JUDGMENT 1. Under Section 3 of the Bihar Electricity Duty Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the 1948 Act) a duty is levied and paid to the State government on the units or value of electrical energy consumed or sold. 2. According to the schedule the duty so payable is 02 paise per unit of energy where energy is consumed for 'industrial purposes' and the duty is 15 paise per unit for energy consumed for 'mining purposes'. 3. The petitioner claims that it is liable to pay duty @ 02 paise per unit on the electricity consumed for washing of coal, treating the same to be consumption for 'industrial pupose'. The case of the respondents is that washing of coal is a part of mining process and, therefore electricity consumed for the purposes will be treated to be for 'mining purposes' and duty on the same would be payable @ 15 paise per unit. There are certain other issues involved which will be dealt with later in this order but the issue aforesaid namely whether the electricity consumed for the purpose of washing of coal extracted from the mine should be treated to be part of mining process or should be treated to be outside of mining process and consequently for industrial purpose is the crucial issue. 4. We have heard Dr. Debi Prasad Pal, Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Abhratosh Majumdar and Mrs. Anubha Rawat Choudhary, Advocates for the petitioner at length and also the learned Counsel for the respondents. 5. The washing of coal extracted from the mine is for the purpose of removing excess ash from the same. 6. In the case of Chowgule & Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. reported in (1981)1 SCC 653 the Supreme Court while dealing with washing of iron ore extracted from the mine held at para-8 as follows: Now there can be no doubt, and indeed this could not be seriously disputed that the process of mining comes to an end when ore is extracted from the mines, washed, screened and dressed in the dressing plant and stacked at the mining site. 7. 7. In view of the above quoted observation of the Supreme Court, it cannot be said, as argued from the side of the petitioner, that 'mining' comes to an end merely upon extraction of the coal or iron ore or other such minerals from the mines. The process of washing of coal, subsequent to its extraction from the mine, is an integral part of mining. Further, the mere washing of coal does not bring into existence the commercially difference and distinct commodity from that which was originally extracted from the mine. Thus, the test prescribed in the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court also makes it clear that the washing of the coal is merely a part of mining. 8. Therefore, the basic contention of the petitioner that electricity consumed for washing of the coal after its extraction from the coal mine is not a 'mining purpose' but is an 'industrial purpose', is not sustainable. 9. The other aspect which has been argued before us from the petitioner's side is that the Commercial Taxes Officer while exercising of the power of review, expressly conferred upon him by Section 9-A(4) of the 1948 Act, had violated the principles of natural justice by relying upon material and circumstances which did not find mention in the show-cause notice. Reliance was placed upon a decision of the Division Bench of Ranchi Bench of Patna High Court in the case of Sri Durga Cement Co. Limited v. State of Bihar and Ors. reported in (1999) 114 STC 268 . 10. It is true that some of the observations in the impugned review order dated 18.5.3010, such as the reference to Section 13(1)(c) of the Bihar Finance Act 1981, are not found in the show-cause notice. However, the basic ground of review is clearly mentioned in the show-cause notice dated 5.3.2010 and can be found at the end of second paragraph, which says that instead of 02 paise per unit, 15 paise per unit duty was to be charged because the energy consumed in 'washery' is treated to be used for 'mining purpose'. 11. Thus the petitioner had been made aware by the show cause notice about the specific ground which the petitioner was required to meet in the reply to the show cause notice. There is no violation of the principles of natural justice, and the petitioner has not been taken by surprise. 11. Thus the petitioner had been made aware by the show cause notice about the specific ground which the petitioner was required to meet in the reply to the show cause notice. There is no violation of the principles of natural justice, and the petitioner has not been taken by surprise. In view of what has been found in the earlier part of this order, all other observations in the impugned review order, even if ignored, would not make any difference to the result namely that the petitioner was required to pay 15 paise per unit instead of 02 paise per unit of electricity in respect of the power consumed by it for washing the coal extracted from the coal mines as the consumption was for 'mining purpose' and not for 'industrial purpose'. 12. It was next argued from the side of the petitioner that the power of review would not have been exercised by the Commercial Taxes Officer on the facts and circumstances of the case as the said power of review should be deemed to be limited to cases covered by Order 47 Rule 1, C.P.C. 13. The submission is without any basis. It is well settled that there is no inherent power of review, except in case involving fraud; and that the power of review must be conferred by statute. However, when a statute confers the power of review, the said power can be limited only by restrictions prescribed by the statute conferring that power. If the statute conferring the power of review does not prescribe any limitation on that power, the power cannot be limited on any principle given in other statutes. The power of review in such cases must be deemed to include every case where the order under review suffers from any kind of error. We do not find it possible to apply the restrictions contained in Section 114 read with Order 47 C.P.C., to the power of review conferred by Section 9-A(4) of the 1948 Act, as the said 1948 Act does not prescribe any limitation on the power of review and does not make applicable either the provisions or the principles of C.P.C. in respect of the proceedings under the 1948 Act. Accordingly, the reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik (Smt.) and Ors. Accordingly, the reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik (Smt.) and Ors. reported in (2006) 4 SCC 78 which is in respect of Code of Civil Procedure is wholly misplaced. 14. It was then argued that there are two fold limitations on the exercise of power of review conferred by Section 9-A(4) of the Act. These are prescribed by Rule 14(10) and (11) of the Rules framed under the 1948 Act. These rules are known as Bihar Electricity Duty Rules, 1949. 15. For ready reference, Section 9-A(4) and Rule 14(10) and (11) are quoted below: Section 9-A(4): Subject to such rules as may be prescribed, any order passed under this Act or the rules made thereunder may be reviewed by the authority passing it of by its successor-in-office. Rule 14(10): Save with the previous sanction of the Commissioner recorded in writing, an order, other than order passed by the Commissioner, shall not be reviewed more than twelve months after the date of the passing of the order which is sought to be reviewed. Rule 14(11): No authority below the rank of Commissioner, shall review an order which has been passed by its predecessors in office, except with the previous sanction of the Commissioner. 16. So far as the sanction under Rule 14(10) is concerned, it is conceded by the petitioner that the same had been accorded by the Commissioner. 17. However pursuant to that sanction review proceedings had been initiated by the Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Ramgarh Circle, Ramgarh. These proceedings were challenged by way of W.P.(T) No. 489 of 2010 connected with W.P.(T) No. 491 of 2010, connected with W.P.(T) No. 499 of 2010, connected with W.P.(T) No. 517 of 2010 which were disposed of by a common order dated 25.2.2010 passed by a Division Bench of this Court. By that judgment, the Division Bench set-aside the proceedings initiated by the Deputy Commissioner and remanded the matter to the Commercial Taxes officer, basically on the ground that review under Section 9-A(4) of the 1948 Act was permissible only by the officer which had passed the order sought to be reviewed or by his successor-in-office which in the present case of the Commercial Taxes Officer and not the Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes. The part of the Division Bench Judgment dated 25.2.2010 which is relevant here is quoted below: Since the matter in effect is practically remitted to the commercial Taxes Officer from the Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, we are of the view that no fresh notice is required to be issued to the petitioner in regard to the review proceeding as the Court has „ merely accepted the contention that the Commercial Taxes Officer would have been the appropriate authority to entertain the review petition. Under the facts and circumstance of the case, we are of the view that a fresh notice is not required to be served to the petitioner except communicating the date on which review would be heard by the Commercial Taxes Officer, Ramgarh Circle, Ramgarh. Since the matter has been remanded by the Court to the Commercial Taxes Officer, Ramgarh Circle, question of a fresh sanction from the higher authority to the commercial Taces Officer is not required and this part of the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that a fresh sanction is required from the Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes is clearly unreasonable and unjustified in the facts and circumstances of the case. In view of the above observations and directions all the writ petitions be treated as disposed of. (Emphasis ours) Thus, the above quoted extract from the earlier decision, which has attained finality between the parties, rules out a fresh sanction from the higher authority to the Commercial Taxes Officer. 18. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has, attempted to get out of this difficulty by arguing that what was under discussion in the aforesaid Judgment was the sanction of the Commissioner under Rule 14(10) which is with regard to the 12 month limitation and the (above quoted) observation of the Division Bench merely means that no fresh sanction will be required in respect of the delay. It has been argued that another sanction of the Commissioner was necessary under Rule 14(11) for review of the order of the Commercial Taxes Officer by his successor-in-office. The argument is without merit. It does not taken into account the spirit of the law which has prescribed the necessity of said sanction. The sanction under Rule 14(10) as well as 14(11) is to be given by the same authority that is the Commissioner of the Commercial Taxes. The argument is without merit. It does not taken into account the spirit of the law which has prescribed the necessity of said sanction. The sanction under Rule 14(10) as well as 14(11) is to be given by the same authority that is the Commissioner of the Commercial Taxes. It would appear that these sanctions have been prescribed as the (subordinate) legislation under the rules thought it fit in its wisdom to entrust only the Commissioner with the decision whether review should or should not be made. It was not deemed appropriate to entrust the officers below the Commissioner, with the said discretion. 19. The Commissioner having sanctioned review after the limitation of 12 months, will be presumed to have examined the matter and thought it a fit case for review. Having regard to the ground of review, there is no personal element attached to the review because of which any fresh or further decision was called for on part of the Commissioner to consider whether review which has been (sic) expressly should or should not be entrusted to successor-in-office of the Commercial Taxes Officer who had fussed the Order under review. The ground of review does not appear to involve any peculiar facts which may have been within the personal knowledge of the predecessor-in-office of the Commercial Taxes Officer because of which there could possibly be any objection to a review by his successor. Accordingly, the said contention also fails. 20. It was also argued from the side of the petitioner that on the very date when the writ petition was filed before this Court the respondents attached the bank account of the petitioner and withdrew the money which was due under impugned review order. It was argued that this is a high handed conduct on the part of the respondents and an attempt to frustrate the proceedings in the writ petition. It was suggested from the side of the petitioner that the respondents should be asked to refund the amount. Firstly, attachment of bank account and withdrawal of the money therefrom does not frustrate the writ proceeding, because if the writ petition succeed the amount can always be ordered to be refunded. Secondly, since we have already upheld the order passed in review, we are of the opinion that this submission need not be examined in this matter. Firstly, attachment of bank account and withdrawal of the money therefrom does not frustrate the writ proceeding, because if the writ petition succeed the amount can always be ordered to be refunded. Secondly, since we have already upheld the order passed in review, we are of the opinion that this submission need not be examined in this matter. We feel that this argument is merely an attempt to prejudice the mind of the Court, and is without any legal merit. 21. No other point was pressed. This writ petition is dismissed. Consequently, the application for interim order is also rejected.