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2010 DIGILAW 733 (JHR)

Samarendra Singh v. Employees in relation to Management of Jamadoba Colliery of M/s Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd.

2010-07-15

D.N.PATEL, SUSHIL HARKAULI

body2010
Order We have heard both parties. 2. The appellant was an employee of the respondent. He applied for voluntary retirement under a Scheme (VRS) by making an application on 12.1.1994, which was accepted by the Management on 24.1.1994. 3. According to the Management the application was accepted on 22.1.1994 and the acceptance was communicated by letter dated 24.1.1994. But this difference in the two dates need not d9tain us as the controversy relates to another dimension. 4. Admittedly the appellant had given another application dated 22.1.1994, which was received by the employer on 24.1.1994. This application sought withdrawal of the request for voluntary retirement contained in the application dated 12.1.1994. 5. It is important to mention here that in the acceptance communicated by letter dated 24.1.1994 the Management/Employer had stated that it was accepting the appellant's request for voluntary retirement with effect from 3.2.1994. 6. The dispute, in substance, is as to whether on 24.1.1994, it was open to the employee/appellant to withdraw his request for voluntary retirement. 7. The matter was referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal in the following terms:- "Whether the demand of the Union for the reinstatement of Shri Samrendra Singh, Ex-Head clerk by the Management of Jamadoba colliery of M/s TISCO is legal and justified / if so, to what relief is the workman entitled ?" 8. The Tribunal decided in favour of the workman. The matter came up before a learned Single Judge of this Court by way of W.P.(L) No. 390 of 2003. 9. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition of the Management/Employer on the ground that it had not been established by the workman that the Management had already received his application for withdrawal of voluntary retirement before the said request of voluntary retirement was accepted by the Management. 10. The learned Single Judge apparently based his decision on the ground that the date of receipt of the withdrawal application and the date of acceptance of the request for VRS were the same i.e. 24.1.1994 and the time difference between the two events was not shown. 11. Further, the learned Single Judge observed that withdrawal of request for voluntary retirement was not permissible once the request was accepted by the Management. 12. 11. Further, the learned Single Judge observed that withdrawal of request for voluntary retirement was not permissible once the request was accepted by the Management. 12. During argument we put a specific question to the learned Counsel for the employer as to whether there is any service rule, or any clause in the scheme of V.R.S., restricting the power of withdrawal of the request for voluntary retirement to a stage prior to its acceptance. It has been fairly stated by the learned counsel for the employer that there is no such restriction. 13. Reliance was placed from the side of the appellant, who appeared and argued in person, upon the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Union of India vs. Gopal Chandra Mishra reported in AIR 1978 SC 694 . In paragraph no. 51 of that law report, the decision lays down :- "It will bear repetition that the general principle is that in the absence of a legal, contractual or constitutional bar, a "prospective" resignation can be withdrawn at any time before it becomes effective, and it becomes effective when it operates to terminate the employment or the office tenure of the resignor. This general rule is equally applicable to Government servants an constitutional functionaries." (Emphasis supplied) 14. Another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Union of India vs. Wing Commander, T. Parthasarathi reported in 2001 (1) J.L.J.R. (SC)307 has been relied upon from the side of the appellant which has followed the aforesaid Constitution Bench decision. 15. On the other hand the employer has relied upon the following two decisions of the Supreme Court:- 1. P. Lal vs. Union of India & Others reported in (2003)3 SCC 393 2. NZCC vs. Vedpathi Dinesh Kumar reported in (2003) 5 SCC 455 . 16. We have examined these authorities, and have also considered the fact that (i) a resignation in normal services, as also (ii) a request for voluntary retirement, both need to be accepted. We are of the opinion that there is no difference between voluntary retirement and a prospective resignation, from the point of view of application of the principles of law relating to permissibility of withdrawal laid down by the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gopal Chandra Mishra (supra). . 17. We are of the opinion that there is no difference between voluntary retirement and a prospective resignation, from the point of view of application of the principles of law relating to permissibility of withdrawal laid down by the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gopal Chandra Mishra (supra). . 17. At the cost of repetition, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has laid down that a request for withdrawal of a prospective resignation is permissible till such time as the resignation becomes effective; and has further laid down that the resignation becomes effective only when it has the effect of terminating the employment. Applying the same principles to the facts of the present case: (1) the voluntary retirement would become effective by having the effect of terminating the service with effect from 3.2.1994, i.e. the date on which the acceptance expressly states the same to become effective. (2) Therefore, withdrawal was permissible at any time up till 2.3.1994. (3) The request for withdrawal of resignation in the present case reached the employer on 24.1.1994, i.e. well within time. 18. These aspects with regard to the law laid down by the Supreme Court have not been taken into account either in the decision of the learned Single Judge or in the decision of the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore neither of the two decisions can be sustained. 19. However, because several other issues are also involved which were attempted to be argued before us, but with regard to which we do not wish to express any opinion at this stage, therefore, we deem it proper, after setting aside the order of the learned Single Judge as well as the order of the Industrial Tribunal, to remand the case to the Industrial Tribunal for a fresh decision in accordance with law after hearing both sides. This writ petition is allowed with costs, as indicated above.