JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri Shahroz Khan learned counsel for petitioner and learned A.G.A. for the State. 2. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged between petitioner and respective respondents. 3. The instant habeas corpus petition is directed against detention order dated 31.8.2009 passed by District Magistrate, Meerut, detaining petitioner under Section 3 (3) of National Security Act 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) while he was in district jail Meerut in connection with case crime No. 326 of 2009 under Sections 232, 234, 235, 420, 467, 468, I.P.C. read with Section 60/63 of Copyright Act, Police Station Lisari Gate, District Meerut. 4. The order dated 31.8.2009 passed by District Magistrate, Meerut under National Security Act, was approved by the State Government under Section 12 (1) of the Act vide order dated 10.9.2009. 5. Assertion made on behalf of petitioner is that he was neither arrested from the alleged place of incident nor any recovery was made but he has been falsely implicated on account of enmity with corporators namely Shamshad and Mohd. Shahid, who had previously threatened petitioner with dire consequences. Consequent to the said threat, a letter was written to police. Case was registered against petitioner on false and fictitious grounds. 6. The counsel for petitioner has challenged detention order on two grounds; first is that on the date when detention order was passed, there was no likelihood of the petitioner being enlarged on bail as petitioner’s bail application by learned Magistrate as well as learned Sessions Judge stood rejected, therefore, so called satisfaction of detaining authority is without any basis. Petitioner was already in jail. There was no possibility of his being released on bail since bail applications were rejected by two Courts. Therefore, satisfaction recorded by detaining authority was without any substance. 7. Next ground of challenge is that detention order has been passed on extraneous circumstances and on prompting by corporators namely Shamshad and Mohd. Shahid, who had grudge against petitioner. 8. Learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance on decision of Hon’ble Apex Court; Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another, AIR 1991 SC 1640 , paragraph No. 13. 7. Next ground of challenge is that detention order has been passed on extraneous circumstances and on prompting by corporators namely Shamshad and Mohd. Shahid, who had grudge against petitioner. 8. Learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance on decision of Hon’ble Apex Court; Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another, AIR 1991 SC 1640 , paragraph No. 13. Emphasis is that detaining authority had no reason to believe and there was no reliable material placed before him to substantiate that there is an oral possibility of his release on bail and consequent of his release, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity, therefore, it was necessary to detain him from doing so. 9. The counsel for petitioner has placed paragraph No. 6 of detention order wherein detaining authority has narrated that petitioner is trying to get himself released on bail. He moved an application for bail on 6.7.2009 through his counsel, which was rejected on 8.7.2009. Thereafter, bail application was moved before learned Sessions Judge on 15.7.2009, which was also rejected on 19.8.2009. 10. Emphasis is that two bail applications were already rejected before the order of detention was passed. There was no assertion that any other bail application is pending, therefore, satisfaction of the District Magistrate is without any basis and consequent detention order is liable to be quashed. 11. Reliance is placed by petitioner’s counsel on two more decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court; T.V. Sravanan @ S.A.R. Prasana Venkatachaariar Chaturvedi v. State through Secretary and another, (2006) 1 SCC (Cri.) 593 and A. Shanthi (Smt.) v. Govt. of T.N. and others, (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 371. Hon’ble Apex Court in both cases directed release of detenu as there was no sufficient basis to sustain apprehension of detaining authority that he was likely to be released on bail. In both cases, bail application moved by appellant was rejected by the Courts and there was no other material whatsoever to apprehend that he was likely to move bail application or there was imminent possibility of prayer for bail being granted. 12. Learned A.G.A. has disputed arguments advanced on behalf of petitioner on the basis of decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court; Ibrahim Nazeer v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, 2006 (56) ACC 227 and Ahamed Nassar v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, 2000 (40) ACC SC 53. 13. 12. Learned A.G.A. has disputed arguments advanced on behalf of petitioner on the basis of decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court; Ibrahim Nazeer v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, 2006 (56) ACC 227 and Ahamed Nassar v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, 2000 (40) ACC SC 53. 13. Emphasis is laid by learned A.G.A. on the observation made by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ahamed Nassar (supra) “Merely because no bail application was then pending is no premise to hold that there was no likelihood of his being released on bail.” 14. So far as next ground of challenge on extraneous circumstances and on account of pressure of corporators namely Shamshad and Mohd. Shahid is concerned, he has placed paragraph No. 5 of the impugned order wherein it is specifically stated that representations were given by Mohd. Shamshad, Member, Ward No. 74, Nagar Nigam, Meerut and Mohd. Shahid Khan, President, Ram Nagar Gola Kuwan, Vyaypar Sangh Ghandi Road, Meerut, to adopt strict measure against petitioner. 15. Contention is that the District Magistrate was led away on account of these circumstances and passed detention order mechanically. 16. We have given a careful consideration to both grounds and also arguments advanced by the counsels for respective parties. We are of the view that entire prosecution commenced on account of political pressure made by two corporators namely Mohd. Shamshad and Mohd. Shahid, who had given representations to the police authority to take action against petitioner. First information report was registered and petitioner was taken into custody. Sponsoring authority made a mention in its report regarding representations received from two corporators. The District Magistrate has also categorically mentioned two complaints. 17. On reading of the entire detention order, it is apparent that this is extraneous circumstance, which was weighing in the mind of sponsoring authority as well as detaining authority i.e. District Magistrate who passed order of detention without recording his satisfaction or even trying to make a casual inquiry. Detention order has been passed consequent to rejection of bail applications by two Courts and without even confirming whether any bail application is pending, there are any chances of petitioner to be released on bail and also that allegation levelled against petitioner in the first information report are likely to be committed if at all detenu is released on bail. 18. 18. On perusal of the detention order, it is obvious that these considerations have material bearing on the satisfaction which is to be arrived at by detaining authority before his fundamental right of liberty is cut short. 19. In the instant case, there is not an iota of satisfaction recorded by District Magistrate to substantiate material aspects which are to be taken into consideration before detention order is passed. We have examined detention order, various citations as well as affidavits brought on record. Assumption that since petitioner moved applications for bail, which were rejected, there was likelihood of his being released on bail or detenu attempting to get himself released on bail is devoid of any subjective satisfaction. Besides, we cannot overlook that detaining authority was labouring under political pressure and fulfilling their whims and passed order of detention. In our view, detention order suffers from illegality first because it is passed on account of extraneous circumstances. Therefore, being no apprehension of breach of public order in the event of his release as well as without any material to arrive at satisfaction that there is likelihood of petitioner being released on bail. 30. In view of what has been stated above, impugned detention order dated 31.8.2009 passed by District Magistrate, Meerut and order dated 10.9.2009 passed by the State Government are quashed. The instant petition is, accordingly, allowed. ————