JUDGMENT V. GOPALA GOWDA, C.J. : In these writ petitions, the petitioners have challenged the constitutional validity of the Orissa Special Courts Act, 2006 and the Rules framed thereunder urging various facts and legal grounds. 2. Brief Facts in nutshell are stated as under: The petitioner in each of the writ petitions is accused of offence punishable under Section 13 (2) read with Section 13 (1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Originally each one of the petitioners case was pending either in the Court of Special Judge, Vigilance at Bhubaneswar or Cuttack or other places in the State. After establishment of the Special Courts pursuant to the notification issued by the State Government establishing Special Courts, the case of the petitioners were transferred to the respective Special Judge of the Special Courts established under the Orissa Special Courts Act. 3. The Orissa Special Courts Act has been passed by the Orissa Legislative Assembly and the same has been assented to by the President of India on 19.9.2007 and published in the Extra ordinary Orissa Gazette on 15.10.2007. The State Government in exercise of its power conferred under Section 24 of the Orissa Special Courts Act, 2007, has framed rules called the Orissa Special Court Rules, 2007 (hereinafter called as ‘the Rules’ in short). The Rules specified the form of declaration. The State Government represented by the Home Department in exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of the Act issued declaration vide Annexure-1 in each of the cases which was published in the Extra Ordinary Orissa Gazette on various dates. 4. The grounds of attack of the provisions of the Act and the Rules are briefly stated and the legal submissions made in support of the same are adverted to in this judgment. 5. The provisions of the Act in not defining as to who is holding “high public or political office” and defining the same in the Rules is not permissible in law. The provisions of the Act and the Rules are unworkable on account of which there would be arbitrariness and discrimination in issuing the declaration in Form I. It is further urged that the Special Courts Act is pro¬spective in nature and not applicable to the pending cases in the Court of the Special Judges prior to 15.10.2007 when the impugned Act came into operation. The entire Rules framed thereunder and the declarations issued pursuant to the Act are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The provisions of Section 2 (a) and 2 (e) are violative of Article 235 of the Constitution. Sections 4 and 9 of the Act are violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. Further the provisions contained in Chapter III of the Act are in contravention of the Constitutional provisions of Articles 14, 21(2) and (3) of the Constitution and apart from the same they are also violative of the principles of natural jus¬tice. We have heard Shri H.K. Mund, Mr. L.N. Patnaik, Mr. G.N. Mohapatra and Mr. Pradipta Mohanty, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in this batch of writ petitions and Mr. Balaram Rout, the petitioner in W.P.Crl. No. 390 of 2008 in person. They raised more or less similar contentions. Leading the argument, Shri Mund placing reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta and others, (2009) 1 SCC 516 and Paragraph 630 of the Halsbury’s Laws of England, Third Edition, 1961 Volume 36 contended that the Act is a penal statute and exproprietory in nature in view of the provisions introduced for confiscation of monies and properties of the accused under Chapter III. Therefore, the said provisions are required to be strictly construed in view of the interpretation made by the Supreme Court in R. Kalyani (supra) and according to paragraph 630 Halsbury’s Laws of England referred to above, which interpreted that a statute is to be regarded as penal for the purposes of construction if it imposes a fine, penalty or forfei¬ture other than a penalty in the nature of liquidated damages, or other penalties which are in the nature of civil remedies. The general rule is that the same has to be strictly construed and should not be extended beyond their clear meaning. The provisions of Sections 4, 12, 13, 14 to 16 and 18 of the impugned Act are stated to be procedural in nature and the provisions of Section 3 and 15 thereof cannot be said to be procedural but substantive. The provisions of Sections 4, 12, 13, 14 to 16 and 18 of the impugned Act are stated to be procedural in nature and the provisions of Section 3 and 15 thereof cannot be said to be procedural but substantive. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was enacted by the Parliament to provide a special jurisdiction to the persons who are facing the prosecution under the provisions of the said Act by trying their cases by the Special Judges appointed by the Central/State Government for such area or areas or for such case or group of cases as may be specified in the notification with a view to expedite the proceedings and for achieving day to day trial of cases. The Act amongst other things discourages stay of proceedings of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Prevention of Corruption Act being a complete code in itself, is applicable to all corruption cases, whereas the State Act is confined to cases of corruption under Section 13 (1)(e) of the Central Act against holder of high public and political office. The provision of Section 5 neither describes nor defines the same. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that in the absence of definition of “high public and political office”, it is the duty of the Court to interpret the expression or the provisions through internal or external aids provided in the legislation only if the expression or the provision could be so interpreted, otherwise the Court would be left with no alterna¬tive but to strike down the provision as being unworkable. Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Utkal Contractors and Journey v. State of Orissa, AIR 1987 S.C. 1954 in support of the proposition of law wherein the apex Court made certain general observation regarding the interpretation of the statute that a statute is best understood if we know the reason for it the same being safest guide to its interpretation. In support of the said contention, he placed reliance upon the Constitution Bench decision in Burrakur Coal Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1961 S.C. 954 . In support of the said contention, he placed reliance upon the Constitution Bench decision in Burrakur Coal Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1961 S.C. 954 . It is further urged that when the Act omitted to describe or define the past holders of “high public or political office”, the Rules, 2007 defines the same in Rule 2 (1)(e) and (f) respectively to cure the provisions of the Act which is not permissible in law, for the reason that the defini¬tion provided by the Rules cannot govern the provision of the Act as it is being a superior legislation, the rules are subordinate legislation framed by the State Government. Therefore, the im¬pugned Act is vague without giving the definition of “high public and political office”. Therefore, the State Government in defin¬ing the said office in the aforesaid Rules in exercise of its rule making power has exceeded its jurisdiction which is not provided in the State. Therefore, the provisions of the Act are vague and are liable to be struck down. 6. In support of the aforesaid contentions, a passage from the Halsbury’s Laws of England was quoted by the Apex Court in the case of Hotel Balaji and others v. State of A.P. and others, AIR 1993 SC 1048 (paras 29-30). It is further contended that in the absence of anything mentioned in the statement of objects and reasons, headings, marginal notes or preamble portion of the Act giving any indication as to what is meant by the State Legisla¬ture, when it used the expression “persons who held high public and political office” in Section 5 of the Special Courts Act, the omission cannot be supplied through any purposive interpretation given by he Court. For this reason also, the Act needs to be struck down as it is vague and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 7. In the Act there is vagueness with regard to the juris¬diction of the Special Court over any “local area” or otherwise, remains unknown. The same is contrary to the well known principle that jurisdiction of a Court or a Judge implies the competence of such Court or a Judge to entertain and decide a disputed question of fact or law. In the absence of the same, once again the provi¬sions of the Act suffer from vagueness. The same is contrary to the well known principle that jurisdiction of a Court or a Judge implies the competence of such Court or a Judge to entertain and decide a disputed question of fact or law. In the absence of the same, once again the provi¬sions of the Act suffer from vagueness. A comparison between the provision of Section 3 (1) of the Central Act and Section 3 (1) of the State Act would clearly go to show that the Central Legis¬lature required a notification by the Central or the State Gov¬ernment to make it clear as to class or classes, group or group of persons and the area or areas that were being covered by the jurisdiction of the Special Judges appointed for the purpose whereas the State Act in the corresponding Section 3 (1) requires the State Government to make a notification for appointment of Special Courts, without further specifying the class or classes, group or group of persons, area or the areas or the territory of territories intended to be brought within the purview of the jurisdiction of such Courts. The same is further confounded by Rule 3(2) of the Rules which is not provided in the Statute. Therefore, the same is not permissible in law. Hence, the im¬pugned Act is liable to be struck down. 8. The definition of the term “offence” is incomplete as could be seen from Section 2(d) as it is simply stated that the said offence is punishable under Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act. Section 13(1)(e) of the P.C. Act defines the offence and the penal consequence is being provided in Section 13(2) of the Act. Therefore, any charge for an offence which does not mention the penal consequence will be illegal. Hence the Act is unworkable in practice and is liable to be struck down. 9. De novo trial of the cases transferred to a Special Court under Section 6(2) and Section 10 of the Act is an inevita¬ble consequence that would follow from cognizance being taken over again by a Special Court, as required under Section 4 of the Act. Hence the Act is unworkable in practice and is liable to be struck down. 9. De novo trial of the cases transferred to a Special Court under Section 6(2) and Section 10 of the Act is an inevita¬ble consequence that would follow from cognizance being taken over again by a Special Court, as required under Section 4 of the Act. In support of the contention, learned counsel placed reli¬ance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. And others, (2008) 2 SCC 492 to the effect that taking of cogni¬zance is a sine qua non or condition precedent for holding a valid trial. The omission of the same in the provisions of the Act for taking cognizance before conducting a de novo trial in the Special Courts Act in respect of the transferred cases from the Special Judge Court is once again the Act is visited by vagueness and liable to be struck down. 10. Not providing the provision for appeal in the impugned Act against judgment of acquittal is bad in law for the reason that Section 248(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provision is applicable to all criminal trials is governed by warrant procedure which governs the prosecution under the P.C. Act and Section 8(1) of the Act envisages an order or sentence following a finding of guilt. Sub-section (1) of Section 8 envisages an order of acquittal. Therefore, there is no escape from the provi¬sions that a judgment holding a person guilty or not guilty is to be followed by a sentence or an order of acquittal, as the case may be. Section 378(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for an appeal against the original or an appellate order of an acquittal by any Court other than a High Court. That provi¬sion cannot be called in aid to sustain the glaring omission of an appeal or provision of an appeal from an order of acquittal as it clearly provides for an appeal against conviction. The omis¬sion negativing the right of appeal or revision to the accused is a significant departure from Section 27 of the P.C. Act. 11. That provi¬sion cannot be called in aid to sustain the glaring omission of an appeal or provision of an appeal from an order of acquittal as it clearly provides for an appeal against conviction. The omis¬sion negativing the right of appeal or revision to the accused is a significant departure from Section 27 of the P.C. Act. 11. The various statutory rights and remedies that are provided under the Prevention of Corruption Act have been taken away by the Special Courts Act in the guise of expediting trial or cases by enacting the provision under Section 13(1) which empowers the State Government to authorize the Public Prosecutor to initiate proceedings for confiscation, based on opinion of the State Government that a person who had held high public or polit¬ical office and accused of offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the Central Act had committed the said offence, which provisions of the Act do not envisage disclosure of any such evidence or mate¬rial or furnishing copies thereof to a person subjected to con¬fiscation proceedings. Existence of prima facie evidence or otherwise being an essential function of the Court at the time of taking cognizance of the offence and thereafter at the time of framing of charge, declaration of the State Government as to existence of prima facie evidence against a person alleged against of having committed the offence after submission of the police report as provided under Section 5 of the State Act does not fit into the scheme of administration of justice as contem¬plated under the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provision is applicable to the proceedings before the Special Courts in view of Section 8(2) of the Act. When the Court of a Judicial Magis¬trate is in seisin of the proceedings following the submission of the charge-sheet, such a declaration by the State Government has an unmistakable tendency to influence or interfere with the course of administration of justice and is liable to be condemned and struck down as violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. The confiscation of money and property is provided in Sections 13 to 19 of the Act, which is not mentioned in the statement of objects and reasons or the preamble portion of the Act, except in the heading of the same. Appointment of authorized officers before whom proceedings for confiscation could be initiated are provided in Section 2(a) and Section 13(1) of the Act. Appointment of authorized officers before whom proceedings for confiscation could be initiated are provided in Section 2(a) and Section 13(1) of the Act. On the culmination of the proceedings, monies and properties of the accused which are the subject matter of such proceedings are ordered to be confiscated and possession of which are required to be delivered or surrendered before the authorized officer under Section 18(1). Eviction of an affected person or accused from any part of the residential premises, beyond the permitted period of the stay through use of force is provided in Section 18(2) of the Act which is bad in law. Conferment of power to use force as provided under Section 18(2) of the Act to take possession of such house is once again unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of power and violation of Article 19(1)(e) read with Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, the aforesaid provisions are viola¬tive of the aforesaid Constitutional provisions and, therefore, the same are liable to be struck down. 12. The jurisdiction as to any enquiry or trial is provided in Chapter XIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 177 thereof provides or local jurisdiction. Orissa Act 9 of 2007 being a Special Act, does not provide that the aforesaid provisions of Chapter XIII of the Cr.P.C. would be applicable for conducting trial. The said provisions are violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. Learned counsel for the peti¬tioners placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mirza Iqbal Hussain v. State of U.P., AIR 1983 SC 60 in support of the legal contention that the confiscation is one of the powers exercisable by a Court under Section 452 Cr.P.C. at the conclusion of the trial, whereas the power now vested with the Authorised Officer at the stage of the proceedings is totally opposed to the substantial statutory rights of the accused con¬ferred under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, taking away such rights under the provisions of the Special Courts Act renders the Act arbitrary and the same is liable to be struck down. Confiscation provisions are provided under the various statutes, namely, Essential Commodities Act, 1955, Customs Act, 1962, Orissa Forest Act, 1972, Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976, N.D.P.S. Act, 1985, Special Court Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities Act, 1992. Confiscation provisions are provided under the various statutes, namely, Essential Commodities Act, 1955, Customs Act, 1962, Orissa Forest Act, 1972, Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976, N.D.P.S. Act, 1985, Special Court Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities Act, 1992. The aforesaid Acts are to be protected National wealth or to prevent smuggling and evasion of customs duties or hawala transactions that are offences against nation’s finance etc. whereas the monies and properties that may be sub¬ject matter of prosecution under Section 13(1)(e) of the Preven¬tion of Corruption Act, prima facie belong to the person who has title or possession thereof and confiscation of the same before he or they are found guilty by a Court trying him/them and re¬cording a finding further that any part of the monies and proper¬ties were illegally obtained through corrupt means, confiscation of the same seems highly obnoxious on the face of it. Accusation of the alleged offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is one of acquisition of assets disproportion¬ate to the known source of income and probable resources over the years of the accused who occupied a public position and exercised public power for a spell during which, it is alleged, that the accused by accepting illegal gratification aggrandized himself-a pattern of accusation tragically and traumatically so common against public persons who have exercised and exited from public power, and a phenomenon so suggestive of Lord Acton’s famous dictum. The charge has a wide ranging scope and considerable temporal sweep, covering activities and acquisitions, sources and resources private and public dealings and nexus with finances personal and of relatives. The scope and object of the laws, thus do not afford any comparison with the laws cited supra although all the laws have one thing in common, i.e., they deal with offences and provide for forfeiture and confiscation which is not adequate to bring those provisions as being in pari materia with the State law under consideration. 13. Further it is contended that “right to property” though no more a fundamental right yet, nonetheless it is a constitutional right recognized under Article 300 A. It has to be considered as a human right covered under Article 21 of the Constitution. 13. Further it is contended that “right to property” though no more a fundamental right yet, nonetheless it is a constitutional right recognized under Article 300 A. It has to be considered as a human right covered under Article 21 of the Constitution. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed by the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners in the case of Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. M/s. Pure Industri¬al Cock & Chem. Ltd. And others, AIR 2007 SC 2458 . The impugned enactment provides for confiscation of monies and properties of a person accused of possession of assets disproportionate to his known sources of income before he is found guilty in trial, is exproprietory in nature. The accused who is deprived of posses¬sion and beneficial use of such monies or properties while await¬ing trial by a Court of competent jurisdiction, cannot obtain restitution of the same, if it is not possible to return the property in which event he is entitled to the price of the property with interest at the rate of 5% upon his acquittal which provision begs the question as to whether a person accused of the offence be allowed to be deprived of the use of his own monies and properties until he is found guilty by a competent Court of law and secondly whether confiscation should be permitted pending trial when there may be circumstances that may not permit com¬plete restitution, in the event of his acquittal. Therefore, the provisions of confiscation as provided in Section 24 of Chapter III of the impugned Act cannot be said to provide the authority of law as contemplated under Article 300A of the Constitution. 14. Another ground of attack of the impugned Act is, that the provisions of the impugned Act is repugnant to the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act enacted by the Parliament. Therefore, the same is violative of Article 254(2) of the Consti¬tution of India. On this ground also the impugned enactment is liable to be struck down. 15. It is further urged that the provisions of the impugned Act are repugnant to the provisions of Prevention of Money Laun¬dering Act, 2002 as amended by the Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2009 (Act 21 of 2009) and hence violative of the provisions of Article 254(1) of the Constitution of India. 16. 15. It is further urged that the provisions of the impugned Act are repugnant to the provisions of Prevention of Money Laun¬dering Act, 2002 as amended by the Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2009 (Act 21 of 2009) and hence violative of the provisions of Article 254(1) of the Constitution of India. 16. Section 26 of the impugned Act provides for a non obstante clause that notwithstanding anything contained in the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 or any other law for the time being in force, the provisions of the impugned Act shall prevail in case of any inconsistency. Therefore, the State Act contemplates inconsisten¬cies and repugnancy between the said law and other Central laws occupying the field. Therefore, Article 254(1) o the Constitution stipulates unless the State law enacted in respect of any matter covered under the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule under Article 246 of the Constitution, has been reserved for the assent of the President of India and assent of the President has been obtained, after pointing out all the specific inconsistencies and the repugnancies and the President had applied his mind thereto as required under Article 254(2). The Special Courts Act cannot prevail over Central Act. 17. In so far as the case on hand is concerned, the assent has been obtained from the President of India in respect of cer¬tain provisions of the Act. The opposite parties have placed reliance on the letter dated 28.10.2006 addressed by the Commis¬sioner-cum-Secretary to the Governor of Orissa to the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi. The letter discloses that assent was sought for Clauses 6, 7, 22 and 26 of the proposed Bill as being repugnant to existing provisions of certain Central laws, viz. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944; satisfies the requirement of Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner disputing the aforesaid position of law placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court reported in Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. And others etc. v. National Textile Corporation Ltd. And other etc. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner disputing the aforesaid position of law placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court reported in Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. And others etc. v. National Textile Corporation Ltd. And other etc. AIR 2002 SC 3404 in support of the proposition that the phrase used in Article 254(2) “is re¬served for consideration” cannot be an idle formality, but, would require serious consideration on the material placed before the President. In the present case the consideration could only be to the proposal made by the State Government. If the proposal made by the State is limited qua the repugnancy of the State law and law or laws specified in the said proposal, then it cannot be said that the assent was granted, qua the repugnancy between the State law and other laws for which no assent was sought for. 18. To find out whether ‘assent’ given by the President was restricted or unrestricted, the letter written or proposal made by the State Government for obtaining assent is required to be looked into. The consideration by this Court is limited to the extent that whether the State has sought assent, qua particular earlier law or laws made by the Parliament prevailing in the State or it has sought general assent. It is further contended that granting of assent as required under Article 254(2) is not in exercise of legislative power of President such as contemplat¬ed under Article 123 of the Constitution but is part of legisla¬tive procedure. Whether procedure prescribed by the Constitution before enacting the law is followed or not can always be looked into by the Court. In the facts of the case, as stated supra, not taking President’s assent is an omission which is fatal to the Act and it cannot be remedied by the Court by any recognized cannons of interpretation. It is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners, for the reasons stated supra, the impugned Act has been passed in absolute contravention of Article 254(2) so much of it as is repugnant to or inconsistent with the existing law as embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure, the Indian Con¬tract Act and the Transfer of Property Act and therefore the impugned Act must be declared to be void. It is also further urged that the President has to necessarily consider the nature and extent of repugnancy, the feasibility, practicalities and desirabilities involved therein though may not be obliged to write a judgment in the same manner the Courts of law does before arriving at a conclusion to grant or refuse to grant or even grant partially if the repugnancy is with reference to more than one law in force made by the Parliament., then protection cannot be claimed for the State law when the question before Courts taking cover under the assent merely asserting that it was in general form irrespective of the actual fact whether the State is entitled for such protection as claimed against a specific law, the attention of the President was invited to at least an appre¬hended repugnancy vis-a-vis the particular Central law. The same has not been done in the instant case by the State. Therefore, Article 254(2) has no application to the impugned Act. 19. Further, he placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court, with regard to the term ‘repugnancy’ in the Arti¬cle 254(2) of the constitution, in T.K.V.T.S.S. Medical & Char¬itable Trust v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1996 SC 2384 , wherein the Apex Court explained the meaning of ‘repugnancy’ in the context of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935, that two laws cannot be said to be properly repugnant unless there is a direct conflict between them, as when one said ‘do’ and the other ‘don’t’. There is no true repugnancy according to this view, if it is possible to obey both the laws. Repugnancy between two statutes may be ascertained on the basis of three principles, namely, (i) whether there is direct conflict between the two provisions; (ii) whether Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the subject-matter replacing the Act of the State Legislature; and (iii) whether the law made by Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature occupy the same field. If the laws made by the two legislatures collide and when the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication provides that the enactment of one legislature has superiority over the other, then, to the extent of the repugnancy the one supercedes the other. Two enactments may be repugnant to each other even though obedience to each of them is possible without disobeying the other. Two enactments may be repugnant to each other even though obedience to each of them is possible without disobeying the other. The test of two legislations containing contradictory provisions is not however the only criterion of repugnancy for if a competent legislature with a superior effica¬cy expressly or impliedly evinces by its legislation an intention to cover the whole field, the enactments of the other legislature whether passed before or after would be overcome on the ground of repugnance. The aforesaid position of law is observed in the case of State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch and Co., AIR 1964 SC 1284 . 20. Clause 8(2) of the Bill has been omitted from the said letter addressed to the Central Government seeking President of India’s assent. Clause 9 of the Bill in the omitting provision of appeal against any order of a Special Court as distinguished from appeal against judgment, order and sentence of a Special Judge trying offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 provided for in Section 27 thereof as also denial of right of revision to the High Court in Clause 9(2) of the Bill runs coun¬ter to Section 5(3) read with Section 27 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Sections 378 and 401 read with Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 but the State of Orissa on its own showing has not sought the assent of the President with regard thereto. Clause 10 of the Bill that circumscribes the power of the High Court to transfer cases from one criminal Court subordinate to its authority to another such Court of equal or superior jurisdiction under Section 407 Cr.P.C. and limits such power of transfer from one Special Court to another only. In this regard no assent has been sought from the President of India in respect of such curtailment of right of an accused, as is clear from the letter of the State Government. Further the State’s letter does not show that entire Chapter III contained Clauses 13 to 19 of the Bill that provide for confiscation of monies, properties and also eviction from the residence of a ‘person affected’ including the person accused of offences under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act before trial and by a quasi judicial authority other than was submitted or brought to the notice of the President of India for his assent. Therefore, the aforesaid clauses of the Bill are irreconcilable with the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, permitting inter¬im management of properties during trial in view of Section 5(6) read with Section 29 incorporating the provisions of Sections 8 and 9 of the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 and Section 452 of the Code of Criminal Procedure providing for disposal of properties including confiscation or return of monies and proper¬ties to any person fund to be entitled thereto at the conclusion of the trial. Clause 19 of the Bill provides only for the return of the property to a person affected upon his acquittal by a Special Court to be established under the aforesaid Bill. That provision rules out a person other than an accused who could avail the benefit of such return in the event of acquittal after trial, whereas the expression ‘person affected included any person holding any money or property on behalf of another person alleged to be possessed of property beyond his known sources of income such person, it may further be noted, is deprived of any remedy except by way of appeal to the High Court in view of clauses 15(6) and 17(1) and access to Civil Court under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in view of Clauses 22 and 23 of the Bill. Transfer of subject matter of confiscation proceed¬ing is also barred during the pendency of confiscation proceed¬ings under clause 16 of the Bill. The above provisions of the Bill in Chapter III thereof not having been submitted for assent of the President of India cannot be held to be saved by Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India. Further placed reliance upon the decision of the Federal Court reported in AIR 1941 FC 16 in support of the contention that Section 9 of the C.P.C. postulates the jurisdiction of the Ordinary Civil Courts to try all suits of a civil nature except suits of which cognizance is either ex¬pressly or impliedly barred. These qualifying or saving words preclude the contention that the impugned Act which bars a civil remedy under Section 22 of the Special Courts Act is repugnant to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Hence, the impugned provision is bad in law and is liable to be struck down. 21. These qualifying or saving words preclude the contention that the impugned Act which bars a civil remedy under Section 22 of the Special Courts Act is repugnant to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Hence, the impugned provision is bad in law and is liable to be struck down. 21. Another contention urged on behalf of the petitioners is that the services of the Central Government have been classi¬fied under the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Ap¬peal) Rules, 1965. Rule 4 of the said Rules envisages four cate¬gories of services. They are: (i) Central Civil Service Group-A (ii) Central Civil Service Group-B (iii) Central Civil Service Group-C (iv) Central Civil Service Group-D Rule 5 of the aforesaid Rules defines constitution of dif¬ferent group of services. Part I of the Schedule enumerates different service/grade of services which are classified as Group-A Services. A bare reading of the provisions of Section 2 & 2-A of the All India Services Act, 1951 read with Rules 4 and 5 of the C.C.S.(C.C.A.) Rules makes it clear that the All India Service do not belong to Group-A Services. If the expression as defined in the Rules is applied to the impugned Act for the sake of argument, then also the Special Courts Act, 2006 being ap¬plicable to only to the Group-A services of the Central or State Government, the said classification is arbitrary, irrational and mala fide and thus hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. 22. A detailed statement of counter has been filed on behalf of opposite party no.1 sworn to by Shri Kanhu Charan Sarangi, working as Deputy Secretary to Government of Orissa, Home (Special) Department traversing the various petition aver¬ments and the legal contentions urged in the writ petitions. 23. With reference to the validity of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, it has been stated that the similar Act is already held to be constitutionally valid placing reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court regarding the legislative competence to enact the Special Courts Act for establishing Special Courts. Strong reliance is placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State (Delhi Administration) v. V.C. Shukla and another, AIR 1980 SC 1382 in which the Supreme Court with reference to the impugned Act therein has held that the Act has assumed a new complexion. Strong reliance is placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State (Delhi Administration) v. V.C. Shukla and another, AIR 1980 SC 1382 in which the Supreme Court with reference to the impugned Act therein has held that the Act has assumed a new complexion. The heading of the Act shows that its main object is to provide for the speedy trial of a certain class of offences with reference to the commission of Enquiry and Investigation conducted by the Government through its agency disclosed the similar offences committed during the period of conferment of powers upon the officers of the State is a trust and holders of high public and political offices are accountable for the exercise of their powers in all cases where Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952, or investigations conducted by Government through its agencies disclose offences committed by such holders. Further it is stated that the Constitutional, Moral and legal obligations of the State to prosecute persons involved in commit¬ting such offences and whereas the ordinary Criminal Courts due to congestion of work and other reasons cannot reasonably be expected to bring those prosecutions to a speedy termination,therefore, it was imperative for the efficient func¬tioning of the parliamentary democracy and the institutions creat¬ed by or under the Constitution of India that the Commission of offences referred to in the recitals aforesaid should be judi¬cially determined with utmost dispatch and for the said purpose it is necessary to establish additional Courts presided over by sitting Judges of High Courts and whereas it is expedient to make some procedural changes whereby avoidable delay in the final determination of the innocence or guilt of the persons to be tried is eliminated without interfering with the right to a fair trial. Section 2;of the Act defines ‘Code’, ‘declaration’ and ‘Special Court’ and the residuary clause(d) thereof says that words and expressions not defined in the Act would have the same meaning as in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 3 (1) gives power to the Central Government to establish an adequate number of Special Courts by notification in the Official Gazette. Sec¬tion 3(2) enacts that a Special Court shall consist of a sitting Judge of the High Court nominated by the Chief Justice thereof with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India. Section 3 (1) gives power to the Central Government to establish an adequate number of Special Courts by notification in the Official Gazette. Sec¬tion 3(2) enacts that a Special Court shall consist of a sitting Judge of the High Court nominated by the Chief Justice thereof with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India. Sections 5(1), 5(2) 9 and 9(3) are referred to and held that provisions of Sections 238 to 243 and 248 regarding the procedure prescribed under the Cr.P.C. is made applicable. All these things are stated with reference to the Special Court Act which provisions have been examined in the Shukla’s case. The same are placed reliance by the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the opposite party no.1 in justification of the constitutional validity of the provisions of the impugned Act and the Rules. 24. Learned Senior Counsel also placed reliance upon cer¬tain decisions of the Supreme Court referred to in Shukla’s case with regard to observations made by Chandrachud, C.J. and Krishna Iyer, J. with reference to Parliamentary democracy that it will see its halcyon days in India, when law will provide for a speedy trial of all offenders who misuse the public offices held by them. He also placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in J. Jayalalitha v. Union of India and another, AIR 1999 SC 1912 and a Division Bench decision of this Court in Kishore Chandra Patel v. State of Orissa and others, 76 (1993) CLT 720 and another Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Phoolan Devi v. The State of U.P. and oth¬ers, 1997 Crl.L.J. 4134 in support of the proposition that,the Special Courts Act is a procedural statute and does not in any way affect the rights and liabilities of the petitioners under the Act and also placed reliance upon the Privy Council judgment in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills v. C.I.T., Delhi, AIR 1927 PC 242, in the case of Jose De Costa v. Bascora, AIR 1975 SC 1843 and Gurubachan Singh v. Satpal Singh, AIR 1990 SC 209 wherein the statement in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes is adverted to,in support of the legal contention that no person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution and defence in the manner pre¬scribed for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending if by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered, he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. The said observation has been quoted with approval in several decisions of the apex Court, namely, Anant Gopal v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 915 and Union of India v. Sukumar Pyne, AIR 1966 SC 1206 . it has been held in Bahadur singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 394 that a trial under a procedure different from what obtained at the time of the commis¬sion of the offence or by Court different from that which had competence at the time cannot ipso facto be held to be unconsti¬tutional and no accused has any fundamental right to trial of a particular Court or by a particular procedure. Therefore, the provisions of the Act cannot be challenged on the ground of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. Hence, the challenge made on this legal contention must fail. 25. It is further contended that, with the specific inten¬tion to avoid unnecessary delay and keeping in view the concept of speedy trial, the State Legislature has enacted the Orissa Special Courts Act, 2006 and has constituted the Special Courts to exclusively try the offences and disproportionate assets against persons holding” high public and political offices”. Further the attack on Section 5(1) contending that it is enacted to oust the jurisdiction of all Courts is untenable on the ground that the declaration as provided under Section 5(1) of the Act is a procedural step to segregate the cases meant for Special Courts from other cases instituted by Vigilance,in furtherance to achieve the object of the Act to dispose of such special category cases exclusively in specially constituted Courts. Such procedur¬al step is not prejudicial nor adverse to the interest of the accused concerned so as to confer a right of challenge to such procedural step to stall further proceeding which will be an antithesis to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. Hence, the State Legislature has consciously barred interference of any Court of law. 26. Such procedur¬al step is not prejudicial nor adverse to the interest of the accused concerned so as to confer a right of challenge to such procedural step to stall further proceeding which will be an antithesis to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. Hence, the State Legislature has consciously barred interference of any Court of law. 26. Further it is contended that the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 390 of 2008 who is an IAS Officer belong to a category other than Officers of ‘Group A’ service in the definition in the Rules is to be read in the context of categorization of the Government Officers by the State Government on the basis of their “pay scales” into Groups A, B, C and D vide resolution dated 7th June, 1999 and, therefore, he belongs to Group A category in accordance with the said Government resolution and comes under the purview of the Orissa Special Courts Act, 2006. 27. He further submitted that in Kishore Chandra Patel (supra), similarly placed petitioner questioned the constitution¬al validity of Orissa Special Courts Act, 1990 more or less on similar grounds, excepting the ground of repugnancy between the Central Law and the State law under Article 254(1) of the Consti¬tution of India. Validity of the said provision of the Act was threadbare examined by this Court and this Court made certain observations at paragraph 116 with regard to the constitutional validity of certain provisions contained in the said Act and the specific observation is made in paragraph 118 giving time to the State legislature to comply with the same to bring about the amendment to the said provision in the Act. the judgment in Kishore Chandra Patel’s case was delivered on 22.7.1993. 28. Thereafter in compliance with the direction made by the High Court, the State Government promulgated the Orissa Special Courts (Amendment) Ordinance, 1993 which was published in the Extra Ordinary Orissa Gazette on 13.8.1993 with regard to Sec¬tions 2, 5, 14, 16 and 19. the judgment in Kishore Chandra Patel’s case was delivered on 22.7.1993. 28. Thereafter in compliance with the direction made by the High Court, the State Government promulgated the Orissa Special Courts (Amendment) Ordinance, 1993 which was published in the Extra Ordinary Orissa Gazette on 13.8.1993 with regard to Sec¬tions 2, 5, 14, 16 and 19. The said provision was carefully examined by the Division Bench of this Court which held that the aforesaid proposed amendment to the Act by way of Ordinance would show that the two suggestions which this Court gave in Kishore Chandra Patel’s case to take care of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution, in so far as the provisions contained in Chapter III are concerned,have been incorporated in the Ordinance. There¬fore,according to the Division Bench of this Court the provisions of Chapter III of the Act as amended by the aforesaid Ordinance do not violate, according to the Division Bench, Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The said observation is made after noting the contention of Mr. Rath appearing for the petitioners that the Ordinance was not valid with the observation “we do not express any opinion on this aspect”. Having made such observation, at paragraph 5 it is held that the result is that the Act as amended by the aforesaid Ordinance does not suffer from any infirmity. Therefore, all the petitions stood rejected. 29. In view of the Division Bench judgment in Kishore Chan¬dra Patel’s case and the decision of the Supreme Court in V.C. Sukla’s case, learned Senior Counsel submits that there is no merit in the challenge to the provisions of the impugned Act. Hence the petitions are devoid of merit and the same are liable to be dismissed. JUDGMENT V. GOPALA GOWDA, C.J. : In these writ petitions, the petitioners have challenged the constitutional validity of the Orissa Special Courts Act, 2006 and the Rules framed thereunder urging various facts and legal grounds. 2. Brief Facts in nutshell are stated as under: The petitioner in each of the writ petitions is accused of offence punishable under Section 13 (2) read with Section 13 (1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Originally each one of the petitioners case was pending either in the Court of Special Judge, Vigilance at Bhubaneswar or Cuttack or other places in the State. Originally each one of the petitioners case was pending either in the Court of Special Judge, Vigilance at Bhubaneswar or Cuttack or other places in the State. After establishment of the Special Courts pursuant to the notification issued by the State Government establishing Special Courts, the case of the petitioners were transferred to the respective Special Judge of the Special Courts established under the Orissa Special Courts Act. 3. The Orissa Special Courts Act has been passed by the Orissa Legislative Assembly and the same has been assented to by the President of India on 19.9.2007 and published in the Extra ordinary Orissa Gazette on 15.10.2007. The State Government in exercise of its power conferred under Section 24 of the Orissa Special Courts Act, 2007, has framed rules called the Orissa Special Court Rules, 2007 (hereinafter called as ‘the Rules’ in short). The Rules specified the form of declaration. The State Government represented by the Home Department in exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of the Act issued declaration vide Annexure-1 in each of the cases which was published in the Extra Ordinary Orissa Gazette on various dates. 4. The grounds of attack of the provisions of the Act and the Rules are briefly stated and the legal submissions made in support of the same are adverted to in this judgment. 5. The provisions of the Act in not defining as to who is holding “high public or political office” and defining the same in the Rules is not permissible in law. The provisions of the Act and the Rules are unworkable on account of which there would be arbitrariness and discrimination in issuing the declaration in Form I. It is further urged that the Special Courts Act is pro¬spective in nature and not applicable to the pending cases in the Court of the Special Judges prior to 15.10.2007 when the impugned Act came into operation. The entire Rules framed thereunder and the declarations issued pursuant to the Act are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The provisions of Section 2 (a) and 2 (e) are violative of Article 235 of the Constitution. Sections 4 and 9 of the Act are violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. The entire Rules framed thereunder and the declarations issued pursuant to the Act are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The provisions of Section 2 (a) and 2 (e) are violative of Article 235 of the Constitution. Sections 4 and 9 of the Act are violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. Further the provisions contained in Chapter III of the Act are in contravention of the Constitutional provisions of Articles 14, 21(2) and (3) of the Constitution and apart from the same they are also violative of the principles of natural jus¬tice. We have heard Shri H.K. Mund, Mr. L.N. Patnaik, Mr. G.N. Mohapatra and Mr. Pradipta Mohanty, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in this batch of writ petitions and Mr. Balaram Rout, the petitioner in W.P.Crl. No. 390 of 2008 in person. They raised more or less similar contentions. Leading the argument, Shri Mund placing reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta and others, (2009) 1 SCC 516 and Paragraph 630 of the Halsbury’s Laws of England, Third Edition, 1961 Volume 36 contended that the Act is a penal statute and exproprietory in nature in view of the provisions introduced for confiscation of monies and properties of the accused under Chapter III. Therefore, the said provisions are required to be strictly construed in view of the interpretation made by the Supreme Court in R. Kalyani (supra) and according to paragraph 630 Halsbury’s Laws of England referred to above, which interpreted that a statute is to be regarded as penal for the purposes of construction if it imposes a fine, penalty or forfei¬ture other than a penalty in the nature of liquidated damages, or other penalties which are in the nature of civil remedies. The general rule is that the same has to be strictly construed and should not be extended beyond their clear meaning. The provisions of Sections 4, 12, 13, 14 to 16 and 18 of the impugned Act are stated to be procedural in nature and the provisions of Section 3 and 15 thereof cannot be said to be procedural but substantive. The provisions of Sections 4, 12, 13, 14 to 16 and 18 of the impugned Act are stated to be procedural in nature and the provisions of Section 3 and 15 thereof cannot be said to be procedural but substantive. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was enacted by the Parliament to provide a special jurisdiction to the persons who are facing the prosecution under the provisions of the said Act by trying their cases by the Special Judges appointed by the Central/State Government for such area or areas or for such case or group of cases as may be specified in the notification with a view to expedite the proceedings and for achieving day to day trial of cases. The Act amongst other things discourages stay of proceedings of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Prevention of Corruption Act being a complete code in itself, is applicable to all corruption cases, whereas the State Act is confined to cases of corruption under Section 13 (1)(e) of the Central Act against holder of high public and political office. The provision of Section 5 neither describes nor defines the same. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that in the absence of definition of “high public and political office”, it is the duty of the Court to interpret the expression or the provisions through internal or external aids provided in the legislation only if the expression or the provision could be so interpreted, otherwise the Court would be left with no alterna¬tive but to strike down the provision as being unworkable. Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Utkal Contractors and Journey v. State of Orissa, AIR 1987 S.C. 1954 in support of the proposition of law wherein the apex Court made certain general observation regarding the interpretation of the statute that a statute is best understood if we know the reason for it the same being safest guide to its interpretation. In support of the said contention, he placed reliance upon the Constitution Bench decision in Burrakur Coal Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1961 S.C. 954 . In support of the said contention, he placed reliance upon the Constitution Bench decision in Burrakur Coal Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1961 S.C. 954 . It is further urged that when the Act omitted to describe or define the past holders of “high public or political office”, the Rules, 2007 defines the same in Rule 2 (1)(e) and (f) respectively to cure the provisions of the Act which is not permissible in law, for the reason that the defini¬tion provided by the Rules cannot govern the provision of the Act as it is being a superior legislation, the rules are subordinate legislation framed by the State Government. Therefore, the im¬pugned Act is vague without giving the definition of “high public and political office”. Therefore, the State Government in defin¬ing the said office in the aforesaid Rules in exercise of its rule making power has exceeded its jurisdiction which is not provided in the State. Therefore, the provisions of the Act are vague and are liable to be struck down. 6. In support of the aforesaid contentions, a passage from the Halsbury’s Laws of England was quoted by the Apex Court in the case of Hotel Balaji and others v. State of A.P. and others, AIR 1993 SC 1048 (paras 29-30). It is further contended that in the absence of anything mentioned in the statement of objects and reasons, headings, marginal notes or preamble portion of the Act giving any indication as to what is meant by the State Legisla¬ture, when it used the expression “persons who held high public and political office” in Section 5 of the Special Courts Act, the omission cannot be supplied through any purposive interpretation given by he Court. For this reason also, the Act needs to be struck down as it is vague and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 7. In the Act there is vagueness with regard to the juris¬diction of the Special Court over any “local area” or otherwise, remains unknown. The same is contrary to the well known principle that jurisdiction of a Court or a Judge implies the competence of such Court or a Judge to entertain and decide a disputed question of fact or law. In the absence of the same, once again the provi¬sions of the Act suffer from vagueness. The same is contrary to the well known principle that jurisdiction of a Court or a Judge implies the competence of such Court or a Judge to entertain and decide a disputed question of fact or law. In the absence of the same, once again the provi¬sions of the Act suffer from vagueness. A comparison between the provision of Section 3 (1) of the Central Act and Section 3 (1) of the State Act would clearly go to show that the Central Legis¬lature required a notification by the Central or the State Gov¬ernment to make it clear as to class or classes, group or group of persons and the area or areas that were being covered by the jurisdiction of the Special Judges appointed for the purpose whereas the State Act in the corresponding Section 3 (1) requires the State Government to make a notification for appointment of Special Courts, without further specifying the class or classes, group or group of persons, area or the areas or the territory of territories intended to be brought within the purview of the jurisdiction of such Courts. The same is further confounded by Rule 3(2) of the Rules which is not provided in the Statute. Therefore, the same is not permissible in law. Hence, the im¬pugned Act is liable to be struck down. 8. The definition of the term “offence” is incomplete as could be seen from Section 2(d) as it is simply stated that the said offence is punishable under Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act. Section 13(1)(e) of the P.C. Act defines the offence and the penal consequence is being provided in Section 13(2) of the Act. Therefore, any charge for an offence which does not mention the penal consequence will be illegal. Hence the Act is unworkable in practice and is liable to be struck down. 9. De novo trial of the cases transferred to a Special Court under Section 6(2) and Section 10 of the Act is an inevita¬ble consequence that would follow from cognizance being taken over again by a Special Court, as required under Section 4 of the Act. Hence the Act is unworkable in practice and is liable to be struck down. 9. De novo trial of the cases transferred to a Special Court under Section 6(2) and Section 10 of the Act is an inevita¬ble consequence that would follow from cognizance being taken over again by a Special Court, as required under Section 4 of the Act. In support of the contention, learned counsel placed reli¬ance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. And others, (2008) 2 SCC 492 to the effect that taking of cogni¬zance is a sine qua non or condition precedent for holding a valid trial. The omission of the same in the provisions of the Act for taking cognizance before conducting a de novo trial in the Special Courts Act in respect of the transferred cases from the Special Judge Court is once again the Act is visited by vagueness and liable to be struck down. 10. Not providing the provision for appeal in the impugned Act against judgment of acquittal is bad in law for the reason that Section 248(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provision is applicable to all criminal trials is governed by warrant procedure which governs the prosecution under the P.C. Act and Section 8(1) of the Act envisages an order or sentence following a finding of guilt. Sub-section (1) of Section 8 envisages an order of acquittal. Therefore, there is no escape from the provi¬sions that a judgment holding a person guilty or not guilty is to be followed by a sentence or an order of acquittal, as the case may be. Section 378(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for an appeal against the original or an appellate order of an acquittal by any Court other than a High Court. That provi¬sion cannot be called in aid to sustain the glaring omission of an appeal or provision of an appeal from an order of acquittal as it clearly provides for an appeal against conviction. The omis¬sion negativing the right of appeal or revision to the accused is a significant departure from Section 27 of the P.C. Act. 11. That provi¬sion cannot be called in aid to sustain the glaring omission of an appeal or provision of an appeal from an order of acquittal as it clearly provides for an appeal against conviction. The omis¬sion negativing the right of appeal or revision to the accused is a significant departure from Section 27 of the P.C. Act. 11. The various statutory rights and remedies that are provided under the Prevention of Corruption Act have been taken away by the Special Courts Act in the guise of expediting trial or cases by enacting the provision under Section 13(1) which empowers the State Government to authorize the Public Prosecutor to initiate proceedings for confiscation, based on opinion of the State Government that a person who had held high public or polit¬ical office and accused of offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the Central Act had committed the said offence, which provisions of the Act do not envisage disclosure of any such evidence or mate¬rial or furnishing copies thereof to a person subjected to con¬fiscation proceedings. Existence of prima facie evidence or otherwise being an essential function of the Court at the time of taking cognizance of the offence and thereafter at the time of framing of charge, declaration of the State Government as to existence of prima facie evidence against a person alleged against of having committed the offence after submission of the police report as provided under Section 5 of the State Act does not fit into the scheme of administration of justice as contem¬plated under the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provision is applicable to the proceedings before the Special Courts in view of Section 8(2) of the Act. When the Court of a Judicial Magis¬trate is in seisin of the proceedings following the submission of the charge-sheet, such a declaration by the State Government has an unmistakable tendency to influence or interfere with the course of administration of justice and is liable to be condemned and struck down as violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. The confiscation of money and property is provided in Sections 13 to 19 of the Act, which is not mentioned in the statement of objects and reasons or the preamble portion of the Act, except in the heading of the same. Appointment of authorized officers before whom proceedings for confiscation could be initiated are provided in Section 2(a) and Section 13(1) of the Act. Appointment of authorized officers before whom proceedings for confiscation could be initiated are provided in Section 2(a) and Section 13(1) of the Act. On the culmination of the proceedings, monies and properties of the accused which are the subject matter of such proceedings are ordered to be confiscated and possession of which are required to be delivered or surrendered before the authorized officer under Section 18(1). Eviction of an affected person or accused from any part of the residential premises, beyond the permitted period of the stay through use of force is provided in Section 18(2) of the Act which is bad in law. Conferment of power to use force as provided under Section 18(2) of the Act to take possession of such house is once again unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of power and violation of Article 19(1)(e) read with Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, the aforesaid provisions are viola¬tive of the aforesaid Constitutional provisions and, therefore, the same are liable to be struck down. 12. The jurisdiction as to any enquiry or trial is provided in Chapter XIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 177 thereof provides or local jurisdiction. Orissa Act 9 of 2007 being a Special Act, does not provide that the aforesaid provisions of Chapter XIII of the Cr.P.C. would be applicable for conducting trial. The said provisions are violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. Learned counsel for the peti¬tioners placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mirza Iqbal Hussain v. State of U.P., AIR 1983 SC 60 in support of the legal contention that the confiscation is one of the powers exercisable by a Court under Section 452 Cr.P.C. at the conclusion of the trial, whereas the power now vested with the Authorised Officer at the stage of the proceedings is totally opposed to the substantial statutory rights of the accused con¬ferred under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, taking away such rights under the provisions of the Special Courts Act renders the Act arbitrary and the same is liable to be struck down. Confiscation provisions are provided under the various statutes, namely, Essential Commodities Act, 1955, Customs Act, 1962, Orissa Forest Act, 1972, Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976, N.D.P.S. Act, 1985, Special Court Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities Act, 1992. Confiscation provisions are provided under the various statutes, namely, Essential Commodities Act, 1955, Customs Act, 1962, Orissa Forest Act, 1972, Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976, N.D.P.S. Act, 1985, Special Court Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities Act, 1992. The aforesaid Acts are to be protected National wealth or to prevent smuggling and evasion of customs duties or hawala transactions that are offences against nation’s finance etc. whereas the monies and properties that may be sub¬ject matter of prosecution under Section 13(1)(e) of the Preven¬tion of Corruption Act, prima facie belong to the person who has title or possession thereof and confiscation of the same before he or they are found guilty by a Court trying him/them and re¬cording a finding further that any part of the monies and proper¬ties were illegally obtained through corrupt means, confiscation of the same seems highly obnoxious on the face of it. Accusation of the alleged offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is one of acquisition of assets disproportion¬ate to the known source of income and probable resources over the years of the accused who occupied a public position and exercised public power for a spell during which, it is alleged, that the accused by accepting illegal gratification aggrandized himself-a pattern of accusation tragically and traumatically so common against public persons who have exercised and exited from public power, and a phenomenon so suggestive of Lord Acton’s famous dictum. The charge has a wide ranging scope and considerable temporal sweep, covering activities and acquisitions, sources and resources private and public dealings and nexus with finances personal and of relatives. The scope and object of the laws, thus do not afford any comparison with the laws cited supra although all the laws have one thing in common, i.e., they deal with offences and provide for forfeiture and confiscation which is not adequate to bring those provisions as being in pari materia with the State law under consideration. 13. Further it is contended that “right to property” though no more a fundamental right yet, nonetheless it is a constitutional right recognized under Article 300 A. It has to be considered as a human right covered under Article 21 of the Constitution. 13. Further it is contended that “right to property” though no more a fundamental right yet, nonetheless it is a constitutional right recognized under Article 300 A. It has to be considered as a human right covered under Article 21 of the Constitution. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed by the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners in the case of Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. M/s. Pure Industri¬al Cock & Chem. Ltd. And others, AIR 2007 SC 2458 . The impugned enactment provides for confiscation of monies and properties of a person accused of possession of assets disproportionate to his known sources of income before he is found guilty in trial, is exproprietory in nature. The accused who is deprived of posses¬sion and beneficial use of such monies or properties while await¬ing trial by a Court of competent jurisdiction, cannot obtain restitution of the same, if it is not possible to return the property in which event he is entitled to the price of the property with interest at the rate of 5% upon his acquittal which provision begs the question as to whether a person accused of the offence be allowed to be deprived of the use of his own monies and properties until he is found guilty by a competent Court of law and secondly whether confiscation should be permitted pending trial when there may be circumstances that may not permit com¬plete restitution, in the event of his acquittal. Therefore, the provisions of confiscation as provided in Section 24 of Chapter III of the impugned Act cannot be said to provide the authority of law as contemplated under Article 300A of the Constitution. 14. Another ground of attack of the impugned Act is, that the provisions of the impugned Act is repugnant to the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act enacted by the Parliament. Therefore, the same is violative of Article 254(2) of the Consti¬tution of India. On this ground also the impugned enactment is liable to be struck down. 15. It is further urged that the provisions of the impugned Act are repugnant to the provisions of Prevention of Money Laun¬dering Act, 2002 as amended by the Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2009 (Act 21 of 2009) and hence violative of the provisions of Article 254(1) of the Constitution of India. 16. 15. It is further urged that the provisions of the impugned Act are repugnant to the provisions of Prevention of Money Laun¬dering Act, 2002 as amended by the Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2009 (Act 21 of 2009) and hence violative of the provisions of Article 254(1) of the Constitution of India. 16. Section 26 of the impugned Act provides for a non obstante clause that notwithstanding anything contained in the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 or any other law for the time being in force, the provisions of the impugned Act shall prevail in case of any inconsistency. Therefore, the State Act contemplates inconsisten¬cies and repugnancy between the said law and other Central laws occupying the field. Therefore, Article 254(1) o the Constitution stipulates unless the State law enacted in respect of any matter covered under the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule under Article 246 of the Constitution, has been reserved for the assent of the President of India and assent of the President has been obtained, after pointing out all the specific inconsistencies and the repugnancies and the President had applied his mind thereto as required under Article 254(2). The Special Courts Act cannot prevail over Central Act. 17. In so far as the case on hand is concerned, the assent has been obtained from the President of India in respect of cer¬tain provisions of the Act. The opposite parties have placed reliance on the letter dated 28.10.2006 addressed by the Commis¬sioner-cum-Secretary to the Governor of Orissa to the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi. The letter discloses that assent was sought for Clauses 6, 7, 22 and 26 of the proposed Bill as being repugnant to existing provisions of certain Central laws, viz. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944; satisfies the requirement of Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner disputing the aforesaid position of law placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court reported in Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. And others etc. v. National Textile Corporation Ltd. And other etc. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner disputing the aforesaid position of law placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court reported in Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. And others etc. v. National Textile Corporation Ltd. And other etc. AIR 2002 SC 3404 in support of the proposition that the phrase used in Article 254(2) “is re¬served for consideration” cannot be an idle formality, but, would require serious consideration on the material placed before the President. In the present case the consideration could only be to the proposal made by the State Government. If the proposal made by the State is limited qua the repugnancy of the State law and law or laws specified in the said proposal, then it cannot be said that the assent was granted, qua the repugnancy between the State law and other laws for which no assent was sought for. 18. To find out whether ‘assent’ given by the President was restricted or unrestricted, the letter written or proposal made by the State Government for obtaining assent is required to be looked into. The consideration by this Court is limited to the extent that whether the State has sought assent, qua particular earlier law or laws made by the Parliament prevailing in the State or it has sought general assent. It is further contended that granting of assent as required under Article 254(2) is not in exercise of legislative power of President such as contemplat¬ed under Article 123 of the Constitution but is part of legisla¬tive procedure. Whether procedure prescribed by the Constitution before enacting the law is followed or not can always be looked into by the Court. In the facts of the case, as stated supra, not taking President’s assent is an omission which is fatal to the Act and it cannot be remedied by the Court by any recognized cannons of interpretation. It is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners, for the reasons stated supra, the impugned Act has been passed in absolute contravention of Article 254(2) so much of it as is repugnant to or inconsistent with the existing law as embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure, the Indian Con¬tract Act and the Transfer of Property Act and therefore the impugned Act must be declared to be void. It is also further urged that the President has to necessarily consider the nature and extent of repugnancy, the feasibility, practicalities and desirabilities involved therein though may not be obliged to write a judgment in the same manner the Courts of law does before arriving at a conclusion to grant or refuse to grant or even grant partially if the repugnancy is with reference to more than one law in force made by the Parliament., then protection cannot be claimed for the State law when the question before Courts taking cover under the assent merely asserting that it was in general form irrespective of the actual fact whether the State is entitled for such protection as claimed against a specific law, the attention of the President was invited to at least an appre¬hended repugnancy vis-a-vis the particular Central law. The same has not been done in the instant case by the State. Therefore, Article 254(2) has no application to the impugned Act. 19. Further, he placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court, with regard to the term ‘repugnancy’ in the Arti¬cle 254(2) of the constitution, in T.K.V.T.S.S. Medical & Char¬itable Trust v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1996 SC 2384 , wherein the Apex Court explained the meaning of ‘repugnancy’ in the context of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935, that two laws cannot be said to be properly repugnant unless there is a direct conflict between them, as when one said ‘do’ and the other ‘don’t’. There is no true repugnancy according to this view, if it is possible to obey both the laws. Repugnancy between two statutes may be ascertained on the basis of three principles, namely, (i) whether there is direct conflict between the two provisions; (ii) whether Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the subject-matter replacing the Act of the State Legislature; and (iii) whether the law made by Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature occupy the same field. If the laws made by the two legislatures collide and when the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication provides that the enactment of one legislature has superiority over the other, then, to the extent of the repugnancy the one supercedes the other. Two enactments may be repugnant to each other even though obedience to each of them is possible without disobeying the other. Two enactments may be repugnant to each other even though obedience to each of them is possible without disobeying the other. The test of two legislations containing contradictory provisions is not however the only criterion of repugnancy for if a competent legislature with a superior effica¬cy expressly or impliedly evinces by its legislation an intention to cover the whole field, the enactments of the other legislature whether passed before or after would be overcome on the ground of repugnance. The aforesaid position of law is observed in the case of State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch and Co., AIR 1964 SC 1284 . 20. Clause 8(2) of the Bill has been omitted from the said letter addressed to the Central Government seeking President of India’s assent. Clause 9 of the Bill in the omitting provision of appeal against any order of a Special Court as distinguished from appeal against judgment, order and sentence of a Special Judge trying offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 provided for in Section 27 thereof as also denial of right of revision to the High Court in Clause 9(2) of the Bill runs coun¬ter to Section 5(3) read with Section 27 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Sections 378 and 401 read with Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 but the State of Orissa on its own showing has not sought the assent of the President with regard thereto. Clause 10 of the Bill that circumscribes the power of the High Court to transfer cases from one criminal Court subordinate to its authority to another such Court of equal or superior jurisdiction under Section 407 Cr.P.C. and limits such power of transfer from one Special Court to another only. In this regard no assent has been sought from the President of India in respect of such curtailment of right of an accused, as is clear from the letter of the State Government. Further the State’s letter does not show that entire Chapter III contained Clauses 13 to 19 of the Bill that provide for confiscation of monies, properties and also eviction from the residence of a ‘person affected’ including the person accused of offences under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act before trial and by a quasi judicial authority other than was submitted or brought to the notice of the President of India for his assent. Therefore, the aforesaid clauses of the Bill are irreconcilable with the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, permitting inter¬im management of properties during trial in view of Section 5(6) read with Section 29 incorporating the provisions of Sections 8 and 9 of the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 and Section 452 of the Code of Criminal Procedure providing for disposal of properties including confiscation or return of monies and proper¬ties to any person fund to be entitled thereto at the conclusion of the trial. Clause 19 of the Bill provides only for the return of the property to a person affected upon his acquittal by a Special Court to be established under the aforesaid Bill. That provision rules out a person other than an accused who could avail the benefit of such return in the event of acquittal after trial, whereas the expression ‘person affected included any person holding any money or property on behalf of another person alleged to be possessed of property beyond his known sources of income such person, it may further be noted, is deprived of any remedy except by way of appeal to the High Court in view of clauses 15(6) and 17(1) and access to Civil Court under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in view of Clauses 22 and 23 of the Bill. Transfer of subject matter of confiscation proceed¬ing is also barred during the pendency of confiscation proceed¬ings under clause 16 of the Bill. The above provisions of the Bill in Chapter III thereof not having been submitted for assent of the President of India cannot be held to be saved by Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India. Further placed reliance upon the decision of the Federal Court reported in AIR 1941 FC 16 in support of the contention that Section 9 of the C.P.C. postulates the jurisdiction of the Ordinary Civil Courts to try all suits of a civil nature except suits of which cognizance is either ex¬pressly or impliedly barred. These qualifying or saving words preclude the contention that the impugned Act which bars a civil remedy under Section 22 of the Special Courts Act is repugnant to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Hence, the impugned provision is bad in law and is liable to be struck down. 21. These qualifying or saving words preclude the contention that the impugned Act which bars a civil remedy under Section 22 of the Special Courts Act is repugnant to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Hence, the impugned provision is bad in law and is liable to be struck down. 21. Another contention urged on behalf of the petitioners is that the services of the Central Government have been classi¬fied under the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Ap¬peal) Rules, 1965. Rule 4 of the said Rules envisages four cate¬gories of services. They are: (i) Central Civil Service Group-A (ii) Central Civil Service Group-B (iii) Central Civil Service Group-C (iv) Central Civil Service Group-D Rule 5 of the aforesaid Rules defines constitution of dif¬ferent group of services. Part I of the Schedule enumerates different service/grade of services which are classified as Group-A Services. A bare reading of the provisions of Section 2 & 2-A of the All India Services Act, 1951 read with Rules 4 and 5 of the C.C.S.(C.C.A.) Rules makes it clear that the All India Service do not belong to Group-A Services. If the expression as defined in the Rules is applied to the impugned Act for the sake of argument, then also the Special Courts Act, 2006 being ap¬plicable to only to the Group-A services of the Central or State Government, the said classification is arbitrary, irrational and mala fide and thus hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. 22. A detailed statement of counter has been filed on behalf of opposite party no.1 sworn to by Shri Kanhu Charan Sarangi, working as Deputy Secretary to Government of Orissa, Home (Special) Department traversing the various petition aver¬ments and the legal contentions urged in the writ petitions. 23. With reference to the validity of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, it has been stated that the similar Act is already held to be constitutionally valid placing reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court regarding the legislative competence to enact the Special Courts Act for establishing Special Courts. Strong reliance is placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State (Delhi Administration) v. V.C. Shukla and another, AIR 1980 SC 1382 in which the Supreme Court with reference to the impugned Act therein has held that the Act has assumed a new complexion. Strong reliance is placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State (Delhi Administration) v. V.C. Shukla and another, AIR 1980 SC 1382 in which the Supreme Court with reference to the impugned Act therein has held that the Act has assumed a new complexion. The heading of the Act shows that its main object is to provide for the speedy trial of a certain class of offences with reference to the commission of Enquiry and Investigation conducted by the Government through its agency disclosed the similar offences committed during the period of conferment of powers upon the officers of the State is a trust and holders of high public and political offices are accountable for the exercise of their powers in all cases where Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952, or investigations conducted by Government through its agencies disclose offences committed by such holders. Further it is stated that the Constitutional, Moral and legal obligations of the State to prosecute persons involved in commit¬ting such offences and whereas the ordinary Criminal Courts due to congestion of work and other reasons cannot reasonably be expected to bring those prosecutions to a speedy termination,therefore, it was imperative for the efficient func¬tioning of the parliamentary democracy and the institutions creat¬ed by or under the Constitution of India that the Commission of offences referred to in the recitals aforesaid should be judi¬cially determined with utmost dispatch and for the said purpose it is necessary to establish additional Courts presided over by sitting Judges of High Courts and whereas it is expedient to make some procedural changes whereby avoidable delay in the final determination of the innocence or guilt of the persons to be tried is eliminated without interfering with the right to a fair trial. Section 2;of the Act defines ‘Code’, ‘declaration’ and ‘Special Court’ and the residuary clause(d) thereof says that words and expressions not defined in the Act would have the same meaning as in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 3 (1) gives power to the Central Government to establish an adequate number of Special Courts by notification in the Official Gazette. Sec¬tion 3(2) enacts that a Special Court shall consist of a sitting Judge of the High Court nominated by the Chief Justice thereof with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India. Section 3 (1) gives power to the Central Government to establish an adequate number of Special Courts by notification in the Official Gazette. Sec¬tion 3(2) enacts that a Special Court shall consist of a sitting Judge of the High Court nominated by the Chief Justice thereof with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India. Sections 5(1), 5(2) 9 and 9(3) are referred to and held that provisions of Sections 238 to 243 and 248 regarding the procedure prescribed under the Cr.P.C. is made applicable. All these things are stated with reference to the Special Court Act which provisions have been examined in the Shukla’s case. The same are placed reliance by the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the opposite party no.1 in justification of the constitutional validity of the provisions of the impugned Act and the Rules. 24. Learned Senior Counsel also placed reliance upon cer¬tain decisions of the Supreme Court referred to in Shukla’s case with regard to observations made by Chandrachud, C.J. and Krishna Iyer, J. with reference to Parliamentary democracy that it will see its halcyon days in India, when law will provide for a speedy trial of all offenders who misuse the public offices held by them. He also placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in J. Jayalalitha v. Union of India and another, AIR 1999 SC 1912 and a Division Bench decision of this Court in Kishore Chandra Patel v. State of Orissa and others, 76 (1993) CLT 720 and another Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Phoolan Devi v. The State of U.P. and oth¬ers, 1997 Crl.L.J. 4134 in support of the proposition that,the Special Courts Act is a procedural statute and does not in any way affect the rights and liabilities of the petitioners under the Act and also placed reliance upon the Privy Council judgment in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills v. C.I.T., Delhi, AIR 1927 PC 242, in the case of Jose De Costa v. Bascora, AIR 1975 SC 1843 and Gurubachan Singh v. Satpal Singh, AIR 1990 SC 209 wherein the statement in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes is adverted to,in support of the legal contention that no person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution and defence in the manner pre¬scribed for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending if by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered, he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. The said observation has been quoted with approval in several decisions of the apex Court, namely, Anant Gopal v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 915 and Union of India v. Sukumar Pyne, AIR 1966 SC 1206 . it has been held in Bahadur singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 394 that a trial under a procedure different from what obtained at the time of the commis¬sion of the offence or by Court different from that which had competence at the time cannot ipso facto be held to be unconsti¬tutional and no accused has any fundamental right to trial of a particular Court or by a particular procedure. Therefore, the provisions of the Act cannot be challenged on the ground of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. Hence, the challenge made on this legal contention must fail. 25. It is further contended that, with the specific inten¬tion to avoid unnecessary delay and keeping in view the concept of speedy trial, the State Legislature has enacted the Orissa Special Courts Act, 2006 and has constituted the Special Courts to exclusively try the offences and disproportionate assets against persons holding” high public and political offices”. Further the attack on Section 5(1) contending that it is enacted to oust the jurisdiction of all Courts is untenable on the ground that the declaration as provided under Section 5(1) of the Act is a procedural step to segregate the cases meant for Special Courts from other cases instituted by Vigilance,in furtherance to achieve the object of the Act to dispose of such special category cases exclusively in specially constituted Courts. Such procedur¬al step is not prejudicial nor adverse to the interest of the accused concerned so as to confer a right of challenge to such procedural step to stall further proceeding which will be an antithesis to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. Hence, the State Legislature has consciously barred interference of any Court of law. 26. Such procedur¬al step is not prejudicial nor adverse to the interest of the accused concerned so as to confer a right of challenge to such procedural step to stall further proceeding which will be an antithesis to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. Hence, the State Legislature has consciously barred interference of any Court of law. 26. Further it is contended that the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 390 of 2008 who is an IAS Officer belong to a category other than Officers of ‘Group A’ service in the definition in the Rules is to be read in the context of categorization of the Government Officers by the State Government on the basis of their “pay scales” into Groups A, B, C and D vide resolution dated 7th June, 1999 and, therefore, he belongs to Group A category in accordance with the said Government resolution and comes under the purview of the Orissa Special Courts Act, 2006. 27. He further submitted that in Kishore Chandra Patel (supra), similarly placed petitioner questioned the constitution¬al validity of Orissa Special Courts Act, 1990 more or less on similar grounds, excepting the ground of repugnancy between the Central Law and the State law under Article 254(1) of the Consti¬tution of India. Validity of the said provision of the Act was threadbare examined by this Court and this Court made certain observations at paragraph 116 with regard to the constitutional validity of certain provisions contained in the said Act and the specific observation is made in paragraph 118 giving time to the State legislature to comply with the same to bring about the amendment to the said provision in the Act. the judgment in Kishore Chandra Patel’s case was delivered on 22.7.1993. 28. Thereafter in compliance with the direction made by the High Court, the State Government promulgated the Orissa Special Courts (Amendment) Ordinance, 1993 which was published in the Extra Ordinary Orissa Gazette on 13.8.1993 with regard to Sec¬tions 2, 5, 14, 16 and 19. the judgment in Kishore Chandra Patel’s case was delivered on 22.7.1993. 28. Thereafter in compliance with the direction made by the High Court, the State Government promulgated the Orissa Special Courts (Amendment) Ordinance, 1993 which was published in the Extra Ordinary Orissa Gazette on 13.8.1993 with regard to Sec¬tions 2, 5, 14, 16 and 19. The said provision was carefully examined by the Division Bench of this Court which held that the aforesaid proposed amendment to the Act by way of Ordinance would show that the two suggestions which this Court gave in Kishore Chandra Patel’s case to take care of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution, in so far as the provisions contained in Chapter III are concerned,have been incorporated in the Ordinance. There¬fore,according to the Division Bench of this Court the provisions of Chapter III of the Act as amended by the aforesaid Ordinance do not violate, according to the Division Bench, Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The said observation is made after noting the contention of Mr. Rath appearing for the petitioners that the Ordinance was not valid with the observation “we do not express any opinion on this aspect”. Having made such observation, at paragraph 5 it is held that the result is that the Act as amended by the aforesaid Ordinance does not suffer from any infirmity. Therefore, all the petitions stood rejected. 29. In view of the Division Bench judgment in Kishore Chan¬dra Patel’s case and the decision of the Supreme Court in V.C. Sukla’s case, learned Senior Counsel submits that there is no merit in the challenge to the provisions of the impugned Act. Hence the petitions are devoid of merit and the same are liable to be dismissed.