JUDGEMENT 1. Heard learned counsel for the sole appellant and learned counsel for the sole respondent. 2. This second appeal has been filed by defendant-respondent-appellant challenging the judgment of reversal passed by the learned court of appeal below. 3. The matter arises out of Eviction Suit No. 291 of 2002, which was filed by plaintiff-appellant-respondent for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises on the ground of default in payment of rent by the defendant as well as personal necessity of the plaintiff and for other ancillary reliefs. The said suit was dismissed on contest by the learned Munsif, Bhabua (Kaimur) vide his judgment and decree dated 8.11.2007. 4. The said judgment and decree of the trial court was challenged by the plaintiff in Title Appeal No. 34 of 2007 (1/ 2008), which was allowed on contest by the learned Additional District Judge-cum- Fast Track Court No. 5, (Kaimur) vide his judgment and decree dated 4.9.2008, setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. Against the aforesaid judgment and decree of the lower appellate court, the instant second appeal has been filed by the defendant. 5. After considering the arguments of learned counsel for the parties and the materials on record, it is quite apparent that there is no dispute as to the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Hence, the learned trial court found relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, but did not find any default in payment of rent by the defendant prior to the filing of the suit, nor did it find any bona fide personal requirement of the plaintiff. Furthermore, even the learned court of appeal below did not find any default in payment of rent by the defendant prior to the filing of the suit, nor did it find any bona fide personal requirement of the plaintiff. However, the claim of the plaintiff was decreed by the learned court of appeal below on the ground of default in payment of rent by the defendant during the pendency of the title suit as a subsequent event. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently challenges the aforesaid judgment and decree of the learned court of appeal below on two grounds. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently challenges the aforesaid judgment and decree of the learned court of appeal below on two grounds. The first ground was that the learned court of appeal below did not discuss any oral evidence of the parties with regard to the respective claims of the plaintiff and the defendant in their pleadings and hence, according to him, the learned court of appeal below has violated the specific provision of law as settled by the Honble Apex Court in case of L.N. Aswathama vs. P. Prakash, reported in 2009(4) PLJR (SC) 11. 7. The second ground taken by learned counsel for the appellant was that no subsequent event regarding default was ever pleaded or proved by the plaintiff either in the trial court or in the court of appeal below and hence there was no occasion for the lower appellate court to take into consideration any subsequent event and decree the claim of the plaintiff on that ground. In this connection, learned counsel for the appellant relies upon two decisions of this Court in case of Sri Nand Gopal Prasad vs. Mostt. Prem Lata Devi & Ors., reported in 1985 PLJR 923 (paragraph 14) as well as in case of Mostt. Rukmini Devi & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Keshari & Ors., reported in 2001(1) PLJR 575 (paragraphs 16 to 19) and also upon a decision of the Honble Apex Court in case of Om Prakash Gupta vs. Ranbir B. Goyal, reported in AIR 2002 Supreme Court 665. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent contests the claim raised by learned counsel for the appellant and submits that in the trial court evidence had been led showing default in payment of rent by the defendant during the pendency of the title suit and the defendant himself had admitted non-payment of rent during the pendency of the suit in the rejoinder filed by him on 1.8.2006 as well as in his deposition before the trial court. He further submits that the trial court directed him to pay the said arrears of rent but the defendant paid it only in part in spite of instalments fixed by the trial court, but this aspect of the matter was not at all considered by the learned trial court at the time of final hearing and hence the lower appellate court was duty bound to consider the same and pass an order with respect thereto. 9. From the facts and circumstances of this case as well as from the materials on record as well as the provisions of law, it is quite apparent that no doubt earlier on 7.11.1984 a learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Shri Nand Gopal Prasad (supra) had held that any default that may be taken notice of in a suit for eviction for the purpose of evicting a tenant must be a default prior to the institution of the suit, but subsequently the law has been settled by the Honble Apex Court in case of Amarjit Singh vs. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain, reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court 741, in which it was held that in such suits events subsequent to the filing of the suit can be considered but cautiously. Thereafter, the Honble Apex Court in case of Om Prakash Gupta (supra) (paragraph 11) held that the ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystallized on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore, the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stood at the commencement of the lis. However, it was also held that the Court has power to take note of subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly subject to the following conditions being satisfied: (i) that the relief as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted; (ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or changed circumstances, would shorten litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties; and (iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise. 10. This Court also in case of Mostt. Rukmini Devi & Ors. 10. This Court also in case of Mostt. Rukmini Devi & Ors. (supra) has held that in an eviction suit the Court can take cognizance of event and developments subsequent to the institution of the suit but in doing so the court is obliged to see that rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. 11. Considering the aforesaid settled principles of law in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, it is quite clear that the relief claimed originally by the plaintiff with regard to default in payment of rent has become appropriate in the changed facts and circumstances of the case. Hence, the trial court was duty bound to consider the subsequent event but has miserably failed to do that. Hence, the learned court of appeal below was quite within its jurisdiction to consider the said subsequent event. 12. Furthermore, the plaintiff is admittedly the owner of the suit premises and the landlord of the defendant and hence the changed circumstance due to the subsequent event would definitely shorten the litigation and would enable complete justice being done to the parties with regard to their above claims. This aspect of the matter had also been completely ignored by the trial court. 13. Moreover, from the materials on record it is quite apparent that subsequent event of default in payment of rent during the pendency of the title suit was brought to the notice of the trial court promptly by the plaintiff, due to which the trial court gave specific directions to the defendant in that regard, but even the said directions were not fully complied by him. Even the defendant admitted default in payment of rent during the pendency of the title suit as would be apparent from his deposition as well as his rejoinder filed in the trial court. It is also apparent that the plaintiff led evidence with respect to default in payment of rent by the defendant during the pendency of the title suit and hence neither the rule of procedural law was violated nor the defendant can be deemed to be taken by surprise. 14. It is also apparent that the plaintiff led evidence with respect to default in payment of rent by the defendant during the pendency of the title suit and hence neither the rule of procedural law was violated nor the defendant can be deemed to be taken by surprise. 14. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it was necessary in the ends of justice for the trial court to consider the said subsequent event and to decide the matter in accordance with law, but the trial court having failed to do so, it was the duty of the lower appellate court to decide the matter and from the judgment and decree of the learned court of appeal below it is quite apparent that it has considered the matter in detail according to the specific principles of law as well as the pleadings and evidence of the parties. 15. So far question of non-consideration of oral evidence of the parties is concerned, the said evidence were only with respect to the default in payment of rent prior to the filing of the suit as well as the personal necessity of the plaintiff, which had been decided by the learned trial court against the plaintiff and the lower appellate court did not interfere with the said finding at all. Hence, non-consideration of evidence with respect to the aforesaid facts did not affect the defendant as on those points the judgment and decree of the trial (sic- court ?) was not reversed, rather the learned court of appeal below allowed the appeal and decreed the claim of the plaintiff only on the basis of the subsequent event of default in payment of rent by the plaintiff during the pendency of the title suit. Hence provision of Section 11(1)(d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982 as well as the decision of the Honble Apex Court in case of L.N. Aswathama (supra) relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant will have no bearing to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 16. Hence provision of Section 11(1)(d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982 as well as the decision of the Honble Apex Court in case of L.N. Aswathama (supra) relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant will have no bearing to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 16. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court does not find any illegality in the impugned judgment and decree of the learned court of appeal below nor does it find any substantial question of law involved in the instant second appeal, which is, accordingly, dismissed at this stage of hearing under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.