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2010 DIGILAW 703 (KER)

Husband v. Wife

2010-09-15

M.L.JOSEPH FRANCIS, R.BASANT

body2010
JUDGMENT : R. Basant, J. Does the concept of matrimonial cruelty vary in accordance with the religious persuasions of individuals? Is a spouse bound to suffer greater amount of matrimonial cruelty because the spouses belong to a religion which considered marriage as indissoluble? Can the secular constitutional republic recognize and accept the existence of different varieties of matrimonial cruelty - Hindu cruelty, Christian cruelty, Muslim cruelty and secular cruelty? Should not matrimonial cruelty entitling a spouse for divorce yield to a uniform conceptualization notwithstanding the different semantics employed in different pieces of matrimonial legislations applicable to different religions? Should not the courts take inspiration from Art.44 of the Constitution and attempt to understand the concept of matrimonial cruelty in a uniform manner to ensure that the right to life under Art.21 is made effective and meaningful under the matrimonial roof and to liberate spouses from a marital life in perpetual fear of contumacious cruelty? These questions arise before us in these appeals. 2. These appeals are directed against a common judgment under which three Original Petitions were disposed of by the Family Court, Ernakulam. 3. The parties are spouses. Their marriage took place in accordance with the Christian religious rites on 20.1.2001. The marriage is admitted. After marriage, the spouses set up residence at Mumbai. They resided together till 14.5.2004. On that day, the respondent/wife returned from the matrimonial home and took up residence along with her sister at Bangalore. She issued Ext.A1 notice demanding divorce and return of properties on 14.12.2004. The same was served on the appellant. There was no response to Ext.A1. Thereafter, the appellant filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights before the Family Court, Bandra on 30.12.2004. Later, the same was transferred to Family Court, Ernakulam as per order of the Supreme Court and the same was renumbered as O.P.399 of 2006. The wife filed O.P.69 of 2005 before Family Court, Ernakulam claiming divorce on the ground of cruelty and non consummation of marriage. Wife had further filed O.P.68 of 2005 claiming return of gold ornaments, money etc. The husband/appellant herein in O.P.68 of 2005 had staked a counter claim for return of ornaments, money etc. allegedly due to him. All the three Original Petitions along with the counter claim were taken up for trial together by the court below. 4. Wife had further filed O.P.68 of 2005 claiming return of gold ornaments, money etc. The husband/appellant herein in O.P.68 of 2005 had staked a counter claim for return of ornaments, money etc. allegedly due to him. All the three Original Petitions along with the counter claim were taken up for trial together by the court below. 4. The wife examined herself as PW1, her mother as PW2 and her brother in law as PW3. Exts.A1 to A9 were marked on her side. The husband examined himself as RW1 and two friends of his as Rws 2 and 3. Exts.B1 to B10 were marked. 5. The learned Judge of the Family Court, by the impugned common order, came to the conclusion that the wife was entitled for a decree for divorce on the ground of cruelty under S.10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act. The claim of the wife for divorce under S.10(1)(vii) on the ground of refusal to consummate the marriage was rejected by the Family Court. O.P.69 of 2005 was thus allowed. Husband's prayer for restitution of conjugal rights in O.P.399 of 2006 was turned down by Family Court. The claim for return of money in O.P.68 of 2005 was allowed in part. The counter claim of the husband was rejected. 6. Both parties appear to have accepted the decree/order in O.P.68 of 2005 and the counter claim. No appeal is seen preferred against the said part of the impugned order by either spouse. The appellant/husband has preferred these appeals to assail the decree for divorce on the ground of cruelty under S.10(1)(x) and the rejection of his claim for a decree for restitution of conjugal rights under S.32 of the Divorce Act. 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent. The learned counsel for the appellant assails the impugned order on the following grounds. (i) The court below has significantly omitted to record a specific finding on the disputed question of cruelty. (ii) The court below should, at any rate, have held that the ground of cruelty under S.10(1)(x) has not been validly established by the evidence adduced by the wife. (iii) The court below ought to have granted a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in favour of the appellant/husband. Ground No. 1: 8. (ii) The court below should, at any rate, have held that the ground of cruelty under S.10(1)(x) has not been validly established by the evidence adduced by the wife. (iii) The court below ought to have granted a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in favour of the appellant/husband. Ground No. 1: 8. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the court below had significantly omitted to pointedly consider the question whether the claim for divorce on the ground of cruelty under S.10(1)(x) has been established by the evidence tendered by the wife. The learned counsel particularly points out the following observations/findings in paras. 23 and 24 to contend that the issue had not received the pointed consideration which it deserves. We extract Paras. 23 and 24. “23. On going through the evidence tendered by PW1 and RW1, it is evident that the parties were not so cordial at the time when they were residing together at Mumbai. There was no consensus of mind between the petitioner and the respondent. It has come out in evidence that there were frequent quarrels between them. The petitioner has alleged that it was the respondent who subjected her to cruelty. The respondent has stated that the petitioner was more interested in her career than retaining a family relationship. He has also stated that at times, the petitioner acted hysterically as if she has some mental imbalance. The evidence tendered by PW2, PW3, RW2 and RW3 will not be of any help to substantiate the contention of cruelty alleged by the petitioner. The answers given by PW1 and RW1 with respect to their private life reveal that there was no healthy interaction between the spouses in their private life. The reason why she was compelled to return to her sister's house at Bangalore has been explained by PW1. According to RW1, the petitioner left his flat at the time when he was on business trip. Even though the respondent has contended that the petitioner behaved like an abnormal person, no medical records were produced to substantiate the same. On evaluation of the evidence tendered by PW1 and RW1 it is revealed that their marital life was not happy and that there was no healthy interaction between them. It shows that there was no cordial or affectionate relationship between the petitioner and the respondent. 24. On evaluation of the evidence tendered by PW1 and RW1 it is revealed that their marital life was not happy and that there was no healthy interaction between them. It shows that there was no cordial or affectionate relationship between the petitioner and the respondent. 24. Under S.10(1)(x), in order to obtain a decree of divorce the petitioner has to substantiate that the respondent subjected her to cruelty so as to cause reasonable apprehension in her mind that it will be harmful or injurious for her to reside along with him. The answers given by PW1 and RW1 during cross examination reveal that it will be harmful for the petitioner to continue the marital relationship with the respondent. The marital relationship between the petitioner and the respondent has been broken and it has reached upto a stage that it is not possible to have a peaceful and happy life between them. In such circumstances, the conclusion that can be arrived at is that the petitioner is entitled to get a decree of divorce against the respondent on the ground of cruelty”. (emphasis supplied) 9. We are unable to agree that the above findings do not constitute a sufficient finding required under S.10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act. The findings recorded above clearly show that the court below had come to a positive conclusion that the perception of the respondent/wife that it will be harmful for her to live with the appellant/husband and continue marital relationship with the appellant has been accepted by the court below. The court below has further held that a decree for divorce against the appellant herein on the ground of cruelty deserves to be granted. Thus, we are unable to accept the contention laboriously advanced by the counsel for the appellant that there is no sufficient or specific finding rendered by the court below to justify a decree for divorce on the ground of cruelty under S.10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act. The challenge on this ground - on the ground of want of a specific and definite finding on the plea of cruelty, must, in these circumstances, fail. Ground No. 2: 10. The learned counsel for the appellant alternatively contends that, at any rate, the said finding that the wife is entitled to a decree for divorce on the ground of cruelty under S.10(1)(x) is not justified. Ground No. 2: 10. The learned counsel for the appellant alternatively contends that, at any rate, the said finding that the wife is entitled to a decree for divorce on the ground of cruelty under S.10(1)(x) is not justified. There is no material in support of that conclusion, argues the learned counsel. The learned counsel for the respondent/wife on the contrary, contends that even assuming that specific finding on the alleged acts of physical and mental cruelty have not been rendered by the court below, respondent/wife is entitled before this appellate court to contend that sufficient materials are available in evidence to support the impugned decree by which relief of dissolution on the ground of cruelty has been granted. We are satisfied and it is trite that the relief granted can be attempted to be supported on other grounds by a litigant defending the decree in appeal. 11. That takes us to the all important question as to whether sufficient evidence has been adduced to justify the finding in favour of the wife that appellant/husband is guilty of matrimonial cruelty. The claim for divorce under S.10(1) (vii) has been rejected and it is unnecessary for us to go into the evidence tendered on that aspect. However, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the wife/respondent herein, some of the evidence tendered on that ground will have relevance to the claim of sexual misconduct amounting to cruelty also. To that extent, the evidence tendered in support of the claim for divorce under S.10(1)(vii) will have to be reckoned as relevant. (Ed. Note: Paragraphs 12 to 23 omitted being appreciation of evidence). 24. Having discussed the facts as above, the short question is whether these findings of fact can justify a decree for divorce under S.10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that in order to answer the description of cruelty under S.10(1)(x), a much higher degree of cruelty has to be established. According to him, natural wear and tear of matrimony will have to be excluded. 25. The learned counsel for the appellant raises a contention that cruelty under the matrimonial law cannot be reckoned as identical for all religious denominations. The counsel advances a curious argument that so far as a christian couple are concerned, much higher decree of cruelty has to be established to justify a decree of divorce under S.10(1)(x). 25. The learned counsel for the appellant raises a contention that cruelty under the matrimonial law cannot be reckoned as identical for all religious denominations. The counsel advances a curious argument that so far as a christian couple are concerned, much higher decree of cruelty has to be established to justify a decree of divorce under S.10(1)(x). The counsel points out that cruelty by itself as a ground for divorce was not recognised under the Divorce Act till Act 51 of 2001 which came into effect from 3.10.2001. The counsel hence argues that such cruelty as would justify a decree for dissolution of a christian marriage has not been established. 26. We shall straightaway refer to S.10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act which reads as follows:- “10. Grounds for dissolution of marriage.-- (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001, may, on a petition presented to the District Court either by the husband or the wife, be dissolved on the ground that since the solemnization of the marriage, the respondent-- (i) xxxxxxxxxxxx (x) has treated the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the respondent”. (Rest of the Section except (x)omitted as not essential for our purpose). 27. The learned counsel for the appellant points out to us the provisions for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty under other pieces of matrimonial law applicable to different communities. The counsel first of all points out the provisions in S.13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act which reads as follows:- “Divorce.-- (1) Any marriage solemnised, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party- (i) xxxxxxxxxxxx (ia) has, after the solemnisation of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty”. 28. The counsel then points out that provisions of the Special Marriage Act dealing with divorce on the ground of cruelty. S.27(1)(d) of Special Marriage Act deals with cruelty. 28. The counsel then points out that provisions of the Special Marriage Act dealing with divorce on the ground of cruelty. S.27(1)(d) of Special Marriage Act deals with cruelty. We extract the same below:- “Divorce.-- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and to the rules made thereunder, a petition for divorce may be presented to the district court either by the husband or the wife on the ground that the respondent – (a) xxxxx (b) xxxxx (c) xxxxx (d) has since the solemnization of the marriage treated the petitioner with cruelty;". (irrelevant portions omitted) 29. The learned counsel then points out S.2(viii) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act which we extract below:- “Grounds for decree for dissolution of marriage - A woman married under Muslim law shall be entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on any one or more of the following grounds, namely:- (i) xxxxxxx (ii) xxxxxxx (iii) xxxxxxx (iv) xxxxxxx (v) xxxxxxx (vi) xxxxxxx (vii) xxxxxxx (viii) that the husband treats her with cruelty, that is to say,- (a) habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable by cruelty of conduct even if such conduct does not amount to physical ill- treatment, or (b) associates with women of evil repute or leads an infamous life, or (c) attempts to force her to lead an immoral life, or (d) disposes of her property or prevents her exercising her legal rights over it, or (e) obstructs her in the observance of her religious profession or practice, or (f) if he has more wives than one, does not treat her equitably in accordance with the injunctions of the Quran”. 30. The sum and substance of the argument of the learned counsel boils down to this. The spouses belonging to different communities are entitled to indulge in different standards of cruelty against spouses without the risk of a decree for divorce. Some of them are entitled to indulge in more cruelty than those belonging to other religions. The concept of indissolubility of marriage in the Christian religion is such that matrimonial cruelty which would have entitled a woman belonging to other religions for divorce may not entitle a Christian wife to claim divorce on that ground. She must establish gross variety of matrimonial cruelty. 31. We are afraid this contention cannot be accepted. The concept of indissolubility of marriage in the Christian religion is such that matrimonial cruelty which would have entitled a woman belonging to other religions for divorce may not entitle a Christian wife to claim divorce on that ground. She must establish gross variety of matrimonial cruelty. 31. We are afraid this contention cannot be accepted. The nature of cruelty which would entitle a spouse in matrimony for divorce must certainly be identical in all religions - at least at the present juncture in Indian society. Law cannot recognise different varieties of cruelty as Hindu cruelty, Muslim cruelty, Christian cruelty or secular cruelty to justify a decree for divorce. As early as in Itwari v. Asghari (AIR 1960 All.684), the Allahabad High Court had observed that such different varieties of matrimonial cruelty cannot be recognized. We have no hesitation to agree that the mere fact that Hindu Marriage Act and the Special Marriage Act refer to cruelty without any rider or explanation or the fact that the Divorce Act and the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act give indication of the nature of matrimonial cruelty that ought to be established, cannot justify the conclusion that the nature of matrimonial cruelty which would entitle the spouses for divorce is different under different personal laws. It would be absolutely safe to draw inspiration from Art.44 of the Constitution also to jump to the conclusion that nature of cruelty justifying a decree for divorce cannot be different under different personal laws. To our mind, it appears that matrimonial cruelty must have a uniform definition or conceptualisation to justify the founding of a decree for divorce. Under S.10(1)(x), the cruelty must be such as to cause reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner spouse that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the respondent. The expression harmful or injurious cannot be limited to physical harm or injury. Anything that would hinder the ability of the spouse to blossom into his/her fullness and to enjoy life in matrimony must be held to fall within the sweep of S.10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act. The expression harmful or injurious cannot be limited to physical harm or injury. Anything that would hinder the ability of the spouse to blossom into his/her fullness and to enjoy life in matrimony must be held to fall within the sweep of S.10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act. Cruelty which is not defined in S.13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act and S.27(1) of the Special Marriage Act and cruelty which is explained in S.2(viii) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act and S.10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act must all take inspiration from such understanding of matrimonial cruelty. 32. We may straight away refer to the decision in Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli AIR 2006 SC 1675 ) where the three Judge bench of the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the sweep of matrimonial cruelty. Of course they were dealing with undefined matrimonial cruelty under S.13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act. In paragraph 64 of the said decision, their Lordships referred to an earlier three bench decision of the Supreme Court in Jayachandran v. Aneel Kumar ( (2005) 2 SCC 22 ) which understood and accepted matrimonial cruelty as a ground for dissolution of marriage as such “wilful and unjustifiable conduct of such character as to cause danger to life, limb, health and body or mentally or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such danger”. Paragraphs 66 to 68 of the said judgment Naveen Kohli (supra) appear to be crucial and vital to us and we extract the same below:- “66. To constitute cruelty, the conduct complained of should be “grave and weighty” so as to come to the conclusion that the petitioner-spouse cannot be reasonably expected to live with the other spouse. It must be something more serious than “ordinary wear and tear of married life”. The conduct taking into consideration the circumstances and background has to be examined to reach the conclusion whether the conduct complained of amounts to cruelty in the matrimonial law. Conduct has to be considered, as noted above, in the background of several factors such as social status of parties, their education, physical and mental conditions, customs and traditions. It is difficult to lay down a precise definition or to give exhaustive description of the circumstances, which would constitute cruelty. Conduct has to be considered, as noted above, in the background of several factors such as social status of parties, their education, physical and mental conditions, customs and traditions. It is difficult to lay down a precise definition or to give exhaustive description of the circumstances, which would constitute cruelty. It must be of the type as to satisfy the conscience of the Court that the relationship between the parties had deteriorated to such extent due to the conduct of the other spouse that it would be impossible for them to live together without mental agony, torture or distress, to entitle the complaining-spouse to secure divorce. Physical violence is not absolutely essential to constitute cruelty and a consistent course of conduct inflicting immeasurable mental agony and torture may well constitute cruelty within the meaning of S.10 of the Act. Mental cruelty may consist of verbal abuses and insults by using filthy and abusive language leading to constant disturbance of mental peace of the other party. 67. The Court dealing with the petition for divorce on the ground of cruelty has to bear in mind that the problems before it are those of human beings and the phychological changes in a spouse's conduct have to be borne in mind before disposing of the petition for divorce. However, insignificant or trifling, such conduct may cause pain in the mind of another. But before the conduct can be called cruelty, it must touch a certain pitch of severity. It is for the Court to weigh the gravity. It has to be seen whether the conduct was such that no reasonable person would tolerate it. It has to be considered whether the complainant should be called upon to endure as a part of normal human life. Every matrimonial conduct, which may cause annoyance to the other, may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may also not amount to cruelty. Cruelty in matrimonial life may be of unfounded variety, which can be subtle or brutal. It may be words, gestures or by mere silence, violent or non-violent. 68. The foundation of a sound marriage is tolerance, adjustment and respecting one another. Tolerance to each other's fault to a certain bearable extent has to be inherent in every marriage. Cruelty in matrimonial life may be of unfounded variety, which can be subtle or brutal. It may be words, gestures or by mere silence, violent or non-violent. 68. The foundation of a sound marriage is tolerance, adjustment and respecting one another. Tolerance to each other's fault to a certain bearable extent has to be inherent in every marriage. Petty quibbles, trifling differences should not be exaggerated and magnified to destroy what is said to have been made in heaven. All quarrels must be weighed from that point of view in determining what constitutes cruelty in each particular case and as noted above, always keeping in view the physical and mental conditions of the parties, their character and social status. A too technical and hypersensitive approach would be counter-productive to the institution of marriage. The Courts do not have to deal with ideal husbands and ideal wives. It has to deal with particular man and woman before it. The ideal couple or a mere ideal one will probably have no occasion to go to Matrimonial Court”. 33. All courts called upon to consider the plea for a decree for divorce on the ground of matrimonial cruelty under any of the enactments referred above must reckon the above observations as beacon lights to ascertain the contours of matrimonial cruelty. To live without the threat or risk of matrimonial cruelty must be reckoned as a Constitutional fundamental right guaranteed under Art.21 of the Constitution. That inalienable human right must ideally be available to all human beings existing on the planet today. More so in a secular socialist Constitutional republic like ours which guarantees right to life. The right to live without matrimonial cruelty in the domestic environment in a secular republic cannot obviously depend on the religious moorings of a citizen. After all religion, more often than not, is not a matter of choice of the citizen. It is a fait accompli with no real option or choice for the individual. It is an accident of birth. If nature or the Intelligent Designer had ordained that you must be born not in this house but in the neighbour's, you would have belonged to another religion. How many citizens in this country have known, studied and understood his own religion? How many have cared to know, study and understand the neighbour's religion ? How many have exercised an informed choice about religion ? How many citizens in this country have known, studied and understood his own religion? How many have cared to know, study and understand the neighbour's religion ? How many have exercised an informed choice about religion ? The point is only that liability to suffer matrimonial cruelty in a secular republic cannot at all depend on the religious denomination of the citizen. Notwithstanding the absence of a uniform legislation relating to marriage and matrimonial cruelty despite the mandate/hope of Art.44, Judges are bound to interpret the concept of matrimonial cruelty in different personal laws in such a manner as to usher in identical standards of matrimonial cruelty for all citizens. It must shock the judicial conscience that a citizen belonging to any religious denomination can/ought to be compelled to endure greater or graver matrimonial cruelty merely on the basis of his religious faith. That would be negation of the right to equality and right to life guaranteed by the Constitution. We discard the theory that the concept of matrimonial cruelty to entitle a spouse for divorce can be dissimilar and different for persons belonging to different religious faiths merely because different words are used in the relevant personal law statutes. The concept of matrimonial cruelty recognised and accepted in Naveen Kohil must inform the Courts while ascertaining contumaciousness in matrimony whatever the religious faith of the parties. Wherever the law offers elbow room to the Courts, they must resort to the exercise of interpretation to navigate the Indian polity to the promised shores under Art.44 of the Constitution. 34. We have already gone through the evidence in the light of the pleadings. We have come to the conclusion that the acts of physical cruelty, the acts of sexual cruelty, the acts of mental cruelty (as reflected in the despatch of Ext.A7 e-mail communication and denial of opportunity to the respondent to work in an MNC) have all been established. The short question is whether these acts on the part of the appellant would constitute matrimonial cruelty of the contumacious variety justifying a decree for divorce under S.10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act. 35. We have no hesitation to agree that the acts complained of and established clearly constitute acts which cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the wife that it would be harmful and injurious for her to live with the respondent. 35. We have no hesitation to agree that the acts complained of and established clearly constitute acts which cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the wife that it would be harmful and injurious for her to live with the respondent. The petitioning spouse/wife cannot be reasonably expected to live with the appellant in the light of the acts of cruelty proved. 36. We do also note that the spouses have not been able to resume cohabitation after they started separate residence on 14.05.2004. A period of more than 6 years has elapsed. All efforts made before the trial court and the appellate court to persuade the parties to live together have failed. We do not find it difficult to conclude that the marriage has irretrievably broken down. Our efforts to persuade the parties to honourably settle their disputes either by reuniting or by parting as friends have not succeeded. The irretrievable break down of marriage, it is well established now, cannot be a ground in itself for dissolution of marriage under the Divorce Act unless the parties agree to apply for divorce by mutual consent. The wife expressed her willingness to do so, but the appellant/husband was unwilling to accept separation. It is not as though there has been no irretrievable break down of marriage. An anxious perusal of the counter statement filed by the husband reveals the predicament which he allegedly faced while the matrimony was subsisting. Going by the version of the appellant/husband or by the version of the respondent/wife, it was a tumultuous and traumatic marital life. A reading of the counter statement filed by the husband in the divorce petition reveals clearly that even according to the husband, it was not a happy and harmonious married life. It was trauma and suffering that this matrimony brought to both of them going by the versions of both. We fail to understand why the husband does not agree for a harmonious and healthy separation. Mental cruelty is not proved even if the evidence is accepted, it is urged. We have already held that it has been established satisfactorily that the husband must have been responsible for publications of Ext.A7. That finding of fact must necessarily justify the finding on mental cruelty. 37. Mental cruelty is not proved even if the evidence is accepted, it is urged. We have already held that it has been established satisfactorily that the husband must have been responsible for publications of Ext.A7. That finding of fact must necessarily justify the finding on mental cruelty. 37. The learned counsel for the appellant/husband contends that in not granting permission to his wife to take up employment in an MNC (Seimens), the respondent is not guilty of any matrimonial cruelty. He did not permit her to take up employment in that company only in her own interest. She would have been obliged to travel long distance every day, if she were to take such employment. That would have upset their plans of raising a family. It was the compassionate husband concerned in the welfare of his wife who in her interest wanted her not to take up such an employment. There is no question of matrimonial mental cruelty on this aspect, contends the counsel. 38. We look at the facts. The wife badly wanted to take up employment with an MNC. That was her life's ambition. She became cranky and unreasonable when she could not achieve this life's ambition of hers. According to the husband, she wanted raising a family also to be postponed till she gets a respectable employment consistent with the employment of her husband who was equally qualified. The husband helped her to apply for such an employment. He helped her to acquire the requisite competence. After all this and after putting in great efforts, she secured employment. It was then that the husband adamantly refused her permission to join such employment. 39. No husband living in the present times can claim an anachronistic prerogative to finally rule on the career ambitions of his wife. In matrimony, there must be partnership, affection, caring and sharing. No privilege of the ruler over the ruled can be claimed by the husband over the wife. More so, in a situation like the instant one where the husband really perceived and encouraged the career ambitions of his wife. We are unable to agree that the invocation of the assumed anachronistic prerogative of the husband to rule on the career ambitions of his wife to deny her of the opportunity to achieve and accomplish her life's ambitions in respect of her employment, does not amount to matrimonial mental cruelty. 40. We are unable to agree that the invocation of the assumed anachronistic prerogative of the husband to rule on the career ambitions of his wife to deny her of the opportunity to achieve and accomplish her life's ambitions in respect of her employment, does not amount to matrimonial mental cruelty. 40. Be that as it may, the point that we have to consider now is the submission urged that there has been irretrievable break down of marriage. As held in Naveen Kohli's case (supra), the crucial question is whether the petitioning spouse can be reasonably expected to live with the other spouse. If in her perception such continued living would be harmful and injurious to her and such perception of hers is justified by the matters available on record, she is certainly entitled for a decree for divorce under S.10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act. It is evident that because of the acts alleged, which appear to us to be grave and weighty, the spouses have not been able to live together after their separation on 14.5.2004. This separation for the past 6 years and the inability of the parties to resume cohabitation must certainly be attributed to the events that preceded 14.5.2004. Those acts have made it impossible for the parties to live together as spouses. Those acts we have already found do amount to cruelty. The fact of irretrievable break down of marriage, though not a ground in itself to order divorce, convinces us that, incidents prior to 14.5.2004 have made it impossible for the petitioning spouse/wife to live with the appellant/husband. To that extent the test in Naveen Kohli's case (supra) is answered clearly in favour of matrimonial cruelty. 41. The above discussions lead us to the conclusion that the finding of the court below that the respondent/wife is entitled for a decree for divorce on the ground of matrimonial cruelty under S.10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act is absolutely justified and the same does not warrant any interference. The challenge on this ground must hence fail. Ground No. 3: 42. The court below had found that the husband is not entitled to a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. Any ground which is sufficient to justify a decree for divorce is certainly sufficient to deny the relief of restitution of conjugal rights. The challenge on this ground must hence fail. Ground No. 3: 42. The court below had found that the husband is not entitled to a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. Any ground which is sufficient to justify a decree for divorce is certainly sufficient to deny the relief of restitution of conjugal rights. We have already found on ground No.2 that the wife is entitled for a decree for divorce under S.10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act. Consequently it has to be held that the rejection of the claim for restitution of conjugal rights is also absolutely justified. The challenge raised on ground No.3 fails. 43. The learned counsel for the wife has filed I.A.No.2292 of 2010. Notwithstanding the inaccuracies and errors in the affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.2292 of 2010, it is submitted that the short prayer therein is that Ext.B2 series (2 deposit receipts) and Ext.B3 series (3 deposit receipts) may be ordered to be released to the petitioner/respondent. The learned counsel for the respondent/wife points out that the operative portion of the decree in O.P.68 of 2005 specifically directs return of the amounts under Exts.B2 and B3 series. We extract the operative portion of the order in O.P.68 of 2005 below: “In the result, O.P.68/2005 is decreed in part; that the respondent is directed to pay the petitioner the amount covered by Ext.B2 series FD receipts and the amount as per the three FD receipts of the South Indian Bank mentioned in the petition together with the interest accrued thereon from the date of deposit till payment.” 44. The learned counsel for the respondent/wife submits that inasmuch as Exts.B2 and B3 series have been filed as documents in the joint trial, the respondent/wife was not able to request that they be released to her earlier. In the light of the specific directions, it is prayed that Exts.B2 and B3 series may be ordered to be released to the respondent/wife with specific directions to the bank concerned to renew the deposit if necessary and release the proceeds to the respondent. 45. This application is opposed by the learned counsel for the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that though he has no objection against the release of Ext.B2 series, he has objections against the release of Ext.B3 series. 45. This application is opposed by the learned counsel for the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that though he has no objection against the release of Ext.B2 series, he has objections against the release of Ext.B3 series. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that actually Ext.B3 series are not F.D. receipts which belong exclusively to the wife. According to him, 3 deposit receipts in the name of the respondent/wife issued by the South Indian Bank were there at the time of marriage. When those deposits matured, the appellant allegedly invested some of his amounts also and got the 3 deposit receipts which are now marked as Ext.B3 series. Hence the counsel argues that not the entire amount covered by Ext.B3 series, but only a portion thereof is liable to be released to the respondent. 46. This contention does not appeal to us at all. We have extracted the operative portion above. It is very evident that the direction covers the entire amounts covered by Ext.B3 series. In these circumstances, in the absence of an appeal by the appellant against the decision in O.P.No.68 of 2005, he is not entitled to contend that the entire amount covered by these 3 F.D receipts cannot be released to the respondent/wife. 47. The learned counsel for the appellant raises a further plea founded on technicality that the respondent/wife also having not preferred any appeal against the order in O.P.68 of 2005, no such directions relating to execution of the order in the O.P.68 of 2005 is liable to be passed in this judgment. That technical contention though impressive at the first blush, cannot stand closer scrutiny because what the respondent now requests is the release of Exts.B2 and B3 series which remain on the file because they are marked in the joint trial of 3 petitions, appeals from 2 of which are being dealt with by us in this judgment. In fact, the direction sought for is only regarding release of a document marked in the matter relating to the appeal that we are dealing with. We are hence satisfied that I.A.No.2292 of 2010 can be allowed. 48. In the result: (a) These appeals are dismissed; (b) The impugned common order is upheld; (c) I.A.No.2292 of 2010 is allowed. In fact, the direction sought for is only regarding release of a document marked in the matter relating to the appeal that we are dealing with. We are hence satisfied that I.A.No.2292 of 2010 can be allowed. 48. In the result: (a) These appeals are dismissed; (b) The impugned common order is upheld; (c) I.A.No.2292 of 2010 is allowed. Exts.B2 and B3 series, which are marked in the impugned judgment shall forthwith be released by the Registry to the respondent/wife, the petitioner in this I.A. The Registry shall forthwith hand over the same to the respondent/wife (after substituting certified copies in their place for further reference if necessary. There shall be a direction to the Banks concerned - Federal Bank and South Indian Bank to renew the deposits on the instructions of the respondent in accordance with the rules of the bank and on maturity to release the entire amounts covered by those deposit receipts to the respondent/wife, ie. the petitioner in I.A.No.2292 of 2010.