JUDGMENT B.K. Sharma and H. Baruah, JJ. 1. Heard Mr. L.S. Jamir, learned Addl. Advocate General, Nagaland appearing for the Appellants as well as Mr. C. T Jamir, learned Counsel representing the Respondent-writ Petitioner. 2. The State of Nagaland is aggrieved by the judgment and order dated June 19, 2009 passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 23(K)/2008, by which the particular period when the Petitioner remained under suspension, has been directed to be treated to be as on duty entitling the writ Petitioner with back wages/arrears pay and allowances. The period in question is from March 2, 2005 to July 18, 2007. 3. The basic facts, which led to filing of the writ petition in February 2008, have been elaborately stated in the impugned judgment and order. However, the basic facts are reproduced below. 4. The writ Petitioner, who is the Respondent herein, while was serving as Warden, Kohima (South) P.S. Case No. December 1, 2004 was registered against him under Section 407/506/307, IPC read with Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act. Subsequently, the case was registered as G.R. No. 29/2004. Pursuant to such alleged involvement of the Petitioner in the criminal case, he was placed under suspension by order dated February 5, 2004. 5. The Petitioner was also booked under NSA detention by an order dated March 1,2004 and the representation submitted by the Petitioner against the said detention order was rejected confirming the detention order. Pursuant to such detention, the writ Petitioner remained in custody and after serving full term of detention, was eventually released on May 8, 2005. 6. According to the Petitioner, he was not aware of the outcome of the aforesaid G.R. No. 29/2004 and it was only in 2007, on enquiry, he could come to know that in the said G.R. case, he was discharged by order dated March 8, 2004 passed by the learned A.D.C.(JudL), Kohima. The order was passed on March 8, 2004 discharging the Petitioner from the purported offence as there was no evidence which could be collected during investigation. 7. The order was passed on March 8, 2004 discharging the Petitioner from the purported offence as there was no evidence which could be collected during investigation. 7. From the materials on record, it appears that the Petitioner, for the first time, made a representation to the Director General of Prisons, Nagaland on July 18, 2007 urging for revocation of the order of suspension and reinstatement in service in view of his discharge from criminal liability in the aforesaid G.R. case by the aforesaid order dated March 8, 2004. Annexure-'E' is the representation dated July 18, 2007 annexed to the writ petition, in which, however, the Petitioner did not take the. plea that he was unaware of his acquittal/discharge on March 8, 2004 in the said G.R. case. 8. Pursuant to the said representation dated July 18, 2007, he was reinstated in service by order dated August 18, 2007 passed by the Director General of Prisons & Home Guards, Nagaland. However, in the order, it was specifically stated that he would not be entitled to any pay and allowances other than subsistence allowance already paid to him for the period from March 8, 2004 to July 18, 2007 as he remained absent from duty. It was stated in the order that the Petitioner did not approach the office for his reinstatement at earlier point of time. 9. After such reinstatement of the Petitioner in service, he made a further representation on September 10, 2007, in which, it was stated that he having been released from prison only on May 8, 2005, after serving full term of NSA detention, he had no occasion to know about the order of discharge dated March 8,2004 in G.R. Case No. 29/2004. It was also stated that since even after release, he did not receive any summons asking him to appear in the Court in connection with the said G.R. case, he was under impression that the criminal case had not come to an end. According to the said representation, the Petitioner made an enquiry to his engaged counsel in the year 2007 through whom he could come to know about the aforesaid order dated March 8, 2004, by which he was discharged from criminal offence. 10. According to the said representation, the Petitioner made an enquiry to his engaged counsel in the year 2007 through whom he could come to know about the aforesaid order dated March 8, 2004, by which he was discharged from criminal offence. 10. Thus, from the above narration of facts, what has transpired is that it is the case of the Petitioner that he being not aware of the aforesaid order of discharge dated March 8, 2004 passed by the trial Court in G.R. No. 29/2004, he had no occasion to approach the office of the Respondents for his reinstatement. The further contention raised on behalf of the Petitioner-Appellant is that irrespective of any approach being made by him, it was incumbent on the part of the Respondents to reinstate the Petitioner in service on revocation of the order of suspension as he was acquitted from the criminal offence by the aforesaid order dated March 8, 2004. 11. In the counter-affidavit filed by the Respondents, it was contended that the Petitioner is not entitled to any pay and allowances other than subsistence allowance paid to him during the period of his suspension on the basis of the principle of "no work no pay". According to the Respondents, it was incumbent on the part of the writ Petitioner to approach the authority for his reinstatement and he having not done so and having remained unauthorizedly absent from duty is not entitled to claim full pay and allowances for the period of suspension, although he was acquitted in the aforesaid GR case. 12. It will be pertinent to mention here that Anr. criminal case being G.R. No. 21/2003 was registered against the accused-Appellant under Section 409, IPC, from which also, he got acquitted vide order dated March 30, 2009 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kohima. It will also be pertinent to mention here that the Director General of Prisons by his order dated May 1, 2008 provided that the Petitioner would not be entitled to back wages for the revised period from March 2, 2005 to July 18, 2007 on the principle of "no work no pay". By the said order, the earlier period from March 8,2004 to July 18,2007 was modified to March 2, 2005 to July 18, 2007 entitling the Petitioner to receive pay and allowances for the period from March 8, 2004 to March 1, 2005. 13. By the said order, the earlier period from March 8,2004 to July 18,2007 was modified to March 2, 2005 to July 18, 2007 entitling the Petitioner to receive pay and allowances for the period from March 8, 2004 to March 1, 2005. 13. The above modified order dated May 1, 2008 was passed in view of the fact that the Petitioner was released from prison on May 8, 2005 on serving full term of NSA detention. 14. The learned single Judge has issued direction for payment of full pay and allowances for the period from March 2, 2005 to July 18, 2007 firstly, on, the ground that the suspension order dated February 5, 2004 was wholly unjustified as per the provisions of FR 54B(3) as he was acquitted in the aforesaid G.R. Case. Secondly, it has been held that the principle "no work no pay" will not be applicable inasmuch as it was not on account of the Petitioner that he could not perform his duties but it was because of the fault on the part of the Respondent-authorities, he was not allowed to perform his duties. 15. So far as the first ground is concerned, we are of the considered opinion that it could not have been held that the suspension of the Petitioner from service was wholly unjustified. As per the requirement of the relevant Service Rules, once the Government servant is involved in a criminal case and arrested in connection with the same, it is incumbent on the part of the authorities to place him under suspension. The order of suspension dated February 5, 2004 itself speaks that since a criminal case against the Petitioner was under investigation, he has been placed under suspension in exercise of power conferred under Sub-rule (1) of Rule of the Nagaland Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1967. The order also provided that during the period of suspension, the Petitioner would not leave the headquarters without obtaining the previous permission of the Superintendent, District Jail, Mokokchang. 16. It is Anr. thing that eventually, the Petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case, but it is altogether a different thing that he was placed under suspension pursuant to the registration of a police case with eventual registration of G.R. Case. Thus, in our considered opinion it cannot be said that the suspension of the Petitioner was wholly unjustified. 17. It is Anr. thing that eventually, the Petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case, but it is altogether a different thing that he was placed under suspension pursuant to the registration of a police case with eventual registration of G.R. Case. Thus, in our considered opinion it cannot be said that the suspension of the Petitioner was wholly unjustified. 17. This leads us to the second ground, on which the impugned judgment and order has been passed, which is that the principle of "no work no pay" is not applicable. The Petitioner was released from jail on May 8, 2005 after serving NSA detention period. There is nothing to show that after such release, the Petitioner had made any approach to the Respondent-authorities either in person or through any representation. In the order of suspension itself, it was provided that the Petitioner would not leave the headquarters without obtaining the previous permission of the Superintendent, District Jail, Mokokchang. In our view, it was incumbent on the part of the Petitioner after his release from jail custody on May 8, 2005 to immediately report to the authority, who had placed him under suspension and/or to remain in the headquarters. Nothing of the sort was done by the Petitioner-Appellant and it was, only on July 18, 2007, for the first time, he made representation to the Director General of Prisons, Nagaland urging for his reinstatement on the ground of discharge from G.R. case on March 8, 2004. In the meantime, more than 3 (three) years had gone by. Thus, in our view, the Petitioner, after remaining absent from duty and/or leaving the headquarters during the said period, cannot claim full pay and allowances for the period in question. 18. The authority by its revised order dated May 1, 2008 rightly provided full pay and allowances to the Petitioner-Appellant for the period from March 8, 2004 to March 1, 2005 as during that period, he was under detention. However, after his release he having not reported to the jurisdictional authority and having represented only on July 18,2007 for his reinstatement, we are of the considered opinion that the principle of "no work no pay" has been rightly applied by the authority. 19. However, after his release he having not reported to the jurisdictional authority and having represented only on July 18,2007 for his reinstatement, we are of the considered opinion that the principle of "no work no pay" has been rightly applied by the authority. 19. In State of U.P. v. Ved Pal Singh AIR 1997 SC 608 : (1997) 3 SCC 483 : 1998 III LLJ (Suppl) 615 the Apex Court, dealing with the case relating to corruption, from which the Respondent was acquitted, held that merely because the accused was acquitted, there cannot be any direction for reinstatement with full back wages inasmuch as the same might be a premium on corruption. It was provided that it is for the authority to decide as to whether in the given facts and circumstances, the incumbent could be provided with full back wages for the period of suspension. 20. In Krishnakant Raghunath Bibhavnekar v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. AIR 1997 SC 1434 : (1997) 3 SCC 636 : 1997 I LLJ l 190 the Apex Court held that the acquittal in a criminal case based on insufficient evidence cannot automatically entitle a person to back wages on reinstatement where the suspension is ordered pending criminal case. It has further been held that the competent authority is empowered to treat the suspension period as not spent on duty. 21. In the case of Baldev Singh v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 2006 SC 531 : (2005) 8 SCC 747 , the Apex Court held that the Appellant, who was dismissed from service, pursuant to conviction in a criminal case, but was, subsequently acquitted on appeal, cannot automatically be entitle to get salary for the concerned period applying the logic of "no work no pay". 22. In the instant case, although the Petitioner/Appellant was discharged from the criminal offence by the aforesaid order dated March 8, 2004 and was released from NSA detention on May 8, 2005, he did not made any approach to the authority and he made representation for the first time on July 18, 2007. Thereafter, he was reinstated in service by the aforesaid order dated August 18, 2007 with the stipulation that no back wages will be payable to him. Subsequently, the order was modified granting him full pay and allowances till such time he remained in judicial custody pursuant to his detention under NSA. 23. Thereafter, he was reinstated in service by the aforesaid order dated August 18, 2007 with the stipulation that no back wages will be payable to him. Subsequently, the order was modified granting him full pay and allowances till such time he remained in judicial custody pursuant to his detention under NSA. 23. Another significant fact, which cannot escape our notice is that in the meantime the Petitioner was also involved in G.R. No. 21/2003 under Section 409, IPC from which he got acquittal only on March 13, 2009. Thus, even after his acquittal in the earlier G.R. No. 29/2004 vide order dated March 8, 2004, he could not have been entitled to get reinstatement inasmuch as the other G.R. case being G.R. No. 21/2003 was still pending, from which he got final acquittal on March 30,2009. 24. For all the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered opinion that the Petitioner cannot make automatic claim of full pay and allowances for the period in question i.e. from March 2, 2005 to July 18, 2007 and we are of the considered opinion that the ; Respondent-authority has rightly taken the conscious decision not to pay the same, having regard to the facts and circumstances involved in the case. 25. In view of the above, we are inclined to allow the appeal by setting aside the aforesaid order dated June 19, 2009 passed by the learned single Judge in W.P.C. No. 23(K) 2008. However, it is hereby provided that irrespective of the fact that the Petitioner would not be entitled to arrear pay and allowances for the aforesaid period, the period will not entail any break in service and the said period shall be counted for all other service benefits.