JUDGMENT S.A. BOBDE, J.:- Rule returnable forthwith. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties by consent. 2. The petitioner's grievance is that though the petitioner has been selected for appointment to the post of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, but he has been wrongly denied appointment to that post. 3. In brief, the petitioner applied for selection to the post of Judicial Magistrate, First Class as a member of the Bar. In the attestation form, he had admittedly disclosed that he was facing prosecution under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. He was interviewed by the Selection Committee constituted in accordance with the Rule 4(4)(ii) of the Bombay Judicial Service Rules, 1956 which reads as follows: "The appointment shall be made by the Governor in consultation with the commission ---- (Provided that the commission shall invite a representative of the High Court, as one of the member of the Selection Committee. Provided further that, the opinion given by such member of the selection Committee with regards to the suitability of the candidate shall prevail unless there are strong and cogent reasons for not accepting the opinion, which reasons must be recorded in writing." This Committee selected the petitioner and he was sent for medical examination. However, thereafter instead of making his appointment, the Government has written a letter dated 25.3.2009 stating that it has received a report from the police regarding verification of his character and the opinion of the High Court thereon and he is found to be unfit for appointment as J.M.F.C.. 4. Mr. A. V. Bhide, learned Advocate for petitioner, submitted that the petitioner has subsequently been acquitted from the said charge and that since acquittal operates from nativity, he was not guilty of the said offence at any point of time and, therefore, he could not have been treated as disqualified. Mr. Bhide further submits that under the aforesaid Rules, it is the Selection Committee alone, which can give an opinion with regard to the suitability of the candidate. We find that the submission based on Rule 4 made on behalf of the petitioner is correct. The Rule contemplates that a candidate will be selected for appointment to the post of Judicial Magistrate, First Class on the basis of his selection by a Selection Committee and shall be appointed by the Governor. We find that the submission based on Rule 4 made on behalf of the petitioner is correct. The Rule contemplates that a candidate will be selected for appointment to the post of Judicial Magistrate, First Class on the basis of his selection by a Selection Committee and shall be appointed by the Governor. The Rule also lays down that the suitability of a candidate shall be determined in accordance with the opinion given by a Member of the Committee, who is a representative of the High Court, unless, there are strong and cogent reasons for not accepting the opinion, which reasons must be recorded in writing. Mr. Bhide relied upon the case of Vidya Charan Shukla Vs. Purshottam Lal Kaushik reported in (1981)2 SCC 84 . The relevant observations of Their Lordships read as under: "28-29. Before examining the facts and ratio of Manni Lal case, it will be worthwhile to notice here a general principle of criminal law bearing on this issue. This principle as reiterated by this Court in Dilip Kumar Sharma case, is as follows: [A]n order of acquittal particularly one passed on merits, wipes off the conviction and sentence for all purposes, and as effectively as if it had never been passed. [A]n order of acquittal annulling or voiding a conviction operates from nativity. As Kelson puts it, "it is a true annulment, an annulment with retroactive force". So when the conviction (for the offence) was quashed by the High Court (in appeal).... it 'killed the conviction not then, but performed the formal obsequies of the order which had died at birth'." 5. We find from the present case that though the opinion of the Member, who is representative of the High Court with regard to the suitability has not been separately recorded in the selection process, it may be taken as a fact that the Selection Committee approved the selection of the petitioner in spite of the fact that he had disclosed in his attestation form that he was undergoing a prosecution under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. After this stage, it is true that the Rule states that the opinion of the Member of the Selection Committee shall prevail and in normal course, the petitioner ought to have been appointed. After this stage, it is true that the Rule states that the opinion of the Member of the Selection Committee shall prevail and in normal course, the petitioner ought to have been appointed. However, the Rule also contemplates that if there are strong and cogent reasons for not accepting the opinion of the Selection Committee, which are recorded in writing, the opinion expressed by the Selection Committee may not prevail. Thus, in this case if it is taken that the fact of selection of the candidate is demonstrative of the opinion by the Selection Committee as to suitability, it may be taken that the Government has stated reasons which have been recorded in writing for not appointing the petitioner. Those reasons are the prosecution which the petitioner was facing at the time when he was selected. The question that arises is whether the reason that a candidate for selection to the post of Judicial Magistrate, First Class is facing the prosecution under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, is a strong and cogent reason for not accepting the recommendation of the Selection Committee? We find that the term 'strong and cogent reason' cannot be defined by its very nature and indeed has not been defined. It would indicate the existence of such a reason which contra-indicates the suitability of a candidate for appointment as a Judicial Magistrate, First Class. Whether a particular reason such as pending prosecution of a candidate is strong and cogent, would depend on the fact of each case. It cannot be laid down as a rule that merely because a candidate is facing a prosecution, he must be denied an appointment because indeed the candidate may be facing prosecution for a frivolous reason or for trifles. It would certainly be open for the Government to make an appointment of such a candidate. 6. However, in the present case, the Government has refused to appoint the petitioner on the ground that he was facing a prosecution for an offence under Section 498A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. It would certainly be open for the Government to make an appointment of such a candidate. 6. However, in the present case, the Government has refused to appoint the petitioner on the ground that he was facing a prosecution for an offence under Section 498A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. If in such a situation, on the basis of a police verification report, the Government formed an opinion that such a person was not suitable for being appointed as a Judicial Magistrate, first Class, it cannot be said that the opinion of the Government is contrary to the Rule under which the appointments to such posts are to be made by the Governor of the State after selection by the Selection Committee. In these circumstances, even though we accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that an acquittal operates from nativity, still we are of the opinion that it would not be proper to interfere with the impugned order which was made at the time after selection and before the appointments were made to the said post; indeed, we do not consider it necessary for the Government to wait for the result of the prosecution which may take years and go through a series of appeals and revisions in order to decide on the suitability of a candidate. In these circumstances, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned decision of the Government. 7. At this stage, Shri. A. V. Bhide, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, points out an amendment to the Recruitment Rules for Judicial Magistrate, First Class framed in exercise of powers conferred by Articles 233, 234 and proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India read with Article 235. Rule 7 which provides for disqualification for appointment reads as follows: "7. Rule 7 which provides for disqualification for appointment reads as follows: "7. Disqualification for appointment.- No person shall be eligible for appointment to the service: (a) if he is not a citizen of India, (b) if he is compulsorily retired, removed or dismissed from judicial service or from service in Government or Statutory or Local Authority or failed to complete probation period in judicial service on any post, or in Government or Statutory or Local Authority or (c) if he has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude or he is or has been permanently debarred or disqualified by the High Court or the Union Public Service Commission or any State Public Service Commission from appearing for examinations or selection conducted by it; or (d) if he directly or indirectly influences the Recruiting Authority by any means for his candidature; or (e) if he is a man, has more than one wife living and if a woman has married a man already having another wife; or (f) if he has more than two children." According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, if the case had arisen under the new Rules, the petitioner would not have been disqualified for appointment since he had not been convicted of any offence involving moral turpitude at the relevant time but was only undergoing a trial. The learned Counsel, therefore, submits that the petitioner be given a fair chance to have his case considered. 8. In the circumstances, we direct that if the petitioner makes a representation for seeking appointment, that representation will be considered by the Government in accordance with the law within the period of three months from the date of receipt of the representation. 9. With these observations and directions, the Writ Petition stands disposed of. Rule is discharged. There shall be no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.