JUDGMENT Hon'ble RAFIQ, J.-This writ petition was tiled by petitioner Naushad Ali way back in the year 1997 assailing the order dated 29.06.1996 of his dismissal from service and order dated 18.06.1997 of the appellate authority thereby rejecting his appeal against the former order. In this writ petition, petitioner has prayed for issuance of a writ of mandamus quashing aforesaid two orders and directing to respondents to reinstate him back in service with all consequential benefits. 2. Factual matrix of the case is that petitioner was initially appointed as a constable (Guard) in Jail Department on 02.08.1978 and was posted at Sub Jail, Malpura in District Tonk. An incident of break up of jail took place in that Jail on 02.05.1994 wherein six under-trial prisoners escaped from the jail by culling rods of bathroom window. Petitioner was on duty in jail as a rifle sentry at its main gate from 10 PM to 2 AM in the intervening night of the fateful day. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against petitioner and few other delinquents. Petitioner was served with a charge-sheet under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the CCA Rules') on 19.07.1994 wherein four charges were levelled against him, crux of which was that he was grossly negligent when the prisoners cut the rods of bathroom window during his duty hours in the intervening night of 2nd and 3rd of May, 1994 owing to which six prisoners, namely, Baldev Singh, Harvindra Singh, Dalip Sharma, Umesh @ Mahendra, Prahlad Ram Sharma and Sukh Dev Singh escaped from the jail. Conduct of petitioner was violative of Rules 81 to 84 and 253 (f) of the Jail Manual, 1981, Part 10 Section 3 thereof, because thereby he helped the prisoners escape from the jail. 3. On receipt of charge-sheet, petitioner by application dated 05.08.1994 requested disciplinary authority to make him available concerned record for inspection. The disciplinary authority however as per allegation of petitioner, without awaiting for his reply, appointed enquiry officer by order dated 23.01.1995. The Inspector General (Jail) wrote a letter to enquiry officer on 0/1.05.1995 that as and when petitioner demanded record, the same may be made available to him. Petitioner submitted an application to the Director General of Police on 24.07.1995 pointing out that demanded record was not made available to him. The Inspector General (Jail) wrote a letter to enquiry officer on 0/1.05.1995 that as and when petitioner demanded record, the same may be made available to him. Petitioner submitted an application to the Director General of Police on 24.07.1995 pointing out that demanded record was not made available to him. Petitioner specifically pointed out seven different documents which he demanded and were not supplied to him, on the basis of which preliminary enquiry report was prepared, namely, statements of Sentry Moharnrnad Sharif, prisoner Farid Mohammad S/o Shamsuddin, prisoner Panchya, prisoner Mool Singh, Sentry Radhey Shyam, Assistant Jailer Shri Rarnswaroop and Sentry Ramphool Meena. Petitioner was served with show cause-notice on 30.03.1996 along-with report of enquiry, calling upon him to submit his explanation and show cause within a fortnight as to why he should not be removed from service. Petitioner submitted detailed reply to show-cause notice on 08.05.1996 pointing out certain discrepancies made in the enquiry and the fact that there was no difference between the statements recorded during departmental enquiry and those recorded during criminal trial. Disciplinary authority however by his order dated 29.06.1996 dismissed the petitioner from service. Appeal filed by petitioner was also dismissed by order dated 18.06.1997. Hence this writ petition. 4. Shri Sanjeev Prakash Sharma, learned counsel for petitioner, has argued that despite specific demand by petitioner, he was not provided services of defence nominee. This was violative of Rule 16(5) of the CCA Rules. This fact has been admitted by enquiry officer in his report that petitioner demanded by written application and was not yet provided with services of defence nominee. Enquiry officer in the report also admitted that even though petitioner had also requested for inspection of record but as per instruction received from the office of Director General of Prisons dated 23.05.1995, only two of the delinquents were allowed to inspect the record and not the petitioner. Other delinquents were Ram Phool Meena, Head Constable, Ram Swaroop, Assistant Jailer and Sentry Bala Sahai. 5. Learned counsel has referred to the findings recorded by enquiry officer on charges against petitioner from Page 21 onwards of enquiry report. Learned counsel submitted that enquiry officer has held petitioner guilty on the basis of petitioner's own statement in the cross-examination by co-delinquent, who wanted to shift entire burden upon him. 5. Learned counsel has referred to the findings recorded by enquiry officer on charges against petitioner from Page 21 onwards of enquiry report. Learned counsel submitted that enquiry officer has held petitioner guilty on the basis of petitioner's own statement in the cross-examination by co-delinquent, who wanted to shift entire burden upon him. This was a serious irregularity inasmuch the enquiry officer committed yet another illegality by taking into consideration statement of petitioner recorded by police under Section 161 of Code of Criminal Procedure during investigation on 14.09.1995 solely with purpose of holding him guilty. While on one hand, the enquiry officer accepted that petitioner being on duty as rifle sentry at main gate of the jail, thus accepting that he was not required to enter the jail to check the barrack but on the other hand, he also observed that he could certainly keep a vigil even from outside the jail by looking through the hole of main gate as to what activities were going on inside. The enquiry officer on the basis of statement of petitioner that there was no noise during the period of his duty, has proceeded to hold that petitioner was hand in gloves with ran away prisoners. Statements of co-delinquents have been taken into consideration to hold that the incidence of escape occurred during the period when petitioner was on duty, whereas there was clear evidence to the effect that at 2.30 am Jailer was reported about escape by Sentry Radhey Shyam, who replaced the petitioner at 2.00 AM. Thus actually escape occurred when petitioner seized to be on duty. 6. Shri Sanjeev Prakash Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, further submitted that disciplinary authority has failed to take into consideration the detailed representation submitted by petitioner on 08.05.1996 raising objections about enquiry report to the disciplinary authority. It was argued that petitioner specifically raised the point that when he demanded inspection of record and approached the office of disciplinary authority, the record was not made available to him and that it was informed to him that record was sent to court of concerned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate. The provisions of Rule 16(3) of the CCA Rules were thus flouted. Petitioner for this reason could not file reply to the charge-sheet. 7. The provisions of Rule 16(3) of the CCA Rules were thus flouted. Petitioner for this reason could not file reply to the charge-sheet. 7. Petitioner had specifically objected to continuity of proceedings of departmental enquiry without availability of record and also in view of the fact that the criminal trial was pending in the court on the same charges, yet the disciplinary proceedings were continued to be carried out. Learned counsel submitted that by reason of not allowing him services of defence nominee, his defence was seriously prejudiced because petitioner himself was only middle school pass. Petitioner was allowed to be cross-examined by his co-delinquents but defence witnesses produced by them were not available for cross-examination by petitioner. In this manner, petitioner suffered serious prejudice because in order to save co-delinquents, who were also charged for same delinquency, entire burden was shifted onto the petitioner. Not only this, petitioner was not allowed to cross-examine co-delinquents. Their evidence therefore could not be read against him and they could not be treated as witness of the department to prove the charge against petitioner. Statement of prisoner Panchya, produced as PW-2, could not be accepted as a witness. He stated that when he heard shout of another prisoner Mool Singh to the effect that some prisoners had escaped from jail, he made such statement even before the police and the criminal court, but his statement was never placed before the enquiry officer. Learned counsel submitted that the sole basis on which disciplinary proceedings were initiated was the statement of Mool Singh, a prisoner, who in his statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. slated that he raised alarm from inside the jail premise and called petitioner to say that some prisoners were trying to escape from the jail but the petitioner did not pay any heed to him. He was not produced as a witness during the departmental enquiry. In his statement recorded during criminal trial, however, he clearly stated that he gave the earlier statement under pressure from SHO Shri Bajrang Lal and that when he was giving his statement before the Magistrate, Bajrang Lal was also present who directed him to make such statement and also sign the statement. 8. In his statement recorded during criminal trial, however, he clearly stated that he gave the earlier statement under pressure from SHO Shri Bajrang Lal and that when he was giving his statement before the Magistrate, Bajrang Lal was also present who directed him to make such statement and also sign the statement. 8. Learned counsel submitted that in the case of petitioner a separate order was passed by disciplinary authority on 29.06.1996 dismissing him from service, whereas show cause notice was given to him only for removal from service. Separate order was passed awarding penalty of stoppage of one grade increments without cumulative effect, respectively to Ramphool Meena, I lead Constable and Ram Swaroop, Assistant Jailer, respectively, each on 17.07.1996. This was again a serious illegality because if joint enquiry was conducted, the penalty against delinquents should have been imposed by cornman order, though thereby, may be awarding them different penalties. 9. Appeal filed by petitioner was dismissed on the basis of preliminary enquiry report of Superintendent Central Jail, Ajmer, observing that petitioner received a sum of Rs.25,000/- as illegal gratification, although no such charge was ever framed against petitioner in disciplinary proceedings. The appellate authority has thus dismissed appeal on extraneous consideration not germane to record. Even though the appellate authority had found that all delinquents arc equally responsible for escape of prisoners from jail but dismissed appeal of petitioner only. 10. Learned counsel submitted that the criminal court by its judgment dated 22.02.2006 acquitted petitioner of charges under Section 221 of Indian Penal Code, but at the same time convicted Sub Jailer Ram Swaroop for offence under Section 221 IPC and sentenced him to undergo 2 years SI with line of Rs.1000/-. It was argued that departmental enquiry could not have been continued during pendency of criminal trial in view of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines - 1999(3) SCC 679 and Roop Singh Negi vs. PNB - 2009(6) SCC 570. 11. Learned counsel for petitioner citing judgment in Roop Singh Negi's case (Supra) specifically argued that in that case admission/confession of delinquent employee before police authorities was taken into consideration, it was held that subsequent acquittal by criminal court on the self same evidence cannot be ignored. 11. Learned counsel for petitioner citing judgment in Roop Singh Negi's case (Supra) specifically argued that in that case admission/confession of delinquent employee before police authorities was taken into consideration, it was held that subsequent acquittal by criminal court on the self same evidence cannot be ignored. Learned counsel submitted that the Supreme Court held that confession of delinquent should have been proved by other independent evidence and could not be relied upon by itself for holding him guilty. In the present case also the statement of petitioner recorded by police under Section 161, Cr.P.C., could not be considered. Learned counsel for petitioner also relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in M.V. BijJani vs. UOI 2006(5) SCC 88 on the question of burden and standard of proof. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Basanti Prasad vs. Chairrrian, Bihar School Examination Board - 2009(6) SCC 791 , in which case also the delinquent was acquitted of charge in the criminal case and on that basis, the order of penalty in disciplinary proceedings was held to be bad. 12. Learned counsel for petitioner relied on judgments of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. vs. Mohammad Sharif - 1982(2) SCC 376 , Committee of Management, Kishan Degree College vs. Shambhu Sharan Pandey - 1995(1) SCC 404 and Sawai Singh vs. State of Rajasthan - (1986) 3 SCC 454 , to argue that enquiry proceedings stood vitiated as the documents were not made available to the petitioner. Learned counsel also relied on Division Bench decision of this Court in Babu Lal vs. State of Rajasthan & Others - 2000(3) RLR 416 and argued that this court interfered on the question of quantum of dissimilar penalty awarded to otherwise similarly situated delinquents and argued that the Court can make interference even on proportionality of penalty on the ground of discrimination as well. 13. Shri M.F. Baig, learned Deputy Government Counsel appearing for respondents, opposed writ petition and submitted that when charge-sheet was served upon petitioner, it was clearly informed to him that if he wanted inspection of record, he should supply the list of documents which he wanted to rely in order to defend himself. The petitioner by application dated 05.08.1994 only requested for permitting him to inspect the relevant record but never supplied the list of documents which he wanted to inspect. The petitioner by application dated 05.08.1994 only requested for permitting him to inspect the relevant record but never supplied the list of documents which he wanted to inspect. In spite of the fact that in the charge-sheet dated 09.07.1994, a clear cut time limit of days was given to him to file reply, but neither he made request to inspect the documents nor did he file any reply to the charge-sheet. He was given one more opportunity and still he failed to do so. The disciplinary authority, by its letter dated 06.07.1994 required the petitioner to inspect the documents. Having failed to inspect the documents, the petitioner again submitted an application on 24.07.1995 stating that enquiry officer has not provided complete record instead he made available only certain Photostat copies which were not legible. The enquiry officer gave ample opportunity to petitioner. Even though petitioner did not file reply to charge-sheet, he granted him as many as five opportunities to file reply. Rather on 06.07.1995 petitioner gave in writing to enquiry officer that he was not willing to lead any evidence in his defence. The enquiry officer completed the enquiry in just and reasonable manner and in conformity with provisions of CCA Rules. All charges were found proved against petitioner on testimony of prosecution witnesses. Learned counsel submitted that the charge no. 1 was found fully proved against petitioner because it was he who was working as sentry on the night duty from 10 pm to 2 am in the intervening night of 2nd and 3rd of May, 1994 when six prisoners broke open the jail and ran away. Petitioner was liable to check locks and fencing and also liable to enquire from the prisoners of jail in terms of Rules 81 to 84 of Jail Manuals, 1984, Part 10 Section 3. The enquiry officer has recorded finding of his guilt on this charge on the basis of documentary evidence Exhibit P-1, P-2 and P-6. He has clearly recorded that at the relevant time sentry Bala Sahai was absent and his charge was also transferred to petitioner in alternative arrangement. The enquiry officer clearly noted that petitioner himself in his statement as PW-6, has admitted that at the time of taking charge he ensured by looking through holes of main gate that everything was alright and he also ensured that all nine prisoners were in jail. The enquiry officer clearly noted that petitioner himself in his statement as PW-6, has admitted that at the time of taking charge he ensured by looking through holes of main gate that everything was alright and he also ensured that all nine prisoners were in jail. This was ensured by him at 12.00 Hours in night and thereafter he did not get any report till 2.00 am. The learned counsel submitted that as per the relevant Rules he was duty obliged to take report of the prisoners at each and every hour but he enquired about the same only once. 14. Charge No.2 was also fully proved against petitioner because he was not vigilant enough to curb the noise which was purposely raised in the name of 'kirtan' to facilitate cutting of iron bars. Even though the barrack in which the detenus were lodged was situated only 40 ft. away from his duty point, petitioner did not ensure its safety. His conduct was thus violative of Part 104 Section 3 Rule 71 and Part 8 Section 14 Rule 253(f) of Jail Manual, 1951. The enquiry officer has fully supported his finding on the testimony of PW-2 Panchya and PW-3 Harjinder Singh, both under-trial prisoners, who stated that between 10 pm to 2 am no 'bhajan-kirtan' was going on. Despite complete silence if petitioner was not able to hear noise of cutting of iron bars from bare distance of 30-40 ft., he was utterly negligent in discharge of his duties. 15. Charge No.3 with regard to negligence was also proved that when petitioner was on duty at 1.30 am, prisoner Mool Singh shouted from inside the jail to inform him about attempt of escape made by prisoners, but petitioner rather scolded him and instead asked him to sleep. Petitioner till he handed over charge to another rifle sentry Radhey Shyam at 2 am, did not inform of this fact to either him or Assistant Jailer or any other authority. Thus, he was fully responsible for the incident. Learned counsel referred to certain excerpts from the statements of PW-2 Panchya, under-trial prisoner, and PW-4 Radhey Shyam. Petitioner till he handed over charge to another rifle sentry Radhey Shyam at 2 am, did not inform of this fact to either him or Assistant Jailer or any other authority. Thus, he was fully responsible for the incident. Learned counsel referred to certain excerpts from the statements of PW-2 Panchya, under-trial prisoner, and PW-4 Radhey Shyam. Sentry, who replaced the petitioner as rifle sentry, stating that when he was awakened by petitioner to take charge, immediately on his awakening he heard noise from inside the jail; he immediately rushed to main gate and saw through the small windows, the prisoners were crying and raising voice that certain prisoners have escaped but petitioner never informed about the incident. Learned. counsel submitted that petitioner himself appeared as a witness as PW-6 and in his statement he stated that at about 1.50 am, on hearing noise from Mool Singh from inside jail, he awakened Sentry Radhey Shyam and asked him to go inside the jail. The learned counsel submitted that therefrom it is clear that till then Radhey Shyam was not on duty and petitioner himself was on duty. 16. Charge No.4 was also fully proved against petitioner as during his duty hours prisoners ran away and this fact carne to his notice much before his duty hours expired but he did not raise alarm as per Rule 81(6) of Section 3 of Part 10 of jail Manual 1951, and also did not inform about this fact to higher authorities. This clearly shows that petitioner had known about escape of prisoners much before his duty hours came to an end and that he wanted to pass on the entire blame onto the incoming rifle sentry Radhey Shyam by keeping mum till 2 am. 17. Shri M.F. Baig. learned Deputy Government Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents, further submitted that criminal court had framed four charges against petitioner. In this connection, it may be noticed that PW-4 Radhey Shyam made a statement before the court that at 2.00 am when he was awakened by petitioner Naushad Ali, he heard him saying that six prisoners have ran away and Radhey Shyam after taking keys from petitioner opened the gate and went inside the barrack to check; he also awakened Ramphool. It clearly shows that keys of the jail were still with the petitioner when the incident took place. It clearly shows that keys of the jail were still with the petitioner when the incident took place. The criminal court acquitted petitioner by giving him benefit of doubt, however such an observation does not absolve petitioner of his negligence or connivance. Charges in the criminal trial and disciplinary proceedings were materially different. The learned counsel relied on the judgment in Commissioner of Police vs. Narendra Singh, 2006(1) SCC 265 and argued that the degree and extent of proof required in recording a finding of guilt by any criminal court and in a departmental proceedings are different. While in the former, charges have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt but in the departmental proceedings, such guilt can be recorded even if the charges are proved by preponderance of evidence. Acquittal of accused in criminal trial by itself could not be therefore a ground not to initiate departmental proceedings against him and drop the same in the event of his acquittal. 18. Learned counsel referring from Para 13 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Police's case (supra) and also from discussion in Capt. M. Paul Anthony's case (supra), argued that the same view has been expressed by the Supreme Court. It is therefore prayed that writ petition be dismissed. 19. Whether or not disciplinary proceedings can be initiated while delinquents were separately facing criminal trial, on same or analogous charges, is the question which needs to be answered first, particularly when petitioner Naushad Ali has been acquitted by criminal court of the charge for offence under Section 221 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, 'the IPC') but he was dismissed from service by the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority. Co-delinquent Ramswaroop, Sub Jailor, was held guilty for committing offence under Section 221 IPC and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment of 2 years with fine of RS.1000/-. In disciplinary proceedings however, he was awarded penalty of stoppage of one grade increments with cumulative effect. Answer to this question would depend on the fact whether the charges against petitioner in criminal trial as also in disciplinary proceedings were same and were founded on same set of evidence. In criminal trial where a stricter degree of proof is required to be applied and the charge has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Answer to this question would depend on the fact whether the charges against petitioner in criminal trial as also in disciplinary proceedings were same and were founded on same set of evidence. In criminal trial where a stricter degree of proof is required to be applied and the charge has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Even after applying strict degree of proof when he has been acquitted of the charge for offence under Section 221 IPC, can he be punished for above referred to four charges in the disciplinary proceedings which in essence are about his negligence in performance of duty in violation of different provisions of Jail Manual, is the core issue in the present case. 20. In Capt. M. Paul Anthony's case (Supra) it was held by the Supreme Court that there is a consensus of judicial opinion on basic principle that proceedings in a criminal case and departmental proceedings can go on simultaneously, except where departmental proceedings and criminal case are based on same set of facts and that the evidence in both the proceedings is common. Basis for this proposition is that proceedings in a criminal case and departmental proceedings operate in distinct and different jurisdictional areas. In departmental proceedings, factors operating in the mind of disciplinary authority may be many, such as enforcement of discipline, or to elicit a level of integrity in the staff. Standard of proof required in those proceedings is also different from that required in a criminal trial. While in departmental proceedings, the standard of proof is one of preponderance of probabilities, whereas in a criminal trial, the charge has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. 21. In G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat (2006) 5 SCC 446 = RLW 2006(3) SC 2480, departmental enquiry and criminal proceedings were based on same set of charges, evidence and witnesses, and there was no other evidence against employee to hold him guilty. The employee was honorably acquitted in criminal trial, during pendency of proceedings challenging dismissal. 21. In G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat (2006) 5 SCC 446 = RLW 2006(3) SC 2480, departmental enquiry and criminal proceedings were based on same set of charges, evidence and witnesses, and there was no other evidence against employee to hold him guilty. The employee was honorably acquitted in criminal trial, during pendency of proceedings challenging dismissal. It was held by the Supreme Court that when two proceedings are based on identical and similar set of facts and charges against delinquent in both proceedings arc one and same, and that there is no evidence against the employee to hold him guilty of having illegally accumulated excess income by way of gratification, the witnesses, who were examined in disciplinary proceedings were the same witnesses, who were examined in criminal case too and the criminal court came to conclusion that the prosecution has not been able to prove guilt alleged against employee beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted him by judicial pronouncement which was made after regular trial and on hot contest, in these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand. 22. In Union of India and Others vs. Naman Singh Shekhawat 2005 (8) RDD 3332, a Division Bench of this Court held that acquittal of a delinquent in criminal trial though will not affect his penalization in departmental enquiry but in case the criminal and disciplinary proceedings are based on same facts and set of evidence and there is no other charge, the disciplinary enquiry cannot be allowed to continue unless there is some other charge or part charge of misconduct is distinct or distinguishable on facts. Departmental authority was held to be bound to consider the order of acquittal in disciplinary enquiry based on same facts and evidence, which led to his acquitted in criminal trial. Since the charges in both were based on same facts and evidence, there was no justification in initiating the departmental proceedings and it was nothing but harassment of officer and sheer wastage of valuable time of the court. Since the charges in both were based on same facts and evidence, there was no justification in initiating the departmental proceedings and it was nothing but harassment of officer and sheer wastage of valuable time of the court. The aforesaid Division Bench judgment of this Court was challenged by the Union of India before the Supreme Court in Union of India and Others vs. Naman Singh Shekhawat - (2008) 4 SCC 1 , where the Supreme Court, upholding the judgment of this Court, held that departmental enquiry can be initiated even after acquittal in criminal case but such power has to be exercised bonafidely, fairly and reasonably, which was held to be otherwise when there is no evidence to prove the charge; there were many irregularities in the disciplinary proceedings; there was delay of nine years in initiation of departmental enquiry, the delinquent was not provided documents and service of defence assistant of his choice despite demand; cross-examination of delinquent was made by presenting officer himself reflecting his biasness and that delinquent was denied to examine the defence witnesses: Besides, some of the witnesses of the department were not supporting its case. Such witnesses were not allowed to be cross-examined, yet the charges against the delinquent were held proved. It was held that departmental enquiry stood thoroughly vitiated. The appeal was dismissed with costs of rupees one lakh. 23. Here in the present case I find that charge against the petitioner, although has been splited into four parts, is of alleged violation of Rules 81 to 81, Part 10 Section 3, and Rule 253(F) of the Jail Manual, but the facts, which were made basis of these charges, and the evidence in support thereof that was produced, were exactly the same which were there against the petitioner in criminal trial. Although in the criminal trial, he was charged for committing offence under Section 221 of the IPC, but the criminal court on examination of witnesses and on the basis of evidence which was substantially the same in both the proceedings, held the petitioner not guilty of the offence under Section 221 of the IPC. Although in the criminal trial, he was charged for committing offence under Section 221 of the IPC, but the criminal court on examination of witnesses and on the basis of evidence which was substantially the same in both the proceedings, held the petitioner not guilty of the offence under Section 221 of the IPC. The court held that when the petitioner, as rifle sentry, was posted outside the main gate of the jail, he could not be held guilty of what happened inside the jail and that it was the Sub Jailer Ramswaroop who was guilty of not ensuring that a sentry was deputed inside the Jail as per the provisions of the Jail Manual. No evidence was produced to establish as to in what manner the petitioner could be held responsible for keeping vigil both inside the jail barrack and also outside at the main gate. Co-delinquent Ramswaroop was held guilty for offence under Section 221 of the IPC. Similarly co-accused Bala Sahai was also acquitted of the charge by the trial court. Some of the under-trial prisoners who ran away and were apprehended again, were however convicted for offence under Section 225 IPC. The criminal trial against co-accused Ramphool, Head Guard, had to be abandoned because of his death during trial. 24. Section 221 IPC inter-alia provides that whoever, being a pubic servant, legally bound as such public servant to apprehend or to keep in confinement any person charged with or liable to be apprehended for an offence, intentionally omits to apprehend such person, or intentionally suffers such person to escape, or intentionally aids such person in escaping or attempting to escape from such confinement, shall be punished with the imprisonment provided therein. Such offence shall be taken to have been committed by petitioner if the evidence adduced by the prosecution during criminal trial proved such offence against petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The crux of allegation against petitioner is of negligence in discharge of duties and in order to prove it against him the disciplinary authority has relied on same set of evidence which was there against him in the criminal trial. Acquittal of petitioner in criminal trial would therefore certainly have bearing on penalty inflicted upon him in disciplinary proceedings and also on outcome of present writ petition challenging the order of dismissal, which was still pending. 25. Acquittal of petitioner in criminal trial would therefore certainly have bearing on penalty inflicted upon him in disciplinary proceedings and also on outcome of present writ petition challenging the order of dismissal, which was still pending. 25. Even if the matter is examined independently, I find that there are very many such glaring irregularities in conduct of disciplinary proceedings, which vitiates the entire departmental proceedings, which shall be presently discussed. Petitioner specifically objected to continuity of the departmental proceedings without availability of record, which was seized and lying with the criminal court and also because the charges in criminal trial framed by the criminal court were founded on the same set of facts and evidence. 26. The foremost amongst them is the fact that despite specific demand made by the petitioner by written application, he was not allowed to inspect various documents and this was notwithstanding the fact that the Inspector General (Jail) by letter dated 04.05.1995 directed the enquiry officer to permit the delinquent to inspect the record. The enquiry officer in the opening para of his report has clearly noted that such inspection was allowed only to two of the co-delinquents, and not to the petitioner. Petitioner has set up a specific plea in the present writ petition that he was not even allowed to inspect the documents despite his written request made by application dated 05.08.1991 Instead of making the record available for inspection to enable the petitioner to file reply to the charge-sheet, the disciplinary authority rather proceeded straightaway to appoint the enquiry officer on 23.01.1995. Petitioner again reiterated his request by his application dated 23.01.1995 for inspection of the documents. The disciplinary authority by his letter dated 04.05.1995 allowed the petitioner to inspect the record and stated in that letter that despite several opportunities, he did not file reply and hence the enquiry officer was appointed under Rule 16 (4) of the CCA Rules The petitioner by submitting another application on 06.07.1995 requested the enquiry officer to allow him to inspect the record. He then submitted yet another application on 24.07.1995 requesting that copies of statements of witnesses recorded during preliminary enquiry be made available to him to know as to what was the foundation for framing of the charges. He also demanded copy of such report. He then submitted yet another application on 24.07.1995 requesting that copies of statements of witnesses recorded during preliminary enquiry be made available to him to know as to what was the foundation for framing of the charges. He also demanded copy of such report. None of these documents were made available to him because record was seized with the criminal court i.e. Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Malpura, District Tonk. The provisions of Rule 16(3) of the CCA Rules were thus flouted. By neither supplying the demanded documents nor making them available to the petitioner for inspection, his defence was certainly prejudiced. The petitioner also requested that he, being only middle school pass, should be allowed to avail of the services of defence assistant in terms of Rule 16(5) of the CCA Rules. The enquiry officer in his report has also acknowledged this fact that the petitioner was not provided with services of any defence assistant despite his written request made to the Director General of Prisons. This has indeed prejudiced his defence. 27. A very strange method was adopted by the disciplinary authority and/or the enquiry officer in the present case. It was a joint disciplinary enquiry against petitioner and co-delinquents, namely, Ramswaroop, Ramphool and Bala Sahai and, it is quite surprising to notice that department set up all these four delinquents as departmental prosecution witnesses; while Bala Sahai and petitioner Naushad Ali were examined as PW-5 and PW-6, Ramphool and Ramswaroop were examined as PW-7 and PW-8. When they were charge-sheeted and were being proceeded against as delinquents as noticed above, there was absolutely no warrant for setting them up as departmental witnesses. 28. Not only this, at various places in the enquiry report, I find that the enquiry officer has relied on the statement of co-delinquents against the petitioner to hold him guilty and in this connection he has also referred to a part of his cross-examination made by the co-delinquents. A serious prejudice was caused to the petitioner thereby when the enquiry officer relied on the statement of co-delinquents but did not give him opportunity to cross-examine the co-delinquents, and also considered his own statement recorded under Section 161 Cr. P. C. Obviously, tendency on the part of the co-delinquents would always be to shift the entire burden onto the petitioner and exaggeration of statement by them was but obvious. 29. P. C. Obviously, tendency on the part of the co-delinquents would always be to shift the entire burden onto the petitioner and exaggeration of statement by them was but obvious. 29. Mool Singh, a key witness, was not examined by the department in disciplinary proceedings, whose statement was recorded under Section 164, Cr.P.C., where he allegedly stated that he raised alarm inside the jail and called the petitioner to see that some prisoners were trying to escape from the jail, but petitioner did not pay any heed to him, but surprisingly he was not produced as a witness in departmental enquiry. His version was sought to be proved by statement of another prisoner Panchya, who Was examined as PW-2 and stated that he heard Mool Singh saying so to the delinquent. This version of Panchya comes in the category of hearsay evidence and the action of the department in withholding Mool Sing in the departmental enquiry should be read against them. Moreover, this Mool Singh was produced in criminal trial before the Court concerned, where he stated that he gave that statement under pressure of SHO Shri Bajranglal who was present in the court throughout recording of his statement and it was he who directed him to make such statement and also sign the statement. Obviously, Mool Singh has not supported the stand of the department in the criminal trial. A presumption should arise that he was deliberately not produced as a witness during disciplinary proceedings and if produced he would not have supported case of the department even in disciplinary proceedings. 30. It is trite law that the principles of natural justice have to be fully adhered to so as to ensure fair play and action on the part of the administrative authorities and thus principles must be observed before taking any adverse action having penal consequence such as loss of livelihood. Any violation of those principles would vitiate the disciplinary proceedings. 31. In my considered view, the disciplinary proceedings in the present case stood vitiated for all the afore-noted reasons and having been conducted in breach of principles of natural justice and in violation of the provisions of Rules 16(3), 16(4) and 16(5) of the CCA Rules. I therefore need not examine other arguments raised by learned counsel for petitioner. 32. 31. In my considered view, the disciplinary proceedings in the present case stood vitiated for all the afore-noted reasons and having been conducted in breach of principles of natural justice and in violation of the provisions of Rules 16(3), 16(4) and 16(5) of the CCA Rules. I therefore need not examine other arguments raised by learned counsel for petitioner. 32. In view of what has been discussed above, this writ petition deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order of punishment dated 29.06.1996 of the disciplinary authority and that of the appellate authority dated 18.06.1997 are quashed and set-aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits. 33. Compliance of this judgment be made within three months from the date its copy is produced before the respondents.