JUDGMENT B.P. Katakey, J. 1. This appeal by the defendant is directed against the judgment and decree dated 29.4.1999 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, North Tripura, Dharmanagar, in Title Appeal No. 4/1997, allowing the appeal preferred by the plaintiff/respondent and decreeing the suit by reversing the judgment and decree dated 31.3.1997 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Dharmanagar, North Tripura in Title Suit No. 25/1996, whereby and whereunder the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. 2. The predecessor-in-interest of the present respondent Nos. 1(a) to 1(d), Rabindra Kr. Bhattacharjee instituted Title Suit No. 25/1996 against the present appellant Smt. Minati Rani Shil in the court of the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Dharmnanagar, North Tripura for ejectment, arrear rent and compensation contending, inter alia, that the appellant/defendant was a monthly tenant according to the English calendar month, in respect of the suit house under the plaintiff since 1986, at initial monthly rent of Rs. 165, which was subsequently raised from time to time by executing different lease agreements, the last being with effect from 1.7.1992, to 30.6.1993. It has further been pleaded that despite several requests made, the appellant/defendant did not pay the monthly rent payable from September 1993 (part) and did not vacate the suit premises though the same is required for the use and occupation of the plaintiff and also for repairing the same being partially damaged due to leakage of the water through the roof. The plaintiff in the plaint his further pleaded that a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ('the Act') was thereafter, issued under registered cover with acknowledgement due asking the appellant/defendant to vacate the suit premises, which was though received in 15.5.1996, she neither replied to the notice nor vacated the suit house. The plaintiff, therefore, instituted the suit for ejectment and for realization of arrear rent from September 1993 (part) to 30th June, 1996 and also for compensation. 3. The plaintiff, therefore, instituted the suit for ejectment and for realization of arrear rent from September 1993 (part) to 30th June, 1996 and also for compensation. 3. The suit was contested by the appellant/defendant by filing written statement contending, inter alia, that the notice under Section 106 of the said Act is not valid and legal and she came to possess the suit premises as monthly tenant with effect from 5.11.1980 under one Abani Bhusan Bhattacharjee and her sister Smt. Nirada Bhattacharjee, who had accepted her as permanent tenant with the condition that so long she pays the monthly rent, she will occupy the house. It has further been pleaded in the written statement that at a later point of time Smt. Bani Bhattacharjee, mother-in-law of the plaintiff, representing herself as the true and exclusive owner of the suit premises, started collecting monthly rents after the death of Abani Bhusan Bhattacharjee, who issued receipts under her own signature but such receipts were issued showing the name of her son-in-law, the plaintiff, as the owner on the plea that she had no printed receipt book in her own name. The appellant/defendant in the written statement denied the relationship of lessor and lessee between the plaintiff and the defendant and has further pleaded that she paid the monthly rent up to December 1993 to Smt. Bani Bhattacharjee, who, however, did not issue any receipts after receiving the rent. 4. The learned trial court on the basis of the pleadings of the parties framed the following, issues for consideration and decision: 1. Is the suit maintainable in its present form? 2. Is there any cause of action for this suit? 3. Is the notice under Section 106 T.P. Act valid and legal? 4. Was the defendant a monthly tenant under the plaintiff in the suit premises? 5. Is the plaintiff entitled to get the decree as prayed for? 6. Is the plaintiff entitled to get the arrear rent and compensation from the defendant? 7. Are the parties entitled to get any other relief/reliefs/costs ? 5. 4. Was the defendant a monthly tenant under the plaintiff in the suit premises? 5. Is the plaintiff entitled to get the decree as prayed for? 6. Is the plaintiff entitled to get the arrear rent and compensation from the defendant? 7. Are the parties entitled to get any other relief/reliefs/costs ? 5. The plaintiff in order to prove his case had examined 5(five) witnesses including the plaintiff as PW-1 and also exhibited the rent receipts book showing payment of rent by the defendant for the months of June, 1986 to the month of March 1993 (Annexure A series), lease agreements dated 14.12.1987, 17.11.1988, 17.8.1989, 25.7.1990, 11.9.1991 and 11.9.1992 between the plaintiff and the defendant as Exhibit-2 series; notice issued under Section 106 of the Act; the postal receipt and the acknowledgement due card, collectively as Exhibit-3 series; the registered deed of sale transferring the suit premises by Smt. Nirada Bhattacharjee in favour of the plaintiff as Exhibit-4. The lease agreement dated 14,11.1987 for the period from 1.7.1987 to 30.6.1988, which is also part of Exhibit-2 series, had again been proved as Exhibit-5. 6. The defendant had also examined 4 (four) witnesses including the defendant herself as DW-2 and exhibited the lease agreement dated 5.11.1980 between Abani Bhusan Bhattacharjee and the defendant as Exhibit-A; document allegedly written by Abani Bhusan Bhattacharjee on 5.11.1980 that he will not charge any additional rent in respect of the land over which the suit house is situated, as Exhibit-B and the rent receipts from the month of November 1982 to March 1986 issued in the name of Nirada Bhattacharjee and Abani Bhusan Bhattacharjee as Exhibit-C series. 7. The learned trial court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff by holding that there is no relationship of lessor and lessee between the plaintiff and the defendant and by virtue of Exhibit-4/sale deed, the plaintiff cannot step into the shoes of the original lessor, there being no partition of the land between the original owners Abani Bhattacharjee and Nirada Bhaitacharjee and also on the ground that since the defendant is a yearly tenant for manufacturing purposes, she is not evictable by serving 15 (fifteen) days notice under Section 106 of the Act and can only evicted by be serving 6 (six) months notice. 8. 8. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred Title Appeal No. 4/1997, which had been decided by the learned Additional District Judge, North Tripura, Dharmanagar vide judgment dated 29.4.1999 decreeing the suit of the plaintiff by allowing the appeal and reversing the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court. The learned first appellate court while allowing the appeal has held that there was relationship of lessor and lessee between the plaintiff and the defendant; the tenancy being the monthly tenancy and not for manufacturing purposes, it is terminable by giving 15 (fifteen) days notice under Section 106 of the Act and the defendant having not paid the rent due and payable to the plaintiff for part of the month of September 1993 to June 1996, she is evictable from the suit premises. Hence, the present appeal by the defendant. 9. During pendency of the appeal before this Court, the original plaintiff died and, hence, his legal heirs were brought on record by virtue of the order dated 5.6.2006 passed in CM Application No. 42/2006. 10. A Single Bench of this Court vide order dated 16.6.1999 while admitting the appeal for hearing had passed the following order relating to the substantial question of law involved in the appeal: The substantial question evolved with the documents dated 5.11.1980 marked Exs. 'A' and 'B' shall be heard and any other ground may also be heard at the time of hearing. 11. Another Single Bench of this Court vide order dated 27.11.2009 framed the following substantial question of law for hearing of the appeal: Whether the first appellate court completely ignores the materials documents and evidence in the record while passing the impugned decree dated 29.4.1999 ? 12. I have heard Mr. B. Das, the Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, the Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents. 13. Mr. Das, the Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has submitted that it is apparent from the evidences adduced by the parties that Abani Bhattacharjee and Smt. Nirada Bhattacharjee were the original owners in respect of the suit premises under whom the appellant/defendant was the tenant and in the absence of any proof relating to the partition of the property between said Abani Bhattacharjee and Nirada Bhattacharjee, no title can be passed on to the original plaintiff, namely, Rabindra Kr. Bhattacharjee, by virtue of the sale deed dated 27.5.1986 (Exhibit-4) executed by one of the co-owners of the suit property, namely Smt. Nirada Bhattacharjee and as such, the plaintiff cannot be the lessor in respect of the suit premises. It has further been submitted that there being no relationship of lessor and lessee between the plaintiff and the defendant and the defendant never having attorn the plaintiff as the lessor and no rent having been paid to him, which was in fact paid to Smt. Bani Bhattacharjee, the mother-in-law of the plaintiff, the suit filed by the original plaintiff for eviction of the defendant cannot be decreed. Mr. Das, further submits that the very basis for issuing notice under Section 106 of the Act being the alleged lease agreement dated 11.9.1992 (document No. 2 in Exhibit-2 series), which is evidently forged, as the deed was shown to have been executed on 11.9.1992 on the stamp paper purchased on 17.9.1992, the suit of the plaintiff ought not to have been decreed by the learned first appellate court, as, such vexatious suit is required to be nipped in the bud as held by the Apex Court in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and Anr. AIR 1977 SC 2421 . It has further been contended by the Learned Senior Counsel that by the lease agreements exhibited as Exhibit 2 series, the lease for one year having boon created, no suit can be brought by the plaintiff on the basis of such lease agreements, those being not registered, as Section 107 of the transfer of property Act stipulates that a lease of immovable property from year to year can only be made by a registered instrument. Mr. Das further submits that the learned first appellate court while decreeing the suit of the plaintiff also did not consider the comparative hardship of the plaintiff and the defendant as required to be considered and as held by the Apex Court in Purushottam Das v. The VIII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Allahabad and Ors. AIR 1977 SC 1520 and B. Kandasamy Reddiar v. O. Gomathi Ammal AIR 1998 SC 3235 . 14. Mr. AIR 1977 SC 1520 and B. Kandasamy Reddiar v. O. Gomathi Ammal AIR 1998 SC 3235 . 14. Mr. Chakraborty, the Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, supporting the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate court has contended that it is evident from the Exhibit-1 series, i.e., the receipts issued by the plaintiff acknowledging payment of rent from June 1986 to March 1993, wherein the defendant had also put her signatures, that the plaintiff was the lessor and defendant was the lessee in respect of the suit premises, which has been accepted by the defendant and, hence, there was a relationship of lessor and lessee between the plaintiff and the defendant. It has further been contended that the defendant being the lessee under the plaintiff, she cannot subsequently deny the title of the plaintiff as sought to be done. That apart, according to the Learned Senior Counsel, the plaintiff by adducing the evidence could prove that after partition between the original owners, namely Abani Bhattacharjee and Smt. Nirada Bhattacharjee, the suit premises fell in the share of Smt. Nirada Bhattacharjee, who transferred the same to the plaintiff by the sale deed/Exhibit-4. Mr. Chakraborty further submits that the tenancy being the monthly tenancy, the lease agreements are not required to be registered and the lease of the immovable property being not for manufacturing purposes, it is terminable by 15 days notice under Section 106 of the said Act. The Learned Senior Counsel further submits that even assuming that the lease agreement dated 11.9.1992 cannot be termed as valid, then also the plaintiff being able to prove that the defendant is a monthly tenant under the plaintiff, she is bound to pay or tender the rent to the plaintiff at the proper time or place as per the earlier agreement, which she having failed to pay, is evictable from the suit premises and, hence, the learned first appellate court has rightly passed the decree. 15. I have considered the submissions of the Learned Counsel for the parties and also perused the materials available on record including the judgments and decrees passed by the learned courts below. 16. 15. I have considered the submissions of the Learned Counsel for the parties and also perused the materials available on record including the judgments and decrees passed by the learned courts below. 16. As noticed above, the learned trial court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff on 3 (three) grounds, namely - (i) there is no relationship of lessor and lessee between the plaintiff and the defendant; (ii) the plaintiff by virtue of the sale deed/Exhibit-4, in the absence of any partition of property between the original owners, cannot step into shoes of the lessor and (iii) the tenancy being the yearly tenancy and for manufacturing purposes, the defendant is not evictable by issuing 15 days notice under Section 106 of the Act. The learned first appellate court, however, has reversed such judgment and decreed the suit of the plaintiff by holding that (i) there was relationship of lessor and lessee between the plaintiff and the defendant; (ii) the plaintiff acquired the title of the suit premises by virtue of Exhibit-4/sale deed, which was executed by Smt. Nirada Bhattacharjee in favour of the plaintiff after the land was partitioned between its original owners, namely Abani Bhattacharjee and Nirada Bhattacharjee; (iii) the tenancy being the monthly tenancy and not for manufacturing purposes, the defendant is evictable by giving 15 days notice under Section 106 of the said Act and (iv) the defendant having failed to pay the rent payable to the plaintiff, she is evictable from the suit premises. 17. The plaintiff in order to substantiate his plea that he is the owner in respect of the suit premises has proved the sale deed dated 27.5.1986 (Exhibit-4), by which the suit premises had been transferred by one of the original owners, namely Smt. Nirada Bhattacharjee, in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff also in order to prove the relationship of lessor and lessee between him and the defendant proved Exhibit-A series, i.e., the counterfoil of the rent receipts issued by the plaintiff to the defendant in token of receipt of rent from the month of June 1986 to. March 1993. The plaintiff has also proved the signatures of the defendant on such counterfoils. 18. March 1993. The plaintiff has also proved the signatures of the defendant on such counterfoils. 18. It is evident from the said Exhibit-A series that the defendant has accepted the plaintiff as the lessor in respect of the suit premises having paid the rent from the month of June 1986 to March 1993 and by putting her signatures in the counterfoil of such receipts, which signatures have not been denied by the defendant. No doubt the rents for different months were collected by different persons including Bani Bhattacharjee, but the fact remains that the plaintiff was the lessor in respect of the suit premises, as it has clearly been mentioned in such receipts to that effect, which had been accepted by the defendant by putting her signatures therein. The defendant, therefore, cannot deny the title of the lessor, which she wanted to do by pleading that in the absence of any partition between the original owners, namely Abani Bhattacharjee and Nirada Bhattacharjee, the suit premises cannot be transferred by Nirada Bhattacharjee in favour of the plaintiff by Exhibit-4, even assuming that there was no partition of land between the original owners. The plaintiff, however, as noticed above, even proved such mutual partition and also the transfer of the suit premises by Smt. Nirada Bhattacharjee in his favour on 27.5.1986 vide Exhbit-4/sale deed. Hence, the learned first appellate court has rightly held that there was relationship of the lessor and lessee between the plaintiff and the defendant. 19. Exhibit-A and Exhibit-B both dated 5.11.1980, proved by the defendant cannot in any way disprove the relationship of lessor and lessee between the plaintiff and the defendant. By Exhibit-A, lease agreement in respect of the suit premises was executed between Abani Bhattacharjee and the defendant and by Exhibit-B executed by Abani Bhattacharjee, it was agreed that no separate rent would be charged in respect of the land over which the suit premises is situated. Exhibit-C series are the rent receipts issued by Abani Bhattacharjee and Nirada Bhattacharjee for the period from November 1980 to March 1986, wherefrom it appears that the defendant was a monthly lessee in respect of the suit premises according to the English calendar month initially under Abani Bhattacharjee and Nirada Bhattacharjee. Exhibit-C series are the rent receipts issued by Abani Bhattacharjee and Nirada Bhattacharjee for the period from November 1980 to March 1986, wherefrom it appears that the defendant was a monthly lessee in respect of the suit premises according to the English calendar month initially under Abani Bhattacharjee and Nirada Bhattacharjee. However, by virtue of the transfer vide sale deed dated 27.5.1986 (Exhibit-4), after the mutual partition of the property between the original owners, Abani Bhattacharjee and Nirada Bhattacharjee, the plaintiff become the owner of the suit premises and the defendant by paying rent to the plaintiff has attorned him as the lessor in respect of the suit premises. 20. As noticed above, the defendant was a monthly tenant under the plaintiff as the lessor in respect of the suit premises and the suit premises having let out for running of tailoring shop, it cannot be termed as the lease of the property for manufacturing purposes within the meaning of Section 106(1) of the said Act so as to constitute a lease from year to year and terminable by giving six months notice. No argument has also been advanced by the Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant to the effect that lease was for manufacturing purpose. No lease of immovable property from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving yearly rent, having been created by the lease agreements (Exhibit-2 series), those cannot be termed as invalid on the ground of not being registered as stipulated in Section 107 of the said Act. It is evident from the lease agreements (Exhibit-2 series) that the lease was the monthly lease reserving monthly rent and not from year to year or for any term exceeding 1 (one) year or reserving a yearly rent, hence, such lease agreements are not required to be registered and can be made even by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. 21. Section 116 of the said Act lays down the effect of holding over. 21. Section 116 of the said Act lays down the effect of holding over. If the lessee or under lessee remains in possession of the property after the determination of the lease granted to the lessee, and the lessor or his legal representative accepts rents from the lessee, or under lessee or otherwise ascents to his continuing in possession, the lease is, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, renewed from year to year or from month to month, according to the purpose for which the property is leased, as specified in Section 106 of the said Act. Hence, in case of a lease from month to month and for a particular period of time, if the lessee, ' even after expiry of that period of lease, continues in possession of the property and pays rent to the lessor which he accepts, the lease stands renewed from month to month and in the same terms and conditions as well as purpose for which it was created, by virtue of doctrine of holding over, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary. In the instant case, prior to the lease agreement dated 11.9.1992 (document No. 2 of Exhibit-2 series), which agreement according to the lessee is not valid, another lease agreement dated 11.9.1991 (document No. 1 of Exhibit-2 series) was executed between the plaintiff and the defendant creating lease on month to month basis reserving monthly rent and for a period of 1 (one) year expiring on 30.6.1990. The lessee even after expiry of the period of the said lease continued to be in possession of the leased out premises and paid the monthly rent to the lessor up to March 1993, for which the receipts in writing were issued and proved by the lessor as Exhibit-1 series, wherein the signatures of the lessee appears, which are proved. The lessee even after expiry of the period of the said lease continued to be in possession of the leased out premises and paid the monthly rent to the lessor up to March 1993, for which the receipts in writing were issued and proved by the lessor as Exhibit-1 series, wherein the signatures of the lessee appears, which are proved. Therefore, even if, the lease agreement dated 11.9.1992 (document No. 2 in Exhibit-2) is accepted to be not valid, then also, since after expiry of the period of lease created vide lease agreement dated 11.9.1991, the lessee continued to remain in possession of the leased out premises and pays the rent to the lessor, which was accepted by the lessor, the lease from month to month on the conditions in which it was earlier created vide lease agreement dated 11.9.1991 stands renewed under Section116 of the said Act, it is being not the case of the defendant that there was an agreement to the contrary. 22. By agreement dated 11.9.1991, both the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to the following conditions, while creating lease in respect of the suit premises: (i) The tenancy is created with effect from 1.7.1991 at a monthly rent of Rs. 231 in accordance with the English calendar month on condition that the lessee shall pay the said rent to the lessor, who will have the right to evict the lessee. (ii) This agreement shall be for a period from 1 year, i.e., up to 30.6.1992. (iii).... (iv) The monthly rent on each month shall be paid within first week of the succeeding month and the lessee in token of payment of such rent shall obtain receipt from the lessor. One of the conditions stipulated in the said lease agreement was, therefore, for payment of the monthly rent for each English calendar month by the lessee to the lessor within first week of the succeeding calendar month. 23. Such lease, therefore, can be determined under Section 111 of the said Act, if the lessee breaches any condition of the lease. As noticed above, the lessor issued the notice under Section106 of the said Act by giving 15 (fifteen) days time to vacate the suit premises amongst other, on the ground of breach of one of the conditions of the tenancy, i.e., non-payment of monthly rent, receipt of which has not been denied by the lessee. As noticed above, the lessor issued the notice under Section106 of the said Act by giving 15 (fifteen) days time to vacate the suit premises amongst other, on the ground of breach of one of the conditions of the tenancy, i.e., non-payment of monthly rent, receipt of which has not been denied by the lessee. The defendant, though received the said notice, did not reply the same. Though such notice had a mention about the lease agreement dated 11.9.1992 (document No. 2 in Exhibit-2 series), the lessee being in possession of the leased out property and having paid the rent up to part of September 1993, it would not render the notice under Section 106 invalid, since, as noticed above, the lease between the lessor and the lessee stands renewed from month to month and under the same terms and conditions as well as the purpose for which it was earlier created vide lease agreement dated 11.9.1991 (document No. 1 of Exhibit-2 series), in view of Section 116 of the said Act and there being no subsequent agreement to the contrary. 24. It appears from the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate court that the ground on which the decree of eviction has been passed is the non-payment of rent by the lessee to the lessor, i.e., by the defendant to the plaintiff, thereby violating the terms of the lease. No argument has been put forward by the Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant challenging finding recorded relating to non-payment of rent by the defendant to the plaintiff. As discussed above, there was a lease agreement in writing between the plaintiff and the defendant, whereby and whereunder the defendant undertook to pay the monthly rent for each English calendar month to the plaintiff in the first week of succeeding calendar month at the rate fixed. The relationship of lessor and lessee having been established, the defendant cannot deny the title of the plaintiff in respect of the leased out premises. The plaintiff in the plaint has pleaded that the defendant after paying half of the rent payable for the month of September 1993, did not pay the rent thereafter, for which the notice under Section 106 of the Act had been issued terminating the tenancy, for violating the conditions of the lease. Oral evidence has also been led by the plaintiff in that respect. Oral evidence has also been led by the plaintiff in that respect. The plaintiff also produced the receipt books to demonstrate the months up to which the monthly rent was paid by the defendant. In the written statement filed, the defendant, as noticed above, denied the relationship of lessor and lessee between the plaintiff and her and further contended that Bani Bhattacharjee, the mother-in-law of the plaintiff, is the owner and the lessor of the suit premises and the rent up to December 1993 was paid to her. It has further been pleaded that thereafter, said Smt. Bani Bhattacharjee refused to accept the rent and told the defendant that she would neither issue the receipt nor accept the payment of rent. The defendant in the written statement has further pleaded that the receipts after accepting rent up to the month December 1993 were also not issued by said Smt. Bani Bhattacharjee, though rent was received by her up to December 1993. 25. The defendant, therefore, at least admitted in her pleadings in the written statement that she did not pay the rent in respect of the suit premises from January 1994, which though according to her was tendered, the said Smt. Bani Bhattacharjee declined to receive. Smt. Bani Bhattacharjee was examined by the plaintiff as PW-4. In her evidence she has categorically stated that the suit premises belongs to the plaintiff though she collected the rent on behalf of the plaintiff and receipts were issued in token of receipt of the rent whenever the same was paid by the defendant. She has also stated that she did not accept any rent from the defendant without issuing any receipt. The defendant could not elicit anything from the said witness relating to the payment of rent up to December 1993, The defendant in fact did not put any question to the said witness relating to the offer of rent after December 1993 and her alleged refusal to accept the same. The defendant also could not substantiate such plea taken in the written statement by adducing any cogent evidence. The defendant also could not substantiate such plea taken in the written statement by adducing any cogent evidence. The defendant even did not pay or tender to the plaintiff the rent in arrear, together with interest thereon or expressed her willingness to furnish such security within 15 days to the court below, though the lease was determined by issuing the notice on the ground of non-payment of rent and the suit was initiated for her eviction on the said ground, as required under Section 114 of the Act, so as to get the protection from making a decree for ejectment. The defendant, on the contrary, denied the relationship of lessor and lessee between the plaintiff and her. 26. There cannot be any dispute to the proposition of law as laid down by the Apex Court in T. Arivandandam (supra) that, if the plaint is manifestly vexatious and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing clear right to suit, the trial court should exercise the power under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC and if the trial court is satisfied that the litigation was inspired by vexatious motives, such suit should be nipped in the bud. The said principle of law, however, in view of the facts and circumstances, cannot be applied in the instant case. The decision of the Apex Court in Purushottam Das (supra) and B. Kandasamy Reddiar (supra) being based on the provisions of the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation and Rating Land and Eviction) Act and the Tamilnadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, respectively, which require taking into account the comparative hardship of landlord and tenant, in the matter of eviction of tenant on the ground of requirement of the tenanted premises by the landlord for his own use and occupation, are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case, the decree having been passed on the ground of violation of condition of lease, i.e., non-payment of rent. 27. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the decree passed by the learned first appellate court does not require any interference and, hence, the appeal is dismissed. The parties are, however, directed to bear their own cost. Appeal dismissed