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2010 DIGILAW 72 (GAU)

Sanjib Saha v. Himangshu Saha

2010-02-03

UTPALENDU BIKAS SAHA

body2010
JUDGMENT U.B. Saha, J. 1. The instant petition is filed by the petitioner tenant under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the impugned judgment dated 20.4.2007 of the Revisional Court passed in RCC (Rev) No. 02 of 2006 dismissing the revision, petition filed under Section 22(1) of the Tripura Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1975 and upholding the judgment dated 22.3.2006 of the Appellate Court of the Rent Control Cases, Court No. 2, West Tripura, Agartala passed in RCC Appeal No. 26 of 2005 preferred under Section 20 of the Tripura Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1975 hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', directing the respondent tenant to put the appellant landlord in possession of the rented premises subject to the provisions of Clause (c) of Section 12(2) of the Act and as provided under Section 12(10) of the Act, after setting aside the judgment dated 23.11.2005 passed by the Presiding Officer, Rent Control Court, Agartala, West Tripura in RCC 7 of 2005 whereby and whereunder the petition filed under Section 12(3) of the Act by the respondent landlord was rejected and the opposite party petitioner tenant was directed to clear up the arrear of the rent within forty-five days from the date of the order, failing which the tenant shall hand over the vacant possession of the rented premises to the landlord. 2. The brief history of the case in hand is that the petitioner was a tenant under one Jogesh Chandra Saha, the original landlord since deceased, under an agreement for five years with effect from 1.6.1996 to 31.5.2001 at a monthly rent of Rs. 650 per month and after expiry of such lease term, the said Jogesh Ch. Saha asked the petitioner tenant to vacate the rented premises as he intended to sell the said rented premises clue to his bona fide need of money. The petitioner tenant did not respond to it. Thereafter, the original landlord by a registered deed No. 1-7576 transferred the rented premises to the present respondent landlord Sri Himangshu Saha on 20.6.2002. The present respondent landlord also requested the petitioner tenant to vacate the rented premises for starting a business for his own livelihood and of his dependant family members. The petitioner tenant did not respond to it. Thereafter, the original landlord by a registered deed No. 1-7576 transferred the rented premises to the present respondent landlord Sri Himangshu Saha on 20.6.2002. The present respondent landlord also requested the petitioner tenant to vacate the rented premises for starting a business for his own livelihood and of his dependant family members. Ultimately, the present respondent landlord sent a notice to the petitioner tenant on 5.10.2002 by registered post demanding vacation of the rented premises within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of the said notice. But the petitioner tenant did not vacate the said rented premises. Then the respondent landlord filed a case under Section 12(3) of the Act for eviction of the petitioner tenant and the said suit was ultimately disposed of as premature. In the result, the petitioner tenant continued in possession of the suit premises. Again on 26.10.2004, the respondent landlord sent another notice demanding arrear rent of Rs. 15,812 for the period from 20.8.2002 to 30.9.2004 at the rate of Rs. 650 per, month. On receipt of the said notice, the petitioner tenant desired to know the Bank Account number of the respondent landlord for depositing the arrear rent and monthly rent in the said account, but the petitioner tenant disagreed to vacate the suit premises. The respondent landlord then furnished his Bank account, but the petitioner tenant did not deposit the arrear rent and current rent thereafter except part of the arrear rent and that too in installments. Thus, the petitioner tenant became defaulter in payment of the arrear rent and monthly rent of the rented premises and the respondent landlord filed the petition under Section112(3) of the Act to put him in possession of the rented premises for bona fide need of the rented premises which was Registered as RCC No. 7 of 2005 before the Rent Control Court. 3. The petitioner tenant contested the said suit by filing written objection wherein he denied the allegations made by the respondent landlord that he was the defaulter in payment of the rent. The petitioner tenant also disputed the bona fide necessity of the respondent landlord. 4. Upon hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and on appreciation of the evidence, the learned Rent Control Court rejected the petition of the respondent landlord. The petitioner tenant also disputed the bona fide necessity of the respondent landlord. 4. Upon hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and on appreciation of the evidence, the learned Rent Control Court rejected the petition of the respondent landlord. However, the Rent Control Court directed the petitioner-tenant to clear up the arrear of the rent within forty-five days from the date of the order, failing which the tenant shall hand over the vacant possession of the suit rented premises to the landlord. 5. Being dissatisfied with the impugned judgment of the Rent Control Court, the respondent landlord preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority under Section 20 of the Act and the appellate authority vide judgment dated 22.3.2006 passed in RCC Appeal No. 26 of 2005 set aside the order of the Rent Control Court and directed the petitioner tenant to put the respondent landlord in possession of the rented premises immediately subject to the provision of Clause (c) of Section 12(2) of the Act. 6. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the petitioner tenant filed a revision petition before the Rent Control Revisional Court under Section 22(1) of the Act and after considering the impugned judgment of the Rent Control Court as well as Appellate Court, the Revisional Court vide impugned judgment dated 10.4.2007 passed in RCC (Rev) 2 of 2006 dismissed the revision petition upholding the judgment of the appellate court which is under challenge before this Court by the instant revision petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution. 7. Heard Dr. H.K. Bhattacharjee, learned Counsel for the petitioner tenant and Mr. D.B. Sengupta, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. D. Datta, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent landlord. 8. Dr. Bhattacharjee learned Counsel for the petitioner tenant attacked the judgment of the Revisional Court as well as appellate court on various grounds, but mainly on the point that neither the appellate authority nor the revisional authority while passing the respective order considered the comparative hardship of the petitioner tenant which was required to be looked into by both the Authority as per the first proviso of Sub-section (10) of Section 12 of the Act. He also submitted that both the aforesaid authority have failed to consider the second proviso of Sub-section (3) of Section 12 wherein it has been stated that the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to put the landlord in possession if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. According to him, for decision of eviction of a tenant from any premise, a court is to first decide the comparative hardship of the parties, particularly, the tenant and his family and non-determination of comparative hardship itself is a ground for setting aside the order of revisional authority as well as appellate authority. In support of his aforesaid contention, he relied on a decision of the Apex Court, particularly he referred to paras 7 and 8 of the judgment in the case of Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada v. Govindram Ramgopal Mundada AIR 2003 SC 2713 . 9. Per contra, Mr. Sengupta, learned senior counsel for the respondent landlord submits that the present revision petition is not maintainable at all under Article 227 of the Constitution having been filed the same against the judgment and order of the Statutory revisional authority, particularly, when the petitioner did not make any allegation regarding jurisdiction of the revisional authority. He also contended that the original landlord, i.e., predecessor of the present landlord issued notice informing the petitioner for handing over the vacant possession of the room under the possession of the present petitioner tenant and also informed him that the original landlord intended to transfer the suit premises, i.e., the room under the occupation of the petitioner tenant for bona fide reasons. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner tenant was not given opportunity for purchasing the rented premises, rather it would be evident from record that he never expressed his willingness for purchasing the suit premises in the life time of the original landlord. According to him, it is also not the case of the petitioner tenant that the petitioner tenant had challenged the transfer of the property by the original landlord to the present landlord. According to him, it is also not the case of the petitioner tenant that the petitioner tenant had challenged the transfer of the property by the original landlord to the present landlord. The only grievance of the petitioner tenant that he was not provided opportunity for purchasing the rented premises before transferring the same to the present respondent landlord which is contrary to the evidence on record. He further contended that this Court while exercising the revisional jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot convert itself as a court of appeal for appreciating the evidence on record. But while he was saying so, he also referred to the evidence of P.W.3 Sri Nepal Ch. Saha to show that the petitioner have two other rooms in the first floor at Kumudini Mension with his brother Dilip Kumar Saha and not only that, the petitioner also got other rooms in the adjoining buildings, such as three rooms in the 1st floor of Shri Ramakrishna Market, two rooms in the building owned by Sri Laxman Saha and two rooms in a building owned by the legal heirs on late Sunil Dhar. Therefore, according to the learned senior counsel, the petitioner tenant is not entitled to get protection under second proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act, as contended by Dr. Bhattacharjee, learned Counsel for the petitioner. He also contended that the learned appellate court as well as Revisional Court though clearly not mentioned the word 'hardship", but considered the said aspect of comparative hardship and both the learned court below have discussed in their respective judgment relating to the rooms having by the petitioner tenant which is situated nearby the suit premises. Hence, the judgment of the appellate court as well as the Revisional Court cannot be set at naught on the ground of mere non-mentioning the word "Hardship". He also placed reliance a decision of this Court in the case of Ramesh Chandra Sharma v. Jitendra Kishore Horn Roy and Ors.(1986) 2 GLR 306, particularly para 8 of the said report. 10. He also placed reliance a decision of this Court in the case of Ramesh Chandra Sharma v. Jitendra Kishore Horn Roy and Ors.(1986) 2 GLR 306, particularly para 8 of the said report. 10. In view of the rival submission of the parties, the first point for consideration comes as to whether the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is maintainable against the judgment and order of the statutory revisional authority and the next point is whether the judgment of the revisional authority is bad in law for non-consideration of comparative hardship of the petitioner tenant. Before expressing any opinion on the aforesaid points, it would be proper for this Court to refer the relevant provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act as well as Sub-section (10) of the said section. Before expressing any opinion on the aforesaid points, it would be proper for this Court to refer the relevant provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act as well as Sub-section (10) of the said section. Accordingly, these are quoted hereunder: (3) A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him: Provided that the Rent Control court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will he just and proper to do so: Provided further that the Rent Control court shall not give any direction to tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business: Provided also that no landlord whose right to recover possession arises under an instrument of transfer inter vivos shall be entitled to apply to be put in possession until the expiry of one year from the date of instrument: Provided always that if a landlord after obtaining an order to be put in possession transfers his rights in respect of the building to another person, the transferee shall not be entitled to be put in possession unless he proves that he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him. (10) The Rent Control Court shall, if it is satisfied that the claim of the landlord under Sub-section (3), (4), (7) or Sub-section (8) is bona fide, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building on such date as may be specified by the Rent Control Court, and if the Rent Control Court is not so satisfied, it shall make an order rejecting the application: Provided that in the case of an application made under Sub-section (8) the Rent Control Court shall reject the application if it is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord: Provided further that the Rent Control Court may give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of the building and may extend such time so as not to exceed three months in the aggregate. 11. The power of superintendence of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is no longer res integra as the same is settled by the Apex Court by way of catena of decisions, some of which are the cases of (1) Waryam Singh v. Amarnath AIR 1954 SC 215 ; (2) Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai AIR 1975 SC 1297 ; (3) Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chancier Rai (2003) 6 SCC 675 ; (4) Bimal Sahoo, Secy., Dasudebpur Girls' High School v. Gouri Rani Paharii; (5) Miss Maneck Custodji Surjarji v. Sarafazali Nawabali Mirza AIR 1976 SC 2446 . After considering all the earlier cases, the Apex Court in Surya Dev Rai (supra) held that power of superintendence conferred upon the High Court under Article 227 is administrative as well as judicial, and is capable of being invoked at the instance of any person aggrieved or may even be exercised suo motu. The paramount consideration behind vesting such wide power of superintendence in the High Court is paving the path of justice and removing any obstacles therein. The power under Article 227 is wider than once conferred on the High Court by Article 226 in the sense that the power of superintendence is not subject to those technicalities of procedure or traditional fetters which are to be found in certiorari jurisdiction. The power under Article 227 is wider than once conferred on the High Court by Article 226 in the sense that the power of superintendence is not subject to those technicalities of procedure or traditional fetters which are to be found in certiorari jurisdiction. Not only that, their lordships of the Apex Court in the aforesaid case also discussed the difference between the writ and the certiorari under Article 226 and the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 and also discussed in which circumstances, the court can exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution. The relevant paragraph Nos. 24, 25, 26 and 38 of Surya Dev Rai (supra) are quoted hereunder as the same would be profitable for deciding the question agitated by Mr. Sengupta, learned senior counsel for the respondent landlord. 24. The difference between Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was well brought out in Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Radhikabai. Proceedings under Article 226 are in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court while proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution are not original but only supervisory. Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Sections 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 excepting that the power of superintendence has been extended by this article to tribunals as well. Though the power is akin to that of an ordinary court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as then (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is, being exercised in a manner which tantamount to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction. 25. Upon a review of decided cases and a survey of the occasion, wherein the High Courts have exercised jurisdiction to command a writ certiorari or to exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in the given facts and circumstances in a variety of cases. It seems that the distinction between the two jurisdiction stands almost obliterate in practice. 25. Upon a review of decided cases and a survey of the occasion, wherein the High Courts have exercised jurisdiction to command a writ certiorari or to exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in the given facts and circumstances in a variety of cases. It seems that the distinction between the two jurisdiction stands almost obliterate in practice. Probably, that is the reason Why it has become customary with the lawyers labeling their petitions as one common under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, though such practice has been deprecated in some judicial pronouncement. Without entering into niceties and technicality of the subject. We venture to state the broad general difference between the two jurisdictions. Firstly, the writ of certiorari is an exercise of its original jurisdiction by the High Court; exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is not an original jurisdiction and in this sense it is akin to appellate, revisional or corrective jurisdiction. Secondly, in a writ of certiorari, the record of the proceedings having been clarified and sent up by the inferior court or tribunal to the High Court, the High Court is inclined to exercise its jurisdiction, may simply annual or quash the proceedings and then do no more. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, the High Court may not only quash or set aside the impugned proceedings, judgment or order but it may also make such direction as the facts and circumstances of the case may warrant, may be by way of guiding the inferior court or tribunal as to the manner in which it would not proceed further or afresh as commended to or guided by the High Court. In appropriate cases the High Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, may substitute such a decision of its own in place of the impugned decision, as the inferior court or tribunal should have made. Lastly, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is capable of being exercised on a prayer made by or on behalf of the party aggrieved; the supervisory jurisdiction is capable of being exercised suo motu as well. 26. In order to safeguard against a mere appellate or revisional jurisdiction being exercised in the garb of exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, the courts have devised self-imposed rules of discipline on their power. 26. In order to safeguard against a mere appellate or revisional jurisdiction being exercised in the garb of exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, the courts have devised self-imposed rules of discipline on their power. Supervisory jurisdiction may be refused to be exercised when an alternative efficacious remedy by way of appeal or revision is available to the person aggrieved. The High Court may have regard to legislative policy formulated on experience and expressed by enactments where the Legislature in exercise of its wisdom has deliberately chosen certain orders and proceedings to be kept away from exercise of appellate and revisional jurisdiction in the hope of accelerating the conclusion of the proceedings and avoiding delay and procrastination which is occasioned by subjecting every order at every stage of proceedings to judicial review by way of appeal or revision. So long as an error is capable of being corrected by a superior court in exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, though available to be exercised only at the conclusion of the proceedings, it would be sound exercise of discretion on the part of the High Court to refuse to exercise the power of superintendence during the pendency of the proceedings. However, there may be cases where but for invoking the supervisory jurisdiction, the jurisdictional error committed by the inferior court or tribunal would be incapable of being remedied once the proceedings have concluded. 38(1) *** (2) *** (3) *** (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. 12. In Bakul Debnath v. Oriental Insurance Co. 12. In Bakul Debnath v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (2008) 2 GLR 49, a Division Bench of this Court, in which I was a party, held that the framers of the Constitution had conferred unfettered powers to every High Court of the country by way of inserting Articles 226, 227 and 228, without making them subject to any law to be made by the appropriate Legislature, and had put these articles beyond the legislative reach of the Parliament and the State Legislatures without the result that the jurisdiction conferred by the aforesaid articles can only be curtailed or executed with respect to any matter by constitutional amendment and not by other ordinary legislation and/or in other way whatever may be the mode. Now, if the aforesaid Articles can be considered as a part of the basic feature of the Constitution those cannot also be amended even by the Parliament. The reason behind this is that the framers of the Constitution considered that the people/citizens of the Nation be armed with certain powers to seek justice and for that purpose, the Constitution vested the High Courts with wide power of judicial review under Article 226 and power of judicial supervision and superintendence under Article 227 which enable the court to act suo motu in the interest of justice. It was also held that as the power is directly derived from the Constitution, which is the basic source and mother of all laws and statutes in the republic, the power given to High Court is sacred duty on it so as to enable to administer justice to the Citizen(s) without any compromise. Such power is given to the people to get proper justice from the High Court in appropriate cases and duty of the court is to nullify injustice to protect and provide justice. More so, if a Tribunal while acting even within its jurisdiction makes an error of law, which it reveals on the face of its recorded determination, then the court in exercise of its supervisory function may correct the error unless there is some provisions in the statute itself preventing by a review by a court of law. 13. There is no quarrel with the submission of Mr. 13. There is no quarrel with the submission of Mr. Sengupta, learned senior counsel for the respondent landlord that the court while exercising the power under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot, convert itself into an appellate court for re-appreciating the evidence recorded by the RCC court. But at the same time, when the court finds that the order challenged before this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is a perverse one and caused injustice to the justice Seeker, then obviously the court has the power to correct the error committed by the appellate court as well as revisional court. Therefore, the case of Ramesh Ch. Sharma (supra) though helpful to decide the matter on certain counts, but it cannot be held that the petition is not maintainable. 14. Now question before this Court is that even if the instant writ petition is maintainable, then also whether the judgment and order of the learned Revisional Court is required to be interfered with by this Court on the plea of comparative hardship as raised by Dr. Bhattacharjee in support of the petition of the petitioner. 15. This Court has gone through the judgment of the Apex Court in Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada (supra) wherein the Apex Court considering the Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act held that the court may deny the relief of eviction if the issue as to comparative hardship is answered against the landlord and in favour of the tenant. In the said case, the Apex Court also noted that the family, the business background of the parties, the availability of accommodation with either parties or in the township, the extent of direness or pressing nature of the need for eviction as against the direness of need or urge of the tenant to continue to occupy or cling to the tenancy premises with reasons therefor, assumed relevance. The court may keep in view how the things would take shape in a reasonably foreseeable future in either event. The conduct of the parties, their mutual relationship may also be relevant. The court may keep in view how the things would take shape in a reasonably foreseeable future in either event. The conduct of the parties, their mutual relationship may also be relevant. In spite of the availability of ground for eviction being legally sustainable, for the purpose of deciding the issue as to comparative hardship, the court may take into consideration availability of such other premises with the landlord, which though not necessarily alternative to the suit premises, may still be available to accommodate the proven requirement of the landlord. The fact that the tenant could have had shifted to other premises or has missed the opportunity of availing occupation of other premises or is likely to part with possession over premises whereto his business can be or could have been shifted are all relevant factors for the purpose of Section 13(2) though may not be relevant for the purpose of Section 13(1)(g). These are illustrative factors, incapable of being listed fully and precisely, which enter into the thinking process leading to formulation of opinion on comparative hardship. 16. On going through the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court, this Court is of considered opinion that mere comparative hardship should not be considered as a sole ground for eviction of the tenant. The court is supposed to take note with other grounds as stated by the Apex Court, particularly, the availability of such other premises either with the landlord or with the tenant and whether the requirement is so bona fide or not on the part of the landlord as well as tenant. The Apex Court also noted that the said Act does not lay down any guidelines or relevant factors based whereon the question of comparative hardship is to be decided. Only a slight indication is given in the first para of Section 13(2) of the said Act that regard must be had to (i) all the circumstances of the case (ii) including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available for the landlord or the tenant. The expression other reasonable accommodation, as employed here does not mean an accommodation suitable in all respects as is the suit accommodation. The Legislature has chosen it appropriate to leave the determination of issue on sound discretion of the court. 17. The expression other reasonable accommodation, as employed here does not mean an accommodation suitable in all respects as is the suit accommodation. The Legislature has chosen it appropriate to leave the determination of issue on sound discretion of the court. 17. Sub-section (9) of Section 12 of the Acts specifically states that whether the tenancy is for a specified period agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant, the landlord shall not be entitled to apply to the Rent Control Court before the expiry of such period, meaning thereby after expiry of the specific period agreed upon by the landlord and the tenant, the landlord is entitled to approach the Rent Control Court for a direction to the petitioner tenant to put his landlord in possession of the rented premises. In the instant case, it is not the case of the petitioner tenant that the respondent herein is not the landlord of the petitioner tenant. Whether the landlord will approach the Rent Control Court for eviction of the tenant or not, it is up to the landlord. But when the landlord approached the Rent Control Court, the Court is supposed to be guided by the provisions of Section 12 of the Act as enunciated by the Legislature. It has to be kept in mind that the provisions of Section 12 of the Act is a certain protection to the tenant. But that does not mean that even if a tenant has the availability of the accommodation either in the nearby place or in the same building and the tenant fails to make out any genuine case on hardship, the court cannot pass an order of eviction directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if the landlord proves his case of bona fide need of the premises either for his own occupation or for the occupation by any members of his family dependent upon him. It cannot be said that the said provisions are only for protection of the tenants. The Legislature has also taken a note of how the interest of the landlord can be protected. It cannot be said that the said provisions are only for protection of the tenants. The Legislature has also taken a note of how the interest of the landlord can be protected. In the instant case, it appears from the judgment of the Rent Control Court that the Rent Control Court decided the case of the landlord taking note of two points-one of which is the tenant was the defaulter and another was bona fide necessity of the landlord of the rented premises. While giving findings on those points, the Rent Control Court held that the tenant is conducting business in the suit premises and admittedly he had bona fide need and the tenant made approach to the original landlord for purchasing the suit rented premises prior to selling the same to the present landlord for purchasing the same, but the learned Rent Control Court failed to consider the fact that the original landlord before selling the suit premises to the present landlord made a notice to the petitioner tenant which is also pointed out by Mr. Sengupta, learned senior counsel for the respondent landlord relying on the Exbt. 4, a letter dated 6.3.2002 addressed' to the petitioner tenant by the original landlord. On the other hand, the appellate court while decided the appeal considered the judgment of the learned Rent Control Court as well as the evidence and held that the reasoning of the Rent Control Court is not proper as the order of the Rent Control Court is a conditional order, the Rent Control Court on the one hand rejected the prayer for eviction of the tenant, on the other hand directed the tenant to clear up the arrear rent within forty-five days from the date of judgment, otherwise to hand over the possession of the suit premises to the landlord. According to this Court, such an order of the Rent Control Court is contrary to the provisions of law as from the above findings of the Rent Control Court, it appears that the petitioner tenant was a defaulter one and the learned Rent Control Court did not give any finding on the point of default in payment of rent. According to this Court, such an order of the Rent Control Court is contrary to the provisions of law as from the above findings of the Rent Control Court, it appears that the petitioner tenant was a defaulter one and the learned Rent Control Court did not give any finding on the point of default in payment of rent. And the learned Revisional Court also while giving its findings on the judgment of the appellate court considered the submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties, particularly, the fact which was considered by the learned Rent Control Court, inter alia, that the landlord had no comparative thought of mind that the tenant is conducting business in the suit premises and purchased the suit premises knowing fully well that the tenant is continuing business therein. According to the Rent Control Court, purchase of the premises under, tenancy with acquired bona fide need has no value as the tenant in occupation is certainly carrying the business even when the bona fide need of the landlord was in his womb. According to the said court, the bona fide need deserves consideration for the landlord who is real owner of the estate. On the other hand, the appellate court was of the opinion that a tenant can be evicted from the premises by a person who has purchased the premises while the tenant was in occupation, the appellate court found safe guard under Section 12(9) of the said Act. 18. It appears from the judgment of the revisional court that the petitioner tenant never raised question about comparative hardship what has been raised, before this Court; Learned Counsel for the petitioner tenant has also failed to point out any jurisdictional error on the part of the Revisional Court as well as any perverse findings of it. 19. There is no doubt that this Court while exercising the power under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot convert itself as an appellate court, but at the same time being a court of record, it is the duty of the court to see certain documents and pleadings that are available on record. 19. There is no doubt that this Court while exercising the power under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot convert itself as an appellate court, but at the same time being a court of record, it is the duty of the court to see certain documents and pleadings that are available on record. Accordingly, this Court has gone through the evidence as annexed by the petitioner tenant in the instant petition as a part of his pleadings, particularly, the evidence of P.W. 2 who is a nearby shop owner who specifically stated in his statement on oath that the petitioner and his brother Sri Dilip Saha took lease of two rooms, namely, Room Nos. 10 and 11 in the first floor of the same building, namely, 'Kumudini Mansion', for a period of five years where the business of clothing is being carried out by them and still they are in occupation of the said premises. Not only that, the petitioner and his brother are also carrying out business jointly end they are having other shops in other shopping complex at Masjid Road, Agartala including three rooms in the first floor of 'Shri Ramakrishna Market' owned by one Harekrishna Roy Chowdhury, the elder brother of P.W.2 and he has also got two rooms in the ground floor in a building of Masjid Road owned by Shri Laxman Saha and two other rooms in the first floor in a building at Masjid road owned by the legal heirs of late Sunil Dhar. P.W.3 Nepal Ch. Saha also laid evidence on the same light and the petitioner tenant did not but any question regarding their statement in their cross, meaning thereby the petitioner tenant admitted that he has some other accommodation for doing his business. On the other hand, the respondent landlord has made out a case that he purchased the rented premise in question even while the petitioner tenant in occupation with an intention to start a business. It is also an admitted position that at the relevant time, the petitioner was defaulter in payment of rent of the suit premises and there was no further agreement for extension of period of tenancy after expiry of the earlier agreement dated 31.5.2001. It also appears from para 17 of the judgment of the appellate court that there is no evidence that the respondent landlord has any other premise in the locality. It also appears from para 17 of the judgment of the appellate court that there is no evidence that the respondent landlord has any other premise in the locality. On the other hand, new room are coming up for the business purpose in the locality where the petitioner tenant was doing business and there he can easily shift his business if he so interested. It also appears from the judgment of the appellate court that the petitioner tenant has some other premises in the same building as wall as in the same locality and he is not fully dependent on the earning of the rented premises in question. Therefore, it cannot be said that the comparative hardship even if considered will go in favour of the petitioner tenant, rather it appears from the record that the respondent landlord has no other premises within the said locality for starting his business as he wanted and actually he is facing the real hardship. 20. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of considered opinion that the judgment of the revisional court is not called for any interference by this Court. Accordingly, the same is maintained. In the result the present revision petition is dismissed being devoid of merit. No order as to costs.