Judgment 1. These writ petitions are heard and disposed of to-gether as the second of these petitions is filed consequent upon the further developments pursuant to the first of these petitions. 2. The facts, briefly stated, are as follows: - The petitioner in the first of these petitions is an elected Councillor of the City Municipal Council, Chikkaballapur. It transpires that several Councillors of the City Municipal Council had submitted a representation on 18.3.2010, to call for a meeting of the Council to consider a motion for want of confidence in the President of the Council. The Commissioner, second respondent herein, of the City Municipal Council had, in turn, placed the requisition before the President, the fourth respondent herein, on 19.3.2010, to call for a meeting on a specified date as required under Section 47(2) of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). The fourth respondent, however, had directed the second respondent to convene a meeting on 17.4.2010, by a communication dated 3.4.2010. The second respondent had thereafter issued notice of the proposed meeting to all concerned, as on 5.4.2010. The petitioner has questioned the validity of the said notice. In the second of these petitions, the petitioner is the President of the City Municipal Council, Chikkaballapur himself. It is his grievance that though there was a representation submitted by several Councillors requesting that a meeting of the Council be convened to consider a no-confidence motion against himself, which was placed before him on 19.3.2010, the second respondent had, however, proceeded on leave thereafter between the period 27.3.2010 and 11.4.2010. In the result, as there was no other person appointed as In-charge officer, till 31.3.2010, he was in a position to direct the convening of a meeting only as per direction dated 3.4.2010. As this was not in consonance with the requirement under Section 47(2) of the Act, which he had realised in retrospect, he had issued a further direction on 15.4.2010, to recall the notice of meeting scheduled for 17.4.2010. As this was not in consonance with the requirement under Section 47(2) of the Act, which he had realised in retrospect, he had issued a further direction on 15.4.2010, to recall the notice of meeting scheduled for 17.4.2010. But it is the complaint of the petitioner that respondent No. 2 did not act upon the direction and though the petitioner did bring it to the attention of this court of his intention to recall the notice of the meeting – the meeting having been convened on 17.4.2010 pursuant to a direction by this court, the petitioner questions the validity of the procedure followed and claims that in his opinion he had acted in violation of the mandatory requirement of Section 47(2) of the Act and therefore, the proceedings of the Council dated 17.4.2010 are rendered void. 3. Shri Padmanabha Mahale, Senior Advocate appearing for the Counsel for the petitioner in the first of these petitions and Shri Madhusudan R Naik, Senior Advocate appearing for the Counsel for the petitioner in the second of the petitions would both urge that the short point of consideration in these petitions is whether, in terms of Section 47(2) of the Act, the President of the Municipal Council could, on the basis of the representations of the Councillors received on 18.3.2010 and placed before him on 19.3.2010, direct as on 3.4.2010 the convening of a meeting scheduled on 17.4,2010. Especially, when the President himself had expressed that he had apparently acted contrary to the requirement under Section 47(2) of the Act and had sought to withdraw the notice as intimated to this court during the course of these proceedings. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that the meeting scheduled on 17.4.2010 was in fact convened by virtue of a direction of this Court, the legality of the proceedings in the above background is the only point for consideration. Reliance is sought to be placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Chandra Kishore Jha vs. Mahavir Prasad, AIR 1999 Supreme Court 3558, to contend that, it is a well settled salutary principle that if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner. 4. 4. Shri Jayakumar S.Patil, Senior Advocate appearing for the Counsel for the respondents 11 to 14 in the first of these petitions and Shri S.P.Shankar, Senior Advocate appearing for the Counsel for the respondents No.5 and 10, on the other hand, contend that the validity or otherwise of the notice of the meeting that was to be convened on 17.4.2010 is wholly academic. In that, the said notice though was under challenge before this court, the purported withdrawal of the same not having been permitted by this court, in view of the permission to conduct the meeting on 17.4.2010 and that meeting having been attended by more than the requisite number of Councillors to constitute a quorum and the no-confidence motion having been put to vote and having been carried by an overwhelming majority, the purpose and object contemplated under Section 47 has been legitimately achieved and the seeming infirmity in the notice of the meeting having been issued beyond the prescribed period, is not vitiated as the exercise of such power was well before any action had been taken in terms of Section 47(3) of the Act. Further, given the circumstance that this court did permit the meeting to be convened in terms of the notice and the meeting having been conducted with members far exceeding the quorum of the Council, the body has exercised its function in accordance with the principles of democracy and hence the proceedings cannot be characterized as being illegal or vitiated for want of any essential procedural compliance. It is contended that the principle that if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner, is sought to be pressed into service out of context and cannot be strictly applied in the instant case. 5. In the above facts and circumstances, the first question to be answered would be, whether the President of the City Municipal Council who was called upon to convene a meeting of the council by a requisite number of Councillors on 18.3.2010 and which requisition was brought to his attention on 19.3.2010, could yet direct the issuance of a notice of a meeting to be convened on 17.4.2010 by a direction dated 3.4. 2010? In this regard, the language of Section 47 of the Act may be seen. 2010? In this regard, the language of Section 47 of the Act may be seen. The Section read as follows: 47. Meeting: -(1) The municipal council shall ordinarily hold at least one meeting in every month for the transaction of business [which shall be called an ordinary general meeting]. (2) The President may, whenever he thinks fit, and shall, upon the written request of not less than one-third of the whole number of councillors and for a date not more than fifteen days after the presentation of such request, call a special general meeting. (3) If the President fails to call a special general meeting as provided in sub-section (2), the Vice-President or one-third of the whole number of councillors may call such meeting for a day not more than thirty days after the presentation of such request and require the Chief Officer or the Municipal Commissioner to give notice to the councillors and take such action as may be necessary to convene the meeting. (4) Any meeting may be adjourned until the next or any subsequent date, and an adjourned meeting may be further adjourned in like manner. [47-A. Participation by Legislators-xxxx]. 6. As can be seen from the language employed in Sub-section (2) above, the President is vested with the power to call for a special meeting of the Council-whenever he thinks fit! But, however, he shall fix the meeting within 15 days from the date of any requisition made by not less than one-third of the whole number of Councillors. It follows therefore that the President at all times has the power to call for a meeting – even if there is no request from the requisite number of councilors. However, when there is a requisition by the required number in respect of a meeting to consider a particular subject and if the President fails to act in terms of Sub-section (2), the power of the Vice President or one-third of the whole number of Councillors may then call the meeting to be held within the period as contemplated under Sub-section (3). 7. In the instant case, the President though did not call for a meeting within 15 days from 18.3.2010 (or 19.3.2010), but he has done so by his direction on 3.4.2010, to convene a meeting on 17.4.2010. 7. In the instant case, the President though did not call for a meeting within 15 days from 18.3.2010 (or 19.3.2010), but he has done so by his direction on 3.4.2010, to convene a meeting on 17.4.2010. Though this action is not consistent with the letter of sub-section (2), it cannot be said that there was no power available to the President to do so. The President continues to have the general power to call for a special meeting “ whenever he thinks fit”. This general power is curtailed only if the Vice President or one-third of the whole number of Councillors have proceeded to exercise power under Sub-section (3) immediately on the failure of the President to act in terms of sub-section (2), insofar as the subject for which a meeting was requisitioned. From the sequence of events, it is clear that the Vice President or one-third of the whole number of Councillors did not choose to exercise their power under Sub-section (3) on the President having failed to act in terms of Sub-section (2). Therefore, the meeting notice directed to be issued on 3.4.2010 is not invalid or without jurisdiction. Reliance sought to be placed on Chandra Kishore’s case, supra and the salutary principle reiterated therein would not strictly apply to the circumstances of the present case. 8. The next question to be answered would be, whether the President in choosing to withdraw the notice of the meeting that was issued on 3.4.2010, by a further direction in this regard addressed to respondent No.2, in the first of these petitions, as on 15.4.2010, would have the effect of nullifying the notice dated 3.4.2010, would straight away have to be answered in the negative. For two reasons-firstly, though such a direction was issued to respondent No.2 to cancel the meeting –it was apparently not acted upon and secondly, because this court intervened by its order dated 16.4.2010 and directed the meeting to be held as proposed. 9. In the light of the views expressed above, there is no merit in the above writ petitions and the same stand dismissed. Consequently, effect shall be given to the result of the no-confidence motion at the meeting held on 17.4.2010 of the City Municipal Council, Chikkaballapur and the Council shall take such further steps in accordance with law.