JUDGMENT ( 1. ) ISSUE which crops up for consideration in this writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India is as to whether the findings in a Departmental Enquiry in respect of conduct of police personnel leading to breach of human rights of a citizen, will have a precedent over the findings of the Human Rights Commission recorded earlier on the basis of complaint leading to an investigation under Section 14 and proceedings under Section 16 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993. ( 2. ) FACTS giving rise to the above issue lies in a narrow compass. On 16-10-2000, the Commission received a complaint from one Smt. Geetabai and others against respondent Nos. 2 and 3, who as alleged, came with other policemen to their village, abused and misbehaved with them and also threatened them, preventing them from harvesting their crops, as a result whereof the agricultural labours ran away from the field and the police personnel destroyed their crop. Allegation was also that, the police party hauled up the labours and took them to police station and kept them in custody and were harassed. The investigation and the enquiry held on the basis of the complaint led to establishment of the correctness of complaint wherein respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were found guilty of violating human rights. The Commission, therefore, recommended for a Departmental Enquiry against them and directed State Government for payment of Rs. 30,000/- as interim compensation to the complainants and awarded Rs. 3,000/- to the labour Radheshyam. ( 3. ) THE respondent Nos. 2 and 3 against whom the Commission had tendered recommendation for a Departmental Enquiry preferred writ petition before the Court forming subject matter of W.P. No. 4166/2001 and W.P. No. 4190/2001. These writ petitioners were dismissed on 22-11-2001. ( 4. ) AS per recommendations, the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were charge- sheeted on 13-2-2003. After holding an enquiry and on the basis of the statement recorded during the course of enquiry, the respondents were exonerated of the charges as per enquiry report dated 5-5-2003. The respondent State, therefore, on the basis of recording of exoneration of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, declined to pay the compensation awarded by the Commission. After holding an enquiry and on the basis of the statement recorded during the course of enquiry, the respondents were exonerated of the charges as per enquiry report dated 5-5-2003. The respondent State, therefore, on the basis of recording of exoneration of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, declined to pay the compensation awarded by the Commission. It is this action of the State Government, which has led the Human Rights Commission to file this writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. In the background of these facts the question which crops up for consideration, as posed in the beginning is as to whether the recommendation by the Commission being based on full fledged inquiry would have any bearing over a Departmental Enquiry or conversely whether the Departmental Enquiry held in pursuance to the recommendations have an overriding effect. ( 5. ) IN other words in a given case like the present one wherein the Officers/ Govt. servants in discharge of their official duties having found violating the human right of the citizens would be exonerated on the ground that in a domestic enquiry which is held against such an erring officer, the witnesses have not supported the charges. ( 6. ) CONDUCT of the officials like respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are governed by the rules framed under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. In the present case, it is M.P. Civil Services (CONDUCT) Rules, 1965 (referred to as 'Rules of 1965'). Rules 3 and 3-A of the Rules, 1965 provides for :- "3. General.- (1) Every Government servant shall at all times :- (i) maintain absolute integrity; (ii) maintain devotion to duty; and (iii) do nothing which is unbecoming of a Government servant. (2) (i) Every Government servant holding a supervisory post shall take all possible steps to ensure the integrity and devotion to duty of all Government servants for the time being under his control and authority. (2) (i) Every Government servant holding a supervisory post shall take all possible steps to ensure the integrity and devotion to duty of all Government servants for the time being under his control and authority. (ii) No Government servant shall, in the performance of his official duties or in the exercise of the powers conferred on him, act otherwise than in his best judgment except that when he is acting under the direction of his official superior and shall, where he is acting under such direction, obtain the direction in writing, wherever practicable, and where it is not practicable to obtain the direction in writing, he shall obtain written confirmation of the direction as soon thereafter as possible. Explanation :- Nothing in clause (ii) of sub-rule (2) shall be construed as empowering the Government servant to evade his responsibilities by seeking instructions from, or approval of, a superior officer or authority when such instructions, are not necessary under the scheme of distribution of powers and responsibilities. 3-A. Promptness and courteous behaviour.- No Government shall- (a) act discourteously in the performance of his/her official functions; (b) adopt dilatory tactics in his/her official dealings with the public or otherwise and shall make deliberate delay in disposing of the work assigned to him; (c) do nothing which denotes indiscipline; (d) sub-let, lease or otherwise allow occupation or use for gain by any person on Government accommodation which has been alloted to him." Thus, a conduct unbecoming of a Government servant is a misconduct and when proved, the delinquent is liable for punishment as per Disciplinary Rules. In the present case the rules are, M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. ( 7. ) NOW coming to the provisions of Act of 1993. The Act, viz., the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 has been enacted to provide for the Constitution of a National Human Rights Commission, State Human Rights Commission in States and Human Rights Court for better protection of human rights and for matter connected therewith or incidental thereto. ( 8. ) HUMAN Rights as defined under Section 2 (d) of the Act of 1993, means "the right relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the International Covenants and Enforceable by Courts in India". ( 8. ) HUMAN Rights as defined under Section 2 (d) of the Act of 1993, means "the right relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the International Covenants and Enforceable by Courts in India". The State Commission means a State Human Rights Commission constituted under Section 21 of the Act of 1993 and consists of (a) a Chairperson who has been a Chief Justice of a High Court; (b) one Member who is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court; (c) one Member who is, or has been, a District Judge in that State; (d) two Members to be appointed from amongst persons having knowledge of, or practical experience in, matters relating to human rights. ( 9. ) THE function and powers are as delineated under Chapter III of the Act of 1993. Section 12 lays down function of the Commission. Relevant whereof for the present case is Clause 12 (a) and (j) which stipulates that Commission shall- (a) inquire, suo motu or on petition presented to it by a victim or any person or on his behalf which complaint of- (i) violation of human rights or abetment thereof; (ii) negligence in the prevention of such violation by a public servant. (j) Such other functions as it may consider necessary for the protection of human rights. ( 10. ) SECTION 16 provides for that the persons likely to be prejudicially affected to be heard. It stipulates :- "16. Persons likely to be prejudicially affected to be heard.- If, at any stage of the inquiry, the Commission- (a) considers it necessary to inquire into the conduct of any person; or (b) is of the opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry; it shall give to that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the inquiry and to produce evidence in his defence : Provided that nothing in this section shall apply where the credit of a witness is being impeached." SECTION 17 stipulates :- "17. Inquiry into complaints.- The Commission while inquiring into the complaints of violations of human rights may- (i) call for information or report from the Central Government or any State Government or any other authority or organisation subordinate thereto within such time as may be specified by it : Provided that- (a) if the information or report is not received within the time stipulated by the Commission, it may proceed to inquire into the complaint on its own; (b) if, on receipt of information or report, the Commission is satisfied either that no further inquiry is required or that the required action has been initiated or taken by the concerned Government or authority, it may not proceed with the complaint and inform the complainant accordingly; (ii) without prejudice to anything contained in clause (i), if it considers necessary, having regard to the nature of the complaint, initiate an inquiry." Whereas section 18 provides the steps after inquiry, i.e., 18. Steps after inquiry.- The Commission may take any of the following steps during or upon the completion of an inquiry held under this Act namely :- (a) where the inquiry discloses, the commission of violation of human rights or negligence in the prevention of violation of human rights or abatement thereof by a public servant, it may recommend to the concerned Government or authority- (i) to make payment of compensation of damages to the complainant or to the victim or the members of his family as the Commission may consider necessary; (ii) to initiate proceedings for prosecution for such other suitable action as the commission may deem fit against the concerned person or persons; (iii) to take such further action as it may think fit; (b) approach the Supreme Court or the High Court concerned for such directions, orders or writs as that Court may deem necessary; (c) recommend to the concerned Government or authority at any stage of the enquiry for the grant of such immediate interim relief to the victim or the members of his family as the Commission may consider necessary; (d) subject to the provisions of clause (c), provide a copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner or his representative; (e) the Commission shall send a copy of its inquiry report together with its recommendations to the concerned Government or authority and the concerned Government or authority shall within a period of one month, or such further time as the Commission may allow, forward its comments on the report, including the action taken or proposed to be taken thereon, to the Commission; (f) the Commission shall publish its inquiry report together with the comments of the concerned Government or authority, if any, and the action taken or proposed to be taken by the concerned Government or authority on the recommendations of the Commission.' The Act of 1993 is thus a special enactment making provision for better protection of human rights and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. It includes within its ambit the conduct of the Government servant amongst the public while discharging the official duties. In other words, if he is found having violating the human rights even while discharging official duties he is liable for the consequences under the Act of 1993. It includes within its ambit the conduct of the Government servant amongst the public while discharging the official duties. In other words, if he is found having violating the human rights even while discharging official duties he is liable for the consequences under the Act of 1993. This inference is drawn after combined reading of Rules 3,3-A of the Rules of 1965 and the provisions contained under the Act of 1993. In other words Government servant cannot be absolved if found committing breach of human rights merely because he was discharging the official duties. ( 11. ) THE question is as to whether the object with which the Act of 1993 has been brought into existence would be allowed to whittle down by construing that the Rules framed under Article 311 of the Constitution of India will have over-riding effect. As in the present case, despite there being a categorical finding by the Commission regarding violation of human rights by respondent Nos. 2 and 3, thus establishing their conduct being unbecoming of a Government servant under the Rules, 1965. The department exonerate them by holding a Departmental Enquiry, where as apparent they are exonerated of the charges. ( 12. ) HOWEVER, before answering the riddle worth it would be to note few judgments in the field. In The (U. P. State Electricity Board and another Vs. Hari Shankar Jain and others, (1978) 4 SCC 16 , Their Lordships were pleased to observe :- "8. The maxim 'Generalia specialibus non derogant' is quite well known. The rule flowing from the maxim has been explained in Mary Seward Vs. The Owner of the "Vera Cruz", (1884) 10 AC 59 at p. 68, as follows :- "Now if anything be certain it is this, that where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier Legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special Legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so." The question in Seward Vs. The Owner of " Vera Cruz " was whether Section 7 of the Admiralty Court Act of 1861, which gave jurisdiction to that Court over "any claim for damage done by any ship" also gave jurisdiction over claims for loss of life which would otherwise come under the Fatal Accidents Act. It was held that the general words of Section 7 of the Admiralty Court Act did not exclude the applicability of the Fatal Accidents Act and therefore, the Admiralty Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a claim for damages for loss of life. 9. The reason for the rule that a general provision should yield to a specific provision is this: In passing a Special Act, Parliament devotes its entire consideration to a particular subject. When a General Act is subsequently passed, it is logical to presume that Parliament has not repealed or modified the former Special Act unless it appears that the Special Act again received consideration from Parliament. Vide London and Black wall Railway Vs. Limehouse District Board of Words, 26 LJ Ch 164 = 69 ER 1048 and Thorpe Vs. Adams, (1871) 6 CP 125, In J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC 1170 , this Court observed (at P.1174):- "The rule that general provisions should yield to specific provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers and Judges but springs from the common understanding of men and women that when the same person gives two directions one covering a large number of matters in general and another to only some of them his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards these while as regards all the rest the earlier direction should have effect." In Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. D.J. Bahadur and others, (1981) 1 SCC 315 , Their Lordships were pleased to observe :- "57. What is special or general is wholly a creature of the subject and context and may vary with situation, circumstances and angle of vision. Law is no abstraction but realises itself in the living setting of actualities. Which is a special provision and which general, depends on the specific problem, the topic for decision, not the broad rubric nor any rule of thumb. The peaceful coexistence of both Legislations is best achieved, if that be feasible, by allowing to each its allotted field for play. Which is a special provision and which general, depends on the specific problem, the topic for decision, not the broad rubric nor any rule of thumb. The peaceful coexistence of both Legislations is best achieved, if that be feasible, by allowing to each its allotted field for play. Sense and sensibility, not mechanical rigidity gives the flexible solution. It is difficult for me to think that when the entire industrial field, even covering Municipalities, Universities, Research Councils and the like, is regulated in the critical area of industrial disputes by the I.D. Act, Parliament would have provided as oasis for the Corporation where labour demands can be unilaterally ignored. The general words in Sections 11 and 49 must be read contextually as not covering industrial disputes between the workmen and the Corporation. Lords Haldane had, for instance, in 1915 AC 885 (891) observed that (1):- "general words may in certain cases properly be interpreted as having a meaning or scope other than the literal or usual meaning. They may be so interpreted where the scheme appearing from the language of the Legislature, read in its entirety, points to consistency as requiring modification of what would be the meaning apart from any context, or apart from the general law." To avoid absurdity and injustice by judicial servitude to interpretative literality is a function of the Court and this leaves me no option but to hold that the I.D. Act holds where disputes erupt and the LIC Act guides where other matters are concerned. In the field of statutory interpretation there are no inflexible formulae or fool-proof mechanisms. The sense and sensibility, the setting and the scheme, the perspective and the purpose these help the Judge navigate towards the harbour of true intendment and meaning. The legal dynamics of social justice also guide the Court in Statutes of the type we are interpreting. These plural considerations led me to the conclusion that the I.D. Act is a special statute when industrial disputes, awards and settlements are the topic of controversy, as here. There may be other matters where the LIC Act vis-a-vis the other statutes will be a special law. I am not concerned with such hypothetical situations now." In Raton Lal Adukia Vs. There may be other matters where the LIC Act vis-a-vis the other statutes will be a special law. I am not concerned with such hypothetical situations now." In Raton Lal Adukia Vs. Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 537 , Their Lordships were pleased to observe :- "18........The doctrine of implied repeal is based on the postulate the Legislature which is presumed to know the existing state of the law did not intend to create any confusion by retaining conflicting provisions. Courts, in applying this doctrine, are supposed merely to give effect to the Legislative intent by examining the object and scope of the two enactments. But in a conceivable case, the very existence of two provisions may by itself, and without more, lead to an inference of mutual irreconcilability if the later set of provisions is by itself a complete code with respect to the same matter. In such a case the actual detailed comparison of the two sets of provisions may not be necessary......" In State of M.P. Vs. Kedia Leather and Liquor Ltd. and others. Respondents, (2003) 7 SCC 389 , Their Lordships were pleased to observe :- "13. There is presumption against a repeal by implication; and the reas.on of this rule is based on the theory that the Legislature while enacting a law has a complete knowledge of the existing laws on the same subject matter, and therefore, when it does not provide a repealing provision, the intention is clear not to repeal the existing Legislation. [See : Municipal Council, Palai through the Commissioner of Municipal Council, Palai Vs. T.J. Joseph, AIR 1963 SC 1561 , Northern India Caterers (Private) Ltd. and another Vs. State of Punjab and another, AIR 1967 SC 1581 , Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Shiv Shanker, (1971) 1 SCC 442 , and Ratan Lal Adukia and another Vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 104 . When the new Act contains a repealing section mentioning the Acts which it expressly repeals, the presumption against implied repeal of other laws is further strengthened on the principle expressio unius (persone vel rei) est exclusio alterius. (The express intention of one person or thing is the exclusion of another), as illuminatingly stated in Garnett Vs. Bradley, (1878) 3 AC 944 (HL). (The express intention of one person or thing is the exclusion of another), as illuminatingly stated in Garnett Vs. Bradley, (1878) 3 AC 944 (HL). The continuance of existing legislation, in the absence of an express provision of repeal by implication lies on the party asserting the same. The presumption is, however, rebutted and a repeal is inferred by necessary implication when the provisions of the later Act are so inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of the earlier Act and that the two cannot stand together. But, if the two can be read together and some application can be made of the words in the earlier Act, a repeal will not be inferred. [See: A.G. Vs. Moore, (1878) 3 Ex. D. 276, Ratanlal's case (supra) and R.S. Raghunath Vs. State of Karnataka and another, AIR 1992 SC 81 ] 14. The necessary questions to be asked are :- (1) Whether there is direct conflict between the two provisions. (2) Whether the Legislature intended to lay down an exhaustive Code in respect of the subject-matter replacing the earlier law. (3) Whether the two laws occupy the same field. [See : Pt. Rishikesh and another Vs. Salma Begum (Smt.), (1995) 4 SCC 718 = 1995 (3) RRR 429 (SC), and Shri A.R. Krishna and others Vs. The State of Karnataka and others, JT 1998 (1) SC 613]. 15. The doctrine of implied repeal is based on the theory that the Legislature, which is presumed to know the existing law, did not intend to create any confusion by retaining conflicting provisions and, therefore, when the Court applies the doctrine, it does not more than give effect to the intention of the Legislature by examining the scope and the object of the two enactments and by a comparison of their provisions. The matter in each case is one of the construction and comparison of the two statutes. The Court leans against implying a repeal, "unless two Acts are so plainly repugnant to each other that effect cannot be given to both at the same time, a repeal will not be implied, or that there is a necessary inconsistency in the two Acts standing together." (See : Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition, Page 366, with reference to Re: Berrey, (1936) Ch. 274, To determine whether a later statute repeals by implication an earlier, it is necessary to scrutinize the terms and consider the true meaning and effect of the earlier Act. Until this is done, it is impossible to ascertain whether any inconsistency exists between the two enactments. The area of operation in the Code and the pollution laws in question are different with wholly different aims and objects, and though they alleviate nuisance, that is not of identical nature. They operate in their respective fields and there is no impediment for their existence side by side." In Ajoy Kumar Bonerjee and others Vs. Union of India and others, (1984) 3 SCC 127 , Their Lordships were pleased to observe :- "38......As mentioned hereinbefore if the scheme was held to be valid, then the question, what is the general law and what is the special law and which law in case of conflict would prevail would have arisen and that would have necessitated the application of the principle "Generalia specialibus non derogaut". The general rule to be followed in case of conflict between two statutes is that the later abrogates the earlier one. In other words, a prior special law would yield to a later general law, if either of the two following conditions is satisfied :- (i) The two are inconsistent with each other, (ii) There is some express reference in the later to the earlier enactment. If either of these two conditions is fulfilled, the later law, even though general, would prevail. 39. From the text and the decisions, four tests are deducible and these are : (i) The Legislature has the undoubted right to alter a law already promulgated through subsequent legislation, (ii) A special law may be altered, abrogated or repealed by a later general law by an express provision, (iii) A later general law will override a prior special law if the two are so repugnant to each other that they cannot co-exist even though no express provision in that behalf is found in the general law, and (iv) It is only, in the absence of a provision to 'the contrary and of a clear inconsistency that a special law will remain wholly unaffected by a later general law'. See in this connection, Maxwell on "the Interpretation of Statutes", Twelth Edition, Pages 196-198." In Gobind Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. See in this connection, Maxwell on "the Interpretation of Statutes", Twelth Edition, Pages 196-198." In Gobind Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar and others, (1999) 7 SCC 76 , Their Lordships were pleased to hold :- "10. While determining the question whether a Statute is a general or a special one, focus must be on the principal subject-matter coupled "with particular perspective with reference to the intendment of the Act. Keeping in mind this basic principle, we will have to examine the provisions of the two Acts to find out whether it is possible to construe harmoniously the provisions of Section 4 of the Finance Act and Section 49 of the Sugarcane Act. If it is not possible then an effort will have to be made to ascertain whether the Legislature had intended to accord the levy on sugarcane a special treatment vis-a-vis the levy of purchase tax on other items, and a further endeavour will have to be made to find out whether Section 49 of the Sugarcane Act excludes the applicability of the levy under Section 4 of the Finance Act. On a perusal of the provisions of the above Acts including the objects of the two Acts, it could be seen that the two enactments in question contemplates levy of purchase tax. While the Finance Act empowers the State to levy all commercial taxes generally, the Sugarcane Act empowers the levy of purchase tax only on sugarcane. In this background, there can be no doubt that the Legislature intended to enact a special enactment for the purpose of levy of purchase tax with reference to sugarcane under the Sugarcane Act to the exclusion of such levy under the Finance Act. Once we come to the conclusion that this is the intention of the Legislation then the rule "general provision should yield to special provision" is squarely attracted." Survey of these judgments will thus establish that in case of a special enactment the same will have an overriding effect on the provisions of other enactment in respect of the field covered by it over the general provisions. Combined reading of Rule 3 and Rule 3-A of the Rules of 1965 as well as Sections 2 (d) and 12 (a) and (j) of the Act of 1993 would reveal that they are complementing rather than contradicting each other. Combined reading of Rule 3 and Rule 3-A of the Rules of 1965 as well as Sections 2 (d) and 12 (a) and (j) of the Act of 1993 would reveal that they are complementing rather than contradicting each other. There being no head on collusion in a field where both the Rules and said Sections would harmoniously operate when an inquiry is undertaken in respect of allegation of the breach of human rights against a Government servant during discharge of his official duties. ( 13. ) THUS, in a matter like the present one wherein a Government servant in discharging of his duties exceeds his powers and commits breach of human rights for which he is tried as per the procedure laid down under the Act of 1993. And on the basis of such enquiry the Commission returns a finding and directs the employer to take action, in the considered opinion of this Court, it will not be within the power of authorities to dilute the finding of the Commission in a domestic enquiry. ( 14. ) IN view of above the action of respondent-State of M.P. in exonerating the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 cannot be given a stamp of approval. The petition is allowed with a direction to respondent-State of M.P. to inflict punishment on respondent Nos. 2 and 3, on the basis of findings and the recommendations by the Commission, as also pay the compensation to victims along with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date or order of commission till final payment. ( 15. ) LET the same be done within three months from the date of communication of this order. ( 16. ) PETITION is allowed to the extent above. No costs.