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2010 DIGILAW 678 (BOM)

Kashinath Shetye v. State of Goa

2010-05-04

S.J.VAZIFDAR, U.D.SALVI

body2010
JUDGMENT S. J. VAZIFDAR, J.:- The petitioners have sought a writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to withdraw or cancel all orders retaining retired/superannuated officers in employment in the posts under the Government by way of extension in service or on contract basis appointments. The petitioners have also sought an order directing the respondents to fill the posts by making regular promotions, transfers/appointments of eligible persons in terms of the recruitment rules and by following the due procedure prescribed by law and the rules. 2(A). By an order dated 22th April, 2010, we allowed the petitioners to amend the petition. By this amendment, the petitioners challenged the continuation in service by extension or on contract basis of respondent Nos.2 to 5 and 8. (B). Respondent Nos.6, 7 and 9 whose appointments were also challenged, were deleted by separate orders passed earlier in view of their engagement in any manner having been discontinued. The learned Advocate General made a statement that the appointment of respondent No.8 expires on 31st May, 2010 and the government is not going to extend the same nor is the government going to engage his services in any other manner including by way of grant of extension or on contract basis, short term or otherwise. The statement is accepted. In view thereof, it is not necessary to consider the case in respect of respondent No.8 either. Thus the hearing was confined, apart from the general questions to the case regarding respondent Nos.2 to 5 only. (C). Respondent Nos.10 and 11 were impleaded by an amendment. Respondent No.10 is the Goa Public Service Commission (GPSC). Respondent No.11 is the Goa Government Employees' Association, a registered association. 3. The petition is filed as a Public Interest Litigation. Petitioner Nos.1 and 9 are Junior Engineers and petitioner No.2 is an Assistant Executive Engineer in the Electricity Department of the Government of Goa. The petitioners claim to be concerned about the welfare of the State of Go a and the interest of its citizens as also the proper administration of the State. Petitioner Nos.1 and 9 are Junior Engineers and petitioner No.2 is an Assistant Executive Engineer in the Electricity Department of the Government of Goa. The petitioners claim to be concerned about the welfare of the State of Go a and the interest of its citizens as also the proper administration of the State. The petitioners have questioned the alleged practice of respondent No.1 of continuously granting appointments to posts by way of extensions and contracts without giving an opportunity to all the members of the public eligible as per the rules of appointment to the concerned posts or by depriving the persons in the feeder grades of the benefit of promotion to the higher posts without there being any special or extraordinary reasons to justify the same. They contend that the same is not in public interest. It was contended that the practice deprived the officers in service of an opportunity of being considered for promotion, transfer or appointment, and as a consequence thereof, their career prospects are prejudiced. It was contended that this practice has been implemented without even resorting to the alternate modes of filling the concerned vacancies as provided in the recruitment rules framed by the Government in respect of the said posts. 4. It is not necessary for us to pass omnibus directions compelling the Government to follow the law including the rules and regulations framed by it. That, they are bound to do. Further, the Government of Goa has recognised the need to do so and has adopted a policy in this regard by issuing various instructions, some of which are as follows : (A) By an Office Memorandum dated 12th July, 2001 issued by the Under Secretary (Personal), the attention of the Heads of Departments was 'once again' invited to an Office Memorandum (O.M.) dated 31st January, 2001 conveying the policy decision of the Government not to grant any extension in service and not to make any appointment on contract basis unless it is provided under the recruitment rules for the posts. The O.M. states that it has come to the notice of the Government that the proposals for extensions in service beyond the age of superannuation and for appointment on contract basis are being recommended by the departments. The O.M. states that it has come to the notice of the Government that the proposals for extensions in service beyond the age of superannuation and for appointment on contract basis are being recommended by the departments. The O.M. reiterates that it is the policy of the Government to neither• give extensions of service nor to make appointments on contract basis of the retired officers and that no file should be moved in this regard unless specifically called for by the Government. Lastly, the O.M. states that the same be strictly adhered to. (B) By an Office Memorandum dated 4th April, 2007 issued by the Joint Secretary (Personal) the attention of all the Heads of the Departments was invited to the earlier Office Memorandum. It stated that Goa Government Employees' Association had strongly objected to the re-engaging of retired State Government Officials/Officers on contract basis "as it hampers the promotional avenues and also numbers of government servants are stagnating without promotion". The O.M. states that the Government had constituted a High Level Committee to examine the same, and that High Level Committee had recommended not to resort to engaging any retired government servants on contract basis 'as far as possible', and that the Government had accepted the recommendation, and has decided not to engage retired government officers/officials on contract appointment. The O.M. further clarifies that the department may consider only those candidates where proper justification is furnished by the respective departments and whose services are essentially required for continuation of work at hand as per the prevailing guidelines. The Heads of Department/officers were directed to comply with the instructions strictly. (C)(i). By an Office Memorandum dated 15th January, 2008 issued by the Joint Secretary (Personal), it is stated that inspite of instructions to the contrary, it has been observed that the Heads of the Department forward/recommend the proposals for grant of extension in service. The O.M. further states as follows : "It is once again reiterated that, in accordance with Government policy, no proposal for grant of extension in service beyond superannuation shall be forwarded/ recommended by the Heads of Departments, except in respect of technical posts and those rare cases where there is no other alternative, subject to fulfillment of the conditions for grant of extension laid down under the a.M. read in preamble. It is, therefore, enjoined upon all the Heads of Departments to strictly adhere to the instructions/guidelines issued by the Government from time to time in this behalf" We find it difficult to read the words "no other alternative" very strictly. They must be interpreted reasonably and in the context in which they appear. The alternative must be a reasonable, viable one suited to the situation. The words cannot be read to mean that merely because there is another candidate, who is qualified to be appointed to the post, he must as an inflexible, absolute rule be appointed in preference to the grant of extension to an incumbent even where the exigencies of the situation require an extension being granted to the incumbent. Take for instance a case of an extremely sensitive project of a highly confidential nature, which requires to be completed within a given period of time on which the incumbents have been working for a number of years in a key position and the project is expected to be completed within a short period after his superannuation. The Government cannot then be faulted for continuing/extending his services to enable the successful and efficient execution of the project. In other words, the Government must be allowed some play in the joints without which it would be difficult for it to function efficiently. The resort to extension in service of an incumbent, however, must be an exception in "those rare cases where there is no alternative". Whether the extension meets the test formulated even by the policy decision of respondent No.1 is a question of fact which must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. (D)(ii). An Office Memorandum dated 17th August, 2009 issued by the Under Secretary (Personal) referred to the said Office Memoranda dated 2nd September, 1993, 4th April, 2007 and 15th January, 2008. The O.M. laments that inspite of the instructions contained in the previous O.Ms. various departments continued to submit proposals for extension in service and appointment of retired officers on contract basis without going into the merits of the case. The O.M. laments that inspite of the instructions contained in the previous O.Ms. various departments continued to submit proposals for extension in service and appointment of retired officers on contract basis without going into the merits of the case. It also records that during the Assembly Session summoned in March, 2009, the Chief Minister had given an assurance on the floor of the House that as far as possible no extension to retired government servants on attaining the age of 60 years would be given nor would they be appointed on contract basis. 5. The policy of the government is, therefore, in place at least in letter. There is and indeed there can be no grievance about the same. This is what the petitioners seek. This is what public interest demands. The question is whether the same is being followed and implemented. Looking to the tenor of the O.Ms. themselves and nothing more, Mr. Menezes was justified in inviting us to conclude that the policy of the Government has been observed in several cases in the breach. The OMs contain clear, unequivocal admissions that the Heads of Department have acted in this regard contrary to the policy of the Government and the instructions issued to them. There cannot be a clearer admission of the same. If it were not so, there would have been no need for the government itself to issue successive Office Memoranda of the above nature. This is indeed unfortunate. It discloses a very sorry state of affairs. 6. The petitioners' submission in this regard is not merely well founded but conclusively established on the basis of the above Office Memoranda. The fact that the petitioners have not made out a case on merits regarding respondent Nos.2 to 5 makes no difference. The remaining respondents other than respondent No.1 have been deleted in view of the statement on behalf of the government during the pendency of this writ petition that their services would not be extended. It is for this reason alone that we have not dealt with the cases of respondent Nos.6 to 9. Not having dealt with the cases of respondent Nos.6 to 9, we desist from holding the Writ Petition as being irresponsible on the ground that we do not find substance in the merits of the case as against respondent Nos.2 to 5. Not having dealt with the cases of respondent Nos.6 to 9, we desist from holding the Writ Petition as being irresponsible on the ground that we do not find substance in the merits of the case as against respondent Nos.2 to 5. Such a finding would be unfair to the petitioners especially as we did not permit Mr. Menezes to address us on the merits of the appointments/engagement of respondent Nos.6 to 9. We did not permit him to do so as their engagement in any event are now discontinued. 7. The learned Advocate General invited us to dismiss the writ petition on the ground that the same was mala-fide. He submitted that petitioner No.1 had not filed this as a genuine public interest litigation, but had done so in view of his personal grievances against the Government. This submission as far as petitioner No.1 is concerned is well founded. 8. Petitioner No.1 had earlier filed Writ Petition No.55 of 2009 challenging an order of transfer. On 30th January, 2009, the writ petition was allowed to be withdrawn. It is pertinent to note that the order records that along with the petitioner various other employees have also been transferred. It also records that the Counsel of petitioner No.1, realising that in transfer matters, the powers of the Court are very limited, sought to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to make a representation to the appropriate authority after joining at the place where he is transferred. Petitioner No. 1 thereafter made a representation against his transfer, but the same was rejected on 13th April, 2009. Petitioner No. 1, thereafter, filed W.P. No.324 of 2009 on 25th May, 2009 challenging his transfer and the rejection of his representation. While W.P. No.324 of 2009 was pending, the present writ petition was filed on 15th June, 2009. By this time, petitioner No. 1 was an aggrieved person as his representation against his transfer order was rejected. On 30th November, 2009, the Division Bench of this Court dismissed writ petition No.324 of 2009. The Division Bench rejected the contention that petitioner No. 1 has been victimised and that he had been frequently transferred. The Division Bench held that petitioner No. I had made false allegations belatedly and by way of an afterthought. On 30th November, 2009, the Division Bench of this Court dismissed writ petition No.324 of 2009. The Division Bench rejected the contention that petitioner No. 1 has been victimised and that he had been frequently transferred. The Division Bench held that petitioner No. I had made false allegations belatedly and by way of an afterthought. On 1st December, 2009, petitioner No. 1 made an application for intervention in the Suo Motu PIL W.P. No.1/2009 regarding the acquisition of CFL bulbs by the government. The application was dismissed by an order dated 16th February, 2010. 9. The above facts do indicate that petitioner No. 1 had a serious grievance against respondent No. 1. These facts indicates that the present writ petition has been filed by him only in view thereof. This view finds further support from the fact that petitioner No. 1 filed this writ petition only on 15th June, 2009 after respondent No. 1 had issued him a transfer order, and rejected his representation against the same. If petitioner No. 1 had a genuine and bona-fide intention of agitating the issues in the present writ petition, in the interest of public, he would have filed the same many years ago. As we shall indicate, if his allegations against respondent Nos.2 to 9 are correct and justified, which obviously he thought they were, he would have filed the writ petition latest by the year 2005-2006 as the appointments challenged in the Writ Petition pertain to the period commencing in the year 2003 and continued throughout. 10. We are, however, not inclined to dismiss a writ petition of this nature merely because a strong case has been made out against petitioner No.1. Mr. Ryan Menezes, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners rightly pointed out that there are eight other petitioners. There is nothing on record, which justifies our painting them with the same brush. There is nothing that justifies the conclusion that the remaining petitioners joined petitioner No.1 in this writ petition only to assist him in airing his personal grievance. Thus, while we would have rejected this writ petition had it been filed by petitioner No.1 alone, we are not inclined to do so in view of the fact that we find nothing against the remaining petitioners despite the fact that the Writ Petition has been verified only by petitioner No.1. 11. Mr. Thus, while we would have rejected this writ petition had it been filed by petitioner No.1 alone, we are not inclined to do so in view of the fact that we find nothing against the remaining petitioners despite the fact that the Writ Petition has been verified only by petitioner No.1. 11. Mr. Menezes raised a point of considerable impotance under Article 320 of the Constitution of India. He submitted that under Article 320 of the Constitution of India, it was mandatory for the government to consult the GPSC even while granting extension or appointing persons on short term contracts. He was supported in this regard by Mr. A.N.S. Nadkarni, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the GPSC - respondent No.10. 12. After this point was argued for a while, we agreed with the learned Advocate General that the point ought not to be permitted to be advanced in the present writ petition as it had not been pleaded. Indeed, it appears that on an earlier occasion, the point had been raised across the bar and noted in an earlier order. The point is undoubtedly of considerable public interest and importance with very vital implications. For that reason itself, we are of the view that such an important point dealing with a constitutional issue ought not to be permitted to be raised across the bar at the last minute if it is not pleaded as it may be detrimental not only to the parties, but to the development of the law itself. 13. Suffice it to state, as agreed by all the learned Advocates that while making appointments on contract basis or by extension of service, the GPSC, if required, shall be consulted. We leave the question open as to whether consultation with the GPSC is required in each case. By an interim order dated 21.11.2009, respondent No.1 was directed to make such appointments only after approval by the G PSC and with the leave of this Court. The interim orders would come to an end by this judgment and order finally disposing of this writ petition. However, needless to add that if consultation with the GPSC is required by law, respondent No.1 shall do so. Whether it is bound to do so in a given case will be decided on merits in independent proceedings if the occasion arises. 14. However, needless to add that if consultation with the GPSC is required by law, respondent No.1 shall do so. Whether it is bound to do so in a given case will be decided on merits in independent proceedings if the occasion arises. 14. The next question is whether the government has the power to extend the services of an employee. Referring to the recruitment rules in respect of the posts, Mr. Menezes submitted that unless the modes of recruitment stipulated therein are exhausted, the government does not have power to extend the services of an employee. For instance, some of the rules provide for the modes of filling up vacancies by promotion, failing which by transfer on deputation and failing both by short term contracts or by direct recruitment. Mr. Menezes submitted that unless these modes of recruitment are exhausted, the government does not have power to extend the services of an employee. 15. The submission is not well founded. That the recruitment rules do not specify extending the services of an incumbent as one of the modes of filling up vacancies, does not denude the government of the power to do so. The learned Advocate General's reliance upon the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in R. R. Tripathi Vs. Union of India, 2008(4) BCR 688: [2008(2) ALL MR 591] is well founded. This was also a PIL. The petitioners challenged the grant of extension of services to the Director General of Police, Maharashtra State and the Commissioner of Police, Mumbai. The Division Bench, however, made it clear that the decision rested on the finding that the decision making process was flawed. One of the questions dealt with by the Division Bench was whether the government has power to grant extension under the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958. Rule 16 thereof provided inter alia that a member of the service shall retire from the service at the age of 60 years. The Rule however permitted the services of an incumbent to be extended in the manner and to the extent specified therein. Section 3 of the All India Service Act, 1951 empowered the Central Government to make rules. Pursuant thereto, the All India Services (Condition of Services - residuary matters) Rules, 1960 were made. The Rule however permitted the services of an incumbent to be extended in the manner and to the extent specified therein. Section 3 of the All India Service Act, 1951 empowered the Central Government to make rules. Pursuant thereto, the All India Services (Condition of Services - residuary matters) Rules, 1960 were made. Rule 3 thereof vested the powers in the Central Government to relax the operation of any rules made or deemed to have been made under the All India Services Act, 1951 or any regulation made under any such rule regulating the conditions of services of persons appointed to All India Service in case of undue hardship in any particular case to such extent and subject to such exceptions and conditions as it may consider necessary for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner. The learned Advocate General's reliance upon paragraphs 17, 19, 20 and 21 of the judgment is well founded. The same read as under: "17. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that firstly there is no power with the authorities to grant extension beyond the specified period and the Rule should be strictly construed in consonance with the language of the rule and secondly the grounds stated in the Rules have not been specified in the order granting extension. In fact, according to the counsel appearing for the petitioners, the Central Government hardly has the power to grant extension particularly in the facts of the present case. This contention is based upon misconception of the relevant rules and is opposed to the basic concept of service jurisprudence. The rules are to be framed by the Central Government. Thus, the Government, in any case, would have the powers to frame such rules or to pass such orders as may be called for in the facts and circumstances of a given case but certainly not contrary to the provisions of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. The residuary powers vested to meet extraordinary situations which have not been specifically provided for in the Rules cannot be circumvented or limited and it must be left to the authorities to exercise their powers objectively and in consonance with the spirit of the Rules. The residuary powers vested to meet extraordinary situations which have not been specifically provided for in the Rules cannot be circumvented or limited and it must be left to the authorities to exercise their powers objectively and in consonance with the spirit of the Rules. Besides the power to extend, power to relax the rule in its absolute term to a given case and to remove hardship or otherwise is clear indication of the powers of the rule framing authority and there should not be unnecessary embargoes upon the exercise of such powers. We may refer to the language of Rule 3 which clearly says that the Rule could be relaxed to such an extent and subject to such exceptions and conditions as it may consider necessary for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner (emphasis supplied by us). The expression "just and equitable manner" is a well known expression in the Administrative law and within the domain of service jurisprudence. The decision will have to be left to the discretion of the authority concerned and the Court would not sit as an appellate authority to examine the extent and degree of justness and equitability. 19. We may now deal with the argument that in absence of any specific Rules and strictly construing the relevant provisions, whether there is power with the Government to grant extension in service. This argument suffers from fallacy that in the absence of specific rules, the Government would not have discretion even to prepare guidelines or to issue administrative instructions. The competent rule making authority, and in the present case the Central Government, will have the power to issue appropriate orders even in individual cases in absence of any specific Rule. Issuance of executive instructions which are in conformity with the provisions of the Act and the Rules, can hardly be questioned on the ground of inherent Jurisdiction. In the case of Nagpur Improvement Trust Vs. Yadaorao Jagannath Kumbhare and others, ( 1999(8) SCC 99 : [1999(4) ALL MR 160 (S.C.)]), the Supreme Court held as under. "It is, no doubt, true that under Section 21 of the Act, the State Government is required to make rules prescribing the conditions under which members of the staff requiring professional skill could be appointed by the Trust. Yadaorao Jagannath Kumbhare and others, ( 1999(8) SCC 99 : [1999(4) ALL MR 160 (S.C.)]), the Supreme Court held as under. "It is, no doubt, true that under Section 21 of the Act, the State Government is required to make rules prescribing the conditions under which members of the staff requiring professional skill could be appointed by the Trust. But when the State Government has not made any such rules even if the rules can be held to be of mandatory nature as has been held by the High Court, then it is difficult to comprehend that the Board is denuded of its general power of appointing and promoting people to different posts as provided under Section 22 of the Act. If the view of the High Court under the impugned judgment is taken to be correct then all appointments to different posts ever since 1936 have to be held to be invalid inasmuch as no rules have been framed by the State Government in exercise of the power under Section 21 of the Act. While interpreting the provisions of Section 21 of the Act, the High Court has lost sight of the general principle of service jurisprudence that in the absence of any statutory rules governing the service conditions of the employees, the executive instructions and/or decisions taken administratively would operate in the field and appointments/promotions can be made in accordance with such executive instructions/administrative directions. In this view of the matter and concededly, no rules having been framed by the State Government in exercise of power under Section 21 of the Act, the Trust/Board was fully empowered to take administrative decisions in the matter of appointments and promotions to different posts including the posts requiring professional skill and consequently the resolution of the Board taken in accordance with sub-section (2) of Section 22 of the Act deciding to promote the employees to the post of Assistant Engineer cannot be said to be invalid or inoperative. The High Court, therefore, in our view fell in error in holding that the appointments made to the posts of Assistant Engineer are invalid in law." 20. It may also be noticed that extension of service would also squarely fall within the expression "condition of service" and would squarely bring within its ambit the power of the Government to issue appropriate directions even in this regard. It may also be noticed that extension of service would also squarely fall within the expression "condition of service" and would squarely bring within its ambit the power of the Government to issue appropriate directions even in this regard. A Bench of Kerala High Court in the case of Sajan Mannali Vs. Hon'ble Chief Justice and others, (1994(2) LLJ 817) held as under. "9. The expression "conditions of service" is one of wide import. It means all those conditions which regulate the holding of a post by a person right from the time of his appointment, till his retirement and even beyond it, in matters like pension, etc. The dismissal of a Government servant or his compulsory retirement are all matters which fall within his conditions of service. North West Frontier Province Vs. Suraj Narain Anand, (AIR 1949 PC 112); State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Shardul Singh, ( 1970(1) SCC 108 ). The expression would include age of superannuation as also the right to reduce it. State of Bihar Vs. Yogendra Singh ( AIR 1982 SC 882 ); Srinivasan Vs. State of Kerala ( AIR 1968 Ker. 158 (FB)). Compulsory retirement, dismissal and reduction in age of retirement being part of conditions of service, extension of service is equally a condition of service. We are unable to find any difference in principle between the two." "10. We do not find any rhyme or reason to exclude extension of service alone from conditions of service. In fact, counsel for the petitioner frankly admitted (not that he can contend otherwise in the light of the binding authorities on the point) that conditions relating to age of retirement and retirement benefits pertain to the realm of conditions of service of a Government servant and cannot be disassociated therefrom. The only contention necessitated by exigencies of the case is that extension of service of a Government servant is not a condition of service." 21. The above Rules, and in any case, the Government's decision to grant extension or to relax the applicability of Rule 16(1) in favour of respondent Nos.6 and 7 thus cannot be termed as one without authority of law. of course, exercise of such power has to be for valid reasons in public interest and the proposal should satisfy the ingredients of the specified Rules. Therefore, we have no hesitation in answering this question against the petitioners. of course, exercise of such power has to be for valid reasons in public interest and the proposal should satisfy the ingredients of the specified Rules. Therefore, we have no hesitation in answering this question against the petitioners. Whether the action of the official respondents can be termed arbitrary, unreasonable, violative of the Rules and in colourable exercise of power." 16. The ratio of this judgment supports the learned Advocate General's contention that the power to extend the service of an incumbent beyond his superannuation is an inherent power vested in the State. This inherent power to extend the employment of an incumbent would exist either in the absence of the rules or in the absence of a provision to that effect in the rules. The matter may be different if the rules expressly prohibited the extension in certain circumstances or restricted the exercise of such powers in a particular manner or to a particular extent. We are not concerned with the same and we, therefore, do not express any views in that regard. The Division Bench has held that issuance of executive instructions, which are in conformity with the provision of the Act and Rules, can hardly be questioned on the ground of inherent jurisdiction. Nor can orders be questioned if the same are not contrary to the provisions of the Act and the Rules that govern the field. 17. The power to grant an extension and to make contractual appointments however, is not unbridled. It must be exercised in public interest reasonably and fairly only in the case of necessity and for valid reasons. We will deal with the question as to whether respondent no.1 was justified in granting extension to the concerned respondents later. 18. Respondent No.1 also appointed some of the respondents on contract basis. Mr. Menezes submitted that the appointments of respondent Nos 4 and 5 which are on a contractual basis are illegal being contrary to the recruitment rules. We have referred to the recruitment rules in respect of the Superintending Engineer (Electrical) and Executive Engineers (Electrical) later. He submitted that the posts of Superintending Engineers (Electrical) and Executive Engineers (Electrical) can indeed be filled by short term contracts. However, he submitted that as per the recruitment rules, the same can be filled only by persons with the requisite qualifications stipulated therein. Admittedly, respondent Nos 4 and 5 do not have the stipulated qualifications. He submitted that the posts of Superintending Engineers (Electrical) and Executive Engineers (Electrical) can indeed be filled by short term contracts. However, he submitted that as per the recruitment rules, the same can be filled only by persons with the requisite qualifications stipulated therein. Admittedly, respondent Nos 4 and 5 do not have the stipulated qualifications. Thus, he submitted, a writ of quo-warranto can be issued in respect of their appointments. 19. The submission proceeds on an erroneous presumption that the appointments of respondent Nos4 and 5 are made pursuant to the recruitment rules. They are not. The contracts entered into with respondent Nos4 and 5 are not under the recruitment rules. They have been entered into independent thereof. The grant of extension of service and contractual appointments do not fall within the purview of the recruitment rules. Even though they may in practical terms constitute appointments to the posts, they do not constitute recruitment to the post under or in terms of the recruitment rules. The submission is, therefore, rejected as it is based on an incorrect premise. 20. The learned Advocate General's submission that the Government has the power to make such contractual appointments even in the absence of statutory powers to do so is well founded and supported by the judgment of the Supreme Court in B. Srinivas Reddy Vs. K. U. Water Supply Drainage Board Employees' Association - (sic) AIR SCC 6 3106. The Supreme Court upheld the powers exercised by the State of Karnataka in the appointment of the appellant under the relevant statutory provisions applicable in that case with which we are not concerned in this case. It is, however, important to note the following observations of the Supreme Court : "72. In the circumstances which we have narrated above in paragraphs supra, it is indeed difficult to hold that the appellant did not have the requisite qualification. 75. Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the trade union, fairly conceded that the Government has unrestricted power to make contractual appointment. Even otherwise, the Government, in our opinion, has the undoubted power to make a contractual appointment until further orders. The finding to the contrary is ex facie erroneous." 21. If this be so, there is no bar to the appointment of respondent Nos4 and 5 based on their age. Even otherwise, the Government, in our opinion, has the undoubted power to make a contractual appointment until further orders. The finding to the contrary is ex facie erroneous." 21. If this be so, there is no bar to the appointment of respondent Nos4 and 5 based on their age. In other words, the restrictions as regards age under the recruitment rules do not apply to contractual appointments made by the Government in exercise of its sovereign power. 22. A writ of quo-warranto, therefore, cannot be issued against them. A writ of certiorari in any event cannot be issued against them for the obvious reason that the petitioners are not aggrieved by their appointments. In Srinivasa Reddy's case, the Supreme Court has also held as under: "47. Section 4(2) of the Act, 1973 mandates that the Managing Director shall possess the prescribed qualification and he shall be appointed by the Government. Rule 3 of the Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board Rules, 1974 prescribes the qualification for appointment of the Managing Director in these words: "3..... The Managing Director shall be a person having experience in administration and capacity in commercial matters." 55. It is useful to refer to University of Mysore Vs. C. D. Govinda Rao, SCR at pp.580-81 : "As Halsbury has observed*:- 'An information in the nature of a quo warranto took the place of the obsolete writ of quo warranto which lay against a person who claimed or usurped an office, franchise, or liberty, to inquire by what authority he supported his claim, in order that the right to the office or franchise might be determined. ' Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial remedy by which -any person, who holds an independent substantive public office or franchise or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty, so that his title to it may be duly determined, and in case the finding is that the holder of the office has no title, he would be ousted from that office by judicial order. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto gives the judiciary a weapon to control the executive from making appointments to public office against law and to protect a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he has a right. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto gives the judiciary a weapon to control the executive from making appointments to public office against law and to protect a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he has a right. These proceedings also tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office, who might be allowed to continue either with the connivance of the executive or by reason of its apathy. It will, thus, be seen that before a person can effectively claim a writ of quo warranto, he has to satisfy the court that the office in question is a public office and is held by a usurper without legal authority, and that inevitably would lead to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not." 23. Mr. Menezes submitted that in any event, the Government can take recourse to extending contracts and making contractual appointments only after exhausting all the modes of recruitment stipulated in the recruitment rules. 24. The Government has inherent power to grant extension of service and to make contractual appointments subject to certain limitations. By their very nature, such appointments are temporary, stop gap in nature, only to meet the exigencies of a situation. Once the power to appoint persons on such a basis is recognised, to circumscribe the same by holding that it can be exercised only upon exhausting all other avenues stipulated in the recruitment rules irrespective of the facts and circumstances of the case, would be incongrous. It would defeat the very purpose of recognizing such power in the Government. Indeed, such a limitation would also have adverse consequences upon the administration and be detrimental to public interest. If this proposition is to be accepted as an absolute and inflexible one, it would prevent the government from engaging persons even in case of dire necessity and supervening public interest. The submission is erroneous on principle. It would in cases render the power ineffective and the Government helpless in meeting the exigencies of a situation. 25. As in the case of granting extensions of service the power to make contractual appointments is not absolute. It must be exercised as an exception and not as a rule. It must be exercised in public interest. As a rule only regular appointments must be made. 25. As in the case of granting extensions of service the power to make contractual appointments is not absolute. It must be exercised as an exception and not as a rule. It must be exercised in public interest. As a rule only regular appointments must be made. The policy of respondent No.1 itself circumscribes and limits the power to make appointments on contractual basis and grant extension in service. The same is evidenced by and contained in the said Office Memoranda referred to earlier. Thus, even on the basis of the policy of respondent No.1, it can take recourse to contractual appointments and grant extensions in service only in the limited circumstances mentioned in the Office Memoranda. Such appointments also can always be challenged in appropriate proceedings if they are a colourable exercise of power to bypass the normal, regular mode of appointment. Whether the power has been validly exercised or not, must depend on the facts of each case. 26. Mr. Menezes then submitted that the principles enunciated in Secy., State of Karnataka Vs. Uma Devi, 2006(4) SCC 1 : [2008 ALL SCR 134] ought to be applied even in respect of the appointments made on a contractual basis. 27. We are unable to agree. The appointments made on a contractual basis are in exercise of inherent powers to meet the exigencies of a situation. The power to make such appointments even as per the policy of respondent No.1 is to be resorted to only in certain cases and, as we have held, is only temporary in nature. Such appointments are not therefore, regular appointments made under the recruitment rules. Such appointments were not under consideration in Uma Devi's case. If anything the observations in Uma Devi's case are contrary to the submission for the Constitution Bench recognised the power to make temporary appointments. It was not held that such appointment also must be made in accordance with the statutory scheme. 28. This brings us to a consideration of the merits of the case relating to respondent Nos.2 to 5. They are all from the electrical department. 29. By an order dated 16.07.2009, the Division Bench directed respondent No.1 while making such appointments to take the leave of the Court before issuing such appointment orders. Pursuant thereto, applications have been made from time to time by respondent No.1 in respect of various officers including the respondents and even others. They are all from the electrical department. 29. By an order dated 16.07.2009, the Division Bench directed respondent No.1 while making such appointments to take the leave of the Court before issuing such appointment orders. Pursuant thereto, applications have been made from time to time by respondent No.1 in respect of various officers including the respondents and even others. Most of these applications have been granted. After we reserved judgment on the last day of the term, we granted extensions up to the date of the judgment. Re : Respondent No.2 - 30. Respondent No.2 occupied the post of Chief Electrical Engineer. He superannuated on 30th September, 2006. He was granted an extension in service from 1/10/2006 to 30/09/2007, 1/10/2007 to 31/12/2007, 1/1/2008 to 31/12/2008 and from 1/1/2009 to 30/12/2009. Thereafter, his services were permitted to be extended by the orders of this Court. 31. The Government of Goa, Electricity Department, Group A Gazetted Posts Recruitment Rules, 2008 apply in respect of a Chief Electrical Engineer. The method of recruitment provided thereunder is; "By promotion, failing which, by transfer on deputation and failing both, by short term contract". 32. We have held earlier that there is inherent power in the Government to grant extension of service. The rules in any event do not prohibit the same. Nor do they, therefore, regulate the grant of extension of the incumbent's service. 33. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that extensions continuously granted to respondent No.2 prevented persons from the feeder grade from being promoted. The feeder post for the post of Chief Electrical Engineer is that of Super intending Engineer (Electrical). 34. Firstly as rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate General all that the petitioners state about respondent No.2 is that he had been granted the said extensions. There is nothing in the petition, which establishes the contention that as a result of said extensions granted to him persons in the feeder grade have been deprived the opportunity of being promoted to the post of Chief Electrical Engineer. 35. Further Respondent No.1 has in any event filed a detailed affidavit establishing conclusively that there is not a single person in the feeder post namely Superintending Engineer (Electrical), who is qualified to be appointed as the Chief Electrical Engineer. 35. Further Respondent No.1 has in any event filed a detailed affidavit establishing conclusively that there is not a single person in the feeder post namely Superintending Engineer (Electrical), who is qualified to be appointed as the Chief Electrical Engineer. Promotion to the post of Chief Electrical Engineer can only be granted to a Superintending Engineer (Electrical) with five years regular service in the grade. The first respondent's affidavit contains the details of every officer in the feeder post. The same establishes that none of them were eligible to be promoted to the post of Chief Electrical Engineer and that to date, there is no regular Superintending Engineer (Electrical) available in the department for being promoted to the post of Chief Electrical Engineer. The petitioners were unable to dispute these facts. 36. Respondent No.1 further stated that the post of Chief Electrical Engineer was advertised with a view to fill the same by transfer on deputation in January, 2008, but due to the poor response, no person could be appointed to the post. In the rejoinder, it is stated that the contents of the reply are sketchy and vague. It is contended that no documents including copies of letters, orders, memoranda, advertisements to demonstrate the action taken by respondent No.1 have been filed. 37. The stand taken in the rejoinder is curious. As pointed out by the learned Advocate General, petitioner Nos.1, 2 and 9 are presently working in the Electrical Department. It is reasonable to presume that they were aware of the circumstances in which extensions have been granted and appointments have been made on contractual basis. It is also reasonable to presume that they are aware of the avenues which respondent No.1 ought to have explored, but did not explore. They are fully aware of their rights. They are fully aware of how to obtain the information. Yet, they furnished no particulars in this regard and have merely made allegations without any evidence in support thereof. The petitioners have invoked the provisions of the Right to Information Act in the past. They are not unaware of the same. They filed a petition with bare averments without even attempting to call for any particulars. A substantial part of the allegations as regards the prejudice caused to the incumbents in the feeder grade has been demonstrated to be false. 38. They are not unaware of the same. They filed a petition with bare averments without even attempting to call for any particulars. A substantial part of the allegations as regards the prejudice caused to the incumbents in the feeder grade has been demonstrated to be false. 38. Persons filing public interest litigations cannot be permitted to merely make bald averments without any basis whatsoever, without making any attempt at obtaining the facts and expect the other side to answer them. In a given case, a Court may well call upon the respondents to furnish necessary information. That the Court can always and even may do so, however, does not absolve the duty of persons filing public interest litigations to assist the Court with the best available means at their disposal. They did not call for any particulars. They did not requisition any particulars. They did not invoke the provisions of R.T.I. Act in this regard. Such petitioners cannot be allowed to merely sit back and make allegations without any basis despite the fact that they had the available means to ascertain the facts necessary to substantiate their allegations. 39. The learned Advocate General has furnished a note indicating the actions taken and had the files available in the Court with him. There has not even been an attempt to inspect the files. These facts were also stated in M.C.A. No.996/2009 filed by respondent No.1 while seeking extension of services in respect of respondent No.2. An affidavit-in-reply has been tiled. The contents of the application were not disputed before us during hearing. The note indicates the steps taken by respondent No.1 to appoint on deputation officers from the Power Grid and the interaction of respondent No.1 with the GPSC in regard thereto. However, the Power Grid stated that it was not their policy to depute officers on deputation. Correspondence was addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director and The Power Grid Corporation, Haryana with a request to send a suitable officer on deputation to the post of Chief Electrical Engineer and two Superintending Engineers (Electrical). The post was also advertised on 08/01/2008. Thirteen applications were received and the same were forwarded to the G PSC by the Personal Department. GPSC by a letter dated 11.07.2008 informed that none of the candidates fulfilled the eligibility criteria. The government was prepared to partially relax some of the conditions. The post was also advertised on 08/01/2008. Thirteen applications were received and the same were forwarded to the G PSC by the Personal Department. GPSC by a letter dated 11.07.2008 informed that none of the candidates fulfilled the eligibility criteria. The government was prepared to partially relax some of the conditions. This fact was communicated to the GPSC. The Personal Department issued letters to the Chief Secretaries of All the States/Union Territories, Ministry of Power, Chairman of MSEB and KSEB, CEA, The Managing Director of BSES and DEST and to the Secretary (Power) of All State Undertakings with a request to circulate the vacancy amongst their officers. Pursuant to the advertisement issued by respondent No.1 only one application was received from an incumbent working with the Power Grid Corporation, (PGC). However, as the PGC was not ready to post their officer on deputation, he could not be considered. 40. It can be hardly suggested that public interest would be served by keeping the post of Chief Electrical Engineer vacant. In the above facts, the extensions granted to respondent No.2 were valid and justified. Indeed, the learned Advocate General invited the petitioners to recommend the names of persons whom they can consider for appointment in accordance with rules. There has been no suggestion from the petitioners. They may do so even hereafter. Re : Respondent Nos.3 and 4 : 41. Respondent Nos.3 and 4 are Superintending Engineers (Electrical). In their case as well, all that the petitioners have averred apart from the general allegations in the writ petition are the extensions granted to them. Respondent No.3 superannuated on 30/ 11/2006. He was granted extensions from 1/12/2006 to 30/11/2007, from 1/12/2007 to 30/11/2008 and 1/12/2008 to 30/11/2009. Thereafter, they were granted extensions by orders of this Court upon applications for the same made by respondent No.1. 42. Respondent No.4 superannuated on 31.8.2003. His services were extended from 1.9.2003 to 31.3.2004 and from 1.4.2004 to 30.09.2004. Thereafter, he was appointed on contract basis on six occasions over the period 26.11.2004 to 24.04.2010. The post of Superintending Engineer (Electrical) is to be filled "By a promotion, failing which by transfer on deputation and failing both, by short term contract". 43. His services were extended from 1.9.2003 to 31.3.2004 and from 1.4.2004 to 30.09.2004. Thereafter, he was appointed on contract basis on six occasions over the period 26.11.2004 to 24.04.2010. The post of Superintending Engineer (Electrical) is to be filled "By a promotion, failing which by transfer on deputation and failing both, by short term contract". 43. Firstly, there is nothing to indicate that any employee from the feeder post namely electrical engineer has been deprived of an opportunity of being promoted to this post as a result of extensions granted to respondent Nos.3 and 4. Promotions can be granted to these posts only to Executive Engineers (Electrical) possessing a degree in Electrical Engineering with 5 years regular service in the grade. The affidavit-in-reply establishes that no Executive Engineer (Electrical) was eligible to be considered for promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer (Electrical) and that to date, there is no Executive Engineer (Electrical) available in the department for being promoted to the post of Superintending Engineer (Electrical). It is pertinent to note that there are four sanctioned posts for Superintending Engineers (Electrical), two of which are vacant. Thus, in any event, the promotional chances of incumbents in the feeder grade have not been prejudiced in any manner whatsoever. The bald averments to this effect in the writ petition are belied conclusively. The rejoinder to the averments in respect of respondent Nos.3 and 4 is similar to the re-joinder to the affidavit-in-reply in respect of respondent No.2. There is nothing to suggest that the petitioners sought any information in respect of the allegations made by them with regard to the posts held by respondent Nos.3 and 4. It is not their case that they sought information, but were denied the same. No explanation was even offered as to on what basis the averments in the writ petition were made. As the petition has been filed in person, we do not intend questioning petitioner No.1 as to the basis on which he verified the petition by stating that the contents of para Nos.1 to 7 thereof are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and information. As the petition has been filed in person, we do not wish to embarrass the petitioner No.1 by questioning him about the source of his alleged knowledge and information. 44. As the petition has been filed in person, we do not wish to embarrass the petitioner No.1 by questioning him about the source of his alleged knowledge and information. 44. In the said note tendered by the Advocate General the steps taken to fill the posts of Superintending Engineers (Electrical) have been set out. Some of these facts have also been stated in M.C.A. No.995/2009 while seeking extension of services in respect of respondent No.3. In the year 2003, applications were invited from the PWD and Water Resources Department for candidates by transfer on deputation to the said posts of Superintending Engineers (Electrical). On 3.2.2004 one S. A. Mandrekar was appointed by transfer on deputation from the PWD. He continued till 28.2.2007 when he superannuated and thereafter, he was appointed on a short term contract till 30.9.2007. In the meanwhile, in the year 2005, applications were invited for candidates by transfer on deputation on All India Basis for the two posts of Superintending Engineers (Electrical). No positive response was received. On 14.4.2006, advertisements were issued for filling seven posts of Electrical Engineer(Electrical) which is feeder post for the post of Superintending Engineer (Electrical). This was to ensure the availability of eligible Electrical Engineers in future for promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer (Electrical). Pursuant to the representations of Engineers Associations, the Government kept direct recruitment on hold and introduced a promotional scheme for Degree and Diploma Engineers by amending the recruitment rules, which were notified on 28.02.2008 for filling the posts of Executive Engineers (Electrical). Accordingly, seven vacant posts of Electrical Engineers (Electrical) were filled in on 04.12.2008. Advertisements were again issued on 09.01.2008 to fill 2 posts of Superintending Engineers (Electrical) by transfer on deputation. Again no suitable response was obtained. On 07.01.2010, advertisements were issued yet again for the said purpose. Yet again, no suitable response was received. Two applications were received from the candidates, who do not fulfill the eligibility criteria. 45. In these circumstances, we cannot fault respondent No.1 for having taken the decision to extend the services of respondent Nos.3 and 4 as well as appointing respondent No.4 on contract basis. Here again, it can hardly be contended that public interest would be served by keeping the posts vacant. Re : Respondent No.5 : 46. Respondent No.5 is an Executive Engineer (Electrical). He superannuated on 30.09.2006. His services were extended from 01.10.2006 to 31.03.2007. Here again, it can hardly be contended that public interest would be served by keeping the posts vacant. Re : Respondent No.5 : 46. Respondent No.5 is an Executive Engineer (Electrical). He superannuated on 30.09.2006. His services were extended from 01.10.2006 to 31.03.2007. He was, thereafter, appointed on contract basis on four occasions over the period 01.04.2007 to 31.03.2010. 47. The writ petition itself merely sets out the extensions granted to respondent No.5. It furnishes no details as to why the same are bad in law except as stated earlier. 48. The recruitment rules in respect of Executive Engineer (Electrical) provide that the same should be filled "By promotion failing which by transfer on deputation (including the short term contract) and failing both, by direct recruitment". Under the recruitment rules in the case of promotion, filling of the posts of Executive Engineer (Electrical) by promotion must be by the appointment of Assistant Engineers having a degree (Electrical) with 8 years regular service in the grade and by Assistant Engineers having a Diploma (Electrical) with 12 years regular service in the grade. 49. The following table belies the petitioners' contention that the promotional chances of the incumbents from the feeder grade namely Assistant Engineers were oreiudiced : Dates Vacancies Vacancies Vacancies Vacancies available filed on filled on remaining ad-hoc regular basis 29/07/2005 11 - - 11 29/07/2005 - 6 - 11 13/04/2006 4 - - 15 (Add1. Vacancies) 13/04/2006 - 2 - 15 30/09/2006 - - - 16 R-5 retired 12/12/2006 2 - - 18 (Posts created) 28/03/2008 - - 8 10 04/12/2008 - - 7 3 24/2/2009 - (by relaxation) - 3 01/09/2009 1 - - 4 (vacancies occurred) 29/1/2010 5 - - 9 (Pots created) By May, 2 - - 11 2010 50. The affidavit-in-reply sets out step by step the vacancies that arose in respect of 22 sanctioned posts for Executive Engineers (Electrical). The affidavit-in-reply details the steps taken by respondent No.5 to fill up the said vacancies including by transfer on deputation and by direct recruitment including by relaxing the rules. The petitioners were unable to refute the same. 51. The affidavit further states that due to the non-availability of other departmental engineers from the feeder grade of Assistant Engineers for promotion, the Government had advertised through the GPSC on 14.04.2006 for filling up vacancies by direct recruitment as is permissible under the rules. The petitioners were unable to refute the same. 51. The affidavit further states that due to the non-availability of other departmental engineers from the feeder grade of Assistant Engineers for promotion, the Government had advertised through the GPSC on 14.04.2006 for filling up vacancies by direct recruitment as is permissible under the rules. However, representations were made by various Engineers Association against the same. The government, therefore, kept direct recruitment on hold and worked out a total "restructuring package for engineers" with separate promotional schemes for degree and diploma engineers by the amended rules, which were notified on 28.02.2008. In the meantime, as there were only 8 Assistant Engineers available to be considered for promotion, a proposal was submitted to the GPSC on 22.02.2008 to fill only 8 clear vacancies of Executive Engineers (Electrical) by promotion on regular basis, which were earlier only temporarily filled by ad-hoc promotion on 29.07.2005 and 13.04.2006. Thereafter, as per the recommendations of the DPC as conveyed by the GPSC by a letter dated 12.3.2008, 8 eligible Assistant Engineers, who were promoted on ad-hoc basis were promoted on regular basis on 28.03.2008. To fill the balance 7 vacant posts by promotion on regular basis, a proposal were submitted to the GPSC on 1.8.2008. As per the recommendations of the DPC conveyed by the GPSC's letter dated 10.10.2008, 7 Assistant Engineers were promoted on regular basis. 52. Despite the above, as there was a vacancy in respect of the said post, respondent No.5 was initially granted an extension and thereafter, reemployed on contract basis. This, it is averred, was in view of the exigencies of service considering the importance of the post. 53. In view of the importance of filling up the vacancies to the post of Executive Engineers (Electrical), 2 more Assistant Engineers were promoted on ad-hoc basis on 24.2.2009 by relaxing their qualifying service. As on 3.4.2009, 7 Assistant Engineers possessing diplomas had become eligible for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer (Electrical). Indeed, this was only two days after the last contract executed in favour of respondent No.5. However, the fact remains that the vacancies are still there in respect of the said posts. There is nothing that indicates any mala-fides in appointing respondent No.5 on contract basis. It can hardly be suggested that the post is not an important one. Indeed, this was only two days after the last contract executed in favour of respondent No.5. However, the fact remains that the vacancies are still there in respect of the said posts. There is nothing that indicates any mala-fides in appointing respondent No.5 on contract basis. It can hardly be suggested that the post is not an important one. Nor there is anything to refute the Government's contention that it is not advisable to keep the post vacant till an officer from the feeder grade becomes eligible for promotion to the post. No public purpose can be served by keeping the post vacant. 54. Mr. Menezes submitted that respondent No.1 deliberately does not hold the DPC and then contends that there are no candidates eligible for being promoted. The same has a cascading effect on all the posts. if indeed that were so, the action of the State can always be challenged. However, in the facts of the present case pertaining to respondent Nos.2 to 5, the question of holding a DPC does not arise for it has been established that there are no candidates in the feeder grades eligible to be considered for promotion. 55. In view of the above findings, we have not considered the learned Advocate General's contention that the Writ Petition ought to be dismissed on the ground that the petitioners have no locus-standi. He had relied upon the judgment of a Division bench of this Court dated 17th November, 2009 in W.P. No.704/2009 filed by all the petitioners herein except petitioner No.2. It was held that the petitioners had no locus-standi to challenge the re-appointments in public interest. The S.L.P. was dismissed by an order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 26.3.2010 without issuing notice to the respondents. The Supreme Court observed in last sentence; "However, we make it clear that the practice adopted by the High Court is not in accordance with law and it should have been avoided". 56. The learned Advocate General relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Indian Drugs and Pharmaceutical Ltd. Vs. Workmen, 2007(1) SCC 408 : [2007 ALL SCR 174] is not relevant. The Supreme Court held that the Courts must exercise judicial restraint and not encroach into the executive or legislative domain. 56. The learned Advocate General relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Indian Drugs and Pharmaceutical Ltd. Vs. Workmen, 2007(1) SCC 408 : [2007 ALL SCR 174] is not relevant. The Supreme Court held that the Courts must exercise judicial restraint and not encroach into the executive or legislative domain. It was held that the orders inter alia for appointment on posts and continuation in service are all executive or legislative functions and it is highly improper for judges to step into this sphere except in a rare and exceptional case. "Paragraph 40". At least as far as the appointments of respondent Nos.2 to 5 are concerned, we do not consider them to be fit cases in respect whereof interference in the writ jurisdiction especially in a PIL is called for. 57. We, however, make it clear that in the event of any person affected by their appointments adopting proceedings against Respondent Nos.2 to 5, the same would be considered on their own merits. Such persons, who are directly affected, shall not be bound by any of the observations in this judgment. 58. In view of the above findings, we have not considered it necessary to construe the effect of FRS 5-A relied upon by the Advocate General. 59. We would conclude the judgment by reiterating a few of our observations/ findings. The government has power to make contractual appointments as well as to extend the services of the persons, who were superannuated from the service of respondent No.1. This is an inherent power. The power is circumscribed and limited by the policy of the State Government as contained in and evidenced inter-alia by the said Office Memoranda dated 1.7.2001, 4.4.2007, 15.1.2008 and 17.8.2009 and any other such directions given or policy decisions that may have been taken/adopted. It is not necessary that this power is exercised only upon exhausting the modes of recruitment stipulated in the recruitment rules. The legality of such appointments and contracts would depend upon the facts of each case. In the present case, the appointments of respondent Nos.2 to 5 cannot be said to be illegal being contrary to any Statute, Rules or Regulations or instructions. It is, therefore, not possible to issue a writ of quo-warranto. The legality of such appointments and contracts would depend upon the facts of each case. In the present case, the appointments of respondent Nos.2 to 5 cannot be said to be illegal being contrary to any Statute, Rules or Regulations or instructions. It is, therefore, not possible to issue a writ of quo-warranto. The Office Memoranda established that the extensions have been granted and contracts have been issued in breach and violation of the law and of the policy of the State Government. It is unnecessary, however, to pass any orders directing the State Government to comply with the law as well as the policy of the State Government for that, it is bound to do in any event. Any act contrary thereto, must be challenged independently. 60. The Writ Petition as against respondent Nos.2 to 5 is dismissed. 61. The Writ Petition in other respects is disposed of in terms of the above observations and directions. There shall be no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.