JUDGMENT 1. - This intra-court appeal is directed against the order dated 15.02.2000 whereby the learned Single Judge of this Court has dismissed with costs the writ petition (CWP No. 4898/1990) filed by the petitioner-appellant against the demand notice dated 15.09.1990 (Annex.1) as issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Kishangarh for recovery of an amount of Rs. 99,028.61. 2. The writ petition aforesaid was filed with the averments, inter alia, that the petitioner-appellant, a registered partnership firm, submitted its tender in response to the notice inviting tenders ('NIT') for execution of the work of excavation of RMC Chain 320-350 subject to certain conditions and the appellant did not withdraw from the condition though asked for by the Executive Engineer, Som Kambla Amba Canal Division by the letter dated 22.05.1979 (Annex.4); that under the telegram dated 31.08.1979, the Superintending Engineer Irrigation, Construction Circle, Udaipur stated that the tender aforesaid had been approved by the Additional Chief Engineer and the Executive Engineer be contacted to start the work; and that the Assistant Engineer concerned informed the appellant by the letter dated 01.09.1979 (Annex.5) that the work had been allotted to it at 6.71 % above BSR rates and the Executive Engineer concerned be contacted for necessary action. It was further averred that the Executive Engineer, by his letter dated 09.10.1979 (Annex.6), asked the appellant to immediately start the work; and threatened to take proceedings under Clauses (2) and (3) of the agreement in case of default whereupon the appellant informed the Executive Engineer by the communication dated 11.10.1979 (Annex.7) that the allotment of work was not as per the conditions subject to which the tender was given and there was no question of starting the work. The appellant further averred that a number of letters were exchanged and the correspondence in the same line continued until the letter dated 06.03.1980 (Annex.8) whereby the Executive Engineer stated that the tender condition had been accepted but, by that time, the validity of the tender had already come to an end; and the fact was notified to the authorities concerned under the communication dated 20.03.1980. 3. 3. The appellant referred to the exchange of further communications and submitted that ultimately, the Executive Engineer was informed by the letter dated 10.06.1980 (Annex.10) that the work allotted under the letter dated 31.08.1979 was not acceptable to the appellant for the reason that the tender was submitted subject to certain conditions and the department did not mention anything regarding acceptance of the conditions at the time of issuing the work order. 4. It may be pointed out at this juncture that in the said communication dated 10.06.1980 (Annex.10), the appellant stated that though the department had issued a revised letter dated 02.11.1979 mentioning acceptance of the conditions but the validity of the tender had expired on 31.08.1979. This communication dated 02.11.1979, as referred in the letter dated 10.06.1980, has not been produced on record and, as noticed, the suggestion in the writ petition has been as if the Executive Engineer stated acceptance of the tender conditions only by the letter dated 06.03.1980 (Annex.8). Be that as it may, in sum and substance, the stand of the appellant had been that there was no fault on its part and, when the offer had not been accepted with the attached condition within the period of validity and when no agreement was entered into between itself and the respondents, the appellant was not obliged to execute the work. 5. The appellant submitted that without any fault on its part, the department proceeded to allege by the letter dated 10.11.1981 that there was a liability in the appellant to compensate them at the rate of 18% of the cost price amounting to Rs. 14,501/- for the work having not been completed; and the appellant was called upon to deposit this amount failing which proceedings for realisation were threatened. It was pointed out that in the aforesaid circumstances, the recovery was sought to be forced upon the appellant for realisation of the said amount as per the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1956') and the Rajasthan Public Demands Recovery Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as 'the PDR Act'). 6. It was pointed out that in the aforesaid circumstances, the recovery was sought to be forced upon the appellant for realisation of the said amount as per the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1956') and the Rajasthan Public Demands Recovery Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as 'the PDR Act'). 6. The petitioner-appellant further averred that upon receiving the demand, a notice was served by the Collector, Banswara whereupon the objections were submitted to the Collector but the same were rejected by the order dated 23.07.1986 (Annex.12); and, thereafter, though the appellant preferred an appeal to the Revenue Appellate Authority, but the same was dismissed in default. The petitioner-appellant, while stating want of information from the counsel, submitted that the fact about dismissal of appeal could be noticed only after receipt of the impugned notice for recovery. 7. The petitioner-appellant referred to the demand notice dated 15.09.1990 as issued to enforce recovery of a sum of Rs. 99,028.61 and stated the grounds in the writ petition that the proceedings for recovery were wholly without jurisdiction; that no contract was ever entered into with the State Government and hence, there was no question of anything being recoverable under the Act of 1956; and that even if the appeal filed by the appellant before the Revenue Appellate Authority had been dismissed in default, the proceedings were nevertheless without jurisdiction. The petitioner -appellant prayed for the following relief's in the writ petition: “ 10/I by an appropriate writ, order or direction - 10/I/a. It may be declared that no amount whatsoever as set out in the Notice of Demand Annexure-1 is open to be realised from the Petitioner; 10/I/b. the Respondents be prohibited from taking any proceedings against the Petitioner pursuant to Notice of Demand and Citation of Appearance Annex.1; 10/I/c. if for any reason any amount is recovered from the Petitioner then Respondents be directed to return the same to the Petitioner with interest @ 18% per annum on and from the date the amount is recovered from the Petitioner till same is refunded to the Petitioner. 10/II. Any other appropriate writ, order or direction as may be considered proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be made. 10/III Cost of the writ petition be allowed to the Petitioner.” 8. 10/II. Any other appropriate writ, order or direction as may be considered proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be made. 10/III Cost of the writ petition be allowed to the Petitioner.” 8. The respondents submitted a detailed reply contesting the writ petition with the submissions, inter alia, that the appellant initially offered his rate at 8.11% above G Schedule rates with five conditions but during negotiations, reduced it to 6.71% above G Schedule rates with one condition; and the negotiated rate was accepted and sanction was conveyed on 31.08.1979. The respondents referred to the 'condition' as relied upon by the appellant that read: "Any extra item will be done by us will be paid at premium rate and with our running bills"; and submitted that since item No. 16 of the NIT already covered this condition, there was no separate mention in the sanction but when the appellant insisted on incorporation of the condition that the formal order was issued on 13.02.1980. However, according to the respondents, the appellant incurred the liability to compensate the department under the terms of the contract on failing to execute the agreement and to start the work. It was also averred that with dismissal of the appeal by the Revenue Appellate Authority and for not taking recourse to appropriate remedies under the PDR Act, the appellant was not entitled to question the proceedings in the writ jurisdiction. 9. The learned Single Judge considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties in the impugned order dated 15.02.2000 and held that for having failed to execute the agreement and to start the work, the appellant was liable to compensate and the recovery could not be held void ab-initio. The learned Single Judge particularly referred to Clause-11 of the NIT providing for the liability in case of the successful tenderer not executing the agreement or starting the work within the prescribed period. The learned Single Judge also referred to the facts relating to the petition denying liability and the appeal preferred by the petitioner-appellant; and observed that when the appeal stood dismissed in default, the petitioner-appellant ought to have resorted to the appropriate remedies before the appellate authority but the appellant did not do so for the reasons best known to it. The learned Single Judge also referred to the facts relating to the petition denying liability and the appeal preferred by the petitioner-appellant; and observed that when the appeal stood dismissed in default, the petitioner-appellant ought to have resorted to the appropriate remedies before the appellate authority but the appellant did not do so for the reasons best known to it. The learned Single Judge further pointed out that in case the petitioner-appellant was of the view that the provisions of the PDR Act were not attracted, the enactment itself provided for remedy of filing the suit that was also not resorted to; and in view of such remedy, the writ petition could not be entertained. The learned Single Judge yet further observed that the consequential order could not be challenged without challenging the principal orders. The learned Single Judge summarised the findings and conclusions that could usefully be reproduced as under: In view of the above, I reach the following inescapable conclusions: "(1) Petitioner has submitted his tender with his eyes open knowing fully the consequences of non-compliance of the terms and conditions incorporated in the tender-inviting-notice; (2) Clause 11 of the said notice specifically provided for liability in case the successful tenderer does not execute the agreement or starts work within the period prescribed therein; (3) Petitioner failed to execute the agreement and start work, therefore, he was liable to compensate as per the provisions applicable therein and the recovery cannot be held to be void ab initio; (4) Petitioner filed the petition under Section 8 of the Act, 1952, denying the applicability of the provisions of the Act for recovery. As his objections were regarding non-application of the Act, it cannot be held that he has submitted to the jurisdiction of the Authorities under the Act. (Vide State of Tripura v. The Province of East Bengal, AIR 1951 SC 23 ); (5) Petitioner preferred the appeal against the said order passed under the Act before the Revenue Appellate Authority which stood dismissed in default. (Vide State of Tripura v. The Province of East Bengal, AIR 1951 SC 23 ); (5) Petitioner preferred the appeal against the said order passed under the Act before the Revenue Appellate Authority which stood dismissed in default. Petitioner ought to have resorted to the remedy before the Appellate Forum and satisfy the said Authority that the provisions of the Act were not applicable, but he did not persue the appeal for the reasons best known to him, the appellate or revisional Authority could also examine the issue of applicability of the Acts, 1952 and 1956; (6) In case petitioner was of the view that the provisions of the Act are not attracted, the Act of 1952 itself provides for a remedy of filing suit within the stipulated period. Petitioner did not resort to the remedy provided by the said provision. Thus, he deprived himself of the opportunity of redressing his grievances before the Appropriate Forum. In fact, provisions of Section 30 of the Act providing for filing of the suit in such a case make the whole difference for the reason that it provides for a period of limitation to challenge the order passed under the Act and takes away the effect of the judgments referred to above on behalf of the petitioner, that the order can be challenged even at a belated stage whenever it is enforced against the party aggrieved; and (7) As the Statute itself provides for remedy of appeal, revision or filing a civil suit, the writ pe cannot be entertained. More so, the consequential order cannot be challenged without challenging the main orders; 10. The learned Single Judge, thus, found the petition to be an abuse of the process of the Court and, accordingly, dismissed the same with costs quantified at Rs. 2,000/-. 11. Assailing the order aforesaid, it has strenuously been argued on behalf of the appellant that the proceedings for recovery as sought to be adopted in this matter remain wholly without jurisdiction and the learned Single Judge has erred in dismissing the writ petition without examining the submissions in right perspective. 2,000/-. 11. Assailing the order aforesaid, it has strenuously been argued on behalf of the appellant that the proceedings for recovery as sought to be adopted in this matter remain wholly without jurisdiction and the learned Single Judge has erred in dismissing the writ petition without examining the submissions in right perspective. It is submitted that indisputably, the appellant made a conditional offer and the same was not accepted with the condition; that the acceptance being not of the offer as made, no concluded contract came into existence between the parties; and that, in the given fact situation, the appellant was not obliged to execute the work. It is further submitted that the belated attempt on the part of the respondents to accept the condition, much after the expiry of the period of validity of offer, was an exercise in futility and in any case, no contract could be considered existing between the parties for such belated acceptance of the condition. It is yet further submitted that in any case, the amount sought to be imposed upon and recovered from the appellant is not recoverable under the PDR Act for it does not fall in any of the categories of the dues enumerated in the Schedule to the PDR Act and hence, is not a public demand per Section 2(5) read with the Schedule ibid. It is submitted that the proceedings being wholly without jurisdiction, were rightly challenged in the writ jurisdiction of this Court; and the learned Single Judge has erred in dismissing the writ petition on entirely irrelevant considerations. 12. Per contra, the learned Government Counsel, while supporting the order passed by the learned Single Judge, submitted that in the present case, the writ petition was a baseless one wherein only the demand notice was sought to be challenged that was issued after rejection of the objection petition by the Collector and after dismissal of the appeal by the Revenue Appellate Authority. 13. Having given a thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions and having examined the record of the case with reference to the law applicable, we are inclined to concur with the learned Single Judge. 14. Indisputably, the department sent the requisition to the Collector for effecting recovery from the appellant as a public demand and thereupon, a notice was issued to the petitioner per Section 6 of the PDR Act. 14. Indisputably, the department sent the requisition to the Collector for effecting recovery from the appellant as a public demand and thereupon, a notice was issued to the petitioner per Section 6 of the PDR Act. The appellant did submit the petition denying liability as permissible by Section 8 of the PDR Act. The said petition denying liability, after consideration, came to be rejected by the Collector, Banswara by his order dated 23.07.1986 (Annex.12). The appellant was entitled to challenge the said order way of an appeal under Section 23-A of the PDR Act; and did prefer such an appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Udaipur wherein, an interim order was also passed in favour of the appellant. However, the said appeal was dismissed by the Revenue Appellate Authority, Udaipur at its camp Banswara on 08.06.1987 for want of appearance on behalf of the appellant. The appellant never bothered to get the said appeal restored to file nor took recourse to the other specific and efficacious remedies available under the PDR Act as we shall presently refer to. 15. It appears that the appellant simply ignored the process of law and then, chose to file the writ petition in the year 1990 only after receiving the notice issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Kishangarh (Ajmer), to whom the process had been sent from Dungarpur for enforcing recovery. Such a belated attempt on the part of the appellant to question the recovery proceedings could not have been countenanced and was required to be rejected, particularly in view of dismissal of the objection petition and the appeal under the PDR Act. 16. The significant aspect of the matter remains that under Section 20 of the PDR Act, the appellant had had an efficacious remedy of filing a suit for cancellation of certificate and for consequential relief; and such a suit could have been filed within 6 months from the date of service of notice under Section 6, or from the date of determination of the petition denying liability under Section 8, or even from the date of decision of the appeal under Section 23A ibid. The provisions as contained in Section 20 of the PDR Act read as under: "20. Suits for cancellation or modification of certificates.- (1) A defaulter may bring a suit to have a certificate cancelled or modified and for any further consequential relief to which he may be entitled. The provisions as contained in Section 20 of the PDR Act read as under: "20. Suits for cancellation or modification of certificates.- (1) A defaulter may bring a suit to have a certificate cancelled or modified and for any further consequential relief to which he may be entitled. (2) Such a suit may be brought at any time within 6 months - (a) from the service upon the defaulter of the notice required by Section 6, or (b) from the date of determination of a petition denying liability, under Section 8, or (c) from the date of the protest lodged by him under Section 15, or (d) from the date of the decision of an appeal filed by him under Section 23A. Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in this Act and in any other law for the time being in force, the defaulter may in a suit instituted, under section, prove that nothing was due from him on account of the public demand or that the amount due was less than the amount stated in the certificate. 17. It is manifest that in the scheme of PDR Act, substantial number of opportunities are available to a defaulter to question the recovery proceedings and to make out a case against his liability viz., by filing a petition denying liability; by taking the matter in appeal; and by filing a suit for cancellation or modification of certificate at any of the given stages. These remedies are apart from the availability of revisional jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue under Section 23-B of the PDR Act. 18. Moreover, under Clause (c) of Section 20 of the PDR Act, the defaulter may file such a suit within 6 months after making payment, per Section 15 ibid, of the amount due under the certificate to the officer executing it under protest. We are unable to find even a remote reason that the appellant did not take recourse to the specific statutory remedies available to it under the PDR Act itself. Exercise of writ jurisdiction in the present case was required to be, and has rightly been, declined by the learned Single Judge. 19. The submission that the demand in question is not referable to any of the items contained in the Schedule to PDR Act is not correct. Exercise of writ jurisdiction in the present case was required to be, and has rightly been, declined by the learned Single Judge. 19. The submission that the demand in question is not referable to any of the items contained in the Schedule to PDR Act is not correct. The demand is directly referable to item No. 6 of the said Schedule that reads as under: 6. Any money payable to the State Government or to a department or an officer of Government (i) Under or in pursuance of written instrument, or (ii) Under or in pursuance of an agreement evidenced by a writing, a correspondence or otherwise in repayment of any advances or in lieu of any services rendered or supplies made by the Government or such department or officer of Government. 20. After examining the record in its totality, we are clearly of the view that even the suggestion of the petitioner about want of acceptance of its tender condition has itself been rather of pretence and avoidance. It appears that in this matter, the appellant initially offered the rate at 8.11% above the G Schedule rates with five conditions but during negotiations, reduced the rates to 6.71% above the G Schedule rates with one condition that extra items shall be paid at the premium rate with the running bills. The department has pointed out in its reply to the writ petition that such a condition was not separately incorporated because item No. 16 of the NIT already covered the same; and it was only for the insistence of the appellant of incorporation of the said condition that the formal order dated 13.02.1980 was issued. It could further be discerned from the appellant's letter dated 10.06.1980 that, in fact, acceptance of the condition had been communicated earlier too i.e., by the letter dated 02.11.1979. Though this letter dated 02.11.1979 has not been produced on record but from the exchange of letters and communications, it does appear that the appellant had been harping on the said condition only in order to somehow avoid execution of the agreement and the work. Though this letter dated 02.11.1979 has not been produced on record but from the exchange of letters and communications, it does appear that the appellant had been harping on the said condition only in order to somehow avoid execution of the agreement and the work. We find the department right in its submission that the said condition in the offer was rather superfluous for it was, in substance and essence, even otherwise contained in the NIT (Annex.R/2) at item No. 16 that reads as under: " leLr vfrfjDr vkbZVe dk Hkqxrku ch0,l0 vkj0 ftlds vk/kkj ij " th " f'kM~;qy cuk gS ds vuqlkj vkSj Bsdsnkj }kjk tks f'kM~;wy esa nh xbZ izfr'kr vf/kd ;k de tSlk Hkh gks ds vuqlkj fd;k tkosxkA " 21. In any case, the department did accede to the request of the appellant and issued formal orders for incorporating the said condition; and the appellant could not have avoided the contract only on the basis of this superfluous condition allegedly stated in the offer. 22. Taking a comprehensive view of the matter, we are satisfied that the demand as raised by the respondents cannot be said to be void ab initio. In the exchange of communications and negotiations, a concluded contract did come into existence between the parties; and, when Clause-11 of the NIT specifically provided for the liability in case the successful tenderer did not execute the agreement or start the work and when the appellant failed to carry out the requirements of the terms of contract, the department was justified in adopting the proceedings under the said Clause 11 of the NIT that reads as under: " lQy fufonkdj dk dk;Z izkjEHk djus ds fy;s vkns'k izkIr gksus dh rkjh[k ls lkr fnu esa Bsds dk bdjkj ukek ( dfUM'ku QkSj dUV~kDVj ,xzhesUV ) fu"iknu djuk gksxk vkSj mDr fyf[kr vkns'k izkIr gksus ds rkjh[k ls 15 fnu esa dk;Z izkjEHk djuk iMs+xk lQy fufonksdkj }kjk mDr izdkj ls lkr fnu esa bdjkj ukek fu"ikfnr ugha djus ;k 15 fnu esa dk;Z izkjEHk ugha djs dh fLFkfr esa bdjkjukek dh 'kjk;r 2 vkSj 3 tks fd Vs.Mj QkeZ lh esa layXu gS] vuqlkj dk;Zokgh dh tkosxhA " 23. We are further inclined to agree with the learned Single Judge that the writ petition has been an abuse of process of the Court. We are further inclined to agree with the learned Single Judge that the writ petition has been an abuse of process of the Court. It is noticed that in the frame of the writ petition, the petitioner-appellant consciously chose not to challenge the principal orders as passed in the proceedings under the PDR Act; but only attempted to question the process of recovery. In the face of the orders standings against the appellant whereby the petition denying liability had been rejected and appeal had been dismissed in default, a challenge to the consequential recovery proceedings could not have been countenanced. 24. In view of what has been discussed above, this appeal deserves to be dismissed with costs and hence, is hereby dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 3,300/- (Rupees three thousand three hundred).Appeal Dismissed. *******