JUDGMENT Hon’ble D.P. Singh, J.—Heard counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner-landlord filed an application for release under Section 21 (1) (a) and (b) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (here-in-after referred to as the Act) on 25.9.1994 with the allegation that he had purchased the disputed shop in which the petitioner was a tenant at a Rs. 36/- per month vide registered sale deed dated 29.5.1981 and the same is required for his own occupation after demolition and reconstruction. It was also pleaded that the disputed shop was in a dilapidated condition which otherwise also required demolition. 3. After the parties had led evidence, the Prescribed Authority rejected the application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act on the ground that six months notice was not given in accordance to the proviso 1st to the Section before filing the release application. However, it recorded categorical finding that the premises were in a dilapidated condition requiring demolition and reconstruction. The respondent-tenant preferred Rent Appeal No. 1 of 1993 and the appeal has been allowed holding that neither there was any averment to show that the shop was in such a condition that it could not be repaired nor there was any such evidence to show that it required demolition. 4. This petition is directed against the appellate order dated 16.5.2000 and that of the trial Court’s order by which the application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act has been rejected. 5. It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that the appellate authority erred in law in holding that since none of the witnesses had stated that it could not be repaired, despite Commissioner’s report otherwise, therefore finding is vitiated. However, learned counsel for the respondents, relying upon decision of this Court rendered in the case of Smt. Chando Devi and others v. The IIIrd Additional District Judge, Mathura and others, 1984 ARC 10, has contended that the word “demolition” and “reconstruction” as used in the Section denotes that the building should be beyond repairs. 6. No doubt, as held in Chanddo Devi (supra) merely because the premises is old or is in dilapidated condition, that by itself cannot be a ground for release unless it is found that it was beyond repairs. 7. 6. No doubt, as held in Chanddo Devi (supra) merely because the premises is old or is in dilapidated condition, that by itself cannot be a ground for release unless it is found that it was beyond repairs. 7. Both the Courts below have considered the evidence on record including Commissioner’s report submitted in a case filed by the respondent-tenant, which has also been proved in the present proceeding. The report discloses that, apart from the fact that the premises has been found to be in a dilapidated condition with cracks over walls and plaster having fallen down together crumbling wooden planks, it has also found that the room of the shop has sagged by about 2 c.m. It has also been found that the walls have moved from its original place. It is evident from the record that the construction is of lime mixture. The roof of a building is most important part and once it has sagged by 2 c.m., it cannot be said that it can be repaired or reconstructed even by replacing wooden planks. Apart from shifting of the walls, roof has caved in, it cannot but be said that it was beyond repairs. Therefore, on the material on record, the Prescribed Authority was fully justified in holding that the premises was needed for demolition and reconstruction. 8. However, it is contended on behalf of the respondent-tenant that even till now, about 26 years from the date of filing of the application, the roof has not fallen down, would not improve the situation. There should be a reasonable bonafide apprehension supported by evidence that the construction would fall if not demolished in a controlled condition. Merely because, luckily it still stands today, it does not mean that the landlord has to wait for the day when it actually collapses. In fact, after 26 years of the filing of the application, it would further have deteriorated as there is nothing on record to show that any repairs were carried out in the meantime. Thus, for all the reasons above, the Court is of the opinion, that on the present set of facts, the appellate Court was not justified in setting aside the finding recorded by the trial Court and therefore the argument of the counsel for the petitioner is well founded. 9. There is yet another facet to the case. Thus, for all the reasons above, the Court is of the opinion, that on the present set of facts, the appellate Court was not justified in setting aside the finding recorded by the trial Court and therefore the argument of the counsel for the petitioner is well founded. 9. There is yet another facet to the case. The trial Court has refused to consider the application for release under clause (a) on the ground that six months notice was not given before filing of the release application. It has to be kept in mind that the Section says that notice is required if the application is to be filed within three years of the purchase of the building. In the present case, admittedly, the building was purchased on 29.5.1981 while release application was filed on 25.9.1984 i.e. after more than three years of its purchase. The Apex Court in the case of Anwar Hasan Khan v. Mohd. Shafi, (2002 ALJ 758) has approved the decision of this Court that no notice is required under the proviso to the section if the release application is filed after the period of three years from the date of purchase. However, as the petition is being allowed, it would not be necessary to consider this aspect any further and that too after 26 years. 10. For the reasons above, this petition succeeds and is allowed and the impugned appellate judgment dated 16.5.2000 is hereby quashed that of the Prescribed Authority is restored. No order as to cost. ————