Judgment :- 1. In this appeal by the United India Insurance Company Limited, two questions arise for consideration. The first one is, whether a person who himself is responsible for the accident can maintain a claim petition u/s. 163-A of the M.V. Act, 1988 and the second one is, whether the Claims Tribunal could have entertained a petition u/s 163-A when the income of the claimant exceeds the ceiling limit of Rs.40,000/-per annum. 2. The facts in brief are that the 1st respondent-petitioner was proceeding on the motorcycle bearing Regn.No.KA-20-Q-211 belonging to the 2nd respondent Smt. Meenakshi Hegde and he was also carrying in the said vehicle his brother Praveen Kumar Shetty as the pillion rider and near Balkattu Bridge of Ampar Village of Kundapur Taluk, the claimant i.e. the 1st respondent Arun Kumar Shetty who was riding the vehicle, suddenly applied brakes and on account of that, the motorcycle skidded and went off the road and on account of his fault, the claimant sustained injuries. A claim petition was filed u/s. 163-A of the M.V. Act, 1988 (‘Act’ in brief) and the tribunal allowed the claim application of the 1st respondent Arun Kumar Shetty and awarded compensation in a sum of Rs.1,15,200/-and the liability was put on the appellant-Insurance Company. It is this finding of the MACT, Kundapur, that is assailed in this appeal by the Insurance Company. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials placed. 4. Sri. B.C. Seetharama Rao, learned counsel for the Insurance Company contended that the claimant who was riding the motorcycle, though belonging to the owner Smt. Meenakshi Hegde, had put himself into the shoes of the owner and therefore for his own negligence and also at the accident did not involve any other vehicle except the vehicle which was being driven by the claimant himself, a claim petition u/s 163-A of the Act could not have been maintained by the claimant as he having stepped into the shoes of the owner cannot be a person who is liable as the owner of the vehicle and at the same time, be the person entitled to receive compensation. Therefore, relying on the decisions reported in 2004 ACJ 1289 , AIR 2009 S.C. 3056 , 2007 ACJ 698 , 2004 ACJ 934, 2009 AIR SCW 1372, 2007 ACJ 278 , 2009 AIR SCW 1372, 2006 ACJ 229 and ILR 2001 KAR 2879, learned counsel contended that the Claims Tribunal could not have put the liability on the Insurance Company. Particular reference was made by the learned counsel to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ningamma & another Vs. United India Insurance Company Limited ( AIR 2009 S.C. 3056 ) to contend that the law is well settled by the Apex Court in the aforementioned decision and the Apex Court has clearly laid down the law that the person who borrows a vehicle from the owner steps into the shoes of the owner and therefore, such a person when he sustains injuries due to his own fault and thus stands in the position of a tortfeasor, cannot claim compensation against himself as the owner in the other capacity. Therefore, in view of the law laid down in Ningamma’s case and also in the case reported in 2009 AIR SCW 1372 and referring to the Division Bench ruling of this court in the case of Appaji (since deceased) & another Vs. M. Krishna and another ( 2004 ACJ 1289 ), learned counsel for the Insurance Company argued that the liability put on the appellant Insurance Company has to be set aside in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in this regard. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel Sri. Mahesh Kiran Shetty for the 1st respondent-claimant contended that the claimant though was riding the motorcycle belonging to Smt. Meenakshi Hegde, having sustained injuries, had become a victim of accident and therefore by virtue of Section 163-A provision and the law laid down by the Apex Court in 2004 ACJ 934 and also the decision of this court reported in 2007 ACJ 278 and ILR 2008 KAR 1249, the liability put on the Insurance Company therefore cannot be interfered with. 6. 6. As far as the income of the claimant is concerned, submission made is that the Claims Tribunal has taken the income of the claimant at Rs.100/-per day which means the annual income is less than Rs.40,000/-and therefore no error was committed by the Claims Tribunal in allowing the claim application filed u/s 163-A of the Act by the 1st respondent-claimant. The other decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent are as follows: 1. 2006 ACJ 229 3. ILR 2001 KAR 2879 4. 2008 V SCC 736 5. 2009 II SCC 417 6. 1990 (3) SCC 682 7. AIR 2003 SC 2443 8. 2003 (5) SCC 448 9. 2005 (2) SCC 673 10. AIR 1981 P & H 213 7. Having thus heard both sides and the facts also being not in dispute in so far as the 1st respondent claimant having taken the vehicle belonging to the 2nd respondent Smt. Meenakshi Hegde and the accident also having been caused due to the fault of the claimant and none else, whether the claim application u/s 163-A can be said to be maintainable is the first point to be considered at this juncture. 8. The scope of section 163-A and the object behind the said section being introduced into the Act came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this court in the case of Appaji (since deceased) & another Vs. M. Krishna & another ( 2004 ACJ 1289 ). In the said case the facts involved were that the deceased Arun Kumar was riding the motorcycle and near Sugarcane Mill between Maddur and Malavalli, the accident occurred while the deceased was trying to avoid a cyclist who suddenly emerged on the road. Following the injuries sustained in the accident, Arun Kumar died and his parents filed a claim application u/s 163-A of the Act and sought compensation. The Claims Tribunal allowed the claim application under a ‘no fault liability’ clause, but the claim made u/s 163-A was negatived by the Claims Tribunal and the said finding was called in question before this court. 9. The Claims Tribunal allowed the claim application under a ‘no fault liability’ clause, but the claim made u/s 163-A was negatived by the Claims Tribunal and the said finding was called in question before this court. 9. His Lordship Justice T.S. Thakur of this court (as he then was) dealt with Section 163-A exhaustively and also referred to several decisions as well as to the objects and reasons which led to the said section being introduced into the Act and the following observations in the aforesaid judgment are relevant for our purpose. “16.) It is evident from the above that section 163-A was never intended to provide relief to those who suffered in a road accident not because of the negligence of another person making use of a motor vehicle, but only on account of their own rash, negligent or imprudent act resulting in death or personal injury to them. The recommendations of the Law Commission were concerned more with the victims of hit-and-run accident cases where the particulars of offenders could not be ascertained. It also expressed concern about the security of victims of road accidents and recommended dispensing with proof of fault on the part of the owner or driver of the vehicle. The recommendations, it is clear, were made from the point of view of victims of accidents on the roads more than those who were responsible for the same. The Review Committee too had viewed the situation form the point of view of such victims and expressed concern about the time it took for disposal of ordinary cases before the Tribunals. The objects and reasons underlying the introduction of the provision also envisaged adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into what was described as long-drawn procedure. The decision of the Apex Court in Kodala’s case 2001 ACJ 827 (SC), elucidated the purpose underlying the introduction of section 163-A in the light of recommendations of the Law Commission and the Review Committee. There is nothing in any one of the above to suggest that Section 163-A was intended to be available even in a situation where the accident in question had caused death or physical injury to none except the person who was rash and negligent in using the motor vehicle. There is nothing in any one of the above to suggest that Section 163-A was intended to be available even in a situation where the accident in question had caused death or physical injury to none except the person who was rash and negligent in using the motor vehicle. The universal concern was for the safety and the social security of an innocent user of the road and not for a person who had because of his own imprudence, rashness or negligence met with an accident and suffered an injury or death. 19.) The right to receive compensation under section 163-A presupposes that the person who makes a claim is a victim or the legal heirs of a victim. The provision on the plain language employed in the same does not entitle a person who is neither a victim nor his/her legal heir to claim any compensation. In other words, one who is the victim of his own auctions of rash or negligent driving cannot invoke section 163-A for making a claim. The concern of the legislature and the jurists is understandable for the victim in contradistinction to the victimizer or one who falls a victim to his own auction. While falls a victim to his own auction. While road accidents generally affect innocent third parties or those making use of public transport, cases where the owner or driver of the vehicle alone suffers on account of his rash and negligent driving are not uncommon. Drunken driving, speeding in what are high performance new generation of automobiles including two-wheelers are accounting for a large number of accidents every day. Quite often these accidents kills or would even the person who is driving the vehicle. Parliament did not in our opinion intend to provide for compensation to the person responsible for the accident on structured formula basis in such cases. Neither the provisions of Section 163-A nor the background in which the same were introduced disclose any such intention. The argument that section 163-a is a panacea for all ills concerning the accidents regardless of whether the person who is killed or injured is or is not a victim must therefore be rejected. 22.) Two decisions relied upon by the appellants may at this stage be noticed. The argument that section 163-a is a panacea for all ills concerning the accidents regardless of whether the person who is killed or injured is or is not a victim must therefore be rejected. 22.) Two decisions relied upon by the appellants may at this stage be noticed. In Kokla Devi v. Chet Ram, 2002 ACJ 650 (HP), a Division Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh held that section 163-A had brought about a drastic change in the concept of tortuous liability prevailing prior to it. The court was of the view that the ‘non obstante’ clause in section 163-A permitted even the tortfeasor to claim compensation on the principle of no fault liability. With respect to the Hon’ble Judges who delivered the said decision we find it difficult to subscribe to that view. Section 163-A of the Act no doubt brings about a significant change in the legal position as regards the obligation to prove fault is concerned, but the change is not so drastic so as to make even a tortfeasor entitled to claim compensation for his own act of rashness, negligence or imprudence. The ‘non obstante’ clause in section 163-A simply dispenses with proof of fault by the claimants against the driver or the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident. The claimant under section 163-A therefore need not prove that the driver or the owner of the vehicle was at fault in the sense that the accident had occurred on account of any negligence or rashness on his part. That does not, however, mean that claimant can maintain a claim on the basis of his own fault or negligence and argue that even when he himself may have caused the accident on account of his own rash and negligent driving, he can nevertheless made the insurance company pay for the same. Inasmuch as section 163-A dispenses with proof of fault, it does so only where the claimant is not solely responsible for the accident. The correct approach appears to us to be to find out whether in the absence of section 163-A, a claim could on the facts pleaded be maintained by claimant was himself the tortfeasor, the provisions of section 163-A would not come to his rescue and made such a claim maintainable. The correct approach appears to us to be to find out whether in the absence of section 163-A, a claim could on the facts pleaded be maintained by claimant was himself the tortfeasor, the provisions of section 163-A would not come to his rescue and made such a claim maintainable. If the answer is ‘yes’ the beneficial provisions under section 163-A would absolve the claimant of the obligation to prove that the accident had taken place on account of the fault of the driver or owner of the vehicle provided he is willing to accept the amount of compensation offered according to the structured formula prescribed in the Schedule. That is the only way in which the anomaly arising out of a contrary interpretation can possible be avoided.” 10. It is therefore clear from the aforesaid observation of a Division Bench of this court in the aforementioned Appaji’s case that a claimant can maintain a claim on the basis of his own fault or negligence and argued that, even when he himself might have caused the accident on account of his own rash and negligent driving, he can nevertheless make the Insurance Company pay for the same. 11. Further observation at para.22 of the above decision that Section 163-A dispenses with the proof of fault is attracted only where the claimant is not solely responsible for the accident and where the claimant himself was the tortfeasor, the provisions of section 163-A would not come to his rescue, is therefore indicative of the position in law that where the claimant himself was the tortfeasoer, he cannot maintain a claim petition u/s 163-A of the Act. 12. The aforementioned view of this court is also in consonance with the view taken by the Apex court in the case of Ningamma & another vs. United India Insurance Company Limited ( AIR 2009 S.C. 3056 ). 13. In the said case, the Apex Court was concerned with the claim made by the wife and the son of deceased Ramappa. On 9.9.2000 the said Ramappa was travelling on Hero Honda motorcycle which he had borrowed from its real owner to go to Ilkal and near Ilkal – Kustagi National Highway, the motorcycle driven by Ramappa dashed to a bullock cart which was going ahead and it suddenly stopped and consequently Ramappa who was proceeding on the said motor cycle dashed against it. Consequent to the said accident, Ramappa sustained fatal injuries and following his death, the claim application was preferred u/s 163-A by the aforementioned claimants. The Claims Tribunal allowed the claim application by awarding compensation of Rs.2,59,800/-and the Insurance Company appealed to this court aggrieved by the liability being put on it and contended that the claim petition was not maintainable u/s 163-A unless there was another vehicle involved in the accident. It was also contended that the income of the deceased was also more than Rs.40,000/-per annum. 14. This court allowed the appeal by the Insurance Company and held that the claim application was not maintainable before the Claims Tribunal u/s 163-A of the Act and had set aside the judgment of the Claims Tribunal which had put the liability on the Insurance Company. The claimants, after the review petition filed by them being dismissed by this court, took up the matter before the Apex Court in the aforementioned Ningamma’s case. 15. The law laid down by the Apex court in the above case following a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Rajni Devi & Others ( 2008 (5) S.C.C. 736 ) requires to be reproduced here and paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 of the judgment are as under: “17.) However, in the facts of the present case, it was forcefully argued by the counsel appearing for the respondent that the claimants are not the ‘third part’ and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any benefit under Section 163-A of the MVA. In support of the said contention, the counsel relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd v. Rajni Devi, ( 2008 (5) SCC 736 ); and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sadanand Mukhi and Ors., ( 2009 (2) SCC 417 ). 18.) In the case of Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Rajni Devi and Others, ( 2008 (5) SCC 736 , wherein one of us, namely, Hon’ble Justice S.B. Sinha is a party, it has been categorically held that in a case where third party is involved, the liability of the insurance company would be unlimited. 18.) In the case of Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Rajni Devi and Others, ( 2008 (5) SCC 736 , wherein one of us, namely, Hon’ble Justice S.B. Sinha is a party, it has been categorically held that in a case where third party is involved, the liability of the insurance company would be unlimited. It was also held in the said decision that where, however, compensation is claimed for the death of the owner or another passenger of the vehicle, the contract of insurance being governed by the contract qua contract, the claim of the claimant against the insurance company would depend upon the terms thereof. It was held in the said decision that Section 163-A of the MVA cannot be said to have any application in respect of an accident wherein the owner of the motor vehicle himself is involved. The decision further held that the question is no longer res integra. The liability under section 163-A of the MVA is on the owner of the vehicle. So a person cannot be both, a claimant as also a recipient, with Section 163-A of the MVA. In our considered opinion, the ration of the aforesaid decision is clearly applicable to the facts of the present case. In the present case, the deceased was not the owner of the motorbike in question. He borrowed the said motorbike from its real owner. The deceased cannot be held to be employee of the owner of the motorbike although he was authorized to drive the said vehicle by its owner, and therefore, he would step into the shoes of the owner of the motorbike. 19. We have already extracted Section 163-A of the MVA hereinbefore. A bare perusal of the said provision would made it explicitly clear that persons like the deceased in the present case would step into the shoes of the owner of the vehicle. 19. We have already extracted Section 163-A of the MVA hereinbefore. A bare perusal of the said provision would made it explicitly clear that persons like the deceased in the present case would step into the shoes of the owner of the vehicle. In a case wherein the victim died or where he was permanently disabled due to an accident arising out of the aforesaid motor vehicle in that event the liability to make payment of the compensation is on the insurance company or the owner, as the case may be as provided under Section 163-A. But if it is proved that the driver is the owner of the motor vehicle, in that case the owner could not himself be a recipient of compensation as the liability of pay the same is on him. This proposition is absolutely clear on a reading of Section 163-A of the MVA. Accordingly, the legal representatives of the deceased who have stepped into the shoes on the owner of the motor vehicle could not have claimed compensation under Section 163-A of the MVA.” 16. After observing as above, the Apex Court finally declined to interfere with the view taken by this court viz., claim petition was not maintainable u/s 163-A. It is therefore clear from the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex court that, where a person borrows the vehicle from the owner, the said person steps into the shoes of the owner and therefore the heirs of the deceased were held not entitled to maintain a claim application u/s 163-A. 17. In the instant case, the claim application is by the very person who stepped into the shoes of Smt. Meenakshi Hegde, the owner of the vehicle. 18. The Apex Court in the case of New India Assurance Company Limited vs. Sadanand Mukhi & others (2009 AIR SCW 1372) has held that, where the son of the insured was driving the motorcycle met with the accident resulting in his death, the insurer would not be liable to pay compensation as the deceased does not come within the purview of the term ‘person’ within section 147. 19. As far as the contention urged by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent claimant is concerned, learned counsel relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and another vs. United India Insurance Co. 19. As far as the contention urged by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent claimant is concerned, learned counsel relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and another vs. United India Insurance Co. Limited and drew my attention to paragraph 66 of the said decision to contend that Section 163-A of the Act covers cases where even negligence is on the part of the ‘victim’. It is his submission that in view of the aforesaid observation of the Apex Court at para.66 of the decision, in the case on hand, the 1st respondent claimant will have to be construed as a ‘victim’ and therefore Section 163-A gets attracted. He also placed reliance on two decisions of this court which are reported in 2007 ACJ 278 and ILR 2008 KAR 1249. 20. The term ‘victim’ also came up for consideration, in the case of Appaji (since deceased) and another vs. M. Krishna & another, referred to by me earlier and the Division Bench in the said case has observed that though the term ‘victim’ has not been defined in the Act, the court went on to explain the meaning of the term ‘victim’ as found in Section 163-A of the Act and paragraphs 18 and 19 of the aid decision which have already been reproduced above, makes it clear that the provision of section 163-A presupposes that the person who makes a claim is a victim or the legal heirs of a victim and the said provision on the plain language does not entitle a person who is neither a victim nor his or her legal heir to claim any compensation and in other words, one who is a victim of his own actions of rash and negligent driving cannot invoke Section 163-A for making a claim. 21. 21. Apart from the aforesaid meaning given to the term ‘victim’, in view of the categorical statement of law made by the Apex Court which binds the courts in the country, when the claimant borrowed the vehicle from the real owner, the claimant steps into the shoes of the real owner and when the accident was caused only on account of the fault of the claimant and thus he becomes the tortfeasor, the question of the tortfeasor maintaining a claim application against himself as the owner therefore is not permissible in law in view of the Apex Court decision in Ningamma’s case. In other words, as has been held by the Apex Court, a person cannot be both, a claimant as also a recipient, with respect to the claim. 22. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent has not opposed the position in law that, where the deceased himself being the owner of the vehicle was responsible for the accident, no claim application by the L.Rs of the deceased is maintainable u/s 163-A. If this is a position in law, the case of the present claimant who himself was the tortfeasor and who has stepped into the shoes of the real owner cannot be a different one. 23. Other decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent therefore cannot come to the aid of the 1st respondent in view of the categorical statement of law made by the Apex Court in Ningamma’s case. I therefore answer the first question in the negative. In other words, the claim application cannot be maintained u/s 163-A by the very person who himself was responsible for the accident and who stands in the position of the tortfeasor. 24. I therefore answer the first question in the negative. In other words, the claim application cannot be maintained u/s 163-A by the very person who himself was responsible for the accident and who stands in the position of the tortfeasor. 24. As far as the second question is concerned, though learned counsel for the 1st respondent – claimant contended by relying on a Division Bench ruling of this court that, though the claimant had stated that his income was more than Rs.40,000/-per annum in the claim application, the tribunal had determined the income @ Rs.100/-per day and therefore the claim application u/s 163-A is perfectly maintainable is concerned, in the said Division Bench ruling reported in 2006 ACJ 229 , this court had observed that it was not the finding of the Tribunal that the income of the deceased was more than Rs.40,000/-and therefore in the said case, this court did not find any fault in the claim application filed u/s 163-A. apart from this, it is to be mentioned that in the aforementioned decision at para.6, this court has also observed that, except pleading, there was no proof of the income and therefore the income of the claimant taken by the Claims Tribunal was just and proper. 25. It has to be mentioned that the aforementioned decision is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case because the claimant in the instant case has mentioned in his claim petition that his income was Rs.10,000/-per month from business apart from income of Rs.3,000/-from agriculture and the said pleading is also supported by the oral evidence placed by the claimant. The said oral evidence of the claimant had not been seriously challenged during the cross examination. The evidence means not only documentary evidence but even oral evidence and the oral evidence of the claimant is not seriously challenged as to the income put by him which is certainly more than Rs.40,000/-per annum. The Claims Tribunal could not have scaled down the income to less than Rs.40,000/-per annum so as to bring the claim application within the ambit of section 163-A. In this connection, the Apex Court decision in the case of Deepal Girihbhai Soni and others vs United India Insurance Co. The Claims Tribunal could not have scaled down the income to less than Rs.40,000/-per annum so as to bring the claim application within the ambit of section 163-A. In this connection, the Apex Court decision in the case of Deepal Girihbhai Soni and others vs United India Insurance Co. Limited (2004 ACJ 934) has to be referred to and at para.67 the Apex Court has observed that, only whose annual income is up to Rs.40,000/-can take the benefit u/s 163-a. 26. Apart from the aforesaid Apex Court decision, it is also pertinent to refer to a Full Bench decision of this court in the case of Guruanna Vadi & another vs. The General Manager, K.S.R.T.C & another (ILR 2001 KAR 2879). In the said case the Full Bench has held that the claim application u/s 163-A is not tenable if made by a person whose income exceeds Rs.40,000/-per annum. 27. Though it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondent no.1 that, though the income mentioned in the claim application is more than the ceiling limit of Rs.40,000/-per annum, the claimant can very well bring down the income within the limit of Rs.40,000/-per annum. The above submission also does not carry enough force behind it as according to me, in the present case, the claimant has not scaled down his income either in the claim application or in the evidence given by him before the Claims Tribunal that it was the tribunal which brought down the income at less than Rs.40,000/-per annum as against the oral evidence of the claimant himself. For this reason also, the claim application u/s 163-A could not have been said to be maintainable. Accordingly, the second question is also answered. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed and the liability put on the appellant Insurance Company is set aside and the amount in deposit be refunded to the appellant. The claim petition also stands dismissed.