ORDER R.S. Jha, J. 1. The Petitioner has filed this petition being aggrieved by order dated 25.03.1996 and order dated 23.11.1995 by which two separate punishments have been imposed upon the Petitioner. 2. The brief facts leading to the filing of the present petition are that the Petitioner was working in the establishment of the Respondent-Bank as Senior Clerk/Cashier in Sohagpur Branch of District Hoshangabad. On 10.08.1990/15.09.1990 a charge-sheet was issued to the Petitioner levelling six charges upon him. The first charge related to misbehaviour with his Senior Officer, the second charge related to an incident when the Petitioner snatched and tore a draft, the third charge was of refusing to sign the manifold, the charge No. 4 was dereliction and negligence in performance of duty, charge No. 5 was to the effect that the Petitioner refused to carry out orders without being given the same in writing and the charge No. 6 was that his behaviour with his colleagues was not proper. 3. The Petitioner filed his reply to the charge-sheet and thereafter a duly constituted Departmental Enquiry was held against him and an enquiry report was submitted by the Enquiry Officer on 18.09.1995 in which charge Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 were found proved while charge Nos. 4 and 6 were not found proved. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report to the Disciplinary Authority with a recommendation for imposing punishment of removal from service. After giving a notice to the Petitioner the Disciplinary Authority passed the impugned order dated 25-3-1996 imposing a punishment of reduction to the minimum of the grade upon the Petitioner. It is stated by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that he did not file any departmental appeal against the order dated 25.03.1996 and has directly approached this Court by filing the present petition. 4. It is further stated by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that during the pendency of the first Departmental Enquiry a second charge sheet was issued to the Petitioner on 09.08.1991 levelling five charges upon the Petitioner all being related to misbehaviour. There were allegations against the Petitioner of misbehaviour with the Branch Manager of the Respondent-Bank on various instances and of leaving the office premises before the work was over by forcefully making wrong entries in the attendance register. There were allegations against the Petitioner of misbehaviour with the Branch Manager of the Respondent-Bank on various instances and of leaving the office premises before the work was over by forcefully making wrong entries in the attendance register. The Enquiry Officer submitted a report in respect of the aforesaid charges exonerating the Petitioner but the Disciplinary Authority recorded a desent note on 05.10.1995 and issued a notice in that respect to the Petitioner and thereafter by the impugned order dated 23.11.1995 imposed a punishment of withholding of one increment for one year non-cumulatively after holding that charge Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 stood proved on the basis of the evidence and additional documents on record. The Petitioner filed an appeal against the order dated 23.11.1995, which was also dismissed by order dated 14.03.1996. 5. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the impugned order dated 25.03.1996 imposing punishment of reduction to the minimum of grade and the second impugned order dated 23.11.1995 imposing a punishment of withholding one increment for one year deserve to be quashed as the impugned orders suffer from non-application of mind and non-appreciation of the evidence on record and also on account of the fact that the punishment imposed upon the Petitioner is grossly disproportionate to the misconduct alleged to have been committed by the Petitioner. The learned Counsel has also assailed the order dated 25-3-1996 on the ground that the punishment imposed of reduction to the minimum of the grade is not prescribed by the rules and is therefore contrary to law. It is also submitted that the charges per se do not constitute a misconduct and, therefore, even if they are found proved, no punishment could have been imposed upon the Petitioner. 6. Per contra, the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents submits that there is sufficient evidence on record to establish the charges against the Petitioner and that in view of the established charges the punishment imposed upon the Petitioner is commensurate to the misconduct committed by the Petitioner. It is submitted that this Court does not sit over disciplinary proceedings as an Appellate Authority and, therefore, the reappreciation of evidence sought for by the Petitioner is not permissible in law. It is submitted that this Court does not sit over disciplinary proceedings as an Appellate Authority and, therefore, the reappreciation of evidence sought for by the Petitioner is not permissible in law. The learned Counsel for the Respondents submits that the impugned orders of punishment being based on cogent evidence on record do not warrant any interference by this Court. It is further submitted that the penalty imposed upon the Petitioner by order dated 25-3-1996 is specifically within the purview of Regulation 30(c) of the Staff Service Regulations, 1980 governing the services of the employees of Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Hoshangabad, therefore, the petition filed by the Petitioner being meritless deserves to be quashed. 7. I have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the parties at length and have also perused the record of the Departmental Enquiry which has also been produced before this Court. 8. It is settled law that interference by this Court in disciplinary proceedings is limited to cases of no evidence, perversity and Wednesbury unreasonableness, as has been held by the Supreme Court in the cases of Yoginath D. Bagde v. Stale of Maharashtra and Anr. (1999) 7 SCC 739 and Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, (1999) 1 SCC 759 . 9. In the instant case, it is submitted by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that there is no evidence on record to establish any of the charges against him much less charges of misconduct and, therefore, the impugned orders deserve to be set aside. 10. The Respondents in the return have filed the entire proceedings including the statements of witnesses a perusal of which indicates that there is material on record to substantiate the charges against the Petitioner which has been analysed in detail in the enquiry report and in such circumstances as this Court is not required to reappreciate or reappraise the evidence and arrive at a different conclusion when the Disciplinary Authority, with due application of mind to the facts, documents and the evidence on record, has arrived at a conclusion which is reasonably possible. In such circumstances, the present case cannot be said to be one of no evidence or perversity. The conclusions recorded by the authorities are also in accordance with and in consonance with the documents and evidence on record and cannot be said to be suffering from any Wednesbury unreasonableness. 11. If. In such circumstances, the present case cannot be said to be one of no evidence or perversity. The conclusions recorded by the authorities are also in accordance with and in consonance with the documents and evidence on record and cannot be said to be suffering from any Wednesbury unreasonableness. 11. If. It is stated by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the punishment imposed upon the Petitioner is not prescribed by the rules and is beyond the purview thereof and as such deserves to be set aside. The learned Counsel submits that Regulation 30(c) empowers the authority to impose punishment of "degradation to a lower post or grade or to a lower stage in the incremental scale". It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the regulation only permits the authority to impose a punishment of lowering by one stage in the incremental scale and not to the minimum of the scale as the use of "a" before the words "lower stage" indicates that the lowering can only be by one stage. The learned Counsel has sought support for the aforesaid submission by relying upon a judgment of the Rajasthan High Court rendered in the case of Satya Narain Gupta v. UCO Bank and Ors. 2004 II LLJ 858. 12. The learned Counsel for the Respondents, on the other hand, submits that the rule permits the authority to impose a punishment of lowering down the grade of an employee to any of the stages in the incremental scale and "a" used in the regulation shall include the plural in view of the provisions of Section 13(2) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. It is submitted that the regulation empowers the authority to reduce the scale of an incumbent to any of the lower stages in the incremental scale. 13. In the case of Satya Narain Gupta (supra), the relevant regulation that was considered by the Rajasthan High Court in Paragraph 26 was in similar terms and provides imposition of punishment to reduction to a lower grade of post or to a lower stage in a time scale. The Court in Paragraph 47 went on to hold that the rule meant reduction by only one stage from the stage the Petitioner at the relevant point of time was working and not on the lowest stage. 14. The Court in Paragraph 47 went on to hold that the rule meant reduction by only one stage from the stage the Petitioner at the relevant point of time was working and not on the lowest stage. 14. I am in respectful disagreement with the judgment relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Satya Narain Gupta (supra). The issue involved in the present petition basically involves interpretation of the word "to a lower stage in the incremental scale" as the rule permits imposition of a punishment of degradation to a lower stage in the incremental scale. A bare reading of the regulation indicates that the words "a lower stage" are followed by the words "in the incremental scale". Contrary to popular belief "a" does not mean "one". On the contrary grammatically speaking "a" is an indefinite article and is not a definite one. One of the meanings assigned to it in the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, Seventh Edition is any or every. P. Ramnath Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edition states "a" is often used as equivalent to "any" (See: In re, Sanders, 54 LIQB 331). 15. In view of the aforesaid, the words "a lower stage in the incremental scale" can only mean to any one of the lower stages in the incremental scale. In my considered opinion it cannot be given a restrictive meaning or be interpreted as "one lower stage in the incremental scale". Had the rule making authorities intended to make the rule a restrictive one, they would have clearly stated by "one" stage in the incremental scale instead of making an open ended rule by stating a lower stage in the incremental scale. "A lower stage in the incremental scale" can only mean any one of the lower stages in the incremental scale including the lowest and that is the only meaning that can be assigned to the rule. In view of the aforesaid interpretation, I am in respectful disagreement with the judgment of Rajasthan High Court rendered in the case of Satya Narain Gupta (supra). In view of the aforesaid interpretation, I am in respectful disagreement with the judgment of Rajasthan High Court rendered in the case of Satya Narain Gupta (supra). At the same time, I have taken a view that the regulation empowers the authority to impose a punishment of lowering down to any one of the lower stages in the incremental scale and not to more than one lower stage at the same time, i.e., only one punishment at a time the reliance placed by the Respondents on Rule 13(C) of the General Clauses Act is misplaced and cannot be accepted. 16. As I have interpreted the regulation to mean degradation to any one of the lower stages in the incremental scale which also includes the lowest of the scale, in my considered opinion the punishment of reduction to the minimum of the scale imposed upon the Petitioner is within the purview of Regulation 30(c) of the Regulations governing the Petitioner's services and, therefore, cannot be found fault with as it is within the power of the authority to impose such punishment. 17. It is next contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the impugned order dated 23-11-1995 imposing punishment of withholding one increment for one year was assailed by the Petitioner in appeal which was heard and decided by the same authority of the Bank who had imposed the penalty and who is the Disciplinary Authority. 18. The Respondents, in rebuttal of the aforesaid contention, have stated that the Appellate Authority of the Petitioner is the Board of the Bank and the Chairman of the Bank who is the Disciplinary Authority of the Petitioner is also Chairman of the Board of Directors which is the Appellate Authority, however, at the time when the Petitioner's appeal was taken up for consideration by the Board, the minutes clearly state that the Chairman of the Bank excluded himself from the proceedings and in such circumstances in view of the aforesaid factual position, the contention of the Petitioner to the contrary also does not merit consideration as it is in fact the Board of Directors who have duly considered and rejected the appeal filed by him and not the Chairman. 19. 19. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case I do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned orders dated 25.03.1996 and 23.11.1995, therefore, the petition filed by the Petitioner being meritless is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.