JUDGMENT : B.P. Ray, J. - The two revisions arise out of orders passed by learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate (in short, "S.D.M."), Panposh in Criminal Misc. Case No. 3314 of 2010 and Criminal Misc. Case No. 4946 of 2010 respectively initiated u/s.144 of the Cr.P.C. As parties to and subject-matter of the dispute in both the proceedings are same, both the revisions are heard and disposed of by this common order. 2. Both the proceedings were initiated on receipt of Non F.I.Rs. submitted by the I.I.C. of Sector-15 Police Station, Rourkela impleading the petitioner and opp. party no.2 as second party members. Opp. party no.2 is the President and petitioner is the General Secretary of Rourkela Shramik Sangha (in short, "R.S.S."), a labor union. Subject matter of the dispute is Quarters No. D/81 in Sector 18, Rourkela in which R.S.S. is functioning. It is alleged that two days prior to submission of Non-F.I.R. in Crl. Misc. Case No. 3314 of 2010, petitioner suspended opp. party No. 2 and thereafter opp. party no.2 also issued a letter of suspension against the petitioner. 3. In Non-F.I.R. No. 215/2010, on the basis of which Crl. Misc. Case No. 3314 of 2010 was initiated, the history of the case has been described as follows: ...There is a big shramik Sangha of Rourkela Steel Plant (RSP) functioning in Shramik Mandir location at Sector-18 in Qrts. No. D/81. Sri Prasanta Kumar Behera, O.P. No. 2 is the President and Sri M.D.N. Panicker, O.P. No. 1 is the General Secretary of the said R.S.S., About two days back Sri Panicker suspended Sri Behera and after getting this information Sri Behera also issued suspension letter to Sri Panicker basing on his official status in absence of Sri Panicker. Sri Prasanta Kumar Behera and his supporters put lock in the office and get of Shramik Mandir. On receiving this information Sri Panicker was preparing to reach Rourkela on 1.5.2010 and his supporters were in readiness to take possession of the office of RSS by breaking-open the locks. Sri P.K. Behera and his supporters were determined not to allow Sri Panicker and his supporters to enter the office and premises of R.S.S. As such there exists apprehension of serious breach of peace by way of attack and counterattack by both the rival groups of Labor Union R.S.S., which may lead to loss of life and property. 4. Sri P.K. Behera and his supporters were determined not to allow Sri Panicker and his supporters to enter the office and premises of R.S.S. As such there exists apprehension of serious breach of peace by way of attack and counterattack by both the rival groups of Labor Union R.S.S., which may lead to loss of life and property. 4. On receipt of the Non-F.I.R. learned S.D.M. passed ex parte preliminary order dated 1.5.2010 restraining the second party members and their supporters to restrict their movements as prayed for by the I.I.C. and directed the second party members to raise objection, if any, U/s. 144 (5) of the Cr.P.C. It appears that petitioner filed objection against the ex parte prohibitory order. Also documents in support of the respective claims were filed by the petitioner as well as opp. party no.2. In course of enquiry learned S.D.M. appears to have recorded the evidence of I.I.C. of Sector-15 Police Station, Rourkela. On conclusion of enquiry by order dated 11.5.2010, which has been impugned in Crl. Revision No. 791 of 2010, learned S.D.M. made the preliminary order dated 1.5.2010 absolute. The concluding part of the order reads as follows:- ...12. In the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, it abundantly reveals that there is sufficient ground to proceed U/S 144 Cr.P.C. in the face of the materials on record and in the above premises the objection raised by O.P. No.1 in his show cause petition dt. 07.05.2010 filed U/S-144(5) Cr.P.C. is devoid of any merit and hence stands rejected. In the result, the preliminary orders dt. 01.05.2010 passed by this Court U/S-144(2) Cr.P.C. stands confirmed and is accordingly made absolute. 13. The other petitions filed by the O.P. No.1 on 07.05.2010 also stand rejected accordingly in view of the observations made in course of discussions in the foregoing paragraphs. 14. However, the O.Ps. In the result, the preliminary orders dt. 01.05.2010 passed by this Court U/S-144(2) Cr.P.C. stands confirmed and is accordingly made absolute. 13. The other petitions filed by the O.P. No.1 on 07.05.2010 also stand rejected accordingly in view of the observations made in course of discussions in the foregoing paragraphs. 14. However, the O.Ps. are at liberty to take legal shelter in appropriate Court of law for adjudication of their civil dispute, if any, through due process of law to establish their rights regarding genuineness of the office-bearers of the Labor Union in dispute for settlement of the issue in a legal and peaceful manner instead of taking law into their own hands and thereby creating a situation where apprehension of serious breach of peace is involved and unless & until that is attained, no law-abiding citizen having any civic sense will ever wish to allow a chaotic and lawlessness situation to relapse by rescinding the prohibitory order now under promulgation U/S 144 Cr.P.C. 5. During pendency of Crl. Revision No. 791 of 2010 it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that by virtue of the aforesaid order passed by the learned S.D.M. the petitioner has been dispossessed from his dwelling house in Qrs. No. D/81. Considering the rival submissions, by interim orders dated 21.5.2010 & 2.7.2010 the I.I.C. of Sector-15 Police Station was directed to handover essential personal belongings of the petitioner to him. Also by order dated 15.7.2010 the petitioner was allowed to occupy the premises in Qrs. No. D/81 which was used by him as bed room. Relevant part of the order dated 15.7.2010 is quoted below:- ...It is stated that the petitioner was occupying the upstairs of Union office building of p/81 and using the same as bed room. Let the petitioner occupy the said room, if it is suitable to him till next date. The petitioner may remove the articles mentioned in paragraph 4 of the order dated 2.7.2010 in presence of the I.I.C. Sector-15, Rourkela and representative of opp. party No.2 and so far as other documents relating to the union shall not be handed over to the petitioner and it should be kept in the custody of the I.I.C, Sector-15, Rourkela in sealed cover subject to further orders passed by this Court. party No.2 and so far as other documents relating to the union shall not be handed over to the petitioner and it should be kept in the custody of the I.I.C, Sector-15, Rourkela in sealed cover subject to further orders passed by this Court. The petitioner shall not enter into the office premises which are stated to be in the ground floor of D/ 81. The petitioner and his wife shall not be permitted to remove the documents belonging to the union. 6. However, Crl. Misc. Case No. 4946 of 2010 appears to have been initiated by order dated 30.6.2010 on receipt of Non-F.I.R. No. 4937 of 2010. While initiating the proceeding an ex parte prohibitory order was passed again. The concluding part of the order dated 30.6.2010 passed in Crl. Misc. Case No. 4946 of 2010 reads as follows: ...3. Hence, the IIC, Sector-15 Police Station has prayed for promulgation of prohibitory order U/s 144 Cr.P.C in and around the RSS Office, premises and the adjoining road within a radium of 40 Mtrs. Around the Rourkela Shramik Shanga Office to prevent imminent breach of peach. 4. On careful examination of the materials on records, I am satisfied that there is sufficient ground to proceed U/s 144 Cr.P.C. for immediate prevention of nuisance and apprehended danger. As the matter is one of emergency, due service of notice to the parties will defeat the very objective of preventing the serious breach of peace. 5. In the above facts and circumstances of the case as outlined n foregoing paragraphs, I am satisfied to pass an order U/s 144 (2) Cr.P.C. restraining the O.P.s (2nd Part members), all their followers and supporters from entering into the office premises of Rourkela Shramik Sangha situated at Qrts. No. D/81 in Sector-18 and adjoining roads up to a distance of 400 meters for a period of 60 days from today. 6. Any person aggrieved by this order may file an objection petition U/s 144 (5) Cr.P.C. before this Court on or before 12.8.2010 stating therein as to why this order shall not be made absolute. Crl. Revision No. 937 has been preferred assailing the initiation of proceeding and passing of prohibitory order u/s. 144 of the Cr.P.C. Crl. Misc. Case No. 4946 of 2010. 7. It is also pertinent to note that despite interim orders passing Crl. Revn. Crl. Revision No. 937 has been preferred assailing the initiation of proceeding and passing of prohibitory order u/s. 144 of the Cr.P.C. Crl. Misc. Case No. 4946 of 2010. 7. It is also pertinent to note that despite interim orders passing Crl. Revn. No. 791 of 2010, referred to and extracted above, in response to prayer made by the IIC, Sector-15 Police Station, Rourkela, learned S.D.M. by order dated 27.8.2010 converted Crl. Misc. Case No. 4946 of 2010 to a proceeding u/s 145 Cr.P.C, attached Qrs. No. D/81 u/s 146(1) of the Cr.P.C. and appointed a receiver of the disputed building u/s 146(2) of the Cr.P.C. The operative part of the order dated 27.8.2010 reads as follows:- ...5. At present each party is claiming that it is the genuine union and both the parties claim the right over the premises of the union. The statutory period of 60 days of the prohibitory under U/S 144 Cr.P.C. is going to be completed on 28.08.2010. If the two parties are not prevented from entering into the premises in question, it will become a free for all and both parties will try to take possession of the union premises by force leading to serious rioting with deadly weapons as a result of which there may be loss of life and property. Since it has not been decided by a competent Court as to which party is the genuine union and has the right over the premises, it will be hazardous to open the premises for both the parties at this stage. Serious breach of peach can be avoided only when both the parties are prohibited from entering into the premises of the union in question till the matter is decided in a competent Court. 6. In the above facts and circumstances, the I.I.C., Sector-15 P.S. has prayed to convert the present proceedings U/S 144 Cr.P.C. into a proceeding U?S 145 Cr.P.C. as dispute regarding the possession of the union Office and its premises of Rourkela Shramik Sangha situated at Qrts. No. D/81 in Sector-18, Rourkela is likely to cause a serious breach of peace leading to possible bloodshed and loss to life and property. No. D/81 in Sector-18, Rourkela is likely to cause a serious breach of peace leading to possible bloodshed and loss to life and property. The I.I.C., Sector-15 P.S. has further prayed, for attachment of the property U/S 146 Cr.P.C. in view of the emergency to prevent serious breach of peace and for appointment of an independent receiver to take care of the property until a competent Court has determined the rights of the parties, in his police report. 7. After perusal of the objection petition filed by O.P. No. 2 U/S 144 (5) Cr.P.C. the Police Report dt. 26.08.2010, documents and on hearing, I am satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for converting this proceedings to one U/S 145 Cr.P.C. as there is apprehension of serious breach of peace between the parties with regard to the possession of the disputed building wherein the union office of Rourkela Shramik Sangh situates along with its premises. Law is well settled that frequent proceedings U/S 144 Cr.P.C. should not be resorted to avert breach of peace and the right course is to initiate a proceeding U?S 145 Cr.P.C. 8. In the facts and circumstances of the case as outlined in the foregoing paragraphs, I am satisfied to convert this Proceedings U/S-144 Cr.P.C. to one U/S-145 Cr.P.C. and require the parties to attend this Court n person or by pleader on 14.09.2010 at 11.00 A.M. and to put in their Written Statements of the respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the disputed building more fully described in the schedule below. 9. I am further satisfied to attach the disputed building U/S-146(1) Cr.P.C. as the case is one of emergency, until a Competent Court has determined the rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof and the D.G.M., Town Services, Rourkela Steel Plant, Rourkela is appointed as the receiver of the disputed building under sub-section (2) of Section-146 Cr.P.C. who shall have, subject to the control of this Court, all the powers of a receiver appointed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) until further orders by this Court. 8. Lower Court record in Criminal Misc. 8. Lower Court record in Criminal Misc. Case No. 4946 of 2010 further reveals that by order dated 9.9.2010, the learned S.D.M., Panposh has stated to have complied with the interim orders passed in Criminal Revision No. 791 of 2010 by allowing the petitioner to occupy first floor of disputed Qrs. No. D/81. 9. Following contentions were made on behalf of the petitioner in assailing the initiation of both the proceedings by the learned S.D.M., Panposh. (i) Conversion of proceeding u/s 144 Cr.P.C. in Criminal Misc. Case No. 4946 of 2010 to a proceeding u/s 145 Cr.P.C. amounts to an admission to the effect that the dispute between the parties is concerning possession of Qrs. No. D/81. It is not disputed that petitioner is the Secretary of R.S.S. and in that capacity he was in occupation of the disputed premises. While deposing before the learned S.D.M., the IIC of Section 15 P.S., Rourkela did not deny to the suggestion that the petitioner is using a part of the disputed premises for his residential purposes. He rather admitted that passport was issued in favour of the petitioner upon verification of his residential credential from Sector 15 P.S. area and that opp. party no.2 is not staying in Sector 18, Rourkela. In the order impugned in Criminal Revision No. 791 of 2010 also the learned S.D.M. has categorically observed that Qrs. No. D/81 was allotted in favour of the General Secretary. In such circumstances, there being no dispute regarding possession of the petitioner over the disputed quarters, the proceedings under Sections 144 & 145 of Cr.P.C. are not sustainable in law. (ii) Non-FIRs in both the cases indicate that the petitioner is the General Secretary of the R.S.S. Admittedly, in that capacity, the disputed quarters had been allotted to the petitioner. He along with his family members was residing in a portion of the premises. Both the proceedings were initiated at the instance of opp. party no. 2 with the sole intention to dispossess the petitioner from the premises, so that he is not able to discharge his functions as the General Secretary. Proceedings were initiated with the oblique motive of taking control over the R.S.S. Sections 144 & 145 Cr.P.C. do not contemplate adjudication of the dispute relating to right, title and interest or entitlement to rights over the properties. Proceedings were initiated with the oblique motive of taking control over the R.S.S. Sections 144 & 145 Cr.P.C. do not contemplate adjudication of the dispute relating to right, title and interest or entitlement to rights over the properties. Such proceedings cannot be utilized as an alternative to evict a person in actual possession. Instead of resorting to proceedings u/s 144 Cr.P.C. or converting the proceedings to u/s 145 Cr.P.C, learned S.D.M. ought to have directed opp. party no.2 to take recourse to appropriate civil proceeding to establish his right and to establish the liability of the petitioner to be dispossessed. (iii) Scheme of Section 144 Cr.P.C. does not contemplate repetitive orders. The Section itself provides for extension of period of prohibitory order. A Magistrate cannot perpetuate his own order by passing successive orders in successive proceedings in respect of the self-same dispute. (iv) Before initiation of the first proceeding u/s 144 Cr.P.C, a proceeding u/s 107 Cr.P.C. had been initiated in respect of self-same dispute and the proceeding is still pending. The nature of dispute in the present cases does not justify initiation of proceedings either u/s 144 or u/s 145 Cr.P.C. In case of existence of apprehension of breach of peace, learned S.D.M. ought to have proceeded with the proceeding u/s 107 Cr.P.C. 10. In reply, it was contended that Sections 144 & 145 Cr.P.C. empowers initiation of quasi judicial proceedings to contain breach of peace. Learned S.D.M. having arrived at the satisfaction that preventive action is required u/s 144(1) Cr.P.C, the impugned orders are not amenable to interference by invoking revisional jurisdiction. There is also no prohibition in law to convert a proceeding u/s 144 Cr.P.C. to one u/s 145 Cr.P.C. before expiry of the period of prohibitory order. As the petitioner has been suspended and is no more holding the office of the General Secretary of R.S.s., he cannot claim any right in respect of the disputed premises. 11. learned counsel appearing for the parties relied upon a number of judicial pronouncements in support of their contentions. It is interesting to note that reliance was placed by both the sides on the decision reported in Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta and Others Vs. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta and Another, 12. 11. learned counsel appearing for the parties relied upon a number of judicial pronouncements in support of their contentions. It is interesting to note that reliance was placed by both the sides on the decision reported in Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta and Others Vs. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta and Another, 12. As has been reiterated by this Court in the case of Ajit Kumar Mana v. Tusharkanta Bhomik and other reported in (1999) 16 OCR 437 and relied upon by the learned counsel for the opp. party no.2, law is well settled that powers U/s. 144, Cr.P.C. vested with the Magistrate are intended to be exercised sparingly in case of urgency of situation for prevention of imminent breach of public peace and tranquility. It envisages passing of an executive order in due performance of an executive function, where there is no question of adjudication of right or title between the parties. The foundation of an order u/s. 144, Cr.P.C. is a satisfaction of an Executive Magistrate with regard to urgency of the prevailing situation and that power is only to be exercised for preventing imminent breach of public peace and disturbance of tranquility. However, the scope of an order contemplated u/s. 145, Cr.P.C. is specific with regard to a case arising out of a dispute concerning land and water, leading to an apprehension of breach of peace and tranquility. It is only to determine the actual physical possession of the party and consequently right to remain in possession till the right, title and interest to possess the property is determined by a competent Civil Court. In any event, the Executive Magistrate should keep in mind the statutory principle of law that the process of law cannot be allowed to be utilized for oblique purpose by any interested party. 13. It is obvious from the facts and circumstances of the case and rival contentions made on behalf of the parties that the origin and genesis of the dispute in the present revisions relate to internal dispute in RSS between the petitioner and opp. party no.2. Materials on record clearly indicate that the disputed premises ws allotted to the General Secretary of the RSS and that the petitioner is in occupation of a portion of the quarters. party no.2. Materials on record clearly indicate that the disputed premises ws allotted to the General Secretary of the RSS and that the petitioner is in occupation of a portion of the quarters. In such circumstances, contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that prohibitory orders passed by the learned S.D.M., Panposh amounted to dispossession of the petitioner from the premises under his occupation is not unfounded. 14. Evidently petitioner's right to continue with the possession and occupation of the disputed premises is disputed by opp. party no.2 and his supporters on the sole ground of his alleged suspension from the office of the General Secretary of the R.S.S. Therefore, essentially the dispute between the parties involves adjudication of petitioner's right to continue and entitlement to hold the office of the General Secretary of the R.S.S. Annexure-11 to Criminal Revision No. 937 of 2010 is the order dated 14.7.2010 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Rourkela in R.F.A. No. 7 of 2007 preferred by the R.S.S. through the present petitioner as the General Secretary against the Steel Authority of India. It appears from the order that objection to the authority of the petitioner to continue with the appeal as the General Secretary was rejected and the present petitioner was allowed to continue with the appeal in his capacity as the General Secretary of R.S.S. Therefore, dispute as regards the status of the present petitioner as the General Secretary of the R.S.S. has already been raised before the Civil Court. Petitioner's right to possess the disputed quarters is dependent upon the adjudication of his rights and entitlement to hold the office of General Secretary. Neither in a proceedings u/s. 144, Cr.P.C. or Section 145, Cr.P.C. such a question involving rights or entitlement can be decided. 15. In Ranbir Singh Vs. Dalbir Singh and Others, it has been held : The Court, while dealing with a proceeding u/s 145, Cr.P.C, is mainly concerned with possession of the property in dispute on the date of the preliminary order and dispossession, if any, within two months prior to that date; the Court is not required to decide either title to the property or right of possession of the same. The question for determination before the High Court in the present case was one relating to the validity or otherwise of the preliminary order passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate u/s 145(1), Cr.P.C. and sustainability of the order of attachment passed u/s 146(1), Cr.P.C. for deciding the questions it was neither necessary nor relevant for the High Court to have considered the matters relating to title to and right of possession of the property. Further, both the parties in the case have filed suits seeking decree of permanent injunction against each other and in the suit filed by the appellant and order of interim injunction has been passed and an objection petition has been filed by respondent no.1. The suits and the interim order are pending further consideration before the Civil Court. In these circumstances, we are of the view that while maintaining the order of the High Court quashing the preliminary order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate u/s 145 (1) and the order of attachment of the property u/s 146(1), Cr.P.C, leave should be granted to the parties to approach the Civil Court for appropriate interim order and the Civil Court should deal with the application for interim order without being influenced by the observations made/findings recorded by the High Court in the impugned judgment. It is ordered accordingly. 16. It is well settled that party in actual physical possession cannot be dispossessed by order passed in a proceedings U/s. 144, Cr.P.C. or Sec. 145, Cr.P.C. Section 144, Cr.P.C. does not confer any power on the Executive Magistrate to adjudicate the question of title to the property or entitlement of rights. In cases such disputes or entitlement to rights have already been adjudicated, The executive Magistrate must have due regard to established rights. Pendency of proceedings u/s. 145, Cr.P.C. reflects the factum of possession and does not in any manner affect the title of the parties to the disputed premises. In these context decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ravi Raman Prasad and another Vs. State of Bihar and others, ; Sadhuram Bansal Vs. Pulin Behari Sarkar and Others, & Gulam Abbas and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, may be referred to. 17. Moreover passing of repetitive orders u/s. 144, Cr.P.C. has been consistently deprecated in authoritative judicial pronouncements. State of Bihar and others, ; Sadhuram Bansal Vs. Pulin Behari Sarkar and Others, & Gulam Abbas and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, may be referred to. 17. Moreover passing of repetitive orders u/s. 144, Cr.P.C. has been consistently deprecated in authoritative judicial pronouncements. In Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as opp. party no.2 it has been held that the clear and definite view of the Supreme Court is that an order u/s. 144 of the Code is not intended to be either permanent or semi permanent in character. It was held: The proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 144 which gives the State Government jurisdiction to extend the prohibitory order for a maximum period of six months beyond the life of the order made by the Magistrate is clearly indicative of the position that Parliament never intended the life of an order u/s 144 of the Code to remain in force beyond two months when made by a Magistrate. The scheme of that Section does not contemplate repetitive orders and in case the situation so warrants, steps have to be taken under other provisions of the law such as Section 107 or Section 145 of the Code when individual disputes are raised and to meet a situation such as here, there are provisions to be found in the Police Act. If repetitive order are made it would clearly amount to abuse of the power conferred by Section 144 of the Code.... 18. Referring to provisions under sub-sections (4) & (6) of Section 144, Cr.P.C. It has been observed by this Court in Khirod Ch. Sahu and others v. Executive Magistrate (Sadar) Cuttack and others (1996) 10 OCR 422 that: A combined reading of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that the State Government is empowered to increase the duration of an order passed by a Magistrate and unless such a course is adopted by the State Government, no order u/s 144 can remain in force for a period more than two months. It is trite saying that what cannot be done directly cannot be permitted to be done indirectly. If the Executive Magistrate or any other authority felt the necessity of continuance of an order under Sec. 144, the appropriate course would have been to approach the State Government under Sec. 144(4) proviso. It is trite saying that what cannot be done directly cannot be permitted to be done indirectly. If the Executive Magistrate or any other authority felt the necessity of continuance of an order under Sec. 144, the appropriate course would have been to approach the State Government under Sec. 144(4) proviso. In this case, it is apparent that the Executive Magistrate without proper application of mind to the mandatory provisions of law has tried to perpetuate his own order by passing successive orders in respect of the self-same dispute. 19. Thus under the facts and circumstances of the case neither of the proceedings, out of which the revisions have arisen, is legally sustainable. Learned S.D.M. should not have initiated the proceedings to serve the oblique motive of opp. party no.2 and should not have tried to perpetuate the prohibitory order by initiating the second proceedings that too in spite of above referred interim orders passed by this Court. Therefore, the impugned orders are set aside. It is made clear that if the circumstances so require learned Magistrate can proceed with the proceeding u/s. 107 Cr.P.C. which is stated to be pending or steps may be taken by opp. party no.2 to approach for appropriate orders from the competent Civil Court. Consequently, the order directing conversion of the proceeding to one u/s 145, Cr.P.C. and the order of attachment passed u/s 146, Cr.P.C. are also set aside. Criminal Revisions are accordingly allowed. Final Result : Allowed