 100(1)(d)(iv) and this non-compliance would call for interference provided that the non-compliance is shown to have materially affected with the result of the election. In either case, therefore, the pleading would be incomplete in the absence of further allegation and supporting material facts indicating that there was casting of votes by means of 'postal ballot' by persons, who were ineligible to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot' and that the result of the election has been materially affected by reception of such void votes. 14. 14. What section 101 does is that it not only empowers the High Court to declare, in terms of the provisions of section 100(1), the election of the returned candidate to be void, but also the power to declare the election petitioner or such other candidate, as the case may be, to have been duly elected. Thus, while section 100 empowers the High Court to declare election of the returned candidate be void, section 101 makes it clear that after declaring the election of the returned candidate to be void, the High Court shall have the power to further declare that the election petitioner or such candidate, as the case may be, has been duly elected. 15. There is no dispute, before this court, that though the Election Petition does seek to hint some kind of relationship between the returned candidate, on the one hand, and an Assistant Returning Officer, on the other, no collusion or conspiracy, between the two, has been alleged nor has it been contended that the returned candidate has, in any manner taken help of the said Assistant Returning Officer and/or of 'any other official of the Election Commission. There is, thus, it is admitted, no allegation of 'corrupt practice'. The election petitioner's I case, therefore, if sustained, falls within the ground, which is embodied in sub-clause (iv) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 100 of the RPAct, 1951 inasmuch as the election petitioner alleges, in the election petition, non-compliance of the provisions of the RPAct, 1951, the Rules and Orders made thereunder and he further contends that the said non-compliance has materially affected the result of the election. In other words, the election petitioner's case is that the result of the election, in so for as it concerns the returned candidate, has been materially affected by non-compliance of the relevant provisions of the RP Act, 1951, the Rules and Orders made thereunder so far as the casting votes by means of "postal ballot" is concerned. In short, thus, the ground of challenge is that the vote, which have been cast by means of "postal ballot", were all illegal and the counting of those votes has materially affected the outcome of the election. What must an Election Petition contain? 16. In short, thus, the ground of challenge is that the vote, which have been cast by means of "postal ballot", were all illegal and the counting of those votes has materially affected the outcome of the election. What must an Election Petition contain? 16. Bearing in mind the ground, on the which the election of the returned candidate (who is the applicant in the present miscellaneous application) has been challenged, let me, now, turn to section 83, which lays down as to what shall be the contents of an election petition. Section 83, if extracted, reads as under : "83. Contents of petition. - (i) An election petition - (a) shall contain a concise statement of the materiel facts on which the petitioner relies; (b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice; and (c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) for the verification of pleadings : Provided that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof. (2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition." 17. From a bare reading of section 83, it becomes transparent that an election petition shall contain a concise statement of material facts on which the election petitioner relies. It may be noted that clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 83 of the RPAct, 1951, is in tune with order VI, rule 1, read with sub-rule (1) of rule 2 thereof inasmuch as order VI, rule 1 states that "pleading" shall mean plaint or written statement, and sub-rule (1) of rule 2 of order VI states that every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved. Thus, an election petition must contain a concise statement of 'material facts' on which the election petitioner relies to sustain the allegations made, in an election petition, against the declaration of the result of the election. Whether Code of Civil Procedure applies to an Election Petition under the RPAct, 1951? 18. The question, posed above, brings one to section 87, which embodies the procedure of an election petition. The relevant provisions, contained in section 87, read as under : "87. Procedure before the High Court. - (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the High Court, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of'Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) to the trial of suits : Provided that the High Court shall have the discretion to refuse, for reasons to be recorded in writing, to examine any witness or witnesses if it is of the opinion that the evidence of such witness or witnesses is not material for the decision of the petition or that the party tendering such witness or witnesses is doing so on frivolous grounds or with a view to delay the proceedings. (2) The provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), shall subject to the provisions of this Act, be deemed to apply in all respects to the trial of an election petition." 19. A careful reading of sub-section (1) of section 87, as extracted above, show that an election petition shall be tried by taking resort to as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code to the trial of suits. Thus, the provisions, as regards trial of suits, embodied in the Code, are to be applied to the trial of an election petition as nearly as may be possible. Inasmuch as section 87 makes the procedural provisions of the Code relevant to the trial of the suits applicable to the election petitions. One can, ac a corollary, safely hold that the procedural part of the Code applies to election petitions. 20. Inasmuch as section 87 makes the procedural provisions of the Code relevant to the trial of the suits applicable to the election petitions. One can, ac a corollary, safely hold that the procedural part of the Code applies to election petitions. 20. The election petitioner, with the help of the presently made miscellaneous application, invites this court to apply to the present case the provisions of order VI, rule 16 for the purpose of striking out the pleadings leading thereby to the rejection of the election petition itself in exercise of this court's power under order VII, rule 11. Whether court, on its own motion, strike out pleading? 21. As this miscellaneous application rests on the scope and ambit of order VI, rule 16 and order VII, rule 11, let us, first, take note of the relevant provisions of order VI, rule 16, which read as under : "Order VI, rule 16. Striking out pleadings. - The court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any matter in any pleading - (a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or (b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or (c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court." 22. A cursory reading of the provisions, contained in order VI, rule 16, reveals that the at any stage of a proceeding, such as, the present election petition, the court may strike out any pleading if it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious and/or if it tends to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial, or if it is, otherwise, an abuse of the process of the court. However, a cautious reading of the provisions, so embodied in order VI, rule 16, makes it abundantly clear that in order to strike out a pleading on any of the grounds, which order VI, rule 16 embodies, no specific application from any of the parties to the suit (or an election petition) is necessary. However, a cautious reading of the provisions, so embodied in order VI, rule 16, makes it abundantly clear that in order to strike out a pleading on any of the grounds, which order VI, rule 16 embodies, no specific application from any of the parties to the suit (or an election petition) is necessary. Since an abuse of the process of the court may also lead to the striking out of the pleadings, there can be no dispute, and there is, in fact, no dispute, that the provisions of order VI, rule 16 can be invoked by the court even on its own motion, though apart from the power to strike out pleadings on its own motion, which the court has, any of the parties to a suit (or an election petition) can, indeed, apply for striking out pleadings on the ground or grounds mentioned in order VI, rule 16 and while considering the question as to whether the pleadings, in a given case, shall or shall not be struck out, the court has to keep itself confined to the plaint or the election petition, as the case may be, and not look into, or rely upon, another material - [see Hari Shanker Jain v. Sonia Gandhi. (2001) 8 SCC 233 ]. 23. What follows from the above discussion is that irrespective of the ground on which the returned candidate, who is the applicant in the present miscellaneous application, has applied for striking out the pleadings in the election petition, this court has the power and also a corresponding duty to examine the pleadings in their correct perspective and if the pleadings therein or any part thereof fall within the four corners of order VI, rule 16, such pleadings or part thereof, as the case may be shall be struck out. At what stage can pleading be struck out ? 24. The other aspect of order VI, rule 16 is that the pleadings can be struck out at any stage of the proceeding. Merely, therefore, the fact that in a trial, written statement has already been filed, the court cannot refuse to exercise its power under order VI, rule 16 if the conditions, embodied therein, are, otherwise, satisfied. 24. The other aspect of order VI, rule 16 is that the pleadings can be struck out at any stage of the proceeding. Merely, therefore, the fact that in a trial, written statement has already been filed, the court cannot refuse to exercise its power under order VI, rule 16 if the conditions, embodied therein, are, otherwise, satisfied. It may be clearly understood that the power of the High Court to allow or reject on election petition, on failure to plead material facts, is not dependent on filing of written statement inasmuch as an order of rejection may be made by the court at any stage, if the court is satisfied that the conditions, as embodied in order VI, rule 16 and order VII, rule 11, exist - [see Sonia Gandhi's case (supra)]. 25. In the case at hand, the mere fact that when the returned candidate, who is the applicant in the present miscellaneous application, has already filed his written statement in the election petition, this court cannot consider itself to have been freed front the duty cast upon it to dispassionately examine the pleadings and strike out those pleadings in the election petition, which fall within the ambit of order VI, rule 16. Whether pleading can be struck out on a ground other than the one on which a party applies for striking out the pleading? 26. Thus, when it becomes the duty of the court to invoke order VI, rule 16, whenever its application is warranted, irrespective of the stage of the trial or the proceeding, it necessarily follows that irrespective of the ground, on which a party to a trial or proceeding seeks the court to invoke its powers under order VI, rule 16, the court is bound to strike out the pleadings, when it finds, in a given case, that one or more of the conditions, embodied in order VI, rule 16, are attracted. More illustratively speaking, if a defendant seeks to get a pleading, in a plaint, struck out on the ground that it is scandalous and the court finds that the pleading is not scandalous, such a pleading may still be struck out if the court is, otherwise, satisfied that it would embarrass or delay fair trial. More illustratively speaking, if a defendant seeks to get a pleading, in a plaint, struck out on the ground that it is scandalous and the court finds that the pleading is not scandalous, such a pleading may still be struck out if the court is, otherwise, satisfied that it would embarrass or delay fair trial. To put it a little differently, the court does retain the power to act on its own and strike out a pleading, in any given case, if it finds that the pleading is such, which warrants application of order VI, rule 16. When a plaint can be rejected ? 27. Coming to order VII, rule 11, it may be noted that order VII, rule 11 reads : "Order VII, rule 11. Rejection of plaint - 11. Rejection of plaint'. - The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases : (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law: (e) where it is not filed in duplicate; (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9 : Provided that the time fixed by the court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-papers shall not be extended unless the court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-papers, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff." 28. A bare reading of order VII, rule 11 shows that a court is bound to reject a plaint if the plaint, as provided in clause (a) of rule 11 of order VII, does not disclose 'cause of action'. A bare reading of order VII, rule 11 shows that a court is bound to reject a plaint if the plaint, as provided in clause (a) of rule 11 of order VII, does not disclose 'cause of action'. The court is also bound to reject the plaint if any of the other conditions, mentioned in order VII, rule 11, is satisfied. As section 87 of the RPAct, 1951, makes the procedural provisions, contained in the Code applicable, as nearly as may be possible to election petitions, it follows that an election petition too can be rejected if the election petition, when read as a whole, does not disclose 'cause of action'. In the present case, there is no dispute before this court that the present election petition can be rejected it this court finds that the election petition does not disclose any cause of action. 29. The question, therefore, is : What is 'cause of action'? What is cause of action ? 30. Coming to the question as to what 'cause of action' means, it may be pointed out that 'cause of action' implies a right to sue. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted, inter alia, to mean every fact, which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, it traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. Thus, the material facts, which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove, constitute the cause of action. Negatively put, it would mean that everything, which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would form part of cause of action - [Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 254 ]. 31. The 'cause of action' has no relation whatever to the defence, which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour [Chand Kour v. Partap Singh, (1887-88) 15 JA 1566]. 32. It refers entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour [Chand Kour v. Partap Singh, (1887-88) 15 JA 1566]. 32. What becomes transparent from the above discussion is that the expression 'cause of action' means a bundle of facts, which, if traversed, a plaintiff must prove to entitle him to receive a judgment in his favour. The cause of action bears no relation to the defence, which may, be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief(s) sought for. The cause of action is nothing, but the media upon which the plaintiff or the petitioner seeks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour. For determining, therefore, the question as to whether a plaint or election petition discloses a 'cause of action', the court must take into account all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action without, however, embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the facts pleaded. Can an election petition be rejected under order VII, rule 11 and, if so, when? 33. In the backdrop of the provisions of section 87 of RP Act, 1951, which makes the procedural provisions, contained in the Code, applicable to election petitions, it clearly follows that in terms of order VII, rule 11, an election petition can be rejected if the pleadings, amongst others, do not disclose cause of action. 34. The Supreme Court has clarified, at para 24 of Sonia Gandhi (supra) 8 SCC 233, that the duty is cast on the court to examine the election petition irrespective of written statement or denial and reject the election petition if it does not disclose cause of action and, further, in order to decide whether an election petition needs rejection, the court has to only look at the plaint, i.e., the election petition and nothing else. It has also been pointed out, in Sonia Gandhi's case (supra), that the court has always frowned upon vague pleadings, which will leave a wide scope to adduce evidence. The relevant observations read as under: "24. It has also been pointed out, in Sonia Gandhi's case (supra), that the court has always frowned upon vague pleadings, which will leave a wide scope to adduce evidence. The relevant observations read as under: "24. It is the duty of the court to examine the petition irrespective of any written statement or denial and reject the petition if it does not disclose a cause or action. To enable a court to reject a plaint on the ground that it does not disclose a cause of action, it should look at the plaint and nothing else. Courts have always frowned upon vague pleadings which leave a wide scope to adduce any evidence. No amount of evidence can i cure basic defect in the pleadings." (Emphasis is added) 35. The observations, made in para 24 of Sonia Gandhi's case (supra), leave no room for doubt that a duty is cast on the court to examine the plaint or election petition irrespective of the fact as to whether written statement has or has not been filed or a particular averment made in the election petition is or is not denied and determine if the election petition contains material facts and if the absence of material facts leads to an incomplete cause of action, the court is duty bound to reject the plaint or the election petition on the ground that the election petition does not disclose a cause of action. For the purpose of determining as to whether a plaint or the election petition does or does not disclose a cause of action, the court shall look into the plaint (election petition) only and nothing else. 36. The observations, made in para, 24, in Sonia Gandhi's case (supra), thus, reaffirm the law that it is primarily for the court to determine as to whether a pleading needs to be strike out so as to enable a court to dispose of a suit or an election petition effectively and in accordance with law. Similarly, it is the duty of the court to determine whether the pleadings, in a plaint or election petition, discloses 'cause of action' or not. If the plaint (election petition) does not disclose 'cause of action', the plaint or the election petition, as the case may be, must be rejected. Meaning of material fact : 37. Similarly, it is the duty of the court to determine whether the pleadings, in a plaint or election petition, discloses 'cause of action' or not. If the plaint (election petition) does not disclose 'cause of action', the plaint or the election petition, as the case may be, must be rejected. Meaning of material fact : 37. Since an election petition must contain a concise statement of material facts on which an election petitioner relies in order to get the election of the returned candidate declared void, one has to necessarily understand, in correct perspective, what the expression, 'materiel fact', 'means and how can one distinguish 'material fact' from 'material particular'? 38. In the case at hand, as the election petitioner does not challenge, admittedly, the election of the returned candidate on the ground of 'corrupt practice', we are more concerned with the meaning of the expression 'material fact' than the meaning of the expression, material particular, though the distinction between the two is, at times, difficult to notice. 39. Let me point out as to what the expression, 'material fact' convey, in this regard, it may be noted that the expression, 'material fact', has been explained in many of the decisions in the realm of 'corrupt practice'. However, the meaning of the expression, 'material fact', does not depend upon the question as to whether the result of an election is challenged on the ground of 'corrupt practice' or on some other grounds as permitted in the RP Act, 1951. In other words, the meaning of the expression, 'material fact', remains the same irrespective of the fact as to whether one faces challenge to the result of an election on the ground of 'corrupt practice' or an any other statutory ground. 40. In Sonia Gandhi (supra), the Supreme Court has pointed out that by a series of decisions of the court, it is well settled that the 'material facts' required to be stated are those facts, which can be considered as 'materials' supporting the allegations made. In other words, they must be such facts as would afford a 'basis' for the allegations made in the petition and would constitute the 'cause of action' as is understood in the Code. In short, thus, 'material facts' mean those facts, which support the allegations made by an election petitioner, or those basic facts on which rest the allegations made in the election petition. 41. In short, thus, 'material facts' mean those facts, which support the allegations made by an election petitioner, or those basic facts on which rest the allegations made in the election petition. 41. The Supreme Court has also pointed out, in Sonia Gandhi's case (supra), that omission of a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and the statement of claim becomes bad. The function of the party is to present as full a picture of the cause of action with such further information, in detail, as to make the opposite party understand the case he will have to meet - [See also Samant N. Balkrishna v. George Fernandez, (1969) 2 SCC 433 and Jitendra Bahadur Singh v. Krishna Behari, (1969) 3 SCC 283]. 42. All the primary facts, which must be proved, at the trial, by a party, to establish the existence of a cause of action or his defence, are 'material facts' - [see Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia, (1977) 1 SCC 511 ]. 43. In V.S. Achuthanandan v. P. J. Francis and Another, (1999) 3 SCC 737 , the Supreme court has held, on a conspectus of a series of its decisions, that 'material facts' ore such preliminary facts, which must be proved, at the trial, by a party to establish existence of a 'cause of action' and failure to plead 'material facts' is fatal to the election petition. 44. Whether in an election petition, a particular fact is material or not, and as such, required to be pleaded or not is a question, which depends on the nature of the charge levelled, the ground relied upon and the special circumstances of the case. In short, all those facts, which are essential to clothe the petitioner with a complete 'cause of action', are 'material facts', which must be pleaded and failure to plead even a single material fact amounts to disobedience of the mandate of fiction 83(1)(a) - [see Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, AIR 1986 SC 1253]. 45. The Supreme Court has further pointed out, in Azhar Hussain's case (supra), that all the primary facts, which must be proved by a party to establish a 'cause of action' or his 'defence', are 'material facts'. Can an election petition be rejected if it does not disclose material facts ? 46. 45. The Supreme Court has further pointed out, in Azhar Hussain's case (supra), that all the primary facts, which must be proved by a party to establish a 'cause of action' or his 'defence', are 'material facts'. Can an election petition be rejected if it does not disclose material facts ? 46. It was argued, in Azhar Hussain (supra), that section 86 provides for dismissal of election petition only when it does not comply with the requirements of sections 81, 82 and 117 and not section 83. This contention has not been accepted by laying down that if an election petition does not satisfy the requirement of stating 'material facts', which the petitioner relies upon to obtain relief, section 87, when reed in the light of the provisions of the Code, would warrant such a pleading to be struck out and, following the striking out of the pleadings, if the election petition does not disclose cause of action, it must be rejected by resorting to order VII, rule 11. 47. Thus, court has a duty to reject an election petition if it does not contain all 'material facts', for, omission to state even one 'material fact' would lead to incomplete 'cause of action'. Meaning of'disclosure' of a 'cause of action': 48. While dealing with order VII, rule 11, one has to be conscious of the fact that order VTI, rule 11 warrants 'disclosure' of 'cause of action', which is different from actually having a 'cause or action' in the sense then a person may actually have a 'cause of action' to pursue his grievances in a, court, but that would not be enough to maintain his petition unless his petition discloses 'cause of action' inasmuch as the statutory requirement is the 'disclosure' of a 'cause of action' and not merely having a 'cause of action'. To put it a little more clearly, a plaintiff (or an election petitioner) may have a 'cause of action', but his having 'cause of action' would not be sufficient to maintain the plaint (or the election petition), unless he discloses the 'cause or action' in his plaint (or election petition) and, for the purpose of disclosing 'cause of action', he must state the 'material facts', the 'material facts' being all those facts, which form the basis for making allegations or which furnish the grounds on which the allegations made against the defendant (or the returned candidate) rest. 49. The reasons behind 'disclosure' of 'cause of action' can be gathered from Badat v. East India Trading, AIR 1964 SC 538 , wherein it has been held as under : "Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes, among others, that the plaintiff shall give in the plaint the facts constituting the cause of action and when it arose, and the facts showing the court has jurisdiction. The object is to enable the defendant to ascertain from the plaint the necessary facts so that he may admit or deny them. Order VIII provides for the filing of a written statement, the particulars to be contained therein and the manner of doing so; rules 3,4 and 5 thereof are relevant to the present enquiry and they read : Order VIII, rule 3. It shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his written statement to deny generally the grounds alleged by the plaintiff, but the defendant must deal specifically with each allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth, except damages. 4. Where a defendant denies an allegation of fact in the plaint, he must not do so evasively, but answer the point of substance.... And if an allegation is made with diverse circumstances, it shall not be sufficient to deny it along with those circumstances. 5. Every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically, or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability: Provided that the court may, in its discretion, require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. These three rules form an integrated code dealing with the manner in which allegations of fact in the plaint should be traversed and the legal consequences flowing from its non-compliance. The written statement must deal specifically with each allegation of fact in the plaint and when a defendant denies any such fact: he must not do so evasively, but answer the point of substance. If his denial of a fact is not specific but evasive, the said fact shall be taken to be admitted. In such an event, the admission itself being proof, no other proof is necessary." 50. From the observations made above, what can be clearly gathered is that the object behind 'disclosure' of 'cause of action' is to give to the defendant a fair opportunity to answer the claims made in the petition. Unless 'cause of action' is disclosed by revealing 'material facts', which a plaintiff relies upon to support his contention, the defendant may be taken by surprise, which would defeat the very object of 'pleadings'. Material particular: 51. One may also point out that 'particulars', on the other hand, as laid down in Azhar Hussain (supra), are "the details of the case set up by the party". 'Material particulars' would, therefore, mean all the details, which are necessary to amplify, refine and embellish the 'material facts' already pleaded in the petition in compliance with the requirements of clause (a) of section 83(1) of the RP Act, 1951, 'particulars' serve the purpose of giving finishing touches to the basic contours of a picture already drawn, to make it full, more detailed and more informative. Distinction between material fact and material particular: 52. The distinction between 'material 'facts' and 'material particulars' was brought out by Scott, LJ in Bruce v. Odhams Press (Ltd.), (1936) 1 KB 697, in the following passage : "The cardinal provision in rule 4 is that the statement of claim must I state the material facts. The word "material" means necessary for the 1 purpose of formulating a complete cause of action; and if anyone "material" statement is omitted, the statement of claim is bad it is "demurrable" in the old phraseology, and in the new is liable to be "struck out" under R.S.C. order XXV, rule 4 [see Philipps v. Philipps, (1878)4QBD27\; or "a further and better statement of claim" may be ordered under rule 7. The function of "particulars" under rule 6 is quite different. They are not to be used in order to fill material gaps in a demurrable statement of claim -gaps which ought to have been filled by appropriate statements of the various material facts which together constitute the plaintiff's cause of action. The use of particulars is intended to meet a further and quite separate requirement of pleading, imposed in fairness and justice to the defendant. Their function is to fill in the picture of the plaintiff's cause of action with information sufficiently detailed to put the defendant on his guard as to the case he had to meet and to enable him to prepare for trial", (emphasis is added) 53. The dictum of Scott, LJ, in Bruce's case (supra), has been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Samant N. Balakrishna v. George Fernandez, ( 1969 (3) SCC 238 ), and, having approved the aforesaid dictum, the Supreme Court has observed : "Section 83 requires that the petition must contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies and the fullest possible particular of the corrupt practice alleged. 'Material facts' and 'particulars' may overlap but the word 'material' shows that the ground of corrupt practice and the facts necessary to formulate a complete cause of action must be stated. The function of the particulars is to present as full a picture of the cause of action as to make the opposite party understand the case he will have to meet." 54. In short, thus, the word 'material' means necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete 'cause of action': and even if one 'material' statement is omitted, the statement of claim becomes bad; whereas the purpose of "material particulars" is in the context of the need to give the opponent sufficient details of the charge set up against him and to give him a reasonable opportunity to effectively respond. Can material particulars be provided in an election petition after expiry of the prescribed period of limitation ? 55. Order VI, rule 4 embodies the requirement of giving 'particulars' by laying down that apart from material facts, when the pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, willful default or undue influence and 'in all other cases', wherein particulars may be necessary, the pleadings must give the particulars. 56. 55. Order VI, rule 4 embodies the requirement of giving 'particulars' by laying down that apart from material facts, when the pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, willful default or undue influence and 'in all other cases', wherein particulars may be necessary, the pleadings must give the particulars. 56. The expression, 'in all other cases', is of great significance, for, 'in all other cases' would mean the cases other than the cases of misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, willful default or undue influence. 57. It is, now, of utmost importance to note that order VI, rule 5 provided earlier for supplying of material particulars subsequent to the institution of a suit. Relying upon the provisions of order VI, rule 5, the courts, in the past, could allow material particulars, even in election petitions, to be brought on record subsequent to the date of filing of the election petition. Rule 5 having been omitted, with effect from 1.7.2002, by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002, it is no longer possible, in terms of the provisions of the present Code to supply 'material particulars' subsequent to the institution of a suit or an election petition except by way of amendment. 58. The question, now, is: What is the effect of omission of order VI, rule 5 by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002, on the court's power to allow amendment of the election petitions? 59. It may be noted that section 81 of the RP Act, 1951, prescribes a period of 45 days from the date of the election to presentation of an election petition calling, in question, the election of the returned candidate. As principle of law, it cannot be disputed that amendment does not relate bock to the date of filing of the suit and cannot cure the defect of limitation. Where the amendment changes the basis of the suit itself, the suit would be taken to have been filed on the date of amendment for the purpose of limitation. This is the position of law, which has been laid down in Vishwambhar v. Laxmi Narayan, (2001) 6 SCC 163 . 60. Where the amendment changes the basis of the suit itself, the suit would be taken to have been filed on the date of amendment for the purpose of limitation. This is the position of law, which has been laid down in Vishwambhar v. Laxmi Narayan, (2001) 6 SCC 163 . 60. It may, now, be pointed out that in the case of Dhartipakar Madan lal Agarwal v. Rajiv Gandhi, AIR 1987 SC 1577 , the Supreme Court has pointed out that order VI, rule 17 of the Code permits amendment of an election petition, but the same is subject to the provisions of the RP Act, 1951, and since section 81 prescribes a period of 45 days from the date of the election for presenting election petition calling in question the election of the returned candidate, no election petition is maintainable and the High Court or the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to extend the period of limitati n after the expiry of the period within which an election petition is to be filed. 61. In fact in L.R. Shivaramagowda v. T.M. Chandrashekar, (1999) 1 SCC 666 , the court has held that the failure to plead 'material facts' is fatal to the election petition and no amendment of the pleading can be allowed to introduce such 'material facts' after the time limit prescribed for filing the election petition has expired. The relevant observations made by the Supreme Court read as follows : "The failure to plead 'material facts' is fatal to the election petition and no amendment of the pleading could be allowed to introduce such 'material facts' after the time limit prescribed for filing the election petition." 62. Since an amendment takes effect from the date, when the amendment is allowed and does not relate back to the original date of institution of a suit or proceeding, it logically follows that amendment of an election petition is not possible beyond the prescribed period of 45 days. Consequently it is not possible to furnish, by way of amendment the material facts, when the prescribed period of 45 days is over. However, with the help of order VI, rule 5, material particulars could have been earlier furnished subsequent to the presentation of the election petition. Consequently it is not possible to furnish, by way of amendment the material facts, when the prescribed period of 45 days is over. However, with the help of order VI, rule 5, material particulars could have been earlier furnished subsequent to the presentation of the election petition. However, with the complete omission of order VI, rule 5 by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002, the court no longer has the power to allow, even in an election petition, the election petitioner to furnish 'material particulars' after the prescribed period of 45 days is over. 63. What emerges from the above discussion is that since on election petition cannot be allowed to be amended after the period of limitation expires, the question of making amendment of an election petition even by furnishing 'material particulars' would not, now arise if the period of limitation has expired. In other words, when rule 5 of order VI stands omitted, no amendment, be it in respect of 'material fact' or 'material particular', can be allowed to be made, in an election petition, beyond the period of limitation. Can a vague pleading. In an election petition, be struck out and, if so, why ? 64. When the pleading in a plaint is vague, it disables the defendant from effectively responding to the allegations made in the plaint. Such a pleading, in the plaint, may tend to prejudice the effective defence of the defendant. The pleading, therefore, which is vague, needs to be struck out if such vague pleading has the tendency to prejudice the defence of the opponent. A vague pleading may also be struck out on the ground that it may embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit. 65. In the case of Knowles v. Roberts, (1888) 38 Ch.D 263 Bowen, LJ said: "It seems to me that the rule that the court is nor to dictate to parties how they should frame their case, is one that ought always to be preserved sacred. But that rule is, of course, subject to this modification and limitation, that the parties must not offend against the rules of pleading, which have been laid down by the law: and if a party introduces a pleading which is unnecessary, and it tends to prejudice, embarrass and delay the trial of the action, it, then, becomes a pleading, which is beyond his right. It is a recognized principle that a defendant may claim ex debito justitiae to have the plaintiff's claim presented in an intelligible form, so that he may not be embarrassed in meeting it: and the court ought to be strict even to severity in taking care to prevent pleadings from degenerating into the old oppressive pleadings of the court of Chancery." (emphasis added) 66. From the observations made in Robert's case (supra), it becomes clear that a" defendant has a right to claim that the plaintiff presents his (plaintiff's) pleadings in an intelligible form so that the defendant is not prejudiced in effectively responding to the plaintiff's claim and he (defendant) is not embarrassed at the trial and, in such circumstances, the court has the duty to be not only strict, but severe in ensuring that the pleadings are not in the form of the old oppressive way of pleadings, when a plaintiff's case used to be entertained by the court of Chancery even if his (plaintiff's) case was not presented in a precise and specific form. 67. In Bhagwati Prasad Dixit 'Ghorawala' v. Rajiv Gandhi, (1986) 4 SCC 78 , the Supreme Court has held that in an election petition, pleadings have to be precise, specific and unambiguous and if the election petition does not disclose a 'cause of action', it should be rejected in limine. The Supreme Court has also observed, in Bhagwati Prasad Dixit (supra). That the legal position stands settled that an election petition is liable to be dismissed in limine at the initial stage if it does not disclose any 'cause of action' and that the 'cause of action' in questioning the validity of an election must relate to the grounds specified in section 100 at the RP Act, 1951, and if the allegations, contained in the petition, do not set out grounds of challenge as contemplated by section 100 of the RP Act, 1951, and if the allegations do not conform to the requirements of sections 81 and 83 thereof in the sense that the pleadings do not disclose material facts and also the grounds on which the election of the returned candidate is put to challenge, the pleadings are liable to be struck off and the election petition is liable to be rejected under order VII, rule 11. Leaving none in doubt, the Supreme Court, in Bhagwati Prasad Dixit (supra), has held that a pleading, if vogue and general, is 'embarrassing'. Obviously, therefore, when pleading is vague and general, it would embarrass the trial and such a pleading can, therefore, be struck out in exercise of the court's power under order VI, rule 16. What is the 'test' whether a pleading states 'material facts' or not? 68. Succinctly explaining the expression, 'material facts', the Supreme Court has observed, in Azhar Hussain's case (supra) that 'material facts' ore facts, which, if established, would give the petitioner the relief asked for. The 'test' required to be answered is, points-out the Supreme Court, in Azhar Hussain (supra), whether the court could have given a 'direct verdict' in favour of the election petitioner in case the returned candidate had not appeared to oppose the election petition on the basis of the facts pleaded in the petition. The relevant observations, made in Azhar Hussain (supra), read as under : "14. Before we deal with these grounds seriatim, we consider it appropriate to restate the settled position of law as it emerges from the numerous decisions of this court, which have been cited before us in regard to the question as to what exactly is the content of the expression "material facts and particulars", which the election petitioner shall incorporate in his petition by virtue of section 83(1) of the Act. (1) What are material facts and particular? Material facts are facts, which, if established, would give the petitioner the relief asked for. The test required to be answered is whether the court could have given a direct verdict in favour of the election petitioner in case the returned candidate had not appeared to oppose the election petition on the basis of the facts pleaded in the petition. (2) *** *** *** (3) *** *** *** (A\ *** *** *** (5) *** *** *** (6) *** *** *** (emphasis is added)" 69. From the above observations, made in Azhar Hussain (supra), what becomes clear is that the 'material facts' are those facts, which, if established, would give the petitioner the relief asked for. (2) *** *** *** (3) *** *** *** (A\ *** *** *** (5) *** *** *** (6) *** *** *** (emphasis is added)" 69. From the above observations, made in Azhar Hussain (supra), what becomes clear is that the 'material facts' are those facts, which, if established, would give the petitioner the relief asked for. The test required to be answered is whether the court could have given a 'direct verdict' in favour of the election petitioner, on the basis of the facts pleaded in the petition, in case the returned candidate had not appeared to oppose the election petition. Thus, if, on the basis of the facts pleaded in an election petition, the election petition can be allowed even if the returned candidate does not appear, those facts would be 'material facts'. 70. In short, in order to determine whether an election petition contains 'material facts' or not, the test would be whether the facts, which have been stated in the election petition, if accepted in their entirety, would lead to the allowing of the election petition. This principle is in consonance with order VIII, rule 10, which enables the court to pronounce judgment in a case; if any party, from whom a written statement is required, fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the court, as the case may be. 71. The allegation, therefore, that a person is not an eligible voter is merely an allegation. This can be, at best, treated as a ground for disqualification of a person, but this is not sufficient to give a declaration that X' is not an eligible voter. The election petition must 'disclose' as to why the election petitioner considers the opponent, "X', as an ineligible voter. The reason for calling a person an ineligible voter has to be supported by 'material facts'. If such facts are given, then, one can say that there is an allegation that the opponent is an ineligible voter and that this allegation is supported by 'material facts'. 72. The next question would be whether such 'material facts', based on which the allegation has been made, are or are not true. The truth or veracity would be tested by evidence. 72. The next question would be whether such 'material facts', based on which the allegation has been made, are or are not true. The truth or veracity would be tested by evidence. Therefore, the test of a material fact is whether, in support of the allegations, all such facts, which are necessary to sustain the allegation, have or have not been stated in an election petition. If a person, therefore, alleges that a person "X' is not eligible to cast vote, in a given election, by means of 'postal ballot', his election petition must assign reason. The reason, so assigned, must be complete in nature so that a court can, on the basis of such pleadings, would be able to give the verdict that "X' is or is not an eligible voter even without taking evidence if the opponent does not contest. Unless such facts are stated, it cannot be stated that the election petition discloses 'cause of action'. Election petitioner's case: 73. With the help of the present application, since the returned candidate (as the applicant), has sought to get struck out the pleadings in paragraph 8 to 19 of the election petition, the election petitioner's pleadings, as contained in paragraphs 8 to 19 of the election petition, are reproduced below : "6. That the election of the respondent No.1 to the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly from the 16 YACHULI (ST) Assembly Constituency is being challenged herein on the ground of the same having been materially affected due to improper reception by means of postal ballot' Papers in his favour. As is revealed in the result sheet itself, your election petitioner had polled the highest number of valid votes recorded at the Polling Stations, in fact, the election petitioner having polled a total number of 5471 votes was leading over the respondent No. 1 by a clear margin of 30 votes. As is revealed in the result sheet itself, your election petitioner had polled the highest number of valid votes recorded at the Polling Stations, in fact, the election petitioner having polled a total number of 5471 votes was leading over the respondent No. 1 by a clear margin of 30 votes. However, it was only by way of addition of the number of votes recorded on 'postal ballot' papers that the respondent No. 1 was shown to hove polled the maximum number of total votes numbering 5638, i.e., 42 votes more than the total number of 5596 votes polled by the election petitioner, it is stated that the entire process of allowing recording of votes on 'postal ballot' Papers in the 16 YACHULI(ST) Assembly Constituency and consequently the counting of such voted totally numbering 376 in favour of the three candidates are totally illegal and unknown to law and it is only by means of these illegally cast 'postal ballot' Papers that the respondent No.1 was shown to have secured highest number of votes thereby resulting in his purported election from 16 YACHULI(ST) Assembly Constituency. Consequently, the illegal reception of 197 numbers of 'postal ballot' Papers illegally cast as well as counted in favour of the respondent No. 1 has materially affected the result of the election so far as it 'concerns the Returned Candidate, i.e., the respondent No. 1 consequently entailing a declaration to the effect that the election of the Returned Candidate is void. Further, if the number of votes recorded on 'postal ballot' Papers and counted in respect of all the three candidates, totally numbering 376, are subtracted from the respective tally of total votes of all the three candidates, your election petitioner would be found to have polled the maximum valid votes numbering 5471, i.e., 30 valid votes more than the respondent No. 1 who was shown to have polled 5441 of valid votes cast in Polling Stations. Consequently, the election petitioner would be entitled to a declaration under section 101 of the Act to the effect that he had received the majority of valid votes and after declaring the election of the respondent No. 1 to be void, the election petitioner is, thus, liable to be declared as the duly Returned Candidate from 16 YACHULI (ST) Assembly Constituency. 9. 9. That section 60 of the Act of 1951 provides for giving votes by 'postal ballot' Papers in terms of the Rules made under the said Act by such persons - (i) as is referred to in clause (c) or (d) of section 20(8) of the Representation of People Act, 1950; (ii) the wife of any such person to whom the provisions of section 20(3) of the Act of 1950 apply and such wife being ordinarily residing with that person in terms of section 20(6) of the said Act; (iii) any person belonging to a class of persons notified by the Election Commission in consultation with the Government to give his vote by 'postal ballot' Paper subject to fulfilment of such requirement as may be prescribed in the relevant Rules; (iv) any person subjected to preventive detention subject to fulfilment of requirements prescribed under the relevant Rules. 10. That in terms of the mandate of section 60 of the Act, provisions in Part III and IIIA of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 has been framed. Rule 17 defines the terms "service voter", "special voter" and "voter on election duty" and rule 18 provides that these three classes of voters would be entitled to vote by post subject to their fulfilling of requirements specified under the Rules. Rule 27A(b) of the said Rules prescribes the nomenclature of "notified elector" for such voters who belong to a class of persons notified by the Election Commission under clause (c) of section 60 of the Act of 1951. Further. Rule 27A(a) of the said Rules provides that an Assistant Returning Officer for the purpose of notified class of electors shall be the one as notified by the Election Commission for the purposes of Part IIIA of the Rules. Rest of the provisions of Part-III and III A of the Rules of 1961 provide for various other mandatory procedure in respect of voting by 'postal ballot' Papers. Section 20 of the Act of 1950 categorizes the other persons who are entitled to vote by 'postal ballot' Papers in terms of section 60(a) and (b) of the Act of 1951. 11. Section 20 of the Act of 1950 categorizes the other persons who are entitled to vote by 'postal ballot' Papers in terms of section 60(a) and (b) of the Act of 1951. 11. That the humble election petitioner categorically states that none of the 376 votes recorded on the 'postal ballot' Papers and counted in respect of different candidates including the 197 number 'of such votes counted in respect of the respondent No.1 was cast by any person authorized under the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder to cast their votes by way of 'postal ballot' Papers. None of the voters in whose name the 376 postal ballot's were cast belong to any of the categories of voters covered under the mandate of section 60 of the Act of 1951. None of these voters belong to the categories of voters covered under section 20(8) of section 20(3) or section 20(6) of the Act of 1950. None of these persons also belong to any class of persons notified by the Election Commission in consultation with the Government to give his vote by 'postal ballot' any person subjected to preventive detention. 12. That the election petitioner has come to learn that most of the lists comprising of all these 376 voters in whose names votes were recorded on 'postal ballots' were in fact made and issued by one Sri Jotam Toko Obi, an officer working in the post of Circle Officer of Yachuli Revenue Circle forming part of 16 YACHULI(ST) Assembly Constituency. The said Sri Obi, who is also a close relative of the respondent No. 1, issued most of those lists of persons posing and terming himself as Assistant Returning Officer although he was never appointed as Assistant Returning Officer in connection with the election in question by any authority of law. All these 376 postal ballot' Papers were issued in the names of porters/labourers purportedly engaged for carrying election materials as well as some other persons termed as Gaonburah/Head Gaonburah with duties to arrange logistic support for polling parties. Election petitioner has come to learn that some of such lists of porters/labourers and Gaonburah/head Gaonburah were made and issued by the said Sri Jotam Toko Obi, Circle Officer, posing himself as Assistant Returning Officer (although he was never appointed as such) vide No. YCL/ELN-01/2009/36 date 5.10.2009 and No. YCL/ELN-01/2009/37 dated 6.10.2009. Election petitioner has come to learn that some of such lists of porters/labourers and Gaonburah/head Gaonburah were made and issued by the said Sri Jotam Toko Obi, Circle Officer, posing himself as Assistant Returning Officer (although he was never appointed as such) vide No. YCL/ELN-01/2009/36 date 5.10.2009 and No. YCL/ELN-01/2009/37 dated 6.10.2009. Similar other orders were also reportedly issued at the instance of the said officer vide Memo. No. PTN/ELN-02/2009 dated 4.10.2009. The entire list of the 376 voters whose vote were shown to have been recorded on 'postal ballot' papers and counted as such may be called for judicial scrutiny of this hon'ble court from the custody of the District Election Officer/Returning Officer in respect of 16 YACHULI (ST) Assembly Constituency. 13. That the election petitioner begs to state that none of the 376 voters in whose names votes were recorded on 'postal ballot' Papers and counted in favour of different candidates belong to the class of' serving voter' as specified under clause (a) or (b) of section 60 of the Act of 1951 read with section 20(8) of the Act of 1950. None of these voters are either 'special voter' as defined under rule 17 of the Rules of 1961. Almost all of these 376 votes have been cast in the name of persons who were shown to be engaged as porters/labourers said to be engaged to carry election materials end, persons termed as Gaonburahs/head gaonburahs who were purportedly engaged to arrange logistic support for Polling parties. By no means these 376 votes, which were recorded on 'postal ballot' Papers were cast by any Voters on election duty' or 'service voter' or 'special voter' or 'notified voters' or 'persons' in preventive detention'. None of these persons, in whose names the 376 votes on 'postal ballot' papers were recorded, had been appointed as Polling agents, Polling officers. Presiding officer or other public servant as covered under the definition of rule 17(c) of the Rules of 1961. Further, a 'voter on election duty' as defined under rule 17(c) of the Rules has to belong to a class of persons notified by the Election Commission in terms of the parent statute, i.e., section 60(c) of the Act of 1951. Presiding officer or other public servant as covered under the definition of rule 17(c) of the Rules of 1961. Further, a 'voter on election duty' as defined under rule 17(c) of the Rules has to belong to a class of persons notified by the Election Commission in terms of the parent statute, i.e., section 60(c) of the Act of 1951. Election Commission as defined under article 324 (2) of the Constitution of India, means and includes exclusively the Chief Election Commissioner and such other numbers of Election Commissioners as the President may appoint. None of the persons in whose names the 376 postal ballot' Papers have been issued, votes recorded thereon and finally counted in the election were notified by the Election Commission either under section 60(c) of the Act read with rule 18(a) of the Rules of 1961 or in any other manner known to law entitling such persons to give vote by 'postal ballot's. All these 376 votes recorded on 'postal ballot' Papers are prima facie void votes inasmuch as the 'postal ballot' Papers on which those votes were recorded were not cast by or in the name of any voter entitled to vote on 'postal ballot' Paper under law. 14. That accordingly it is reiterated even at the risk of repetition that all the 376 votes recorded on 'postal ballot' Papers and counted in favour of different candidates, as reflected in the Final Result Sheet are invalid votes which have been counted in favour of the candidates by way of improper reception of void votes and all these 376 votes recorded on 'postal ballot' Papers are liable to be declared void. Consequently, all these 376 votes 'postal ballot' Papers, including the 197 such votes counted in favour of the respondent No.1 as reflected in Result Shelt are liable to be substracted from the tally of votes polled by the respective candidates and as a result thereof the election petitioner is liable to be declared elected having secured the maximum valid votes numbering 5471 which is 30 votes more than the respondent No. 1 who is shown to have polled 5441 number of total votes recorded at Polling Stations. 15. 15. That further the humble election petitioner begs to state that as per the provisions of relevant Rules contained in Parts III and IIIA of the Rules of 1961, 'postal ballot' Papers can be issued to voter entitled to vote by 'postal ballot's only if such voter send intimation to the Returning Officer in Form 12 framed under the Rules of 1961 and only on receipt of such application at least 10 days before the date of poll, the Returning Officer can issue 'postal ballot' Paper to such voters entitled to vote by 'postal ballot's. In the instant case no such application under Form 12 of the Rules were received by the Returning Officer from any voter entitled to vote by 'postal ballot' within the stipulated date fixed by law. If the election authorities are asked to produce all the applications under Form 12 of the Rules in respect of the 376 postal ballot' Papers, votes on which were cast and counted, the aforesaid contention of your humble election petitioner would be proved to be true. These illegalities have materially affected the result of the election in so far as it concerns the Returned Candidate, i.e., the respondent No. 1. 16. That as a matter of fact the list of appointment of Porters/labourers and Goonburahs/head goonburahs for carrying out election materials and for arranging logistics, etc., were issued by and in the name of Assistant Returning Officers on or after 4.10.2009 asking such voters to apply for 'postal ballot' Papers. It may be noted that the date for casting of vote by way of 'postal ballot' Papers for 16 YACHULI(ST) Assembly Constituency was scheduled on 8.10.2009 and 9.10.2009. Thus, there is no question or remote possibility of any voter entitled to vote by 'postal ballot' Papers being able to send any intimation in Form 12 to the Returning Officer expressing his wish to vote by post so as to reach the same to the Returning Officer at least 10 days before the date of such poll. Thus, there is no question or remote possibility of any voter entitled to vote by 'postal ballot' Papers being able to send any intimation in Form 12 to the Returning Officer expressing his wish to vote by post so as to reach the same to the Returning Officer at least 10 days before the date of such poll. This fact apart from occasioning blatant violation of the provisions rules 19 and 27C of Rules of 1961, has also vitiated the entire process of cast of 376 votes on 'postal ballot' Papers entailing a declaration that all these 376 votes/cast/recorded on 'postal ballot' Papers are void votes and reception of 197 of such void votes by the respondent No. 1 has materially affected the result of his election. 17. That further, none of these 376 numbers of 'postal ballot' Papers in question were issued/sent as per the mandates of rules 23 and 27E of the Rules of 1961. If the election authorities are asked to produce the documents regarding Certificate of Posting in respect of these 376 numbers of 'postal ballot' Papers, the gamut of illegalities committed in the entire matter would be proved. These illegalities have vitiated the entire lot of 376 votes cast on 'postal ballot' Papers, illegal reception of 197 whereof has materially affected the result of the election in so far as it concerns the returned Candidate, i.e., the respondent No.1. 18. That consequently, the result of the election from 16 YACHULI(ST) Assembly Constituency declaring the respondent No. 1 to be the Returned Candidate is liable to be declared void and the Election Petitioner is liable to be declared duly elected from 16 YACHULI(ST) Assembly Constituency having received the majority of valid votes. 19. That numerous complaints regarding the illegalities committed in respect of permitting the casting of 376 votes by way of 'postal ballot' Papers by unauthorized persons in manner unknown to law were filed before the Chief Electoral Officer, Itanagar, District Election Officer of Lower Subansiri District and other authorities by the election petitioner, his Election Agent Sri Licha Tara as well as other responsible persons on different dates including 8.10.2009,14.10.2009,15.10.2009,19.10.2009 and 22.10.2009. But, none of these complaints were acted upon by the concerned authorities." What the returned candidate seeks by the present miscellaneous application? 74. But, none of these complaints were acted upon by the concerned authorities." What the returned candidate seeks by the present miscellaneous application? 74. As already indicated above, seeking an order from this court to get struck the election petitioner's 'pleadings' in paragraphs 8 to 19 of the election petition and also to get thereby rejected the election petition itself, what the returned candidate, as applicant, contends, in substance, in the present application, is thus. The contents of paragraphs 8 to 19 of the election petition are vague, vexatious, unnecessary the statements contained therein are presumptuous in nature. These statements are inadequate and do not disclose 'material facts' or facts on which the allegations rest. The statements, so made in the election petition, are, therefore, nothing but, abuse of the process of the court and deserve to be struck out by resorting to order VI, rule 16. The statements, made in the election petition, do not disclose any cause of action warranting this court to enter into trial of this election petition. The election petition, therefore, needs to be rejected in exercise of the power under order VII, rule 11 of the Code. The election petitioner's response : 75. The election petitioner has resisted the present application by contending that the election petition contains materials facts. The election petitioner contends that paragraphs 1 to 7 of the election petition contain primary facts disclosing locus standi or the election petitioner vis-a-vis the present dispute, paragraph 8 is the gist of 'material facts' and the grounds of challenge, while the statements, contained in paragraphs 11 to 19 of the election petition, set out the concise statement of 'material facts' along with necessary particulars on the basis of which the election petitioner seeks to establish his grounds to get the election result declared as void. The election petitioner has also contended that since the returned candidate (i.e., the applicant-respondent No.1) has already filed written statement in the election petition, there is no meaning in insisting on striking out the said-paragraphs, which have already been replied to by respondent No. 1 in his written statement. What should be court's response if an application for striking out pleadings is made, in an election petition, after written statement has been filed by the returned candidate? 76. What should be court's response if an application for striking out pleadings is made, in an election petition, after written statement has been filed by the returned candidate? 76. With regard to the election petitioner's contention that the returned candidate (i.e., the applicant herein) having already filed written statement, there is no meaning in striking out the pleadings, suffice it to point out that the authorities, already cited and discussed above, leave no room for doubt that it is not only the power but also a corresponding duty of the court to examine the pleadings and strike out those pleadings, which fall within the ambit of order VI, rule 16. It is also the duty of the court, irrespective of the fact as to whether a written statement has been filed or not, to determine if the pleadings disclose 'cause of action' and if the pleadings are found to not have disclosed any cause of action, the election petition must be rejected by the court in exercise of its power under order VII, rule 11 and, in that regard, the court has to bear in mind that the pleadings, which are devoid of 'material facts', must be struck out, the 'material facts' being those primary facts, which a election petitioner must state, in the election petition, so as to afford the basis for the allegations, which the election petitioner makes in the election petition. In this regard, the omission to state even a single material fact is fatal inasmuch as omission to state even a single material fact will be treated to have not disclosed cause of action. The requirement for the courts taking recourse to the provisions of order VI, rule 16 for the purpose of striking not the pleadings, and the courts' further duty to take recourse to order VII, rule 11 to reject an election petition, if the pleadings, contained therein, do not disclose I 'cause of action', stand succinctly described and explained in Azhar Hussain (supra). The relevant observations, made in Azhar Hussain I (supra), read as under : "12.................The whole purpose of conferment of such powers is to ensure that a litigation, which is meaningless and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to occupy the time of the court and exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword of Damocle need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or purpose. The sword of Damocle need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or purpose. Even in an ordinary civil litigation, the court readily exercises the power to reject a plaint if it does not disclose any 'cause of action'. Or the power to direct the concerned party to strike out unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious parts of the pleadings. Or such pleadings, which are likely to cause embarrassment or delay the fair trial of the action or which is otherwise an abuse of the process of law. An order directing a party to strike out a part of the pleading would result in the termination of the case arising in the context of the said pleading. The courts in exercise of the powers under the Code of Civil Procedure can also treat any point going to the root of the matter such as one pertaining to jurisdiction or maintainability as a preliminary point and can dismiss a suit without proceeding to record evidence and hear elaborate arguments in the context of such evidence, if the court is satisfied that the action would terminate in view of the merits of the preliminary point of objection. The contention that even if the election petition is liable to be dismissed ultimately it should be so dismissed only after recording evidence is a thoroughly misconceived and untenable argument. The powers in this behalf are meant to be exercised to serve the purpose for which the same have been conferred on the competent court so that the litigation comes to an end at the earliest and the concerned litigants are relieved of the psychological burden of the litigation so as to be free to follow their ordinary pursuits and discharge their duties. And so that they can adjust their affairs on the footing that the litigation will not make demands on their time or resources, will not impede their future work, and they ore free to undertake and fulfil other commitments. Such being the position in regard to matters pertaining to ordinary civil litigation, there is greater reason for faking the same view in regard to matters pertaining to elections. Such being the position in regard to matters pertaining to ordinary civil litigation, there is greater reason for faking the same view in regard to matters pertaining to elections. So long as the sword of Damocles of the election petition remains hanging an elected member of the Legislature would not feel sufficiently tree to devote his whole-hearted attention to matters of public importance which clamour for his attention in his capacity as an elected representative of the concerned constituency. The time and attention demanded by his elected office will have to be diverted to matters pertaining to the contest of the election petition. Instead of being engaged in a campaign to relieve the distress of the people in general and of the residents of his constituency who voted him into office, and instead of resolving their problems, he would be engaged in a campaign to establish that he has in fact been lily elected. Instead of discharging his functions as the 797 elected representative of the people he will be engaged in a struggle to establish that he is indeed such a representative, notwithstanding the fact that he has in fact won the verdict and the confidence of the electorate at the polls. He will have not only to wind the vote of the people but also to win the vote of the court in a long drawn out litigation before he can whole­heartedly engaged himself in discharging the trust reposed in him by the electorate. The pendency of the election petition would also act as a hindrance if he be entrusted with some public office in his elected capacity. He may even have occasions to deal with the representatives of foreign powers who may wonder whether he will eventually succeed and hesitate to deal with him. The fact that an election petition calling into question his election is pending may, in a given case, act as a psychological fetter and may not permit him to act with full freedom. Even if he is made of stern metal, the constraint introduced by the pendency of an election petition may have some impact on his sub-conscious mind without his ever being or becoming aware of it. Even if he is made of stern metal, the constraint introduced by the pendency of an election petition may have some impact on his sub-conscious mind without his ever being or becoming aware of it. Under the circumstances, there is greater reason why in a democratic set-up, in regard to a matter pertaining to an elected representative of the people which is likely to inhibit him in the discharge of his duties towards the Nation, the controversy is set at rest at the earliest, if the facts of the case and the law so warrant. Since the court has the power to act at the threshold the power must be exercised at the threshold itself in case the court is satisfied that it is a fit case for the exercise of such power and that exercise of such powers is warranted under the relevant provisions of law. To wind up the dialogue, to contend that the powers to dismiss or reject an election petition, or pass appropriate orders should not be exercised except at the stage of final judgment after recording the evidence even if the facts of the case warrant exercise of such powers, at the threshold, is to contend that the Legislature conferred these powers without point or purpose, and we must close our mental eye to the presence of the powers which should be treated as non-existent. The court cannot accede to such a proposition. The submission urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this behalf must, therefore, be firmly repelled." (emphasis added) 77. From the observations made in the case of Azhar Hussain (supra), it is abundantly clear that if an election petition contains such pleadings, which fall within the mischief of order VI, rule 16, the court not only has the power, but also the duty to strike out such pleadings at the earliest stage and if, upon striking out such pleadings, the election petition does not disclose a complete 'cause of action', such an election petition must be rejected at the threshold by the court in exercise of its powers under order VII, rule 11, because it is in the interest of a democratic set up that a person, who has been elected by the people as their representative, be allowed to function without any impediment and without being inhibited by the psychological pressure of a pending election petition. If an election petition has to be, otherwise also, end in dismissal, there is no point in keeping such an election petition pending. In other words, what ought to happen at the end of a trial must be made to occur, at the very threshold of the trial if the facts and circumstances of a given case, in the light of the law relevant thereto, so warrant. Who can cast vote by means of postal ballot? 78. While considering the present application, made under order VI, rule 16 read with order VII, rule 11, it may be noted that one of the conditions, laid down by section 19 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, ('the RPAct, 1950') for registration of a person as a voter, in a constituency, is that the person shall be, ordinarily, a resident of that constituency. Section 20 enumerates the conditions subject to which a person would be regarded 'ordinarily resident' in a constituency. Section 20(3) provides that any person, having a service qualification, shall be deemed to be 'ordinarily resident' on any date, in the constituency, in which, but for his having such service qualification, he would have been 'ordinarily resident' on that date. Section 20(4) provides that any person, holding any office, in India, declared by the President in consultation with the Election Commission, to be an office to which the provisions of this sub-section apply, shall be deemed to be 'ordinarily resident' on any date in the constituency in which, but for the holding of any such office, he would have been 'ordinarily resident' on that date. Section 20(6) lays down that the wife of any of the person, who falls within the ambit of section 20(4)(1), shall, if she is ordinary residing with such person, be deemed to be 'ordinarily resident' in the constituency specified by such person. 79. The scheme of the RP Act, 1950, shows that one of the conditions for making a person eligible, for registration, as a voter, in a constituency, is that he must be, ordinarily, be a resident in the constituency. 79. The scheme of the RP Act, 1950, shows that one of the conditions for making a person eligible, for registration, as a voter, in a constituency, is that he must be, ordinarily, be a resident in the constituency. Section 20 makes, however, a departure from this requirement by raising a legal fiction, the legal fiction being that though, due to the nature of his duties following his appointment, a person may not be actually residing at the place, where he was, otherwise, ordinarily resident, he would nevertheless be treated as a person ordinarily resident in the same constituency, where he is a ordinarily resident. 80. Thus, section 20 makes a special provision enabling a person to cast his vote, as a voter, in a constituency, though he may not be actually residing, in that constituency, on a given date, because of the fact that due to his service condition or due to his holding of an office, which the President of India may, in consultation with the Election Commission of India, have so declared, at a place away from the constituency, which he is an ordinary resident of. 81. What is, now, of immense importance to note is that section 20(5) provides that the statement of any such person, as is referred to in sub­section (3) or sub-section (4), made in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner, that but for his having the service qualification or but for his holding any such office as is referred to in sub-section (4), he would have been ordinarily resident in a specified place on any date, shall, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, be accepted as correct. In other words, the statements, made in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner, by a person covered by sub-section (3) or sub-section (4) of section 20, seeking to cast vote by means of 'postal ballot' shall, in the absence of evidence showing to the contrary, be accepted as correct. Unless, therefore, a statement, made by a person, who is covered by sub-section (3) or sub­section (4) of section 20, as regards his status enabling him to cast vote by means of 'postal ballot', is shown to be untrue by adducing evidence, the statement, so made, shall be accepted as correct. 82. Unless, therefore, a statement, made by a person, who is covered by sub-section (3) or sub­section (4) of section 20, as regards his status enabling him to cast vote by means of 'postal ballot', is shown to be untrue by adducing evidence, the statement, so made, shall be accepted as correct. 82. A combined reading of section 20(3) and section 20(4) of the RPAct, 1950, shows that though a person may not be actually present in a constituency on the given day of the polling, he will nevertheless be treated as an 'ordinary resident' in the given constituency, where he would have been, otherwise, but for reasons of his place of posting ordinarily resident provided that he falls under any of the categories of persons mentioned in sections 20(3) and 20(4). Sub-section (5) of section adds a new dimension to the scope of sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 20 by further clarifying that the statement of any such person, as is referred to in sub-section (3) or sub-section (4), while seeking to cast vote by means of 'postal ballot', shall, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, be accepted as correct. There is, thus, a presumption running in favour of the correctness of a statement made by a voter for the purpose of enabling him to cast his vote by means of 'postal ballot' if the statement has been made in the prescribed from and in the prescribed manner. 83. Let me now, turn to sub-section (8) of section 20, which explains the meaning of the terms 'service qualification'. The question, as to what the term 'service qualification' means, is answered by section 20(8) of the PP Act. 1950, which reads as under : "(8) In sub-sections (3) and (5), 'service qualification' means: being a member of the armed forces of the Union; or (a) being a member of a force to which the provisions of the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), have been made applicable whether with or without i modifications; or (b) being a member of an armed police force of a State, who is sewing outside that State: or (c) being a person who is employed under the Government of India, in a post outside India." 84. When the provisions contained in sub-section (8) of section 20 are read in the light of the provisions of section 20(3), what becomes clear is that a person, who is a member of armed forces of the Union, or a person, who is a member of a force to which the provisions of the Army Act, 1950, (with or without modification), apply or a person, who is a member of an armed police force of a State, but serving outside that State, or a person, who is employed under the Government of India and is posted outside India, are to be treated as persons having 'service qualification'. Consequently, all the four categories of persons, as described in clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of section 20(8) of the RPAct, 1950, would be regarded as 'ordinarily resident' of the places, where they would have been residing, but for their service conditions. 85. For the class of people, who have 'service qualification', as indicated by section 20(3). Read with section 20(8), or, who may be, in terms of section 20(5), holding an office, which is declared by the President, in consultation with the Election Commission, as an office to which the provisions of section 20(4) apply, there is a special procedure for casting of votes. The special procedure is embodied in section 60 of the RPAct, 1951, which reads as under : "60. Special procedure for voting by certain classes of persons. The special procedure is embodied in section 60 of the RPAct, 1951, which reads as under : "60. Special procedure for voting by certain classes of persons. - Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in section 59, provision may be made, by rules made under this Act for enabling - (a) any of the persons as is referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub­section (8) of section 20 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, to give his vote either in person or by 'postal ballot' or by proxy, and not in any other manner, at an election in a constituency where poll is taken; (b) any of the following persons to give his vote either in person or by 'postal ballot', and not in any other manner, at an election in a constituency where a poll is taken, namely, - (i) any person as is referred to in clause (c) or clause (d) or sub­section (8) of section 20 of the Act; (ii) the wife of any such person to whom the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 20 of the 1950 Act apply and such wife being ordinarily residing with that person in terms of sub­section (6) of that section; (c) any person belonging to a class of persons notified by the Election Commission in consultation with the Government to give his vote by 'postal ballot' and not in any other manner, at an election in a constituency, where a poll is taken subject to the fulfillment of such requirements as may be specified in those rules; (d) any person subjected to preventive detention under any law for the time being in force to give his vote by 'postal ballot', and not in any other manner, at an election in a constituency where a poll is taken, subject to the fulfillment of such requirements as may be specified in those rules." 86. From a careful reading of section 60, what becomes clear is that there are, broadly speaking, seven categories of persons, who qualify for being allowed to cast vote by means of 'postal ballot'. From a careful reading of section 60, what becomes clear is that there are, broadly speaking, seven categories of persons, who qualify for being allowed to cast vote by means of 'postal ballot'. The seven categories of persons are: (i) a member of the armed forces of the Union, (ii) a member of a force to which the provisions of the Army Act, 1950, have been made applicable, whether with or without modifications, (iii) a member of an armed police force of a State, who is serving outside that State, (iv) a person, who is employed, under the Government of India, in a post outside India, (v) the wife of any such person to whom the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 20 of the RPAct, 1950, apply provided that such wife is, ordinarily, residing with that person in terms of sub-section (6) of section 20, (vi) any person belonging to a class of persons notified by the Election Commission, in consultation with the Government, to give his vote by 'postal ballot' and not in any other manner, at an election in a constituency, where a poll is taken subject to the fulfillment of such requirements as may be specified in those rules, and (vii) any person subjected to preventive detention under any law for the time being in force to give his vote by 'postal ballot', and not in any other manner, at an election, in a constituency, where a poll is taken, subject to fulfilment of such requirements as may be specified in those rules. 87. Bearing in mind that there are as many as seven categories of persons, who may be allowed to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot', in a constituency, where they may not be, on the day of the polling, present, let me, now, turn to the submissions made by the returned candidate (as applicant in this miscellaneous application) seeking to get struck out the election petitioner's pleadings, contained in paragraph 8 to 19 of the election petition, and this court's analysis of these pleadings in the light of the law relevant thereto. Analysis of pleadings: 88. Analysis of pleadings: 88. The submissions of the returned candidate-applicant, and this court's analysis of the pleadings, are as under : (A) Referring to paragraph 8 of the election petition, the applicant contends that the statements made therein are vague, frivolous and vexatious inasmuch as what the election petitioner has stated therein is that due to improper reception of void votes by means of 'postal ballot in favour of the applicant, the result of the election has been materially affected, but the election petitioner has not stated, in paragraph 8, as to why the entire process of allowing the said 376 voters to cast their votes'through 'postal ballot' is illegal. The whole, of 'the allegations, made in paragraph 8, are, thus, according to the applicant, without any basis and, therefore, deserve to be struck out.; (i) The above submissions of the returned candidate (who is applicant in this miscellaneous application) are, in the considered view of this court, substantial inasmuch as the election petitioner has, I find, not assigned any reason whatsoever, in paragraph 8, to show as to why and how the casting of the 376 votes, by means of "postal ballot", in the election, in question, is illegal. The contents of paragraph 8 of the election petition are, thus, nothing but mere allegations, which, have not been supported by 'material facts' by furnishing the materials based on which the considered has been made. These statements, in the considered view of this court, cannot, therefore, survive and must be struck out provided that the 'pleadings', in the rest of the body of the election petition too, do not furnish material facts to sustain the said allegations. (B) As far as the contents of paragraph 9 of the election petition are concerned, the applicant has rightly pointed out that the contents of paragraph 9 are nothing except reproduction of the provisions of section 60 of the RP Act, 1951. (i) The statements, made in paragraph 9 of the election petition, are, therefore, according to the petitioner, absolutely unnecessary and may be struck out, as a whole, the same being an abuse of the process of the court. (i) The statements, made in paragraph 9 of the election petition, are, therefore, according to the petitioner, absolutely unnecessary and may be struck out, as a whole, the same being an abuse of the process of the court. (ii) Considering the tact that in paragraph 9 of the election petition, the election petitioner furnishes nothing, but reproduces the provisions of section 60 of the RP Act, 1951, mere reproduction of the provisions of law, in an election petition, unless, otherwise, shown to be relevant and help in furnishing 'material facts', cannot, but be struck out. In the present case, the contents of paragraph 9, being merely reproduction of section 60, have to be struck out if the remaining body of the election petition is found to have not revealed the "basic1 or 'material facts',, (C) In paragraph 10 of the election petition, points out the applicant, the provisions" of rules 17, 18, 27A(a), 27A(b) and section 20 of the EP Act, 1950, have been merely narrated without mentioning therein as to how these provisions are relevant for the purpose of the election petition. The contents of paragraph 10 of the election petition, according to the applicant, are unnecessary and are, therefore, liable to be struck out. (i) In view of the fact that paragraph 10 of the election petition merely states the law without assigning any reason as to how the provisions have bearing on the election petition, the same cannot but be treated as statements, which have no relevance to the present election petition and unless the remaining 'pleadings', in the election petition show otherwise, the statements made in paragraph 10 needs to be struck out. (D) The applicant contends that in paragraph 11 of the election petition, the election petitioner has merely stated that none of the said 376 voters, who had cost their votes through 'postal ballot', belonged to any of the categories specified in section 60 of the RP Act, 1951, read with section 20(3), section 20(6), and section 20(8) of the RP Act, 1950, nor do they fall in any of the notified class of voters. In this regard, the election petitioner has not, points out the returned candidate, clearly and specifically stated as who were those voters and what were the actual categories in which they were allowed to cast their votes through 'postal ballot'. In this regard, the election petitioner has not, points out the returned candidate, clearly and specifically stated as who were those voters and what were the actual categories in which they were allowed to cast their votes through 'postal ballot'. The whole allegation, made in paragraph 11, is, thus, according to the returned candidate, presumptive and imaginary and, therefore, deserves to be struck out from the election petition. (i) When the statements, made in paragraph 11 of the election petition, are cautiously examined, it becomes clear that the ejection petitioner alleges that none of the 376 voter, who had cast their votes through 'postal ballot'. Belong to any of the categories, which the election petitioner mentions. What is, however, disquieting is that the election petitioner has not given the names of those persons nor has he revealed, in any manner, their identity to show as to who were those voters and, in which category, they have been allowed to cast their votes by means of postal ballot'. I have no hesitation, therefore, in holding that the statements, made in paragraph 11, constitute nothing, but allegations. These allegations, in order to survive ought to have been supported by 'material facts' meaning thereby that there ought to have stated, in paragraph 11 of the election petition or in the body of the election petition, such facts, which could be said to have afforded the basis for contending as to why the voters, who have cast their votes by means of "postal ballot's', were not eligible to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot'. It is one thing to say that a voter, 'X', is not eligible to cast his/her vote under any of the categories of persons entitled to cast vote by means of 'postal ballot', but it is quite another to identify "X' and, then, let the returned candidate know as to what was the category in which "X' had been allowed to cast vote by means of 'postal ballot' and as to why it has been contended by the election petitioner that "X1 could not have fallen in a particular category of voters, who can be allowed to cast vote by means of 'postal ballot's, especially, when there are several categories or persons, who can be allowed to cast vote by means of 'postal ballot'. (ii) The election petitioner, having not disclosed the identity at those voter, who have been allowed to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot', and the election petitioner having also not disclosed, in the election petition, as against each of such voters, as to why he/she was ineligible to cast his or her vote by means of 'postal ballot', must be held to have miserably failed to give the primary facts based on which he has made the said allegations. The said allegations are, thus, nothing but vague allegations, which disable the returned candidate-applicant from effectively responding and replying to the allegations so made. A vague allegation, as held in Bhagwati Prasad Dixit 'Ghorawala' (supra), embarrass a trial and such a pleading needs to be struck out. (iii) The object of 'material facts', as has been discussed above, is to enable a returned candidate (such as, the present applicant) to know as to what facts are being referred to, and relied upon, by the election petitioner in order to sustain his allegations. Unless, therefore, an election petitioner clearly states as to who the person is, who, though ineligible, was allowed to cast his/her vote in the election and unless the election petitioner assigns reason as to why that particular person was not eligible to cast his vote 'by means of 'postal ballot", the returned candidate cannot be expected to be able to effectively meet the allegations made in the election petition. Thus, the pleadings, in paragraph 11 of the election petition, being wholly devoid of 'material facts', cannot but be struck out. (E) The applicant contends that in paragraph 12 or the election petition, the election petitioner has not specifically mentioned as to who were those persons, whom he has described as "most of the 376 voters" nor is there any pleadings, in the election petition, disclosing the names of the persons, who were allegedly allowed to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot' by Sri J.T. Obi, Circle Officer, posing himself as Assistant Returning Officer. The allegations, so made, according to the returned candidate-applicant, are so vague that the same cannot be effectively responded to. The pleadings, in para 12 of the election petition, contends the applicant, need to be, therefore, struck out. The allegations, so made, according to the returned candidate-applicant, are so vague that the same cannot be effectively responded to. The pleadings, in para 12 of the election petition, contends the applicant, need to be, therefore, struck out. (i) While considering the statements made in paragraph 12 of the election petition, it is of great importance to note that, according to the election petitioner, most of the lists of the said 376 voters, who were allowed to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot', were issued by one Sri J.T. Obi, an officer, working in the post of Circle Officer, who had (described himself as an Assistant Returning Officer, though he was, according to the election petitioner, never appointed as Assistant Returning Officer. In this regard, the election petitioner also claims that the said Sri J.T. Obi is a close relative of the returned candidate. (ii) However, as usual, the election petitioner has not specified, in paragraph 12, as to what kind of relationship the said officer and the returned candidate has, or how they are related to each other. The allegation, so made, showing a link between the said officer and the returned candidate, is, thus, nothing but bald allegation devoid of 'material facts'. That the election petitioner has indulged in guesswork and wishes to make a fishing enquiry is clearly discernible from the tact that the election petitioner merely alleges that 'most of the 376 voters' had been issued 'postal ballot' by the said Sri J.T. Obi. The expression, 'most of the 376 voters', clearly indicates that the election petitioner is not aware of the exact number of voters and/or the persons, who had, according to the election petitioner, cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot', although they were not so eligible, on the basis of 'postal ballot's' allegedly issued by the said Sri J.T. Obi. (iii) What logically follows from the above discussion is that the election petitioner is unsure of the exact number of voters, who had cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot' and/or who were allowed, by the said Sri J.T. Obi, to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot'. Further extended logically, it would indicate that the election petitioner does not know who the voters were and to whom the said Sri J.T. Obi had provided the opportunity to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot'. Further extended logically, it would indicate that the election petitioner does not know who the voters were and to whom the said Sri J.T. Obi had provided the opportunity to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot'. Not surprisingly, therefore, that the election petitioner could not reveal, apart from the names of those persons, even the exact number of those, who were allegedly allowed by Sri J.T. Obi to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot'. (iv) Since the election petitioner has come to the court with the allegation that the 376 voters were illegally allowed to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot', it is natural to infer that the election petitioner know, and ought to have known, as to who those 376 voters were, for without knowing the identity of those persons he' could not have rationally made the allegation that they were not eligible to cast votes by means of 'postal ballot'. Far less revealing the identity of the persons, who were ineligible and yet were allegedly allowed by Sri J.T. Obi to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot', the election petitioner does not even know as to how many of the said 376 voters had been allowed by Sri J.T. Obi to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot', who those voters were and whether or not they were eligible to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot'. (v) Compounding the confusion, which the election petitioner has himself created by not mentioning the name/identity of each one of those, who were allowed to cast vote by means of 'postal ballot', the election petitioner has used the expression, 'most of the 376 voters'. It has not been disclosed, in the election petition as to who were the persons, who fell within the expression, 'most of the 376 voters'. Thus, the basis for making the allegation does not exist in the election petition. When allegations are made without any supporting materials, as indicated in Sonia Gandhi's case (supra), and/or without disclosing the basic facts or primary, facts, as have been always insisted by the courts of law, the pleadings, made in paragraph 12 of the election petition, cannot but be treated as devoid of materials facts and deserve to be struck out. When allegations are made without any supporting materials, as indicated in Sonia Gandhi's case (supra), and/or without disclosing the basic facts or primary, facts, as have been always insisted by the courts of law, the pleadings, made in paragraph 12 of the election petition, cannot but be treated as devoid of materials facts and deserve to be struck out. This become clearer, when we proceed further with the contents of paragraph 12 of the election petition, The election petitioner contends, in paragraph 12, that the said 376 postal ballot' papers were issued in the names of porters/labourers purportedly engaged for carrying election materials as well as some other persons termed as Gaonburahs/head gaonburahs with duties to arrange logistic support for polling parties. The statements, so made, indicate that all the voters, who were allowed to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot', were either porters/labourers or Gaonburahs/head gaonburahs. It is, however, not at all discernible from the statements, made in paragraph 12, as to how the election petitioner has come to know that the said 376 persons, who were allowed to cast votes by means of 'postal ballot', were porters/labourers or gaonburahs/head gaonburohs, when his own 'pleadings' make it crystal clear that he does not know the identity of the voters, who have cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot'. Thus, the contents of paragraph 12 are vague and not being supported by 'material facts', these statements have to be treated as bald allegations, which cannot be effectively responded to by the returned candidate-applicant. If allowed to survive, such allegations would, in the light of the decision in Bhagwaii Prasad Dixit 'Ghorawala' (supra), embarrass a fair trial. The pleadings, contained in para 12, must, therefore, be struck out in terms of order VI, rule 16. (vi) As already indicated above, the election petitioner has made allegation, in paragraph 12 of the election petitions, that 'some or the lists' of porters/labourers, purportedly engaged for carrying election materials as well as some other persons termed as gaonburahs/head gaonburahs with duties to arrange logistic support for polling parties, were made and issued by the said Sri J.T. Obi. (vi) As already indicated above, the election petitioner has made allegation, in paragraph 12 of the election petitions, that 'some or the lists' of porters/labourers, purportedly engaged for carrying election materials as well as some other persons termed as gaonburahs/head gaonburahs with duties to arrange logistic support for polling parties, were made and issued by the said Sri J.T. Obi. By the contention, so raised in paragraph 12, the election petitioner has tried to make this court infer that apart from the said 'some of the lists, there were some other lists too, which were made by some persons other than Sri J.T. Obi. Here again, the election petitioner has not, however, disclosed as to who were the persons, other than the said Sri J.T. Obi who had issued the 'postal ballot's to the said 376 voters. Without giving any 'material facts', the election petitioner seeks to get the ballot papers called for scrutiny by this court, which would, if allowed, be nothing but allowing him to make fishing and roving enquiry, which is neither desirable nor permissible in an election petition. Law as regards inspection of ballot papers ; (vii) Though it is possible for the High Court to direct, while trying an election petition, to order inspection of ballot papers, the court, before directing such inspection, must be satisfied that a concise statement of 'material facts', an which the election petitioner relies, has been given, making out a case for inspection or recounting. In the absence of on election petition containing 'material facts', as indicated hereinbefore, it is not possible to direct inspection or recounting of ballot papers. In this regard, the court has to bear in mind that the secrecy of ballot papers is of paramount importance. The court must take care to see that the election petitioner does not get a chance to make a roving or fishing enquiry in the name of inspection of ballot papers so as to justify his claim that the returned candidate's election is void. A reference, in this regard, may be made to the case of Dr. Jagjit Singh v. Giani Kartar Singh, [1967] 1 SCJ 762. The relevant observations, made in this regard, in Dr. A reference, in this regard, may be made to the case of Dr. Jagjit Singh v. Giani Kartar Singh, [1967] 1 SCJ 762. The relevant observations, made in this regard, in Dr. Jagjit Singh (supra), read as under ; "In a proper case, the Tribunal can order the inspection of the ballot boxes and may proceed to examine the objections raised by the parties in relation to the improper acceptance or reject of the voting papers. But in exercising this power, the Tribunal has to bear in mind certain important considerations. Section 83(1)(a) of the Act requires that an election petition shall contain a concise statement of the 'material facts on which the petitioner relies: and in every case, where a prayer is made by a petitioner for the inspection of the ballot boxes, the Tribunal must enquire whether the application made by the petitioner in that behalf contains a concise statement of the 'material facts'on which he relies. Vague or general allegations that valid votes were improperly rejected, or invalid votes were improperly accepted, would not serve the purpose which section 83(1)(a) has in mind. An application made for the inspection of ballot boxes must give 'material facts which would enable the Tribunal to consider whether in the interests of justice, the ballot boxes should be inspected or not. In dealing with this question, the importance of the secrecy of the ballot papers cannot be ignored, and if is always to be borne in mind that the statutory rules framed under the Act are intended to provide adequate safeguard for the examination of the validity or invalidity of votes and for their proper counting. It may be that in some cases, the ends of justice would make it necessary for the Tribunal to allow a party to inspect the ballot boxes and consider his objections about the improper acceptance or improper rejection of votes tendered by voters at any given election; but in considering the requirements of justice, care must be taken to see that election petitioners do not pet a chance to make a roving or fishing enquiry in the ballot boxes so as to justify their claim that the returned candidate's election is void." (emphasis is added) (viii) In fact, even prior to Dr. Jagjit Singh's case (supra), the Supreme Court had made it clear, in the case of Ram Sewak Yadav v. Hussain Kamil Kidwai and Ors., (1964) 6 SCR 238 , that an order for inspection of ballot papers cannot be granted to support vague pleas made in an election petition, not supported by material facts, or to fish out evidence to support such pleas. The relevant observations, made in Ram Sewak Yadav (supra), read as under: "An order for inspection of ballot papers cannot be granted to support vague pleas made in the petition not supported by 'material facts' or to fish out evidence to support such pleas. The case of the petitioner must be set out with precision supported by averments of 'material facts'. To establish a case so pleaded, an order for inspection may undoubtedly, if the interests of justice require, be granted." (emphasis added) (ix) In its later decision, in R. Narayanan v. Semmalai, (1980) SCR 571, where the difference of votes between the returned candidate and his nearest rival was barely 19 votes, the Supreme Court pointed out that without their being an adequate statement of all the material facts and, without the court reaching a prima facie satisfaction that an order for recounting of votes is imperative to decide the dispute and do complete justice to the parties, no order of recount of votes can be passed. Emphasized the Supreme Court, in R. Narayanan (supra), that the right of a defeated candidate to assail the validity of an election result and to seek recount of votes has to be subject to the basic principle that secrecy of ballot papers is sacrosanct in a democracy. (x) In R. Narayanan (supra), the Supreme Court has pointed out that the justification for an order of recount of votes should be provided by the material placed by an election petitioner on the threshold before an order for recount of votes is actually made. The reason for this salutary rule, points out the Supreme Court, in R. Narayanan (supra), is that the preservation of the secrecy of the ballot is a sacrosanct principle which cannot be lightly or hastily broken unless there is prima facie genuine need for it. The reason for this salutary rule, points out the Supreme Court, in R. Narayanan (supra), is that the preservation of the secrecy of the ballot is a sacrosanct principle which cannot be lightly or hastily broken unless there is prima facie genuine need for it. (xi) Coupled with the above legal position with regard to the requirement of maintaining secrecy of ballot papers and of not ordering inspection or recount of votes unless a clear case, by revealing 'material facts', is made out for such inspection or recount, one has to also bear in mind the 'test', which the Supreme Court has prescribed, in Azahar Hussain (supra), as to whether an election petitioner, in a given case, has or has not given 'material facts'. If may be recalled that in the case of Azahar Hussain (supra), the Supreme Court held that 'material facts' are facts, which, if established, would give the petitioner the relief asked for and the 'test' is whether the court could have given a 'direct verdict' in favour of the election petitioner in case the returned candidate had not appeared to oppose the election petition on the basis of the facts pleaded in the petition. (xii) Assuming in the present case, the petition remained uncontested, the test, as laid down in the case of Azhar Hussain (supra), would lead to a probable conclusion, that if the 'postal ballot's are not inspected at the instance of the Tribunal, the petitioner's case would fail, because there exists really no material facts, which could, otherwise, show that the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs) prayed for. But going by the principles as laid in the case of R. Narayanan v. Semmalai (supra), the petitioner's prayer for inspection of 'postal ballot's' can not be allowed unless the justification for an order of recount of votes be provided by the materials placed by an election petitioner on the threshold before an order for recount of votes is actually made. The reason for this salutary rule is that the preservation of the secrecy of the ballot is sacrosanct and this principle cannot be lightly or hastily deviated from unless there is indication of genuine need for inspection. The reason for this salutary rule is that the preservation of the secrecy of the ballot is sacrosanct and this principle cannot be lightly or hastily deviated from unless there is indication of genuine need for inspection. (xiii) One may also refer to the case of Jitendra Bahadur Singh v. Kirshna Behari, (1969) 2 SCC 433 , wherein it has been held as under : 'The importance of maintaining the secrecy of ballot papers and the circumstances under which that secrecy can be violated has been considered by this court in several cases. In particular we may refer to the decisions of this court in Ram Sewak Yadav v. Hussain Kamil Kidwai and Jagjit Singh (Dr.) v. Giani Kartar Singh. These and other decisions of this court and of the High Courts have laid down certain basic requirements to be satisfied before an election tribunal can permit the inspection of ballot papers. They are - (1) that the petition for setting aside the election must contain an adequate statement of the 'material facts'on which the petitioner relies in support of his case, (emphasis added) (xiv) From what have been laid down in Jitendra Bahadur Singh (supra). Ram Sewak Yadav (supra), R. Narayanan (supra) and in Jagjit Singh (supra), it becomes clear that unless an election petition sets out adequate statement of material facts on which the petitioner relies in support at his case, the question of inspection of 'postal ballot' does not arise at all. In the present case, without inspection of the 'postal ballot' and the relevant records maintained in respect thereof, it is impossible to even prima facie hold, far less confidently conclude, that there was reception of void votes cast by means of 'postal ballot' materially affecting the result of the election. In such circumstances, the election petition must fail, because of lack of material facts leading to incomplete disclosure of cause of action. (xv) During the course of hearing of this miscellaneous case, when it was pointed out that the election petitioner has not clearly specified, in the election petition, the names of each of the persons, who were allowed to cast votes by means of 'postal ballot's, nor has he assigned clearly the reasons, against each of the voters, as to why he/she was not eligible to cast vote by means of 'postal ballot', Mr. S.S. Dey, learned counsel for the election petitioner, referring to rule 93 of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, has sought to contend that the election petitioner could not have obtained the identity of those, who were allowed to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot'. When the election petitioner did not even know the identity of the persons, who were allowed to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot', it is impossible to comprehend as to how did he know that those persons, who had cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot', were not eligible to so cast their votes. Thus, the allegations are not only bald, without any supporting material, but are also nothing but allegations devoid of any 'material fact'. Such a 'pleading, which is devoid of 'material facts', cannot be treated to have disclosed 'cause of action', for, omission to state even a single 'material fact' leads to incomplete 'cause of action'. An election petition, which does not disclose complete 'cause of action' cannot but be rejected by the court in exercise of its powers under order VII, rule 11. (xvi) Moreover, with regard to the contention of Mr. S.S. Dey, learned counsel, that the election petitioner could not have obtained the name and/or identity of the voters, who were allowed to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot', it needs to be pointed out that unless an election petitioner has personal knowledge or information, which he believes to be true, that a particular person, who has been allowed to cast his/her vote by means of 'postal ballot', was not eligible to cast vote by means of 'postal ballot', lie cannot, and ought not to, come to the court with an election petition alleging that a person, though ineligible, was allowed to cast his vote by means of 'postal ballot', for, in the absence of anything to show as to who the voter was and why the said person was not eligible to cast his vote by means of 'postal ballot', the allegation made would remain a mere allegation without supporting materials and such an allegation cannot but be struck out as vague and incomplete 'pleading1. (xvii) Coupled with the above, it may be pointed out that rule 93 of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, reads as under : "93. Production and inspection of election papers. (xvii) Coupled with the above, it may be pointed out that rule 93 of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, reads as under : "93. Production and inspection of election papers. - (1) While in the custody of the District Election Officer or, a the case may be, the returning officer - (a) the packets of unused ballot papers with counterfoils attached thereto; (b) the packets of used ballot papers whether valid, tendered or rejected; (c) the packets of the counterfoils of used ballot papers; (d) the packets of the marked copy of the electoral roll or, as the case may be, the list maintained under sub-section (1) or sub­section (2) of section 152; and (e) the packets of the declaration by electors and the attestation of their signatures; shall not be opened and their contents shall not be suspected by, or produced before, any person or authority except under the order of a competent court. (2) Subject to such conditions and to the payment of such fee as the Election Commission may direct, - (a) all other papers relating to the election shall be open to public inspection; and (b) copies thereof shall on application be furnished. (3) Copies of the returns by the returning officer forwarded under rule 64, or as the case may be, under clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of rule 84 shall be furnished by the returning officer, district election officer, chief electoral officer or the Election Commission on payment of a fee of two rupees for each copy." (xviii) A careful reading of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, as a whole, and rule 93 thereof, in particular, will show that the materials, which are not allowed to be opened or inspected, are the packets of unused or used ballot papers, counter foils, marked copy of the electoral roll and the declaration by the electors and attestation by their signatures. This has nothing to do with the application, which a voter makes, or a form, which a voter fills up, in order to seek the facility to cast vote by means of 'postal ballot', nor does rule 93 disallow seeking of information of the names and addresses of the persons, who have been allowed to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot'. (xix) As a matter of fact, a candidate, in any election, has the right to know as to who is casting vote in his constituency and under what category he or she is casting vote. There is nothing, in the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, directing the authorities concerned to keep shrouded in mystery and secrecy as to who has been allowed to vote by means of 'postal ballot'. Rule 93 has a role to play only so far as the 'postal ballot's, counter foils. Market copy of the electoral roll, declaration by the electors and attestation of their signatures are concerned. Rule 93, thus, comes into play in respect of those materials, which are used at the time or polling and not before polling. A careful reading of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, including rule 93 thereof, clearly shows that while no secrecy is required to be maintained, and is not maintained, as regards the voters, who are allowed to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot'; what is confidential and cannot be opened or made known, without leave of the court, under rule 93, is the fact as to who the candidate was in whose favour a voter, who fell in the category of voters, who are allowed to cost their votes by means of 'postal ballot', had actually cost his/her vote. (xx) As a matter of fact, on being pointed out by this court that rule 93 has a very limited scope and it does not bar an election petitioner from knowing as to who are his voters and under what category each one of them would be allowed to cast his/her vote, Sri S.S. Dey, learned counsel, in his usual fairness, agrees that it is possible for an election petitioner to know not only the names of the voters, who have been allowed to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot', but also the category, whereunder each of such voters has been allowed to cast his/her vote. (F) The applicant contends that in paragraph 13 of the election petition, the election petitioner's allegations are to the effect that none of the 376 voters, who had cast votes, through 'postal ballot', falls in the category of either 'service voter', as specified in section 60(a), 60(b) of the RP Act, 1951, or 'special voter', as defined in rule 17 of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, or 'voters on election duty' or 'notifed voters', or appointed as Polling agents. Polling Officers, Presiding Officer or 'other public servant', as defined in rule 17 (c) of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, but the election petitioner has miserably failed to furnish the names and status of these voters nor has he mentioned the serial numbers of these voters and the capacity in which they have cast their votes through 'postal ballot'. In theabsence of these materials, the allegations, made in paragraph 13 of the Election Petition, carftiot but be held, contends the returned candidate, to be devoid of 'material facts' necessary to constitute the 'cause of action'. The contents of paragraph 13 are also, therefore, submits the returned candidate, liable to be struck out of the election petition. (i) I must observe that even paragraph 13 of the election petition merely embodies the allegation that none of the 376 voters, who had cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot', fell in any of the categories of voters, who are legally entitled to cast' their votes by means of 'postal ballot'. However, the election petitioner, as usual, does not reveal as to who those voters were and under what category, each one of them was allowed to cast vote by means of 'postal ballot'. Thus, the allegations, as usual, do not have any foundation as they are devoid of any 'material facts' to sustain the allegations. (ii) What is also of great significance to note, upon reading of paragraphs 11, 12 and 13, is that the election petitioner has submitted that he has come to learn that some of the lists of the porters/labourers, purportedly engaged for carrying election materials, as well as some other persons, termed as Gaonburahs/head gaonburahs, entrusted with duties to arrange logistic support for polling parties, were made by Sri J.T. Obi. Apart from the fact that the election petitioner has not disclosed the source of his information, he does not claim to have verified the correctness of his information. In the absence of the fact as to why a particular voter is stated to have not fallen in any of the categories of voters, who were allowed to cost vote by means of 'postal ballot', the statements cannot but be treated to be mere allegations, which, due to lack of 'material facts', cannot be effectively responded to by the election petitioner. Situated thus, there can be no hesitation in holding, and I do hold, that the pleadings, in the said paragraphs, are devoid of 'material facts' and deserve to be struck out. (G) With regard to paragraph 14 of the election petition, the applicant contends that the contents of paragraph 14 of the election petition, which have already extracted above, are nothing, but repetition of the allegations made in the preceding paragraphs of the election petition and the contents thereof are not only vague, but unnecessary in the facts and circumstances of the case and are, therefore, liable to be struck out. (i) The election petitioner's contention that the contents of paragraph 14 are reproduction of the allegations made in the preceding paragraphs of the election petition could not be disputed on behalf of the election petitioner. Since the contents of the preceding paragraphs of the election petition, as already discussed above, do not disclose 'material facts', the pleadings contained therein and also the pleadings in paragraph 14 must be struck out unless the remaining portion of the election petition are found to have furnished 'material facts' leading to disclosure of a complete 'cause of action'. (H) With regard to paragraph 15 of the election petition, the applicant contends that the election petitioner has made a lukewarm attempt to allege that no application, under Form 12 of the 1961 Rules, was received by the Returning Officer within the stipulated date fixed by law, but the election petitioner has failed to mention the date or dates, on which such application forms were actually received by the Returning Officer. (i) While considering the statements made by the election petitioner in his election petition, at paragraph 15, it is clear that since the election petitioner has not revealed the date or dates on which the requisite application forms, seeking to cast vote by means of 'postal ballot's', were received by the authorities concerned it clearly follows that the election petitioner has no knowledge of the said date or dates nor does he have any information about the said date or dates and it is for this reason that he has stated, in the Election Petition, that if the records are produced, all these allegations would be proved true. This is nothing, as rightly contends the returned candidate, but indication of the vagueness of the allegations made in the election petition and, hence, the contents are liable to be struck out of the election petition. (ii) The statements made, in paragraph 15 of the election petition, are, undoubtedly, incomplete and vague inasmuch as these statements do not disclose as to which voter's application was received by the returning officer on what date. The election petitioner appears to hove been just making wild allegations without revealing basic facts in support thereof. The election petitioner neither has the knowledge of such date(s) nor does tie have the requisite information. In such circumstances, the statements, made in paragraph 15 of the election petition, cannot but be regarded as mere allegations without any 'material fad' and these statements are, therefore, liable to be struck out. (I) With regard to the election petitioner's allegation, made in paragraph 16 of the election petition, that the list of appointment of porters/labourers/Gaonburahs/head gaonburahs were issued in the name of Assistant Returning Officer on or after dated 4.10.2009, the applicant contends that such allegations are vague inasmuch as no date of the list of appointment has been mentioned and the said allegations are made without any reference to the relevant provisions appearing in the Handbook of Returning Officers in this regard. The applicant further contends that the allegation, in the election petition, that there is no possibility of being able to send intimation, in Form 12, to reach the Retuning Officer ten days before the date fixed for 'postal ballot', is also without any reference to the relevant provisions, made in this regard, in the Handbook for Returning Officer and presumptuous. The applicant further contends that the allegation, in the election petition, that there is no possibility of being able to send intimation, in Form 12, to reach the Retuning Officer ten days before the date fixed for 'postal ballot', is also without any reference to the relevant provisions, made in this regard, in the Handbook for Returning Officer and presumptuous. Unless the allegations aforementioned are made with reference to the relevant provisions in the Handbook for Returning Officer, there is no question of violation of the provisions of rules 19 and 27(c) of the 1961 Rules and there is, therefore, no basis for alleging that the entire process of casting of the 376 votes through 'postal ballot', is vitiated. The allegations, made in paragraph 16 of the election petition, are, thus, according to the returned candidate, without any substance, the same are vague and do not give rise to any 'cause of action'. (i) Suffice it to point out, with regard to the above, that the statements, made in paragraph 16, are vague in the sense that neither the names of the persons, who have been allowed to cast their votes, as porters/labourers and/or as gaonburohs/head gaonburahs, have been disclosed nor is there any statement made as to when and/or on what date the forms have been signed by each of them and, on what date each the said forms were received by the returning officer. Merely, therefore, saying that the returning officer could not have received the forms, in question, within the prescribed period, is nothing but mere presumptuous statement made without supported by basic, primary or 'material facts'. (J) The applicant contends that the allegations, in paragraph 17 of the election petition that none of those 376 number of 'postal ballot' Papers was sent/issued as per the mandate of rules 23 and 27(e) of the 1961 Rules is a bald allegation, the pleadings, so made, lack 'material facts' and the allegations, having been made without reference to any specific provisions in the Handbook for Returning Officer, fail to make out any 'cause of action'. (i) It needs to be pointed out that the contents of paragraph 17 are mere submissions and not pleadings of'material facts' and these contentions have been raised without laying any foundation, therefor as warranted by law. (i) It needs to be pointed out that the contents of paragraph 17 are mere submissions and not pleadings of'material facts' and these contentions have been raised without laying any foundation, therefor as warranted by law. Apart form what the present applicant contends as regards the statements made in paragraph 17 of the election petition, what needs to be noted is that even if complaints were made, as alleged by the election petitioner, the fact remains that mere lodging of such complaints, in the absence of any other material, cannot make this election petition survive, because on the mere ground that some complaints were made, an election petition cannot be entertained. The election petitioner must show, giving basic and 'material facts', as to who were those persons, who had been allowed to cast their votes and under what category each one of the voters fell. The pleadings, in this paragraph, are, therefore, vague and cannot but be struck out. (K) As regard the contents of paragraph 18 of the election petition, the applicant states that no 'material fact' has been stated and the election petitioner has merely mentioned, in paragraph 18 of the election petition, the consequences, which are likely to result from the allegations made by him in the preceding paragraphs of the election petition. The contents of paragraph 18 also suffer from want of 'material facts' and the same need to be struck out. (i) There con be no doubt that the statements made in paragraph 18 at the election petition, merely point out the consequences, which are likely to result from the allegations made by the election petitioner in the preceding paragraphs of his election petition. When the preceding paragraphs of the election petition have been found to contain no 'material facts' and facts, which are stated therein, are so vague, that allowing them to remain on record would embarrass the trial, it is but obvious that contents of paragraph 18 read alone or conjointly with the contents of the preceding paragraphs, cannot, but be struck out. (L) With regard to the election petitioner's allegation, made in paragraph 19 of the election petition, that as many as five complaints, as regard the illegalities committed in permitting the said 376 voters to cast their votes through 'postal ballot', were made by several authorities, including the election petitioner and his election agent, the returned candidate (as the applicant in this miscellaneous application) contends that though the said complaints were claimed to have been made before the Chief Election Officer and the District Election Officer, neither the copies of the alleged complaints have been produced nor have the contents thereof been mentioned in any of the paragraphs of the election petition. The contents of paragraph 19, according to the returned candidate, ought to be treated as nothing but wild allegations based on certain vague statements and are, therefore, liable to be struck out. (i) With regard to the above, it is worth reiterating that mere lodging of complaints, in the absence of any other material, as in the case at hand, can be of no avail. Complaints, by themselves, do not constitute sufficient materials to sustain the allegations, particularly, when the identity of the voters are not known and the category, whereunder each one of them was allowed to cast vote by means of 'postal ballot', has equally remained unknown and undisclosed. 89. Bearing in mind that there are as many as seven categories of persons, who may cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot', it, now, needs to be noted that the election petitioner, in paragraph 11 of the election petition, alleges that none of the 376 voters, who had cost his vote by means of 'postal ballot', was a person eligible, under the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules, to cast vote by means of 'postal ballot'. 90. Thus, tie categorical assertion of the election petitioner, in paragraph 11 of the election petition, is that none of the persons, who had cast his vote by means of 'postal ballot', falls under any of the categories of voters, who ore authorized, under the law, to cast vote by means of 'postal ballot'. 90. Thus, tie categorical assertion of the election petitioner, in paragraph 11 of the election petition, is that none of the persons, who had cast his vote by means of 'postal ballot', falls under any of the categories of voters, who ore authorized, under the law, to cast vote by means of 'postal ballot'. Having, thus, boldly claimed that none of the said 376 voters, who had cast their vote by means of 'postal ballot', are covered by the RP Act, 1951, and the rules making them entitled to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot', the election petitioner, at paragraph 13, alleges that 'almost all of these 376' votes have been cast in the name, of persons, who were shown to be engaged as porters/labourers to carry election materials and the persons, termed as gaonburahs/head gaonburahs, who were purportedly engaged to arrange logistic support for polling parties. 91. The expression, 'almost all of these 376 votes', used in paragraph 13 of the election petition, clearly demonstrates that all those who had cast their votes by means of postal ballot', are not persons engaged as porters/labourers and gaonburahs/head gaonburahs. Thus, while in Paragraph 11 of his election petition, the election petitioner asserts that none of the persons, who had cast his vote by means of "postal ballot", falls under any of the categories of voters, who can cast their votes by means of "postal ballot", the election petitioner modifies his stand by stating in paragraph 13 of the election petition that 'almost all of these 376' votes have been cast in the name of persons who were shown to be engaged as porters/labourers to carry election materials and the persons, termed as gaonburahs/head gaonburahs who were purportedly engaged to arrange logistic support for polling parties indicating thereby that there were persons other than porters/labourers, gaonburahs/head gaonburahs, who have cast their votes my means of "postal ballot's'. Who these persons were, under what category these persons have cast their votes by means, of "postal ballot", what their total number was, have all remained undisclosed. Such pleadings cannot survive under order VI, rule 16 and must, therefore, be struck out. 92. The question, which, therefore, immediately, arises is: who were the persons, who had cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot'? The election petitioner is wholly silent, in this regard, in his election petition. Such pleadings cannot survive under order VI, rule 16 and must, therefore, be struck out. 92. The question, which, therefore, immediately, arises is: who were the persons, who had cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot'? The election petitioner is wholly silent, in this regard, in his election petition. Thus, though the election petitioner makes an omnibus statement, in paragraph 11, that none of the person, who had been allowed to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot', falls under any of the categories of voters, who are entitled to cast vote by means of 'postal ballot', the election petitioner rests his claim by saying that 'almost all these 376 persons' were engaged as porters/labourers to carry election materials and/or those, who were termed as gaonburahs/head gaonburahs and were engaged for arranging logistic support for polling parties. Thus, on what basis the election petitioner has alleged that persons, other than those, who were engaged as porters/labourers, or termed as Gaonburahs/head gaonburahs, were not entitled to cast vote, is not at all revealed or clear inasmuch as the election petition is completely silent on this aspect. Considered from this angle too, the election petition suffers from non-inclusion of'material facts' leading to incomplete 'cause of action'. Such an election petition cannot but be rejected by the court in exercise of its powers under order VII, rule 11. 93. It may be noted that section 83 of the RP Act, 1951, clearly lays down that every election petition shall contain concise statement of 'material facts' on which the election petitioner relies. When the 'material facts' are not given, the election petition is incomplete and cannot survive. Relation between 'material facts' and fact in issue? 94. It needs to be understood that 'material facts' give rise to material propositions, Therefore, 'material facts' must be such, which can give rise to a fact in issue. 'Facts in issue' has been defined, in the Evidence Act, as the expression, which means and includes any fact from which, either by itself or in connection with other fact, the existence, non-existence, nature or extent of any right, liability or disability, asserted or denied, in any suit or proceeding, necessarily follows. 95. 'Facts in issue' has been defined, in the Evidence Act, as the expression, which means and includes any fact from which, either by itself or in connection with other fact, the existence, non-existence, nature or extent of any right, liability or disability, asserted or denied, in any suit or proceeding, necessarily follows. 95. Thus, the 'material facts', whereby one proposes to give rise to a fact in issue, must be such, which, by itself or in connection with other facts, give rise to the existence, non-existence, nature or extent of any right, liability or disability, asserted or denied in any suit or proceeding, necessarily follows. To put it otherwise, it is not necessary that every pleading, if it contains 'material facts', would necessarily give rise to material proposition; the stress is on the words 'necessarily follows'. The expression, 'material fact', therefore, means such a fact, which, either by itself or in connection with some other facts, necessarily gives rise to the inference of the existence, non-existence, nature or extent of any right, liability or disability, asserted or denied in any suit or proceeding necessarily follows. 96. Thus, unless a pleading satisfies the above requirement, it has to be rejected at the threshold. 97. The material facts, in the present case, are that those, who have cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot', were not entitled to cast their votes. When the election petitioner is himself unsure as to how many votes have been cast by the persons, who were engaged as labourer, porter and persons terms as 'gaonbura', he cannot expect the respondents to reply effectively. The material facts, therefore, to sustain the accusations that persons not authorized to cast votes, by means of 'postal ballot', had been allowed to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot', cannot be said to have been stated completely. An incomplete pleading, such as, the one at hand, leads to incomplete cause of action and an election petition, without disclosing a complete 'cause of action', cannot, but be rejected by the court in exercise of its powers under order VII, rule 11. 98. Failure to plead even a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action. An incomplete allegation is liable to be struck off under order 6, rule 16. 98. Failure to plead even a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action. An incomplete allegation is liable to be struck off under order 6, rule 16. In the case at hand, the election petitioner has not disclosed as to how many persons of which category have been allowed to cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot', though they were not so entitled. The allegations, made in the election petition, are too vague, as already discussed above. A complete statement of 'material fact' clothes an election petitioner with a complete 'cause of action' and a complete 'cause of action' gives an equal and full opportunity to the respondent to meet the case of the election petitioner and defend the accusations made against him. When the material facts are lacking, the returned candidate cannot effectively give reply and, on the basis of such incomplete 'material facts', no 'cause of action' can be said to have been made out. 99. 'Cause of action' is a term, which precedes the term 'facts in issue'. The accrual of 'cause of action' is followed by fact in issue. Therefore, the maintainability of a petition is based on two basic premise; First being the existence of a right and second being the infringement of such a right All facts, pleaded in a petition, which go to show, apparently, the existence of a right and the infringement of such right will together constitute the 'cause of action' and such a 'cause of action' would give rise to a 'fact in issue'. Hence, it is not enough for a petitioner to plead 'material facts', which show the existence of his right. The petitioner must also plead such 'material facts', which shall go to show the infringement of such rights. Absence of any one of these twin conditions would render the petition not maintainable, because if there is a right, but no infringement, there can be no 'cause of action' for any relief and, in the similar lines, it there is an infringement, but no right, there can be no 'cause of action' for legal remedy. 100. In the present case, the election petitioner ought to have pleaded the 'material facts', to show existence of a statutory right and violation thereof, as contemplated under section 100(d) of the RP Act, 1951, read with sub-clauses (iii) and (iv) thereof. 100. In the present case, the election petitioner ought to have pleaded the 'material facts', to show existence of a statutory right and violation thereof, as contemplated under section 100(d) of the RP Act, 1951, read with sub-clauses (iii) and (iv) thereof. However, as the petition is found to be devoid of 'material facts', the election petition cannot be held to have shown the infringement of such a right. Thus, the 'cause of action' is incomplete and, consequently, no 'fact in issue arises out of the petition. When no fact in issue arises, which could show the existence of any liability on the part of the respondents, there can be no right to sue. Importance of verification of the pleadings in an Election Petition: 101. There is yet another aspect of the petition, which is found in the verification supporting the petition. 102. Order VI, rule 15, CPC 15 deals with verification of pleadings and it states as follows : "(1) Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of he court to be acquainted with the facts of the case. (2) The person verifying shall specify, by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleading what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true. (3) The verification shall be signed by the person making it and shall state the date on which and the place at which it was signed. (4) The person verifying the pleading shall also furnish an affidavit in support of his pleading." 103. The object of verification has been set out in the case of F.A. Sapa v. Singora, AIR 1991SC1557, wherein it has been held that the object of requiring verification of an election petition is clearly to fix the responsibility for the averments and allegations, made in the petition, on the person signing the verification and, at the same time, discouraging wild and irresponsible allegations unsupported by facts. 104. In the case of Sonia Gandhi (supra), it has been observed as follows : "There are two features common to both the election petitions. 104. In the case of Sonia Gandhi (supra), it has been observed as follows : "There are two features common to both the election petitions. Firstly, both the petitions are verified as true to personal knowledge of the two petitioners respectively which is apparently incorrect as the very tenor of pleadings discloses that any of the petitioners could not have had personal knowledge of various facts relating to the respondent personally and during the course of hearing we had put this across to the two petitioners and they responded by submitting only this much that the verification if incorrect was capable of being cured. The second common feature in the two petitions is that there are bald assertions made about the Italian law without stating what the source of such law is as has been pleaded by the election-petitioners or what the basis for raising such pleadings is. These averments also have been verified as true to my knowledge of each of the election-petitioners a position, wholly unacceptable." 105. The observations made above, in Sonia Gandhi's case (supra), would make it clear that verification is not a mere formality. When the statements, contained in the verification, show that a particular averment, made in the election petition, is true to the knowledge of the petitioner, it becomes essential that in the election petition itself, the complete knowledge is disclosed so as to enable the defendant to take proper defence, because the defendant not only has the right to defend the fact stated in the petition, but he also has the right to dispute the source of knowledge and impeach the credibility of such a source. Hence, unless the source of knowledge is disclosed, the defendant is likely to be prejudiced in his defence. What are the consequences of a pleading. Which has been not verified in accordance with law? 106. To ascertain the legal position on the question so arising, a reference may be made here to the case of Kanakeswar Narzary v. Deputy Commissioner, Kokrajhar and Ors., 2003 (2) GLT 51, wherein it has been observed and held as follows : "It is settled law that if a material fact is not verified, it can be cured be allowing the person concerned to verify the material fact. It is also settled position of law that if verification is defective, it can be allowed to be cured...... It is also settled position of law that if verification is defective, it can be allowed to be cured...... If may be noted that it is order 6, rule 15, CPC, which deals with verification of pleadings. According to order 6, rule 15, every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some person proved to the satisfaction of the court to be acquainted with the facts of the case and that the person verifying shall specify by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleadings, what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true. From a careful reading of order 6, rule 15, it clearly transpires that verification shall be of pleadings and not merely of material facts. In other words, material facts may form part of the pleadings, but the material fact may not necessarily in themselves be complete pleading. Viewed from this angle, when amendment of verification of the pleadings is possible, it logically follows that amendment of verification of the entire election petition is possible. It cannot, therefore, be said that amendment of verification with regard to the pleadings contained in the grounds of an election petition cannot be allowed. In other words, when amendment of verification of any part or portion of the pleadings is permissible, the amendment of verification relating to pleadings in the grounds is equally possible." 107. Thus, it can be seen that a defect, in verification, can be cured by way of amendments. Whether verification in an Election Petition can be cured after expiry of the period of limitation? 108. The question, which would, now, arise, is whether an amendment of verification, in an election petition, is possible on expiry of the period of limitation? 109. We may turn for answer to the case of R. P. Moidutty v. P.T. Kunju Mohammad, (2001)1 SCC 481, wherein the Supreme Court, while dealing with the scope of amendment of verification, observed as follows : "All the averments made in paras 1 to 17 of the petition have been stated to be true to the personal knowledge of the petitioner and in the next breath, the very same averments have been stated to be based on the information of the petitioner and believed by him to be true. The source of information is not disclosed. As observed by the supreme Court in F. A. Sapa v. Singora, the object of requiring verification of an election petition is to clearly fix the responsibility for the averments and allegations in the petition on the person signing the verification and, at the same time, discouraging wild and irresponsible allegations unsupported by facts. However, the defect of verification is not fatal to the petition, it can be cured (see Murarka Radhey Shy am Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore andA.S. Subharaj V. M. Muthiah). In the present case, the defect, in verification, was pointed out by raising a plea in that regard in the written statement. The objection was pressed and pursued by arguing the same before the court. However, the petitioner persisted in pursuing the petition without proper verification which the petitioner should not have been permitted to do. In our opinion, unless, the defect in verification was rectified, the petition could not have been tried." (emphasis added) 110. The question, whether verification, in an election petition, can or cannot be allowed to be amended, came up for consideration in the case of Kanakeswar Narzary (supra) and this court held as follows : "26. In the face of the law, as has been laid down in F.A. Sapa, reiterated in H.D. Revanna (supra) and adopted in Dr. Bijoy Laxmi Sadho (supra), there can be no escape from the conclusion that defect in verification is curable and amendment seeking to remove the defect in the verification cannot be declined and as long as the amendment, sought for does not lead to any new cause of action or to the introduction of a material fact beyond the specified period of 45 days, the same cannot be disallowed." (emphasis added) 111. Thus, what emanates from the legal position quoted above is that an amendment of the verification will be refused if it has been preferred beyond the statutory period as provided under section 81 of the RP Act, 1951. Thus, what emanates from the legal position quoted above is that an amendment of the verification will be refused if it has been preferred beyond the statutory period as provided under section 81 of the RP Act, 1951. 112.1 may pause here to point out that under section 83 of the RP Act, 1951, an election petition, which challenges the result of an election on a ground, other than the ground of 'corrupt practice', needs to be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code for verification of pleadings; whereas an election petition, which challenges the result of an election on the ground of 'corrupt practice', shall not only be verified, but shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of allegations of such 'corrupt practice' and the particulars thereof. 113. It is, now, noteworthy that provisions, as regards ' verification', have been made in order VI, rule 15. In other words, how a pleading has to be verified is given in order VI, rule 15. Until coming into force of sub-rule (4) of rule 15 of order VI, with effect from 1.7.2002, rule 15 read as under : "15. Verification of pleadings. - (1) Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person proved, to the satisfaction of the court to be acquainted with the facts of the case. (2) The person verifying shall specify, by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleading, what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true. (3) The verification shall be signed, by the person making it and shall state the date on which and the place at which it was signed." 114. Thus, until before 1.7.2002, the Verification was required to specify, by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleading, what the person pleading verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true. By the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999, sub-rule (4) has been added, to rule 15 of order VI, which reads, 'the person, verifying the pleading, shall also furnish an affidavit in support of his pleadings'. By the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999, sub-rule (4) has been added, to rule 15 of order VI, which reads, 'the person, verifying the pleading, shall also furnish an affidavit in support of his pleadings'. Thus, a pleading, today, must not only be verified, but must also be supported by an affidavit sworn by the person verifying the pleading. Though the election petitioner has supported his election petition by an affidavit, this court, in the present case, is not required to enter into the question as to whether an election petition, made under the RP Act, 1951, seeking to set aside the result of an election on a ground other than the ground of corrupt practice needs to contain material particulars, because, this is not an issue in the present election petition. 115. Having laid down the legal position with respect to verification and the impact of defective verification on the election petition, the verification given by the petitioner, in the election petition, needs to be looked into. 116. Looking into the election petition from the perspective of the law governing verification, what is revealing is that the petitioner, though stated in the verification, that the facts stated in paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21, are true to the knowledge of the petitioner, yet in the petition, he has avoided to state specifically that he knows about these contents nor has he given the particulars, which constitute such knowledge. 117. When a person asserts the existence of a definite fact, true to his knowledge, it implies his knowledge about the non-existence of a fact. Correspondingly, unless there is a definite knowledge about the non-existence of fact, the assertion, as to the existence of a tact, has to be termed as vague. What is the meaning and impact of a statement which is verified as true to knowledge? 118. In the present case, the petitioner makes a definite statement that the persons, who had been allowed to cast their votes by 'postal ballot's, were not covered under the category of persons, who enjoy such a right because the voters were labourer/porters and gaonburahs/head gaonburahs. Such a positive assertion certainly implies the existence of knowledge, on the part of the petitioner, as to the identity of these voters. Such a positive assertion certainly implies the existence of knowledge, on the part of the petitioner, as to the identity of these voters. If the petitioner has knowledge about the identity of these voters, then, he is equally under an obligation to set forth clearly the names of these persons, for, it is only when the names and other particulars of these porters/gaonburahs are disclosed indicating the identity of the voters that the possibility of 'postal ballot's, having not been cast by the classified voters, can be ruled out. Such a statement would imply the non-existence of a fact that the 'postal ballot's were cast by those voters, who were eligible to cost their votes by means of 'postal ballot'. The petitioner, by not divulging the names of porters/gaonburahs has omitted to state material fact. 119. By not furnishing the names of the persons, who had cast their votes by means of 'postal ballot's, the statements of the election petitioner, made in the verification, that the contents of paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 and 21 are true to his knowledge, are not supported by pleadings and is contradicted by his own statement that he has learnt about this fact. Thus, whereas the perusal of the verification shows that the petitioner has brought this election petition on facts, which are true to his knowledge, his own admission, made in the election petition, makes clear that he has only learnt about the facts, which he has averred. Learning about something cannot be equated with personal knowledge. Personal knowledge about a fact is the best form of assertion for the petitioner that he does not rely on hearsay information or guesswork and that he brings the ejection petition on facts known to him. In the present case, it so appears that the petitioner does not have knowledge about the accusations, which he has brought in the petition, and it is just his belief based on which he learnt from an undisclosed source that the 'postal ballot's were improperly issued and/or counted. Such a belief cannot stand in the absence of material facts, which the election petitioner has not furnished. 120. In the case at hand, as the Verification' is clearly defective and the prescribed period of 45 days is already over, the verification, in the case at hand, cannot be cured by way of amendment. Such a belief cannot stand in the absence of material facts, which the election petitioner has not furnished. 120. In the case at hand, as the Verification' is clearly defective and the prescribed period of 45 days is already over, the verification, in the case at hand, cannot be cured by way of amendment. Consequently, an election petition, which is devoid of a valid Verification', such as, the present one, cannot be sustained, because the statement, made in the election petition, would remain without being Verified' in accordance with law. 121. The inference, drawn from the pleadings, in the election petition, that the election petitioner is throwing arrows in the darkness and that is why, his pleadings are vague, lack 'material facts' and cannot be held to have disclosed a complete 'cause of action', gets reinforced, when we examine and analyze, microscopically, the pleadings, as a whole, in the election petition and the election petitioner's case as has been set up by him in his election petition. 122. Election petitioner's definite-case is that altogether 376 votes were case by means of "postal ballot" and, out of the total votes, so cast, while 197 votes were found to have been cast in favour of the returned candidate, the election petitioner got 125 votes and the remaining candidate received 34 votes. However, none of the said 376 persons, who had cast their votes by "postal ballot", falls in any of the categories of voter, who are eligible to cast their votes by "postal ballot". Altogether, therefore, the number of votes cast by means of "postal ballot" - keeps repeating, the election petitioner - is 376. However, when correctly calculated, it clearly emerges that since the returned candidate has, admittedly, received 197 votes, cast by means of "postal ballot", the election petitioner has received 125 votes, cast by means of "postal ballot", and the remaining candidate has received 34 votes, cast by means of 'postal ballot', the total number of votes, so cast by means of "postal ballot", comes to 356 and not 376 as alleged by the election petitioner. 123. Thus, it becomes transparent that the election petitioner's case that 376 votes were cast by means of "postal ballot" is wholly incorrect. 123. Thus, it becomes transparent that the election petitioner's case that 376 votes were cast by means of "postal ballot" is wholly incorrect. Situated, thus, it becomes clear that the election petitioner does not even know as to how many votes were cast by means of "postal ballot" and that is why, he does not know, and has not been able to disclose-, the identity of these voters nor has he been able to disclose the reasons as to why he considers that the persons, who had cast their votes by means of "postal ballot", were not eligible to cast their, votes by means of "postal ballot". No wonder, therefore, that his pleadings are vague and wholly devoid of 'material facts'. Such pleadings cannot, but be treated embarrassing for effective trial and need to be, therefore, struck out. When so struck out, there remains really nothing surviving in the election petition, because the election petitioner has not clothed his election petition with complete 'cause of action' as is required under the law [see Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia, (1977) 1 SCC 511 and Azhar Hussain (supra)]. 124. I have already pointed out that 'material facts', according to Supreme Court, in Sonia Gandhi's case (supra), are 'materials' supporting the allegations made and would, therefore, afford 'basis' for the allegations made. In the present case, the election petitioner has neither been able to state those facts, which one can consider to be 'materials' supporting the allegations nor has the election petitioner been able to state such facts in his election petition which one can take as affording 'basis' for the allegations made by the election petitioner. 125. It deserve to be pointed out, as has already been indicated above, that the provisions, contained in section 20(5) of the RP Act, 1950, would reveal, if analyzed minutely, that in the absence of evidence showing to the contrary, a statement, made by a person in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner, while seeking to cast his vote by means of "postal ballot", shall be accepted to be correct. Unless, therefore, one states the reasons as to why he contends a person, though eligible to cast vote, is not eligible to cast vote by means of "postal ballot", would remain as bald allegation, particularly, in a case of present nature, wherein it has never been the election petitioner's case that the persons, who had cast their votes by means of "postal ballet", were not eligible voters. Their rights, therefore, to cast votes in the election, in question, is not in dispute. The dispute is confined to the means adopted by them to cast their votes. In such circumstances, the election petitioner ought to have clearly stated, against each one of such voters, as to why he or she was, though eligible to cast vote, was not eligible to cast vote by means of "postal ballot". Having not assigned the reasons, the election petitioner cannot but be held to have not given 'material facts' in his election petition. The pleadings, in the election petition, need to be, therefore, struck out as a whole. In consequence thereof, the election petition cannot but be treated to have disclosed no 'cause of action' and must,, therefore, be rejected. 126. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, the pleadings, in the election petition, being vague and devoid of'material facts', are hereby struck out and the election petition is rejected on the ground that it does not disclose any 'cause of action'. 127. In terms of the above observations made and the directions given, this miscellaneous case and the election petition shall stand disposed of. 128. No order as to costs. 129. Send back the records with all materials, which had been called for.