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2010 DIGILAW 710 (PNJ)

Suresh Kumar v. State Of Haryana

2010-01-29

AJAY TEWARI, M.M.KUMAR

body2010
Judgment M.M.KUMAR, J. 1. The petitioners have approached this Court with a prayer for quashing notification dated 30.6.2005 (P-2), issued under Sec.4 of the Land acquisition Act, 1894 (for brevity, the Act) and declaration under Sec.6 of the Act, dated 5.7.2006 (P-5) as well as all other consequential acquisition proceedings. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioners are legal heirs of Late shri Rajmal son of Shri Ram Singh, who died on 1.3.2008. He had purchased 9 marlas of land, comprised in Killa No.4/13/1 in the revenue estate of village rasoi, Tehsil and District Sonipat, vide registered sale deed, dated 17.3.1982. The petitioners in para 2 of the petition have claimed that they have constructed a house over the land in question after making huge investment of lacs of rupees. 3. On 30.6.2005, a notification under Sec.4 of the Act was issued for acquiring land for a public purpose, namely, for development of Sector 39 (public-semi public) in the revenue estate of village Rasoi, Badh Malik and pritampura of Tehsil and District Sonipat (P-2 ). Pursuant thereto the petitioners filed objections under Sec.5-A of the Act on 10.8.2005 (P-3), seeking release of their land on the ground that they have constructed a building after spending about Rs.20 lacs, wherein firstly they constructed a poultry farm and thereafter a factory was established in the name of issue enter Prizes after spending Rs.50 lacs in the year 1992. The petitioners also claimed that their annual sale in the year 1995 was Rs.34,29,142/- and thereafter it was more than Rs.80 lacs. They have also provided employment to 30-40 persons, who would be rendered jobless in case their land is acquired. 4. On 28.11.2005, the District Revenue Officer-cum-Land Acquisition Collector, sonipat, considered the objections of the land owners including the petitioners in their presence. Thereafter, the Collector recommended for the release of land measuring 9 marla, comprised in Killa No.4/13/1, belonging to the petitioners (P-4 ). It has been alleged that without considering the aforementioned recommendation of the Collector, the land of the petitioners has been acquired by including the same in the declaration dated 5.7.2006, issued under Sec.6 of the Act. 5. Thereafter, the Collector recommended for the release of land measuring 9 marla, comprised in Killa No.4/13/1, belonging to the petitioners (P-4 ). It has been alleged that without considering the aforementioned recommendation of the Collector, the land of the petitioners has been acquired by including the same in the declaration dated 5.7.2006, issued under Sec.6 of the Act. 5. It has further been pointed out that on 5.3.2007, respondent No.1 issued a notification releasing 8 Acres 7 Kanals and 19 Marlas of land under Section 48 (1) of the Act, falling under Rasoi village, recommendation whereof was made by the Collector, while deciding objections under Sec.5a of the Act (P-6 ). In this manner, all the surrounding area of the land of the petitioners has been released. Thereafter, on 27.6.2008, the award in respect of the acquired land has also been announced (P-7 ). The petitioners also made a number of applications for release of their land but of no effect. 6. Mr. S. K. Hooda, learned counsel for the petitioners has heavily relied upon the recommendations made by the Land Acquisition Collector (P- 4), to argue that the decision of the State Government not to accept the recommendation for excluding the land belonging to the petitioners from acquisition is arbitrary and discriminatory, inasmuch as, the area surrounding area the land of the petitioners has been released from acquisition. In that regard, learned counsel for the petitioners has drawn our attention to various photographs and the site plan (Annexures P-11 and P-12) to show that how different plots with built up structures in the area have been excluded from acquisition. Learned counsel has, thus, summed up by submitting that there is no uniformity for inclusion or exclusion of the lands having structures. In support of his submissions, learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of Honble the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Sube Singh V/s. State of Haryana, (2001) 7 SCC 545. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioners at a considerable length and perusing the paper book with his able assistance we are of the view that the instant petition lacks merit. It is conceded position on record that the award in the present case was announced on 27.6.2008 (P-7) and the instant petition has been filed on 27.1.2010. Even a supplementary award was also announced on 26.9.2008 (P-14 ). It is conceded position on record that the award in the present case was announced on 27.6.2008 (P-7) and the instant petition has been filed on 27.1.2010. Even a supplementary award was also announced on 26.9.2008 (P-14 ). There is inordinate and un-explained delay in approaching the Court. There is a catena of judgments of Honble the Supreme court laying down the principle that no petition would be competent after announcement of award against the acquisition proceedings. Honble the Supreme court in para 29 of the judgment rendered in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay V/s. Industrial Development and investment Company (P) Limited, (1996) 11 SCC 501, has observed as under:- "29. It is thus well settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loathe to quash the notifications. The High court has, no doubt, discretionary powers to quash the notification under section 4 (1) and declaration under Sec.6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case, is hardly a ground for interference. The division Bench of High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches. " (emphasis added) 8. Considering the issue of maintainability of the writ petition after declaration under Sec.6 of the Act and passing of the award, Honble the supreme Court in the case of Municipal Council, Ahmednagar V/s. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48, in para 17 has held that after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder. While holding so, their Lordships has also noticed the view earlier taken in para 4 of the judgment rendered in the case of C. Padma v. Deputy Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu, (1997) 2 SCC 627, which reads thus: "4. While holding so, their Lordships has also noticed the view earlier taken in para 4 of the judgment rendered in the case of C. Padma v. Deputy Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu, (1997) 2 SCC 627, which reads thus: "4. The admitted position is that pursuant to the notification published under Sec.4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short the Act) in GOR No.1392 Industries, dated 17.10.1962, total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in Madhavaram village, Saidapet Taluk, chengalpatta District in Tamil Nadu was acquired under Chapter VII of the Act for the manufacture of Synthetic Rasiua by Tvl. Reichold Chemicals India Ltd. , madras. The acquisition proceedings had become final and possession of the land was taken on 30.4.1964. Pursuant to the agreement executed by the company, it was handed over to Tvl. Simpson and General Finance Co. which is a subsidiary of Reichold Chemicals India Ltd. It would appear that at a request made by the said company, 66 cents of land out of one acre 37 cents in respect of which the appellants originally had ownership, was transferred in GOMs. No. 816 Industries, dated 24.3.1971 in favour of another subsidiary company, Shri rama Vilas Service Ltd. , the 5th respondent which is also another subsidiary of the company had requested for two acres 75 cents of land; the same came to be assigned on leasehold basis by the Government after resumption in terms of the agreement in GOMs. No.439 Industries, dated 10.5.1985. In GOMs. No.546 industries, dated 30.3.1986, the same came to be approved of. Then the appellants challenged the original GOMs. No.1392 Industries, dated 17.10.1962 contending that since the original purpose for which the land was acquired had ceased to be in operation, the appellants are entitled to restitution of the possession taken from them. The learned single Judge and the Division Bench have held that the acquired land having already vested in the State, after receipt of compensation by the predecessor-in-title of the appellants, they have no right to challenge the notification. Thus the writ petition and the writ appeal came to be dismissed. " 9. The learned single Judge and the Division Bench have held that the acquired land having already vested in the State, after receipt of compensation by the predecessor-in-title of the appellants, they have no right to challenge the notification. Thus the writ petition and the writ appeal came to be dismissed. " 9. Reliance may also be placed on the judgments of Honble the Supreme Court rendered in the cases of Star Wire (India) Ltd. V/s. State of Haryana, (1996) 11 scc 698; M/s Swaika Properties Pvt. Ltd. V/s. State of Rajasthan, JT 2008 (2) SC 280. It is, thus, well settled that no writ petition would be competent after passing of award because possession of land is taken and it is deemed to vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances. 10. On merits, we are also not impressed with the contention of the petitioners that they have been meted with hostile discrimination. No doubt the Land acquisition Collector has made recommendation in favour of the petitioners for release of their land from the acquisition. But a perusal of the report of the collector reveals that there is no running factory at the site but there are only two big hall type structures. Furthermore, from a bare perusal of the site plan and photographs it is evident that there are running factories with the structures which have been excluded from acquisition. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that no discrimination has been made in the case of the petitioners. Accordingly, the judgment of Honble the Supreme Court in the case of Sube Singh (supra) would not come to the rescue of the petitioners and the same does not require any detailed consideration. In any case, the petitioners would of course be entitled to compensation at the market value prevalent at the time of issuance of notification under Sec.4 of the Act in accordance with the award subject to further remedies of reference etc. The petitioners would also be entitled to compensation for the user of the land from the date of possession to the date of notification issued under Sec.4. Furthermore, the petitioners may also be entitled to annual payment in accordance with the policy of the State of Haryana. Thus, no ground is made out to accept the contention raised by the petitioners and to quash the acquisition proceedings subject matter of instant petition. 11. Furthermore, the petitioners may also be entitled to annual payment in accordance with the policy of the State of Haryana. Thus, no ground is made out to accept the contention raised by the petitioners and to quash the acquisition proceedings subject matter of instant petition. 11. In view of above, the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed.