JUDGMENT Jasti Chelameswar, C.J. 1. The four appellants are petitioners in WP(C) No. 1355/2008, which was dismissed by an order, dated 25.7.2008, alongwith a number of other writ petitions, which were clubbed together and heard by the learned Judge as certain common questions arose. 2. Essentially, the question, with reference to each of the appellants herein, is whether he or she is a 'citizen' of India or a 'foreigner' within the meaning of the expression "foreigner", as defined under Section 2(a) of the Foreigners Act, 1946, which reads: 2(a) "foreigner means a person, who is not a citizen of India. 3. The definition is couched in negative language. Therefore, it becomes necessary to examine whether a person is a citizen of India or not in order to determine whether the person is a foreigner or not. However, the expression "citizen" is not defined in any statute. 4. Who is a citizen of India? The law, on this aspect, is contained in Part-II of the Constitution. Articles 5 to 11 thereof deal with the citizenship of this country. Article 5 declares as follows: 5. Citizenship at the commencement of the Constitution. - At the commencement of this constitution every person who has his domicile in the territory of India and - (a) who was born in the territory of India; or (b) either of whose parents was born in the territory of India; or (c) who has been ordinarily resident in the territory of India for not less than five years immediately preceding such commencement, shall be a citizen of India. 5. It can be seen that Article 5 deals with the citizenship of this country at the commencement of the Constitution. Article 5 recognises three categories of people to be citizens of India - (a) a person born in the territory of India, (b) persons either of whose parents was born in the territory of India and (c) persons, who are ordinarily resident in the territory of India for a period not less five years preceding the commencement of the Constitution. Person claiming to be the citizen of India, on the date of the commencement of the Constitution, is not only required to satisfy one of the three alternative specifications mentioned above but also satisfy that he had his domicile on the territory of India. Person claiming to be the citizen of India, on the date of the commencement of the Constitution, is not only required to satisfy one of the three alternative specifications mentioned above but also satisfy that he had his domicile on the territory of India. What exactly is the import of the expression "domicile" in the context of Article 5is not necessary for us to discuss in the instant case. 6. Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution deal with special class of persons migrating either to or from the territory "now included in Pakistan" (i.e., on the date of the commencement of the Constitution). These Articles obviously were introduced in the background of partition of the territory, which was defined as "India" in the Government of India Act, 1935, and the large-scale exodus of people from the newly created two States of India and Pakistani1. It may not be necessary for us to go into the details of the other articles of Part-II of the Constitution except Article 11, which reads as follows: 11. Parliament to regulate the right of citizenship by law. - Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Part shall derogate from the power of Parliament to make any provision with respect to the acquisition and termination of citizenship and all other matters relating to citizenship. 7. It can be seen from the above that Article 11 expressly authorises the Parliament to make law with respect to acquisition or termination of citizenship and all other matters relating to citizenship.: In our view, such a power necessarily inheres in the Parliament, in view of Article 246(1)2 read with Entry 173 of List-I of the Seventh Schedule. Article 8. In exercise of the powers under Article 246(1) read with Entry 17 and Article 11, the Parliament made the Citizenship Act, 1955. Under the scheme of the said Act, there are four modes of acquiring citizenship of this country - (1) Citizenship by birth, (2) Citizenship by descent, (3) Citizenship by registration and (4) Citizenship by naturalisation. 9. Section 3 of the Citizenship Act, 1955, deals with citizenship by birth. It reads as follows: 3. Citizenship by birth. Under the scheme of the said Act, there are four modes of acquiring citizenship of this country - (1) Citizenship by birth, (2) Citizenship by descent, (3) Citizenship by registration and (4) Citizenship by naturalisation. 9. Section 3 of the Citizenship Act, 1955, deals with citizenship by birth. It reads as follows: 3. Citizenship by birth. - (1) Except as provided in Sub-section (2), every person born in India,- (a) on or after the 26th day of January, 1950, but before the 1st day of July, 1987; (b) on or after the 1st (i) both of his parents are citizens of India; or (ii) one of whose parents is a citizen of India and the other is not an illegal migrant at the time of his birth, shall be a citizen of India by birth. 10. It can be seen from the above that there are three categories of persons, who can claim citizenship of this country if such a person is born in India (1) every person born on or after 26th day of January, 1950, but before 1st day of July 1987; such a person automatically becomes a citizen of this country even in the absence of any anterior connection with this country, (2) persons born in India after 1st day of July, 1987, but before the commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003; in the cases of persons falling under this class, it is not only necessary that such a person was born in India between the above mentioned dates, but it is also necessary that at least, one of the parents of such a person must be a citizen of India at the time of his birth and (3) the category of persons, who are born in India after the commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003. In the third category of cases, citizenship accrues to the benefit of such a person only if both the parents of such a person are citizens of India or at least, one parent is a citizen of India and the other is not an illegal migrant at the time of birth of such a person. 11. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 deals with exclusion of persons, who might, otherwise, satisfy one or the other conditions stipulated under Section 3(1). 11. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 deals with exclusion of persons, who might, otherwise, satisfy one or the other conditions stipulated under Section 3(1). It may not be necessary for us to examine the scheme of Sub-section (2) in the context of the present controversy. 12. Section 44 of the Citizenship Act, 1955, deals with citizenship by descent, i.e., it deals with the citizenship status of a person born outside India, but becomes a citizen of India in the various contingencies contemplated under Section 4. 13. Section 55 provides for conferment of citizenship by registration by the Central Government on such a person, who is not a citizen of this country. It can be seen from the scheme of Section 5that the registration, contemplated under Section 5, is permissibly only in the cases of such persons, who have some connection with India as specified in the various sub-clauses of the section, but not citizens of India by virtue of operation of any of the provisions of the Constitution or the other provisions of the Citizenship Act. 14. Section 66 deals with conferment of citizenship by naturalisation, which enables the Central Government to confer citizenship on any applicant under the various conditions specified in the said section read with Schedule-III. 15. Apart from the various modes by which citizenship is acquired or conferred, as discussed earlier, Section 6A of the Citizenship Act deals with a special situation, the citizenship status of persons, who migrated to "Assam", a defined expression under Section 6A(1)(a)7. The Supreme Court, in its judgment, in Sonowal I, Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India and Anr. (2005) 5 SCC 665 , took note of the factual background in which Section 6A came to be introduced by an amendment. In making the said provision, the Parliament took note of the various historical facts of the partition of "India", as defined under the Government of India Act, 1935, into two States called India and Pakistan and the subsequent coming into existence of a new State known as Bangladesh, the territory of which State was part of Pakistan prior to 1971. The Parliament also took note of the fact that such major historical events resulted in a large-scale migration of people to the State of Assam from Bangladesh or 'East Pakistan', as it was called prior to the formation of the new sovereign State called Bangladesh. 16. The Parliament also took note of the fact that such major historical events resulted in a large-scale migration of people to the State of Assam from Bangladesh or 'East Pakistan', as it was called prior to the formation of the new sovereign State called Bangladesh. 16. As long back as in 1950, the Parliament made an enactment called Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950 (Act No. X of 1950). Under Section 2 of the said Act, it is provided that the Central Government may direct any person or class of persons, who are ordinarily resident in any place outside India and came into Assam, to remove himself either from India or Assam. Section 2reads as follows: 2. Power to order expulsion of certain immigrants - If the Central Government is of opinion that any person or class of persons, having been ordinarily resident in any place outside India, has or have whether before or after the commencement of this Act, come into Assam and that the stay of such person or class of person in Assam is detrimental to the interests of the general public of India or of any section or of any Schedule Tribe in Assam, the Central Government may by order - (a) direct such person or class of persons to remove himself or themselves from India or Assam within such time and by such route as may be specified in the order; and (b) give such further directions in regard to his or their removal from India or Assam as it may consider necessary or expedient. 17. It may not be necessary to examine, in details, the scheme and purpose of Section 2 of the Act, 1950. But what is important is the proviso to Section 2, which reads as follows: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any person who on account of civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances in any area now forming part of Pakistan has been displaced from or has left his place or residence in such area and who has been subsequently residing in Assam. 18. 18. It can be seen from the proviso that the authority, conferred on the Central Government under Section 2, does not extend to giving directions contemplated therein in the case of persons, who had been displaced from, or who left their places of residence from, any area forming part of Pakistan (which, now, includes Bangladesh) on account of civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances. 19. Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, must be examined in the light of the proviso to Section2 of the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950 (Act No. X of 1950), as there is a common legislative policy underlying therein. 20. Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, takes note of three categories of persons migrating into the territory of India and, more specifically, the territory of "Assam", the definition for the purpose of Section 6A is already noticed earlier. Sub-section (2) of Section 6A deals with the citizenship status of the migrants who came before the 1st day of January, 1966, into the territory of 'Assam'. 6A(2) Subject to the provisions of Sub-sections (6) and (7), all persons of Indian origin who came before the 1st day of January, 1966 to Assam from the specified territory (including such of those whose names were included in the electoral rolls used for the purposes of General Election to the House of the People held in 1967) and who have been ordinarily resident in Assam since the dates of their entry into Assam shall be deemed to be citizens of India as from the 1st day of January, 1966. 21. Sub-section (3) of Section 6A deals with those persons, who came between the 1st day of January, 1966, but before 25th day of March, 1971. 21. Sub-section (3) of Section 6A deals with those persons, who came between the 1st day of January, 1966, but before 25th day of March, 1971. 6A(3) Subject to the provisions of Sub-sections (6) and (7), every person of Indian origin who - (a) came to Assam on or after the 1st day of January, 1966 but before the 25th day of March, 1971 from the specified territory; and (b) has, since the date of his entry into Assam, been ordinarily resident in Assam; and (c) has been detected to be a foreigner, shall register himself in accordance with the rules made by the Central Government in this behalf under Section 18 with such authority (hereafter in this Sub-section referred to as the registering authority) as may be specified in such rules and if his name is included in any electoral roll for any Assembly or Parliamentary constituency in force on the date of such detection, his name shall be deleted therefrom. 22. In either case, the benefit contemplated is available only for those persons, who are of "Indian origin" and migrating to Assam from the "specified territory". Both the expressions are defined under Sub-section (1)(c)8 and (1)(d)9. 23. The distinction between Sub-section (2) and Sub-section (3) of Section 6A, in our view, is this- While persons, who came to Assam prior to 1st day of January, 1966, and have been ordinarily resident therein from the date of their entry, are deemed to be citizens of India from the 1st day of January, 1966, the other class of persons, arriving in Assam subsequent to the 1st day of January, 1966, but before the 25th day of March, 1971, are required to register themselves with the registering authority to acquire all the rights of citizens of India except the right to participate in the electoral process, either to the Assembly or the Parliament, for a period of 10 years commencing from the date on which such a person has been detected to be a foreigner. In this regard, Sub-section (4) of Section 6A provides as follows: (4) A person registered under Sub-section (3) shall have, as from the date on which he has been detected to be a foreigner and till the expiry of a period often years from that date, the same rights and obligations as a citizen of India (including the right to obtain a passport under the Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967) and the obligations connected therewith), but shall not be entitled to have his name included in any electoral roll for any Assembly or Parliamentary constituency at any time before the expiry of the said period of ten years. 24 It is provided under Sub-section (5) of Section 6A that on expiry of the period of ten years, referred to in Sub-section (4), such a person is deemed to be citizens of India for all purposes. Sub-section (5) reads as follows: (5) A person registered under Sub-section (3) shall be deemed to be a citizen of India for all purposes as from the date of expiry of a period of ten years from the date on which he has been detected to be a foreigner. 25. Section 6A was inserted by Act 65 of 1985 w.e.f. 7.12.1985. The Supreme Court, in Sonowal's case (supra), took note of the fact that the amendment was preceded by a Memo of Settlement, dated 15.5.1985. At para 18 of the judgment, the Supreme Court held as follows: 18. Since extensive reference has been made in the affidavits to the Assam Accord, it is necessary to notice the main provisions thereof It is a Memorandum of Settlement which was signed on 15th August, 1985 by the President and General Secretary of All Assam Students' Union and Convenor of All Assam Gana Parishad on the one hand and Home Secretary, Government of India and the Chief Secretary, Government of Assam on the other, in the presence of Shri Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India. The main clauses of the settlement which have a bearing on the case are being reproduced below: MEMORANDUM OF SETTLEMENT 1. Government have all along been most anxious to find a satisfactory solution to the problem of foreigners in Assam. The All Assam Student Union (AASU) and the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) have also expressed their keenness to find such a solution. 2. Government have all along been most anxious to find a satisfactory solution to the problem of foreigners in Assam. The All Assam Student Union (AASU) and the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) have also expressed their keenness to find such a solution. 2. The AASU through their Memorandum dated 2nd February, 1980 presented to the late Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi, conveyed their profound sense of apprehensions regarding the continuing influx of foreign nationals into Assam and the fear about adverse effects upon the political, social cultural and economic life of the State. 3. Being fully alive to the genuine apprehensions of the people of Assam, the then Prime Minister initiated the dialogue with the AASU/AAGSP. Subsequently, talks were held at the Prime Minister's and Home Minister's levels during the period 1980-83. Several rounds of informal talks were held during 1984. Formal discussions were resumed in March, 1985. 4. Keeping all aspects of the problem including constitutional and legal provisions, international agreements, national commitments and humanitarian considerations, it has been decided to proceed as follows: Foreigners Issue 5.1 For purposes of detection and deletion of foreigners, 1.1.1966 shall be the base date and year. 5.2 All persons who came to Assam prior to 1.1.1966, including those amongst them whose names appeared on the electoral rolls used in 1967 elections, shall be regularized. 5.3 Foreigners who came to Assam after 1.1.1966 (inclusive) and up to 24th March, 1971 shall be detected in accordance with the provisions of the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order 1964. 5.4 Names of foreigners so detected will be deleted from the electoral rolls in force. Such persons will be required to register themselves before the Registration Office of the respective districts in accordance with the provisions of the Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939 and the Registration of Foreigners Rules, 1939. 5.5 For this purpose, Government of India will undertake suitable strengthening of the governmental machinery. 5.6 On the expiry of a period of ten years following the date of detection, the names of all such persons which have been deleted from the electoral rolls shall be restored. 5.7 All persons who were expelled earlier, but have since re-entered illegally into Assam, shall be expelled. 5.8 Foreigners who came to Assam on or after 25th March, 1971 shall continue to be detected, deleted and expelled in accordance with law. 5.7 All persons who were expelled earlier, but have since re-entered illegally into Assam, shall be expelled. 5.8 Foreigners who came to Assam on or after 25th March, 1971 shall continue to be detected, deleted and expelled in accordance with law. Immediate and practical steps shall be taken to expel such foreigners. 5.9 The Government will give due consideration to certain difficulties expressed by the AASU/AAGSP regarding the implementation of the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983." Subsequent thereto the Citizenship Act, 1955 was amended and Section 6A was introduced w.e.f. 7.12.1985. 26. Even before the Assam Accord, referred to above, came to be signed, the Parliament had passed the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 ('the IMDT Act'). Section 1(3) of the said Act declares that it shall be deemed to have come into force in the State of Assam on the 15th day of October, 1983, i.e., with retrospective effect. The Supreme Court noted the objects and reasons behind the Act at para 34 of the judgment and also took note of the Preamble of the Act at para 35 of the judgment in Sonowal's case (supra) in the following words: 34. The provisions of the IMDT Act may now be examined. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983, reads as under: Statement of objects and reasons. - The influx of foreigners who illegally migrated into India across the borders of the sensitive eastern and northeastern regions of the country and remained in the country poses a threat to the integrity and security of the said regions. A substantial number of such foreigners who migrated into India after the 25th day of March, 1971, have, by taking advantage of the circumstances of such migration and their ethnic similarities and other connections with the people of India, illegally remained in India without having in their possession lawful authority so to do. The continuance of these persons in India has given rise to serious problems. The clandestine manner in which these persons have been trying to pass off as citizens of India has rendered their detection difficult. The continuance of these persons in India has given rise to serious problems. The clandestine manner in which these persons have been trying to pass off as citizens of India has rendered their detection difficult. After taking into account the need for their speedy detection, the need for protection of genuine citizens of India and the interests of the general public, the President promulgated, on the 15th October, 1983, the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Ordinance, 1983, to provide for the establishment of Tribunals. 35. The Preamble of the Act which finally came into force on 25th December, 1983 reads as under: An Act to provide for the establishment of Tribunals for the determination, in a fair manner, of the question whether a person is an illegal migrant to enable the Central Government to expel illegal migrants from India and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto WHEREAS a good number of the foreigners who migrated into India across the borders of the eastern and north-eastern regions of the country on and after the 25th day of March, 1971, have, by taking advantage of the circumstances of such migration and their ethnic similarities and other connections with the people of India and without having in their possession any lawful authority so to do, illegally remained in India; AND WHEREAS the continuance of such foreigners in India is detrimental to the interests of the public of India; AND WHEREAS on account of the number of such foreigners and the manner in which such foreigners have clandestinely been trying to pass off as citizens of India and all other relevant circumstances, it is necessary for the protection of the citizens of India to make special provisions for the detection of such foreigners in Assam and also in any other part of India in which such foreigners may be found to have remained illegally; 27. It was the constitutional validity of the said Act, which was in question before the Supreme Court in Sonowal's case (supra). It was the constitutional validity of the said Act, which was in question before the Supreme Court in Sonowal's case (supra). The Supreme Court declared the Act and the Rules made thereunder as ultra virus the Constitution and struck down the same and gave a consequential declaration that the Tribunals, constituted under the said Act, shall cease to function with a further direction that all the cases, pending before the Tribunals constituted under the said Act, shall stand transferred to the Tribunals constituted under the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964. The relevant portion of the judgment of the Supreme Court reads as follows: 84. In view of the discussion made above, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed with the following directions. - (1) The provisions of the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 and the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Rules, 1984 are declared to be ultra vires the Constitution of India and are struck down; (2) The Tribunals and the appellate Tribunals constituted under the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 shall cease to function; (3) All cases pending before the Tribunals under the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 shall stand transferred to the Tribunals constituted under the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 and shall be decided in the manner provided in the Foreigners Act, the Rules made thereunder and the procedure prescribed under the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964. 28. It is in the background of the above mentioned legal history that proceedings, initiated against various persons under the IMDT Act, stood transferred to the Tribunals constituted under the Foreigners Act. A large number of persons, who had faced such proceedings before the Foreigners Tribunal and who had come to be declared 'foreigners' by the Foreigners Tribunal, Barpeta, by various orders passed in the year 2007, approached this court by way of varicus writ petitions. All the writ petitions were heard together and dismissed by a common judgment and order, dated 25.7.2008. Though it is a common order, the learned Judge dealt with the individual merits of each of the writ petitions distinctly in the said order. Aggrieved by the said judgment, appeals are preferred. 29. Writ Appeal No. 238/2008 is one such appeal preferred by the unsuccessful petitioners in four different writ petitions [WP(C) Nos. 1355/2008, 1358/2008, 1359/2008 and 1364/2008] consisting of 4, 5, 4 and 4 petitioners/appellants respectively. 30. Aggrieved by the said judgment, appeals are preferred. 29. Writ Appeal No. 238/2008 is one such appeal preferred by the unsuccessful petitioners in four different writ petitions [WP(C) Nos. 1355/2008, 1358/2008, 1359/2008 and 1364/2008] consisting of 4, 5, 4 and 4 petitioners/appellants respectively. 30. For the purpose of deciding the legal parameters of the controversy, we decided to take up the facts of the WP(C) No. 1355/2008 alone. The other appeals, arising out of various writ petitions, though listed along with the present appeal, are not heard on merit and would be heard and decided in the light of the legal parameters to be determined in this appeal. 31. As already noticed, there are four petitioners in WP(C) No. 1355/2008, who are the appellants before us in WA No. 238/08. They are (1) Moslem Mondal, s/o Sadar Mondal, (2) Rupjan Nessa, w/o Moslem Mondal, (3) Ainul Hoque, s/o Moslem Mondal and (4) Seheruddin, s/o Moslem Mondal. It is obvious from the above that all the four belong to one family headed by Moslem Mondal. 32. Initially, the cases of these four appellants/petitioners were decided ex prate. Admittedly, all the four petitioners were served with notices of the pendency of the cases against them before the Foreigners Tribunal, Barpeta. They engaged two advocates (whose names are mentioned in the judgment under appeal, at para 30), to defend their cases. The learned Judge by the judgment under appeal, at para 33 and 34, recorded as follows : 33. The reference was received by the Tribunal on 7.5.2007 and the petitioners duly appeared on the date fixed which was 18.6.2007. The prayer for adjournment was granted fixing the matter on 24.7.2007. On 24.7.2007, the petitioners did not appear before the Tribunal and the case was adjourned to 27.8.2007 on the basis of the prayer petition filed by the engaged counsel. 27.8.2007 was the date fixed for filing written statement. However, on 27.8.2007, the petitioners did not appear before the Tribunal and the case was adjourned to 28.9.2007 on the basis of the prayer made by their engaged counsel. On 28.9.2007 also, the petitioners remained absent and the matter was again adjourned to 26.10.2007 on the basis of the petition filed by their engaged advocate. Same petition was made on 26.10.2007. On 28.9.2007 also, the petitioners remained absent and the matter was again adjourned to 26.10.2007 on the basis of the petition filed by their engaged advocate. Same petition was made on 26.10.2007. Noticing the fact that the petitioners had already taken four adjournments, the adjournment prayed for was granted as the last chance and the matter was fixed on 21.11.2007 on which date also, the petitioners remained absent without any steps. 34. After the aforesaid dates, the matter was fixed on 17.12.2007 on which date, the petitioners remained absent without any steps. Thus, naturally, the Tribunal had no option than the order for ex parte hearing fixing the date as 29.12.2007. The matter was heard on that day examining the I.O. who proved the documents exhibited and thereafter the impugned judgment and order was delivered on 31.12.2007. 33. However, the appellants, when they approached this Court by way of WP(C) No. 1355/2008 annexed certain documents to the writ petition in support of their claim of being citizens of India. The learned Judge also considered the effect of the documentary evidence sought to be produced by the petitioners/appellants herein and reached the conclusion that even the documents, which were sought to be (belatedly) produced before the learned Judge, did not establish the claim of the petitioners/appellants. 34. It was the case of these four petitioners/appellants (we may mention here that it is the case of all the writ petitioners/appellants covered by the judgment under appeal) that they were let down by their engaged counsel before the Foreigners Tribunal and that they did not have an opportunity of defending themselves in the proceedings to establish that they are citizens of India. If there is even a particle of truth in the said statements, each of the appellants would lose one of the most valuable rights, i.e., citizenship. This Court, therefore, at the stage of the admission of the appeals, called upon (as the record reveals) the appellants to establish their bona fides by lodging a complaint against the counsel, who are alleged to have let down the appellants by non-representation before the Tribunal. The appellants thereupon made a complaint to the Bar Council against the said counsel. Thereafter, by an order, dated 14.8.2008, this Court, while admitting the writ appeals, directed the appellants to surrender before the concerned Superintendent of Police. The appellants thereupon made a complaint to the Bar Council against the said counsel. Thereafter, by an order, dated 14.8.2008, this Court, while admitting the writ appeals, directed the appellants to surrender before the concerned Superintendent of Police. This Court also directed that on such surrender, though the appellants would be detained but they would not be deported from India. This Court further directed that the appellants be given an opportunity of producing further evidence, if any, before the concerned Foreigners Tribunal and called upon the Tribunal to record such further evidence and report it's finding thereon to this Court. 35. Yet another reason, which justifies the giving of direction to the appellants to adduce evidence, in the Tribunal, in support of their plea that they were not foreigners, is that the learned Single Judge, having taken the view that the learned Tribunal was justified in holding the proceeding ex parte against the writ petitioners, chose, however, to consider the effect of the pleadings of the writ petitioners, in their writ petition, in support of their plea that they were Indian citizens and also the documents, which the writ petitioners had sought to rely upon. 36. Having considered the effect of the pleadings in the writ petition, and also the documents, sought to be produced by the writ petitioners, the learned Single Judge reached the conclusion that even the documents, which were sought to be (belatedly) produced in the writ petition, did not establish the claim of the petitioners/appellants. 37. We deem it necessary to point out that under the scheme of the Foreigners Act, 1946, read with Foreigners (Tribunal) Order, 1964 ("1964 Order"), the Tribunal, constituted under the 1964 Order, is required to give, on the 'reference' made to it, only an 'opinion' whether the person, proceeded against, is or is not a 'foreigner'. 37. We deem it necessary to point out that under the scheme of the Foreigners Act, 1946, read with Foreigners (Tribunal) Order, 1964 ("1964 Order"), the Tribunal, constituted under the 1964 Order, is required to give, on the 'reference' made to it, only an 'opinion' whether the person, proceeded against, is or is not a 'foreigner'. For the purpose of rendering such an opinion, the Tribunal has to necessarily determine the question as to whether the person, against whom a 'reference' is made, is or is not an Indian citizen The question as to whether a person is or is not an Indian citizen can also be decided by a civil court at the option of the person, who is alleged to be a foreigner or held to be a foreigner by the Tribunal constituted under the 1964 Order, inasmuch as a civil court is entitled to pass a decree declaring the status of a person as an India citizen. By enacting the Foreigners Act and/or the 1964 Order, the power of the civil courts, to determine the status of a person as an India citizen, has not been taken away. 38. Moreover, a writ proceeding is not, and cannot be made, a substitute for a proceeding before the said Tribunal. For instance, in the case at hand, the learned Single Judge, having extensively discussed the pleadings of the writ petitioners and the documents, relied upon by them, came to the conclusion that even the documents, which the petitioners had sought to rely upon, did not establish their claim of being Indian citizens. Supposing, for instance, the learned Single Judge would have found the documents, which were sought to be relied upon by the writ petitioners, enough to hold that they were Indian citizens. Could the learned Single Judge have, while dealing with a writ petition, arising out of an order passed by a Tribunal opining that the proceedee is a foreigner, upset the decision of the Tribunal, and, contrary to the opinion expressed by the Tribunal, hold, on the basis of the pleadings of the parties in the writ proceeding and the documents, relied upon by them, that the proceedee was an Indian citizen? The answer to this question, has to be in the negative inasmuch as the State cannot be denied the opportunity to cross-examine a writ petitioner before the court relies upon any document annexed to a writ petition or produced by a writ petitioner during the course of hearing in a writ proceeding. At the same time, the writ petitioner too cannot be denied the opportunity of adducing evidence if his writ petition is to be made basis for determination of the question as to whether he (writ petitioner) is or is not a foreigner. 39. It is, thus, clear that on the basis of the pleadings of the parties in a writ proceeding and/or, on the basis of the documents placed on the record in a writ proceeding, a court cannot determine the question as to whether a person is or is not a foreigner. The determination of the question, as to whether a person is or is not a foreigner, falls, when a 'reference' is made to a Tribunal under the provisions of the Foreigners Act read with the 1964 Order, within the ambit of the powers of the Tribunal and, in other cases, by a civil court of competent jurisdiction. We may hasten to point out that so far as the Tribunal is concerned, it only renders an 'opinion' with regard to the question as to whether the person alleged to be a foreigner is or is not a foreigner and, then, it is for the Central Government or the authorities, otherwise empowered, to decide as to whether such a foreigner needs to be deported from the territory of India or not. Thus, the procedure, adopted, in the writ proceeding, in the present case of determining, on the basis of the pleadings made in the writ proceeding and the documents annexed thereto, whether the writ petitioners were or were not foreigners, cannot be said to be a legally permissible procedure. 40. Thus, the procedure, adopted, in the writ proceeding, in the present case of determining, on the basis of the pleadings made in the writ proceeding and the documents annexed thereto, whether the writ petitioners were or were not foreigners, cannot be said to be a legally permissible procedure. 40. We wish to make it clear that against the finding of a Tribunal constituted under the 1964 Order, when a writ petition is entertained and the High Court takes the view that the Tribunal was justified in proceeding ex parte and in coming to the conclusion, which it has reached, that the person proceeded against, is a foreigner, the court is not required to, once again, determine afresh in the writ proceeding, on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the documents brought on record in the writ proceeding, the question as to whether the petitioner is or is not a foreigner. If, however, the court decides and enters into the question of the merit of the conclusion, which the Tribunal has reached, the court's decision has to be based on the materials, which were available before the Tribunal, and not on the basis of such a material, which was not available with the Tribunal or has not been allowed to be produced, as additional evidence, in the writ proceeding, by the High Court. Taking of additional evidence obviously means examining the witness, in person, with regard to the oral evidence, which he likes to give, and also with regard to the documentary evidence, which he would like to rely upon. Examination of the writ petitioner, in such a case, would be subject to cross-examination by the State. No such procedure was, admittedly, followed in the present writ proceeding. 41. As the learned Single Judge had already held, on the basis of pleadings and the documents available on record, that the petitioners had failed to establish their claim of being Indian citizens, it was necessary that the Tribunal be given an opportunity to determine for itself the status of the writ petitioners, on the basis of the evidence, which the writ petitioners might have adduced, and to allow them to be cross-examined by the State and also give an opportunity to the State to adduce any such evidence, which the State considered necessary to adduce in rebuttal of the petitioners' claim of being Indian citizens. 42. 42. In compliance of the interim direction, referred to above, the four appellants surrendered and produced evidence before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, after examining the evidence, by its report, dated 15.10.2008, reached the conclusion as follows: 10. In view of the above discussions and in view of the evidence on record, I am of the opinion that opposite parties/appellants No. 1 and 2 have clearly proved that their families have been living in India since before 1951 and other opposite parties/appellants No. 3 and 4, i.e., Ainal Mandal and Jahur Mandal being sons, obviously could be bom only in Indian soil. They have also proved that they have not entered into Assam after 25.3.1971 as alleged in the reference and, hence, they cannot be declared as foreigners. 43. Certain common questions of law arise in all these appeals. Therefore, we though it fit to request the learned Counsel, appealing for the various parties, in this batch of appeals, to identify the questions of law, which arise for consideration of this Court for deciding this batch of appeals and make their submissions. The learned court for all the parties have accordingly made their submissions on the commonly identified questions of law. The following questions of law are identified: (i) when proceedings under the Foreigners Act are initiated before the Tribunal constituted under the Foreigners Order, 1964 on whom does the burden of proof lie ? (ii) whether the State is required to prima facie satisfy the Tribunal before a person, against whom proceedings are initiated, is called upon to discharge the burden under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act ? (iii) whether the documents prepared under the Census Act and the Electoral Rolls prepared for the purpose of elections under the Representation of the People Act are admissible piece of evidence and if they are admissible what is the evidentiary value of such documents ? (iv) what is the standard of proof in such proceedings ? (v) what is the role of the Tribunal in such proceedings ? 44. The Foreigners Act, 1946, in our view, was not designed essentially to deal with the situation such as the one on hand. We may not be understood to say that the provisions of the said Act cannot be made applicable to the situation such as the one on hand. 44. The Foreigners Act, 1946, in our view, was not designed essentially to deal with the situation such as the one on hand. We may not be understood to say that the provisions of the said Act cannot be made applicable to the situation such as the one on hand. By the expression "situation on hand", we mean a large scale immigration into the territory of India. The said Act was, primarily, enacted to regulate the entry, stay and departure of individuals, who are not citizens of India. The scheme of the said Act contemplates that every movement from the time of the entry of a foreigner be monitored and properly documented for the various activities of the foreigners on Indian soil. 45. Under Section 3(1)10 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, the Central Government is authorised to make orders providing for prohibiting, regulating or restricting entry of foreigners into India or their departure or continued presence from or in India. Sub-section (2) Clauses (a) to (g) of Section 3enumerates various matters with reference to which the power contemplated under Section 3(1)could be exercised. The enumeration, made in Sub-section (2), is not to be exhaustive of the authority given under Sub-section (1), but only illustrative. It may also be noticed that the power under Section 3(1) could be exercised by the Central Government generally with respect to all foreigners or with respect to any particular foreigner or with respect to any prescribed class of foreigners. The other provisions of the Foreigners Act may not be necessary for the present purpose. 46. Section 3 of the said Act, in this regard, authorises the Central Government to pass appropriate orders regulating the various aspects of the entry, stay and departure of the foreigners indicated under Sub-section (2)11thereof. For example, Sub-section (2)(a) enables the Government of India to make an order providing for prohibition or regulation of the entry of foreigners into India by such routes or by such course and the conditions subject to which such arrival is permitted. In exercise of the said power, the Government of India made an order known as the Foreigners Order, 1948, which prescribes the various conditions regulating the entry of the foreigners into India. Section 14of the Foreigners Act makes it a punishable offence for any person to contravene any provisions of the Foreigners Act and any order made or direction given under the said Act. Section 14of the Foreigners Act makes it a punishable offence for any person to contravene any provisions of the Foreigners Act and any order made or direction given under the said Act. Such an offence is punishable with imprisonment, which may extend to five years alongwith fine. In other words, in the context of the entry into India, when a person enters into Indian territory without appropriate permission evidenced by appropriate documents, such as, visa, etc, he commits a punishable offence under Section 14 referred to above. 47. But the Indian Government is faced with the situation - on its own admission - of about ten million illegal migrants from Bangladesh in India; a fact testified to by an affidavit before the Supreme Court in Sonowal's Case (supra). The Foreigners Act was made in an era, when international traveling was a luxury available to a limited number of people. It was also possible those days to identify "foreigners" by their appearance/anthropological features, such as, the colour of the skin, facial features, etc. The subsequent historical developments in the sub-continent of India created three sovereign States from out of the same territory that was called "India" before enactment of the Foreigners Act, 1946 (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh). The consequence is that there exist a huge number of people, who became foreigners within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946, though they were citizens of this country at one point of time and it is difficult to identify them as foreigners on the basis of their anthropological features. (See Sonowal I). 48. Under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, whenever a question arises whether any person is or is not a foreigner with reference to any provision of the said Act or an order made under the said Act, the burden is upon such person. Section 9 reads as follows: 9. Burden of proof. - If any case not falling under Section 8 any question arises with reference to this Act or any order made or direction given thereunder, whether any person is or is not a foreigner of a particular class or description the onus of proving that such person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the India Evidence Act 1872 (1 of 1872), lie upon such person. 49. 49. Two factors are required to be taken note in the context of Section 9. First of all, that it has no application to the cases falling under Section 8 of the Act. It may be stated here that admittedly, none of the cases on hand are cases falling under Section 8 and, therefore, we need not examine that aspect of the matter. Secondly, that the rule of evidence contained under Section 9 is notwithstanding anything contained under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In other words, when it comes to the questions of deciding whether a particular individual is a foreigner or not, the Indian Evidence Act has no application to the extent as Section 9 envisages. In this regard, the Supreme Court in Abdul Sattar Haji Ibrahim Patel v. State of Gujarat AIR 1965 SC 810 at para 10 held - 10. There is one more point which deserves to be mentioned before dealing with the merits of the case. The appellant is being prosecuted under Section14 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 (31 of 1946). In determining the question as to whether he is a foreigner within the meaning of the said Act or not. Section 9 of the said Act will have to be borne in mind. Section 9 applies to all cases under the Act which do not fall under Section 8, and this case does not fall under Section 8, and so, Section 9 is relevant. Under this section, the Legislature has placed the burden of proof on a person who is accused of an offence punishable under Section 14. This section provides inter alia that where any question arises with reference to the said Act, or any order made, or direction given thereunder, whether any person is or is not a foreigner, the onus of proving that such a person is not a foreigner, shall notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, lie upon such person; so that in the present proceedings in deciding the question as to whether the appellant was an Indian citizen within the meaning of Article 5, the onus of proof will have to be placed on the appellant to show that he was domiciled in the territory of India on 26th January, 1950 and that he satisfied one of the three conditions prescribed by Clause (a), (b) and (c.) of the said article. It is on this basis that the trial of the appellant will have to proceed. 50. The Supreme Court, in Sonowal I (supra), at para 24, held that such a rule of evidence, in the context of the citizenship of a person, exists in the leading democracies of the world. The Supreme Court, at para 24 and 2512, took note of the similar provisions of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada and Australia and, then, held, at para 32, as follows: 32. Section 9 of the Foreigners Act regarding burden of proof is basically on the same lines as the corresponding provision is in U.K. and some other western nations and is based upon sound legal principle that the facts which are peculiarly within the knowledge of a person should prove it and not the party who avers the negative. 51. Further, the Supreme Court took note of the scheme of the Evidence Act regarding the burden of proof as contained under Section 101, 106, etc, and also the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in Sambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer AIR 1956 SC 404 ; Collector of Customs v. D Bhoormall (1974) 2 SCC 544 ; State of W.B. v. Mir Mohd Omar (2000) 8 SCC 382 ; R. v. Oliver (1943) 2 All ER 800and Williams v. Russel (1993) 149 LT 190 and held that such placement of burden of proof is not only consistent with the international practice of the countries following the Anglo Saxon jurisprudence, but also legally justified. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court appear, in this regard, at para 26 in Sonowal I (supra). 52. Further, at para 73, the Supreme Court, in Sonowal I (supra), also declared that - In our opinion, the procedure under the Foreigners Act and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 is just, fair and reasonable and does not offend any constitutional provision. 53. That the burden of proof under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act is not on the State but on the person, whose nationality is in question is well recognised in this country (Fida Hussain v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1961 SC 2522, Union of India and Ors. v. Ghaus Mohammad AIR 1961 SC 1526 and Fateh Mohd v. Delhi Administration AIR 2963 SC 1035. 54. v. Ghaus Mohammad AIR 1961 SC 1526 and Fateh Mohd v. Delhi Administration AIR 2963 SC 1035. 54. The expression "burden of proof, occurring under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, has more than one facet to it. Phipson, on his classical work, on the law of evidence (14th edition) at chapter 4, discussed the concept. According to him, the phrase "burden of proof has three meanings - (i) the persuasive burden, the burden of proof as a matter of law and pleading the burden of establishing a case, whether by preponderance of evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt. (ii) the evidential burden, the burden of proof in the sense of adducing evidence. (iii) the burden of establishing the admissibility of evidence. 55. The Privy Council, on more than one occasion, had to deal with the question as to what burden of proof means. In Harmes and Anr. v. Hinkson AIR 1946 PC 256 at para 19 and 20, the Privy Council held as follows: 19. ...when the familiar metaphor of "the burden of proof is employed, precisely what it means. "The strict meaning of the term onus probandi," said Parke, B, in the case already cited, "is this, that if no evidence is given by the party on whom the burden is cast, the issue must be found against him" A valuable supplement to this observation is to be found in the words used by Lord Dunedin when he delivered the judgment of their Lordships' Board in (1927) AC 515 at p. 520: 20. Onus as a determining factor of the whole case can only arise if the tribunal finds the evidence pro and con so evenly balanced that is can come to no such conclusion. Then the onus will determine the matter. But if the tribunal, after hearing and weighing the evidence, comes to a determinate conclusion, the onus has nothing to do with it, and need not be further considered. 56. In Kumbhan Lakshmanna and Ors. v. Tangirala Venkateswarlu and Ors. AIR 1949 PC 278 it is held, in this regard, at paras 43, 44 and 45, as follows: 43. What is called the burden of proof on the pleadings should not be confused with the burden of adducing evidence which is described as "shifting". The burden of proof on the pleadings never shifts, it always remains constant (see Pickup v. Thames Insurance Co. What is called the burden of proof on the pleadings should not be confused with the burden of adducing evidence which is described as "shifting". The burden of proof on the pleadings never shifts, it always remains constant (see Pickup v. Thames Insurance Co. (1878) 3 Q.B.D.594:47 L.J. Q.B. 749. These two aspects of the burden of proof are embodied in Sections 101 and 102 respectively of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 101states: Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. Section 102 states: The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. 44. This section shows that the initial burden of proving a prima facie case in his favour is cast on the plaintiff; when he given such evidence as will support a prima facie case, the onus shifts on to the defendant to adduce rebutting evidence to meet the case made out by the plaintiff. As the case continues to develop, the onus may shift back again to the plaintiff. It is not easy to decide at what particular stage in the course of the evidence the onus shifts from one side to the other. When after the entire evidence is adduced, the tribunal feels it cannot make up its mind as to which of the versions is true, it will hold that the party oh whom the burden lies has not discharged the burden; but if it has on the evidence no difficulty in arriving at a definite conclusion, then the burden of proof on the pleadings recedes into the background. 45. How the above rules relating to onus operate in a case is, thus, described by Lord Dunedin in Robins v. National Trust Co. Ltd. (1927) A.C. 515: 96 L.J.P. C. 84: Their lordships cannot help thinking that the appellant takes rather a wrong view of what is truly the function of the question of onus in such cases. Onus is always on a person who asserts a proposition or fact which is not self-evident. Ltd. (1927) A.C. 515: 96 L.J.P. C. 84: Their lordships cannot help thinking that the appellant takes rather a wrong view of what is truly the function of the question of onus in such cases. Onus is always on a person who asserts a proposition or fact which is not self-evident. To assert that a man who is alive was born requires no proof. The onus is not on the person making the assertion, because it is self-evidence that he had been born. But to assert that he was born on a certain date, if the date is material, requires proof; the onus is on the person making the assertion. Now, in conducting any inquiry, the determining tribunal, be it judge or jury, will often find that the onus is sometimes on the side of one contending party, sometimes on the side of the other, or as it is often expressed, that in certain circumstances the onus shifts. But onus as a determining factor of the whole case can only arise if the tribunal finds the evidence pro and con so evenly balanced that it can come to no such conclusion. Then the onus will determine the matter. But if the tribunal, after hearing and weighing the evidence, comes to a determinate conclusion, the onus has nothing to do with it, and need not be further considered. [See also Standard Chartered Bank v. Andhra Bank Financial Services Ltd. and Ors. (2006) 6 SCC 94 at para 31] 57. In Narayan Govind Gavate and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (1977) 1 SCC 133 , the Supreme Court, at para 15, noted the confusion prevailing in legal literature regarding the phrase "burden of proof. It further took note of Phipson's analysis of the concept of burden of proof. At paras 16 and 17 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court held as follows: 16. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (1977) 1 SCC 133 , the Supreme Court, at para 15, noted the confusion prevailing in legal literature regarding the phrase "burden of proof. It further took note of Phipson's analysis of the concept of burden of proof. At paras 16 and 17 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court held as follows: 16. In Phipson on Evidence (11th Edn) at page 40, paragraph 92), we find the principles stated in a manner which sheds considerable light on the meanings of the relevant provisions of our Evidence Act: As applied to judicial proceedings the phrase 'burden of proof' has two distinct and frequently confused meanings: (1) the burden of proof as a matter of law and pleading - the burden, as it has been called, of establishing a case, whether by preponderance of evidence, or beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) the burden of proof in the sense of adducing evidence. It is then explained: The burden of proof, in this sense, rests upon the party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue. 'It is an ancient rule founded on consideration of good sense, and it should not be departed from without strong reasons.' It is fixed at the beginning of the trial by the state of the pleadings, and it is settled as a question of law, remaining unchanged throughout the trial exactly where the pleadings place it, and never shifting in any circumstances whatever. If, when all the evidence, by whomsoever introduced, is in, the party who has, thus, burden has not discharged it, the decision must be against him. 17. The application of rules relating to burden of proof in various types of cases is, thus, elaborated and illustrated in Phipson by reference to decide cases (see p. 40 para 93): In deciding which party asserts the affirmative, regard must of course be had to the substance of the issue and not merely to its grammatical form, which later the pleader can frequently vary at will, moreover a negative allegation must note confounded with the mere traverse of an affirmative one. The true meaning of the rule is that where a given allegation, whether affirmative or negative, forms an essential party of a party's case, the proof of such allegation rests on him; e.g. in an action against a tenant for not repairing according to covenant, or against a horse-dealer that a horse sold with a warranty is unsound, proof of these allegations is on the plaintiff, so in actions of malicious prosecution, it is upon him to show not only that the defendant prosecuted him unsuccessfully, but also the absence of reasonable and probable cause; while in actions for false imprisonment, proof of the existence of reasonable cause is upon the defendant, since arrest, unlike prosecution, is prima facie a tort and demands justification. In bailment cases, the bailer must prove that the goods were lost without his fault. Under the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act, 1939, the burden of proving that the defendant was unable immediately to satisfy the judgment and that that inability arose from circumstances attributable to the war rested on the defendant. But it would seem that in an election petition alleging breaches of rules made under the representation of the People Act, 1949, the court will look at the evidence as a whole, and that even if breaches are proved by the petitioner, the burden of showing that the election was conducted substantially in accordance with the law does not rest upon the respondent. Where a corporation does an act under statutory powers which do not prescribe the method, and that act invades the rights of others, the burden is on the corporation to show that there was no other practical way of carrying out the power which would not have that effect. 58. At para 23 of its judgment, in Narayan Govind Gavate (supra), the Supreme Court explained the nature of the trial proceedings and the manner of assessment of the evidence and held, at para 29, as follows: 29. ...The principle of onus of proof becomes important in cases of either paucity of evidence or in cases where evidence given by two sides is so equibalanced that the court is unable to hold where the truth lay. 59. Section 2(a) of the Foreigners Act defines 'foreigner' as a person, who is not a citizen of India. Thus, the definition of foreigner, under the said Act, is a negative definition. 59. Section 2(a) of the Foreigners Act defines 'foreigner' as a person, who is not a citizen of India. Thus, the definition of foreigner, under the said Act, is a negative definition. Proving of a negative fact is difficult and, at times, even impossible. No wonder, therefore, that Section 9 places the onus of proving that he is not a foreigner on the person, who is proceeded against. In order to enable the Tribunal hold, if the proceedee so desires, that the proceedee is not a foreigner, the proceedee has to necessarily prove to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that he is an Indian citizen. 60. What is, now, of immense importance to note is that while Section 9 of the Foreigners Act starts with the heading, 'burden of proof', this section, in its body, lays down that when any question arises, in the reference, as to whether any person is or is not a foreigner, 'onus of proving' that such a person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of a particular class or description, as the case may be, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, lie upon such person. Thus, one can clearly notice that the Legislature has used, in Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, both the expressions, namely, 'burden of proof' and the 'onus of proving', i.e., 'onus of proof'. It cannot be presumed that the Legislature, while making the legislation, did not know the distinction between the 'burden of proof' and 'onus of proof'. Though burden of proof and onus of proof are, at times, inter-changeable expressions, both these expressions carry different meanings. Before, however, we, in the context of 1964 Order, explain the two expressions, namely, 'burden of proof' vis-a-vis the 'onus of proof', one needs to take note of para 3 of 1964 Order, which embodies the procedure for disposal of the question, which may arise for determination before the Tribunal. Para 3 lays down as under: 3. Before, however, we, in the context of 1964 Order, explain the two expressions, namely, 'burden of proof' vis-a-vis the 'onus of proof', one needs to take note of para 3 of 1964 Order, which embodies the procedure for disposal of the question, which may arise for determination before the Tribunal. Para 3 lays down as under: 3. Procedure for disposal of questions - (1) The Tribunal shall serve, on the person to whom the question relates, a copy of the main grounds on which he is alleged to be a foreigner and give him a reasonable opportunity of making a representation and producing evidence in support of his case and after considering such evidence as may be produced and after hearing such persons as may deserve to be heard, the Tribunal shall submit its opinion to the officer or authority specified in this behalf in the order of reference. 61. From a cautious reading of para 3, what transpires is that the Tribunal, on receiving the reference, shall serve, on the person to whom the question relates (i.e., the proceedee), a copy of the 'main grounds' on which he is alleged to be a foreigner and give him a reasonable opportunity of making representation and producing evidence in support of his case. Thus, before a Tribunal issues a notice, the reference, which the Central Government or any other authority, competent, in this regard, makes, must contain the 'grounds' on which the person concerned is alleged to be a foreigner. This is obviously required so that the Tribunal knows as to why the proceedee is being alleged to be a foreigner. This apart, the 'grounds', so furnished, by the notice, to the proceedee, serve the purpose of enabling the proceedee to know as to why he is alleged to be a foreigner. The Tribunal is also required to give to the person concerned a reasonable opportunity of making not only representation, but also producing evidence in support of his case. Para 3 requires the Tribunal to consider 'such evidence' as may be produced. The expression 'such evidence', occurring in para 3, obviously refers to the evidence, which may be adduced by the proceedee. 62. There is, thus, no specific provision, in para 3, requiring the Tribunal or permitting the Tribunal to allow the State to adduce evidence. Para 3 requires the Tribunal to consider 'such evidence' as may be produced. The expression 'such evidence', occurring in para 3, obviously refers to the evidence, which may be adduced by the proceedee. 62. There is, thus, no specific provision, in para 3, requiring the Tribunal or permitting the Tribunal to allow the State to adduce evidence. Does this mean that the State has no right, under the 1964 Order, to adduce evidence in order to rebut the evidence given by the person proceeded against? Such an interpretation would defeat the very purpose of enacting Section 9 read with para 3 aforementioned, inasmuch as Section 9 and/or para 3 aforementioned, while placing the onus, on the person against whom the 'reference' is made, to adduce evidence in support of his plea that he is an Indian citizen, cannot be reasonably expected to have divested the Central Government of the opportunity to give evidence in rebuttal of the evidence, which the alleged foreigner may adduce. Necessarily, therefore, such an opportunity for the Central Government has to be read into the scheme of para 3. Can it be so read? It needs to be noted, in this regard, that apart from the evidence, which the alleged foreigner can produce in support of his case, the Tribunal has also been given the responsibility of 'hearing such persons as may deserve to be heard'. Such a 'hearing' would obviously include hearing of the Central Government too. Logically extended, the opportunity of 'hearing' would include the opportunity to adduce evidence. Thus, though it is not specifically mentioned in para 3 that the Central Government shall have the opportunity of adducing evidence or shall be given the opportunity to adduce evidence, such a right has to be inferred in favour of the Central Government in order to ensure that the procedure, as envisaged by para 3, is not rendered otiose. 63. What follows from the above discussion is that it is, eventually, the Central Government, which has to obtain the Tribunal's opinion that the person, proceeded against, is a foreigner. We need to be conscious of the fact that, it is the Central Government, which makes the 'reference', and the 'reference' would fail if no evidence is adduced from either side and the truth or veracity of the grounds, which form basis of the making of the 'reference', remains unproved. 64. We need to be conscious of the fact that, it is the Central Government, which makes the 'reference', and the 'reference' would fail if no evidence is adduced from either side and the truth or veracity of the grounds, which form basis of the making of the 'reference', remains unproved. 64. Thus, the onus probandi, as the burden of proof is, at times, called, stands placed by Section 9on the State, because it is the State, which has approached the Tribunal to hold that the person, alleged by the Central Government to be foreigner, is, in fact, a foreigner. In order, however, to avoid a negative definition from being proved, the law, overrides the provision of the Evidence Act, which are to the contrary and places the onus, on the alleged foreigner, to prove that he is an Indian citizen. How the State, under the scheme of the Foreigners Act read with 1964 Order, can discharge this burden? This is, now, the momentous question and calls for a deep and patient analysis of the scheme contained therein. 65. While considering the question, raised above, it is of utmost importance to bear in mind that though it is the State, which seeks the opinion of the Tribunal as to whether the person, against whom the 'reference' is made, is or is not a foreigner, the fact remains that since it is within the special knowledge of the person proceeded against as to who he is, the onus of proving, under Section 9, that he is an Indian citizen, is placed by the Legislature on the person, who is proceeded against. In other words, it is the proceedee, who has the onus to prove that he is an Indian citizen. 66. Thus, while, it is the State, which goes, under para 3 of 1964 Order, to the Tribunal seeking its opinion if the proceedee is or is not a 'foreigner' and, ordinarily, it is the State, which shall have the burden of proving that the proceedee is not an Indian citizen, Section 9 on the other hand, places the onus of proving that he is an Indian citizen on the proceedee. How to reconcile these two distinctly different requirements ? 67. The question, posed above, may be answered, more clearly by illustration. How to reconcile these two distinctly different requirements ? 67. The question, posed above, may be answered, more clearly by illustration. Let us assume, for a moment, that in a case, as the one at hand, a police report is laid before the Tribunal, wherein the police reports that according to what the reporting police officer has been informed by 'X', 'Y' is a foreigner inasmuch as 'Y' has recently moved into the locality in which 'X' resides. The Tribunal, on receiving such a report, issues a notice, under para 3 of 1964 Order, to 'Y' When a notice is given to an alleged foreigner, under para 3, such as 'Y', 'Y' would have a right to make a representation, wherein he may admit that he is a foreigner or he may assert that he is an Indian citizen. If 'Y' asserts that he is an Indian citizen and he seeks to adduce evidence in support of his plea, para 3 allows him to adduce such evidence. Supposing the person proceeded against, i.e., 'Y', does not appear in the proceeding and does not contest the proceeding. Does it, as a corollary, mean that, on the basis of the police report itself, and, without determining for itself if a person, called 'X', at all exists or had existed or whether 'X', had ever reported to the police, as claimed by the police, that 'Y' is a foreigner, the Tribunal would render an opinion against the proceedee, i.e., 'Y', that he is a foreigner? 68. The answer to the above question has to be in the negative inasmuch as the burden of, eventually, obtaining an opinion that the person, proceeded against, is a foreigner, rests on the State. Assuming the State examines 'X', as a witness and 'X, deposes before the Tribunal that it was 'Z', who had told him that 'Y' is a foreigner. The evidence of 'X', in such a case, would be nothing but hearsay. In such circumstances, in the absence of the evidence of 'Z', the Tribunal cannot give an opinion that 'Y' is a foreigner merely because of the fact that the police have reported that Y' is a foreigner. Necessarily, therefore, even 'Z' would have to be examined as a witness. Viewed from this perspective, it becomes clear that the onus probandi even in a case, under the Foreigners Act, rests on the State. Necessarily, therefore, even 'Z' would have to be examined as a witness. Viewed from this perspective, it becomes clear that the onus probandi even in a case, under the Foreigners Act, rests on the State. The State shall have to, therefore, adduce evidence - when no evidence is adduced by the proceedee - to prove that the grounds, on which it considers 'Y' as the foreigner, do exist and that the grounds, so proved, give rise to an inference that 'Y' is a foreigner. If the State gives no evidence whatsoever to support the grounds on which it claims that 'Y' is a foreigner, the 'reference' has to end in the negative. However, if 'Y' chooses to contest the proceeding and claims that he is an Indian citizen, the onus would shift to him to prove that he is an Indian citizen and it would, thereafter, be for the State to adduce evidence in rebuttal. 69. In short, thus, in terms of the special procedure, which para 3 embodies, when a 'reference' is received by a Tribunal, that a person, such as, 'Y', is a foreigner, the Tribunal has to issue notice to 'Y' informing him of the grounds on which he is alleged to be a foreigner. If, in response to the notice and the right given to him by para 3, 'Y' comes forward to claim that he is an Indian citizen, law places the onus of proving, that he is an Indian citizen, on 'Y'; and after he gives evidence in support of his plea of being an Indian citizen, the State can give evidence in rebuttal. Such evidence, in rebuttal, would also include the evidence, which the State has to give in order to show that the grounds, on which it alleges 'Y' as a foreigner, are true. In this sense, that is, in the sense of proving that the grounds (which form the basis of a 'reference' are true, the onus probandi rests on the State, though the State is not to give, as rightly contended by Mr. Dutta, the negative evidence that the proceedee is not an Indian citizen. 70. The grounds, it must be clarified, furnish the basis for formation of the 'reference' that the proceedee is a foreigner. Dutta, the negative evidence that the proceedee is not an Indian citizen. 70. The grounds, it must be clarified, furnish the basis for formation of the 'reference' that the proceedee is a foreigner. The State does not have the burden to prove that 'Y' (who is sought to be proceeded against) is not an Indian citizen; but the State has nevertheless the burden of proving as to 'why' it chooses to claim that 'Y' is a foreigner. This 'why' has to answered by the State on the basis of the grounds on which it rests its accusation against 'Y' that 'Y' is a foreigner. If it is held, as Mr. K.N. Choudhury and Mr. Dutta, would like us to hold, that the State has no responsibility of giving any evidence at all to prove the grounds, which it has mentioned in its 'reference' for the purpose of asserting that 'Y' is a foreigner, then, the consequence would be that even without proof of the truth of the contents of a police report, which would obviously contain the grounds, the Tribunal would have to opine that the proceedee is a 'foreigner'. It would be tantamount to holding that unless contested by the proceedee, the Tribunal has to compulsorily answer the reference in the affirmative. In the face of the two expressions, which the Legislature has used, namely, 'burden of proof' and 'onus of proving', such a view, as projected, cannot be sustained. 71. We have already pointed out that according to Phipson on Evidence, which Mr. Dutta relies upon, the phrase 'burden of proof' carries three meanings, namely, (i) the persuasive burden, the burden of proof as a matter of law and pleading the burden of establishing a case, whether by preponderance of evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt, (ii) the evidential burden, the burden of proof in the sense of adducing evidence and (iii) the burden of establishing the admissibility of evidence. 72. What needs to be noted is that in all the three categories of cases, the expression 'burden of proof' is applicable. Necessary, therefore, it is, now, for us to clarify as to what kind of 'burden of proof' lies on the proceedee in a proceeding under 1964 Order. 73. Persuasive burden, in criminal cases, lies upon the prosecution of proving beyond all reasonable doubt that an accused, charged with an offence, is guilty of the offence. Necessary, therefore, it is, now, for us to clarify as to what kind of 'burden of proof' lies on the proceedee in a proceeding under 1964 Order. 73. Persuasive burden, in criminal cases, lies upon the prosecution of proving beyond all reasonable doubt that an accused, charged with an offence, is guilty of the offence. Even where the evidential burden shifts to the defendant, the burden of establishing and proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused, charged with an offence, is guilty of the offence remains on the prosecution and never shifts. Phipson indicates, in Phipson on the Law of Evidence (14th Edition), that the only exception to this general rule occurs in the cases, where the statute so provides and where the defence of insanity is raised. Phipson has further clarified that the Legislature has, in many cases, relieved the prosecution of its original onus by casting the proof of the authority's consent, lawful excuse, etc. upon the defendant. Even where such an onus is placed on the defendant, points out Phipson, the State may discharge its onus by eliciting evidence in the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses. This exception to the general rule is embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act, which lays down as under: Section 106. Burden of Proving fact especially within knowledge. - When any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustrations: (a) When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him. (b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without a ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him. 74. A cautious reading of Section 106, as a whole, shows that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is on him. Illustration (b) to Section 106shows that when A is charged with travelling, on a railway, without a ticket, the burden of proving that he had a ticket with him lies on A. This shows that before the burden is placed on A, the prosecution establishes that A was found travelling on a railway without any ticket. Illustration (b) to Section 106shows that when A is charged with travelling, on a railway, without a ticket, the burden of proving that he had a ticket with him lies on A. This shows that before the burden is placed on A, the prosecution establishes that A was found travelling on a railway without any ticket. When these facts are proved, the burden would shift to A to show that he had a ticket with him, when he was travelling, on the railway, and unless he proves that he had such a ticket, he will be held guilty of travelling, oh the railway, without ticket. Consequently, the initial burden of proving the facts, which are alleged, by the State, namely, that A was found travelling on a railway, without ticket, remains on the prosecution. If the prosecution adduces this much of evidence, it is sufficient to convict A unless he shows that he had a ticket on him, when he was travelling on the railway. 75. In Sonowal (I), the Supreme Court has pointed out that world over, the 'burden of proof' that he is a foreigner is on the person, who is alleged to be a foreigner. 76. In para 26, in Sonowal (I), the Supreme Court has clearly explained the reasons for placing the 'burden of proof' on the prosecution in the following words: 26. There is good and sound reason for placing the burden of proof upon the person concerned who asserts to be a citizen of a particular country. In order to establish one's citizenship, normally he may be required to give evidence of (i) his date of birth (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his parents (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. Sometimes the place of birth of his grandparents may also be relevant like under Section 6A(1)(d) of the Citizenship Act. All these facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State. After he has given evidence on these points, the State authorities can verify the facts and can then lead evidence in rebuttal, if necessary. If the State authorities dispute the claim of citizenship by a person and assort that he is a foreigner, it will not only be difficult but almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid points. If the State authorities dispute the claim of citizenship by a person and assort that he is a foreigner, it will not only be difficult but almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid points. This is in accordance with the underlying policy of Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. 77. From the observations made above, it becomes clear that the 'burden of proof', which Section9 envisages, is in accord with Section 106. What is, however, necessary to bear in mind is that Section 106 does not replace Section 101 in its entirety. What Section 106 does is that it creates an exception to Section 101 in the sense that when essential facts are proved by the prosecution, the fact, which is within the special knowledge of the accused and which, if not proved, would lead to the conviction of the accused, the burden would be on the accused to prove such a fact, which would exonerate him from the charge. For instance, when the prosecution proves that an accused 'X' has killed a person, 'Y', by giving him blows with a 'dao' and if the accused, in such a case, takes the plea that he was insane at the relevant point of time, then, it would be for the accused to prove that at the relevant point of time, he was insane. Section 101 does not, however, relieve the prosecution of its burden to, otherwise, prove that accused 'X', has killed 'Y'. Thus, when the prosecution proves that 'X', has killed 'Y', 'X', can escape the conviction only when he can show that when he, (i.e., 'X') had killed 'Y', he was insane. 78. In the context of the 'burden of proof', which, thus, Section 9 places on the alleged foreigner, Sarbananda Sonowal (I) as well as Sarbananda Sonowal (II) make it clear that Section 9, basically, reflects what Section 106 of the Evidence Act envisages, Section 106 being an exception to Section101 thereof. The question, now, is whether Section 9 replaces Section 101 completely. The question, now, is whether Section 9 replaces Section 101 completely. It needs to be remembered that Section 101 of the Evidence Act places the 'burden of proof' on that person, who desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts, which he asserts. The minimum facts, thus, have to be established by the State in order to receive an opinion from the Tribunal that the person, proceeded against, is a foreigner. 79. No wonder, therefore, that in Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer AIR 1956 SC 404 , which the Supreme Court refers to, and relies upon, in Sonowal (I), the Supreme Court holds as under: Section 106 is an exception to Section 101. The latter with its Illustration (a) lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish facts which are 'especially' within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The word 'especially' stresses that. It means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. 80. Quite naturally, thus, the Legislature has cautiously used the expression 'onus of proof' in place of 'burden of proof' in Section 9. It is the main body of the section, which controls the application of a section and not its heading. The main body of Section 9 speaks of 'onus of proof and not of 'burden of proof'. It is for this reason that the references, which have been made by the Apex Court in Sarbananda Sonowal I as well Sonowal II, are all of those cases, where application of Section 101 is not ousted. As, for instance, in Shambhu Natli Mishra's case (supra), the Supreme Court has made it clear that though, in a criminal case, the prosecution is not relieved of the duty to prove its case, Section 106 places the burden of proof of the fact, which is within the special knowledge of the accused, on the accused, for, it is the accused, who can prove such a fact without any difficulty or inconvenience. Thus, Section 106 does not replace, completely, Section101 inasmuch as the basic facts are required to be proved by the prosecution. Similarly, in D. Bhoormal's case (supra), the initial burden of proving that the goods, which were sought to be confiscated, are of foreign origin, rests on the State and if this fact is proved, the goods would be confiscated unless the person, in whose possession the goods have been found, proves that he lawfully obtained the same. 81. Even in R v. Oliver (1943) 2 All E R 800, which finds its reference in Sonowal I, the accused was charged with having sold sugar, as a wholesaler, without necessary licence. The question, that he had sold sugar, as a wholesaler, was not in dispute. The question was as to who had the burden of proving that the accused did not have licence at the time, when he had made the sale. Since it was the accused, who claimed to have had a licence and it was he only, who knew that he had a licence, the court held that in the circumstances of the case, prosecution was not required to adduce evidence of non-existence of a licence and that it was for the defendant to prove that he made the sale, while he had a valid licence. Thus, what needs to be borne in mind is that Section106 is an exception to Section 101 subject to the fact that under Section 101, the party, who has the onus probandi, proves the essential facts. 82. In civil cases, as observes Phipson, the persuasive burden rests on the party, whether the plaintiff or defendant, who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue. It is fixed at the beginning of the trial by the state of the pleadings, and it is settled as a question of law, which remains unchanged throughout the trial and never shifts in any circumstances whatever. If, when all the evidence, by whomsoever introduced, is in, the party, who has this burden, does not discharge his burden, the decision must be against him. 83. Turning to the question of evidential burden, it needs to be noted that Phipson has pointed out that while the persuasive burden is always stable, the evidential burden may shift constantly, according as one scale of evidence or other preponderates. 83. Turning to the question of evidential burden, it needs to be noted that Phipson has pointed out that while the persuasive burden is always stable, the evidential burden may shift constantly, according as one scale of evidence or other preponderates. The onus probandi, in this sense, rests upon the party, who would fail if no evidence at all, or no more evidence, as the case may be, were given on either side, i.e., it rests, before evidence is gone into, upon the party asserting the affirmative of the issue; and it rests, after evidence is gone into, upon the party against whom the tribunal, at the time the question arises, would give judgment if no further evidence were adduced. 84. Mr. Dutta has endeavoured hard to convince us to hold that the persuasive burden, in a proceeding under the Foreigners Act read with 1964 Order, rests on the proceedee and that Section 9 does not merely place the evidential burden on the proceedee, but also the persuasive burden. It needs to be pointed out that it is the State, which makes the 'reference' and seeks an opinion from the Tribunal, in support of its claim that the proceedee is a foreigner; hence, it is the State, which needs a verdict in its favour from the Tribunal. 85. The persuasive burden, therefore, unless it is shown otherwise, lies on the State. Engrafting special procedure for the purpose of enquiry, the Legislature has made provisions in 1964 Order requiring that, upon being served with the notice, which would include the main grounds on which the proceedee is claimed to be a foreigner, the proceedee shall have the right to make representation and adduce evidence in support of his case. When the evidence is adduced by the proceedee, the State, as already indicated above, will have the right to adduce evidence in rebuttal. At the same time, it needs to be borne in mind that to establish, to the Satisfaction of the Tribunal, that the grounds, on which it claims the proceedee to be foreigner, are true, the State has to give evidence before the Tribunal. 86. The Tribunal cannot, therefore, render an opinion that the proceedee is a foreigner merely because the proceedee does not respond to the notice. 86. The Tribunal cannot, therefore, render an opinion that the proceedee is a foreigner merely because the proceedee does not respond to the notice. The omission to respond to such a notice, issued by the Tribunal, as indicated hereinabove, would deny him the opportunity of placing his case before the Tribunal. It will not, as a corollary, absolve the State of its burden to prove the truth of the grounds on which it claims the proceedee to be a foreigner. If the State establishes the grounds before the Tribunal by bringing such materials, which would establish the truth of the assertions made in the 'reference', the Tribunal would be free to give its opinion if it finds that the grounds are sufficient to hold the proceedee a foreigner. The evidence to be given by the State, as already mentioned above, may remain confined to the grounds on which the State rests its case and it will have no responsibility to prove (apart from the grounds, which the State must prove) that the proceedee is not an Indian citizen. (Emphasis is added by us). Whether such grounds are sufficient to interfere that the proceedee is or is not a foreigner, however, remains, within the ambit of the powers of the Tribunal, to determine. Thus, when it is stated that the 'burden of proof' is on a foreigner to prove that he is an Indian citizen, what it means is that if the proceedee claims to be an Indian citizen, he has the burden to establish his claim of being an Indian Citizen, because the State is not expected to prove a negative fact, namely, that the proceedee is not an Indian Citizen. 87. Coming to the question No. 2, it was argued, on behalf of the appellants, that before any proceedings are initiated before the Foreigners Tribunal, the Tribunal is required to be satisfied prima facie that there is some material to proceed against an individual. 88. On the other hand, Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned Addl. Advocate General, Assam, and Mr. N. Dutta, learned senior counsel, submitted that such a prima facie satisfaction is not contemplated under the Act nor is it consistent with the requirement of the adjudication having regard to the nature of the enquiry. Mr. 88. On the other hand, Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned Addl. Advocate General, Assam, and Mr. N. Dutta, learned senior counsel, submitted that such a prima facie satisfaction is not contemplated under the Act nor is it consistent with the requirement of the adjudication having regard to the nature of the enquiry. Mr. N. Dutta, learned senior counsel, more specifically, argued that having regard to the legal history of the problem, where a separate enactment was made by the parliament known as the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunal) Act, 1983, which provided for a procedure of identification of illegal migrants by a more elaborate procedure including "the establishment of some basic facts" before the Tribunal, constituted under the said Act, to initiate an enquiry and in view of the declaration by the Supreme Court that such a law was not consistent with the requirement of Article 355 of the Constitution, accepting the submission, made by the appellants, would virtually amount to subverting the declaration of law made by the Supreme Court in Sonowal's case (supra). 89. We accept the submission made by the respondents that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Sonowal's case (supra), it is not open to the appellants to argue that even the Tribunal, functioning under the Foreigners Act, is required to arrive at a prima facie satisfaction before initiating a proceeding against an individual. 90. Coming to the third question, invariably, in all these appeals, the appellants mostly relied upon the various Voters Lists prepared in connection with the elections under the representation of the Peoples Act either to the Parliament or the Legislative Assemblies of Assam and the document called National Register of Citizens (NRC), which document is prepared in exercise of the authority under the Census Act, 1948. 91. Section 1513 of the Census Act declares that no entry in any book, register, record or schedule made by a Census Officer in the discharge of his duties shall be admissible in evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding except a prosecution under the Census Act or any other law for any act or omission constituting an offence under the Census Act. The fact that the NRC is a document, prepared in exercise of the authority under the Census Act, is not disputed by the appellants. However, Mr. The fact that the NRC is a document, prepared in exercise of the authority under the Census Act, is not disputed by the appellants. However, Mr. M.U. Mahmud, learned Counsel for the appellants, in the instant appeal, argued that the census documents being documents prepared under the authority of the Government of India flowing from the Census Act, 1948, the same are public documents within the meaning of Section74 of the Evidence Act and, therefore, such documents could not be excluded from consideration. 92. We regret that the submission of the appellants in this regard cannot be accepted. May be, the documents, prepared during the census operation, are public documents within the meaning of Section 74 of the Evidence Act, but that does not mean in law that all public documents are automatically admissible in evidence. Section 5 of the Evidence Act declares that evidence may be given of the existence or non-existence of every fact in issue or relevant facts but the right so created under Section 5 is restricted by the explanation to Section 5. Section 5 of the Evidence Act reads as follows: 5. Evidence may be given of facts in issue and relevant facts. - Evidence may be given in any suit or proceedings of the existence or non-existence of every fact in issue and of such other facts as are hereinafter declared to be relevant, and of no others. Explanation. - This section shall not enable any person to give evidence of a fact which he is disentitled to prove by any provision of the law for the time being in force relating to civil procedure. 93. It can be seen from the Explanation to Section 5 that the Evidence Act itself recognises a limitation on the right recognised under Section 5. Similarly, the Parliament, by declaration under Section 15 of the Census Act, has excluded the admissibility of the documents referred to therein; a declaration, in our view, within the authority of the Parliament. Therefore, the submission of Mr. Mahmud is rejected. 94. Coming to the entries in the voters lists prepared in connection with the elections under the representation of the People Act, 1950, the learned Counsel for the respondents fairly submitted that such entries are admissible in evidence, though they are not conclusive proof of the correctness of the facts evidenced by such entries. Mahmud is rejected. 94. Coming to the entries in the voters lists prepared in connection with the elections under the representation of the People Act, 1950, the learned Counsel for the respondents fairly submitted that such entries are admissible in evidence, though they are not conclusive proof of the correctness of the facts evidenced by such entries. He relied on Babloo Pasi v. State of Jharkhand and Anr. (2008) 13 SCC 133 at para 29 - 29. Therefore, on facts at hand, in the absence of evidence to show on what material the entry in the voters' list in the name of the accused was made, a mere production of a copy of the voters' list, though a public document, in terms of Section 35, was not sufficient to prove the age of the accused. Similarly, though a reference to the report of the Medical Board, showing the age of the accused as 17-18 years, has been made but there is no indication in the order whether the Board had summoned any of the members of the Medical Board and recorded their statement. It also appears that the physical appearance of the accused, has weighed with the Board in coming to the aforenoted conclusion, which again may not be a decisive factor to determine the age of a delinquent. 95. The learned Counsel for the respondents also relied on Bhanwaroo Khan and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (2002) 4 SCC 346 where the Supreme Court at para 15 observed - 15. We agree with the High Court that a case for interference with the order of deportation is not made out. Long stay in the country and enrolment in the voters' list would not confer any right on an alien to continue to stay in the country. We do not find any infirmity either with the reasoning adopted or the conclusion arrived at by the High Court or even by the Government of India in its order dated 21.7.1995 passed under Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955. 96. On the other hand, Mr. Mahmud, learned Counsel for the appellants, relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in PUCL and Ors. v. Electoral Registration Officer and Ors. (1995) 3 SCC 100 , wherein at para 13 it has been held as follows: 13. ... 3. 96. On the other hand, Mr. Mahmud, learned Counsel for the appellants, relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in PUCL and Ors. v. Electoral Registration Officer and Ors. (1995) 3 SCC 100 , wherein at para 13 it has been held as follows: 13. ... 3. If any person whose citizenship is suspected is shown to have been included in the immediately preceding electoral roll, the Electoral Registration Officer or any other officer inquiring into the matter shall bear in mind that the entire gamut for inclusion of the name in the electoral roll must have been undertaken and, hence, adequate probative value be attached to that factum before issuance of notice and in subsequent proceedings; 97. In Bhanwaroo Khan and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (2002) 4 SCC 346 , the two appellants before the Supreme Court were originally residents of the present State of Rajasthan, who had, admittedly, migrated to Pakistan at the time of partition of the country and entered India, again, in the year 1955, with Pakistani passports and after obtaining necessary visas from the Indian High Commission, After stay of about three months, they reported to the police station (having jurisdiction over the village to which they, originally, belonged) that they were leaving for Pakistan. However, they did not leave India and stayed back till 1984. In 1984, they made applications for registration as citizens of India obviously under Section 5 of the Citizenship Act, 1955. Proceedings under the Foreigners Act were initiated. It is in the above mentioned factual background that the Supreme Court observed at para 15, thus: long stay in the country and enrolment in the voters list would not confer any right on any alien. 98. In fact, the question whether enumeration in the voters list would confer any right of citizenship was not the issue at all, in the case of Bhanwaroo Khan (supra), before the Supreme Court. The admitted fact was that the appellants before the Supreme Court were Pakistani national, who had entered the country on Pakistani passports. Though it is not very clear from the judgment whether they had pleaded any right on the basis of any entry of their names in the voters list, we presume that such an argument was advanced before the Supreme Court, but the argument was not accepted by the Supreme Court. Though it is not very clear from the judgment whether they had pleaded any right on the basis of any entry of their names in the voters list, we presume that such an argument was advanced before the Supreme Court, but the argument was not accepted by the Supreme Court. In our opinion, the said decision is not an authority for the proposition that the entries, in the voters list, are irrelevant in the context of an enquiry of the citizenship of a person. In our considered view, the entries do not either create or destroy the rights of citizenship. Such entries are only evidence of the fact that a person, whose name finds an entry in the voters list at a given point of time, is present on Indian soil on the date of the enumeration, if such presence is, otherwise, relevant in an enquiry. 99. In Babloo Pasi v. State of Jharkhand and. Anr. (2008) 13 SCC 133 the question before the Supreme Court was whether the appellant before the Supreme Court was a juvenile as defined under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000. One of the pieces of evidence, sought to be relied upon by the appellant, was an entry in the Voters' List. In this regard, the Supreme Court, at para 27 and 28, held as follows: 27. Insofar as the Board is concerned, it is evident that it has mechanically accepted the entry in the voters' list as conclusive without appreciating its probative value in terms of the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Section 35 of the said Act lays down that an entry in any public or other official book, register or record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty especially enjoined by the law of the country is itself a relevant fact. 28. It is trite that to render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions have to be satisfied, namely; (i) entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; (ii) it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or a relevant fact, and (iii) it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duties, or in performance of his duty especially enjoined by law.... 100. 100. In our view, the judgment is only an authority for the proposition that the entries, in the voters lists, are not conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. 101. On the other hand, in Lal Babu Hussain and Ors. v. Electoral Registration Officer and Ors. (1995) 3 SCC 100 , the Supreme Court elaborately considered the statutory scheme of the representation of the People Act, 1950, under which the voters lists are prepared. At para 6, the Supreme Court noted as follows: 6. From the resume of the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution and the Citizenship Act it becomes clear that whenever any authority is called upon to decide even for the limited purpose of another law, whether a person is or is not a citizen of India, the authority must carefully examine the question in the context of the constitutional provisions and the provisions of the Citizenship Act extracted hereinbefore. In the instant case Article 323 of the Constitution provides for one general electoral roll for every territorial constituency; so does 1950 Act. This has to be done under the Superintendence, direction and control of Election Commission as per the man date of Article 324 the Constitution. Section 16 of the 1950 Act in terms states that a person shall disqualified for registration in an electoral roll if he is not a citizen of India. Put positively a person must be a citizen of India to be entitled to inclusion in the electoral roll. Sub-section (2) of the said section empowers striking off the name of a person who incurs a disqualification set out in Clauses (a), (b) or (c) of Sub-section (1) after his name is entered in the register of electoral rolls. Otherwise every person who is not less than 18 years of age on the qualifying date and is ordinarily resident in a given constituency is entitled to be registered. Section 22empowers the Electoral Registration Officer for a constituency to delete any entry already made if on enquiry he is satisfied that it is erroneous or detective in any particular or needs to be transposed to another place in the roll or the concerned person has died or has ceased to be ordinarily resident in that constituency or that he is otherwise not entitled to be registered. Of course before any such action is taken the person concerned, except in the case of death, must be given an opportunity to be heard. Similar is the provision in Rule 21A of the 1960 Rules which empowers the registration officer before final publication of the roll to delete the name or names of any person or persons which, have been entered owing to inadvertence or error if the person concerned is dead or has ceased to be ordinarily resident in that constituency or is otherwise not entitled to be registered. The procedure for exercise of the said power is set out therein and conforms to the requirements of the principles of natural justice. It is obvious from the above that two situations arise; the first where the name is to be entered on the rolls for the first time and the second where the name already entered is required to be deleted. In the first mentioned situation before the name is entered on the rolls, the concerned officer must be satisfied that the person seeking to have his name entered is not disqualified by reason of his not being a citizen of India. Therefore, he would be justified in requiring the concerned person to show evidence that he is a citizen of India. In the second situation, since the name is already entered, it must be presumed that before entering his name the concerned officer must have gone through the procedural requirements under the statute. This would be so even if we invoke Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act. But then possibilities of mistakes cannot be ruled out. These mistakes, if any, would have to be corrected. Even if we are to assume (without deciding) that the words "is otherwise not entitled to be registered in that roll" used in Section 22 of the 1950 Act or Rule 21A of the 1960 Rules are wide enough to cover the question relating to citizenship, the issue would have to be decided after giving the concerned person a reasonable opportunity of being heard. If the opportunity of being heard before deletion of the name is to be a meaningful and purposive one, it goes without saying that the concerned person whose name is borne on the roll and is intended to be removed must be informed why a suspicion has arisen in regard to his status as a citizen of India so that he may be able to show that the basis for the suspicion is ill founded. Unless the basis for the doubt is disclosed, it would not be possible for the concerned person to remove the doubt and explain any circumstance or circumstances responsible for the doubt. 102. Therefore, it follows, in our view, that the entries in the voters lists are admissible in evidence. They establish a fact that if a name is found in the voters list that a person by such name existed on the Indian soil on the date of preparation of the voters list. Even in the above judgment, the Supreme Court recognised the possibility of mistaken entries in the voters list. Any person, interested in asserting that such an entry was mistakenly made even though no such person existed on the Indian soil on that day, must substantiate his claim. We must also hasten to add that a person, producing a voters list as a piece of evidence in support of his claim to have been present on the Indian soil on the date of preparation of the voters list, must not only produce the voters list and prove the relevant entry, but also establish/prove that the name entered, in such a voters list, is referable only to him inasmuch as it is possible that more than one person, with the same name exist or existed, more particularly, when, for a long time, no voter identity cards were in existence in this country. 103. We may also mention that an entry in the voters list is certainly a relevant piece of evidence in the enquiry of the nationality of a person. Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, which has specific application only to the State of Assam makes a specific reference to the voters list by Sub-section (2) thereof. The relevant portion of Sub-section (2) reads as follows: 6A(2). Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, which has specific application only to the State of Assam makes a specific reference to the voters list by Sub-section (2) thereof. The relevant portion of Sub-section (2) reads as follows: 6A(2). ...(including such of those whose names were included in the electoral rolls used for the purposes of the General Election to the House of the People held in 1967).... 104. Section 6A(2) declares a certain class of persons to be citizens of India, who are not, otherwise, entitled to be recognised as citizens of India in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the other provisions of the Citizenship Act. By a legal fiction, Sub-section (2) of Section 6A recognises as Indian citizens those persons, who came to Assam before the 1st day of January, 1966, and have been, ordinarily, resident in Assam since the date of their entry as Indian citizens. While making such a declaration, the Parliament also conferred the benefit on such persons, who on coming to Assam from a specified territory, have been, ordinarily, resident in Assam since their date of entry and whose names were included in the voters list used for the purpose of general elections to the House of People held in the year 1967. We are informed, at the Bar, that the voters list, used for the purpose of general elections to the House of the People, held in the year 1967, was prepared subsequent to 1st day of January, 1966, and but for the specific declaration extracted above, some of the persons, who had come to Assam, whose names were found in such electoral lists, would not have been eligible for being treated as citizens of this country, because of the fact that they had entered into India subsequent to 1st day of January, 1966. In other words, the cut off date prescribed under Sub-section (2), that is, the 1st day of January, 1966, stood slightly modified by extending the benefit of Sub-section (2) to those persons, whose names were included in the electoral lists used for the purpose of the general elections to the House of the People, held in the year 1967, irrespective of the fact whether they came before the 1st day of January, 1966 or not. 105. 105. Coming to the question of the standard of proof required in the proceedings under the Foreigners Act, it is submitted by Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned Addl. Advocate General, Assam, and Mr. N. Dutta, learned senior Advocate, that the standard of proof, required in these cases, is higher than the standard of proof required in civil proceedings, which is, normally, based on the preponderance of the probabilities, but they fairly submitted that the standard of proof required is not certainly the same as the one adopted in the criminal proceedings, that is, proof beyond all reasonable doubt. Except a mere submission as above, the learned Counsel did not demonstrate before us as to what is the standard of proof such as the one suggested by them nor any authority of law to indicate the parameters of such standard of proof is brought to our notice. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the standard of proof, in the context of an enquiry on the nationality of a person under the Foreigners Act, is a standard based on preponderance and probabilities. 106. There is yet another reason, which leads us to hold that the standard of proof in a proceeding before the Tribunal, constituted under the 1964 Order, is same as that of the civil court and the reason is that a civil court is entitled, under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to declare the status of a person as an Indian citizen. This position is recognised even in Union of India v. Gaus Mohammed AIR 1961 SC 1526 , which the respondents have relied upon. When the civil court's declaration, made under Section 9, is binding on the Government, it logically follows that the Tribunal cannot adopt a higher standard than the one, which is applied by the ordinary civil courts for the purpose of making a declaratory decree of the fact as to whether a suitor is or is not a foreigner. 107. The correctness of the conclusion reached by the Tribunal in its further report, dated 15.10.2009, is, now, required to be examined in the light of the legal position discussed earlier in this judgment. 108. From the report, it appears that the appellants herein examined four witnesses and proved, as many as ten documents, namely, Ext-A to Ext-J. The witnesses are none other than the four appellants herein. 108. From the report, it appears that the appellants herein examined four witnesses and proved, as many as ten documents, namely, Ext-A to Ext-J. The witnesses are none other than the four appellants herein. Of the ten documents proved by the appellants, eight documents are the electoral rolls of a village called Howly pertaining to various years commencing from 1966 and one document pertains to the electoral roll of a village called Jogirpam. 109. From the depositions of the four appellants, it appears that the appellants are aged about 66 years, 60 years, 26 years and 21 years respectively. 110. According to the first appellant, his name appeared in the electoral list pertaining to the year 1966 (of which the relevant entry is marked at Ext-A) of the Village Ambari in Barpeta Legislative Assembly Constituency. It is also in his evidence that his name appeared in the electoral lists of 1970, 1985 and 1997 of the above mentioned constituency. It may be mentioned here that in the cross-examination of the first appellant herein, it was not even suggested by the respondents/authorities concerned that the various entries, in the electoral lists referred to above, do not pertain to the first appellant. In the absence of any such suggestion or any other material on record to establish that the entries, in the electoral lists, relied upon by the first appellant, do not pertain to him, there can be legally no reason for rejecting the evidence produced by the first appellant to establish the fact that his name appeared in the electoral list of Barpeta Legislative Assembly Constituency as early as in the year 1966. This shall, in our opinion, necessarily lead, in the absence of anything showing to the contrary, to the further conclusion that the first appellant was present on Indian soil, at least, by the time the electoral list for the Barpeta Legislative Assembly Constituency was prepared in the year 1966. It may be mentioned here that the fact that the first appellant is a person of Indian origin is not in dispute. It is also the case of the respondents that the appellant migrated from the "specified territory" contemplated under Section6A(2) of the Citizenship Act. It may be mentioned here that the fact that the first appellant is a person of Indian origin is not in dispute. It is also the case of the respondents that the appellant migrated from the "specified territory" contemplated under Section6A(2) of the Citizenship Act. From the fact that the first appellant's name appeared in successive electoral lists of the Barpeta Legislative Assembly Constituency as indicated earlier, it would, naturally, go to establish that the appellant has been, ordinarily, resident in Assam, at least, from the year 1966. It further follows, in view of the declaration contained under Section 6A(2) of the Citizenship Act, that the first appellant shall be deemed to be a citizen of India from the first day of January, 1966. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the first appellant is clearly entitled to the benefit of the legal fiction, which Section 6A(2) of the Citizenship Act creates. We accordingly uphold the findings of the learned Tribunal in respect of the citizenship of the appellant No. 1. 111. Coming to the second appellant, who is the wife of the first appellant, she proved that her name appeared in the electoral list, for the first time, in the year 1985 and, later, in the years 1997 and 2005. According to the second appellant, her parents' names appeared in the electoral list of 1970 pertaining to village Jogirpam in Barpeta Legislative Assembly Constituency. Ext-H is the said electoral list proved by the second appellant. The respondents never disputed the fact that Ext-H does pertain to the parents of the second appellant. Amazingly, not even a suggestion, in this regard, is made during the cross-examination of the second appellant. In fact, the short cross-examination of the second appellant reads as follows: My other mother Dud; an Nessa is still alive. I have not submitted any other electoral roll of father-mother after 1970. I have not submitted any document to show that my father's name appeared in 1951 N.R.C. 112. It is not clear from the evidence of the second appellant whether the second appellant's parents have always been citizens of India or migrated from some other country to Assam and whether such other country is one of the specified territories (Bangladesh) or not. It is not clear from the evidence of the second appellant whether the second appellant's parents have always been citizens of India or migrated from some other country to Assam and whether such other country is one of the specified territories (Bangladesh) or not. Assuming for the sake of argument that the parents of the second appellant illegally migrated to India (Assam) some time after the first January, 1966, because their names appeared, for the first time, in the electoral list of the year 1970, they are entitled to acquire citizenship after complying with the requirements of Section 6A(3). Whether they did, in fact, comply with the provisions of Section 6A(3) or not is not available on record. The question herein is not the citizenship of the parents of the second appellant. The question is of the citizenship of the second appellant. According to the deposition of the second appellant, her age is about 60 years on 19.9.2008, i.e., the day on which she deposed before the Tribunal. That would mean that the appellant was aged about 22 years in the year 1970. In the absence of any other material produced by either side, even if we presume that the second appellant illegally migrated, around the year 1970, to India along with her parents, the fact that she has been present on Indian soil ever since is not in dispute as her name appeared in the electoral lists of 1985, 1997 and 2005. Her case falls under Section 6A(3) of the Citizenship Act. She is entitled to be treated as a citizen of India under Section 6A(3) and (5) subject to the condition that she registers herself in accordance with the Rules made under Section 18 of the Act. We may mention that there is nothing on record to establish that she did register herself as such. The failure, on the part of the second respondent to so register, does not necessarily mean that she can be thrown out of the country. 113. Rule 16F of the Rules framed under the Citizenship Act deals with the procedure of registration contemplated under Section 6A(3). Rule 16F reads as follows: 16F. The registering authority for the purpose of Section 6A(3) and form of application for registration. 113. Rule 16F of the Rules framed under the Citizenship Act deals with the procedure of registration contemplated under Section 6A(3). Rule 16F reads as follows: 16F. The registering authority for the purpose of Section 6A(3) and form of application for registration. - (1) The registering authority, for the purpose of Sub-section (3) of Section 6A of the Act shall be such officer as may be appointed for each district of Assam by the Central Government. (2) An application for registration under Sub-section (3) of Section 6A of the Act shall be filed in Form XXIII by the person with the registering authority for the district in which he is ordinarily resident,- (a) within thirty days from the date of his detection as a foreigner, when such detection takes place after the commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Rules, 1986, or (b) within thirty days of the appointment of the registering authority for the district concerned where such detection has taken place before the commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Rules, 1986. (3) The registering authority shall, after entering the particulars of the application in a register in Form XXIV, return a copy of the application under his seal to the applicant. (4) One copy of every application received during a quarter shall be sent by the registering authority to the Central Government, and the State Government of Assam along with a quarterly return in Form XXV, (5) The period referred to in Sub-rule (2) may be extended for a period not exceeding sixty days by the registering authority for reasons to be recorded in writing. 114. It can be seen from Rule 16F(2)(a) that such application can be made within thirty days from the date of the detection of a foreigner. So, in our opinion, the second appellant is still entitled to seek such registration in which case she would only lose her right to participate in the electoral process of the country for a period of ten years from the date of this judgment. To this extent, we modify the finding of the learned Tribunal insofar as the second appellant is concerned. 115 Coming to the cases of the appellant Nos. To this extent, we modify the finding of the learned Tribunal insofar as the second appellant is concerned. 115 Coming to the cases of the appellant Nos. 3 and 4, these two appellants are, admittedly, the children of the first two appellants and in view of our conclusion that the appellant No. 1 is deemed to be a citizen of this country under Section 6A(2) and in view of the ages of the appellant Nos. 3 and 4, which as per the record, are 26 years and 21 years respectively, they having born around 1982 and 1987, necessarily makes them the citizens of this country under Section 3(1)(a) and (b) of the Citizenship Act respectively. We, therefore, confirm the findings of the learned Tribunal insofar as the appellants Nos. 3 and 4 too are concerned. 116. The decision, reached in WP(C) No. 1355/2008, which stands impugned in this appeal, shall accordingly stand set aside. While the findings of the learned Foreigners Tribunal, Barpeta, recorded in its report/order, dated 31.12.2007, in FT. Case No. 164/2007, are hereby set aside and quashed, the learned Tribunal's findings, recorded and the opinion expressed, in its report/order, dated 15.10.2008, shall hereby, to the extent that the same are consistent with the findings recorded in this appeal, stand upheld. 117. Before parting with this writ appeal, we may observe, with some anxiety, that though the State has made the 'reference', the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted/in the learned tribunal, on behalf of the State, shows that its conduct suffers from either inefficiency or disinterest or both. We have, in fact, drawn the attention of the learned Additional Advocate General to the slipshod manner in which the State has conducted the proceedings. 118. With the above observations and directions, this appeal shall stand disposed of. 119. No order as to costs. - - - 1. The scheme of the Articles is elaborately explained by the Supreme Court in AIR 1966 SC 1614 . 2. 246. Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States. - (1) Notwithstanding anything in Clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule in this Constitution referred to as the "Union List". 3. 17. Citizenship, naturalisation and aliens 4. 4. Citizenship by descent. - (1) Notwithstanding anything in Clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule in this Constitution referred to as the "Union List". 3. 17. Citizenship, naturalisation and aliens 4. 4. Citizenship by descent. - DA person born outside India shall be a citizen of India by descent, - (a) on or alter the 26th day of January, 1950, but before the 10th day of December, 1992, if his father is a citizen of India at the time of his birth; or (b) on or after the 10th day of December, 1992, if either of his parents is a citizen of India at the time of his birth: Provided that if the father of a person referred to in Clause (a) was a citizen of India by descent only, that person shall not be a citizen of India by virtue of this section unless- (a) his birth is registered at an Indian consulate within one year of its occurrence or the commencement of this Act, whichever is later, or, with the permission of the Central Government, after the expiry of the said period; or (b) his father is, at the time of his birth, in service under a Government in India; Provided further that if either of the parents of a person referred to in Clause (b) was a citizen of India by descent only, that person shall not be a citizen of India by virtue of this section unless - (a) his birth is registered at an Indian consulate within one year of its occurrence or on or after the 10th day of December, 1992, whichever is later, or, with the permission of the Central Government, after the expiry of the said period; or (b) either of his parents is, at the time of his birth, in service under a Government in India: Provided also that on or after the commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003, a person shall not be a citizen of India by virtue of this section, unless his birth is registered at an Indian consulate in such form and in such manner, as may be prescribed,- (i) within one year of its occurrence or the commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003, whichever is later; or (ii) with the permission of the Central Government, after the expiry of the said period: Provided also that no such birth shall be registered unless the parents of such person declare, in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed that the minor does not hold the passport of another country; (1A) A minor who is a citizen of India by virtue of this section and is also a citizen of any other country shall cease to be a citizen of India if he does not renounce the citizenship or nationality of another country within six months of attaining full age. (2) If the Central Government so directs, a birth shall be deemed for the purposes of this section to have been registered with its permission, notwithstanding that its permission was no obtained before the registration. (3) For the purposes of the proviso to Sub-section (1), any person born outside undivided India who was, or was deemed to be, a citizen of India at the commencement of the Constitution shall be deemed to be a citizen of India by descent only. 5. Citizenship by registration. - (1) Subject to the provisions of this section and such other conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed, the Central Government may, on an application made in this behalf, register as a citizen of India any person not being an illegal migrant who is not already such citizen by virtue of the Constitution or of any other provision of this Act if he belongs to any of the following categories, namely: (a) a person of Indian origin who are ordinarily resident in India for seven years before making an application for registration; (b) a person of Indian origin who is ordinarily resident in any country or place outside undivided India; (c) a person who is married to a citizen of India and is ordinarily resident of India for seven years before making an application for registration; (d) minor children of persons who are citizens of India; (e) a person of full age and capacity whose parents are registered as citizens of India under Clause (a) of this Sub-section or Sub-section (1) of Section 6; (f) a person of full age and capacity who, or either of his parents, was earlier citizen of independent India, and has been residing in India for one year immediately before making an application for registration; (g) a person of full age and capacity who has been registered as an overseas citizen of India for five years, and who has been residing in India for one year before making an application for registration. 6. Citizenship by naturalization. 6. Citizenship by naturalization. - (1) Where an application is made in the prescribed manner by any person of full age and capacity not being an illegal migrant for the grant of a certificate of naturalisation to him, the Central Government may, if satisfied that the applicant is qualified for naturalization under the provisions of the Third Schedule, grant to him a certificate of naturalization: Provided that, if in the opinion of the Central Government, the applicant is a person who has rendered distinguished service to the cause of science, philosophy, art, literature, world peace or human progress generally, it may waive all or any of the conditions specified in the Third Schedule. (2) The person to whom a certificate of naturalization is granted under Sub-section (1) shall, on taking the oath of allegiance in the form specified in the Second Schedule, be a citizen of India by naturalization as from the date on which that certificate is granted. 7. 6A(1)(a) "Assam" means the territories included in the State of Assam immediately before the commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985. 8. 6A(1)(e) "specified territory" means; the territories included in Bangladesh immediately before the commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985. 9. 6A(1)(d) a person shall be deemed to be of Indian origin, if he, or either of his parents or any of his grandparents was born in undivided India. 10. 3. Power to make orders. - (1) The Central Government may by order make provision, either generally or with respect to all foreigners or with respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or description of foreigner, for prohibiting, regulating or restricting the entry of foreigners into India or, their departure therefrom or their presence or continued presence therein. 11. 3(2)(a) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, orders made under this section may provide that the foreigner - (a) shall not enter India or shall enter India only at such times and by such route and at such port or place and subject to the observance of such conditions on arrival as may be prescribed. 12. 24. It needs to be emphasized that the general rule in the leading democracies of the world is that where a person claims to be a citizen of a particular country, the burden is upon him to prove that he is a citizen of that country. 12. 24. It needs to be emphasized that the general rule in the leading democracies of the world is that where a person claims to be a citizen of a particular country, the burden is upon him to prove that he is a citizen of that country. In United Kingdom, the relevant provision is contained in the Immigration Act, 1971 and Sub-section (1), (8) and (9) of Section 3 thereof read as under: 3. General provisions for regulation and control. (1) Except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, where a person is not a British citizen - (a) he shall not enter the United Kingdom unless given leave to do so in accordance with the provisions of, or made under this Act; (b) he may be given leave to enter the United Kingdom (or when already there, leave to remain in the United Kingdom) either for a limited or for an indefinite period; (c) if he is given a limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, it may be given subject to conditions restricting his employment or occupation in the United Kingdom, or requiring him to register with the police, or both. * * * (8) When any question arises under this Act whether or not a person is a British citizen, or is entitled to any exemption under this Act, it shall lie on the person asserting it to prove that he is. (9) A person seeking to enter the United Kingdom and claiming to have the right of abode there shall prove that he has that right by means of either - (a) a United Kingdom passport describing him as a British citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies having the right of abode in the United Kingdom; or (b) a certificate of entitlement. 25. Somewhat similar provision is contained in Immigration and Nationality Act of USA and Section291 places the burden of proof upon the person concerned in any removal proceeding. Section 318provides that no person shall be naturalized unless he has been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence in accordance with all applicable provisions of the Act and the burden of proof shall be upon such person to show that he entered the United States lawfully. Section 318provides that no person shall be naturalized unless he has been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence in accordance with all applicable provisions of the Act and the burden of proof shall be upon such person to show that he entered the United States lawfully. The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 of Canada contains a provision of placing the burden upon the concerned person to establish his right to have a permanent residence in the said country. Section 188 of the Migration Act, 1958 of Australia provides that an officer may require a person whom the officer knows or suspects is a non-citizen to (a) show the officer evidence of being a lawful non-citizen; or (h) show the officer evidence of the person's identity. 13. 15. Records of census not open to inspection nor admissible in evidence: No person shall have a right to inspect any book, register or record made by a census-officer in the discharge of his duty as such, or any schedule delivered under Section 10, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, no entry in any such book, register, record or schedule shall be admissible evidence in any civil proceeding whatsoever or in any criminal proceeding other than a prosecution under this Act or any other law for any act or omission which constitutes an offence under this Act.