JUDGMENT : REKHA SHARMA, J. (ORAL) This appeal has been preferred against the order of Additional District Judge, Shri Umed Singh Grewal dated October 18, 2008 dismissing the objections filed by the appellant against an arbitral award dated November 07, 2007 on the ground that the same were barred by the law of limitation. 2. The facts are not in dispute and are as under:- The arbitral award dated November 07, 2007 was received by the appellant on November 21, 2007. In terms of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which provides that, ´an application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral awardµ, the appellant ought to have filed the objections by February 20, 2008. However, instead of filing the objections in the Court of Additional District Judge, the appellant filed a writ-petition in this Court on February 20, 2008. The Registry of this Court raised an objection as to the maintainability of the writ-petition and consequently returned the same to the appellant on February 22, 2008. It was only thereafter, on April 23, 2008, that the appellant filed objections to the award in the Court of Additional District Judge. 3. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant that the objections thus filed were barred by the law of limitation. He, however, submits that the delay in filing the objections ought to have been condoned, as the appellant was misled by his previous counsel who filed a writ-petition instead of the objections and that a party cannot be made to suffer for the fault of the counsel. 4. It is well settled that the limitation for filing objections to the award is to be calculated as laid down by Section 34(3) of the Act and the proviso thereto. The said Section grants three months’ time to a party to file objections to the award from the date it receives the same. 4. It is well settled that the limitation for filing objections to the award is to be calculated as laid down by Section 34(3) of the Act and the proviso thereto. The said Section grants three months’ time to a party to file objections to the award from the date it receives the same. Insofar as the proviso is concerned, it says that, "if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter." The proviso, thus, extends the period of limitation by another 30 days, provided the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the original period of three months. The crucial words in the proviso are "but not thereafter". These words in unequivocal term convey that the court has discretion to condone the delay in filing the application for setting-aside the award only by 30 days after the expiry of the original period of three months and that is all. It has no further discretion. 5. In the case in hand, even if the extra period of 30 days is granted to the appellant and the time taken in pursuing the remedy of writ-petition is excluded in calculating the limitation, then also the appeal is barred by time. 6. For the fore-going reasons, there is no merit in the appeal. The same is dismissed.