JUDGMENT:- S.P. Talukdar, J.: The petitioner, Dr. Tapas Roy Chowdhury, by filing the instant application under section 401 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has sought for setting aside of the order dated 8th May, 2007 passed by ld. 12th Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Kolkata, in connection with K2/D.D. Case No. 84 of 2004 under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code. Learned Court by the said order dismissed the application filed by the petitioner for his discharge. Grievances of the petitioner may briefly be stated as follows: -The petitioner is a reputed cardiac surgeon with many achievements and distinction. He treated one Priyanko Mukherjee, son of Aloke Kumar Mukherjee, during the period from 13th April, 1989 to 28th May, 1997. On 18th July, 2003, the said Priyanko Mukherjee, six years after being treated by the petitioner, expired. On the basis of a written complaint filed by the said Aloke Kumar Mukherjee, Shakespeare Sarani Police Station started a case being No. 84 of 2004 dated 20.3.2004 under section 304A of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner. The investigation authority after a perfunctory investigation submitted charge sheet being No. 19 of 2006 dated 21.2.2006 under section 304A of the I.P.C. against the petitioner in the Court of ld. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Kolkata. The said case was subsequently transferred to the ld. 12th Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Kolkata for disposal. The petitioner filed an application praying for discharge. This was opposed by the prosecution by filing a written objection. Learned Trial Court by order dated 8th May, 2007 dismissed the application filed by the present petitioner as accused person. Sri Aloke Kumar Mukherjee, as father of the alleged victim, Priyanko Mukherjee, filed an application before the State Consumer Forum on 13.7.2005 under section 12A read with Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the same was numbered as S.C. No. 23/0/2005. By filing the said application, he claimed an amount of Rs. 24 lakhs, as compensation for alleged deficiency in service. By order dated 23rd August, 2005, the Consumer Forum dismissed the said application being S.C. No. 23/0/2005. Being aggrieved by such order, the applicant therein filed an application before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. It was numbered as First Appeal No. 492 of 2005. By order dated 16th December, 2005, the said appeal was dismissed. By order dated 23rd August, 2005, the Consumer Forum dismissed the said application being S.C. No. 23/0/2005. Being aggrieved by such order, the applicant therein filed an application before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. It was numbered as First Appeal No. 492 of 2005. By order dated 16th December, 2005, the said appeal was dismissed. A Supplementary Affidavit was filed by and on behalf of the petitioner thereby bringing on record the copies of the various documents accompanying the formal charge sheet. Mr. Dastoor, as learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that there could be no such material before the ld. Court so as to justify continuation of the criminal proceeding under section 304 A of I.P.C. against the present petitioner. In his extensive argument, which was undoubtedly rich in content, Mr. Dastoor sought to establish that if the entire materials which the prosecution seeks to rely upon are accepted in entirety, the same cannot constitute an offence under section 304 A of I.P.C. Mr. Dastoor submitted that the copies of the various documents, as supplied to the petitioner, have been annexed to the Supplementary Affidavit. According to him, a close scrutiny of the said materials would inevitably indicate that the present petitioner could not even remotely be said to be rash and/or negligent in the treatment of the son of the private opposite party which could result in his death. Mr. Dastoor submitted that the order by which the ld. Magistrate took cognizance under section 304A of the I.P.C. and the impugned order dated 8th May, 2007 by which the ld. Trial Court dismissed the prayer for discharge would clearly reflect non-application of judicial mind on the part of the ld. Trial Court. It was contended that continuation of the proceeding would tantamount to abuse of the process of Court. In response to this, Mr. Ahmed, appearing as learned Counsel for the opposite party/State, submitted that the anxiety, as ventilated on behalf of the present petitioner, is premature. Mr. Ahmed contended that this is not the appropriate stage for a detailed analysis of the materials available on record. According to Mr. Ahmed, law does not permit the ld. Trial Court to discharge an accused person at this stage and it would not be just and proper for this Court either to intervene in exercise of its powers under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Mr. According to Mr. Ahmed, law does not permit the ld. Trial Court to discharge an accused person at this stage and it would not be just and proper for this Court either to intervene in exercise of its powers under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Mr. Jyotirmoy Adhikary being led by Mr. N.R. Adhikary, submitted that the point for adjudication before the learned Trial Court was whether the criminal proceeding is barred by limitation or not. Learned Court by the impugned order dated 8th May, 2007 dealt with such technical plea. There had been no prayer for discharge nor the petitioner in the revisional application challenged the maintainability of the criminal proceeding. From the materials available on record, it is found that the present petitioner/accused person filed an application praying for his discharge. In such application, he claimed that the son of the defacto complainant was, no doubt, under his treatment during the period from 13.4.1989 to 28.5.1997. The cause of action, if any, thus, arose during the said period of time. Criminal proceeding having been initiated on 20th March, 2004 i.e., after a lapse of six years ten months (approx) and cognizance having been taken after a lapse of more than eight months, the said proceeding cannot be permitted to continue further. It was claimed that as per provision of Section 468(2) (c), the period of limitation for taking cognizance is three years for the offence under section 304A of I.P.C. In the application filed before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission compensation of Rs. 26 lakhs was prayed for. It could be very well assumed that the present petitioner treated the child for the last time on 28.5.1997. Taking this into consideration the State Commission while dismissing the application held that the death of the child cannot be directly linked to the treatment given by the present petitioner/doctor about eight years back, It is not in dispute that the National Commission dismissed the appeal and that too, on the ground that the approach made by the present opposite party, being the father of the alleged victim boy, was barred by limitation. It was urged before the learned Trial Court that it was within the knowledge of the complainant that the wrong treatment or advice made by the present petitioner was on or before 29th May, 1997. It was urged before the learned Trial Court that it was within the knowledge of the complainant that the wrong treatment or advice made by the present petitioner was on or before 29th May, 1997. Thus, it was urged before the learned Trial Court that cognizance could only be taken within three years from the said date i.e., 29th May, 1997. In the present case, cognizance having been taken long after expiry of eight years and eight months, it was barred by limitation. Learned Trial Court by order dated 8th May, 2007 took into consideration the fact that so far starting of limitation period is concerned in a case under section 304A of I.P.C., it can only be after the death of the victim. It was held that the period of limitation cannot start running unless the offence is completed and in case of death caused by Negligent Act, period of limitation starts running from the date of death of the victim and not prior to that. Learned Trial Court also referred to a number of decisions as cited before him at the time of hearing. It appears from the impugned order that the present petitioner/accused person also raised the point that there had been delay of 9 ½ years in proceeding with an offence under section 279 read with Sections 304A/338 of I.P.C. and as such, it was liable to be quashed being hit by Article 21 of the Constitution. Learned Court very rightly observed that it was within the power of Apex Court to quash such a proceeding in exercise of its constitutional authority but that could not be a precedent before the learned Court of Magistrate. After due consideration of all relevant facts and materials, I find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to hold any view contrary to that of the learned Magistrate as reflected from the impugned order. On behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Dastoor submitted that it is within the scope of an application under section 482 of Cr.P.C. and certainly within the right of an accused person to invite attention of the Court to the materials, which the prosecution seeks to rely upon. On behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Dastoor submitted that it is within the scope of an application under section 482 of Cr.P.C. and certainly within the right of an accused person to invite attention of the Court to the materials, which the prosecution seeks to rely upon. It was emphatically submitted that the copies of the various documents and medical papers as annexed to the Supplementary Affidavit are only copies of the documents supplied to the accused person in compliance with Section 207 of the Cr.P.C. It is true that while dealing with an application under section 482 of Cr.P.C., this Court should not ordinarily permit an accused petitioner to rely upon something extraneous. But this Court can very well take into consideration as to whether the materials, as proposed to be relied upon by the prosecution in the entirety, can make out an offence or not. Since in the present case, no attempt has been made by the petitioner to rely upon something extraneous, I do not find any justification for ventilating any grievance in that regard as made by Mr. Ahmed for the opposite party/State and by Mr. Adhikary for the private opposite party. In course of submission, the written complaint dated 19th March, 2004 had been read between the lines. In it, the complainant alleged that in the early part of 1988, his son was diagnosed as suffering from ‘cyanotic congenital heart disease, pulmonary atresia with V.S.D. aertio pulmonary collaterals’. Dr. S. S. Chatterjee, P.G. Poly Clinic suggested that the only remedy was by way of operation which would be only possible either in Australia or in U.S.A. since adequate management was not possible at that time in India. Dr. S.C. Kundu, Consultant Cardiologist thereafter referred his son to Dr. Tapas Ray chaudhury. On 13th April, 1989, Dr. Ray chaudhury assured to treat and cure his son under his guidance either at Australia or at U.S.A. after his son grows a little taller and achieves the target weight of around 20-25 kgs. The complainant alleged that from 13th April, 1989 onwards, Dr. Ray chaudhury started regular treatment of his son. For a long period of eight years, the complainant kept his son under care and guidance of Dr. Ray chaudhury. In 1989, Dr. The complainant alleged that from 13th April, 1989 onwards, Dr. Ray chaudhury started regular treatment of his son. For a long period of eight years, the complainant kept his son under care and guidance of Dr. Ray chaudhury. In 1989, Dr. Ray chaudhury issued another certificate wherein he added that along with the said target weight, the boy was required to reach the age of 10 years and in that event, he would himself arrange for his son’s operation either in Australia or in U.S.A. The complainant continued to maintain written communication with CMC, Vellore and whenever he used to receive any guidance or instruction from there he used to bring it to the notice of Dr. Ray chaudhury and he used to be assured of the best treatment either at Australia or in U.S.A. It was further stated by the complainant that he showed Dr. Tapas Ray chaudhury, the article published early in June, 1990 in Sunday Magazine entitled ‘born again’ which reported that such operation was ideally possible in case of new born child, but he ignored and reminded him of his certificate dated 16.11.1989. The complainant categorically alleged that due to negligent treatment of Dr. Tapas Ray chaudhury, his son developed multiple MAPCAS. Despite being advised by other doctors, the complainant could not have had a homograft operation of his son since Dr. Ray chaudhury did not care or take any step. As a result, the victim breathed his last at Apollo Hospital, Chennai on 18th of July, 2003. The petitioner in a desperate bid to save life of his son went to different institutions including Escorts Heart Research at New Delhi, B.M. Birla Heart Research, Kolkata as well as Apollo, Chennai. He was, however, told that the ailment had taken acute form ‘mainly due to multiple MAPCAS and high lungs pressure’ caused by earlier treatment under Dr. Tapas Ray chaudhury. Those institutions were initially reluctant even to admit his son. He was told that the situation took such tragic shape in view of the gross negligence of Dr. Tapas Ray chaudhury and the reports contained hints that if proper treatment could be done at the early stage, life of his son could be saved. Tapas Ray chaudhury. Those institutions were initially reluctant even to admit his son. He was told that the situation took such tragic shape in view of the gross negligence of Dr. Tapas Ray chaudhury and the reports contained hints that if proper treatment could be done at the early stage, life of his son could be saved. In the complaint, the petitioner further claimed that there had been delay in lodging of the complaint since the petitioner was engaged in rushing from one institution to another and the premature death of his son put the entire family in a state of shock and despair. His wife has reportedly become a psychiatric patient. Mr. Adhikary, as learned Counsel for the added respondent, submitted that the present petitioner filed an application praying for his discharge on the ground that the case was barred by limitation. Learned Court by order dated 8th May, 2007, rejected the said application and being aggrieved by such order of rejection dated 8th May, 2007, the petitioner approached this Court. Only at the time of hearing of the application, the petitioner filed a Supplementary Affidavit annexing thereto copies of the various documents supplied to him in compliance with Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such added respondent No. 1, thus, raised a point regarding entertainability of all such grievances since the original revisional application and the relief sought for therein are entirely directed against order dated 8th May, 2007. Mr. Adhikary submitted that the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly and only in rare and exceptional cases. This Court can exercise its inherent power under Section 482 and quash a proceeding if after perusing the entire prosecution documents, it is found that the prosecution case falls short of the minimum legal requirement. Before commencement of the trial, it is neither possible nor desirable to guess the veracity. It is submitted that at this nascent stage, this Court is not expected to consider the matter in details and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts if proved would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. Before commencement of the trial, it is neither possible nor desirable to guess the veracity. It is submitted that at this nascent stage, this Court is not expected to consider the matter in details and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts if proved would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. When after consideration of the entire materials the prosecution seeks to rely upon, it is found that no case could be made out and the allegations do not disclose any prima facie offence, there, in that event only, this Court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It is not the stage to judge whether the case is likely to end in conviction of the accused. It is enough if there is strong suspicion leading to the presumption that an offence had been committed and in that event, this Court would certainly not be justified in interfering. The revisional application was filed with the prayer for setting aside of the order dated 8th May, 2007 passed by ld. 12th Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Kolkata. Mr. Adhikary quite rightly submitted that by the said order, learned Court rejected the application dated 8th September, 2006 filed by the present petitioner challenging maintainability of the criminal proceeding on the ground of limitation. On perusal of the impugned order, I find that the learned Court took into consideration the fact that victim was under treatment of the present petitioner/accused person during the period from 13th of April, 1989 to 28th May, 1997. If there had been any negligence on the part of the petitioner, the same must have been during the said period. It cannot be disputed that the victim expired on 18th of July, 2003 i.e., about six years after. Learned Court very rightly took the date of death into consideration while computing the period of limitation. Learned Court was perfectly justified in mentioning that so far as starting of limitation period is concerned, in a case under Section 304A of I.P.C., limitation can only run with the expiry of the victim. Period of limitation runs from the date of completion of the offence. At the time of hearing of the revisional application, learned Counsel Mr. Dastoor, however, did not lay much emphasis on that aspect. Period of limitation runs from the date of completion of the offence. At the time of hearing of the revisional application, learned Counsel Mr. Dastoor, however, did not lay much emphasis on that aspect. In fact, by way of filing a Supplementary Affidavit, the petitioner shifted his stand and sought for quashing the entire criminal proceeding. The main emphasis in the argument of Mr. Dastoor was that there could be no such material before the learned Court of Magistrate so as to justify proceeding with the case for the alleged offence under Section 304A of IPC. It was mentioned that it could be that the Court of learned Magistrate had its own restrictions but, according to him, so far Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is concerned, this Court can very well quash a proceeding when it finds that no offence in law could be made out by the prosecution. Mr. Dastoor deriving inspiration from the Apex Court decision in the case between Jacob Mathew And State of Punjab & Anr., as reported in (2005) 6 SCC 1 , submitted that to prosecute a medial professional for negligence under criminal law it must be shown that the accused did something or failed to do something which in the given facts and circumstances, no medical professional in his ordinary senses and prudence would have done or failed to do. The Apex Court while dealing with ‘criminal medical negligence’ observed: Indiscriminate prosecution of medical professionals for criminal negligence is counterproductive and does no service or good to society. A medical practitioner faced with an emergency ordinarily tries his best to redeem the patient out of his suffering. He does not gain anything by acting with negligence or by omitting to do an act. Obviously, therefore, it will be for the complainant to clearly make out a case of negligence before a medical practitioner is charged with or proceeded against criminally. A surgeon with shaky hands under fear of legal action cannot perform a successful operation and a quivering physician cannot administer the end-dose of medicine to his patient. Obviously, therefore, it will be for the complainant to clearly make out a case of negligence before a medical practitioner is charged with or proceeded against criminally. A surgeon with shaky hands under fear of legal action cannot perform a successful operation and a quivering physician cannot administer the end-dose of medicine to his patient. It was further observed: “If the hands be trembling with the dangling fear of facing a criminal prosecution in the event of failure for whatever reason – whether attributable to himself or not, neither can a surgeon successfully wield his life-saving scalpel to perform an essential surgery, nor can a physician successfully administer the life-saving dose of medicine. Discretion being the better part of valour, a medical professional would feel better advised to leave a terminal patient to his own fate in the case of emergency where the chance of success may be 10% (or so), rather than taking the risk of making a last ditch effort towards saving the subject and facing a criminal prosecution if his effort fails. Such timidity forced upon a doctor would be a disservice to society.” As referred to by Mr. Dastoor, the criminal law has invariably placed medical professionals on a pedestal different from ordinary mortals. The Apex Court in the said context referred to Section 88, Section 92 and Section 93 of the I.P.C. Observation of the Apex Court in that regard is: “The Indian Penal Code enacted as far back as in the year 1860 sets out a few vocal examples. Section 88 in the Chapter on General Exceptions provides exemption for acts not intended to cause death, done by consent in good faith for person’s benefit. Section 92 provides for exemption for acts done in good faith for the benefit of a person without his consent though the acts cause harm to the person and that person has not consented to suffer such harm……………… Section 93 saves from criminality certain communications made in good faith.” In the case of Jacob Mathew (Supra), the Apex Court relied upon the statement of law on criminal negligence by reference to surgeons, doctors etc. and unskilful treatment contained in Roscoe’s Law of Evidence (15th Edn.). and unskilful treatment contained in Roscoe’s Law of Evidence (15th Edn.). The same is reproduced as follows: “Where a person, acting as a medical man etc., whether licensed or unlicensed, is so negligent in his treatment of a patient that death results, it is manslaughter if the negligence was so great as to amount to a crime, and whether or not there was such a degree of negligence is a question in each case for the jury. In explaining to juries the test which they should apply to determine whether the negligence in the particular case amounted or did not amount to a crime, Judges have used many epithets, such as ‘culpable’, ‘criminal’, ‘gross’, ‘wicked’, ‘clear’, ‘complete’. But whatever epithet be used and whether an epithet be used or not, in order to establish criminal liability the facts must be such that, in the opinion of the jury, the negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving punishment. Whether he be licensed or unlicensed, if he display gross ignorance, or gross inattention, or gross rashness, in his treatment, he is criminally responsible. Where a person who, though not educated as an accoucheur, had been in the habit of acting as a manmidwife, and had unskilfully treated a woman who died in childbirth, was indicted for the murder. L. Ellenborough said that there was no evidence of murder, but the jury might convict of manslaughter. To substantiate that charge the prisoner must have been guilty of criminal misconduct, arising either from the grossest ignorance or the [most?] criminal inattention. One or other of these is necessary to make him guilty of that criminal negligence and misconduct which is essential to make out a case of manslaughter” Reference was made to the Privy Council decision in the case of John Oni Akerele v. R., as reported in AIR 1943 PC 72. Their Lordships in the said case observed: (i) That a doctor is not criminally responsible for a patient’s death unless his negligence or incompetence went beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects and showed such disregard for life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State. Their Lordships in the said case observed: (i) That a doctor is not criminally responsible for a patient’s death unless his negligence or incompetence went beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects and showed such disregard for life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State. (ii) That the degree of negligence required is that it should be gross, and that neither a jury nor a court can transform negligence of a lesser degree into gross negligence merely by giving it that appellation……. There is a difference in kind between the negligence which gives a right to compensation and the negligence which is a crime. (iii) It is impossible to define culpable or criminal negligence, and it is not possible to make the distinction between actionable negligence and criminal negligence intelligible, except by means of illustrations drawn from actual judicial opinions. It was held that the most favourable view of the conduct of an accused medical man has to be taken, for it would be most fatal to the efficiency of the medical profession if no one could administer medicine without a halter round his neck. In Kurban Hussein Mohammedali Rangwalla v. State of Maharashtra, as reported in (1965) 2 SCR 622 , while dealing with Section 304-A of IPC, the following statement of law by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Omkar Rampratap, (1902) 4 Bom LR 679, was cited with approval : “To impose criminal liability under Section 304-A, Indian Penal Code, it is necessary that the death should have been the direct result of a rash and negligent act of the accused, and that act must be the proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of another’s negligence. It must be the causa causans; it is not enough that it may have been the causa sine qua non.” It was further submitted by Mr. Dastoor that for negligence to amount to an offence, the element of mens rea must be shown to exist. For an act to amount to criminal negligence, the degree of negligence should be much higher i.e. gross or of a very high degree. Negligence which is neither gross nor of a higher degree may provide a ground for action in civil law but cannot form the basis for prosecution. For an act to amount to criminal negligence, the degree of negligence should be much higher i.e. gross or of a very high degree. Negligence which is neither gross nor of a higher degree may provide a ground for action in civil law but cannot form the basis for prosecution. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that there is need for protecting doctors from frivolous or unjust prosecutions. He referred to the observation in the case of Jacob Mathew (Supra) that the investigating officer should, before proceeding against the doctor accused of rash or negligent act or omission, obtain an independent and competent medical opinion preferably from a doctor in government service, qualified in that branch of medical practice who can normally be expected to give an impartial and unbiased opinion. Assailing the criminal proceeding under reference, Mr. Dastoor submitted that there can be no rational justification for allowing such a misconceived criminal proceeding to continue any further. On the other hand, Mr. Kasem Ali Ahmed, appearing as learned Counsel for the State, categorically submitted that there is hardly any scope for entertaining the grievances, as ventilated on behalf of the petitioner at this stage. Deriving support from the decision of the Apex Court in the case between State of Maharashtra And Some Nath Thapa, as reported in 1996 Cri LJ 2448, it was submitted that probative value of statement of witness should not be gone into at this stage. Referring to the decision in the case between Munshi Ram & Ors. And Delhi Administration, as reported in AIR 1968 SC 702 , it was submitted that if the accused takes the plea of private defence, it is his burden, which can be discharged by showing preponderance of probabilities in favour of that plea on the basis of material on record. Though the decision of the Apex Court in the case between Pershadi And State of Uttar Pradesh, as reported in AIR 1957 SC 211 , was referred to, having regard to the issues involved in the said case, I do not think that it has much relevance for the purpose of adjudication of the controversy raised herein. Mr. Adhikari, appearing as learned Counsel for the defacto complainant, analyzed the various materials collected during investigation. The same could very well find reflection in the Supplementary Affidavit filed by the petitioner/accused person. He referred to the report of Dr. Mr. Adhikari, appearing as learned Counsel for the defacto complainant, analyzed the various materials collected during investigation. The same could very well find reflection in the Supplementary Affidavit filed by the petitioner/accused person. He referred to the report of Dr. A. K. Gupta submitted on 25.5.2005. Dr. Gupta in the said report opined that being not a Paediatric Cardio Thoracic Surgeon, the petitioner transgressed his limit as Cardio Thoracic Surgeon by not referring the case timely to the concerned expert. It was further submitted that how far the findings of Dr. Gupta can pass the test of judicial scrutiny is a matter which can best be appreciated at the stage of trial. Mr. Adhikari further referred to the opinions of some other doctors like Dr. Swapan Kumar Jana, Dr. Sukumar Chandra Kundu and Dr. S. S. Chatterjee in support of his contention that the manner in which the petitioner treated the victim would certainly indicate rashness and negligence on his part. Mr. Adhikari further referred to the prescription dated 29th May, 1997 of Dr. Debasish Biswas as well as the discharge summary of the Escort Heart Institute and Research Centre dated 8.4.1998. This was in support of his contention that all those opinions of various doctors would harmoniously combine so as to establish criminal negligence on the part of the petitioner. Mr. Adhikari referred to the observation of Salmond regarding ‘culpable carelessness’. It was observed that ‘when I consciously expose another to the risk of wrongful harm without any wish to harm him and harm actually ensures, it is inflicted not willfully, since it was not desired, nor inadvertently, since it was foreseen as possible or even probable, but nevertheless negligently.’ Mr. Adhikari deriving inspiration from the decision in the case between B. Jagdish & Anr. And State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., as reported in (2009) 1 SCC 681 , submitted if there are two sets of opinion; one in favour of the complainant and another in favour of the accused, it is for the trial Judge to decide as to which opinion would ultimately prevail and that can only be done upon considering the evidence adduced by the parties. He further submitted that at the stage of quashing of an order taking cognizance, an accused cannot be permitted to use the material, which would be available to him only as his defence. He further submitted that at the stage of quashing of an order taking cognizance, an accused cannot be permitted to use the material, which would be available to him only as his defence. The Apex Court in the case of B. Jagdish (Supra) observed that a person should not profess himself to be a child specialist unless he has the requisite expertise. It was then categorically submitted that the veracity and authenticity of the opinion of the expert cannot be assessed at the pretrial stage at the time of hearing of an application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was submitted by Mr. Dastoor that further proceeding of the case under reference, in view of its latent weakness and inherent infirmity, will amount to abuse of the process of Court. In response to this, Mr. Kasem Ali Ahmed, appearing as learned Counsel for the State, submitted that the petitioner-accused person consistently misrepresented himself and misguided the family and that he was not a Paediatric Cardio Surgeon should have been spelt out. Mr. Ahmed further submitted that there is very little scope for appreciation of evidence on merits at this nascent stage. This Court can exercise its inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and quash a proceeding but that power deserves to be exercised only in rarest of the rare cases and in order to prevent manifest injustice. Mr. Adhikary joined Mr. Ahmed while submitting that the materials on record would reflect conscious calculated inaction on the part of the accused amounting to rashness and negligence. It is settled law that the extraordinary jurisdiction could be exercised by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of the various kind of cases wherein such power should be exercised. By invoking inherent power the High Court cannot embark upon any enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not conform an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice. By invoking inherent power the High Court cannot embark upon any enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not conform an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice. (Ref: State of Kerala Vs. O. C. Kuttan, 1999 SCC (Cri) 304), Following the guidelines as laid down by the Apex Court in the case between State of Haryana And Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 and the observations made in the case between Rupen Deol Bajaj And K.P.S. Gill, AIR 1996 SC 309 , it can very well be said that the allegations made in the case and the materials collected, if uncontroverted, certainly make out a case and disclose an offence and as such, this cannot be a case which deserves to be quashed at this stage in exercise of this Court’s power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. As such, the application, being C.R.R. No. 2694 of 2007 fails and be dismissed. Needless to add, the petitioner will have liberty to raise all the points and ventilate his grievances at the appropriate stage. Learned Court will not be influenced by any observation made by this Court hereinbefore. Interim order, if any stands vacated. Send a copy of this judgment along with the LCR, if any, to the learned Trial Court for information and necessary action. Criminal department is directed to supply certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, to the learned Court for both parties as expeditiously as possible.