Judgment :- 1. Heard the learned Counsel for the appellants and the respondent No.1. 2. Admit. 3. Heard finally with consent of the learned Counsel for the respective parties. The present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred challenging the judgment dated 16th October, 2009 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 1561 of 2009, whereby the Writ Petition preferred by the respondent No.1 was allowed and the appeal preferred by the respondent No.1 before the School Tribunal was partly allowed and the appellants/Management was directed to reinstate the respondent No.1 in service within a period of four weeks from the said date, failing which it shall start paying him monthly salary and further benefits referred to in the impugned judgment. 4. Brief facts of the case are as under:- The respondent No.1 was appointed as an Assistant Teacher on the post reserved for Scheduled Tribe on the basis that he belongs to caste “Halba”. The Caste Scrutiny Committee by its order dated 20th February, 2008 held that the respondent No.1 does not belong to the said caste 'Halba' and cancelled his Caste Certificate dated 28th September, 1981. Consequently, on 26th February, 2008 the appellants terminated the services of the respondent No.1. On 25th of March, 2008 the respondent No.1 preferred an appeal before the School Tribunal claiming protection in terms of the Government Resolutions dated 15-6-1995 and 30-6-2004. The School Tribunal dismissed the appeal preferred by the respondent No.1 by order dated 20th January, 2009. The Writ Petition No. 1561 of 2009 was filed by the respondent No.1 against the order passed by the School Tribunal. On 17-2-2009 the respondent No.1 filed Writ Petition No. 1900/2009 against the order of the Caste Scrutiny Committee rejecting his caste claim, which came to be dismissed by order dated 7th August, 2009. By the impugned judgment dated 16-10-2009, the Writ Petition preferred by the respondent No.1, challenging the order of the School Tribunal came to be partly allowed. Being aggrieved by the said judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, the present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the appellants. 5. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that the learned Single Judge has erroneously come to the conclusion that the respondent No.1 was entitled for protection of the service. Being aggrieved by the said judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, the present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the appellants. 5. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that the learned Single Judge has erroneously come to the conclusion that the respondent No.1 was entitled for protection of the service. The learned Counsel further submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to consider that the protection granted by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment reported in 2001(1) Mh.L.J. 1 in the case of (State of Maharashtra vs. Milind and others) was under Article 142 of the Constitution. The learned Counsel further submitted that the Division Bench of this Court in the Judgment passed in Writ Petition No.3590/2009, after referring the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as the Full Bench of this Court, came to the conclusion that the law declared by the Full Benches of this Court in the case of Ganesh Rambhau Khalale .vs. State of Maharashtra and others, reported in AIR 2009 Bombay 122 shows that observation made by the Hon'ble Apex Court granting protection to the petitioner in Milind's case was in exercise of the power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. 6. The learned Counsel for the appellants further submitted that a Special Leave to Appeal challenging the said judgment passed by this Court on 5th December, 2009 in Writ Petition No.3590 of 2009, came to be dismissed by the Hon'ble Apex Court by order dated 26th March, 2010. The learned Counsel further submitted that in fact the judgment impugned in the present appeal dated 16th October, 2009 was also referred to by the Division Bench of this Court while disposing the said Writ Petition No.3590 of 2009. The learned Counsel further submitted that, as such the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 7. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No.1, has supported the impugned judgment and submitted that the respondent No.1 is entitled for protection in view of the said Government Resolutions dated 15-6-1995 and 30-6-2004. He further submitted that the respondent No.1 is also entitled for protection in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed in Milind's case. 8. He further submitted that the respondent No.1 is also entitled for protection in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed in Milind's case. 8. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record, we find that the learned Single Judge was not justified in granting any protection to the respondent No.1 on the basis of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Milind and other, 2001(1) Mh.L.J. 1 . 9. This Court in the said judgment dated 5th December, 2009 has held that:- “8). Similarly, the three Judges' Bench of the Supreme Court in paras (5) and (7) of the judgment in Union of India vs. Dattatraya Namdeo Mendhekar and others (2008 (2) Mh.L.J. 720) has observed thus: '5. Milind (supra) related to a Medical College admission. The question that arose for consideration in that case was whether it was open to the State Government or Courts or other authorities to modify, amend or alter the list of Scheduled Tribes and in particular whether the “Halba-Koshti” was a sub-division of 'Halba' Tribe. This Court held that it was not permissible to amend or alter the list of Scheduled Tribes by including any sub-divisions or otherwise. On facts, this Court found that the respondent therein had been admitted in medical course in ST category, more than 15 years back; that though his admission deprived a scheduled tribe student of a medical seat, the benefit of that seat could not be offered to scheduled tribe student at that distance of time even if respondent's admission was to be annulled; and that if his admission was annulled, it will lead to depriving the services of a doctor to the society on whom the public money had already been spent. In these peculiar circumstances, this Court held that the decision will not affect the degree secured by respondent or his practice as a doctor but made it clear that he could not claim to belong to a Scheduled Tribe. But the said decision has no application to a case which does not relate to an admission to an educational institution, but relates to securing employment by wrongly claiming the benefit of reservation meant for Scheduled Tribes. But the said decision has no application to a case which does not relate to an admission to an educational institution, but relates to securing employment by wrongly claiming the benefit of reservation meant for Scheduled Tribes. When a person secures employment by making a false claim regarding caste/tribe, he deprives a legitimate candidate belonging to scheduled caste/tribe, of employment. In such a situation, the proper course is to cancel the employment obtained on the basis of the false certificate so that the post may be filled up by a candidate who is entitled to the benefit of reservation. 7. We are of the view that the High Court failed to appreciate the ratio of Milind. Having held that the first respondent had falsely claimed that he belonged to a Scheduled Tribe, it wrongly extended him the benefit of continuing in employment.' The observation of the Apex Court in the above referred decision clearly demonstrate that the person securing employment by making a false claim regarding caste cannot be protected merely on the basis of length of service in the employment once his caste certificate is invalidated by the Caste Scrutiny Committee and the proper course in such situation is to cancel his appointment. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that the observations made by the Apex Court in Milind's case were in the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case, which cannot be made applicable in other cases, since they were restricted only to that case. 9) Similarly, the Apex Court in Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala and others ( AIR 2004 SC 1469 ) has held that the observations made by the Apex Court in Milind's case do not constitute ratio decidendi of the said case, but are the observations made by the Apex Court in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution to grant relief in view of peculiar facts and circumstances of the said case. It is, therefore, evident that the observations made by the Apex Court in para (36) of Milind's case not being the ratio decidendi of that case was not the law declared by the Apex Court under Article 141 of the Constitution and, therefore, protection granted to the petitioner in the said case by the Apex Court was by exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution in the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case. 10) The Full Bench of this Court after taking into consideration the law laid down by the Apex Court in Milind's case as well as other decisions of the Apex Court referred to hereinabove, in para (13) of the judgment in the case of Ganesh Rambhau Khalale (cited supra) has observed thus: '13. Having regard to the legal position that emerges from the above referred judgments, we record the following conclusions and answer the question framed: (1) The observations/directions issued by the Supreme Court in para 36 of the judgment in the case of State vs. Milind reported in 2001 (1) Mah. L.J. (S.C.) 1 is not the law declared by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. (2) The said observations/directions are issued in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. (3) The said observations/directions have no application to the cases relating to appointments and are restricted to the cases relating to admissions. (4) The protection, if any, to be granted in the facts and circumstances of the case would depend upon the exercise of discretion by the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. As the powers under Article 142 are not available to the High Court, no protection can be granted by this Court even in cases relating to admissions.” 10. The judgment of the learned Single Judge impugned in the Letters Patent Appeal has also been considered by this Court in the said judgment dated 5th December, 2009, and has held at Paragraph 17, as follows:- “17. In the circumstances, the law declared by the Full Benches of this Court in the case of Ganesh Rambhau Khalale (cited supra) and Vandana Bharat Kauthalikar (cited supra) is a valid declaration of law on the subject and is binding on the other coordinate Benches, Division Benches and Single Benches of this Court.” 11. It is an admitted fact that the petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of this Court dated 5th December, 2009 came to be dismissed by the Hon'ble Apex Court by order dated 26th March, 2010 in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 7899/2010. 12. Considering the said judgment passed by this Court dated 5/12/2009, the learned Single Judge was not justified in granting any protection to the respondent No.1 on the basis of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Milind's case referred supra. 12. Considering the said judgment passed by this Court dated 5/12/2009, the learned Single Judge was not justified in granting any protection to the respondent No.1 on the basis of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Milind's case referred supra. The impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge as such cannot be sustained. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No.1 to the effect that the judgment in Milind's case is applicable to the present case cannot be accepted, in view of the judgments referred by this Court in the judgment dated 5th December, 2009. The learned Single Judge has committed an error while passing the impugned judgment dated 16th October, 2009 and granting protection of service to the respondent No.1. 13. In the circumstances, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment dated 16th October, 2009 passed in Writ Petition No. 1561 of 2009 is quashed and set aside. The Writ Petition No. 1561 of 2009 filed by respondent No.1 stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.