Judgment :- Balakrishnan Nair, J. The respondents in the writ petition are the appellants. The respondent herein was the writ petitioner. 2. The brief facts of the case are the following : The respondent was appointed as Part Time Sweeper by the second appellant, as per Ext.P1 proceedings dated 22.5.2004. Going by the said proceedings, it is clear that the respondent's name has been sponsored by the Cherthala Employment Exchange, and based on such sponsoring, she was considered and selected for appointment. But, the said appointment was temporary and for a period of 179 days. When she was going to be terminated on completion of the term of appointment under Ext.P1, she filed the writ petition. The learned Single Judge noticed that the regular method of appointment of Part Time Sweeper, which is a post borne on Part Time Contingent Service, is through Employment Exchange. Therefore, though the appointment order said that it was provisional and only for a period of 179 days, it as held that it should be taken as a regular appointment. In that view of the matter, the writ petition was allowed. The appellants, feeling aggrieved by the said judgment, have preferred this Writ Appeal. 3. We heard the learned counsel on both sides. The learned Government Pleader, who appeared for the appellants, submitted that even though the regular method of appointment is through Employment Exchange, in this case, the appointment was only provisional and limited to 179 days or till a regular hand joins duty. Even in the case of posts, to which regular appointments are made through the Employment Exchange, occasionally provisional appointments are made in contingencies like the vacancies available are not substantive vacancies etc. This is one such case, it is submitted. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Sreekala v. Superintendent, Oldage Home (2008(2) KLT 13), in support of the above submissions. It was a case where a Cook was appointed in an Old Age Home, on being sponsored by the Employment Exchange. It was a temporary appointment. Though the incumbent claimed that her appointment should be treated as regular, as the same was made through the Employment Exchange, this Court repelled the said contention. It was held that even in cases where regular appointments are to be made through Employment Exchange, temporary appointments through Employment Exchange can be made for short periods. It was a temporary appointment. Though the incumbent claimed that her appointment should be treated as regular, as the same was made through the Employment Exchange, this Court repelled the said contention. It was held that even in cases where regular appointments are to be made through Employment Exchange, temporary appointments through Employment Exchange can be made for short periods. The above decision was concerning the post of Cook borne on the last grade service. The learned Government Pleader submitted that the principles enunciated therein would apply to the provisional appointment of part time contingent employees also. 4. The learned counsel for the respondent/writ petitioner submitted that in view of Annexure R1(a) order (G.O.(P) No.501/05/Fin. dated 25.11.2005), the contentions of the appellants are untenable. Going by that order, even if without reference to the Employment Exchange, the respondent was selected by the Sub Inspector concerned and engaged for sweeping work, she was entitled to get regularisation. In this case, it is pointed out that the respondent was sponsored by the Employment Exchange and the selection was made by a Board, which included the appointing authority, the District Superintendent of Police. 5. But for Ext.R1(a) order dated 25.11.2005, there will be substance in the contention of the appellants. But, in view of the aforementioned Government Order, we find it difficult to interfere with the direction issued by the learned Single Judge. The casual sweepers engaged from the open market, without any reference to the Employment Exchange, by the Head of the Office concerned, are regularized on the strength of the above order. In view of the above position, the case of the respondent, in any way, stands on a better footing. Therefore, we find no reason to interfere with the judgment under appeal. Accordingly, the Writ Appeal is dismissed.