JUDGMENT Being aggrieved by the judgment dated 27-11-2003 passed by XX Additional District Judge (Fast Track), Indore in Civil First Appeal No. 19/03 whereby the judgment and decree dated 11-10-2001 passed by VIII Civil Judge, Class II, Indore in Civil Suit No. 57-A/2000 whereby the suit filed by the appellant under section 12(1)(b) and (i) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act (which shall referred hereinafter as an "Act") was decreed, was set aside, the present appeal has been filed. 2. The appeal was admitted by this Court for final hearing vide order dated 23-3-2004 on the following substantial questions of law :- 1. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the appellant was entitled to an eviction decree under section 12(1)(a) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961? 2. Whether lower Appellate Court was justified in holding that appellant was entitled to a decree of eviction under section 12(1)(i) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 ? 3. Short facts of the case are that on 30-9-1983 an application for eviction was filed by the appellant under section 23 of the Act before Rent Controlling Authority alleging that the appellants are owner of the house situated at 36/1, Shankarganj, Indore in which respondent is in occupation of two rooms on ground floor as tenant @ Rs. 50/- per month. In the petition it was alleged that respondent is in arrears of rent and also the appellant requires the suit accommodation bona fidely, for which no alternative accommodation is available to the appellants. It was prayed that decree of eviction be passed against the respondent. The petition filed by the appellant was transferred to the Civil Court because of change in law. Appellant also carried out amendment in the suit and also prayed eviction under section 12(1)(b)(c)(e) and (i) of the Act. So far as section 12(1)(i) is concerned it was alleged that in the plaint by way of amendment that respondent has constructed pakka house, which is at a distance of 100 yard from the suit accommodation, which contains four pakka rooms wherein respondent is residing. It was alleged that respondent is not residing in the suit accommodation. It was also alleged that respondent has inducted her son in the suit accommodation as sub-tenant. 4. The suit was contested by the respondent by filing written statement wherein all the plaint allegations were denied. It was alleged that respondent is not residing in the suit accommodation. It was also alleged that respondent has inducted her son in the suit accommodation as sub-tenant. 4. The suit was contested by the respondent by filing written statement wherein all the plaint allegations were denied. So far as sub-tenancy is concerned, it was specifically denied by the respondent. It was alleged that Deshraj son of respondent was residing at Bhagirathpura, Indore near to the house of his in-laws' in tenanted accommodation. It was alleged that son of respondent now is residing with the respondent in the suit accommodation. So far as section 12(1)(i) of the Act is concerned, allegations made in the plaint were denied. 5. After framing of issues and recording of evidence, learned trial Court decreed the suit against the respondent under section 12(1)(b) and (i) of the Act and in appeal filed by the respondent, decree was set aside, against which present appeal has been filed. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant argued at length and submits that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court is illegal, incorrect and deserves to be set aside. It is submitted that since the respondent was in default in payment of rent during pendency of appeal, therefore, an application was filed by the appellant for striking out the defence of respondent. It is submitted that the application was allowed, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, decree ought to have been passed in favour of appellant under section 12(1)(a) of the Act. So far as section 12(1)(i) of the Act is concerned, learned counsel submits that the learned Appellate Court committed error in-setting aside the decree passed by the learned trial Court. It is submitted that after due appreciation of evidence recorded by the learned trial Court decree was passed in favour of appellant. It is submitted that the document Ex.P/1 is on record, which goes to show that the respondent is having a house. It is submitted that the respondent in her cross-examination has admitted that the accommodation which is in occupation of the respondent is having facility of telephone, which is bearing telephone No. 412164 which belongs to her son and she is residing with her son. It is submitted that Ex.P/1 contains full details of the nature of accommodation, which is owned by husband of respondent. It is submitted that Ex.P/1 contains full details of the nature of accommodation, which is owned by husband of respondent. It is submitted that the learned Appellate Court committed error in holding that the appellant failed to prove that the alleged house acquired belongs to the respondent. It is submitted that even if the property belongs to husband of respondent, then too, decree of eviction ought to have been passed against the respondent. For this contention reliance is placed on a decision in the matter of Shivnarayan vs. Narendra Kumar, 2004(2) MPLJ 344 wherein this Court held that if a wife or husband acquires a property and the other spouse if he is a tenant, has as a legal right by virtue of such acquisition to go and stay there, then only such a acquisition of premises attracts the provisions of clause (i) of section 12(1). Learned counsel further submits that so far as suitability of accommodation is concerned, is not required to be pleaded. For this contention reliance is placed on a decision in the matter of Dudhnath vs. Ashok Mahadeo, 1998(2) MPLJ 50 wherein this Court held that landlord filing suit for eviction under this ground is not required to plead the words "suitable for his residence" in his plaint and in case the pleading fulfils the requirement of the clause, an eviction decree against the tenant should be passed. On the basis of aforesaid position of law and the facts and circumstances of the case, it is submitted that the appeal filed by the appellant be allowed. 7. Learned counsel for respondent submits that after due appreciation of evidence on record learned Appellate Court set aside the decree which was passed by the learned trial Court wrongly. So far as section 12(1)(a) of the Act is concerned, it is submitted that the basic requirement of section was not complied with by issuing notice of demand, therefore, even if there was default in payment of rent, then too, no decree could have been passed against the respondent under section 12(1)(a) of the Act. So far as section 12(1)(i) of the Act is concerned, learned counsel submits that the requirement of the law which gives right to the appellant to file the suit for eviction was not fulfilled. So far as section 12(1)(i) of the Act is concerned, learned counsel submits that the requirement of the law which gives right to the appellant to file the suit for eviction was not fulfilled. It is submitted that initial burden was on the appellant to plead and prove that the respondent has acquired the accommodation which is suitable for his residence. It is submitted that if the initial burden would have discharged by the appellant then the burden would shift on the respondent, but since the appellant failed to discharge the initial burden, therefore, learned Appellate Court committed no error in setting aside the decree passed by the learned trial Court. It is submitted that the appeal filed by the appellant be dismissed. 8. So far as substantial question of law No. 1 is concerned, undisputedly no notice of eviction was issued by the appellant to the respondent demanding arrears of rent. It is true that there was default in payment of rent during pendency of appeal. Even if it is assumed that the tenant commits default in compliance of section 13(1) of the Act in a suit where the eviction is prayed on any of the ground except section 12(1)(a) of the Act and the defence is also struck off, then too, it will not entitled the Court to pass a decree of eviction under section 12(1)(a) of the Act. If the defence of the respondent/tenant is struck off, then the benefit of that situation can be given to the appellants only to the extent that no opportunity shall be given to the respondent to adduce the evidence to rebut the case of appellant on the ground on which decree of eviction is prayed. In view of this, this Court is of the view that the appellant were not entitled for a decree of eviction under section 12(1)(a) of the Act. 9. So far as section 12(1)(i) of the Act is concerned, law is as under:- Section 12(1)(i) - That the tenant has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, built, acquired vacant possession of, or, been allotted an accommodation suitable for his residence. 10. Thus, for obtaining decree under section 12(1)(i) of the Act what is required to be prove is that the tenant has acquired vacant possession of the accommodation which is suitable for his residence. 10. Thus, for obtaining decree under section 12(1)(i) of the Act what is required to be prove is that the tenant has acquired vacant possession of the accommodation which is suitable for his residence. In this regard the pleadings of the appellant is to the effect that the respondent has constructed the house which is 100 yard away from the suit accommodation, which contains four rooms where the respondent is residing. In support of this part of pleading, document which has been filed is Ex.P/1. Suit accommodation is situated at Shankarganj. Address of the respondent mentioned in the plaint is also shown as Shankarganj, while Ex.P/1 is a house situated at Gokulganj. In oral evidence adduced by the appellant PW/1 Jamnabai has stated that Ex.P/1 is the order of assessment of a house situated at Gokulganj, PW/1 has further stated that this house is in the name of Bhagwandeen, in which respondent is residing with Bhagwandeen and her children. Except this there is no evidence on the basis of which a decree of eviction could have been passed in favour of appellant under section 12(1)(i) of the Act. 11. It is true that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead that the accommodation which has been acquired by the tenant is suitable for his residence, but by adducing cogent evidence the landlord is required to prove that the house which has been acquired by the respondent is suitable for his residence. It is also true that for the purpose of passing the decree under section 12(1)(i) of the Act the accommodation which has been acquired by the spouse of tenant can also be taken into consideration. But in the present case the accommodation which has been alleged to have been acquired is situated at Gokulganj, while the suit accommodation is at Shankarganj. As per plaint allegation, alleged acquired accommodation is situated 100 yards away from the suit accommodation. It is nowhere stated that Gokulganj is adjoining to Shankarganj. In examination-in-chief it is stated by Jamnabai that the house acquired by the respondent is situated at Kandilpura, which has specifically been denied by the respondent. As per plaint allegation, alleged acquired accommodation is situated 100 yards away from the suit accommodation. It is nowhere stated that Gokulganj is adjoining to Shankarganj. In examination-in-chief it is stated by Jamnabai that the house acquired by the respondent is situated at Kandilpura, which has specifically been denied by the respondent. Learned Appellate Court has gone one step ahead in holding that even if it is assumed that suit accommodation is suitable for residence, then too, it cannot be said that it is relating to the respondent, as the complete name of husband of respondent is not mentioned in Ex.P/1. 12. Heard on LA. No. 5912/09 which is an application filed by the respondent under Order 41 Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code. This Court is of the view that for just disposal of appeal the documents filed by the respondent along with the application are not required. In view of this LA. No. 5912/09 stands dismissed. 13. In the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that after due appreciation of evidence learned Appellate Court rightly found that the appellant failed to make out a case under section 12(1)(i) of the Act, which requires no interference. Hence, appeal filed by the appellant has no merits and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.