Judgment :- K.M. Joseph, J. In this appeal the appellant would press before us the contentions that no court fee is payable. The appellant filed an application for reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The appellant is awarded compensation. Not being satisfied, the appellant has preferred the present appeal. The original valuation made by the appellant was about Rs.29 lakhs and the officer took the stand that the appellant is liable to pay court fee on ad valorem basis computed as per the Kerala Court Fees Suits Valuation Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The appellant did not pay the amount. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. The appellant carried the matter in appeal before the Apex Court. In the Apex Court the appellant has limited the claim to Rs.5 lakhs. According to the appellant, the appellant was permitted to remit the court fee payable and the Apex Court has directed that the court fee paid in that Court shall be treated as the court fee paid in this Court. Later on, the Apex Court has disposed of the appeal and permitted, according to the appellant, to urge the question of court fee before this Court. It is accordingly that the appellant urges that no court fee is payable in the land acquisition appeal. 2. We heard the learned counsel for the appellant Sri. K.G. Balasubramanian and learned Senior Government Pleader. 3. Sri. K.G. Balasubramanian, learned counsel would contend as follows: The Act does not specifically provide for any court fee in an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. He would contend that Section 52 of the Act deals with the court fee to be paid in an appeal. He would contend that on a reference application under Section 18, no court fee is payable by virtue of the exemption granted under Section 72 of the Act. If that be so, he poses the question how in an appeal carried against an award on the reference any court fee is payable in view of the express provisions of Section 52 of the Act. In regard to Section 51, he would contend that it is a dead letter. Apart from saying that, the court fee payable shall be the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed it does not expressly charge the appellant with liability to pay any court fee, he contends. In regard to Section 51, he would contend that it is a dead letter. Apart from saying that, the court fee payable shall be the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed it does not expressly charge the appellant with liability to pay any court fee, he contends. When confronted with the Full Bench decision of this Court in Balakrishnan Nambiyar v. Madhavan & Others (1978 KLT 843 (F.B.) and the Bench decision in L.A.A.No.8 of 2003 the appellant would canvass the correctness of the judgments and he would request us to revisit the whole issue on the basis that the view taken by the Full Bench and also by the Division Bench is erroneous. According to him, the error committed by the Full Bench lay in not noting the distinction between the provisions of the Court-fees Act, 1870 and the provisions of the Act. According to him, in the Court-fees Act, 1870, there was a charging provision and the entire reasoning of the learned Judge in In re Ananda Lal Chakrabutty and others (AIR 1932 Calcutta 346) which is followed with approval by the Full Bench in (1978 KLT 843) (supra) turned on the provisions contained in the Court-fees Act, 1870. He reiterates that in the Act there is no charging provision charging the appellant under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act with liability to pay court fee ad valorem. 4. We notice that, now, it is necessary for us to look at the state of law emanating from the judgments of this Court on the point. In L.A.A.No.8/2003, a Bench of this Court considered the very same question and took the view that under Section 72 (xviii) of the Act an application for compensation alone is exempted from court fee and appeals and applications are entirely different. It is further observed that such application is treated as plaint in terms of Rule 378 (3) of the Civil Rules of Practice and that it cannot be taken as institution of a proceedings in the court of first instance to attract Section 52 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Division Bench further observed that land acquisition appeals are covered by Section 51 and not by Section 52 of the Act. The Court also referred to the Full Bench decision of this Court in Balakrishnan Nambiyar v. Madhavan & Others (1978 KLT 843 (F.B.). The Division Bench further observed that land acquisition appeals are covered by Section 51 and not by Section 52 of the Act. The Court also referred to the Full Bench decision of this Court in Balakrishnan Nambiyar v. Madhavan & Others (1978 KLT 843 (F.B.). In the said case the Full Bench had to consider the question of court fee payable in an appeal from an award under Section 32 of the Land Acquisition Act regarding apportionment of compensation. We shall advert to that judgment at some length later on. Suffice to say at this point that the Court took the view that the appellants are liable to pay court fee on an ad valorem basis on the compensation amount they laid claim to in the appeals under Section 51 of the Act. 5. A learned Single Judge of this Court, when the matter came up before him, the appellant therein canvassed the correctness of the decision of the Division Bench, thought it fit to refer the matter to the Honourable Chief Justice for placing the matter before the Larger Bench. Accordingly, the matter came before the Full Bench of this Court. The Full Bench of this Court in Peter v. Sara (2006 (4) KLT 219) proceeded to take the view that reference in all the cases is incompetent since there are binding Full Bench and Division bench decisions on all the points in the order of reference. We notice that in the Full Bench also the appellant in question was represented by the very same learned counsel who appears for the appellant in this case, namely, Sri. K.G. Balasubramanian. The Full Bench took the view that it is not open to the Single Judge to doubt the correctness of the decision of the Division Bench. In the course of the judgment, we notice that, the Full Bench has observed as follows: “9. Regarding reference to larger Benches also, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the matter, in a recent case in Pradip Chandra Parija & Ors. V. Pramod Chandra Patnaik & Ors. (JT 2001 (10) SC 347), wherein it has been held that whether a decision requires reconsideration is itself to be first decided by the Bench of co-equal strength. In other words, a bench of smaller strength cannot bypass the bench of larger strength and make a reference to a bench of still larger strength. V. Pramod Chandra Patnaik & Ors. (JT 2001 (10) SC 347), wherein it has been held that whether a decision requires reconsideration is itself to be first decided by the Bench of co-equal strength. In other words, a bench of smaller strength cannot bypass the bench of larger strength and make a reference to a bench of still larger strength. To quote, “In our view, judicial discipline and propriety demands that a bench of two learned Judges should follow a decision of a bench of three learned Judges. But if a bench of two learned Judges concludes that an earlier judgment of three learned Judges is so very incorrect that in no circumstances can it be followed, the proper course for it to adopt is to refer the matter before it to a bench of three learned Judges setting out, as has been done here, the reasons why it could not agree with the earlier judgment. If, then, the bench of three learned Judges also comes to the conclusion that the earlier judgment of a bench of three learned Judges is incorrect, reference to a bench of five learned Judges is justified.” 6. Perhaps the appellant may seek to derive assistance from the aforesaid paragraph in his bid to convince us that a case is made out yet another reference to a larger Bench. But, we must at once notice that it is not as if a reference to a larger Bench is to be made for the mere asking. The Court before which a request for reference to a larger Bench is made must be satisfied that the judgment which is sought to be reconsidered is clearly wrong. Therefore, we must now advert to the contentions of the appellant in an attempt to consider whether the decision of the Bench which is co-ordinate Bench or that of the larger Bench namely the Full Bench reported in Balakrishnan Nambiyar v. Madhavan & Others (1978 KLT 843 (F.B.) requires any reconsideration. It is the case of the learned counsel that the specific contention raised by him was not raised before this Court. 7. We must now advert to the relevant provisions of the Act. We must notice that the Court Fees Act is divided into various Chapters. Chapter II which deals with liability to pay fee. It is the case of the learned counsel that the specific contention raised by him was not raised before this Court. 7. We must now advert to the relevant provisions of the Act. We must notice that the Court Fees Act is divided into various Chapters. Chapter II which deals with liability to pay fee. Chapter III consists of Sections 10 to 20 can be described as machinery section as it deals with determination of fee by the concerned officers. Chapter IV consisting of Sections 21 to 52A deals with computation of fee in various categories of proceedings. Chapter V consists of two Sections namely Sections 53 and 54. Section 53 provides for valuation of suits not otherwise provided for. Section 54 relates to miscellaneous aspects. Chapter VI deals with probates, letters of administration and certificates of administration. Chapter VII deals with refunds and remissions. Chapter VIII consisting of Section 76 deals with legal benefit fund. Chapter IX which is the last of the Chapter deals with miscellaneous matters. The Act is thereafter followed by three schedules. 8. Coming back to Chapter II, the most crucial Section in the Chapter would be Section 4. It reads as follows: 4. Levy of fee in Courts and public offices. – No document which is chargeable with fee under this Act shall – (i) be filed, exhibited or recorded in, or be acted on or furnished by, any Court including the High Court, or (ii) be filed, exhibited or recorded in any public office or be acted on or furnished by any public officer Unless in respect of such document there be paid a fee of an amount not less than that indicated as chargeable under this Act: Provided that, whenever the filing or exhibition in a Criminal Court of a document in respect of which the proper fee has not been paid is in the opinion of the Court necessary to prevent a failure of justice, nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to prohibit such filing or exhibition.” Section 4A provides for the question of court fee to be levied at two different stages inter alia. Section 6 deals with multifarious suits. Section 7 deals with determination of market value. Section 8 provides that a written statement pleading a set off or counter claim shall be chargeable with fee in the same manner as a plaint. Section 6 deals with multifarious suits. Section 7 deals with determination of market value. Section 8 provides that a written statement pleading a set off or counter claim shall be chargeable with fee in the same manner as a plaint. Section 9 provides for documents falling under two or more descriptions. We do not think it necessary to deal with Sections 10 to 14. Section 15 deals with fee payable on written statements. Section 16 being relevant we extract the same as under. “16. Fee payable on appeals, etc. – The provisions of Sections 10 to 14 relating to the determination and levy of fee on plaints in suits shall apply mutatis mutandis to the determination and levy of fee is respect of a memorandum of appeal, cross-objection or other proceeding in second appeal or in an appeal under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958.” Section 21 falling in Chapter IV reads as follows: “21. Fee how reckoned. – The fee payable under this Act shall be determined or computed in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, Chapter VI, Chapter IX and Schedules I and II.” Thereafter, it is followed by various sections dealing with various categories of suits and making provision for court fee payable thereon. Section 51 deals with fee on memorandum of appeals against orders relating to compensation. It reads as follows” “51. Fee on memorandum of appeal against order relating to compensation. – The fee payable under this Act on a memorandum of appeal against an order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for the acquisition of property for public purposes shall be computed on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant.” Section 52 also deals with appeals. It is not necessary to refer to the entire section. What it inter alia provides is as follows: 52. Appeals. – The fee payable in an appeal shall be the same as the fee that would be payable in the Court of first instance on the subject-matter of the appeal. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx Section 52A incorporated by Amendment in 2003 starts with non obstante clause in regard to Section 52 and provides for fee on memorandum of appeal against the order of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal or Wealth Tax Appellate Tribunal. 9. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx Section 52A incorporated by Amendment in 2003 starts with non obstante clause in regard to Section 52 and provides for fee on memorandum of appeal against the order of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal or Wealth Tax Appellate Tribunal. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the scheme of Court-fees Act 1870 is different from the Act in question. He would contend that the Full Bench of this Court in Balakrishnan Nambiyar v. Madhavan & Others (1978 KLT 843 (F.B.) has relied upon the judgment of Rankin, C.J. in In re Ananda Lal Chakrabutty and others (AIR 1932 Calcutta 346) and proceeded to take the view that the court fee payable is to be determined on an ad valorem basis. He would contend that the reasoning is flawed for the reason that under the Court-fees Act 1870 there is a charging provision namely Section 4. But, on the other hand, as far as the Act in question is concerned, Section 51 cannot be treated as a charging section. In this regard he relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Sahadu Gangaram Bhagade v. Special Deputy Collector, Ahmednagar and another (AIR 1971 SC 1887). Therein, the Apex Court was considering an appeal from a case arising under the Bombay Court-fees Act (36 of 1959). The Apex Court proceeded to hold inter alia as follows: “6. Section 5(1) of the Bombay Court-fees Act, 1959, provides that no document of any of the kinds specified as chargeable in the first or second schedule to this Act annexed shall be filed, exhibited or recorded in any Court of justice or shall be received or furnished by any public officer, unless in respect of such document there has been paid a fee of an amount not less than that indicated by either of the said schedules as the proper fee for such document. Section 7(1) of that Act provides: “7(1) The amount of fee payable under this Act on a memorandum of appeal against an order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for the acquisition of land for public purposes shall be computed according to the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant.” 7. This provision is similar to Section 8 of the Court-fee Act, 1870. This provision is similar to Section 8 of the Court-fee Act, 1870. It clearly applies to an appeal filed under Section 11 of the Act. It is true that the provision is not a charging section. It only provides for the computation of the Court-fee payable. But that provision makes it clear that it relates to the computation of a Court-fee payable on ad valorem basis. It can have no connection with any Article providing for the payment of fixed Court-fee. Therefore the computation provided under that provision can only be of a Court-fee payable under one or the other articles in Sch.I. Dealing with the scope of Section 8 of the Court-fees Act, 1870, Rankin C.J. in Anandalal Chakrabarti ILR 59 Cal 528 = (AIR 1932 Cal 346) observed: “Section 8, while not itself imposing any fee upon any one, provides a rule for computation of the fee payable under the Act in a certain class of cases. What it says is that, in the class of cases, which it deals with, the amount of fee payable under the Act on a memorandum of appeal, it is to be computed according to the difference between the two sums. Now, that section standing in the text of the Act proceed clearly upon the assumption that otherwise in the Act there is a charge which is an ad valorem charge and is not a fixed charge. ………………….The provisions of S.8, invoking as they do that fee in the class of cases dealt with is an ad valorem fee are themselves sufficient to exclude any question of Article 11 of Schedule II being made applicable to such cases. It is not necessary to consider whether the Tribunal’s award, which is an order and not a decree is an order having the force of a decree. Whatever the effect of that phrase may be, Section 8 shows one perfectly clear that an appeal regarding compensation in the Land Acquisition case is not under Article 11 of Schedule II, because it is not a fixed fee at all……” The Apex Court has held that a provision which is pari materia with Section 51 of the Act cannot be treated as a charging section. He would therefore contend that since Section 4 of the Act cannot be treated as a charging section as such and there is a charging section in the central Court-fees Act, 1870 and this aspect is not considered by the Full Bench in the decision in Balakrishnan Nambiyar v. Madhavan & Others (1978 KLT 843 (F.B.) the matter requires re-consideration. He would further dwell on the Articles in question. He would contend that Article 1 under which the office has called upon him to pay fees ad valorem is inapplicable. He would say at best the relevant Article which would be applicable is Article 3 of Schedule II, to be more precise Article 3 (b). 10. He would submit that Article 1 if properly construed should it be confined to appeals arising from decrees in civil suits and it has to be interpreted ejusdem generic. Article 1 in the relevant portion reads as follows: “1. Plaint or written statement pleading a set off or counter-claim or memorandum of appeal presented to any Court. When the amount or value of the subject-matter in dispute— xx xx …….” In this context, he would refer to us the definition clause namely Section 3. It inter alia provides as follows: “3. Definitions. – In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires: -- (i) “appeal” includes a cross-objection; (ii) “Court” means any Civil, Revenue, or Criminal Court and includes a Tribunal or other authority having jurisdiction under any special or local law to decide questions affecting the rights of parties; (iii) “prescribed” means prescribed by rules made under this Act; and (iv) expressions used and not defined in this Act or in the Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125 (Act VII of 1125), but defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908), shall have the meaning (respectively assigned to them in the said Code.” According to him, particularly in view of the definition of the word ‘Court’, the High Court would not be comprehended within the scope of Article 1. 11. Learned counsel also relied on the Full Bench decision in State of Kerala v. Kiriyan Varghese (2001 (2) KLT 416 (F.B.). Therein the question which arose was whether from an appeal under Section 54 decided by the learned Single Judge a further appeal will lie under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act to a Division Bench. 11. Learned counsel also relied on the Full Bench decision in State of Kerala v. Kiriyan Varghese (2001 (2) KLT 416 (F.B.). Therein the question which arose was whether from an appeal under Section 54 decided by the learned Single Judge a further appeal will lie under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act to a Division Bench. Now, in the course of the said judgment, the Full Bench observed as follows: “18……. In this context, what falls for consideration is the scope of the expression ‘original decree or order in any suit or other proceeding’ occurring in the Section. There cannot be any difficulty in understanding the expression ‘original decree or order in any suit’. In Palakattu Mala Devaswom v. Pylee (1969 KLT 275) the Full Bench has clearly held that a reference to the Land Acquisition Court under S.18 or S.30 (then S.32) of the Land Acquisition Act, is not a suit. Everything therefore boils down to understanding the scope of the expression ‘other proceeding’ occurring in the section. The expression ‘other proceeding’ is preceded by the words ‘any suit or’. The rule of ejusdem generic may not apply since that rule applies when (1) the statute contains an enumeration of specific words; (2) the subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category; (3) that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration; (4) the general terms follow the enumeration and (5) there is no indication of a different legislative intent. (See Amarchandra v. Collector of Excise (AIR 1972 SC 1863).” 12. Learned counsel points out that while Section 51 provides that the fee payable in an appeal under the Land Acquisition Act would be the amount which is the difference between the amount awarded and the amount which is claimed it cannot be treated as a charging section. According to him, tax or fee should be authorized and the method known to law by which such authorization can be made is by way of charging section. He would submit that such a charging provision is conspicuous by its absence in respect of an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. 13. We must first of all consider what is the nature of court fee. He would submit that such a charging provision is conspicuous by its absence in respect of an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. 13. We must first of all consider what is the nature of court fee. The question is no longer res integra as the Apex Court has spoken on the issue by virtue of its decision in The Secretary, Government of Madras, Home Department and another v. Zenith Lamps and Electrical Ltd. (AIR 1973 SC 724). Therein, the Apex Court has held as follows. “Fees taken in Court’ are not taxes, for if it were so, the word ‘taxes’ would have been used or some other indication given. Taxes that can be levied by the Union are mentioned in List I from Entry 82; in List II taxes that can be imposed start from Entry 45, the very use of the words ‘not including fees taken in any Court’ in Entry 96, List I, and Entry 66, List II shows that they would otherwise have fallen within these entries. The separate mention of ‘fees taken in Court’ in the Entries 77 and 3 of Lists 1 and 2 respectively of Schedule 7 has no other significance than that they logically come under entries dealing with administration of justice and Courts. If these words had not been separately mentioned in List I Entry 7 and List II, Entry 3, the court fees would still have been levied under List I, Entry 96 and List II, Entry 66.” 14. Therefore, there cannot be any doubt that court fee is essentially a fee and not tax and we must approach the question raised bearing in mind this fundamental distinction between tax per se and court fee. It is no doubt true that in respect of tax there cannot be any tax by implication and either the person is within the tax net or he is out of it. We would also think that even otherwise the appellant may not be justified in contending that there is no provision rendering the appellant liable to pay court fee under Section 51 read with Article 1. We would think that the distinction which is sought to be projected by the appellant between Section 4 of the Act and Section 4 of the Court-fees Act 1870 may not be of such a nature that the appellant is justified in his contention. We would think that the distinction which is sought to be projected by the appellant between Section 4 of the Act and Section 4 of the Court-fees Act 1870 may not be of such a nature that the appellant is justified in his contention. Section 4 of the Court-fees Act, 1870 reads as follows: “4. Fees on documents filed, etc., in High Courts in their Extraordinary Jurisdiction. – No document of any of the kinds specified in the First or Second Schedule to this Act annexed, as chargeable with fees, shall be filed, exhibited or recorded in, or shall be received or furnished by, any of the said High Courts in any case coming before such Court in the exercise of its extraordinary original civil jurisdiction; Or in the exercise of its extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction; In their appellate jurisdiction. – or in the exercise of its jurisdiction as regards appeals from the judgments other than judgments passed in the exercise of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the Court or one or more Judges of the said Court, or of a Division Court; Or in the exercise of its jurisdiction as regards appeals from the Courts subjects to its superintendence; As Courts of reference and revision. – or in the exercise of its jurisdiction as a Court of reference or revision; Unless in respect of such document there be paid a fee of an amount not less than that indicated by either of the said Schedules as the proper fee for such document.” 15. If the appellant stands by his contention that Section 4 of the Court-fees Act 1870 is a charging provision then Section 4 of the Act must also be treated as a charging provision. The Schedules to the Act are also part of the Act. Learned Special Government Pleader, in fact, would also draw our attention to Section 21 of the Act which we have already extracted. Section 21, while it is true, falls in Chapter IV dealing with computation of fee cannot be clearly eschewed when we consider the question whether a party is liable under Section 51, on a scanning of the entire Act and Schedules. Section 51 under which the appellant stands charged to pay court fee ad valorem falls in Chapter IV. Section 21, while it is true, falls in Chapter IV dealing with computation of fee cannot be clearly eschewed when we consider the question whether a party is liable under Section 51, on a scanning of the entire Act and Schedules. Section 51 under which the appellant stands charged to pay court fee ad valorem falls in Chapter IV. We further notice that Section 52 of the Act must be treated as a general provision which deals with court fee payable in appeals. The Legislature intended that no court fee is payable on a reference application under Section 18 as it stands exempted under Section 72. An application for reference is one thing; an appeal carried in the exercise of right under Section 54 under the Land Acquisition Act is another. As to on what documents court fee is payable is essentially the result of a legislative value judgment. Apparently, the legislative body clearly intended that court fee must be payable in an appeal carried under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. In this regard we would like to refer to the judgment of Rankin, C.J. in In re Ananda Lal Chakrabutty and others (AIR 1932 Calcutta 346) which stands quoted by the Full Bench in Balakrishnan Nambiyar v. Madhavan & Others (1978 KLT 843 (F.B.) which reads as under: “8. In coming to the decision, we are afraid that due regard has not been paid by the Division Bench to S.51 of the C.F. Act which we have quoted earlier. That Section would be applicable when the appeal is against an order relating to compensation under any Act in force for the acquisition of the property for public purposes and the fee will have to be computed on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant. As the order of reference correctly points out, the word “awarded” occurring in S.51 has to be given a wide and generic sense as meaning “ordered to be paid”. We would in this connection refer to the observations of that eminent Judge, Chief Justice Rankin of the Calcutta High Court In re Ananda Lal Chakrabutty (AIR 1932 Calcutta 346). That case dealt with three appeals from an award of the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal and the question which arose there was regarding the proper amount of court-fee payable on the appeals. That case dealt with three appeals from an award of the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal and the question which arose there was regarding the proper amount of court-fee payable on the appeals. A certain property in Calcutta has been compulsorily acquired. Portions of that property acquired lay within the ambit of the zamindaris of the appellants in that case. The Tribunal held that the property acquired was revenue free property and no part of the mal lands of the appellants. Therefore, the Tribunal allotted the whole of the compensation to the Kalnani Industrial Bank rejecting the claim of the Zamindar appellants to any portion thereof. It is from that decision, the zamindars came in appeal to the High Court and the question of court-fee arose. After referring to S.8 of the Court-fees Act of 1870 which reads as follows: “The amount of fee payable under this Act on a memorandum of appeal against an order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for the acquisition of land for public purposes shall be computed according to the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant.” The learned Chief Justice observed: “The provisions of S.8 invoking as they do that the fee in the class of cases dealt with it an ad valorem fee are themselves sufficient to exclude any question of Art.II of Sch.2 being made applicable to such cases. It is not necessary to consider whether the tribunal’s award which is an order and not a decree is an order having the force or a decree. Whatever the effect of that phrase may be, S.8 shows one perfectly clearly that an appeal regarding compensation in a land acquisition case is not under Art.II Sch.2 because it is not a fixed fee at all. In this connection, I will only add that I think the provisions of S.8 have been misinterpreted because S.8 is really a provision (upon the assumption that there is already and ad valorem fee laid down by the Act) that the ad valorem charge is to be made in a way that is most favourable to the subject. The object of S.8 is not to impose an ad valorem charge; it assumes that that has already been done. The object of S.8 is not to impose an ad valorem charge; it assumes that that has already been done. If a person is appearing from an award in a compensation matter there are various ways in which it might have been thought right to charge him with court-fee. If he is appealing about the total amount of the award and saying that the total amount ought to be so much more, it would be arguable whether or not he ought not to be charged upon that difference. In the same way, if the question as to his right to compensation involves a question of title to land, it might be argued that his appeal should be valued upon the basis of the value of the land that was in dispute. The purpose of S.8 to my mind is to say that he is to be charged in the most favourable way. It does not matter what is the difference between the total amount awarded and the amount which he says should have been the total amount awarded. It does not matter whether the question of title involved is a question of title relating to a large and valuable estate. The position is that he as an individual appellant is only interested for this purpose in his own claim for compensation. Whatever may be the matter to be discussed in the end, the point is: “I have been given so much money as compensation for my interest and I claim by the appeal to get so much more.” S.8 says that he is only to be charged upon the further amount that he is claiming by the appeal, that is, the amount of money which he says should be awarded to him in his own individual case in excess of the amount which in fact has been awarded. The business of the section is not, therefore to impose an ad valorem charge but on the assumption that the Act has already made an ad valorem charge to say that it is to be charged upon him in that particular way. It is the least onerous way that could very well be suggested. The business of the section is not, therefore to impose an ad valorem charge but on the assumption that the Act has already made an ad valorem charge to say that it is to be charged upon him in that particular way. It is the least onerous way that could very well be suggested. Nevertheless the section has to be taken into account when one is construing the Act as a whole and on the face of that section, I have no doubt at all that an ad valorem fee is chargeable under Art.1, Sch.1, Court-fees Act.” 16. Section 51 had been inserted so that it may not be open for the appellant to contend that as no court fee is payable on a reference application and going by Rule 378 of Civil Rules of Practice reference application is to be treated as a plaint no court fee need be paid in an appeal as court fee to be paid in an appeal going by the general provisions contained in Section 52 is determined with reference to the court fee paid or payable in the court of first instance. It is with full knowledge of the said position in law that the legislature inserted Section 51 specifically dealing with appeals in relation to orders for compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. We are not at all impressed by the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that Section 51 is to be condemned as a dead letter and has no use. We fee that certainly the legislature intended by the scheme of the Act read with the Schedule that court fee in a land acquisition appeal under Section 54 is to be levied with fees ad valorem. 17. We must also noticed that, while Section 51 refers to appeal against order relating to compensation the question is whether it will be an order within the meaning of Article 3 of Schedule II. If the expression has been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure it should be assigned the said meaning. The word ‘Order’ has been defined under the Code of Civil Procedure as follows: “order” means the formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree.” 18. It is necessary to notice Section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which reads as under: “26. Form of awards. The word ‘Order’ has been defined under the Code of Civil Procedure as follows: “order” means the formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree.” 18. It is necessary to notice Section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which reads as under: “26. Form of awards. – (1) Every award under this Part shall be in writing signed by the Judge, and shall specify the amount awarded under clause first of sub-section (1) of section 23, and also the amounts (if any) respectively awarded under each of the other clauses of the same sub-section, together with the grounds of awarding each of the said amounts. (2) Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of section 2, clause (2) and section, clause (9) respectively, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908). 19. Therefore, the decision of the reference Court under Section 18 is in the form of an award. It is to be treated as a deemed decree and the statement of the grounds of such award is to be treated as a judgment. In fact, in this case also the decision is styled as a judgment. We should not overlook the words of the definition clause which as usual starts with the words ‘unless the context otherwise requires’. The Court is not bound by the definition clause as applicable irrespective of the context and it is always open to the Court to assign a different meaning to a particular provision of the Act despite what the definition clause may provide if such a different meaning is called for in the context. We would think that the appellant is not justified in contending that the appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act would fall under Article 3 of Schedule II. The appeals which are contemplated under the said Article are appeals carried against orders. Ad we have already noticed an appeal under Section 54 is carried against a judgment and decree. In fact, under Section 54 appeals lies to the High Court from the award. Apparently, the said provision must be read in conjunction of Section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act which we have already referred to. Ad we have already noticed an appeal under Section 54 is carried against a judgment and decree. In fact, under Section 54 appeals lies to the High Court from the award. Apparently, the said provision must be read in conjunction of Section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act which we have already referred to. Therefore, we are of the view that the case of the appellant will not fall within the four corners of Article 3 of Schedule II as contended by him. 20. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that there is no other provision providing for appeals to the High Court apart from Article 3. If that be so, the only Article which is available in the Schedule under which court fee could be levied in an appeal under Section 54 to the High Court would be Article 1. Article 1 deals with plaint, written statement pleading set off counter claim or memorandum of appeal presented to any Court. We do not see any reason why we should cut down the width of the word used in Article 1 to hold that Court would not take in High Court also. In answer to the query from the Court as to under which Article court fee is being paid in respect of appeals carried to the High Court under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, learned counsel for the appellant would fairly point out that court fee is being paid under Article 1. We also should not overlook the fact that while the word Court is defined as meaning any Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court including Tribunal and even proceeding on the basis that a Civil Court would not include High Court having regard to the scope of Civil Courts in the Civil Courts Act we would think that at any rate having regard to the fact that the context would demand that word ‘Court’ used in Article 1 should be widely interpreted so as to include High Court also within its scope. It is not as if the High Court cannot be treated as a Civil Court either. But as already pointed out we would think in the context of the provision, ‘Court’ in Article 1 it would certainly take in High Court also. 21. It is not as if the High Court cannot be treated as a Civil Court either. But as already pointed out we would think in the context of the provision, ‘Court’ in Article 1 it would certainly take in High Court also. 21. We notice that a Division Bench of this Court in Sebastian v. State of Kerala (1977 KLT 196) has also taken the following view. “Therefore, when an appeal under S.52 is before Court and the question of payment of court fee on the appeal rises for consideration, we have necessarily to determine what exactly the subject-matter of the appeal is. We are called upon to apply S.51 her and we shall confine our consideration to that section. It is agreed that the memoranda of appeal before us are against the decisions relating to compensation under the law for the time being in force for the acquisition of property for public purposes. That being the case, the fee shall be computed on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant. An award in proceedings by way of reference to the Court would arise on a claim made by the parties. If a party is not satisfied with the amount awarded, a right of appeal is conferred on him which he could exercise. The amount awarded may in some cases be nil and even in such cases, a person may claim that some amount should have been awarded. S.51 provides for the payment of the Court fee on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed which difference in the particular instance would be the amount claimed, for, no amount was awarded at all. The court may award a lesser amount than the amount claimed or direct that no amount need be paid for sufficient reason. The real attack is against the failure to award what has been claimed. In other words, in determining the court-fee, what the court is primarily concerned with is the relief sought by the person and not the reason why the Court of first instance refused to award the amount claimed or in some cases any amount at all.” 22. Learned Government Pleader also relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Indore Development Authority v. Tarak Singh (1995 Supp (3) SCC 25). Therein the Court inter alia held as follows: “6. Learned Government Pleader also relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Indore Development Authority v. Tarak Singh (1995 Supp (3) SCC 25). Therein the Court inter alia held as follows: “6. The case on hand stands on a higher footing than the one dealt with in Ghanshyamdas case. Here, the Subordinate Judge, who deals with the reference, is a civil court under the Central Act to determine compensation. By operation of Section 26 (2), his award is a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of CPC. It is a formal expression of an adjudication on the compensation awardable or measurement of the land acquired under the Central Act. It is a final adjudication also, unless it can be avoided in any other forum known to law; and it could be avoided only by filling appeal as prescribed in Section 54 of the Central Act. 7. In this context, it is relevant to note Section 8 of the M.P. Court Fees act which reads thus: “8. Fee on memorandum of appeal against order relating to compensation: The amount fee payable under this Act on a memorandum of appeal against an order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for the acquisition of land for public purposes shall be computed according to the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant.” 8. It is true that the appellant is not the claimant. But when the appellant seeks to avoid the decree, which is made by the reference court, it must be construed that the appellant is seeking to avoid the amount of higher compensation determined by the reference court, as claimed by the landowners. Therefore, the appellant is required to pay the court fee on the memorandum of appeal of the extent on which the appellant seeks to avoid the higher compensation awarded by the reference court under the Central Act. When its legality is challenged by filling the appeal under Section 54, the difference of the amount for which the appeal is filed, ad valorem court fee under Section 8 is required to be paid. Article 11 of Schedule II has no application, since it is expressly covered by Section 8 of the M.P. Court Fees Act.” The Court proceeded to hold that the appellant is required to pay ad valorem court fee. 23. Article 11 of Schedule II has no application, since it is expressly covered by Section 8 of the M.P. Court Fees Act.” The Court proceeded to hold that the appellant is required to pay ad valorem court fee. 23. The conspectus of provisions which we have adverted to would lead us to the conclusion which is inevitable that Section 4 read with Section 21 further read in conjunction with Section 51 and Article 1 of Schedule I provides for levy of ad valorem court fee in an appeal carried under Section 54 aggrieved by the compensation ordered by the reference Court. At any rate we must also bear in mind, the decision of the Apex Court which we have referred to the effect that if a Court intends to refer the matter to a larger Bench it must be convinced that the judgment, the correctness of which is doubted, must be clearly incorrect. We are not persuaded to hold that the judgment of the Division Bench as also the Full Bench of this Court is so incorrect that it requires reconsideration. In the light of this discussion, we also think that there is no merit in the contention that Section 51 of the Act is inapplicable to the appeal or that the appellant is not liable to pay ad valorem court fee and we reject the said contention. 24. Office will verify whether the appellant has paid the court fee as directed by the Apex Court on the valuation he has finally placed and if the court fee is found to be sufficient the matter may be posted for admission.