JUDGMENT Iqbal Ahmed Ansari, J. 1. By filing this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, who is plaintiff in Title Suit No. 13 of 2004, has put to challenge the order, dated 02.07.2008, passed, in the said suit, by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Karimganj, whereby the plaintiff-petitioner's petition, filed in the said suit, seeking to allow him to adduce evidence in support of the written statement, which the petitioner, as plaintiff, had filed against the counter-claim of the defendant No. 3 in the said suit, has been rejected. MATERIAL FACTS: Before entering into the discussion of the law governing the questions, which this application, made under Article 227, has raised, it is necessary to take note, in a nutshell, of the material facts giving rise to the present application. The material facts are as under: (i) The present petitioner, as plaintiff, instituted Title Suit No. 13 of 2004 aforementioned against the respondent praying for decree for declaration of his rights and interest in the suit property created due to investments made on development, construction and renovation of the suit property and also for a declaration that the deed of partition, which the defendants have executed, is collusive, illegal, mala fide and not binding upon the plaintiff, the said deed being contrary to the agreement, dated 01.02.2002, executed between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1, and the power of attorney, dated 30.01.2002, executed by the defendant No. 1, in favour of the plaintiff, authorizing allowing him to look after Bharati Press situated on the suit land, the case of the plaintiff being, in brief, thus: (i) The plaintiff is a monthly tenant under the defendant No. 1 in respect of the suit property on a monthly rental of Rs. 2,000/-, commencing from 01.02.2002, with provisions contained in the agreement for renewal of tenancy. Before creation of tenancy, defendant No. 1 executed, on 30.01.2002, a registered power of attorney, in favour of the plaintiff, authorizing him to look after Bharati Press, situated over the suit land. Based on the power of attorney, plaintiff made substantial investments on development and renovation of the suit property. Before creation of tenancy, defendant No. 1 executed, on 30.01.2002, a registered power of attorney, in favour of the plaintiff, authorizing him to look after Bharati Press, situated over the suit land. Based on the power of attorney, plaintiff made substantial investments on development and renovation of the suit property. The defendant No. 3 made an attempt to encroach upon the suit property; hence, the plaintiff had to institute a suit, being Title Suit No. 15 of 2004, in the Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Karimganj, for declaration that he is a monthly tenant under the defendant No. 1 and also for granting permanent injunction restraining defendant No. 3 from encroaching upon the suit property and an injunction was accordingly granted restraining the defendant No. 3 from encroaching upon the suit property. The plaintiff came to learn that suppressing the terms of the said agreement of the tenancy, dated 30.01.2002, and the said power of attorney, dated 31.01.2002, the defendant No. 1, in collusion with the other defendants including the defendant No. 3, has executed, on 27.01.2004, a registered partition deed, partitioning, amongst themselves, some immovable properties including the tenanted premises ignoring the investments, which the plaintiff had made on the development and renovation of the suit property. As the financial investments made by the petitioner on the development of the suit property had created bona fide interest and right over the suit property in favour of the plaintiff and since the partition-deed had created a cloud on the right and interest, which the plaintiff had so acquired over the suit property, the plaintiff brought the present suit, namely, Title Suit No. 13 of 2004. (ii) The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 filed a joint written statement asserting that the said power of attorney was a forged document. The defendant No. 3 filed a separate written statement denying and disputing the plaintiff's claim over the suit property and describing him as a stranger to the suit property. Along with his written statement, the defendant No. 3 has also filed a counter-claim, wherein the case of the defendant No. 3 being as under: The suit property, along with some other land, was homestead land, which were owned and possessed by Basanta Kumar Dey Laskar. Along with his written statement, the defendant No. 3 has also filed a counter-claim, wherein the case of the defendant No. 3 being as under: The suit property, along with some other land, was homestead land, which were owned and possessed by Basanta Kumar Dey Laskar. The outer house, located within the said homestead, used to be utilized, being situated by the side of the road, as a printing press for carrying out business of printing work under the name and style of M/S Bharati Press. While carrying out his said business of printing press, Basanta Kumar Dey Laskar died leaving behind three sons, namely, Bikash Dey Laskar and Bidhan Dey Laskar (who are defendant Nos. 3 and 4 respectively), and another son, namely, Biman Dey Laskar, who died, on 22.10.2002, leaving behind his widow, namely, Smti. Bithi Dey (i.e., defendant No. 1) and a son, namely, Aparup Dey (i.e., defendant No. 2). As Basanta Kumar Dey Laskar's wife, Khanoprabha Dey Laskar, died on 01.09.1986, the said three sons of Basanta Kumar Dey Laskar became joint owners of the whole property including the suit property, where the said printing press was located. On the basis of the amicable arrangement made, the heirs of deceased Basanta Kumar Dey Laskar possessed and enjoyed the properties owned by Basanta Kumar Dey including the suit property. Biman Kumar Dey, son of Late Basanta Kumar Dey Laskar, used to look after the business of the said printing press; but after his demise, the business was closed and the entire outer house, where the business of printing press was being carried out, had to be put under lock and key with all the machine and materials inside the said house. As the house located on the suit land remained closed, it got dilapidated and was left deserted. The defendant No. 2, the only son of Late Biman Dey, a school teacher, at Hojai, started staying with his mother, defendant No. 1, and they occasionally visited Karimganj. As the widow of Biman Dey used to hold the keys of the outer house, the plaintiff, being a very cunning and intelligent man, managed to contact defendant No. 1 and convinced her to start the said printing press by alluring her with profits. All these developments remained unknown to the other two sons of Basanta Kumar Dey Laskar, namely, the defendant Nos. 3 and 4. All these developments remained unknown to the other two sons of Basanta Kumar Dey Laskar, namely, the defendant Nos. 3 and 4. In the year 2001, on apprehension having arisen in the mind of the defendant No. 4 that the defendant Nos. 1 and 2, having shifted to Hojai, may sell the suit property, which was the joint property as mentioned hereinbefore, they published a notice, in a news-paper, informing the public, in general, that since there was no partition of the homestead of Basanta Kumar Dey Laskar, the said property nor any part thereof can be sold until the partition. Eventually, all the defendants got together and they, on mutual agreement, partitioned the property along with the outer house by means of a registered partition deed, dated 24.01.2004. By virtue of this partition, the suit property has fallen in the share of the defendant No. 3, namely, Bikash Dey, and, thus, he has become the sole and absolute owner thereof. As the plaintiff has realized that he would be evicted from the suit property, because of the partition, whereby the defendant No. 3 has become the sole and absolute owner of the suit property, the plaintiff has filed the present suit by making false allegations and seeking reliefs, which are untenable in law. In the counter-claim, a declaration has been accordingly sought to the effect that the defendant No. 3 has title to the suit property including the suit house with consequential relief of eviction of the plaintiff with his men and materials from the suit property. (iii) Following the framing of the issues, the suit came to be fixed for hearing. However, the plaintiff took adjournments on 15.06.2005, 10.08.2005, 23.09.2005, 29.11.2005, 12.01.2006, 18.02.2006 and 23.03.2006. Lastly, the plaintiff, on 30.05.2006, sought for adjournment of hearing of the suit. As the learned trial Court rejected, on 30.05.2006, the petition filed by the plaintiff for adjournment, the plaintiff filed yet another petition seeking to get re-called the order, dated 30.05.2006, aforementioned. By order, dated 30.11.2006, the learned trial Court rejected the application, so made by the plaintiff seeking to get recalled the order, dated 30.05.2006. As the learned trial Court rejected, on 30.05.2006, the petition filed by the plaintiff for adjournment, the plaintiff filed yet another petition seeking to get re-called the order, dated 30.05.2006, aforementioned. By order, dated 30.11.2006, the learned trial Court rejected the application, so made by the plaintiff seeking to get recalled the order, dated 30.05.2006. Aggrieved by the fact that the learned trial Court had rejected his prayer for adjournment of hearing and for allowing him time to adduce evidence, the plaintiff came to this Court and impugned the order, dated 30.11.2006 aforementioned, by filing an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. By judgment and order, dated 28.02.2007, passed in CRP No. 53/2007, the Court rejected the application made under Article 227 by taking the view that though under Order XVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, not more than three adjournments can be granted, the plaintiff has obtained several adjournments and in the fact situation of the case, the plaintiff was not entitled to any further adjournment The revision accordingly Med and was dismissed. (iv) Thereafter, the evidence, adduced by the defendants, was recorded, whereupon the plaintiff filed a petition stating to the effect, inter alia, that in the counterclaim of the defendant No. 3, the plaintiff had filed his written statement and the plaintiff needs to adduce evidence, in support of his written statement, for proper disposal of the counter-claim and he may, therefore, be allowed to adduce evidence in support of his written statement filed in the counter-claim. The learned trial Court has rejected the said petition, on 02.07.2008, on the ground that since the evidence of both the sides already stood closed and, on being aggrieved that he had not been allowed adjournment to adduce his evidence, the plaintiff had already filed a revision before this Court and the same had been rejected, there was no further scope for the plaintiff to adduce evidence and if the plaintiff were to be allowed to adduce evidence, the defendants would be prejudiced. Aggrieved by the order, dated 02.07.2008, aforementioned, the present revision has been filed. 2. In the backdrop of the facts set out above, this revision needs to be, now, considered. 3. I have heard Mr. N Choudhury, learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner, and Mr. AS Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the defendant-respondent No. 3. SUBMISSIONS: 4. Aggrieved by the order, dated 02.07.2008, aforementioned, the present revision has been filed. 2. In the backdrop of the facts set out above, this revision needs to be, now, considered. 3. I have heard Mr. N Choudhury, learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner, and Mr. AS Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the defendant-respondent No. 3. SUBMISSIONS: 4. Appearing on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. N. Choudhury, learned counsel, has submitted that though Order VIII Rule 6A(2) lays down that a counter-claim shall have the same effect as a cross-suit so as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit both on the original claim and the counter-claim, the fact remains that Rule 6E empowers the Court to pronounce judgment if the plaintiff defaults in filing a written statement in the counter-claim. This apart, points out Mr. N. Choudhury, learned counsel, Order VIII Rule 6D permits the Court to proceed with the counter-claim even if the suit, wherein the counter-claim has been filed, is stayed, discontinued or dismissed. The provisions, so contained in Rule 6D and E, according to Mr. Choudhury, necessitates the registration of the counter-claim as a cross-suit enabling thereby the Court to frame issues, in the suit and the counter-claim, separately and record evidence in the two, namely, the suit and the counter-claim separately so that two independent judgments, one in the suit and the other in the counter-claim, may, if necessary, be passed. 5. Mr. Choudhury further points out that if the counter-claim is not registered separately, it would be become impossible to give decree in the counter-claim, when the suit, wherein the counter-claim is filed, gets dismissed or discontinued. Necessarily, therefore, according to Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel, there would be two sets of evidence, one in the suit and the other in the counter-claim. 6. Mr. Choudhury contends that in the case at hand, the High Court had upheld the learned trial Court's order refusing to grant of adjournment for hearing of the suit, when the plaintiff had applied for adjournment. The said adjournment was sought for, contends Mr. 6. Mr. Choudhury contends that in the case at hand, the High Court had upheld the learned trial Court's order refusing to grant of adjournment for hearing of the suit, when the plaintiff had applied for adjournment. The said adjournment was sought for, contends Mr. Choudhury, to give evidence in the suit, where the burden of proof rested on the plaintiff, but in the counter-claim, the burden to prove the case, which the defendants have set up, is on the defendants and, in such a case, when the plaintiff had filed his written statement in the counter-claim, he was entitled to give evidence in support of his claim even if the defendants chose not to give any evidence. The learned trial Court has, however, submits Mr. Choudhury, rejected the petitioner's prayer for allowing him to adduce evidence in support of his written statement filed in the counter-claim on the ground that the plaintiff's earlier prayer for adjournment of the hearing of the suit has already been rejected. It has escaped the attention of the learned trial Court, submits Mr. N. Choudhury, learned counsel, that the earlier application for adjournment was in respect of the plaintiff's burden to adduce evidence in support of the issues framed in the suit and not in the counterclaim, whereas the later petition was filed, in the counter-claim, for opportunity to adduce evidence in support of the plaintiff's written statement. Hence, the plaintiff, according to Mr. Choudhury, has the right to adduce evidence in support of his written statement filed in the counter-claim, and the impugned order disallowing the prayer, so made by the plaintiff, is contrary to law contained in that behalf. 7. Resisting the revision, Mr. AS Choudhury, learned Senior counsel, has submitted that irrespective of fact as to whether a counter-claim shall or shall not be registered as a cross-suit, the fact remains that the plaintiff's earlier application for adjournment of hearing of the suit was rejected by the learned trial Court and upheld by this Court and, hence, the plaintiff cannot be given any further opportunity to adduce evidence in the garb of a plea that the plaintiff wants to adduce evidence in support of the written statement filed in the counter-claim. According to Mr. According to Mr. AS Choudhury, learned Senior counsel, even in a suit, where the counter-claim is filed, the opportunity to give evidence would be given to the plaintiff only once, because the burden lies on the plaintiff to prove his case in order to get a decree in the suit and he also has the liability to get the counter-claim dismissed. A plaintiff cannot receive, contends Mr. AS Choudhury, opportunity to give evidence twice, once in the suit and, then, once again, in the counter-claim. Such an approach, according to Mr. Choudhury, would defeat the whole scheme of pronouncement of a final judgment as perceived by Order VIII Rule 6A(2). Mr. AS Choudhury, therefore, submits that this revision is wholly without merit and may be dismissed with cost. 8. While considering the present application made under Article 227, it may be noted that in Amton Vs. Bobbett, reported in (1889) 22 QBD 543, it was observed: A counter-claim is, therefore, to be treated, for all purpose for which justice requires it to be so treated, as an independent action. 9. Is, therefore, a counter claim an independent action? 10. The question, posed above, brings us to the historical background of counter-claim. In order to clearly understand the development of the legal remedy of counter-claim, one has to take note the origin of the term 'cross suit' or 'cross action'. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF 'CROSS-SUIT' AND 'COUNTERCLAIM' 11. The origin of the terms 'cross suit' or 'cross action' may be traced to the terms 'suit' and 'action'. The right or remedy of set off was unknown in common law, for, according to common law, mutual debts were distinct and inextinguishable, except by actual payment, release, or agreement. A defendant, who had a demand against a plaintiff, was, therefore, compelled to resort either to his cross action or a bill in chancery except in a few limited cases, wherein very restricted right of recoupment was available. 12. A defendant, who had a demand against a plaintiff, was, therefore, compelled to resort either to his cross action or a bill in chancery except in a few limited cases, wherein very restricted right of recoupment was available. 12. Since the common law did not permit set off to be raised by the defendant in the action brought by the plaintiff, the defendant had to bring an independent action known as 'cross action' in order to set off the claim of the plaintiff, but such 'cross action' did not give the benefit of withholding of the payment of the plaintiff's claim if the plaintiff's suit was decided prior to the cross action brought by the defendant. The consequences of a money decree were severe as the defendant could be sent to debtor's prison. 13. The above deficiency of the common law, with regard to monetary claim, led to the enactment of statutory provisions making available to the defendant the remedy of set-off, which was designed by allowing set off in actions at law to supersede or obviate the necessity of a resort to bills in equity for that purpose. The legal defense of set off was, thus, introduced to prevent the unfair situation, whereby a person ("Party A") who owed money to another ("Party B") could be sent to debtors prison despite the fact that Party A also owed money to Party B. By allowing set off to be pleaded along with written statements, the law allowed both parties to defer payment until their respective claims have been heard in court. Upon judgment, both claims are extinguished and replaced by a single net sum (e.g. If Party A owes Party B Rs. 100/- and Party B owes Party A Rs. 105/-, the two sums are set off and replaced by a single obligation of Rs. 5/- to be payable by Party B to Party A). At times, 'cross actions' came to be referred to as 'cross suits', because the terms, suit and action, became, in course of time, interchangeable terms, as may be noticed from the judicial pronouncement noted below. 14. 'Action' and 'suit' are often synonymous, (See Hall Vs. Bartlett, N. Y., 9 Barb. 297, 300, citing Weston Vs. City of Charleston, 27 U. S. 449, 464, 2 Pet 449, 464, 7 L. Ed. 481; Miller Vs. Rapp, 34 N. E. 125, 126, 7 Ind. App. 89). 14. 'Action' and 'suit' are often synonymous, (See Hall Vs. Bartlett, N. Y., 9 Barb. 297, 300, citing Weston Vs. City of Charleston, 27 U. S. 449, 464, 2 Pet 449, 464, 7 L. Ed. 481; Miller Vs. Rapp, 34 N. E. 125, 126, 7 Ind. App. 89). The word 'suit', in legal nomenclature, is generic and applies to any proceeding in a court of justice in which a plaintiff pursues a remedy, whether at law or in equity, being broader than the word 'action', which is applied exclusively to matters at law. (See Syracuse Plaster Co. Vs. Agostini Bros, Building Corporation, Sup., 7 N. Y. S. 2d. 897, 900). Though the legislation abolished the common law distinctions between suits and actions and did away with the name suits, a 'suit' now is either an action or a proceeding in the nature of an action in court (See Milwaukee Light, Heat and Traction Co., 125 N. W. 903, 905, 142, Wis, 424, 27 L.R.A., N. S., 567, 20 Ann. Cas. 707). The words 'suit' and 'action' are, sometimes, used synonymously. (See Throp Vs. Rutherford, 43 P.2d 907, 910, 150 Or. 157). The words 'action' and 'suit', as used in statutes of limitation, are generally synonymous (See Whitfield Vs. Burrell, 118 S. W. 153, 156, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 567; Jettison Vs. Swan, 74 A. 920, 922, 105 Mc. 356). In legal sense, 'action', 'suit', and "cause," are convertible terms. (See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 4 Wall, 21s L. Ed. 281). Tillamook County Vs. Wilson River Road Co., 89 P. 958, 959, 49 Or. 309, citing Bonv. Law Diet; And, Law Dict.: Messenger Vs. Board of Com'rs of Converse County, 117P. 126, 130, 19 Wyo, 309. 15. Thus, the term 'cross suit' or 'cross action' has essentially a bearing on the term set off. What is, now, necessary to note is that counter-claims evolved as a concept, because counter-claims, with respect to property rights, were not contemplated in the days of origin of the concept of 'set off'. Even today, the concept of set off applies to money claims, though a counter-claim can be not only for a money claim, but it can be for other corporeal or incorporeal rights as well. Since the origin of counter-claim lies in the concept of set off, counter-claim too came to be treated at par with 'cross suit' or 'cross action'. 16. Since the origin of counter-claim lies in the concept of set off, counter-claim too came to be treated at par with 'cross suit' or 'cross action'. 16. What may, now, be noted is that the provisions for counter-claim did not exist in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which, for the first time, re-arranged the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, into two parts, namely, the body of the Code and the Schedule. In the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in order to meet the needs of incorporating a claim for set off by the defendant in a suit for recovery of money, the part, which contained the Schedule, made provisions for set-off in the form of Order VIII Rule 6, which exists even today. 17. As the provisions of set off, which Order VIII Rule 6 embodies, would have an important bearing on the understanding of the law of counter-claim, Order VIII Rule 6 is reproduced below: 6. Particulars of set-off to be given in written statement: (1) Where in a suit for the recovery of money the defendant claims to set-off against the plaintiff's demand any ascertained sum of money legally recoverable by him from the plaintiff, not exceeding the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, and both parties fill the same character as they fill in the plaintiff's suit, the defendant may, at the first hearing of the suit, but not afterwards unless permitted by the Court, present a written statement containing the particulars of the debt sought to be setoff. (2) The written statement shall have the same effect as a plaint in a cross-suit so as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in respect both of the original claim and of the set-off; but this shall not affect the lien, upon the amount decreed, of any pleader in respect of the costs payable to him under the decree. (3) The rules relating to a written statement by a defendant apply to a written statement in answer to a claim of set-off. 18. (3) The rules relating to a written statement by a defendant apply to a written statement in answer to a claim of set-off. 18. A careful analysis of what Order VIII Rule 6 embodies would show that when, in a suit for recovery of money, instituted against him, the defendant too has his own claim for recovery of money against the plaintiff, the defendant may, in such a suit for recovery of money, instituted against him, make his claim to set-off by ascertaining such amount as may be legally recoverable by him from the plaintiff. 19. Thus, instead of relegating the defendant to the position of a plaintiff by making him institute a separate suit for recovery of claim of money, which he may have against the plaintiff, the law provided, in the form of set-off, adjudication of the claim and counterclaim between the parties with regard to, of course, the monetary claims, the limitation being that the claim of the defendant must not exceed the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, where the suit against him has been filed. Yet another limitation, imposed on the right of the defendant to claim set-off, is that the defendant must raise his claim for set-off by filing written statement containing the particulars of the debt sought to be set off and that the claim of set-off must be made at the first hearing of the suit and not afterwards unless permitted by the Court. 20. What is, however, of great significance to note is that under Order VIII Rule 6(2), the defendant's written statement seeking set-off shall have the same effect as a plaint in a cross-suit so as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in respect of both, the original claim and the set-off. Thus, in a suit for recovery of money, where the plaintiff claims set-off, his claim for set-off must be made in the written statement, which shall have the effect of plaint in a cross-suit; but it is not an independent suit and would not, therefore, require the Court to pronounce two judgments; rather, there would be one final judgment in respect of both, the original claim and also the claim of set-off. Illustration (d) to Order VIII Rule 6 clarifies the position by laying down thus: A sues B on a bill of exchange for Rs. 500. Illustration (d) to Order VIII Rule 6 clarifies the position by laying down thus: A sues B on a bill of exchange for Rs. 500. B holds a judgment against A for Rs. 1,000. The two claims being both definite, pecuniary demands may be set-off. 21. Notwithstanding the fact that the counter-claim, in the form of set-off, was possible only in a suit for recovery of money, it appears that, as a matter of practice, under the provisions of set-off, counter-claims used to be raised by the defendants. An indication, in this regard, is discernible from the case of Laxmi Das Dayabhai Kabrawala Vs. Nanabhai Chunilal Kabarwala: AIR 1964 SC 11 , wherein the plaintiff instituted a suit for enforcement of an agreement, which had been entered into between him and his partner as regards division of assets of the partnership business on its dissolution. The plaintiff's partner having been died, his legal representatives were brought on record of the suit The defendants, who were so impleaded, while filing written statement, also filed a counter-claim for rendition of accounts, etc. The claim, so made, was treated to be a counter-claim. In fact, in course of time, the plaintiff filed his written statement in the said counter-claim. It was, eventually, decided by the Supreme Court that the plaintiff's suit being, in effect, for specific performance of the contract, no counter-claim could have been made inasmuch as a counter-claim would lie only in a suit for recovery of money. This was, thus, the position of law before provisions for counter-claim were made in the Code in respect of suits other than suits for recovery of money. 22. What is, however, extremely important to note is that in Laxmi Das Dayabhai Kabrawala (supra), having held that the counter-claim was not maintainable except in a suit for recovery of money, the Supreme Court concluded that if the contents of a counter-claim satisfy the requirements of a plaint, there is no bar, in the Code, in treating the counter-claim as a plaint and registering the same as a 'cross suit'. This decision clarifies that even when a counter-claim is filed in a suit other than a suit for recovery of money, the counter-claim can still be treated by the Court as a plaint, in a 'counter suit', if the counter-claim, so made by the defendant, satisfies the requirements of a 'plaint'. This decision clarifies that even when a counter-claim is filed in a suit other than a suit for recovery of money, the counter-claim can still be treated by the Court as a plaint, in a 'counter suit', if the counter-claim, so made by the defendant, satisfies the requirements of a 'plaint'. The relevant observations made, in this regard, which appear at para 13, read: 13. The question has, therefore, to be considered on principle as towhether there is anything in law - statutory or otherwise - which precludes a court from treating a counter-claim as a plaint in a 'cross suit'. We are unable to see any. No doubt the Civil Procedure Code prescribes the contents of a plaint and it might very well be that a counter-claim which is to be treated as a cross-suit might not conform to all these requirements but this by itself is not sufficient to deny to the Court the power and the jurisdiction to read and construe the pleadings in a reasonable manner. If, for instance, what is really a plaint in a cross-suit is made part of a Written Statement either by being made an annexure to it or as part and parcel thereof, though described as a counter-claim, there could be no legal objection to the Court treating the same as a plaint and granting such relief to the defendant as would have been open if the pleading had taken the form of a plaint. Mr. Desai had to concede that in such a case the Court was not prevented from separating the Written Statement proper from what was described as a counter-claim and treating the latter as a cross-suit. If so much is conceded it would then become merely a matter of degree as to whether the counter-claim contains all the necessary requisites sufficient to be treated as a plaint making a claim for the relief sought and if it did it would seem proper to hold that it would be open to a Court to covert or treat the counterclaim as a plaint in a 'cross suit'. To hold otherwise would be to erect what in substance is a mere defect in the form of pleading into an instrument for denying what justice manifestly demands. We need only add that it was not suggested that there was anything in O. VIII. To hold otherwise would be to erect what in substance is a mere defect in the form of pleading into an instrument for denying what justice manifestly demands. We need only add that it was not suggested that there was anything in O. VIII. r. 6 or in any other provision of the Code which laid an embargo on a Court adopting such a course. (Emphasis is added) 23. Since a plea of counter-claim or set-off could have been set up, as already indicated above, in a suit for monetary claim only, the Law Commission of India, in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings recommended, on 31.12.1964, in its Twenty Seventh Report, that the defendants should be allowed to raise, in addition to the plea of set off, a counter-claim in the same suit irrespective of the fact as to whether the 'cause of action' for the counter-claim or set off had accrued to the defendant before or after filing of the suit. 24. The above recommendations of the Law Commission, having been accepted, except for some cosmetic changes, Rule 6A to Rule 6G have been added to Order VIA introducing thereby, with effect from 01.02.1977, provisions for making of counter-claim in suits, which may not be for recovery of money, the limitation, however, being that the cause of action for the counterclaim must accrue before the defendant has filed his written statement or before the time limit for delivery of the written statement has expired irrespective of the fact as to whether such counter-claim is in the nature of claim for damages or not Further limitation is that the counter-claim shall not exceed the pecuniary limit of the jurisdiction of the Court, where the suit is instituted. In other words, the Court, where the suit is instituted, cannot be divested of its power to try the suit, which it had already entertained. This position can be gathered from what sub-rule (1) of Rule 6A Order VIII embodies inasmuch as Order VIII Rule 6A(1) states: 6A. In other words, the Court, where the suit is instituted, cannot be divested of its power to try the suit, which it had already entertained. This position can be gathered from what sub-rule (1) of Rule 6A Order VIII embodies inasmuch as Order VIII Rule 6A(1) states: 6A. Counter-claim by defendant.- (1) A defendant in a suit, in addition to his right of pleading a set-off under rule 6, may set up, by way of counter-claim against the claim of the plaintiff, any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the defendant either before or after the tiling of the suit but before the defendant has delivered his defence and before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired, whether such counterclaim sounds in damages or not. Provided that such counter-claim shall not exceed the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the Court. 25. While considering the scope of Rule 6A of Order VIII, it also needs to be borne in mind that the expression, "before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limit for delivering his defence has expired", which appears in Rule 6A, necessarily implies that the 'cause of action' for the counter-claim must arise before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time for delivering of his defence, by way of written statement, has expired. This, in turn, means that the defendant's 'cause of action' for a counter-claim may be different from, or independent of, the 'cause of action' of the plaintiff's suit (see Mahendra Kumar Vs. State of M.P., reported in (1987) 3 SCC 265 , Shanti Rani Das Dewanjee Vs. Dinesh Chandra Dey, reported in (1997) 8 SCC 174 and Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya Vs. Anil Panjwani (AIR 2003 SC 2508). 26. Quite naturally, therefore, in a suit for injunction, the defendant can set up a counter-claim for possession. In fact, the Supreme Court has, in no uncertain words, held, in Gurbachan Singh Vs. Bhag Singh, ( AIR 1996 SC 1087 ), that in the light of the provisions of Order VIII Rule 6A, a counter-claim for possession, in a suit for injunction, can also be entertained. In fact, the Supreme Court has, in no uncertain words, held, in Gurbachan Singh Vs. Bhag Singh, ( AIR 1996 SC 1087 ), that in the light of the provisions of Order VIII Rule 6A, a counter-claim for possession, in a suit for injunction, can also be entertained. This apart, and as already indicated above, 'cause of action' for a counterclaim may arise after the plaintiff's suit already stands instituted or 'cause of action' for a counter-claim might have arisen before the plaintiff's suit came to be instituted; what is, of course, required is that the 'cause of action' for the counter-claim must arise before the written statement is filed or before the date for filing of the written statement expires. 27. While considering the above aspect of the matter, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court in Jagmohan Chawla Vs. Dera Radha Swami Satsang ( AIR 1996 SC 2222 ), observed thus: In sub-rule (1) of Rule 6A, the language is so couched with words of wide width as to enable the parties to bring his own independent cause of action in respect of any claim that would be the subject matter of an independent suit. Thereby, it is no longer confined to money claim or to cause of action of the same nature as original action of the plaintiff. It need not relate to, or be connected with, the original cause of action or matter pleaded by the plaintiff. The words "any right of claim In respect of a cause of action accruing with the defendant" would show that the cause of action from which the counter-claim arises need not necessarily arise from, or have any nexus with, the cause of action of the plaintiff that occasioned to lay the suit. The only limitation is that the cause of action should arise before the time fixed for filing the written statement expires. The defendant may set up a cause of action, which has accrued to him even after the institution of the suit The counter-claim expressly is treated as a 'cross suit' with all the indicia of pleadings as a plaint including the duty to aver his cause of action and also payment of the requisite Court fee thereon. The defendant may set up a cause of action, which has accrued to him even after the institution of the suit The counter-claim expressly is treated as a 'cross suit' with all the indicia of pleadings as a plaint including the duty to aver his cause of action and also payment of the requisite Court fee thereon. Instead of relegating the defendant to an independent suit, to avert multiplicity of the proceeding and needless protraction, the legislature intended to try both the suit and the counter-claim in the same suit as suit and 'cross suit' and have them disposed of in the same trial. In other words, a defendant can claim any right by way of counter-claim in respect of any cause of action that has accrued to him even though it is independent of the cause of action averred by the plaintiff and have the same cause of action adjudicated without relegating the defendant to file a separate suit. (Emphasis is supplied). 28. In the light of the law laid down in Gurbachan Singh (supra) and Jagmohan Chawla (supra) and also the discussion held above, it no longer remains res integra that the 'cause of action' for a counter-claim may have arisen before a suit is instituted (wherein the defendant seeks to file his written statement) and the 'cause of action' for a counterclaim may arise after the suit has been instituted. In either case, making of a counterclaim is possible. The limitation, however, is that the 'cause of action' must arise before the written statement is filed. A defendant can claim any right by way of counter-claim in respect of any 'cause of action' that has accrued to him even though it is independent of the 'cause of action' averred by the plaintiff and have such 'cause of action' adjudicated without relegating the defendant to file a separate suit provided that the counter-claim does not exceed the pecuniary limit of the Court, where the suit has been instituted. 29. Bearing in mind the fact that a counterclaim dispenses with the requirement of filing an independent suit by the defendant, let me, now, turn to Sub-Rule(2) of Rule 6A of Order VIII, which not only gives the effect of a counter-claim, but also the object with which the provisions for counter-claim have been embodied in the scheme of the Code. Order VIII Sub-Rule(2) of Rule 6A reads: 6A. Order VIII Sub-Rule(2) of Rule 6A reads: 6A. Counter-claim by defendant: (1) **** (2) Such counter-claim shall have the same effect as a cross-suit, so as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit, both on the original claim and on the counterclaim. 30. A bore reading of what Rule 6A(2) shows that counter-claim shall have the effect of a cross-suit so as to enable the Court to pronounce 'a final judgment' in the same suit, both on the original claim as well as on the counter-claim. 31. It is pertinent to note that the 'effect' of a counter-claim and the 'object' of incorporating the provisions of counter-claim, under the scheme of the Code, cannot be clearly appreciated without a reference to, and without taking notice of, Sub-Rule (4) of Rule 6A of Order VIII. With this end in view, Order VIII Rule 6A(4) is reproduced below: 6A. Counter-claim by defendant: (1) **** (2) **** (3) **** (4) The counter-claim shall be treated as a plaint and governed by the rules applicable to plaints. 32. A combined reading of Order VIII Rule 6A (2) and 6A(4) shows that a counterclaim shall be treated as a plaint and shall be governed by the rules applicable to plaint and it shall have the effect of a cross-suit so as to enable the Court to pronounce 'a final judgment' in the same suit, both on the original claim and on the counter-claim, meaning thereby that the final judgment is given in one and the same suit. 33. Thus, Order VIII Rule 6A, having laid down that the 'counter claim' shall be treated as a 'plaint' and shall have the effect of a 'cross-suit', further provides that there would be 'a final judgment' in one and the same suit, both on the original claim (i.e., on the claim, which is made in the 'plaint' of the suit) as well as on the 'counter claim' of the defendant filing the suit. On the ground, therefore, that a 'counter claim' shall be treated as a 'plaint', if one registers the 'counterclaim' as a Suit, even then, there has to be 'one final judgment' in the sense that the judgment would be pronounced in one and the same suit, both on the original claim as well as on the counter claim. 34. On the ground, therefore, that a 'counter claim' shall be treated as a 'plaint', if one registers the 'counterclaim' as a Suit, even then, there has to be 'one final judgment' in the sense that the judgment would be pronounced in one and the same suit, both on the original claim as well as on the counter claim. 34. I may pause here to point out that the option of preferring a counter-claim along with the written statement is of the defendant. He may choose to institute an independent suit on his 'cause of action' or he may set up a counter-claim. Assuming, the defendant, in a suit, chooses not to prefer a counter-claim, but files an independent suit, it is not necessary for the Court to try both the suits as claim and counter-claim in one and the same suit. Nevertheless, the Court has the power to try such a suit jointly if all the issues or some of the issues are common and the evidence, to be let in both the suits, is entirely or substantially same so as to expedite disposal of the suits and also to ensure that two judgments, emanating from two different suits, do not result into inconsistent decrees or decrees, which are so conflicting with each other that they mutually destroy each other. Notwithstanding, therefore, the fact that a defendant may not set up a counter-claim and prefer to institute an independent suit, the Court has, in order to avoid possibility of conflicting judgments in the two suits, the power to hold a joint trial in both the suits. The purpose of joint trial is that there should be no conflict of decisions. In this regard, a reference may be made to the case of State Bank of India Vs. Ranjan Chemicals Ltd. & Anr., reported in (2007) 1 SCC 97 , wherein, at para 10 and 11, the Supreme Court has observed thus: 10. A joint trial can be ordered by the court if it appears to it that some common question of law or fact arises in both proceedings or that the right to relief claimed in them are in respect of or arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions or that for some other reason it is desirable to make an order for joint trial. Where the plaintiff in one action is the same person as the defendant in another action, if one action can be ordered to stand as a counter claim in the consolidated action, a joint trial can be ordered. An order for joint trial is considered to be useful in that, it will save the expenses of two attendance by counsel and witnesses and the trial judge will be enabled to try the two actions at the same time and take common evidence in respect of both the claims. If therefore the claim made by the Company can be tried as a counter claim by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, the Court can order joint trial on the basis of the above considerations. It does not appear to be necessary that all the questions or issues that arise should be common to both actions before a joint trial can be ordered. It will be sufficient if some of the issues are common and some of the evidence to be let in is also common, especially when the two actions arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions. 11. A Joint trial is ordered when a Court finds that the ordering of such a trial, would avoid separate overlapping evidence being taken in the two causes put in suit and it will be more convenient to try them together in the interests of the parties and in the interests of an effective trial of the causes. This power inheres in the Court as an inherent power. It is not possible to accept the argument that every time the Court transfers a suit to another court or orders a joint trial, it has to have the consent of the parties. A Court has the power in an appropriate case to transfer a suit for being tried with another if the circumstances warranted and justified it. In the light of our conclusion that the claim of the company in the suit could be considered to be a claim for set off and a counter claim within the meaning of Section 19 of the Act, the only question is whether in the interests of justice, convenience of parties and avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings, the suit should be transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal for being tried jointly with the application filed by the bank as a 'cross suit'. Obviously, the proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal could not be transferred to the civil Court since that is a proceeding before a Tribunal specially constituted by the Act and the same has to be tried only in the manner provided by that Act and by the Tribunal created by that Act. Therefore, the only other alternative would be to transfer the suit to the Tribunal in case that is found warranted or justified. (Emphasis is supplied) 35. From the observations, made in Ranjan Chemicals (supra), what can be gathered is that where the plaintiff, in one suit, is the same person as the defendant in another suit and some of the issues, in both the suits, are common, such a suit, which really stand on the footing of a 'cross suit', may be tried jointly. When two suits arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions, some of the issues being common and some of the evidence to be let in being also common, a joint trial is necessary so as to avoid overlapping of evidence. The power to order, in such circumstances, a joint trial inheres in the Court as its inherent power, for, such a course is not only in the interest of the parties, but also in the interest of an effective trial of the causes. However, as held in the case of Jagmohan Chawla (supra), a 'counter claim' enables the defendant to prosecute his 'cause of action' in the suit, instituted against him, instead of being relegated to the position of a plaintiff by compelling him to institute an independent suit as plaintiff. Thus, counter-claim, today, is a matter of convenience inasmuch as a 'cross suit' is an independent suit, whereas a counter-claim is not an independent suit, but its effect is that of a 'cross suit' meaning thereby that if the defendant instituted a suit on the 'cause of action' for which he can raise a counter-claim, the relief, which can possibly be granted to him in the counter-claim, would not be better than, or different from, the one, which he would receive by instituting an independent suit instead of making a counterclaim. 36. A counter-claim, on corporeal or even incorporeal rights, is purely a statutory remedy of modern origin; it was not known to the common law. 36. A counter-claim, on corporeal or even incorporeal rights, is purely a statutory remedy of modern origin; it was not known to the common law. A 'cross suit' is a suit, which is instituted by one or some of the defendants of another suit, and such a cross-suit arises out of the same transaction or a series of transactions on which rests the plaintiff's suit. 37. In a cross-suit, thus, the plaintiff, in one action, is the defendant in another action. In the case of a cross-suit, there can be a joint trial, because many a times, common questions of fact and law may arise in both the suits. If a Court finds that it is more convenient to try the two suits together in the interest of the parties and in the interest of an effective trial of the cause, the Court has, as held in Ranjan Chemical (supra), the inherent power to direct a joint trial of such a suit avoiding thereby overlapping of evidence. Unless, however, a joint trial is ordered, in a cross-suit, the issues have to be separately framed and the evidence have to be separately recorded leading to two different judgments same as in the case of cross cases under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 38. As against the above concept of 'cross suit', where two independent suits may be tried together, a counter-claim arises at the instance of the defendant, when he files a counterclaim in the existing suit of the plaintiff. The counter-claim is, therefore, not an independent suit, while a 'cross suit' is, and always remains, an independent suit, though a 'cross suit' should be tried, ordinarily jointly with the suit of which the defendant's suit is a 'cross suit'. 39. Thus, for the purpose of the present case, it is sufficient to bear in mind, as we proceed further, that a counter-claim can be wholly independent of, or unconnected with, the 'cause of action' of the suit, where the counter-claim is made. 40. A claim means the assertion of aright to sue. In the law, a cause of action (sometimes, called a claim) is a set of facts sufficient to justify a right to sue to obtain money or property or the enforcement of a right against another party. 40. A claim means the assertion of aright to sue. In the law, a cause of action (sometimes, called a claim) is a set of facts sufficient to justify a right to sue to obtain money or property or the enforcement of a right against another party. To pursue a cause of action, a plaintiff pleads or alleges facts, in a plaint, leading to the institution of a suit. A 'cause of action', generally, encompasses both the legal theory (i.e., the legal wrong, which the plaintiff claims to have suffered) and the remedy (i.e., the relief, a court is asked to grant). Thus, a counter-claim must satisfy the requirement of a cause of action against the plaintiff so as to entitle the defendant to claim a definite relief against the plaintiff. The word counter is attached to the word 'claim', because the 'claim' of the defendant strikes at the 'claim' of the plaintiff and by such a 'claim', the defendant not only seeks to defeat the plaintiff's 'claim', but also prays for a relief against the plaintiff. 41. As observed above, a careful analysis of the provisions, embodied in Order VIII Rule 6A(2), reveals that the provisions for counter-claim have been made so as to enable the Court to pronounce one 'final judgment' in the same suit, both on the original claim and also on the counter-claim meaning thereby that the provisions for counter-claim, as already indicated above, have been made in order to dispense with the requirement of the defendant instituting an independent suit, which would require trial and delivery of two independent judgments in two suits, one instituted against the defendant, and the other, instituted by the defendant. Consequently, with the filing of a counter-claim, possibility of conflict of two mutually destructive decrees is wholly avoided. No wonder, therefore, that Order VIII Rule 6A(2) makes, in no uncertain words, the legislative intent explicit and transparent by laying down that counter-claim enables the Court to pronounce one 'final judgment' in the same suit, both on the original claim and also on the counter-claim. A reference, in this regard, may be made to the case of Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya Vs. A reference, in this regard, may be made to the case of Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya Vs. Anil Panjwani (AIR 2003 SC 2508), wherein the Supreme Court has observed as follows: The purpose of the provision enabling filing of a counter-claim is to avoid multiplicity of judicial proceedings and save upon the Court's time as also to exclude the inconvenience to the parties by enabling claims and counterclaims, that is, all disputes between the same parties being decided in the course of the same proceedings. 42. Bearing in mind the object of 'counter claims', as reflected by Order VIII Rule 6A(2), let me, now, turn to Order VIII Rule 6C, which is also of great importance. Order VIII Rule 6C reads, "Where a defendant sets up a counter-claim and the plaintiff contends that the claim thereby raised ought not to be disposed of by way of counter-claim but in an independent suit, the plaintiff, at any time before issues are settled in relation to the counter-claim, apply to the Court for an order that such counter-claim may be excluded, and the Court may, on the hearing of such application make such order as it thinks fit." 43. A close reading of Order VIII Rule 5C shows that Rule 6C lays down that when a defendant sets up a counter-claim and the plaintiff contends that the claim, so raised, ought not to be disposed of by way of counter-claim, but by way of an independent suit, the plaintiff may, at any time, but before the issues are settled in relation to the counterclaim, apply to the Court for an order that such counter-claim may be excluded and, upon hearing such an application, the Court may direct that the counter-claim be registered as 'independent suit'. 44. Thus, the above provisions, embodied in Order VIII Rule 6C indicate that when a counter-claim is made in a suit, the Court, in a given case, does have the power to direct that the counter-claim be tried as an 'independent suit' if the plaintiff applies to the Court for an order in this regard. Rule 6C, thus, proves beyond doubt that in a given case, a counter-claim can be registered as an independent suit. Rule 6C, thus, proves beyond doubt that in a given case, a counter-claim can be registered as an independent suit. As a corollary, it also follows that until, otherwise, directed to be registered as an 'independent suit', a counterclaim will remain as a counter-claim and the same cannot be treated as an independent suit 45. What logically follows from the above discussion is that until the time a 'counter claim' is registered as an independent suit, a 'counter claim' cannot be treated as an independent suit. Necessarily, therefore, unless a 'counter claim' is registered as an independent suit, there has to be, in the light of the provisions of Order VIII Rule 6, one 'final judgment' in the suit, both on the original claim of the plaintiff and on the 'counter- claim' of the defendant. 46. What is, now, important to note is that Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 6A of Order VIII vests in the plaintiff the right to file written statement against the counter-claim. No wonder, therefore, that sub-Rule (4) of Rule 6A provides that a counter-claim shall be treated as a plaint and governed by the rules applicable to the plaint Mr. N. Choudhury is, therefore, correct, when he contends that the concept emanating from these provisions give to a counter-claim the status of a cross-suit. What is, however, necessary to reiterate is that though a counter-claim has the effect of a cross-suit, it is not, or never, a cross-suit. 47. Order VIII Rule 6E echoes, as correctly points out Mr. N. Choudhury, the application of the concept of Order VIII Rule 10 inasmuch as it empowers the Court to pronounce judgment, in a counter-claim, if the plaintiff defaults in filing written statement against the counter-claim. 48. Thus, in a given case, if a plaintiff does not file written statement against the counterclaim, the Court is empowered to pronounce judgment on the counter-claim, while the suit of the plaintiff may continue to be tried 'on contest'. When, however, a judgment is passed, in a counter-claim, on the failure of the plaintiff to file written statement against the counter-claim, the question of adducing evidence, in the counter-claim, would not arise, while the suit would continue to survive until, otherwise, concluded in accordance with law. 49. When, however, a judgment is passed, in a counter-claim, on the failure of the plaintiff to file written statement against the counter-claim, the question of adducing evidence, in the counter-claim, would not arise, while the suit would continue to survive until, otherwise, concluded in accordance with law. 49. Turning to Order VIII Rule 6D, one may note that Rule 6D provides, "If in any case in which the defendant sets up a counterclaim, the suit of the plaintiff is stayed, discontinued or dismissed, the counter-claim may nevertheless be proceeded with." The provisions, so embodied in Rule 6 D, give clear indication of the fact that it is possible for a counter-claim to be proceeded with, while the suit, wherein counter-claim was may have been stayed, discontinued or even dismissed. Conversely, on mere disposal of the suit by way of dismissal or otherwise, the counter-claim may not lapse and may still remain pending. 50. From the above scheme of counterclaim, which the Code embodies, it transpires that Sub-Rule(2) of Rule 6A of Order VIII makes a broad statement of law that a counter-claim shall have the same effect as a cross-suit so as to enable a Court to pronounce one 'final judgment' in the suit, both on the original claim as well as on the counterclaim. Bearing in mind this particular position of law in view, when one turns to Order 8 Rule 6D, what clearly transpires is that Rule 6D provides that it in any suit, wherein a defendant sets up a counter-claim, the suit of the plaintiff is stayed, discontinued or dismissed, the counter-claim may nevertheless be proceeded with and Rule 6E provides that if the plaintiff makes default in putting in a reply to the counter-claim, the Court may pronounce judgment against him or make such order in relation to the counter-claim as it thinks fit, while the main suit may still remain pending. 51. What emerges from the above discussion is that Rule 6E clarifies that it is possible, in a given case, to pronounce judgment on a counter-claim if the plaintiff fails to put any reply by way of a written statement to the counter-claim made by the defendant. 51. What emerges from the above discussion is that Rule 6E clarifies that it is possible, in a given case, to pronounce judgment on a counter-claim if the plaintiff fails to put any reply by way of a written statement to the counter-claim made by the defendant. Resultantly, therefore, a counter-claim may be decreed, while the suit may remain still pending necessitating thereby pronouncement of a judgment, in the suit, at a later date and, following pronouncement of such a judgment, there has to be a separate decree in the suit. 52. Thus, Order VIII Rule 6E perceives a situation, where there would be two judgments and, consequently, two decrees; one in the suit and the other in the counter-claim. 53. Similarly, and as already indicated above, Order VIII Rule 6 D makes it possible for the counter-claim to remain pending, while the suit may be discontinued, stayed or dismissed necessitating thereby, in some cases, passing of two judgments, one in the suit and the other, in the counter-claim, and, as a corollary thereof, drawing of two decrees, one in the suit and the other in the counter-claim, may become necessary. However, the suit would be one and would remain one. Is such an interpretation correct? 54. What surfaces from the above discussion is that while Order VIII Rule 6A(2) makes the legislative intent clear that there shall be a 'final judgment' in the same suit, both on the original claim and also on the counterclaim, Order VIII Rule 6D and 6E make it possible, as already indicated above, to have two separate judgments at two different stages, one on the original claim, in the suit, and the other, on the counter-claim, in the same suit. Such an interpretation, if attributed to Order VIII Rule 6D and 6E would not only defeat the legislative intent as expressed by Rule 6A(2), but would also not rule out the possibility of having two conflicting decisions, one, on the original claim in the suit, and the other, on the counter claim in the same suit. 55. The situation may be explained by an illustration. 55. The situation may be explained by an illustration. Let us assume that a Court gives a judgment by invoking its power under Order VIII Rule 6E in favour of the defendant for not filing of written statement by the plaintiff against the counter-claim and a decree is also prepared in terms of the judgment and, at a latter stage, the suit, wherein the counterclaim had already been decreed, is decided in favour of the plaintiff. There will, then, be clear possibility of two conflicting judgments, which is definitely against the scheme of the counter-claim, for, there would not only be two conflicting judgments, but there would be two contradictory decrees, which would be wholly undesirable and unwarranted in law. The interpretation that the counter-claim has to be treated as a separate suit and can give rise to a judgment, independent of the suit, where the counter-claim is made, is a wholly unreasonable proposition and must, therefore, be eschewed. 56. What emerges from the above discussion is that Rule 6E clarifies that it is possible, in a given case, to pronounce judgment on a counter-claim if the plaintiff fails to put any reply by way of a written statement to the counter-claim made by the defendant. Does it, therefore, mean a counter-claim may be decreed, while the suit may remain still pending necessitating thereby pronouncement of a judgment, in the suit, at a later date, though the legislative intent, as explicitly expressed by Order VIII Rule 6A(2), is aimed at enabling the Court to give one 'final judgment', both on the 'original claim' as well as on the counter-claim. Are we, therefore, to interpret Rule 6E in such a manner that it runs contrary to, and collides against, the legislative intent of having one 'final judgment' both on the 'original claim' as well as on the counter-claim. Similarly, are we to interpret Order VIII Rule 6D in such a manner that while the suit of the plaintiff remains stayed, the counter-claim is decreed raising thereby the possibility of having an independent judgment, at a latter stage, and a decree on the 'original claim' made by the plaintiff in the suit? Similarly, are we to interpret Order VIII Rule 6D in such a manner that while the suit of the plaintiff remains stayed, the counter-claim is decreed raising thereby the possibility of having an independent judgment, at a latter stage, and a decree on the 'original claim' made by the plaintiff in the suit? Since the Code has to be read as a complete scheme and different provisions contained therein are to be interpreted in such a manner that they do not give rise to conflicting results, mutually destructive of each other making thereby the entire justice delivery system uncertain. Necessarily, therefore, the provisions, relating to counterclaim, have to be interpreted harmoniously. 57. What surfaces from the above discussion is that while Order VIII Rule 6A(2) makes the legislative intent clear by allowing making of counter-claim in a suit other than a suit for recovery of money also with the object of having one 'final judgment' in the same suit, both on the 'original claim' and also on the counter-claim, Order VIII Rule 6D and 6E, if interpreted as indicated hereinbefore, make it possible to have two separate judgments at two different stages, one on the 'original claim' and the other on the counterclaim. Such an interpretation, if attributed to Order VIII Rule 6D and 6E vis--vis Rule 6A, would completely defeat the legislative intent by failing to rule out conflicting decisions being rendered, one on the 'original claim' in the suit and the other, on the counterclaim, in the suit. 58. The fallout of the above conclusion gives rise to the question as to how one shall reconcile the provisions, contained in Order VIII Rule 6A vis--vis Rule 6C, 6D and 6E so as to make the provisions, embodied therein, a complete scheme, where the possibilities of collision of judgments, contrary directions and mutually destructive decrees do not arise. 59. If the predominant legislative intent of having one 'final judgment', both on the 'original claim' as well as on the counter-claim, is borne in mind, Order VIII Rule 6D and 6E can, indeed, be interpreted in such a manner that the possibility of any conflict of mutually exclusive decrees, destructive of each other, would be safely ruled out. 59. If the predominant legislative intent of having one 'final judgment', both on the 'original claim' as well as on the counter-claim, is borne in mind, Order VIII Rule 6D and 6E can, indeed, be interpreted in such a manner that the possibility of any conflict of mutually exclusive decrees, destructive of each other, would be safely ruled out. The predominant object of Order VIII Rule 6A, as already indicated above, is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and unnecessary delay, which may be caused if there are multiplicity of proceedings and, therefore, the Code provides a scheme, in the form of counter-claim, to enable the Court to give one 'final judgment' both, on the 'original claim' as well as on the 'counter-claim'. 60. As against the above object, which Order VIII Rule 6A stipulates, Order VIII Rule 6D and 6E give a contrary indication as already indicated before. In such a situation, if one bears in mind the requirement of Order VIII Rule 6A(2) that there must be one 'final judgment' in the same suit, both on the 'original claim' as well as on the counter-claim, then, Order VIII Rule 6D and 6E shall have to be treated, and must be treated, as enabling provisions empowering a Court, with the help of Rule 6D, to proceed with a counter-claim even if the suit, instituted by the plaintiff, is stayed, discontinued or dismissed. Similarly, with the help of Rule 6E, the legislature allows the Court to pronounce judgment in the counter-claim if the plaintiff fails to file written statement in the counter-claim. These enabling provisions have a definite objective and the objective is that in a given case, if it may so happen, that the plaintiff does not pursue his suit, his suit may come to be dismissed. In such circumstances, shall the counter-claim fail, because there is no existence of the suit? It is to meet such a dangerous situation that Rule 6D enables the Court to continue with the counter-claim and, eventually, pronounce a judgment and, it is for this reason, that Rule 6D lays down that even if the suit, wherein counter-claim is made, is stayed, discontinued or dismissed, the Court shall have the power to proceed with the counter-claim and pronounce judgment. The judgment would, however, be in the suit, wherein the counterclaim was filed. 61. The judgment would, however, be in the suit, wherein the counterclaim was filed. 61. Hence, as regards the fact that Order VIII Rule 6D provides that in a case, where the defendant sets up a counter-claim, the suit of the plaintiff is stayed, discontinued or dismissed, the counter-claim may nevertheless be proceeded with, suffice it to point out that this provision merely enables the Court to proceed with the counter-claim even if the suit, instituted by the plaintiff, stands stayed. This does not necessarily mean that the Court, on having proceeded with the counter-claim, must pronounce judgment. The scheme, as emerges from the study of Order VIII Rule 6A(2), Rule 6D and Rule 6E, give a fair indication that the legislative object of Order VIII Rule 6A(2) being to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, Rule 6D and Rule 6E are enabling provisions inasmuch as even when the plaintiff's suit is discontinued, stayed or dismissed, the Court may proceed with the counter-claim and pronounce its judgment, which would be followed by a decree in the counter-claim, filed in the suit. When the suit is stayed, the counter-claim, in the light of Rule 6D, may be proceeded with to the extent that the counter-claim can be proceeded with in a given case. This enabling provision has been made so that the Court, even when the counter-claim is stayed, proceed with the suit, but the Court need not necessarily give a judgment When, however, a suit is discontinued, stayed or dismissed, Rule 6D would enable the Court to bring the counter-claim to a logical conclusion by proceeding with the same and finally delivering the judgment, which would end a decree in the suit. 62. The same result would follow if we treat Order VIII Rule 6E as an enabling provision. Though the Court, under Order VIII Rule 6E, has the power to pronounce judgment in a counter-claim on the failure of the plaintiff to file written statement therein, it does not necessarily follow that the Court must pronounce the judgment. This power is, again, discretionary and would, therefore, be exercisable in a case, where the suit is discontinued or dismissed so that mere can be a final judgment. This power is, again, discretionary and would, therefore, be exercisable in a case, where the suit is discontinued or dismissed so that mere can be a final judgment. The pre-eminent object of having one 'final judgment in the same suit, both on the 'original claim' as well as on the counterclaim, can be certainly achieved if the discretion under Rule 6D and 6E are properly exercised. This Court does not find any contradiction between the provisions embodied in Rule 6D and 6E, on the one hand, and Rule 6A(2), on the other. The object of having one 'final judgment' in the suit, both on the claim of the plaintiff as well on the counter-claim, in such a situation, is to avoid contradictory judgments and decrees and this can, indeed, be achieved if the pre-eminent object of making provisions of counter-claim is borne in mind. In a suit wherein a 'counter-claim' is filed, whether the issues have to be separately framed and whether the evidence, in the two, one, on the original claim of the plaintiff in the suit, and the other, on the counter-claim of the defendant in the suit, shall be separately recorded? 63. While answering the question posed above, it needs to be noted that it is Order XVIII, which makes the provisions for hearing of suit and examination of witnesses. The provisions, embodied in Order XVIII, cannot be read in isolation and must be read conjointly with other provisions of the Code, particularly, Order XIV, which relates to settlement of issues. 64. Let us, first, consider as to what an 'issue' means. 65. Order XIV Rule 1 reads: Framing of issues.-- (1) Issues arise, when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by the one party and denied by the other. (2) Material propositions are those propositions of law or fact which a plaintiff must allege in order to show a right to sue or a defendant must allege in order to constitute his defence. (3) Each material proposition affirmed by one party and denied by the other shall form the subject of a distinct issue. 66. (2) Material propositions are those propositions of law or fact which a plaintiff must allege in order to show a right to sue or a defendant must allege in order to constitute his defence. (3) Each material proposition affirmed by one party and denied by the other shall form the subject of a distinct issue. 66. From a reading of what Sub-Rule (1) and (2) of Rule 1 of Order XIV embodies, what transpires is that issues arise, when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by the one party and denied by the other, material propositions being those propositions of law or fact, which a plaintiff must allege in order to show a right to sue or a defendant must allege in order to constitute his defence and each material proposition, affirmed by one party and denied by the other, shall form the subject of a distinct issue. 67. Close on the heels of Order XIV Rule 1, which indicate as to what an issue is and when an issue arises, one has to take note of Order XVIII Rule 3, which states that where there are several issues, the burden of proving some of which lies on the other party, the party beginning may, at his option, either produce his evidence on those issues or reserve it by way of answer to the evidence produced by the other party; and, in the latter case, the party beginning may produce evidence on those issues after the other party has produced all his evidence, and the other party may, then, reply specially on the evidence so produced by the party beginning; but the party beginning will, then, be entitled to reply, generally, on the whole case. 68. A careful reading of Order XVIII Rule 3 shows that when issues are framed in a suit, where there may or may not be a counterclaim, several issues may arise. The burden to prove some of the issues may be on the plaintiff and, on some issues, the burden of proof may lie on the defendant. 69. The question, therefore, which stares at us, now, is: Who has to adduce evidence in a given suit? 70. The burden to prove some of the issues may be on the plaintiff and, on some issues, the burden of proof may lie on the defendant. 69. The question, therefore, which stares at us, now, is: Who has to adduce evidence in a given suit? 70. The answer to this question is discernible from Section 102 of the Evidence Act, which provides that the burden of proof lies on that party, who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. Ordinarily, since it is the plaintiff, whose suit would tail if no evidence at all were given on either sides, it is he, who has the burden of proof. 71. In a given case, however, the defendant may take such a plea, which may shift the burden of proof to the defendant. As an illustration, when a plaintiff sues a defendant seeking declaration of the plaintiff's right and title to the suit property, the defendant may not dispute the tact that the plaintiff had, at one point of time, title to the suit property, but defendant may contend that the plaintiff's title, if any, to the property stands extinguished by the defendant's adverse possession of the suit property. In such a situation, since the defendant admits that the plaintiff had title to the suit property, the plaintiff need not give evidence, because his case stands admitted unless the defendant proves, by adducing evidence, that the plaintiff's title to the property stands extinguished by the defendant's adverse possession. However, the evidence, so given by the defendant, may be countered by the plaintiff by cross-examining the defendant's witnesses and/or by adducing his own evidence in denial of the defendant's assertion that the plaintiff's title to the suit property stands extinguished. There may be another case, wherein the defendant may not admit to title of the plaintiff to the suit property and may, while, denying the plaintiff's title to the suit property, claim that the plaintiff's title, if any, to the suit property stands extinguished by the defendant's adverse possession of the suit property. In the latter case, the plaintiff's case that he has title to the suit property is not admitted by the defendant and, hence, under Section 102 of the Evidence Act, the suit would fail if no evidence from either side is adduced. In the latter case, the plaintiff's case that he has title to the suit property is not admitted by the defendant and, hence, under Section 102 of the Evidence Act, the suit would fail if no evidence from either side is adduced. In such a case, the burden to adduce evidence first would on the plaintiff. 72. While considering Section 102 of the Evidence Act, one has also to bear in mind Section 101, which states: Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependant on the existence of facts, which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. 73. A close reading of Section 101 makes it clear that whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependant on the existence of facts, which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist and when a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. 74. Since Section 101 as well as Section 102 both lay down as to who the person is on whom the burden of proof lies, the question is: what is the distinction between the two, namely, Section 101and Section 102? The distinction really lies in the fact that while Section 101 lays down as to who has the burden of proof, in a case, by providing that when a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is on him that the burden of proof lies, Section 102 really shows as to who has the onus to adduce evidence. The burden of proving a fact is, therefore, different and distinct from burden to adduce evidence. While Section 101 provides as to who will have the burden to prove in a given case, Section 102 provides as to who has the burden to adduce evidence first. Obviously, the person, who has the legal liability to adduce evidence first, has to be the one, who must have the right to begin. It is in this context that Order XVIII Rule 1, which contains the provisions as regards the right to begin, must be read. Order XVIII Rule 1 reads: Order XVIII, Rule 1. Obviously, the person, who has the legal liability to adduce evidence first, has to be the one, who must have the right to begin. It is in this context that Order XVIII Rule 1, which contains the provisions as regards the right to begin, must be read. Order XVIII Rule 1 reads: Order XVIII, Rule 1. Right to begin.--The plaintiff has the right to begin unless the defendant admits the fact alleged by the plaintiff and contends that either in point of law or on some additional facts alleged by the defendant the plaintiff is not entitled to any part of the relief, which he seeks, in which case the defendant has the right to begin. 75. Closely following Order XVIIII Rule 1, Order XVIII Rule 2 provides: Order XVIII, Rule 2. Statement and production of evidence, - (1) On the day fixed for the hearing of the suit or on any other day to which the hearing is adjourned, the party having the right to being shall state his case and produce his evidence in support of the issues which he is bound to prove. (2) The other party shall then state his case and produce his evidence (if any) and may then address the court generally on the whole case. (3) The party beginning may then reply generally on the whole case. 76. A combined reading of Rules 1 and 2 of Order XVIII shows that ordinarily, it is the plaintiff, who has the right to begin; but when the defendant admits the facts, which the plaintiff alleges, and yet contends that either in point of law or on some additional facts, which the defendant may allege, the plaintiff is not entitled to any part of the relief, which the plaintiff seeks, it is the defendant, who has the right to begin, because, the facts, which the plaintiff alleges, having been admitted by the defendant, the suit would succeed unless the defendant takes specific plea of fact or law, such as, a plea of res judicata or plea that the plaintiff's title to a suit property stands extinguished by adverse possession. In the circumstances, when the defendant, having admitted, either in full or in part, the facts alleged by the plaintiff, takes, at the same time, a plea of law or of facts disputing the entitlement of the plaintiff to seek the relief, which the plaintiff might have sought for, it is the defendant, who has the right to begin. 77. From the discussion of the provisions of Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act read with the provisions of Order XVIII Rules 1 and 2, what becomes transparent is that since Section 102 of the Evidence Act lays down that it is the person, whose suit will fail if he does not adduce any evidence, has the burden to adduce evidence, it follows that ordinarily, since it is the plaintiff, whose suit would fail, in the case of contest, unless he adduces evidence, it is the plaintiff, who has the burden to adduce evidence and it is, therefore, the plaintiff, who has, ordinarily, the right to begin. When, however, the defendant admits the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff need not adduce evidence, because his claim stands already admitted. Notwithstanding such admission of the plaintiff's claim, when the defendant contends that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief either in point of law, such as, res judicata, limitation etc., or on some other facts, which the defendant may allege, the defendant incurs the burden to prove what he contends and it is, therefore, he, who receives the right to begin and adduce evidence. 78. What further becomes clear from the discussions held above, particularly, in the light of the provisions of Order XVIII Rule 3, is that in a suit, whether there is, or there is, not a counter-claim, several issues may arise. The burden of proof on some of the issues may be on the plaintiff and, on some issues, the burden of proof may lie on the defendant. 79. It is, therefore, not necessary that in a suit, the burden of proof on all the issues would be on the plaintiff. The burden of proof on some of the issues may be on the plaintiff and, on some issues, the burden of proof may lie on the defendant. 79. It is, therefore, not necessary that in a suit, the burden of proof on all the issues would be on the plaintiff. For instance, when the defendant does not dispute the fact that the plaintiff had title over a suit property, but claims that the plaintiff's title to the property stands extinguished by the defendant's adverse possession, the issue as to whether the suit is barred by adverse possession would be an issue on which the burden of proof would lie on the defendant. Similar may be a case, where the defendant contends that the suit is barred by res judicata, because on such an issue, the burden would be on the defendant. 80. On the issues, on which the burden is on the defendant, the plaintiff may not adduce any evidence (while adducing evidence in support of those issues, which cast burden of proof on the plaintiff), and reserve his right, under Order XVIII Rule 3, to adduce evidence, if required, after the defendant has adduced evidence on the issues on which the burden of proof lies on the defendant. Thus, in a suit, irrespective of the fact as to whether a counter-claim has or has not been made, when several issues arise, and the burden of proof, in respect of some of the issues, so framed, lies on the defendant, the plaintiff may reserve his right to adduce evidence on such issues after the defendant, as required by law, has adduced evidence in support of such issues. 81. In short, thus, if the party, who has the right to begin, reserves his right to adduce evidence on the issues on which the burden of proof lies on the opponent, the party, who has the right to begin, may adduce evidence on such issues after the opponent has adduced his evidence on the issues. Logically extended, what it would mean is that when a counter-claim is filed in a suit, issues would be framed on material propositions of fact and law. Logically extended, what it would mean is that when a counter-claim is filed in a suit, issues would be framed on material propositions of fact and law. In respect of issues, which may place burden of proof on the plaintiff, the plaintiff has the right to begin and he would have the liability to adduce evidence in support of those issues, which place burden of proof on him (plaintiff). As regard the issues, which place burden of proof on the defendant, the plaintiff may, while adducing evidence on the issues (which place burden of proof on him), reserve his right to give evidence on those issues, which place the burden of proof on the defendant until the time the defendant, in support of such issues, has adduced his evidence. Order XVIII Rule 3 does not given any right to the plaintiff, and does not allow the plaintiff, to reserve his right to give evidence on issues on which the onus of proof lies on the plaintiff. The reservation of right to give evidence is only in respect of those issues on which the burden of proof lies on the other party. When the right to begin, in a suit, is, ordinarily, with the plaintiff, it is the plaintiff, who has to adduce evidence in support of all the issues if the burden to prove such issues lies on the plaintiff. Where, however, in respect of some of the issues, the defendant has the burden to prove, the plaintiff may, while adducing his evidence, in exercise of his right to begin, reserve his right to give evidence on such issues after the defendant has already adduced his evidence on such issues (i.e., the issues in respect whereof, the burden of proof lies on the defendant). 82. Order XVIII Rule 3 applies to cases, where there are several issues and out of such several issues, the burden of proof, on some of the issues, lies on the party other than the one, who has the right to begin. In such a case only, question arises of reserving the right to adduce evidence on the issue on which the burden of proof lies on the other party. 83. Thus, the scheme of recording of evidence, as reflected by Order XVIII Rule 3, completely fits into the scheme of disposal of counter-claims. In such a case only, question arises of reserving the right to adduce evidence on the issue on which the burden of proof lies on the other party. 83. Thus, the scheme of recording of evidence, as reflected by Order XVIII Rule 3, completely fits into the scheme of disposal of counter-claims. The scheme of the Code can, therefore, be summarised thus: In a suit, the defendant may deny the contentions of the plaintiff or may admit the plaintiff's claim or part of the claim. While admitting or denying the contentions of the plaintiff and his entitlement to receive the reliefs, which a plaintiff seeks, the defendant may raise a counterclaim. If the defendant admits the contentions and files a counter-claim, the plaintiff's burden to prove his case stands discharged under Section 101. The burden to prove what the defendant contends in his counter-claim, then, rests, in the light of Section 102, on the defendant. In such circumstances, the defendant, having the burden to prove the issues, which are raised in such a counter-claim, has the right to begin. As the defendant receives the right to begin, this right casts the liability on him to, first, adduce evidence. While adducing evidence, the defendant may reserve his right to give evidence on issues on which the onus of proof lies on the plaintiff. 84. Conversely, when the defendant does not admit the claim of the plaintiff and/or part of the claim of the plaintiff, which may be raised in the suit, and also raises a counterclaim, the burden to prove some of the issues would obviously be on the plaintiff and on some of the issues, the burden would be on the defendant The plaintiff would, then, have the right to begin and would have to adduce evidence. With regard to, however, the issues, which place the burden of proof on the defendant, the plaintiff may, in such a case, reserve his right to give evidence if the defendant adduces evidence on the issues, which place the burden on the defendant. 85. It is, therefore, wrong to assume that in a suit, irrespective of the nature of defence, which the defendant may take, it is the plaintiff, who has the right to begin and also the burden to adduce evidence first It really depends on the nature of the defence, which the defendant takes. 85. It is, therefore, wrong to assume that in a suit, irrespective of the nature of defence, which the defendant may take, it is the plaintiff, who has the right to begin and also the burden to adduce evidence first It really depends on the nature of the defence, which the defendant takes. In a given case, the burden to prove all the issues may be on the plaintiff. Such a situation may arise, where the defendant's case is a case of mere denial. In such circumstances, the question of any of the issues placing burden of proof on the defendant would, perhaps, not arise. However, in a case, where some of the issues place burden of proof on the plaintiff and some on the defendant, the suit having been brought by the plaintiff, the plaintiff would have the right to begin and, while adducing evidence in support of the issues, which place the burden of proof on him (plaintiff), the plaintiff may reserve his right to give evidence so far as those issues are concerned, which place the burden of proof on the defendant. 86. I have already indicated above that even when the suit of the plaintiff is stayed, discontinued or dismissed, the counter-claim may nevertheless be proceeded with. I have also indicated that a counter-claim may have the same effect as a cross-suit so as to enable the Court to pronounce 'one final judgment' in the same suit, both on the original claim and also on the counter-claim. Thus, there would be a common judgment both on the original claim and on the counter-claim. While the original claim is the suit, the counterclaim, though treated as the cross suit, is not really registered as an independent suit The counter-claim can be registered as an independent suit only when, as indicated by Order VIII Rule 6C, the Court, on the application of the plaintiff and upon hearing the parties concerned, passes an order excluding the counter-claim and directing its registration as an independent suit. 87. As regards Mr. 87. As regards Mr. N. Choudhury's contention that when a counter claim is filed in a suit, the evidence would have to be recorded at two different stages, namely, in respect of the issues, which are framed in the suit, and in respect of issues, which are framed in the counter-claim, sufficient it is to point out that counter-claim is not a cross-suit, but merely has the effect of a cross-suit. The issues, on the claim of the plaintiff in the suit, and on the counter-claim, in the suit, would not be separately framed. There would be, in such a case, a set of issues and burden of proof, in respect of some of such issues may be on the plaintiff and in respect of some of them, the burden of proof may be on the defendant. If the defence taken by the defendant is such that the suit would fail if no evidence is adduced by either side, the plaintiff would have the right to begin and, correspondingly, he would have the liability to adduce evidence. In such circumstances, in respect of all the issues, which may have been framed in the light of the pleadings of the parties in the suit as well as the counter-claim, the burden would obviously not be on the plaintiff. In such circumstances, the plaintiff, in the light of Order VIII Rule 3, may, while adducing evidence in support of those issues, which place burden of proof on the plaintiff, reserve his right to give evidence in respect of those issues, which the defendant has the burden to prove, after the defendant adduces his evidence. 88. Since the scheme of the Code, as embodied in Order 18 Rule 3, takes care of a counter-claim, filed in a suit, there is no question of adducing evidence separately in the suit and the counter-claim though, the party, who has the right to begin may, if he reserves his right to give evidence as reflected by Order 18 Rule 3, would get another opportunity to adduce evidence in respect of those issues, which place burden of proof on the other side. 89. Ordinarily, the plaintiff must indicate, while adducing his evidence or while, at least, before his evidence is closed, that he reserves his right to give evidence on those issues, which the defendant has the burden to prove. 89. Ordinarily, the plaintiff must indicate, while adducing his evidence or while, at least, before his evidence is closed, that he reserves his right to give evidence on those issues, which the defendant has the burden to prove. Unless he specifically reserves his right to give his evidence as mentioned hereinbefore or gives a clear indication in this regard, he cannot -- after the defendant has already adduced evidence in support of his case, which he may have set up by way of a written statement and also by the counter-claim -- seek to adduce evidence, in rebuttal, on the issues, which the defendant had the burden to prove. However, the Court is not wholly powerless in this regard and, in exceptional circumstances, it can allow the plaintiff to adduce evidence in rebuttal of the issues, which place burden of proof on the defendant. Such exceptional exercise of power is possible provided no prejudice is caused to the defendant or the Court, for some reason, which shall be assigned, consider it necessary, in the interest of justice, to so allow the plaintiff to adduce evidence. 90. In the case at hand, the plaintiff had obtained several adjournments to adduce evidence. However, as not more than three adjournments can be, ordinarily, granted and the plaintiff could not assign sufficient reasons for seeking adjournment, the learned trial Court declined to allow him any further time to adduce evidence. When the plaintiff's petition to recall the said order disallowing him to adduce evidence was also turned down by the learned trial Court, the plaintiff filed the revision as indicated above and this revision too failed. Thus, ordinarily, the plaintiff stands precluded from giving evidence; more so, when the defendant has already adduced evidence. It is for this reason that the plaintiff has, now, prayed for allowing him to adduce evidence in rebuttal in the counter-claim. 91. In the case at hand, however, the issues, which have been framed, clearly indicate that proper issues have not been framed at all in the suit inasmuch as no issue has been framed on the basis of the contentions raised in the counter-claim. 91. In the case at hand, however, the issues, which have been framed, clearly indicate that proper issues have not been framed at all in the suit inasmuch as no issue has been framed on the basis of the contentions raised in the counter-claim. The framing of issues, thus, suffers, in the present case, from serious infirmity of law inasmuch as the relief(s), which the defendant No. 3 has claimed in the counter-claim, namely, declaration of his title to the suit property to the exclusion of the title of the defendant No. 1, whose tenant the plaintiff claims to be, required framing of an issue as to whether the defendant has title to the suit property and whether it is the plaintiff, who is liable to be evicted from the suit property or it is the defendant, who is liable to be evicted from the suit property. 92. The case, which the plaintiff has set up, namely, that he is a tenant under the defendant No. 1, he has, in terms of an agreement, which the plaintiff had entered into with the defendant No. 1, made huge investment on the suit property and remained in occupation of the suit property and run the business of the said printing press, it is the plaintiff, who has to prove his case and on all the issues, where the plaintiff's assertions have been disputed by the defendant, the burden to prove lies on the plaintiff. On the other hand, the burden to prove the case, which the defendant has set up in the counter-claim, lies on the defendant. The learned trial Court has, however, not framed any issue on the counterclaim. In such circumstances, the learned trial Court has the duty, cast by law, to frame appropriate issues and, upon framing of the issues, the plaintiff would have to, under the scheme of Order VIII Rule 3, indicate as to whether he wants to adduce evidence on all the issues or he wants to reserve his right to give evidence on the issues, which place the burden of proof on the defendant. 93. According to what the plaintiff indicates and the learned trial Court decides, the evidence has to be recorded in the suit, both on the original claim of the plaintiff and the counter-claim of the defendant, bearing in mind, however, the observations made in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment. 94. 93. According to what the plaintiff indicates and the learned trial Court decides, the evidence has to be recorded in the suit, both on the original claim of the plaintiff and the counter-claim of the defendant, bearing in mind, however, the observations made in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment. 94. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, this revision succeeds. The impugned order, dated 02.07.2008, is hereby set aside and the suit is remanded to the learned trial Court for framing necessary issues in the suit, both on the original claim of the plaintiff as well as on the counter-claim of the defendant, record the evidence, which may be adduced by the parties in addition to what evidence may have already come on record, and, then, dispose of the case in accordance with law. 95. With the above observations and directions, this revision shall stand disposed of. No costs.