JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rakesh Sharma, J.—Heard Sri M.N. Singh, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Somesh Khare, learned counsel, who has put in appearance on behalf of the respondents. 2. This is a Second Appeal, preferred under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure assailing the judgment and decree dated 19.12.1999, passed by the XI Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad in Civil Appeal No. 98 of 1999 by which the Lower Appellate Court has affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, that is, the First Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Ghaziabad on 26.2.1999. 3. Both the Courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact in arriving at a conclusion that the cancellation and resumption of residential plot of the plaintiff-respondent by the Authorities of New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the NOIDA) was illegal, null and void. 4. It emerges from the record that in the year 1997, a Suit No. 797 of 1997 was instituted by one Ravindra Kumar Singhvi against the NOIDA seeking a declaration that the order dated 18.10.1996 by which Authorities of NOIDA had cancelled the allotment of Plot No.D-49, Sector 30, NOIDA is illegal, null and void. It was further prayed that the plaintiff be declared as a lawful lessee of the said plot. A prohibitory injunction was also sought by the plaintiff-respondent restraining the respondent-NOIDA to re-allot the said plot to some-one else and relief against dispossession was also sought. 5. Plaintiff’s case in the Suit was that the plaintiff-Ravindra Kumar Singhvi was allotted a residential Plot No.D-49 in Sector 30, NOIDA in the capacity of a bona fide member of the Defence Services Cooperative Housing Society on 6.10.1981 by the Defendant-NOIDA. A lease deed was also executed in favour of the plaintiff on 24.8.1991 and its possession was also delivered to the plaintiff on the said date. The plaintiff had made payment of the entire amount as demanded by the Authorities of the NOIDA as consideration for acquiring the lease rights. The plaintiff, thus, became the absolute owner of the leasehold rights of the said plot and no amount was outstanding against him. 6. The plaintiff and his wife, Smt. Amila Singhvi were looking for a proper accommodation, plot or residential house in the vicinity of Delhi and as such in furtherance of the same, plaintiff’s wife had also applied for a plot in a NOIDA scheme. 6. The plaintiff and his wife, Smt. Amila Singhvi were looking for a proper accommodation, plot or residential house in the vicinity of Delhi and as such in furtherance of the same, plaintiff’s wife had also applied for a plot in a NOIDA scheme. The residential plot, bearing Plot No. 84, in Sector 15-A, was allotted in the name of Smt. Amila Singhvi on 10th March, 1981. The lease deed was executed in her favour on 31.10.1983. Since a litigation, in regard to the said plot had been going on between the Society and the NOIDA before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, the plaintiff and his wife , therefore, were not sure of getting Plot No. 84, Sector 15-A, NOIDA on account of uncertainty of litigation. Under these compelling circumstances, with an intention of having a residential house in NOIDA area, the plaintiff applied for another plot and on his application, the disputed plot was allotted to him. Ultimately, the litigation with regard to Plot No. 84, Sector 15-A, NOIDA, came to an end and it became certainty that the said plot would ultimately be given to plaintiff’s wife, Smt. Amila Singhvi. In fact, the plaintiff was interested in Plot No. D-49, Sector 30, NOIDA and the family wanted to settle in this Sector and as such Smt. Amila Singhvi transferred Plot No. 84, Sector 15-A, NOIDA in favour of one Smt. Kanta Modi. Before making said transfer, a formal permission from the concerned Authority of the NOIDA was also obtained. The said transfer deed was executed on 25.10.1990. After this exercise, the plaintiff or his wife, Smt. Amila Singvi ceased to have any concern with Plot No. 84, Sector 15-A, NOIDA. 7. The plaintiff, after possession of the pot had raised construction and started living in Sector 30, NOIDA. To the great surprise and shock of the plaintiff’s, he received a letter dated 12.6.1996, issued by the Authorities of the NOIDA, thereby the plaintiff was informed that since Plot No. 84, Sector 15-A, NOIDA was existing in favour of plaintiff’s wife, Smt. Amila Singhvi and Plot No. D-49, Sector 30, NOIDA was obtained subsequent to it, the allotment of the plot was cancelled. On receiving the said letter of cancellation, dated 12.6.1996, the plaintiff made a representation to the Authorities of NOIDA and made several efforts to persuade the Authorities to recall the order of cancellation, dated 18.10.1996, but Nothing was done and the Authorities of NOIDA had insisted upon cancellation and resumption of the plot in question. Under these circumstance, the plaintiff-respondent was compelled to file aforementioned Suit and the same was decreed in his favour on 26.2.1999. Against the said judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the NOIDA had preferred an Appeal before the First Appellate Court, which was also dismissed on 9.12.1999. 8. Both the Courts below have recorded concurrent findings of facts that the cancellation and resumption of plot in question was wholly illegal, null and void and there was no reason to take such a harsh and drastic action against a leaseholder as on the date of execution of the lease deed and handing over of possession, that is, on 24.8.1991, neither the plaintiff, Ravindra Kumar Singhvi nor his wife, Smt. Amila Singhvi had any plot or land in their possession in NOIDA area. 9. Following issues were framed by the Trial Court while adjudicating upon the dispute : Þ1- D;k lEifŸk fookfnr ds lEca/k esa Áfroknh uks,Mk }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 18-10-1996 voS/k fu"ÁHkkoh o 'kwU;A tSlk fd okni= esa vfHkdfFkr gSA ;fn gka rks ÁHkko\ 2- D;k oknh }kjk viuh Jherh vfeyk fl/koh ds ge esa gq, Hkw[k.M la[;k 84 lsDVj 15, ds vkoaVu dks fookfnr lEifŸk dk vkoaVu ÁkIr djus ds le; Nqik;k x;k vkSj bl lEca/k esa ,d vlR; 'kiFki= Áfroknh ds le{k ÁLrqr fd;k x;kA ;fn gka rks ÁHkko\ 3- D;k oknh dk okn /kkjk 34] 37 ,oa 41 fof'k"V vuqrks"k vf/kfu;e ds Ákfoèkkuksa ls ckf/kr gS\ 4- D;k oknh dksbZ vuqrks"k ikus dk vf/kdkjh gS\ 5- D;k okn vYi ewY;kafdr gS vkSj vi;kZIr U;k;'kqYd vnk fd;k x;k gS\ 10. The oral and documentary evidence, six in number, were produced by the plaintiff. The Defendant-NOIDA had examined the Manager (Plots), as DW-1 and photostat copies of some documents were also produced by the Defendant-NOIDA to prove its case. 11. Sri M.N. Singh, learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the two judgments of the Courts below, that is, one rendered by the Lower Appellate Court and the other by the Trial Court on various grounds. 11. Sri M.N. Singh, learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the two judgments of the Courts below, that is, one rendered by the Lower Appellate Court and the other by the Trial Court on various grounds. As per learned counsel for the appellant-NOIDA, the findings recorded by the Courts below are against the record and the Courts below had failed to consider that prior to allotment of Plot No. D-49, Sector 13, NOIDA in favour of the plaintiff, another Plot No. 84, Sector 15-A, NOIDA, was already allotted in favour of Smt. Amila Singhvi, wife of plaintiff, by the NOIDA. A false statement was made in the affidavit by the plaintiff-respondent in the office of NOIDA. It was indicated that neither the plaintiff nor his spouse or his children has any residential house, plot or flat in the NOIDA area on 1.12.1988. A new case has been set up by the Courts below that when the lease deed was executed in favour of the plaintiff, that is, on 24.8.1991, there was no residential plot, house or flat in his or her name with the plaintiff-respondent. 12. The Courts below has not given weightage to the allotment letter, but were persuaded by the event of execution of the lease deed. The lease was determined in accordance with law as the appropriate Authority of the NOIDA is empowered to cancel a lease deed. The interpretation of Section 14 of U.P. Industrial Development Act was not correctly done. The notice under Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act was not mandatory. The notice dated 12.6.1996 was a valid notice. The Suit was barred by Sections 34, 38 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act. 13. Sri Somesh Khare, learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent, has opposed the Second Appeal and drawn attention of the Court, which took place prior to cancellation of the lease deed. According to him, the Trial Court as well as the Lower Appellate Court have recorded concurrent findings of facts to conclude that a lease holder cannot be divested of the property in such a manner. Mere allotment letter does not confer a legal right on a person to enjoy benefits of a residential property. According to him, the Trial Court as well as the Lower Appellate Court have recorded concurrent findings of facts to conclude that a lease holder cannot be divested of the property in such a manner. Mere allotment letter does not confer a legal right on a person to enjoy benefits of a residential property. It is only when the lease deed was executed and the possession was handed over to Ravindra Kumar Singvi on 24.8.1991, the legal and valid rights accrued to him and as such he became a lease holder having specific, legal and clear rights. Lease of the plot in question cannot be cancelled or resumed without following due process of law and without giving notice under Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act. Both the Courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plaintiff-respondent was not having two plots at a time as when his wife was allotted a plot, the litigation was going on in the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and there were very remote chances of her getting possession or ownership of the plot. However, when another allotment was made, the family of the plaintiff-respondent decided to construct a residential house on Plot No.D-49 in Sector-30, NOIDA. The decisions cited by the appellant-NOIDA were taken note of by the Courts below and were discussed in the judgments. He has supported the two judgments rendered by the Trial Court and the Lower Appellate Court. 14. In addition to this, Sri Somesh Khare, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, has placed reliance on two judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T. Chandigarh and others, (2004) 2 SCC 130 and M.D.H.S.I.D.C. and others v. M/s. Hari Om Enterprises and another, AIR 2009 SC 218 to strengthen his submissions that there was no wilful or dishonest effort on the part of the allottees, that is, the plaintiff Ravindra Kumar Singhvi and his wife Smt. Amila Singhvi in staking claim on two plots. The husband and wife were interested only in getting one plot only and ultimately when the above said plot, that is, Plot No. D-49, Sector 30, NOIDA was allotted in their favour and the lease deed was executed with regard to the said plot only, they had settled for the said plot. The husband and wife were interested only in getting one plot only and ultimately when the above said plot, that is, Plot No. D-49, Sector 30, NOIDA was allotted in their favour and the lease deed was executed with regard to the said plot only, they had settled for the said plot. It was never the case of the NOIDA that the husband and wife were having two residential plots, houses or flats in the NOIDA. Every family has a right to manage and plan its affairs in its own way. They had no intention of having proprietary rights over two plots. It was categorically submitted before the two Courts below and has been given weightage by the both the Courts below that on the date of execution of the lease deed and handing over possession on 24.8.1991, plaintiff-respondent was having no other plot in NOIDA, except the plot in dispute. He has placed reliance on following decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in support of his submission that it is a case where the Courts below have concurrently rejected the submissions of NOIDA and the pure findings of fact have been recorded, which cannot be interfered with by the Court in Second Appeal. No substantial question of law arises in this case to seek interference of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1. Narayanan Rajendran and another v. Lekshmy Sarojini and others, 2009 (5) SCC 264 . 2. Rur Singh (D) Th. Lrs. and others v. Bachan Kaur, 2009 (2) SCR 106. 3. Boodireddy Chandraiah and others v. Arigela Laxmi and another, 2007 (9) SCR 1061. 4. G. Mahalingappa v. G.M. Savitha, 2005(6) SCC 441 . 5. Jineshwardas (D) Through L.Rs. v. Jagrani, 2003(11) SCC 372 . 6. Bachhaj Nahar P. v. Nilima Mandal and another, AIR 2009 SC 1103 . 7. Bellachi (Dead) by L.R. v. Pakeeran, AIR 2009 SC 3293 . 8. Bhuri Bai and others v. Ramnarayan and others, 2009 (4) SCC 56 . 15. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the materials on record and have carefully gone through the two judgments rendered by the Courts below. 16. As is evident from the chronology of events, the plaintiff respondent, Ravindra Kumar Singhvi, was allotted a residential Plot No.D-49, Sector 30, NOIDA, in the capacity of a member of Defence Services Cooperative Housing Society on 6.2.1981 by the NOIDA. 16. As is evident from the chronology of events, the plaintiff respondent, Ravindra Kumar Singhvi, was allotted a residential Plot No.D-49, Sector 30, NOIDA, in the capacity of a member of Defence Services Cooperative Housing Society on 6.2.1981 by the NOIDA. Admittedly, after completion of necessary formalities and receiving consideration for lease charges and rent etc., a formal, legal and valid lease deed was executed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent on 24.8.1991. After execution of the lease deed, the plaintiff-respondent became a lease holder having legal, valid and substantial rights accrued to him to enjoy the property leased to him in accordance with the prescribed procedure. 17. Both the Courts below have taken note of the relevant provisions of Transfer of Property Act as well as other surrounding facts and circumstances that no formal notice under Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act was issued against the plaintiff-respondent before cancellation or resumption of the lease in respect of plot in dispute. Both the Courts below have recorded findings of fact that on 24.8.1991, lease deed was executed and possession was handed over to Ravindra Kumar Singhvi. Thus, he became a lease holder having possession of the Plot No. D-49, Sector 30, NOIDA. It has already come on record that his wife was allotted another Plot No. 84 in Sector 15-A, a litigation in respect of which was pending at the relevant time in the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India between the Cooperative Housing Society and the NOIDA and naturally no one would prefer to purchase a litigation to be dragged into unnecessary litigation. The sole intention of the husband and wife appears to be having a plot for residential purposes in NOIDA. Concurrent findings of fact have been recorded by the Courts below that when a proper plot suitable for residential purposes was allotted in the name of husband, that is, plaintiff-respondent, Ravindra Kumar Singhvi, the choice of the family fell on Plot No. D-49, Sector 30, NOIDA as it suited them. It is an admitted fact and has been taken note of by the Courts below that the plot No. 84 in Sector 15-A was sold by the wife on 25.8.1990 that is prior to execution of the lease deed on 24.8.1991. It is an admitted fact and has been taken note of by the Courts below that the plot No. 84 in Sector 15-A was sold by the wife on 25.8.1990 that is prior to execution of the lease deed on 24.8.1991. It is also note worthy that Smt. Amila Singhvi had sold the said plot after obtaining a formal permission from the appropriate Authority of the NOIDA. It was indicated to the NOIDA that she was going to sell the Plot No. 84, Sector 15-A, NOIDA, allotted to her. 18. This itself shows that the husband and wife had no ulterior motive to perpetrate fraud on the NOIDA or to conceal any thing from the Defendant-Appellant. Thus, it cannot be gathered by the NOIDA that there was any wilful or dishonest intention on the part of Ravindra Kumar Singhvi or his wife, Smt. Amila Singhvi to conceal anything from the NOIDA. A formal permission was granted by the appropriate Authority of the NOIDA for disposing of Plot No. 84, Sector 15-A, NOIDA. The plaintiff-respondent and his wife, Smt. Amila Singhvi came with clean hands on 24.8.1991, when the necessary formalities were completed and the lease deed was executed after payment of due and valid consideration for the lease. On the date of execution of the lease deed and handing over the possession of plot in dispute, plaintiff-respondent, Ravindra Kumar Singhvi had only one plot in NOIDA and both the Courts below, on appreciation of facts and law on the subject, have recorded concurrent findings of fact that there was no other plot owned and possessed by the plaintiff-respondent, Ravindra Kumar Singhvi and his wife, Smt. Amila Singhvi. Thus, the Courts below have decreed the Suit by rejecting the case put-forth by the NOIDA. After execution of lease deed and handing over the possession to the lease-holder, he has acquired legal, valid and valuable rights for use and occupation of the plot. Thus, in the present set of facts and circumstances, the cancellation and resumption of the lease of plot in question by the NOIDA appears to be wholly arbitrary and illegal in view of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T. Chandigarh and others, (2004) 2 SCC 130 , and M.D.H.S.I.D.C. and others v. M/s. Hari Om Enterprises and another, AIR 2009 SC 218 . 19. 19. No substantial question of law is made out seeking interference of this Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the light of the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court as Bachhaj Nahar P. v. Nilima Mandal and another, AIR 2009 SC 1103 ; Bellachi (Dead) by L.R. v. Pakeeran, AIR 2009 SC 3293 and Bhuri Bai and others v. Ramnarayan and others, 2009 (4) SCC 56 ; Kashmir Singh v. Harnam Singh and another, AIR 2008 SC 1749 ; Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others, AIR 1999 SC 2213 and Kashibai w/o Lachiram and another v. Parwatibai W/o Lachiram and others, (1995) 6 SCC 213 . Plaintiff-respondent’s case is squarely covered by the case laws of the Hon’ble Apex Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent and this Court also does not find any element of dishonesty on the part of plaintiff-respondent, Ravindra Kumar Singhvi. 20. In view of the discussions made above, the Second Appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. The judgments of the Courts below are affirmed. 21. No order as to cost. ————