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2010 DIGILAW 735 (PNJ)

Mahender Alias Aakash v. State Of Haryana

2010-02-01

ARVIND KUMAR, HEMANT GUPTA

body2010
Judgment Hemant Gupta, J. 1. Appellant herein was made to stand trial for an offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short the IPC)and Section 25 of the Arms Act arising out of FIR No. 320 dated 01.11.1998 registered at Police Station Sampla, District Rohtak. 2. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Rohiak convicted the present appellant and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment for the commission of offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and also imposed fine of Rs. 5000/-. In default of payment of fine, the appellant was to further undergo simple imprisonment for five months. For the commission of offence punishable under Section 25 of the Arms Act, the appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-. In default of fine, the appellant was to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month, vide judgment dated 18.07.2001. Both the sentences were ordered to be run concurrently. 3. During the pendency of the appeal against the aforesaid judgment, the appellant filed Criminal Misc. No. 66504 of 2009 inter alia pleaded that the appellant was a juvenile on the date of commission of crime i.e. 01.11.1998. In support of said assertion, the appellant relied upon School Leaving Certificate issued on 15.12.2009 by the Head Master, Govt. Primary School, Pipli, Sonepat, wherein the date of birth of the appellant is mentioned as 05.12.1982. The said certificate was found to be issued under Rule 190 of the Haryana Education Code Rules, 1995 but vide order dated 29.07.2010. The State was granted opportunity to controvert the said certificate. Subsequently, an affidavit of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Headquarters, Rohtak has been filed in the Court wherein the genuineness of the said school leaving certificate is not disputed. 4. In view of the above, we find that the appellant Mahender alias Aakash was a juvenile on the date of occurrence i.e. 01.11.1998 and thus, the appellant was less than 16 years of age on the date of occurrence. The learned counsel for the appellant does not dispute the conviction of the appellant but submits that since the appellant was juvenile on the date of commission of crime, therefore, he cannot be sentenced. It is not disputed by Mr. Poonia that the appellant has undergone imprisonment for a period exceeding five years and ten months. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant does not dispute the conviction of the appellant but submits that since the appellant was juvenile on the date of commission of crime, therefore, he cannot be sentenced. It is not disputed by Mr. Poonia that the appellant has undergone imprisonment for a period exceeding five years and ten months. 5. Section 15 of The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 provides that a juvenile, who is over seventeen years but less than eighteen years of age can be sent to a special home for a period of not less than two years. Section 16 (1) of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, no juvenile in conflict with law shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment, or committed to prison in default of payment of fine or in default of furnishing security provided that where a juvenile, who has attained the age of sixteen years, has committed an offence and the Board is satisfied that the offence committed is so serious in nature or that his conduct and behaviour have been such that it would not be in his interest or in the interest of other juvenile in a special home to send him to such special home and that none of the other measures provided under this Act is suitable or sufficient, the Board may order the juvenile in conflict with law to be kept in such place of safety and in such manner as it thinks fit and shall report the case for the order of the State Govt. 6. The juvenile, the present appellant was less than 16 years of age on the date of commission of crime. In view of Sections 15 and 16 of the Act, we find no other order of punishment can be passed in respect of the appellant. Thus, the sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon the appellant cannot be maintained and is, therefore, set aside. 7. Appeal is disposed of accordingly.