JUDGMENT Amitava Roy, J. 1. The dissenssus bears on the validity or otherwise of the collection of tolls at the check gates set up by the Respondent District Council, the Syiems of the different Elakas located within the West Khasi Hills District of the State of Meghalaya and their lessees. Whereas the Petitioner in WP (C) 2398/2008 and WP (C) 2421/2008 question the authority and power of the Respondent Syiems to do so, the Petitioner in WP (C) 2275/2004, Syiem of Mylleim and his Durbar seek an appropriate writ to restrain the State Respondents from obstructing his/their lessees from collecting such tolls within the Syiemship. Viewing the striking identicalness of the issues to be attended, the related pleadings being minimally at variance, analogous hearing was the consensus and this adjudication would answer the debate. 2. We have heard Mr. A. Sharma, Sr. Advocate assisted by Ms. S. Sharma, Advocate for the Petitioner in WP (C) 2398/ 2008 and WP (C) 2421/2008, Dr. B.P. Todi, learned Additional Advocate General, Government of Meghalaya, Mr. B.B. Narzari, learned Standing Council, Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council and Mr. D.K. Mishra, Sr. Advocate for the Respondent No. 3 in WP (C) 2398/2008. 3. Skeletally the rival pleadings in pith need be adumbrated to lay the preface for the contentious pleas seeking resolution. The Petitioner in WP (C) 2398/2008 and WP (C) 2421/2008 has introduced itself to be an association of truck owners/operators committed to the cause of its members plying their trucks on public roads including the National Highways laid in the State of Meghalaya. Its members are engaged in the business of transporting coal and agricultural produce for which they utilise the NH 37 and NH 44E (Nongstoin-Shillong Road) which constitute the life line of the coal bearing region(s) of the State as these connect it with the rest of the country. It has alleged that such trucks carrying commercial loads of the aforementioned items while plying on the public roads including NH 44E connecting Nongstoin to Shillong are intercepted at check/toll gates set up by or on behalf of the Khasi Hills District Council (for short hereafter referred to as the Council) and the Respondent Syiemships and are subjected to exactions represented to be tolls without any authority of law. In its pleadings in WP (C) 2398/2008, the Petitioner has enumerated as hereunder eight such points where the trucks of its members are stopped and such payments are realised: (A) Nongstoin Syiemship check gate at Nongstoin (3 receipts of Rs. 300/-, Rs. 100/- and Rs. 300/-). (B) Myriaw Syiemship check gate at Markasa(1 receipt of Rs. 50/-). (C) Hima-Mawlang Syiemship check gate at Mawkohngei (Rs. 100/- without any receipt). (D) The Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council, hereinafter referred to as the "KHADC" check gate at Mairang (Rs. 100/- without any receipt). (E) KHADC check gate at Nongbri (Rs. 200/- without any receipt). (F) Syiem of Hima Nongkhlaw check gate at Ladmihri (Rs. 100/- without any receipt). (G) KHADC check gate at third mile, Upper Shillong (Rs. 200/- without any receipt). 4. While mentioning the amount(s) so extracted in addition to the other collections, the Petitioner has alleged that any refusal to yield to such illegal extortions result in damage to the vehicles as well as physical harm to the drivers and handymen thereof which in turn cause serious disruption of the vehicular movement on the highways and public roads causing traffic snarls every now and then. The Petitioner has referred to various representations submitted by it to the different State authorities as well as the FIRs lodged with the Superintendent of Police, West Khasi Hills, Nongstoin, complaining of the above unlawful activities but to no avail. 5. The Petitioner in WP (C) 2421/2008 has extended these assertions vis-a-vis illegal collections of toll in course of the transportation of the coal by its members from their private forests by using the National Highway No. 37. According to it, such coal is won from the private forests/mines situated at Shallang within Hima Nongstoin and thereafter transported to the State of Assam by using the route Shallang via Riangdo to Atiabari and then joining the National Highway No. 37 at Boko in Assam. It is stated that there are four check gates set up by the Syiem of Nongstoin on the way from Riangdo to Umsohpiang within a distance of 20 kms without any permission from the Ministry of Surface Transport, or the District Administration or the State P.W.D. Authority. It is stated that there are four check gates set up by the Syiem of Nongstoin on the way from Riangdo to Umsohpiang within a distance of 20 kms without any permission from the Ministry of Surface Transport, or the District Administration or the State P.W.D. Authority. It has averred that its members who hold private mines are issued a certificate of origin for timber or other forest produce on payment of tax but inspite thereof they are compelled to pay tolls at the above mentioned check gates time and again. 6. The Petitioner in the above backdrop has contended that the collection of tolls is not only violative of the mandate of Article 265 of the Constitution of India it besides being in infringement of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 14 and Article 19 is a constant cause of disruption of smooth flow of traffic on the Highways and the public roads involved. It has pleaded that after the creation of the District Councils, the right to impose tax is available to them only under the provisions of paragraph 8(3) of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India and in absence of any provision thereunder for levy and collection of tolls from trucks carrying commercial loads, such realisations cannot be made in law either by them or the Syiems or their agents or lessees. According to the Petitioner, such pre-constitutional privilege of the Syiems, if any, ceased with the establishment of the District Council in which the administration of tribal areas was vested by Article244(2) of the Constitution of India. 7. The Deputy Commissioner, West Khasi Hills District, Nongstoin, in his counter in WP (C) 2398/2008 without offering any comment on the merit of the averments made in the writ petition, set out the steps taken in response to the representations received on behalf of the Petitioner alleging forceful collections of tolls. According to him, w.e.f. 26.6.2008 all toll gates on the National Highway No. 44E had been removed in compliance of the order dated 11.6.2008 passed in the aforementioned writ proceeding. 8. According to him, w.e.f. 26.6.2008 all toll gates on the National Highway No. 44E had been removed in compliance of the order dated 11.6.2008 passed in the aforementioned writ proceeding. 8. The Respondent No. 3 in WP (C) 2398/2008, the Acting Syiem of Nongstoin Syiemship, in his affidavit has pleaded that prior to the commencement of the Constitution of India, in the entire area comprising of the Khasi Hills Districts, barring a few villages and the British portion of Shillong, there were 25 Syiemships as original tribal organisations of the Khasis encompassing civil, judicial and administrative jurisdictions. These traditional institutions, according to the answering Respondent, while were headed by Syiems or the Chief of the Khasis were a limited monarchy and the Syiems were appointed by their clans of the particular Elakas. The Syiems or Chiefs were not territorial sovereigns but were elected democratic chiefs whose authority extended over the subjects and not the land. The Syiems managed their business with their Myntris who sat in their Durbars. The deponent stated that though the British assumed its supremacy over the Khasi Hills, it retained the tribal institutions and their customs and thus the Nongstoin Syiemship continued to exist and function as before being annexed to the dominion of India through an instrument of accession in 1947 to be eventually merged with the erstwhile State of Assam with the advent of Constitution of India. 9. According to the Respondent, however, the tribal usages and the customs of the Khasi States were preserved and thus the customary rights and privileges of the Syiems were left intact even under the constitutional set up which provided for the institutions of Syiemship and their continuance. By the same analogy the Khasi States were included in the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India along with other tribal areas of Assam. Though with the evolution of the Constitution, the merged States lost all their attributes of being separate entities and the Sixth Schedule amongst Ors. provided for the administration of the tribal areas enumerated therein, the age old institutions such as Syiemship and the customs prevailing in those areas were preserved. 10. Though with the evolution of the Constitution, the merged States lost all their attributes of being separate entities and the Sixth Schedule amongst Ors. provided for the administration of the tribal areas enumerated therein, the age old institutions such as Syiemship and the customs prevailing in those areas were preserved. 10. The answering Respondent has elaborated that the Syiemship in order to conduct the administration of its affairs is required to collect tolls from the markets on entry of goods and/or produce, the same being the only source of revenue, wherefrom 1/8th of the proceeds is to be deposited with the territorial District Council, the proforma Respondent No. 8. He has asserted that realisation of such customary tolls had been in vogue from time immemorial. The Respondent has in support of the validation of the impost referred to Khasi Hills Autonomous District (Nomination and Election of Syiem, Deputy Syiem and Electors of Nongstoin Syiemship) Act, 2003 (hereafter referred to as the Act, 2003) and the Administration of Nongstoin Syiemship Rules, 2006 (hereafter referred to as the Rules 2006). He has avowed that the said enactments have the force of law under Paragraph-11 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India and thus the collection of customary tolls in the Nongstoin Syiemship has legal endorsement and is thus neither illegal nor unauthorised. The deponent has further stated that not only the realisation is being made on the produce entering and leaving the Syiemship in terms of Rule 12 of the 2006 Rules, necessary permission from the concerned State authority as well as the Council has been obtained to set up such toll gates/revenue stations. The Respondent has denied that such toll/revenue station(s) are situated on the National Highway and, that therefore, permission therefore from the Ministry of Surface Transport was essential. The allegation that the location of the toll/revenue stations hinder the smooth movement of traffic on the road has also been categorically denied. It has been denied as well that the trucks proceeding from Nongstoin to Shillong have to pass through all the eight gates referred to in the Petitioners' pleadings. It has been clarified that the issues in WP (C) 2421/2008 relate to Jyrngam and Riangsih Sirdarship and, therefore, do not concern the Nongstoin Syiemship. A report dated 3.7.1996 submitted by the Extra Assistant Commissioner, West Khasi Hills in CR 110(SH)/1992 (K.K. Singh Phanbuh and Ors. It has been clarified that the issues in WP (C) 2421/2008 relate to Jyrngam and Riangsih Sirdarship and, therefore, do not concern the Nongstoin Syiemship. A report dated 3.7.1996 submitted by the Extra Assistant Commissioner, West Khasi Hills in CR 110(SH)/1992 (K.K. Singh Phanbuh and Ors. v. Fairly Syiem and Ors.) has also been cited to demonstrate that toll collection has been the customary practice of the Syiemships to supplement their revenue. 11. The Council in its counter in WP (C) 2398/2008 and WP (C) 2421/2008 has while reaffirming the age old practice of levy and collection of customary tolls by the Khasi Chiefs on items of merchandise on transit in the Elakas under them has maintained that the same has been saved by the Constitution of India and has attained a force of law which has since been codified under the Rules, 2006. According to it, such collection at the check gates is in conformity with the provisions of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India and is directed against illegal transportation of trees within its jurisdiction. It has reiterated that the toll/revenue gates are on the land(s) contiguous to the public road and, therefore, no permission from the Ministry of Surface Transport is necessary. It clarified that the location of the tolls/revenue station did not in any way hinder the movement of traffic on the roads. While asserting that the Council had been collecting the royalty under the United Khasi Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Management and Control of Forest) Act 1958 (for short hereafter referred to as the Act 1958) and the Rules framed thereunder, the answering Respondent has asseverated that with the closure of all such forest check gates by the District Administration, illegal transportation of forest produce has ensued causing heavy financial loss of the State. The Council has maintained that the toll collection by it has been under appropriate authority of law. It has asserted as well that the practice of levy and collection of customary tolls by the Syiemship in particular within Nongstoin Syiemship has been codified under the Act, 2003 and Rules, 2006. 12. In its rejoinder affidavit, the Council has disclosed the various categories of forests under its control and has emphasised on the essentiality of the establishment of forest stations contemplated under Section 12 of the Act 1958 to prevent illegal transportation of forest produce. 12. In its rejoinder affidavit, the Council has disclosed the various categories of forests under its control and has emphasised on the essentiality of the establishment of forest stations contemplated under Section 12 of the Act 1958 to prevent illegal transportation of forest produce. It categorically denied the allegations against the validity of such forest stations and has indicated rampant illicit transportation of forest produce outside the country as a result of prohibition of checking of the forest produce in the revenue stations. The stand of the Respondent No. 1, Superintendent of Police, West Khasi Hills, Nongstoin, is identical to the one of the Respondent No. 2 alluded hereinabove. 13. In its affidavit in reply, the Petitioner while reiterating and reaffirming its averments in the writ petition has in substance maintained that the Act 2003 and the Rules 2006 are of no relevance as the same do not either recognise or vest the Council or the Syiemship involved with the power to levy and collect tolls at the check/toll gates/revenue stations. 14. The affidavits on behalf of the Shirdarship of Jyrngam and Riangsih which are substantially the same aver that the route involved in WP (C) 2421/2008 is not a part of the National Highway 37 and is a PWD Road and, therefore, the provisions of National Highways Act, 1956 and the National Highways Authority Act, 1988, are not attracted. They have asserted as well that the collection of customary tolls in the Elakas of the respective Shirdarships and Durbars has been an age old practice and does not in any way infringe Article 301 of the Constitution of India and is rather saved by Article 13 thereof. While reiterating that the collection of the customary tolls is neither forceful nor illegal but duly approved by the Durbars and the Executive Committee of the Council, they have insisted that the toll gates at the concerned points have been erected with the permission of the appropriate authorities of the State Administration as well as the Council. Contending that the customary tolls and the market tolls are the principal sources of revenue to meet the expenditure towards discharge of various functions, administrative, judicial and customary, the answering Respondents have dismissed the allegation that the same impinges upon the Petitioner's fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 15. Contending that the customary tolls and the market tolls are the principal sources of revenue to meet the expenditure towards discharge of various functions, administrative, judicial and customary, the answering Respondents have dismissed the allegation that the same impinges upon the Petitioner's fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 15. In WP (C) 2275/2004, the writ Petitioner, Syiem of Mylliem and Durbar while adopting the stand of the Nongstoin Syiemship on the customary right and privileges of the Syiem and the authority of the Syiemships as traditional institutions to levy and collect such tolls as the main source of revenue to conduct the administration thereof, has reiterated as well that the toll gates involved are not situated on the National Highway but are erected at interior places within Raid Marwet, Mylliem Syiemship with due information to and approval of the appropriate State authorities. While asserting that such exaction of tolls is valid, the Petitioner has complained against unauthorised interference of the State authorities with the right of the lessees of the Syiemship, labouring under a wrong interpretation of the relevant laws. The allegation that such collection impedes the free flow of traffic has been denied and intervention of this Court has been sought for to restrain the State Respondents from prohibiting and obstructing their lessees from collecting tolls within the Syiemship. 16. The State of Meghalaya in its affidavit has admitted the power of the Council under the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India to enact laws for collection of tolls by the Syiemship within its jurisdiction as per the provisions of Act 2003 and has recited the stages through which a Bill made by it (Council) is processed culminating in an enforceable instrument of law on receiving the assent thereto of the Governor of the State. The deponent has indicated that the responsibility of implementing the Act 2003 is on the District Council and that the State Government has no role in that matter. 17. In the backdrop of this mammoth and contentious pleadings, Mr. Sharma has insistently argued that the Syiems of the areas involved had never been the territorial sovereigns thereof and prior to the framing of the Constitution of India amongst Ors. 17. In the backdrop of this mammoth and contentious pleadings, Mr. Sharma has insistently argued that the Syiems of the areas involved had never been the territorial sovereigns thereof and prior to the framing of the Constitution of India amongst Ors. exercised a limited traditional right to collect tolls from those who sold goods in the market located within their jurisdiction Relying on the authoritative texts titled, "The Native Races of India" by Major P.R.T. Curdon, A Collection of Treaties etc. compiled by Mr. C.U. Aitchison and "Notes on Khasi Law" by Sir Keith Cantlie, the learned Sr. Counsel has argued that the Syiems were not authorised to collect tolls beyond the said territorial limits. Mr. Sharma has urged that this limited right of the Syiems ceased as the administration of the said areas stood vested in the District Council as mandated by the Constitution of India whereafter they (Syiems) only acted as its (District Council) Officers and could exercise only the powers conferred by it. No traditional right of the Syiems including that of collection of tolls was saved by the Constitution of India, he insisted. As in any view of the matter, the 2006 Rules being beyond the framework of 2003 Act are per se inoperative, null and void, the action of the Syiems to set up toll gates and to collect tolls are purely executive acts without any sanction of law and are thus obviously illegal and unconstitutional. In order to drive home this plea, the learned Sr. Counsel principally relied on the decision of the Apex Court in T. Cajee v. U. Jormanik Siem and Anr. AIR 1961 SC 276 . 18. Referring to paragraph 8(3) of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India, the learned Sr. Counsel maintained that though thereunder, the District Council was empowered to levy and collect tax as contemplated therein, delegation of such power to the Syiems was not comprehended per se. According to the learned Sr. Counsel, a District Council albeit through Regulations made by it could provide for levy and collection of any of the taxes specified in paragraph 8(3), the same ipso facto did not signify the Syiems' authority to exact the same. Contending that the Act 2003 was not a law/regulation envisaged under paragraph 8(4) of the Sixth Schedule, Mr. Counsel, a District Council albeit through Regulations made by it could provide for levy and collection of any of the taxes specified in paragraph 8(3), the same ipso facto did not signify the Syiems' authority to exact the same. Contending that the Act 2003 was not a law/regulation envisaged under paragraph 8(4) of the Sixth Schedule, Mr. Sharma has urged that the rule making power contained in Section 13 thereof could by no means be invoked to provide for levy and collection of tolls and that too by the Syiem and his Durbur. This indeed is in contravention of the peremptory inhibition contained in Article 304 of the Constitution of India. As imposition of tolls contemplated by Rule 12 has the impact of impeding the freedom of trade or commerce or intercourse guaranteed under Article 301 of the Constitution of India, none other than the Legislature of the State is empowered by law to impose reasonable restrictions thereon as conceived of in and approved by Article 304, he urged. Mr. Sharma, therefore, has argued that the Act and the Rules being repugnant to the constitutional guarantees enshrined in Article 19 and 301are invalid and ab initio null and void. Even otherwise in absence of any power of delegation envisaged in the District Council, it could have neither assigned it to the Syiem nor legislated the transition thereof, he urged. Having regard to the language employed in paragraph 8(3), it is impermissible to concede any relaxation to the rigour thereof, he contended. 19. Without prejudice to the above, the learned Sr. Counsel maintained that it being apparent from the title and the preamble of the Act 2003, that it was a legislation under paragraph 3(1)(g) of the Sixth Schedule and not one comprehended under para 8(3), the same as well as the Rules thereunder cannot legally devise any mechanism for levy and collection of tolls. The Act and the Rules being vividly in repudiation of the inviolable rights treasured under Article 19, 301 and 304 of the Constitution of India, are liable to be adjudged non est, he argued. To brace up his contentions, Mr. Sharma has placed reliance on the following decisions of the Apex Court as well. Saurashtra Cement and Chemical Industries Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. (2001) 1 SCC 91 State of Kerela v. Madras Rubber Factory Ltd. (1998) 1 SCC 616 . To brace up his contentions, Mr. Sharma has placed reliance on the following decisions of the Apex Court as well. Saurashtra Cement and Chemical Industries Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. (2001) 1 SCC 91 State of Kerela v. Madras Rubber Factory Ltd. (1998) 1 SCC 616 . Gupta Modern Breweries v. State of J and K and Ors. (2007) 6 SCC 317 . New Delhi Municipal Council v. State of Punjab and Ors. (1997) 7 SCC 339 State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. and Ors. (2004) 10 SCC 201 District Council of United Khasi and Jaintia Hills and Ors. AIR 1972 SC 787 . State of Madhya Pradesh v. Thakur Bharat Singh AIR 1967 SC 1170 . Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. AIR 1982 SC 33 Jantia Hill Truck Owners Association v. Shailang Area Coal Dealer and Truck Owner Association and Ors. 2009 (4) GLT (SC) 1 : (2009) 8 SCC 492 . 20. Dr. Todi, learned Additional Advocate General, Meghalaya, while affirming the power of the District Council under the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India to enact laws for collection of tolls by the Syiemship within their jurisdiction has vouched for the validity of the Act 2003 and the Rules 2006 and has with reference to the affidavit filed on behalf of his Respondent indicated the legislative process relatable thereto. While reiterating that the responsibility of implementing the Act 2003 and the Rules 2006 is exclusively on the District Council, Dr. Todi has submitted that though initially pursuant to the orders of this Court all check gates/toll gates set up by it (District Council) had been dismantled later, only the illegal and unauthorised structures were removed. The learned Additional Advocate General, however, did not elaborate on the power of the Syiems to levy and collect tolls. 21. Mr. Narzary appearing for the District Council while ratifying the age old practice of collection of customary tolls by the Khasi Chiefs on the commercial commodities on transit within their jurisdictional limits, has endorsed the validity of the Act 2003 and the Rules 2006. 21. Mr. Narzary appearing for the District Council while ratifying the age old practice of collection of customary tolls by the Khasi Chiefs on the commercial commodities on transit within their jurisdictional limits, has endorsed the validity of the Act 2003 and the Rules 2006. He has insisted that the collection of the tolls at its check gates is not only in consonance with the imperatives of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India but also is essential to prevent illegal transportation of timber and other items of merchandise. He has clarified that as the check gates/toll gates are not on the Highway, no permission from the Ministry of Surface Transport is warranted and that the collection thereat does not in any manner hinder or obstruct the free flow of traffic. According to him, the long standing practice of collection of customary tolls has since been codified into law by the Act 2003 and the Rules 2006 and that no exception to it is legally tenable. 22. Mr. Mishra as against this has argued that having regard to the process of election of Syiems from their respective clans, appointments by the Sanads of the then British Government and the term of their office, no restriction on the exercise of their powers inter alia to collect tolls is discernible to accord any premium to the plea to the contrary. Contending that the rendering in T. Cagie, (supra) does not propound extinction of all powers of the Syiem with the onset of the Constitution of India, the learned Sr. Counsel has referred inter alia to various local Rules and Orders namely Rules for Administration of Justice and Police in Khasi and Jaintia Hills, 1937, Khasi Syiemships (Administration of Justice) Order, 1950, and United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953, to underline the status of the Syiems at all relevant times and the powers exercised by them. That collection of tolls by the Syiems within their jurisdictions had been a custom in vogue from time immemorial has sought to be established by Mr. Mishra referring to a report submitted in CR 110 (SH)/92 since disposed of by this Court on 20.6.2002. In this premise, the learned Sr. That collection of tolls by the Syiems within their jurisdictions had been a custom in vogue from time immemorial has sought to be established by Mr. Mishra referring to a report submitted in CR 110 (SH)/92 since disposed of by this Court on 20.6.2002. In this premise, the learned Sr. Counsel has urged that in absence of any specific challenge to this custom which with the lapse of time has acquired the force of law, the reliefs sought for by the Petitioners are utterly misconceived. 23. Mr. Mishra has urged with reference to Article 13 of the Constitution of India that as the age long custom of collection of tolls by the Syiems in their respective Elakas has since been constitutionally saved, a categorical challenge thereto is indispensible for an adjudication to determine the validity or otherwise thereof and that in absence of any, the petition is liable to be dismissed in limine. To reinforce this plea, the learned Sr. Counsel has also sought to draw sustenance from Articles 277 and 372 of the Constitution of India. As under these constitutional provisions, the said custom as well as the imposition and realisation of tolls thereunder had been preserved, no inference of invalidity thereof can be drawn unless an assailment to that effect is made and a judicial scrutiny on merits is undertaken, he maintained. In order to elaborate this contention, the learned Sr. Counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court to Section 143 of the Government of India Act, 1935. He insisted that as this provision too is cognitive of the significance of the said custom, which with the efflux of time has fructified into law, no interference therewith is allowable without an impugnment. 24. Mr. Mishra while endorsing the validity of the Act 2003 has argued that if the power of legislature exists mere plurality of the topics encompassed by an enactment would not ipso facto render it invalid. The Act 2003 having been enacted by the Council, it is licit on receiving the assent of the Governor of the State and in absence of any categorical assailment thereof, the incidental pleas raised on behalf of the Petitioner to the contrary ought to be negated, he urged. The Act 2003 having been enacted by the Council, it is licit on receiving the assent of the Governor of the State and in absence of any categorical assailment thereof, the incidental pleas raised on behalf of the Petitioner to the contrary ought to be negated, he urged. Moreover as the conferment of the power on the Syiem and his Durbur to collect tolls by Rule 12 is in acknowledgment of the existing custom, in absence of any impeachment thereof (custom) this Court ought not to entertain the plea of want of their (Syiem and his Durbur) authority in that regard. The learned Sr. Counsel argued that for lack of pleadings, the contention against violation of the Petitioners' fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) is also misconceived. As the Syiem and his Durbur act as units of local self Government for their respective territories discharging governmental functions, individual perspectives of unconstitutionality of their actions and the custom, which has, since been codified as a law for want of a challenge thereto is wholly frivolous. To buttress his arguments the learned Sr. Counsel has placed reliance on the following decisions: Hirabhai Asha Bhai Patel and Ors. v. State of Bombay and Ors. AIR 1955 Bom 185 . Achelal etc. v. Janapada Sabha etc. AIR 1963 M.P. 74 . Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar and Ors. AIR 1958 SC 538 State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. v. K. Jayaraman and Ors. (1974) 2 SCC 738 State of Maharashtra and Ors. v. Jalgaon Municipal Council and Ors. (2003) 9 SCC 731 Mohinuddin @ Moin Master v. District Magistrate, Beed and Ors. (1987) 4 SCC 58 , Shakuntalabai and Anr. v. L.V. Kulkarni and Anr. (1989) 2 SCC 526 25. In reply Mr. Sharma has contended that that as the custom claimed is directly in conflict with the fundamental and other constitutional rights, in terms of Article 13 of the Constitution of India, it is invalid and that therefore no separate challenge is warranted. Referring to a decision of a Single Bench of this Court rendered on 10.10.2002 in Crl. Revision Petition 14 (SH)/2002 and Ors. to the effect that the Syiem has no right to collect tolls, the learned Sr. Counsel has urged that the assertions to the contrary are of no avail. Referring to a decision of a Single Bench of this Court rendered on 10.10.2002 in Crl. Revision Petition 14 (SH)/2002 and Ors. to the effect that the Syiem has no right to collect tolls, the learned Sr. Counsel has urged that the assertions to the contrary are of no avail. While reiterating that the decision of the Apex Court in T Cajee (supra), is determinative of the annihilation of the Syiems right to collect tolls, Mr. Sharma has insisted that the presumption of constitutionality being available only for the parent legislation and not for the one enacted by the delegatee, the Rules 2006 being apparently without jurisdiction is non est. According to him, in terms of Article 243(c), a District Council cannot be construed to be a local authority and Syiems under it being only its officers, the Rules framed by them can by no means be regarded as substitute of a law made by the State Legislature as contemplated under Article 304 of the Constitution of India. The learned Sr. Counsel pressed into service in addition the following decisions Kerela State Electricity Board v. India Aluminium Co. Ltd. AIR 1976 SC 1031 , District Council of the Jowai Autonomous Distt., Jowai and Ors. v. Dwet Singh Rymbai etc. (1986) 4 SCC 38 , the Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. AIR 1962 SC 1406 , Saghir Ahmad v. the State of U.P. and Ors. AIR 1954 SC 728 . 26. Mr. Mishra rounded up his arguments by contending that the decision in Criminal Revision 14 (SH)/2002 was in a different context and does not lay down a legal proposition of uniform application and can at best be binding on the parties to that proceeding. He sought to reinforce this plea by relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Behram Khursid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay AIR 1955 SC 123 . 27. We have lent our thoughtful attention to the pleadings on record and the competing arguments. He sought to reinforce this plea by relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Behram Khursid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay AIR 1955 SC 123 . 27. We have lent our thoughtful attention to the pleadings on record and the competing arguments. The broad features of the polemic pertain to the power of the Syiems of the erstwhile Khasi States in the pre-constitutional era to collect tolls as a customary practice, subsistence and validity thereof thereafter more particularly in the face of the provisions in the Sixth Schedule for the administration of Tribal Areas comprehended thereunder and the vires of the 2003 Act and 2006 Rules so far as those relate to such prerogative of these traditional institutions. Whereas the Petitioners principally rely on the determination made in T. Cajee (supra), to insist that with the making of the constitution of India, all administrative powers of the Syiems of the then Khasi States including their limited authority to collect tolls on the transactions in the markets located within their jurisdictional limits ceased to exist and that thereafter cannot be invoked unless permissible under it (Constitution of India) and/or the laws framed thereunder, the Respondents maintain that the said power founded on the custom and as an inseverable adjunct of the administrative dominion of the Syiems and his Durbar as units of the local government has been saved under Article 13, 277 and372 of the solemn charter. As determinative it would be of the course of adjudication to follow, a decision on this prefatory segment of the lis is considered indispensable at the threshold. 28. The lucidity and the comprehensiveness of the factual recital embodied in T. Cajee, supra, prompt us to borrow therefrom in essence the sequence of events to project the factual backdrop. Before the country attained independence in the year 1947 from the British rule, their existed 25 Khasi States in the Northeastern territory thereof with equal number of Chiefs who were elected by the electoral college or the people generally, the process being confined in most of the cases to the members of certain families known as the chief's families. Hereditary succession was also countenanced. Hereditary succession was also countenanced. However, whether the induction to the office was hereditary or by an election, as a condition precedent for exercise of their powers, the recognition of the British Government through the Crown's representative was necessary which used to be effected by means of Sanads granted to them. The British Government, however, reserved to itself through the Crown's representative, the right to remove the chiefs in certain eventualities. Adherence to the prevalent custom and usages for the purpose of ascertainment of the wishes of the Electoral College or the people was inter alia stipulated. These chiefs were used to be under the control of the Deputy Commissioner of the respective districts. The paramountcy of the British Government having lapsed, after India became a Dominion following its independence, these chiefs established a federation and eventually by an instrument of accession accepted by the Governor General of India on August 17, 1948, they individually as well as collectively as the members of the federation acceded to the dominion of India and all administrative arrangements between the Government of India and the State of Assam on one hand and the Khasi States on the other were to continue till new or modified arrangements were made subject to certain exceptions as to judicial and administrative powers. With the making of the Constitution, the Khasi States merged in the territories of the State of Assam as catalogued in the first Schedule thereto. By Article 244(2) of the Constitution special provisions were incorporated in the Sixth Schedule thereof for the administration of tribal areas in the State. 29. In T. Cajee, supra, the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court was seized with an appeal filed by the Chief Executive Member of the United Khasi and Jantia Hills District Council preferred against a decision of this Court sustaining the challenge of the Respondent to the order passed by the Appellant in its official capacity placing him under suspension. This Court held the view that with the coming into force of the constitution of India, the Khasi States lost all existence as separate entities except to the extent preserved by it (constitution) and that the appointment and succession of the Syiems were never intended to be within the administrative functions of the concerned District Council which could act in that regard only by enacting laws with the assent of the Governor. The order of suspension was thus interfered with as it was not backed by any law framed by the District Council involved and assented to by the jurisdictional Governor. The Apex Court while tracing the transition of the Khasi States observed that with their merger with the State of Assam, the administrative powers of the chiefs there of had come to. an end and the governance of the States was to be thereafter carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Sixth Schedule to the constitution. On a detailed analysis of the various provisions of that Schedule, their Lordships propounded that the District Council thereunder was both an administrative as well as a legislative body and in terms of para 9 thereof these powers were vested in the Governor till it (District Council) was constituted. It was held that as the administrative powers of the Chief came to an end with the enforcement of the Constitution during the transitional period all such powers vested in the Governor and could be exercised by him under para 19 of the Sixth Schedule. It was noted that the initial appointment of the Respondent was as the Syiem of Mylliem made in exercise of such power of the Governor under para 19 subject, however, to the confirmation of the District Council as an when constituted. 30. The facts revealed that the concerned District Council, after it came into existence accordingly confirmed the Respondent's appointment and the terms thereof inter alia required him to conduct the affairs of his Elaka in accordance with the established customs and usages approved by it and in accordance with the laws, rules and regulations to be framed/made/issued by it from time to time. The power to remove the Syiem by the District Council on the ground of unsatisfactory discharge of his duties and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the Syiemship, or the District Council in general was retained by it Provision for the judicial power of the Respondent Syiem in accordance with the United Khasi and Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953, was also made. He was entitled to continue in that capacity unless removed from his office for any lapse of the kind as aforementioned on his part. 31. He was entitled to continue in that capacity unless removed from his office for any lapse of the kind as aforementioned on his part. 31. Their Lordships held having regard to the successive phases of the process of the appointment of the Respondent that he was an administrative officer appointed by the District Council by virtue of its power under para 2(4) of the Sixth Schedule and functioning under its control. It was held, on a scrutiny of Rule 30(a) of the Assam Autonomous Districts (Constitution of District Council) Rules, 1951, that in case of emergency, decisions with regard amongst Ors. to appointment could be taken by the Executive Committee of the Council subject to observance of die attendant formalities. The order of suspension was thus maintained and the determination to the contrary recorded by this Court was interfered with. Their Lordships, however, marked that meanwhile the United Khasi and Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Appointment and Succession) of Chiefs and Headman Act, 1959, had been enacted providing for the appointment of Chiefs and Headman as well as their removal and suspension. 32. On a reading between the lines, this decision does not seem to address in particular to the issue of collection of tolls by a Syiem or a Chief of the erstwhile Khasi States as a symbol of age long customary practice. The contextual facts bearing on the issues seeking adjudication did not warrant the attention of the Apex Court to that effect. The conclusion that with the induction of the constitution of India, the powers of administration of the then Chiefs of the Khasi States had ceased thus has to be construed in the background of the contentions raised and the issues answered. This finding as is evident from the decision itself is not extinctive of all the customs prevalent as it records that the Respondent Syiem after his initial appointment by the Governor and as confirmed by the District Council had been conducting the affairs of his Elaka in accordance with the existing customs and customary laws as approved by it (District Council) as well as in conformity with its Rules and Regulations in terms of his appointment. The essentiality of conformance with the existing customs and customary laws as approved by the District Council by the Syiem was thus recognised and recorded in the decision. 33. The essentiality of conformance with the existing customs and customary laws as approved by the District Council by the Syiem was thus recognised and recorded in the decision. 33. That the Syiems before the enactment of the constitution had a limited power of exacting tolls on the transactions in the markets within their administrative territories is admitted by the Petitioners. 34. In order to disinter the historical facts bearing on the administration of the Khasi States during the British regime, a limited insight into the empirical research works of a few celebrated authors of the contemporary time would be immensely beneficial. 35. Sir Keith Cantlie in his "Notes on Khasi Law" under Chapter 15 with the caption "Territorial Jurisdiction of the Chiefs of States" scripted thus: The words used by the Colonel Bivar did not refer to judicial power. He made his meaning clear in the case in 1874 of U. Ram Khasi on behalf of the Siem of Khyrim v. U Mon Lalu of Jowai, a British subject, "To obtain land tax from him for holding land for cultivation." He said- "It is to be observed that the Chiefs in the Khasi Hills States are not territorial sovereigns but elected democratic Chiefs and that they have no right whatever to the soil. Lands in the Khasi Hills, belonging to the children of the soil, are the property of the owner, for right to which he is answerable to no Chief and for which he pays no land tax of whatever nature and the only person who can demand rent for land is a proprietor who does as he thinks fit with his own and is subject to no control in respect of it. A Chief... is not a zemindar, he is, as I have said before, a democratic ruler and as such his power extends to the subjects and not to the soil. A State land tax is an unknown thing amongst the democratic subjects of the Khasi Hills States and as regards land and rights thereto the Chief is just on the same footing as any other individual of the commonwealth. The Chief Commissioner in upholding the decision of Colonel Bivar said: "Of late years it is admitted that the Chiefs have began to assume territorial jurisdiction and have been encouraged in so doing by the British Government. The Chief Commissioner in upholding the decision of Colonel Bivar said: "Of late years it is admitted that the Chiefs have began to assume territorial jurisdiction and have been encouraged in so doing by the British Government. But their acquiring territorial limits has clearly not yet entitled them to demand rent or land revenue from those who hold the land within those limits." The Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner decided that the Siem could levy the customary State contribution (pynshok or khrong) at times when he made the levy from his own subjects, but not land rent. The Governor in Council set aside these decisions and passed orders that people of Mawmluh who desired to cultivate in Cherra State must either pay the customary State contribution or, if they refused, must pay quit rent for the land. The decision may be open to criticism upon the question of right to impose a land tax, but it laid down correctly that if a State boundary has been fixed, a non-subject who occupies land within the State must acknowledge the authority over that land of the Chief and Dubar of the State. 36. The proforma of the Sanad issued to the Syiems by the Crown's representative in ratification of his election as such empowered him subject to the orders and control of the Deputy Commissioner of the District to decide any dispute that might arise between him and the Chief of any other Khasi State and also to adjudicate and decide on civil cases and criminal offences except those punishable under the Indian Penal Code with death, transportation or imprisonment for five years and upwards committed within the limits of the State in which his subjects were concerned. It required the Syiem to confirm cession to the British Government by his predecessors of all the lime, coal and other mines, metals, minerals found in the soil of his State, of the right to hunt and capture elephants therein on the condition that he would receive half the profits arising from the sale, lease, or other disposal of such natural products or of such right. He was thereby restricted, without the sanction of the Government from leasing or transferring or allowing to be leased or transferred to persons other than his Khasi subjects any land or lands within his jurisdiction. He was thereby restricted, without the sanction of the Government from leasing or transferring or allowing to be leased or transferred to persons other than his Khasi subjects any land or lands within his jurisdiction. Thereunder he was liable to be punished as the local government subject to the control of the Government of India, in case of violation of the conditions of the Sanad or use of oppression by him or for conduct repugnant to the established customs. 37. The following excerpts from the dissertation, "The Khasis" by Major P.R.T. Gurdon also look apt. The head of Khasi State is the Siem or chief. A Khasi State is limited monarchy, the Siem's powers being much circumscribed. According to custom, he can perform no act of any importance without first consulting and obtaining the approval of his durbar, upon which the state mantris sit. .... The Siem manages that State business through the mantris. although it is true that in some States the members of the Siem family have been allowed a considerable share of the State management. This latter arrangement is, however, a departure from the ordinary rule in the Siemships, and is regarded as unconstitutional. .... In the Khasi Hills there is no land revenue, nor are there any tithes or other imposts levied upon the cultivators produce. The land, to a great extent, is the property of the different clans and villages, although in some instances there are estates owned by private persons. The Chief is entitled to receive die income that arises from what are known as the raj or State lands only. All that the Siem usually receives from his people in the way of direct revenue is the State's subscription, or pynsuk. mentioned above. Even this is supposed to be a voluntary contribution, and it is not demanded in some States. This tax is nominally a collection to meet the expenses of the State ceremonies, but is really a means of increasing the chiefs private income. The contribution varies in amount according to the means of the villagers. The Siems principal source of income, however, in all the Khasi States is the toll (khrong). which he takes from those who sell at the markets in his territory. 38. Hamlet Bareh in his thesis "The History and Culture of the Khasi People" amongst Ors. The contribution varies in amount according to the means of the villagers. The Siems principal source of income, however, in all the Khasi States is the toll (khrong). which he takes from those who sell at the markets in his territory. 38. Hamlet Bareh in his thesis "The History and Culture of the Khasi People" amongst Ors. dealt with the duties and responsibilities of Syiems as herein below: VII. Duties and Responsibilities of Syiems. The sovereignty of the Khasi State is based on customary laws of the people of the country established since its inception and handed down form generation to generation. The sovereignty in further reflected by the general will of the people as may be exercised and expressed by them from time to time. The Syiem exercises civil, judicial and executive powers, in the past he was the highest court of appeal inside his Syiemship. although his authority was derived from and exercised by State councils (Durbars) sitting in judgment in his presence: and the verdict in his name is in actual a resolution and agreement of the Durbar. In all his executive actions, a Durbar of Myntris advised him. His executive action today extends principally to management of markets, supervision of prisons, arrest of wrong doers and criminals and collection of fines and imposts at various quarters in the State. It is his duty to inspect the far-off districts regularly, possibly once in a year, and on such occasions people pay their respect to him. He initiates measures to carry on welfare works for the people. Feudatories in the past consisting of Riots (in plains) and Bodos handed over to him collected revenue and other presents. The local authority gave him an escort during his royal tour in the areas. All these do not, however, constitute a stable form of maintenance. If the worst fate befalls him, the people make a special contribution to help him. "The Syiem does not legislate, does not judge, does not take action alone. The Khasi Syiem does not own lands; it belongs to people. He does not tax land holdings. The Khasi Syiem is much more potential figure in relation to his Syiemship than the British monarch in relation to his kingdom. The Khasi Syiem reigns, rules and judges albeit with his Durbar. 39. The Khasi Syiem does not own lands; it belongs to people. He does not tax land holdings. The Khasi Syiem is much more potential figure in relation to his Syiemship than the British monarch in relation to his kingdom. The Khasi Syiem reigns, rules and judges albeit with his Durbar. 39. Various agreements by the then Syiems in terms of the provisions of their Sanads and pertaining amongst Ors. to their day to day administration of the affairs of their Syiemship are compiled in the book "A Collection of Treaties Engagements and Sanads Relating To India and Neighbouring Countries" by C.U. Aitchison. 40. Coeval data as gleanable from the above celebrated works thus demonstrate the Syiem along with his Durbur to be an institution vested with civil, judicial and executive powers in addition to that of general administration of the respective areas or elakas subject, however, to the stipulations contained in the Sanads issued by the British Government in endorsement of the Syiem's Election by the inhabitants of his territory. The Syiem's staple source of income had been toll (Khrong), which he used to realise from those engaged in sale transactions in the markets within his territory. The approved practice of collection of toll by the Syiem on commercial transactions/dealings within his elaka from a distant point of time is thus discernible and established. Though there was no system of land revenue and the land to a great extent used to be the property of different clans and the villagers, the Syiem was entitled to receive the income generated from the Raj or State lands only in the form of direct revenue or pynsuk. 41. With regard to the challenge on the validity of the collections of toll and erection of toll gates by the Syiem of Nongstoin and Shirdarship of Jyrngam and Riangsih involved in CR 110(SH)/92 an enquiry report was submitted by the Extra Assistant Commissioner, West Khasi Hills, in deference to an order to that effect of this Court rendered therein. 41. With regard to the challenge on the validity of the collections of toll and erection of toll gates by the Syiem of Nongstoin and Shirdarship of Jyrngam and Riangsih involved in CR 110(SH)/92 an enquiry report was submitted by the Extra Assistant Commissioner, West Khasi Hills, in deference to an order to that effect of this Court rendered therein. The aforementioned enquiry officer elicited written responses from the various cross sections of the public as considered relevant and submitted his report on 3.7.1996 before this Court to the effect that such collection of toll had been in accordance with law, customary practice and convention in the areas concerned and that the construction of toll gates for the purpose of realisation thereof was with due permission from the appropriate authority. In arriving at this conclusion, the enquiry officer not only marshalled the materials collected in course of the enquiry but also referred to scholarly and explorative texts pertinent to the issue. 42. A single Bench of this Court by order dated 20.6.2000 passed in the above mentioned Civil Rule took on record the said report and disposed of the same. It, however, parted with the observation that the disposal of the writ proceeding on the basis of the enquiry report ought not to be construed to be a stamp of its approval for the collection of the toll by the Syiemship involved. Noticeably this Court did not reject the findings in the enquiry report, which in unequivocal terms endorsed the collection of tolls by the Syiem involved by way of long customary practice and convention. This conclusion understandably was relatable to the levy and collection of tolls in the post constitutional period. The existence and authenticity of this enquiry report has not been denied or questioned by the Petitioner either. 43. Another Single Bench of this Court in a series of Criminal Revision Petitions No. 14(SH)/2002, 15(SH)/2002, 17(SH)/2002 and 18(SH)/2002 preferred against an order of the Additional District Magistrate, Ri-Bhoi, Nongpoh under Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure involving closure and removal of illegal toll gates erected by the lessees of the Syiem of Mylliem on the State PWD Roads, held against the power of the Syiem to grant lease to the Petitioners therein for operation of such gates which as a consequence caused grave public nuisance. It was held that the Syiem had no jurisdiction or authority to grant lease to the individuals for collection of tolls on the National Highways or State PWD Roads as the same caused hindrance and impediment to trade and commerce guaranteed under Article 301 of the Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge held the view that such toll, which was in the nature of a tax or charge, would be valid if permitted under a legislation enacted or framed by the appropriate authority. As the Syiems were neither permitted nor authorised by any such law or by any State action to grant lease to the Petitioners, the operation of the tollgates by them was void. Considering the setting of the proceeding in which the above decision was rendered as well as the parties thereto, it is not of any decisive significance. 44. A plain reading of the relevant provisions of the Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills, 1937, the Khasi Syiemship (Administration of Justice) Order, 1950, and the United Khasi and Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953, bring to the fore the conferment of the police power as well as the authority of administering civil and criminal justice amongst Ors. on the Syiems within their jurisdiction from before the emergence of the Constitution of India The word Syiem is defined in Clause 1A of the Khasi Syiemship (Administration of Justice) Order, 1950, to mean the customary head of the Khasi tribal institution of an administrative area of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District known as the Khasi State prior to the commencement of the constitution of India as recognised by the Governor of Assam and includes Sirdars', Lyngdoh or Wahadadar as the case may be. By the said legislative instrument, the Syiems were endowed with administrative and judicial functions. The United Khasi and Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953, signify that these powers subsist even after the Constitution of India. 45. The definitions of "Khasi Siemships" and "Siemship", "Lyngdoship", "Sirdarship", "Wadadarship" or "Dolloiship" as provided under the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953, are very instructive. The United Khasi and Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953, signify that these powers subsist even after the Constitution of India. 45. The definitions of "Khasi Siemships" and "Siemship", "Lyngdoship", "Sirdarship", "Wadadarship" or "Dolloiship" as provided under the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953, are very instructive. (I)..."Siemship, Lyngdohship, Sirdarship, Wadadarship or "Dolloiship" means an area under the administrative jurisdiction of the siem, lyngdoh, sirdar, wadadar or dolloi, as the case may be, recognised as such by the Governor of Assam, before the commencement of the Constitution and thereafter permitted to exercise customary tribal functions under the supervision and authority of the District Council; (m)..."Khasi siemships" means an administrative area of the United Khasi Jaintia Hills District known as the Khasi States prior to the commencement of the Constitution; 46. All these coupled with the recorded attestations of the surveyed field works of the acclaimed authors on the topic as alluded hereinabove proclaim the existence of the long standing custom/usage of collection of tolls by the Syiems and their Durburs within their territorial limits and the continuation thereof even after the enactment of the constitution of India. Nevertheless, the legality of the practice and the validity of the exaction need be tested in the constitutional perspective. 47. The Government of India Act, 1935, which is the precursor of the Constitution of India vide Section 143 saved the duties and taxes levied in any federated state otherwise than by virtue of an Act of the Federal Legislature applying in the State. It provided that taxes, duties, cesses or fees which immediately before the commencement of Part-III thereof were being lawfully levied by any Provincial Government, Municipality or other local authority or body for the purpose of the Province, municipality, district or other local area under a law in force on the first day of January, 1935, would continue to be levied and to be applied to the same purpose though those were mentioned in the Federal Legislative List, until a provision to the contrary was made by the Federal Legislature. Noticeably such an impost levied amongst Ors. by a body for the purpose of any local area under the law then in force was also allowed to continue till a contrary provision was made by the Federal Legislature. Noticeably such an impost levied amongst Ors. by a body for the purpose of any local area under the law then in force was also allowed to continue till a contrary provision was made by the Federal Legislature. This assumes significance in view of the recognition by the aforementioned statutory local Rules/Orders in vogue, of the Syiems and their Durbars as traditional institutions with the power to discharge executive and judicial functions relating to their Elakas, including the authority to collect tolls on the commercial transactions in the markets thereof. The collection of such tolls by the Syiems and their Durbar under the prevalent custom/usage was thus saved by the Government of India Act, 1935. 48. Article 13 of the Constitution of India proclaims that all laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement thereof and inconsistent with the provisions in its Part-III would, to the extent of such inconsistency be void. Sub-clause (3) of the Article illustrates that laws would include ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India, the force of law. 49. In the backdrop of the above narrative, the custom or usage of collection of tolls by the Syiem and his Durbar, with regard to the duration of its continuance having attained the force of law, was thus clearly comprehended in the said expression. In view of the antiquity, continuity and certainty of the customary practice of collection of tolls by the Syiems and their Durbars as the factual backdrop demonstrates, it had by then ripened into law as comprehended in Sub-clause (3)(a) of Article 13 of the Constitution of India. Whether this custom is repugnant to Article 19(1)(g) to be rendered void or is saved by other constitutional provisions to withstand the scrutiny in the context of the guarantee of free trade, commerce and intercourse through out the territory of India is the next query. The fundamental right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business is not in absolute terms but subject to reasonable restrictions as envisaged in Sub-clause (6) thereof. The State is free to make any law imposing in the interest of general public, reasonable restrictions in the exercise of such right as enumerated therein. 50. The fundamental right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business is not in absolute terms but subject to reasonable restrictions as envisaged in Sub-clause (6) thereof. The State is free to make any law imposing in the interest of general public, reasonable restrictions in the exercise of such right as enumerated therein. 50. This specie of fundamental right is thus subservient to the legislative dominion of the State within the contours outlined and also any existing law pertaining to professional or technical qualification necessary for practicing any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business or any trade, business, industry or service carried on by the State or by a Corporation, owned or controlled by it to the exclusion, complete or partial of citizens or otherwise. 51. Article 277 as well permits continuance of the levy of any tax, duty, cess or fee being imposed immediately before the commencement of the Constitution by the Government of any State or Municipality or other local authority or body for the purpose of the State, Municipality, District or other local area notwithstanding that those impositions are referred to in the Union List until provision to the contrary is made by the Parliament by law. 52. Article 372 ordains continuance of existing laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution until altered or repealed or amended by a competent legislature or other competent authority, repeal of the enactments in Article 395notwithstanding. 53. The Apex Court in Darshan Singh (supra), while reflecting on the possible inter relations between a custom and law enunciated that a custom may either be (i) only judicially noticed or (2) legally confirmed and regulated whereupon it remains as a custom with the law only confirming or regulating it and (3) a statute may be passed on the basis of a custom whereupon it is transformed into a statutory right whereafter it would not be treated as a custom. Paragraphs 58 and 59 of the said decision with elaborations on this legal formulation embodied therein being of considerable significance are extracted hereinbelow. 58... In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn. Vol. 12 paragraph 443), dealing with effect of confirmation of a custom by statute it is said: 443. Paragraphs 58 and 59 of the said decision with elaborations on this legal formulation embodied therein being of considerable significance are extracted hereinbelow. 58... In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn. Vol. 12 paragraph 443), dealing with effect of confirmation of a custom by statute it is said: 443. Effect of confirmation by statute-Where an Act of Parliament has, according to its true construction, embraced and confirmed a right which has previously existed by custom, that right becomes henceforward a statutory right, and the lower title by custom is merged in and extinguished by the higher title derived from the Act of Parliament, unless the Act of Parliament merely intended to confirm the right as a custom. Where the custom has been so extinguished, the old rights do not re-emerge on the repeal of the Act or, it seems, at the termination of a temporary Act. It appears that the custom would not be affected by the repeal of the Act if the Act merely confirmed and recognised the custom. 59... However, the intention of the legislature and the provisions of the statute have to be carefully examined to ascertain the result. An Act of Parliament which recognises the existence and validity of a custom may not operate to create new statutory rights in favour of the persons or classes of persons who might formerly have benefited by the custom. Such a statute may merely have the effect of sanctioning the validity of the custom as a custom, without merging the custom in the higher title by statute. 54. The legally recognised axiom is thus if a statutory enactment recognises the validity of a custom, it would remain as such without being transmuted into a statutory right. The effect of such an enactment is to sanction the validity of the custom as it is. 55. Not only the observations of the Apex Court in T. Cajee (supra), about the cessation of all administrative powers of the Syiem with the merger of the Khasi States in the dominion of India do not having regard to the contextual facts therein conclusively evince the annihilation of the Syiem's customary right to collect toll which existed prior thereto, the attention of this Court has not been drawn to any enactment by a competent legislature or authority abrogating the same. 56. 56. The United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953, in particular affirms the continuance of executive and judicial powers of the Syiems and their Durbars without exception to any of his jurisdictional prerogatives hitherto enjoyed and or wielded by them. The time acknowledged texts referred to hereinabove suggest that the Syiems and their Durbars used to collect tolls for raising revenue to administer the affairs of their Elakas. Such exploits thus were not only within the purview of their entrusted assignments but wore an insignia of statutory and public duty. The long standing custom of collection of tolls by the Syiems and their Durbars with the retention of their administrative powers by instruments of law formulated from time to time was thus institutionalised so much so that the Syiems and their Durbars functioned as units of local self government entrusted with administrative and judicial powers over the Elakas concerned. 57. Having regard to the gamut of the legal and constitutional provisions referred to hereinabove, we are thus inclined to hold that the customary practice of collection of tolls by the Syiems and their Durbars had at the point of commencement of the constitution of India acquired a force of law and was saved by Article 372 thereof so much so that exactions continued to be valid in terms of Article 277. 58. The Respondents have pleaded the customary usage of collection of tolls by the Syiems from time immemorial as a substratum of their power of realisation thereof and the edifice of the Rules 2006. The Petitioner, to reiterate, with reference to the contemporaneous records has also admitted the existence of this right, however, limited to the transactions in the markets within the jurisdictional limits of the Syiems in the pre-constitutional era. A cumulative reading of the authoritative treatises cited hereinabove, the report submitted in CR 110 (SH)/92, and the Rules and Orders still in force, impel this Court to hold in favour of such a customary practice continued beyond the enactment of the Constitution. 59. No post constitutional law enacted either by the Parliament or the State Legislature has been cited repealing, annulling or superceding such customary practice so as to render it non est thereby. 59. No post constitutional law enacted either by the Parliament or the State Legislature has been cited repealing, annulling or superceding such customary practice so as to render it non est thereby. The order dated 10.10.2002 rendered by a Single Bench of this Court in a batch of criminal revision petitions referred to hereinabove to reiterate, was in a different context relatable to proceedings under Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and was not preceded by an exhaustive analysis or an interpretive survey of the progression of events from the days of the origin of the collection of such tolls by the Syiems and their Darburs vis-a-vis the legal provisions bearing thereon and thus cannot be construed to be a binding precedent on the issue. In view of the determinations hereinabove we respectfully disagree that the findings against the power and authority of the Syiems and their Durbars to collect tolls within the territorial limits of their respective Elakas. 60. The decisions of the Apex Court in Ram Krishna Dalmiya, supra, Khayerbari Tea Co. Ltd. and Anr., supra, State of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Jayaram and Ors., supra, have been pressed into service to buttress the plea that once a citizen demonstrates that a statute is transgressive of any fundamental right, the onus shifts on the State to establish the validity thereof. 61. The decision of the Apex Court in State of M.P. v. Thakur Bharat Singh relied upon on behalf of the Petitioner to highlight the enunciation that any law repugnant to the rights conferred by Part-III would be void. These decisions are of no avail to the Petitioner in the face of this conclusion. 62. The constitutional scheme delineated in Part-XIII dwelling on trade, commerce and intercourse within the territory of India though directed towards achieving an economic parity in the country by banishing regional or territorial barriers is visibly informed with the exigency that the freedom envisaged may require to be curbed or curtailed under certain situations taking into consideration the public interest. Liberty as such was accorded to the Parliament as well as to the Legislatures of the State under Articles 302, 303 and 304 to impose restrictions on such freedom of trade and commerce or intercourse between one State and Anr. by following the procedure prescribed in the aforesaid Articles. Liberty as such was accorded to the Parliament as well as to the Legislatures of the State under Articles 302, 303 and 304 to impose restrictions on such freedom of trade and commerce or intercourse between one State and Anr. by following the procedure prescribed in the aforesaid Articles. Thus though in the larger interest of the Union, on one hand free flow of trade, commerce and intercourse both inter State and intra State is sought to be guaranteed, the framers of the constitution were conscious of the local problems to be extended due weightage, if public interest so demanded as exceptions thereto. 63. The Apex Court in Jindal Stainless Limited (II) v. State of Haryana and Anr. (2006) 7 SCC 241 while elaborating on the ambit and purport of this schematic lay out, observed that the freedom envisaged in Article 301 is not one from all laws but from those which restrict or affect activities of trade and commerce amongst the States. Their Lordships elucidated that Article 301 refers to freedom from laws, which go beyond regulations which burden, restrict or prevent the trade movements between States and also within the State. While affirming that Article 301 was binding upon the Union Legislature and the State Legislatures, the Apex Court discerned the relaxations on the limitations clamped thereby on the power of legislations by these two entities. The relative scope of Article 302, 303 and 304 was illustrated. Their Lordships underlined that the inhibitions vis-a-vis the legislative power of the State in the context of the restrictions imposed under Article 301 and 303 was relaxable if regulations were called for to be applied by the State Legislature vis-a-vis the inter as well as the intra State trade and commerce in public interest. That such restrictions imposable by the State Legislature ought to be reasonable and subject to prior sanction of the President before introduction of the related bill however was emphasised. Their Lordships observed that whenever a law was impugned to be violative of Article 301, the Courts were thus required to examine the effect of the operation thereof on the inter State and intra State movement of goods which constituted an integral part of the trade. 64. Their Lordships observed that whenever a law was impugned to be violative of Article 301, the Courts were thus required to examine the effect of the operation thereof on the inter State and intra State movement of goods which constituted an integral part of the trade. 64. The implied limitation on the legislative jurisdiction of Parliament and the State Legislature ensuing from the guarantee of freedom of trade and commerce and intercourse as comprehended under Article 301 of the Constitution of India assuredly therefore is not in absolute terms and is pliable if exigent in public interest. Reasonable restrictions on such freedom thus can be imposed to espouse this imperative. The essential import of Articles 19(1)(g) and 301 of the Constitution of India is thus in apparent harmony. 65. The District Council in its affidavit has persistently underlined the essentiality of the check gates/toll gates/revenue stations to prevent illegal and clandestine transportation of forest and other produce from its elakas thus causing huge loss of revenue to the detriment of the State exchequer. Noticeably there exists no convincing material to confute this assertion. Though the parties are in issue about the location of such check gates/toll gates/revenue stations, no persuasive proof of the same being located on the highways having the potential of interfering with free flow of traffic thereon has been brought on record. Arguments as well have not been advanced emphasising on the prior permission of the concerned authorities of the Ministry of Surface Transport, Department of Highways, Government of India or any other authority in particular to be a validating factor in this regard. On the other hand the District Council has asserted that the check gates/toll gates and the revenue stations have been set up away from the highways and the PWD Roads, however, still with the approval and orders of the concerned State authorities: The Petitioner's plea that the check gates/toll gates and the revenue stations cause obstruction to the free flow of traffic on the highways besides curtailing the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse as assured under Article 301 of the Constitution of India, in the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, does not commend for acceptance. 66. 66. The administration of tribal areas in the State of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram as Article 244(2) of the Constitution of India predicates, is to be governed by the provisions of the Sixth Schedule thereto. Paragraph 2 thereof prescribes that there would be a District Council for each autonomous district with the composition as referred to therein. The powers of the District Council and the Regional Council to make laws as conferred by paragraph 3 thereof relate amongst Ors. to the appointment or succession of Chiefs or Headmen. The catalogued subjects, however, do not relate to revenue or tax. Para-8 of the Sixth Schedule confers powers on the Regional Council and the District Council to asses and collect revenue and to impose tax. Sub-para (3) and (4) of para 8 which are of formidable significance are extracted hereunder: (3)... The District Council for an autonomous district shall have the power to levy and collect all or any of the following taxes within such district, that is to say- (a) Taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments; (b) Taxes on animals, vehicles and boats; (c) Taxes on the entry of goods into a market for sale therein, and tolls on passengers and goods carried in ferries; and (d) Taxes for the maintenance of schools, dispensaries or roads. (4)...A Regional Council or District Council, as the case may be, may make regulations to provide for the levy and collection of any of the taxes specified in Sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) of this paragraph and every such regulation shall be submitted forthwith to the Governor and, until assented to by him, shall have no effect. All laws, rules and regulations made under Sixth Schedule by a District Council or a Regional Council shall have to be published forthwith in the official gazette of the State and on such publication shall have the force of law as is stipulated by paragraph 11. 67. The above excerpt would thus unequivocally proclaim the power of the District Council to levy and collect all or any of the taxes enumerated therein by making regulations to that effect. The items of such impost include tax on vehicles and on the entry of goods into a market for sale therein and tolls on the passengers and goods carried in ferries. The items of such impost include tax on vehicles and on the entry of goods into a market for sale therein and tolls on the passengers and goods carried in ferries. That such power had been conferred on the District Council in question and subsists as on date is not in dispute. The Petitioner too has accepted such investiture in favour of the District Council. 68. The preamble of the Khasi Hills Autonomous District (Nomination and Election of the Syiem, Deputy Syiem and Electors of Nongstoin Syiemship) Act, 2003, reveals that it provides for nomination and election of the Syiem, Deputy Syiem and Electors of Nongstoin Syiemship. This statute passed by the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council and assented to by the Governor of the State of Meghalaya in its prefatory recital discloses it to be enacted in the exercise of the power conferred on the said District Council under Clause (g) of Sub-paragraph 3 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India and of all other powers enabling it in that behalf. The Act 2003 apart from making provisions for nomination of the Syiem, his appointment, term of office etc. confers power on the Executive Durbur of the concerned Syimeship to make laws for the day to day administration in accordance with the customary practice and the provisions of the enactment. The Rules, however, are required to be placed before the Durbur Hima before the submission to the Executive Committee for approval. 69. Whereas Section 2(g) defines Executive Committee to be an Executive Committee of Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council, the Executive Durbar denotes a Committee consisting of the Syiem, Deputy Syiem and other members from amongst the electors and other representatives of the Syiemship, as may be appointed by the Durbar Hima and approved by the Executive Committee to run the day-to-day administration of the Nongstoin Syiemship. By Section 2(d), Durbar Hima has been defined to mean the General Durbar of the Nongstoin Syiemship consisting of the Syiem, the Deputy Syiem and Electors of the Syiemship including other representatives of the villages as may be summoned by the Executive Durbar. By Section 18, the Executive Committee has retained to itself the power to make rules subject to the approval of the District Council for carrying out the purposes of the Act. 70. By Section 18, the Executive Committee has retained to itself the power to make rules subject to the approval of the District Council for carrying out the purposes of the Act. 70. In exercise of power conferred by Section 13, the Executive Durbar framed the Nongstoin Syiemship Rules, 2003, providing inter alia for the collection of toll on all the goods entering into or going out of the market area within the Elaka of the Syiemship by the Syiem and his Durbar in accordance with the prevailing age old customary practice. These rules were approved by the Executive Committee of the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council as well. 71. The administration of Nongstoin Syiemship Rules, 2006 (also referred to as the Rules 2006), was framed thereafter by the Executive Durbar in exercise of its power under Section 13 of the Act 2003 clarifying that it would prevail in the event of any conflict with the Nongstoin Syiemship Rules, 2003. Its statement of objects and reasons discloses that the legislation was considered expedient to safeguard and preserve the customary practices prevailing in the Nongstoin Syiemship, which have been in vogue since time immemorial, and to make such provisions in matters relating to administration thereof. The preamble also embodies the said objective. The Rules 2006 define customary tolls to be those levied and collected by the Syiem and his Durbar on all merchandise in accordance with the established customs and I usages prevailing in the Syiemship since time immemorial enumerating the various specie thereof. Rule 12 under the title "Revenue Administration" engrafts the power of the Syiem and his Durbar to assess and collect revenue and to impose/levy customary tolls, royalty, fees etc. in accordance with the customary practices and usages prevailing in the Syiemship since time immemorial. The Syiem and his Durbar under Rule 13 is required to formulate and prepare the budget of the Syiemship indicating the anticipated income and expenditure for a given financial year. The said provision of the Rules also detailed the other incidental measures to be taken by the office of the Syiem and the Durbar. 72. The Syiem and his Durbar under Rule 13 is required to formulate and prepare the budget of the Syiemship indicating the anticipated income and expenditure for a given financial year. The said provision of the Rules also detailed the other incidental measures to be taken by the office of the Syiem and the Durbar. 72. A plain reading of the opening recital of the Act 2003 evinces that the enactment was not only in the exercise of the power of the District Council conferred under Clause (g) of Sub-paragraph 3 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India but also of all other powers enabling it to provide for incidental and ancillary initiatives in connection therewith. The legislation therefore cannot permissibly be limited to one only for the nomination and election of the Syiem, Deputy Syiem and the Electors of Nongstoin Syiemship but has to be construed also to be to effectuate the governance of the Syiemship to be prosecuted by them individually as well as incidentally. The Executive Durbar which is a representative body approved by the Executive Committee of the District Council and entrusted to conduct the day to day administration of the Syiemship has been invested by Section 13 of the Act 2003 with the power to make rules and to administer its affairs in accordance with the customary practices. 73. This empowerment is strictly not a delegation of the District Council's power to levy tax under paragraph 8(3) of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India but is an bestowal for formulating its (Executive Durbar) guidelines in accordance with the existing customary practices for effective and purposeful day-to-day administration of the Syiemship. The Act 2003 in unmistakable terms recognizes the subsistence of the customary practices, which as the Rules 2006 evidence comprehended one for collection of customary tolls by the Syiem and his Durbar as elaborated in Rule 12 thereof as an integral part of the revenue administration of the Syiemship. This endowment of the power under Section 13 on the Executive Durbar to make Rules for the regular administration of the Syiemship in accordance with the customary practices therefore cannot be construed to be a delegation of the essential legislative powers of the District Council to levy tax as envisaged in paragraph 8(3). This endowment of the power under Section 13 on the Executive Durbar to make Rules for the regular administration of the Syiemship in accordance with the customary practices therefore cannot be construed to be a delegation of the essential legislative powers of the District Council to levy tax as envisaged in paragraph 8(3). This is only an enabling provision for the Executive Durbar to formulate its working norms in conformity with the customary practices so as to execute its daily administrative activities pertaining to the governance of the Syiemship. The customary practice of collecting tolls by the Syiems and their Durbars having been determined to be saved by the constitution of India and assigned the imprint of law, neither the Act 2003 nor the Rules 2006 are liable to be adjudged to be repugnant to paragraph 3(1)(g) or paragraph 8 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India. Act 2003 is a legislation not only for the appointment or succession of Chiefs or Headmen as comprehended in paragraph 3(1)(g) but also to accoutre them and the institution which they constitute to perform the essential functions in the exercise of their roles pertaining to the administration of the Syiemship in consonance with the prevalent customary practices. 74. As these legislations are not in confrontation with the scheme adumbrated in the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India with particular reference to paragraph 3 and 8 thereof, impeachment as laid by the Petitioner cannot be sustained. 75. Two decisions cited at the Bar in this regard need a brief reference. In Hirabhai, supra, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court was seized with the challenge to the levy of water tax on the building of the Appellant on the ground that Section 169 of the City of Bombay Municipal Council Act, 1988, conferring the power upon the Commissioner to this effect was invalid inter alia on the ground of lack of competence of the legislature to enact that section. Referring to Entry 5 of the State list to the Constitution of India which amongst Ors. Referring to Entry 5 of the State list to the Constitution of India which amongst Ors. permitted legislation on local authorities for the purpose of local self governance or village administration, their Lordships, having regard to the plenary nature of the theme, held that if the legislature was competent to impose tax for the purpose of the local self government, it, instead of levying it itself, could confer that power upon the local authority. Their Lordships noticed in the contextual facts that the validity of the impost was not in dispute and that therefore the entrustment to the Municipality to levy the same could not be questioned on the ground of want of competence. The validity of Section 90 of the Central Provinces and Berar Local Government Act, 1948, was in assailment in Achchelal, supra. A resolution of a local authority, Janapada Sabha, Sihora, to impose annual tax and approved by the State Government under Section 90(2) was challenged on the ground that by enacting that section the State legislature had abdicated its essential legislative function. The Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, on an in-depth survey of the various texts on the law of delegation of legislative power and the authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court, held that when the Government of India Act, 1935 and the Constitution of India enabled the Legislature of a State to make laws on the constitution and powers of local authorities for the purpose of local self government, they authorized the Legislature to confer in the said local authorities, by such laws made for that purpose, limited powers' for making laws and imposing taxes. Their Lordships concluded that it was a case of entrustment by law of limited powers of taxation permitted by the Government of India Act, 1935 and the Constitution of India. The challenge was thus negated/repelled. 76. The following passage from "Statutory Construction by Crawford" is of insightful significance. Under the American system of Government, it is a cardinal principal that local affairs shall be managed and controlled by local authorities and general affairs by the central authority. It has been an immemorial practice for the central authority or general Government to vest some portion of the policy power in subordinate Government branches or municipal corporations for the local self-Government of such branches or units. It has been an immemorial practice for the central authority or general Government to vest some portion of the policy power in subordinate Government branches or municipal corporations for the local self-Government of such branches or units. Legislation delegating such power is not regard as a transfer of general legislative power but as the grant of authority to prescribe local regulations in accord with immemorial practice, subject to the interposition of the superior authority in cases of necessity. This does not violate the inhibition against the delegation of legislative power. In fact, it has never been held to entrench upon the rule of delegates non potest delegare. As a result, the State Legislature may empower a municipal corporation to make policy regulations concerning local matters to regulate public utilities locally, to make regulations for the local public health and safety and to levy taxes for local purposes. The delegation of such power by the Legislature to a municipal corporation does not divest the State of its sovereign right to exercise the power itself or to take it away from the local unit at any time it sees fit. And the same restrictions which rest upon the State Legislature regarding the delegation of legislative power and functions are also imposed on the political Sub-divisions or municipal corporation as to the powers granted to them by the Legislature. 77. "Local authority" in General Clauses Act, 1868 (as amended) is defined to mean a municipal committee, district board, body of port commissioners or other authority legally entitled to, or entrusted by the Government with the control or management of a municipal or local fund. 78. The above analogy for the institution of the Syiems and their Durbars, having regard to their multi faceted roles in the administration of their Syiemships as elaborated can be permissibly drawn. Though the provisions in the Chapter-IX-A of the constitution of India dealing with the Municipalities in view of Article 243ZC has no application to the tribal areas referred to in Article 244(2), the same would not be an anathema to the above proclaimed propositions on delegation of legislative power having regard to the statutory composition of the Executive Durbar of the Syiemship and the essential functions of local self governance to be undertaken by it with the Syiem at the helm of the unit. 79. 79. The impeachment of Section 3 of the United Khasi and Jaintia Hills District (Transfer of Land) Act, 1953, District Council of United Khasi and Jaintia Hills and Anr. etc., supra, was on the plea that the concerned District Council lacked competence to legislate on transfer of land under paragraphs 3(1)(a) of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India. The Apex Court, on a scrutiny of the text of paragraph 3(1)(a) upheld the assailment observing that the addition in the Preamble of the Act of the word 'transfer' amounted to an enlargement of the scope of the object and purpose thereof beyond the limits of the power conferred by the Constitution. It is in this context that their Lordships propounded that the power of legislation conferred on the District Council must be confined strictly within the limits prescribed by the plain language used. It was held that the subject of transfer was clearly beyond the scope of the law making power under paragraph 3(1)(a) of the Sixth Schedule and that therefore Section 3 was void. 80. The Apex Court in District Council of Jowai Autonomous Distt., Jowai and Ors. v. Dwet Singh Rymbai etc., (supra), while recognising the power of the District Council to levy tax specified in paragraph 8 of the Sixth Schedule observed that the same did not extend to any one or more of the subjects enumerated in paragraph 3 thereof. Their Lordships, however, clarified that though there was no specific reference to the power to levy any fee in respect of any matter mentioned in paragraph 3, having regard to the nature of such realisation, for services rendered, the power to levy the same ought to be necessarily implied. 81. The decision of the Apex Court in State of Kerala v. Madrass Rubber, has been cited in support of the proposition that a charge under a taxing statute can only be under the parent enactment and not under the Rules framed thereunder. 82. Whereas the decision in Saurastra Cement and Commercial Industries Ltd. and Anr. 81. The decision of the Apex Court in State of Kerala v. Madrass Rubber, has been cited in support of the proposition that a charge under a taxing statute can only be under the parent enactment and not under the Rules framed thereunder. 82. Whereas the decision in Saurastra Cement and Commercial Industries Ltd. and Anr. , supra, have been relied upon to reinforce the contention that "authority of law" comprehended under Article 265 of the Constitution of India signifies a valid law and not a colourable legislation violative of the fundamental rights or other constitutional rights guaranteed, the renderings in Gupta Modem, supra, Jayantia Hill Truck Owners, Association, supra, and Bishambhar Dayal Chander, supra, have been introduced to underline that any executive action of the State or its officers to be valid is to be essentially backed by a specific rule of law. 83. The proposition enunciated in New Delhi Municipal Council, supra, with reference to the power of the municipalities to impose taxes under Article 243X was held to be dependant upon their parent legislations for the bestowal thereof. Their lordships held that in case of municipalities within the State, they would have to be specifically delegated the power to tax by the State Legislature concerned and that the municipalities do not have any independent power to levy tax. That a subordinate legislation to be valid has to be within the scope of the rule making power provided in the statute has been sought to be iterated by citing the decision of the Apex Court in Kerela State Electricity Board (supra). 84. To endorse its plea that any curtailment of free trade and intercourse as guaranteed under Article 301 of the Constitution of India is permissible only by a State Legislation has been sought to be underscored by placing reliance in Shagir Ahmed, supra, and the Automobile Transport Company Ltd. (supra). Though there can be no dissenssus on the above basal time tested proposition, this is of no avail to the Petitioners in response to the impugnment to the Act 2003 and Rules 2006. 85. The Act 2003 enacted by the District Council as constitutionally empowered and Rules 2006 authorised thereby having sustained the challenge, these decisions do not advance the case of the Petitioner. 86. 85. The Act 2003 enacted by the District Council as constitutionally empowered and Rules 2006 authorised thereby having sustained the challenge, these decisions do not advance the case of the Petitioner. 86. In the wake of the above conclusions, on the various issues emanating from the competing contentions, the challenge projected against the power of the Syiems and their Durbars as involved in the related proceedings is rejected. Consequentially WP (C) 2398/2008 [WP (C) 131 (SH)/2009] and WP(C) 2421/2008 are dismissed. WP (C) 2275/2004 filed by the Syiem of Mylliem is answered accordingly. No costs. Petition dismissed.