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2010 DIGILAW 649 (HP)

JANABA RAM v. STATE OF H. P.

2010-03-31

KULDIP SINGH

body2010
JUDGMENT Kuldip Singh, J.(Oral)-The plaintiffs have come in appeal against judgment; decree dated 1.12.1999 passed by learned District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala in Civil Appeal No.106-P/XIII/99, modifying, judgment, decree dated 26.5.1999 passed by learned Sub Judge Ist Class (1), Palampur in Civil Suit No.148/93. 2. The facts in brief are that Chhinju Ram predecessor-in-interest of appellants had allegedly constructed his cow-shed and house over the suit land, more specifically detailed in the plaint. The further case in the plaint is that above the aforesaid cow-shed and house there was a veranda/courtyard of Chhinju Ram on the back side of the house. Chhinju Ram had also planted fruit trees on the suit land. It was pleaded that suit land vested wrongly in the State. The possession of Chhinju Ram over the suit land was claimed since 1947-48 to the knowledge of respondent. A plea of acquisition of title by way of adverse possession has also been raised in the plaint. It has been alleged that for the purpose of construction of Holta/Chadhiar road, H.P. Public Works Department had forcibly demolished a part of the retaining wall and courtyard of Chhinju Ram, as a result of which a loss of Rs.1,00,000/- was caused to him. The suit was filed for declaration that Chhinju Ram had become owner in possession of the suit land by way of adverse possession or in alternative by operation of law. It has also been pleaded that Chhinju Ram was entitled to compensation for acquisition of the land. 4. The suit was contested by the State by filing written statement in which objections of valuation, cause of action, maintainability, estoppel and lack of notice under Section 80 CPC were taken. On merits, it has been pleaded that the suit land was rightly recorded in the ownership of State of H.P. The suit land was shamlat. It was denied that predecessor-in-interest of appellants was in adverse possession of the suit land. The acquisition of a part of suit land was not denied. The possession of predecessor-in-interest of the appellants on the suit land was that of an encroacher. The replication was filed, in which stand taken in the plaint was reiterated. 5. The learned trial Court decreed the suit on 26.5.1999 and Chhinju Ram was declared owner in possession of the suit land. 6. The possession of predecessor-in-interest of the appellants on the suit land was that of an encroacher. The replication was filed, in which stand taken in the plaint was reiterated. 5. The learned trial Court decreed the suit on 26.5.1999 and Chhinju Ram was declared owner in possession of the suit land. 6. It was also observed that since a part of the suit land was acquired by the State of H.P. therefore, Chhinju Ram was entitled to compensation in accordance with law. The judgment dated 26.5.1999 was assailed in appeal. The learned lower Appellate Court vide judgment, decree dated 1.12.1999 accepted the appeal to the extent that plaintiff was held not entitled to the relief of declaration as ordered by the learned trial Court. However, the suit was partly decreed restraining the respondent from interfering with the possession of the appellants over the suit land, otherwise than in due course of law. The judgment, decree dated 1.12.1999 has been assailed by way of second appeal by appellants sons of Chhinju Ram. The second appeal has been admitted on following substantial question of law:- “Whether, in the facts and the circumstances of the case, the suit land vested in the respondent under the provisions of the H.P. Village Common Lands Vesting and Utilization Act, 1974?” 7. I have heard Mr. Dharamvir Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. P.K. Sharma, learned Addl. Advocate General for the State and have also gone through the record. In the plaint it was pleaded that possession of the plaintiff on the suit land was since 1947-48. The suit land could not have vested in the Gram Panchayat and consequently in the State of H.P. The respondent has taken the stand in the written statement that the suit land has rightly been vested in the State of H.P. The respondent has also taken objection of maintainability of the suit. 8. The question raised by the appellants is with respect to vesting of suit land in the State under H.P. Village Common Lands (Vesting and Utilization) Act, 1974 (for short Act). 8. The question raised by the appellants is with respect to vesting of suit land in the State under H.P. Village Common Lands (Vesting and Utilization) Act, 1974 (for short Act). in Dalip Singh and others vs. State of H.P. and others 1992 (1) SLC 320 it has been held that primary relief claimed by the plaintiffs with regard to declaration of their rights as owners cannot be gone into in view of the jurisdictional bar created under section 10 of the Act for which appropriate forum would be the Collector as observed in Gram Panchayat Khunyara’s case. In other words in Dalip Singh (supra) the civil court has no jurisdiction to go into the question whether land has vested in the State under the Act. 9. The appellants in the plaint has precisely raised the question of vestment of suit land in the State, therefore, the civil court has no jurisdiction to go into this question. The learned District Judge has found the possession of appellants on the suit land and after modifying the judgment, decree passed by learned trial Court has protected the possession of the appellants on the suit land when he has decreed the suit of the appellants by granting them decree of prohibitory injunction restraining the respondent from interfering in the possession of the appellants on the suit land in any manner whatsoever, otherwise than in due course of law. The findings recorded by the learned District Judge emerge from the evidence on record. There is no perversity in the impugned judgment, decree. The substantial question of law is answered to the effect that civil court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of vestment of land in the State under the Act. 11. No other point was urged. 12. The result of the above discussion, appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.