JUDGMENT T. Nandakumar Singh, J. 1. This second appeal, filed by the Appellant Plaintiffs, is directed against the judgment and decree of the first appellate court dated 3.5.1999, passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, North Tripura, Dharmanagar in Title Suit No. 34 of 1997 filed by the Respondent-Defendants against the judgment and decree of the trial court dated 22.12.1998 and 5.1.99 respectively in Title Appeal No. 1 of 1999. 2. Heard Mr. D. Chakraborty, learned Counsel for the Appellant-Plaintiffs and Mr. A.K. Deb, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent-Defendants. 3. By the impugned judgment and decree of the first appellate court dated 3.5.1999 passed in Title Appeal No. 1 of 1999, allowed the appeal filed by the Respondent-Defendants by reversing the judgment and decree of the trial court dated 22.12.1998 whereby and whereunder the learned trial court had allowed and granted the reliefs sought for in T.S. No. 34 of 1997 filed by the Appellant-Plaintiffs. The substantial questions of law formulated for decision in the present second appeal are: (1) Whether the original suit bearing Title Suit No. 34 of 1997 is maintainable in its present form and nature? (2) Whether the suit is barred by the law of limitation? 4. For the above two substantial questions of law, only the bare minimal pleaded facts of the Appellant-Plaintiffs and those of the Respondent-Defendants are noted: (i) That it is the case of the Appellant/Plaintiffs that the suit land described in the schedule to the plaint was purchased by one Amzad Ali, father of the Appellant-Plaintiffs, on valuable consideration by registered deeds, viz., dated 9.11.1349 T.E.(Ext-2), dated 2.12.1349 T.E.(Ext-3) and dated 26.3.1349(Ext-4) and since then Amzad Ali by constructing dwelling house in the part of the land and cultivating paddy and seasonal crops in other parts of the suit land, had been possessing the suit land. During the last survey operation Amzad Ali, father of the Plaintiff, was in the Jail custody in connection with a murder case and at that time all the Appellant-Plaintiffs were minors. (ii) Defendant No. 1, Amir Ali, is the step-brother of said Amzad Ali. During the last survey operation Amzad Ali, father of the Plaintiff, was in the Jail custody in connection with a murder case and at that time all the Appellant-Plaintiffs were minors. (ii) Defendant No. 1, Amir Ali, is the step-brother of said Amzad Ali. While the Appellant-Plaintiffs were minors and the said Amzad Ali, father of the Plaintiffs, was in jail custody, Respondent No. 1, Amir Ali, by concealing the said sale deeds for the purchase of the suit land and in collusion with the settlement staff, had entered his name and name of the Appellant-Plaintiffs' father, Amzad Ali, to the extent of half and half in the record of rights, i.e., khatian of the suit land. Defendant No. 1 in the year, 1968 crossed the Indo-Pakistan border and left India with his family and started living at Kulaura, P.O. & P.S. Kulaura, Dist. Sylhet, East Pakistan now Bangladesh. Afterwards in the year 1987 the Defendant-Respondents and their family members again came back to India from Bangladesh and started living temporarily for 4/5 months in the house of the Appellant-Plaintiff as the Respondent-Defendant No. 1, Amir Ali, who is the father in-law of the Appellant-Plaintiff No. 1, Md. Ilias Ali. Thereafter, Respondent-Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 started disturbing the peaceful possession of the suit land by the Appellant-Plaintiffs in the month of June 1993 even though they had no right and title over the suit land and also they had entered their, names in 50% share of the suit land. (iii) During the re-survey operation, the Appellant-Plaintiff No. 1 filed Objection Case No. 598 of Mouja Protyekrov under Section 43(1) of TLR & L.R. Act in the court of A.S.O., Dharmanagar, Revenue circle, but the learned A.S.O. vide order dated 23.9.1993 disallowed the said objection in respect of the entry of the name of the Respondent No. 1 in half share of the suit land. It is also categorically pleaded in the plaint that on 21.9.1994 morning while the Appellant Plaintiff No. 1 was doing agricultural work in the part of the suit land, the Respondent-Defendant had threatened the Appellant-Plaintiffs to dispossess from the suit land. 5. Appellant-Plaintiffs filed Title Suit; No. 13 of 1994 for declaration of rights and perpetual injunction against the Defendants along with a Miscellaneous Case No. Civil Miscellaneous 10 of 1994 against the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 for ad interim temporary injunction. 5. Appellant-Plaintiffs filed Title Suit; No. 13 of 1994 for declaration of rights and perpetual injunction against the Defendants along with a Miscellaneous Case No. Civil Miscellaneous 10 of 1994 against the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 for ad interim temporary injunction. Ultimately on 12.5.1997 T.S. No. 13 of 1994 was dismissed for default as the Appellant-Plaintiff could not appear before the learned court due to his illness. The Appellant-Defendant, having the knowledge of dismissal of the suit land for default, again tried to dispose the Plaintiff from the suit land and tried to trespass the suit land described in the schedule for their ulterior motive. 6. The Appellant-Plaintiffs, in their pleadings, had admitted that the Respondent-Defendants who are their relatives, are residing in the suit land. The Respondent-Defendant No. 1 also filed written statement wherein the Respondent-Defendant No. 1 categorically pleaded that the suit is barred by the provision of TLR & LR Act and also by Specific Relief Act, 1963. The pleaded facts of the Respondent-Defendants are that the suit land along with other lands originally owned and possessed by one, Md. Mansur Ali (grand-father of the Appellant-Plaintiff No. 1 and Respondent-Defendant No. 1) and Khursid Ali (brother of Md. Mansur Ali), as they got the property from their father, Abdul Ali. Ultimately the properties were partitioned amicably between the Mansur Ali and Khursid Ali. As per the said amicable partition, the suit land was in the share of Mansur Ali; after his death the said land was owned and possessed by his two sons, i.e., Amzad Ali and Amir Ali to the extent of half and half. 7. After the death of Amzad Ali, the Plaintiff Appellants became the owners in possession along with Amir Ali (Defendant No. 1) including the suit land. The suit land, is owned and possessed by the Appellant-Plaintiffs and Defendant No. 1 to the extent of half and half as per the mutual partition and demarcation; and the Plaintiff and Defendant are in possession of the suit land as per their shares. Accordingly, records of right regarding the suit land were prepared with the knowledge of the Appellant-Plaintiff and Respondent-Defendant during the survey operation and it is also the pleaded case that in the last settlement operation, records of right regarding the suit land was prepared with the knowledge of Amzad Ali and Amir Ali. 8. Accordingly, records of right regarding the suit land were prepared with the knowledge of the Appellant-Plaintiff and Respondent-Defendant during the survey operation and it is also the pleaded case that in the last settlement operation, records of right regarding the suit land was prepared with the knowledge of Amzad Ali and Amir Ali. 8. Regarding the first substantial question of law, the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents strenuously contends that the present suit is not maintainable in the present form as it is barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 inasmuch as even after clear pleading in the plaint that the Respondent-Defendants are in possession of the some portions of the suit land, did not seek the relief for recovery of possession in the present T.S. No. 34 of 1997. The reliefs in the T.S. No. 34 of 1997 are quoted below: The Plaintiff, therefore, prays for judgment and decree: (a) Declaring the perpetual injunction against the Defendants restraining them from executing and registering any transfer deed/deeds in respect of any part of the suit land in favour of any person till disposal of the suit; (b) Declaring that the Plaintiff is having right, title, interest and possession over the suit land; (c) Declaring perpetual injunction against the Defendants restraining them from entraining into the suit land and disturbing peaceful possession of the Plaintiff over the suit land and from changing nature and character of the suit land; (d) For correction of records of rights wherein Amir Ali has been illegally shown as 50% share holder of khatian No. 238/1, 238/2 under Mouza-Protyekrov, Dharmanagar, North Tripura; (e) Cost of the suit; (f) Any other relief/reliefs the Plaintiff is entitled to. 9. Since the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent-Defendants had placed heavy reliance on Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 for advancing his argument regarding the first substantial question of law formulated in the present appeal, it would be apposite to quote Section34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963: 34. Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right. Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right. -Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the Plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the Plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. Explanation: A trustee of property is a "person interested to deny" a title adverse to the title of some one who is not in existence, and whom, if in existence, he would be a trustee. 10. On bare perusal of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, it is clear that no court shall grand relief where the Plaintiff being able to seek further relief than the relief sought for in the suit. In the present pleaded case of the Appellant Plaintiffs, the Appellant-Plaintiffs have admitted that the Respondent-Defendants have been possessing some parts of the suit land, but the Appellant-Plaintiffs did not seek the relief for recovery of possession, which is a must for getting full reliefs according to the pleaded case of the Appellant-Plaintiffs. 11. Mr. A.K. Deb, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent-Defendants, in order to substantiate his argument that the present suit is not maintainable in the present form, i.e., the first substantial question of law, had placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Ram Saran and Anr. v. Smt. Ganga Devi, AIR 1972 SC 2685 wherein the Apex Court held that where the Defendant is in possession of some of the suit properties; the Plaintiff in his suit does not seek possession of those properties but merely claims a declaration that he is the owner of the suit properties, the suit is not maintainable. Paras 2, 3 and 4 of the AIR in Ganga Devi (supra) read as follows: 2. The fact finding courts, namely the trial court as well as the appellate courts have come to the conclusion that during the lifetime of Chhabili, she was in possession of a portion of the suit properties and the other portion remained in possession of the Plaintiffs. The fact finding courts, namely the trial court as well as the appellate courts have come to the conclusion that during the lifetime of Chhabili, she was in possession of a portion of the suit properties and the other portion remained in possession of the Plaintiffs. The further finding reached by those courts is that after the death of Chhabili Kuer, Ganga Devi took unlawful possession of the properties, which were in possession of Chhabili Kuer. They also found that Ganga Devi was not the heir of Chhabili but on the other hand the Plaintiffs were her heirs. 3. The courts below have come to the conclusion that the present suit falls within the scope of Section 209 of the U.P. Act 1 of 1951, and the suit not having been brought within the period of three years as provided in that Act, the suit is bared by limitation. The High Court agreed with that conclusion. In addition it held that the suit is hit by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. 4. We are in agreement with the High Court that the suit is hit by Section42 of the Specific Relief Act. As found by the fact-finding courts, Ganga Devi is in possession of some of the suit properties. The Plaintiffs have not sought possession of those properties. They merely claimed a declaration that they are the owners of the suit properties. Hence, the suit is not maintainable. In these circumstances, it is not necessary to go into the other contention that the suit is barred by limitation. 12. Mr. A.K. Deb, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent-Defendants has drawn attention of this Court to para No. 5 of the plaint which read as follows: 5. That during present re-survey operation the Plaintiff No. 1 filed objection case No. 598 of Mouja Protyekrov under Section 43(1) of TLR & LR Act in the Court of A.S.O., Dharmanagar, Revenue Circle. But learned A.S.O. in the said dispute case without any cause or reasonable grounds in violation of the law rule and norms passed order on 23.9.1993 and disallowed the said objection case. Now proceeding pending in the Court of Settlement Officer, Kumarghat filed by Plaintiff for correction R.O.R. of the suit land. But learned A.S.O. in the said dispute case without any cause or reasonable grounds in violation of the law rule and norms passed order on 23.9.1993 and disallowed the said objection case. Now proceeding pending in the Court of Settlement Officer, Kumarghat filed by Plaintiff for correction R.O.R. of the suit land. The learned Counsel contends that the Appellant Plaintiffs should have sought further relief for declaring the order of the learned A.S.O. dated 23.9.93 which rejected the objection case No. 598 of Mouja Protyekrov under Section 43(1) of TLR & LR Act as illegal. In the absence of such prayer/relief in the plaint of the T.S. No. 34/97, the learned civil court cannot grant the relief to the extent that the said order of the learned A.S.O. dated 23.9.1993 is illegal. In case the said order of the learned A.S.O. dated 23.9.1993 is not interfered with, the name of the Defendant recorded as owner of half share of the suit land shall remain undisturbed. 13. To the contra Mr. Chakraborty, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant-Plaintiffs contends that even if the relief for recovery of possession of the suit land is not sought for in the plaint of T.S. No. 34/97, the court could grant the relief to the extent of other parts of the suit land, which are under the possession of the Appellant-Plaintiffs. 14. In a civil suit, in the absence of the relief sought for in the plaint, the relief cannot be granted by the court by making out a new case inasmuch as the Plaintiff has to prove his case pleaded in the plaint for the reliefs sought for in the plaint. 15. It is fairly well settled that the party in a civil court cannot be allowed to travel beyond what had been pleaded in their respective pleadings so as to make out a new case wholly inconsistent thereto. The only pleaded case has to be proved and found. Reference: (i) decisions of the Apex Court in Messrs. Trojan & Co. v. RM. N.N. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235 ; (ii) Moran Mar Besselios Chaholicos v. Thukalan Paulo Avira and Ors., AIR 1959 SC 31 ; (iii) S.N. Ranade v. Union of India and Anr., AIR 1964 SC 24 . It is equally well settled that decision of the civil court cannot be based on the ground outside the pleadings of the parties. It is equally well settled that decision of the civil court cannot be based on the ground outside the pleadings of the parties. It is the case pleaded that has to be proved. Reference: Shodhari Rai and Ors. v. Suraj Prasad Singh and Ors., AIR 1954 SC 758 . Finding reached without proper pleading and necessary issues, it cannot be binding any of the parties. Ref.: (i) Smt. Nirmala Sundari Dutta Choudhury and Anr. v. Kumode Bandhu Deb AIR 1976 Gau. 58 and (ii) Mrs. Om Prabha Jain v. Abnash Chand and Anr., AIR 1968 SC 1083 . 16. In view of the settled position of law discussed above, this Court is of the considered view that the submission of the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant that the relief, which is not sought for in the plaint of the T.S. No. 34 of 1997 could be granted, is not sustainable in the eye of law. 17. For the foregoing discussion, the first substantial question of law formulated in the present second appeal is answered in favour of the Respondent-Defendants. In the result, this Court holds that the present suit, i.e., T.S. No. 34 of 1997, is not maintainable in the present form and the same is to be dismissed. 18. As the suit, i.e., T.S. No. 34/97 is to be dismissed on answering the first substantial question of law formulated in the present appeal in favour of the Respondents; further decision on the second substantial question of law is not called for inasmuch as it would be only an academic discussion. 19. For the foregoing discussion, the present appeal is devoid of merit and accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed