JUDGMENT P.K. Musahar, J. 1. This is Defendant's second appeal against the Judgment & Decree dated 12.04.2000 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 2, Guwahati in Title Appeal No. 46 of 1993, dismissing the Judgment dated 15.09.2003 and Decree dated 07.10.1993 passed by the learned Munsiff No. 4. Guwahati in Title Suit No. 43 of 1988, decreeing the suit. The suit was for declaration of title, delivery of khas possession and for permanent injunction in respect of a plot of land measuring 1 Katha 5 Lechas covered by Dag No. 95, K.P. No. 4 at village Khanapara, Mouza - Beltola. The case of the Respondent/plaintiff is that the plaintiff Smt. Meera Thakuria purchased a plot of land measuring 1 Katha 5 Lechas covered by Dag No. 95, K.P. Patta No. 4 at village Khanapara, Mouza - Beltola, at a price of Rs. 5,000/- vide registered sale deed No. 10292/84 dated 26.10.1984 from one Dhiren Das and took possession of the same. The plaintiff's husband Dr. M.M. niakuriaand Sri Satish Baruah were present at the time of delivery of possession. The plaintiff got her name mutated and constructed a thatched house over the suit land. Meanwhile, the Defendants forcefully entered into the land of the plaintiff in absence of her husband and constructed 2 thatched houses on the plaintiff's land. The plaintiff's husband requested them not to trespass into the suit land in future and also further requested them to vacate the land immediately. At last, finding no other alternative, the plaintiff filed the suit before the Court for declaration of title, delivery of possession by ejecting the Defendants from the suit land. The Defendants contested the case by filing written statement with certain documents. The Defendants submitted that they occupied the suit land as 'Sarkari' land. They claimed that the plaintiff did not purchase the suit land but purchased the land covered by Dag No. 152, K.P. Patta No. 34. The Defendants further submitted that the seller Sri Dhiren Das had no saleable land in Dag No. 95, K.P. Patta No. 4 at village Khanapara. It was also submitted by them that as there is no cause of action and the suit is not maintainable in its present form and manner, the suit is liable to be dismissed with cost. The Defendants further submitted that the seller Sri Dhiren Das had no saleable land in Dag No. 95, K.P. Patta No. 4 at village Khanapara. It was also submitted by them that as there is no cause of action and the suit is not maintainable in its present form and manner, the suit is liable to be dismissed with cost. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings, the Learned Trial Court framed the following issues: (1) Whether there is cause of action for the suit? (2) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of other pattadars of suit patta, the members of the Executive Committee of Khanapara Srimanta Sankardev Kristi Kendra and general public interest in the said Kristi Kendra, the Society i.e. Khanapara Srimanta Sankardev Kristi Kendra? (3) Whether the plaintiff purchased the suit land covered by Dag No. 95 under K.P. Patta No. 4 or land covered by Dag No. 152 of K.P. Patta No. 34 of village Khanapara by registered sale deed No. 10292/84 executed and registered on 26.10.1984? (4) Whether the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land and whether Defendants dispossessed the plaintiff? (5) Whether the plaintiff has right, title and interest over the suit land? (6) Whether the vendor of the plaintiff Dhiren Das had saleable interest over the suit land on the date of sale i.e. 26.10.1984? (7) To what extent relief/reliefs, is/are the parties entitled to? (8) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? (9) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? (10) Whether the suit is barred by waiver, estopple or acquiescence? (11) Whether the suit has been properly valued and proper Court fee has been paid for? The suit was decreed and the present Appellant filed title appeal before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), which was dismissed as stated earlier. The Appellant Defendant has filed the present appeal and this Court admitted the appeal after formulating the following substantial questions of law: (1) Whether fabrication of Ext. 1, the registered sale deed and Ext. 2, the order of mutation being apparent on the face, the learned Courts below are justified in decreeing the suit? (2) Whether the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below were vitiated on account of non-consideration of the Ext,- 'Cha', which clearly established that the Appellant/Defendants Society was in lawful possession of the land? 2, the order of mutation being apparent on the face, the learned Courts below are justified in decreeing the suit? (2) Whether the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below were vitiated on account of non-consideration of the Ext,- 'Cha', which clearly established that the Appellant/Defendants Society was in lawful possession of the land? (3) Whether any effective and executable decree could be passed in favour of the Respondent/plaintiff without impleading the registered Society as a party? 2. Heard Mr. C.K. Sarrna Baruah, learned senior counsel, For the Appellant/Defendant and Mr. P.K. Deka, learned Counsel, for Respondent/plaintiff No. 1. 3. In regard t o the substantial question of law No. 1, Mr. Baruah, learned senior counsel, appearing for the Appellant/Defendant, refers to the documents produced and proved by the Appellant/Defendant, namely, Ext. - 'Unga', 'Cha' and Ext. 'Zho', Ext. - ' Unga' is a certified copy of the Jamabandi which was issued on 18.10.1989 in respect of lands covered by K.P. Patta No. 4 under Beltola Mouza, where the name of the Respondent/plaintiff does not find place. Ext. - Cha, is the photo copy of the certificate of possession dated 18.03.1991, counter signed by Assistant Settlement Officer, Guwahati Resettlement Operation, to the: effect that possession of land measuring 3 Kathas was delivered on 18.03.1991 for the purpose of Srimanta Sankardev Kristi Kendra and received by its Joint Secretary Devaraj Das. Ext.- 'Zho', is a certified copy of order dated 18.10.1986 which was issued on 03.06.1992 granting mutation to Respondent/plaintiff in respect of land measuring 1 Katha 5 Eechas covered by Dag No. 152 and K.P. Patta No. 34 on the strength of registered sale deed No. 10292/84 executed by Sri Dhiren Koch, S/o Ninna. The Respondent/plaintiff also produced the same mutation order dated 18.10.1986, Ext.- 2, which was issued on 14.10.1986 wherein the land in dispute is shown to be covered under K.P. Patta No. 4 and Dag No. 95. As per mutation order, the Respondent/plaintiff purchased the land covered by Dag No. 152 and K.P. Patta No. 34. The figure 95 against the Dag No. was inserted by erasing the figure 152. So also, the figure 4 against the K.P. Patta No., by erasing figure 3. In other words, according to the Appellant/Defendant, Ext.- 2 is a document forged and fabricated by the Respondent/plaintiff. This is the bone of contention of the Appellant/Defendant. The figure 95 against the Dag No. was inserted by erasing the figure 152. So also, the figure 4 against the K.P. Patta No., by erasing figure 3. In other words, according to the Appellant/Defendant, Ext.- 2 is a document forged and fabricated by the Respondent/plaintiff. This is the bone of contention of the Appellant/Defendant. In paragraph 7 of the written statement, the Appellant/Defendant pleaded, as follows: 7. Statements of paragraph 1 of the plaint that the plaintiff purchased 1 Katha 5 Lechas of land covered by Dag No. 95 under K.P. Patta No. 4 of village Khanapara is not admitted by the Defendants but are denied and the plaintiff is put to strict proof thereof. From the certified copy of the sale deed being 10292/1984 executed and registered on 26.10.1984, it appears that the plaintiff purchased the land covered by Dag No. 152 under K.P. Patta No. 34 of Khanapara village. If the plaintiff had created subsequently any deed showing to have purchased any land covered by Dag No. 95 by K.P. Patta No. 4 of village Khanapara, that must be a false, fraudulent and forged document. 4. It is to be noted that no issue was framed on the question of forgery or fraud or fabrication. 'However, it is argued by the learned senior counsel for the Appellant/Defendant that Ext. 'Zho', certified copy of the mutation order was proved without objection from the Respondent/plaintiff and it being a public document, is admissible in evidence without being proved by calling a witness. In this regard, he refers to a decision rendered by the Apex Court in Madamanchi Ramappa and Anr. v. Muthaluru Bojjappa, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1633 . Referring to another case of Dayamalhi Bui (Smt.) v. K.M. Shaffi, reported in/2004 7 SCO 107, it is further argued that where a party gives certified copy in evidence, without proving the circumstances, entitling him to give secondary evidence, objection must be taken at the trial before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record and not at appellate stage. The Appellant/Defendant by adducing the documentary evidence i.e. Exhibits - 'Unga', 'Cha' and 'Zho' according to Mr. The Appellant/Defendant by adducing the documentary evidence i.e. Exhibits - 'Unga', 'Cha' and 'Zho' according to Mr. Baruah, have been able to bring home a case of fraud in obtaining the decree by the Respondent/plaintiff and such judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud with the Court is a nullity and non-est in the eyes of law, as was settled in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath and Ors., reported in (1994) 1 SCC 1 , wherein the Hon'ble Justice Kuldip Singh speaking for the Bench began with the observation of Chief Justice Edward Coke of England-- "...Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal" and came to a conclusion that such a judgment/decree by the first Court or by the higher Court is to be treated as a nullity by every Court; whether superior or inferior, and it can be challenged in any Court, even in collateral proceedings. 5. Strenuously countering the above submissions, Mr. Deka, learned Counsel appearing for Respondent/plaintiff, argues that this second appeal is not maintainable inasmuch as there are concurrent findings by the Courts below. While discussing the issue No. 5, on the basis of evidence on record, the learned Munsiff recorded his findings and reasoning like this- ...Defendant vide petition No. 439/93 dated 9.7.93 submitted that the schedule of the land in original sale deed No. 10292/84 dated 26.10.1984 which was recorded as Dag No. 152, Patta No. 34 of Khanapara village was erased and Dag No. 95 under Patta No. 4 were inserted at the instance of plaintiff (PW 1) and her husband (PW 3). But how those Dag and Patta numbers were erased, it is not proved either by any evidence or by any handwriting expert. Defendant further argued that the payment of land revenue cannot create any right over the land. But it seems that payment of land revenue can claim right over the suit land. On the basis of the original sale deed, Bxt.-1 and with other relevant documents, the plaintiff had got his right, title and interest over the suit land. On the other hand, the Defendants could not prove the right, title and interest of 'Namghar' and other houses of Srimanta Sankardev Kristi Kendra, which are situated over the suit land. So this issue is decided in favour of plaintiff. On the other hand, the Defendants could not prove the right, title and interest of 'Namghar' and other houses of Srimanta Sankardev Kristi Kendra, which are situated over the suit land. So this issue is decided in favour of plaintiff. The learned lower appellate Court also discussed and recorded his findings alike- ...But how the number was erased, no evidence either by oral or by handwriting expert was led to establish the assertion. So, in the absence of rebuttable evidence on the point, I find no substance on the allegation made by the Defendants/Appellants. Moreover, Defendant No. 1 by giving evidence stated that they purchased the land for Namghar as Sankardev Kristi Kendra from Dag No. 97 as it appears from record. But the suit land is under Dag No. 95. So, it is transpired that the Defendants claim their land not from Dag No. 95 of Patta No. 4 but from Dag No. 97. So, if there is any land of Defendants/Appellants for the Namghar at Dag No. either 152 of Patta No. 34 or at Dag No. 97, the plaintiff has no claim over it and it clearly goes to show that the plaintiff/Respondent's suit land has separate identity. Therefore, with my above findings, it is held that learned Munsiff rightly decided both the issues in favour of the plaintiff/Respondent. 6. Moreover, Mr. Deka, learned Counsel argues that the evidence of DW-1 Bishoy Ch. Hujuri, Office Assistant of Sub-Registry Office, Guwahati, as regards the sale deed No. 10292/84 would carry no evidentiary value inasmuch as he has not stated which book/Register has been produced by him in the Court and the said book/Register was not exhibited. The allegation of forgery or fabrication of sale deed and obtaining the decree by fraud could not be proved by the Appellant/Defendant. There being no case of fraud/fabrication, it is argued that the learned Courts below were justified in decreeing the suit and as such, the substantial question of law No. 1 must be answered in favour of the Respondent/Plaintiff. 7. Next, it is argued by Mr. Deka, learned Counsel that the Court cannot disturb the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by the Courts of facts in Second appeal. For, the scope of exercise of jurisdiction by High Court in Second appeal under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is limited to the substantial question of law. 7. Next, it is argued by Mr. Deka, learned Counsel that the Court cannot disturb the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by the Courts of facts in Second appeal. For, the scope of exercise of jurisdiction by High Court in Second appeal under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is limited to the substantial question of law. In the present case, with the aforesaid sustainable findings of fact, there may arise sc me question of law but not at all a substantial question of law. Relying on Govindaraju v. Mariamman, reported in (2005) 2 SCC 5011 it is further argued by the learned Counsel hat the High Court is not expected to set as de the concurrent findings recorded by the Trial Court and lower appellate Court on the question of execution of sale deed merely on the ground that the circumstances which had already been considered by the lower Courts, appeared to suggest some other conclusion from proved facts. Placing the written statement, it is also submitted that the Appellant/Defendant took no plea of forgery or fabrication and the trial Court rightly did not frame any issue on it. In such circumstances, the Appellant/Defendant cannot be permitted to raise this issue in the Second appeal. In this regard, reference has been made to Union of India v. Surjit Singh Arwal, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1701 and Union of India v. E.I.D. Parry (Ind.) Ltd., reported in (2000) 2 SCC 223 . Lastly, relying on Corporation of the City of Bangalore v. M. Papaiah and Anr., reported in AIR 1989 SC 1809 : (1989) 3 SCC 612 , it is submitted that there is no scope in the second appeal for interference on the concurrent findings of facts and decisions of Courts below inasmuch as the revenue records are not documents of title and the question of interpretation of a document not being a document of title, is not a question of law - far being a substantial question of law. 8. In reply, Mr. 8. In reply, Mr. Baruah, learned senior counsel submits that the Respondent/Plaintiff intentionally refrained from mentioning in the plaint the name of the person from whom he purchased the suit land, date of purchase, particulars of vendor, when and how, she was dispossessed from the suit land: Nondisclosure of above material particulars is deliberate and it was aimed at obtaining the judgment and decree by fraud. According to him, the seller Dhiren Das had no saleable land in Dag No. 95, K.P. Patta No. 4, yet he executed and registered the sale deed No. 10292/84 (Ext. 1) and, therefore, no land could be handed over to the Respondent/Plaintiff. That is why the seller again executed and registered another sale deed in respect of land covered by Dag No. 152 and K.P. Patta No. 34. There were, therefore, two sale deeds, which was suppressed by the Respondent/Plaintiff deliberately. The learned senior counsel also submits that the learned lower appellate Court in its judgment made no mention about the Ext, ' Cha', proved by the Appellant/Defendant without any objection to establish their case, and as such, the learned lower appellate Court ignored a vital document and in such a case, the recording of concurrent finding on the question of fact can be interfered with by the High Court in second appeal. It is incumbent upon the learned lower appellate Court to consider Ext. 'Cha' on the basis of which the Appellant/Defendant had proved possession over the land in dispute and such consideration having not been done, there are good reasons for treating the finding on the question of possession recorded by the Courts below to be vitiated. This argument has been advanced by him in the light of the decision rendered in Sundra Naicka Vadiyar and Anr. v. Ramaswami Ayyar reported in AIR 1994 SC 532 : 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 534. 9. First of all, let the controversy raised by the parties in regard to admissibility of the second appeal be resolved. The general rule is that no second appeal lies against the concurrent findings of facts by the trial Court and the learned appellate Courts. But, there are some exceptions. One of such exceptions, which may be applicable to the present case, is the alleged failure on the part of the Courts below in examining the core issue. The general rule is that no second appeal lies against the concurrent findings of facts by the trial Court and the learned appellate Courts. But, there are some exceptions. One of such exceptions, which may be applicable to the present case, is the alleged failure on the part of the Courts below in examining the core issue. If there occasions such failure, it can be treated as a substantial question of law and the High Court would entertain the second appeal invoking its power under Section 103 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.1 would, in this respect, refer to Achintya Kumar Saha v. Nanee Printers and Ors., reported in (2004) 12 SCC 368 wherein it is held that when the core issue is not adjudicated upon, it can result in a substantial question of law under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The core issue, in this case, is whether Ext.-2 is a forged/fabricated document as alleged by the Appellant/Defendant. Admittedly, the Courts below framed no issue on this core issue. But going through the judgments delivered by the Courts below, I find enough discussions with reasonings and findings thereon. The reasonings and findings may not be acceptable to a party but there is no scope for making any grievance of failure on the part of the Courts below in discharging their duties or examining the core issue. In view of this, the decision rendered in Sundra Naicka's case (supra), in my considered view, would not be applicable inasmuch as the concurrent finding in the present case, is not based merely on oral evidence but based on oral as well as documentary evidence. 10. However, let me examine how the Appellant/Defendant tried to prove his case of forgery. Ext.- 'Jha' is a certified copy of mutation order dated 08.10.1986 issued on 03.06.1992 in respect of the land measuring 1 Katha 5 Lechas covered by Dag No. 152, P.P. No. 34 produced by the Appellant/Defendant. Ext.-2 is also a certified copy of the mutation order dated 08.10.1986 issued on 24.10.1986 in respect of land measuring 1 Katha 5 Lechas covered by Dag No. 95, P.P. No. 4 produced by the Respondent/Plaintiff. Both the orders were passed on 08.10.1986 by the same SDC, Guwahati, in the same mutation case No. 1482/85-86. Ext. Ext.-2 is also a certified copy of the mutation order dated 08.10.1986 issued on 24.10.1986 in respect of land measuring 1 Katha 5 Lechas covered by Dag No. 95, P.P. No. 4 produced by the Respondent/Plaintiff. Both the orders were passed on 08.10.1986 by the same SDC, Guwahati, in the same mutation case No. 1482/85-86. Ext. 2 was obtained almost immediately on 24.10.1986 i.e. within 16 days from the date of passing of the mutation order when the record was fresh. On the other hand, Ext.-'Jha' was obtained on 03.06.1992 i.e. after more than 5 years from the date of mutation order when the record had already turned old. In Ext.- 2, the names of officials of the Revenue Office involved in issuing the certified copy have been indicated. Amongst them, one Sri Bhabani Nath is the copist. It is the Appellant/Defendant who made the allegation of forgery and fabrication against the Respondent/Plaintiff. The Respondent/Plaintiff has denied it. Therefore, the initial burden of proof would be on the Appellant/Defendant in view of Section 101 of Evidence Act, which reads as under: 101. Burden of Proof-- Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. 11. In terms of the aforesaid provision, the burden of proving of fact lies with the party who substantially asserts the affirmative issues and not the party who denies it. This burden of proof never shi its although the onus of proof may shift. Drawing the distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof, the Apex Court in Addagada Raghavamma and Anr. v. Addagadc Chenchamma and Anr., reported in AIR 1964 SC 136 , held that the burden of proof lies upon a person who has to prove the fact and which never shifts. However, the onus of proof shifts. Such shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. v. Addagadc Chenchamma and Anr., reported in AIR 1964 SC 136 , held that the burden of proof lies upon a person who has to prove the fact and which never shifts. However, the onus of proof shifts. Such shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. In the said case, it has been observed that in a suit for possession based on title, one the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability so as to shift the onus or the Defendant, it is for the Defendant to discharge his onus and in absence thereof, the burden of proof lying on the plaintiff shill be held to have been discharged so en to amount to proof of the plaintiff's title. The Apex Court in R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple and Anr., reported in (2003) 8 SCC 752 further held that in a suit for possession of property based on title, if the plaintiff creates a high degree of probability of his title to ownership instead of proving his title beyond all reasonable doubt, it would be enough to shift the onus on the Defendant and if the Defendant fails to shift back the onus, the plaintiffs burden of proof would stand discharged. 12. In the present case, the Respondent/Plaintiff produced the original sale deed (Ext-1) and she could prove her title on the suit land i.e. land covered by Dag No. 95 K.P. Patta No. 4. The original sale deed is the best documentary evidence and as against it, the Appellant/Defendant has produced the certified copy of the sale deed (Ext.- Gha) and a certified copy of mutation order dated 08.10.1986 (Ext.-- Jha) which are just secondary evidence, to disprove the plaintiffs title on the suit land. The Defendant's allegation of forgery would have stood substantiated if the plaintiff failed to produce the registered sale deed. Thus, the Defendant could not make out a case of shifting of burden of proof back to the plaintiff. The title of the Respondent/Plaintiff stood proved by discharging the burden of proof by the plaintiff. The case of forgery became a distant rather irrelevant issue, may be a none issue too. The reasons are not far to seek. Thus, the Defendant could not make out a case of shifting of burden of proof back to the plaintiff. The title of the Respondent/Plaintiff stood proved by discharging the burden of proof by the plaintiff. The case of forgery became a distant rather irrelevant issue, may be a none issue too. The reasons are not far to seek. The learned trial Court observed, which I must, say, rightly and must agree to, that- ...In this case we are not concerned about the land covered by Dag No. 152 & Patta No. 34. Because it is not the suit land as claimed by the Plaintiff/Defendant submitted that the suit land is a Govt. land and it is allotted to them by Govt. for construction of Sankar Kristi Kendra. Generally, there is no mutation in Govt. land. Then, if it is Govt. land, how the plaintiff got the Jamabandi and mutation order on the basis of the sale deed Ext.-1. And why the Defendants have not been able to prove the suit land is actually a Govt. land through SDC or Lat Mandal? The plaintiff might purchased the land that is covered by Dag No. 152 under Patta No. 34 by any other wrong means. But the suit land is on Dag No. 95, Patta No. 4, so in this case it was the duty of the parties to prove only the suit land and not other Dag and Patta numbers. The Defendant side was to be proved that the suit land covered by Dag No. 95 under Patta No. 4 is a 'Sarkari' land and 'Namghar' exists there. Moreover, from the document itself, it comes to my knowledge that Dag No. 97 is allotted to Sankardev Kristi Kendra. Considering the above mentioned discussions, it is clear that plaintiff purchased the suit land by a registered sale deed. This issue is decided in the positive and in favour of the plaintiff. Thus, Ext.- 'Cha' alone would not establish any case to lawful possession of the suit land by the Appellant/Defendant and as such, even if there is any non-consideration of Ext. 'Cha', which is not correct as discussed earlier, would not, in any way, vitiate the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below. The substantial questions of law Nos. 1 and 2 are answered accordingly against the Appellant/Defendant. 13. 'Cha', which is not correct as discussed earlier, would not, in any way, vitiate the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below. The substantial questions of law Nos. 1 and 2 are answered accordingly against the Appellant/Defendant. 13. For answering the substantial question of law No. 3, let me refer to Ext.- 'Cha' i.e. copy of certificate of registration of the Societies. The concerned Society was registered on 24.05.1989 i.e. much after the title suit was filed on 10.08.1988. Moreover, from the pleadings in the written statement, particularly, document No. 1 annexed to the written statement, it is found that the Defendants 1 and 2 are Joint Secretary and Executive Member respectively of the Society. No prejudice has been caused to the Society even though it was not arrayed as a party. Hence, this substantial question of law is also answered against the Appellant/Defendant. 14. The above discussion leads me to hold that there is no force and merit in this appeal. It is, therefore, liable to be dismissed and it is dismissed accordingly. But in the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. 15. Interim order dated 03.08.2000 passed by this Court, in connected Misc. Case No. 149/2000, stands vacated. 16. LCRs be remitted to the concerned Court below forthwith. Appeal dismissed.