JUDGMENT H.N. Sarma, J. 1. This Letter Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge in First Appeal No. 3/1990 dated 5.11.1998 thereby dismissing the appeal and affirming the judgment and decree dated 5.2.90 passed by the learned trial Court. 2. This appeal having been filed on 9.3.99 and is pending since then the present change in law in terms of the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act, 2002, the maintainability of the letter patent appeal would not be affected and accordingly the appeal is heard to be decided on merit. 3. Heard Mr. T. Rajendra, learned Counsel for the Defendant No. 1/Appellant and Mr. N. Kerani, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the Plaintiff/Respondent. 4. The suit out of which the Letters Patent Appeal arises was instituted by the Respondent/Plaintiff in the Court of the then subordinate Judge No. 1 Manipur, Imphal, on 24.2.1984 praying for recovery of possession of the suit land measuring 0.62 acre evicting the Defendant No. 1 there from, decree for mean profit and for other reliefs. The said suit was registered as original suit No. 5/84, subsequently renumbered as T.S. No. 42/1986 and finally as T.S. No. 23/1987. The present Appellant was impleaded in the suit as principal Defendant No. 1. Summon of the suit having been served, the Appellant/Defendant entered appearance and contested the suit. The other two preformed Defendants did not contest the suit and the same proceeded ex-parte against them, no relief was also claimed against them in the suit. 5. The pleaded case of the Plaintiff inter alia is that the Plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit land measuring 0.62 acre covered by New Dag No. 59, New Patta No. 16/617 of the Lilong Village under Thoubal Tehsil, Manipur, which is fully described in the Schedule of the plaint. The suit land originally belonged to one Md. Chaomacha Mia who expired leaving behind five sons including Md. Khomie Mia and three daughters. On his death the suit land devolved upon Khomie Mia along with certain other areas of land. Khomie Mia sold the suit land to the Plaintiff on 1.5.1967 for consideration of a sum of Rs. 2,000/- by executing a registered sale deed and delivered possession thereof. Khomie Mia and three daughters. On his death the suit land devolved upon Khomie Mia along with certain other areas of land. Khomie Mia sold the suit land to the Plaintiff on 1.5.1967 for consideration of a sum of Rs. 2,000/- by executing a registered sale deed and delivered possession thereof. In the sale deed the father of the Defendant No. 1 late Mahamad Mia and one Maheruddin Mia another son of Chaomacha Mia were the attesting witnesses. The Defendant No. 1 married the daughter of the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff allowed his daughter to possess the suit land and enjoy the produce thereof for her maintenance and comfortable living and accordingly on such arrangement the Defendant No. 1 used to cultivate over the suit land and enjoyed the usufruct thereof. A bit more than one year before the filing of the suit, the Defendant contracting a second marriage drove the daughter of the Plaintiff out from the matrimonial home inflicting torture upon her. Meanwhile, the Defendant also surreptitiously got his name mutated over the suit land in the revenue record in place of the Plaintiff alleging that the suit land was earlier mortgaged to the Plaintiff and he has in the meantime redeemed the mortgage. Alleging the order of mutation dated 17.3.83 passed by the SDC to be in violation of the provisions contained in the Manipur Land Revenue and Manipur Land Reforms Act, 1960 and the Rules framed hereunder the Plaintiff preferred the Revenue Appeal No. 34/83 and upon dismissal of the same further appeal has been filed before the Deputy Commissioner which is registered as Revenue Second Appeal No. 2/84 wherein the order of mutation passed in favour of the Defendant was stayed. It is further alleged in the plaint that the Defendant never mortgaged the suit land to the Plaintiff and he got his name mutated surreptitiously and was forcibly occupying the suit land. The Defendant not having vacated the suit land inspite of demand so made, the Plaintiff filed the suit seeking reliefs as indicated hereinabove. 6. The summon of the suit having served, only Defendant No. 1 contested the suit by filing written statement. The Defendant denied the right of the Plaintiff and he set up an independent right over the suit land in his favour. 6. The summon of the suit having served, only Defendant No. 1 contested the suit by filing written statement. The Defendant denied the right of the Plaintiff and he set up an independent right over the suit land in his favour. The Defendant alleged in this written statement that the suit land formerly belonged to Chaomacha Mia @ Usmial Mia and upon his death it was devolved on his son Mahamad Mia who expired on or around 1970 and the Defendant occupied the suit land during the life time of his father, Mahamad Mia. The Defendant being a son Mahamad Mia possessed the suit land during his life time and prior to his marriage with the daughter of the Plaintiff his father allocated the suit land to him as owner. After the death of Mahamad Mia none of his heirs raised any objection about the rights and title of the Defendant over the suit land and in this fashion the title over the suit land devolved upon him. It is further pleaded in the written statement that the Defendant took a loan of Rs. 500/- from the Plaintiff sometime in 1968 after his marriage with the Plaintiff's daughter mortgaging the suit land in favour of the Plaintiff and has repaid the loan sometime in 1975 and he having found that the name of the Plaintiff was mutated as a co-pattadar in the revenue records raised objection before the Sub-Deputy Collector alleging that the mortgage has been redeemed by him and he is the absolute owner in possession of the suit land accepting his plea his name was entered in the revenue records cancelling the name of the Plaintiff. By filing a supplementary written statement the Defendant further denied the sale of the suit land by Khomei Mia in favour of the Plaintiff on 5.6.1967 and further alleged that the sale transaction is void ab initio as it is hit by Sections 152 and 154 of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960, which prohibits fragmentation of holding by way of sale. Pleading in the aforesaid manner, the Defendant No. 1 prayed for dismissal of the suit. Pleading in the aforesaid manner, the Defendant No. 1 prayed for dismissal of the suit. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues-- (1) Whether the Plaintiff is the owner of the suitland on the strength of purchase from Khomei Mia on 1.5.67 under a registered deed of sale? (2) Whether the Plaintiff allowed his daughter Lahijan Bibi to enjoy the suitland with her husband, the Defendant No. 1 ? (3) Whether the Defendant No. 1 is the owner of the suitland as inherited from his late father, Md. Mahamad Mia. (4) Whether the Plaintiff has been dispossessed of the suitland by Defendant Hashim Mia in the harvesting season 1983? (5) Whether the suit suffers from non-joinder of other co-pattadars? (6) Whether the suit is maintainable in the present form? (7) Whether the Plaintiff had any land covered by patta No. 88/129 IWT at the time of the sale transition? (8) Whether the Court fee paid is proper? (9) Whether the transaction of sale dated 1.5.67 is barred by Sections 153and 154 of the M.L.R. and L.R. Act, 1960? (10) Whether there is a cause of action for the suit? (11) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs claimed? 7. During the course of trial the Plaintiff examined as many as seven witnesses including himself as PW 1 whereas the Defendant examined three witnesses including himself as D W 1. Ten Nos. of documents were exhibited in the suit by the Plaintiff in support of his claim. The learned trial Court upon appreciation and consideration of the materials and evidence on record, both oral and documentary, decreed the suit in favour of the Plaintiff vide judgment and decree dated 15.2.1990. 8. Challenging the aforesaid judgment passed by the learned trial Court the Defendant No. 1 preferred a First Appeal before the High Court which was registered as First Appeal No. 3/90. The learned single judge independently considered the evidence and materials on record and also critically examined the judgment passed by the learned trial Court and upon such consideration having found the appeal to be devoid of merit dismissed the same vide judgment and order dated 5.11.98. 9. Challenging the aforesaid judgment passed in F.A. No. 3/99 the present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed by the Defendant/Appellant. 9. Challenging the aforesaid judgment passed in F.A. No. 3/99 the present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed by the Defendant/Appellant. During the tendency of the appeal the original Plaintiff having expired his legal representatives were brought on record as Respondent No. 1A and 1B who entering into shoes of the original Plaintiff duly contested the appeal. 10. Mr. T. Rajendra, learned Advocate appearing for the Defendant/Appellant submits before us that the execution of the sale deed dated 1.5.67 (Ext. A/7) having been denied by the executant Khomei Mia which is supported by the attesting witness PW 5, both the Courts fell into obvious error in accepting the sale deed as duly executed by comparing the signature of the executant by the Court itself in view of the provisions contained in Section 67 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is further urged that the suit land having devolved upon the Appellant through his father Mahamad Mia who was one of the son of the original owner Chaomacha Mia and other heirs of Mahamad Mia not having denied the right and title of the Plaintiff, the vendor Khomei Mia had no right to sale the suit land in favour of the Plaintiff and consequently, the Plaintiff cannot acquire any right, title and interest over the suit land on the strength of the sale deed, Ext. A/7. It is also contended that in order to resolve the dispute relating to the genuineness of the signature appended in the sale deed the best course for the Court was to obtain opinion from the handwriting expert and decide the matter accordingly and that not having been done, the impugned judgment and decree are vitiated. The final contention of the learned Counsel is that the alleged sale in favour of the Plaintiff is barred under Sections 152 and 154 of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960, and that being so the alleged sale in favour of the Plaintiff Respondent is void ab initio. 11. The submission made on behalf of the Appellant was stiffly resisted by Mr. N. Kerani, learned Senior counsel appearing for the Plaintiff Respondent contending that the Plaintiff could prove his case by adducing clear and impeachable evidence on record which could not be demolished by the Defendant. The Plaintiff also duly proved the registered sale deed, Ext. 11. The submission made on behalf of the Appellant was stiffly resisted by Mr. N. Kerani, learned Senior counsel appearing for the Plaintiff Respondent contending that the Plaintiff could prove his case by adducing clear and impeachable evidence on record which could not be demolished by the Defendant. The Plaintiff also duly proved the registered sale deed, Ext. A/7 in his favour and the Defendant being permissive occupier of the suit land without having any right, title and interest, the learned trial Court rightly decreed the suit which was duly affirmed in the appeal by the learned Single Judge. It is further contended that in appropriate cases the Court has got ample power to compare the signature of the executant in a sale deed with his admitted writing under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act and exercising such power, the learned trial Court has rightly accepted the sale deed, Ext. A/7 to be a genuine one and accordingly there is no substance in the argument advanced on behalf of the Appellant. 12. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the appearing parties. We notice herein that out of the 11 issues framed in the suit, the issue Nos. 1, 3, 9, 11, 13 and 14 are prime issues having vital bearing for decision of this appeal. 13. In order to appreciate the contention raised in this appeal and the submissions made by Mr. T. Rajendra, apart from consideration of the pleadings of the parties we also scrutinised the evidence of the relevant witnesses relating to the issues as adduced by the parties. We also scrutinised the relevant documentary evidences exhibited in the suit. 14. The scrutiny of the pleadings of the parties disclose that the claim of the Plaintiff/Respondent over the suit land rests on his purchase made vide Ext. A/7 on 1.5.67 from Khomie Mia whereas the Defendant/Appellant rests his claim by way of inheritance from Mahamad Mia, son of late Chaomacha Mia, as his legal heir. The Appellant has also denied the purchase of the suit land made by the Plaintiff, further denying the right of the vendor to sale the suit land. A/7 on 1.5.67 from Khomie Mia whereas the Defendant/Appellant rests his claim by way of inheritance from Mahamad Mia, son of late Chaomacha Mia, as his legal heir. The Appellant has also denied the purchase of the suit land made by the Plaintiff, further denying the right of the vendor to sale the suit land. This being the position let us see which of the versions carry an acceptable force on the test of preponderance of probability, which is the basic principle as regards the appreciation of evidence in a civil suit. 15. The Plaintiff who examined himself as PW 1 categorically stated in his deposition that he purchased the suit land from Khomie Mia who is the uncle of the Defendant Appellant being the younger brother of his father, on 1.5.1967 by a registered sale deed paying valuable consideration of sum of Rs. 2,000/-. At the time of purchase of the land the name of the vendor of Khomie Mia was recorded in revenue record as a Pattadar and the land was used for cultivation. He further deposed that after the death of the original owner Chaomacha Mia the properties left by him was devolved upon his children including Khomie Mia and Mahamad Mia (the father of the Defendant) and that the suit land was allotted to the share of Khomei Mia after an amicable settlement and agreement amongst the brothers and sisters. The sale was accompanied by delivery of possession in his favour. In the sale deed Mahamad Mia and Maheruddin Mia respectively the father and uncle of the Defendant, were the attesting witnesses. Before purchase of the suit land he made the necessary enquiry as regards the title of the vendor over the suit land with the other brothers of the vendor Khomie Mia, including the attesting witnesses and on their clearance that the suit land belonged to Khomie Mia, he proceeded to purchase the same. He further deposed that after the marriage of his daughter with the Defendant Appellant he allowed the suit land to be enjoyed by his daughter for her comfortable living and accordingly the Defendant cultivated over the suit land along with his daughter till 1980-1981 by which time the Defendant drove away her daughter from the matrimonial home by contracting a second marriage. In the meantime the Defendant surreptitiously and without serving any notice upon him got his name mutated over the suit land in the revenue record which was challenged by him by filing revenue appeal. The Plaintiff also proved the certified copy of the jamabandi of the suit patta as Ext. A/1 which contains his name. The necessary revenue of the suit land was paid by him vide Ext. A/2. The order dated 2.3.84 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Thoubal passed in Revenue Second Appeal No. 2/84 staying the operation of the mutation order is proved as Ext. A/6 and the copy of the registered sale deed dated 1.5.67 is proved as Ext. A/7. He further deposed that the vendor put his signature on every page of the sale deed in his presence as Ext. A/7/1 to A/7/13, and that the scribe of the deed after writing the sale deed read over the contents to the vendor and also to him and thereafter the vendor put his signature in presence of the attesting witnesses. After the deed was executed it was presented before the Registrar for registration wherein the vendor admitted the execution of the sale deed and accordingly the registration was done. He also proved Ext A/8 which is the certified copy of the jamabandi containing his name as Pattadar. In cross examination he denied the suggestion that he did not purchase the suit land in the year 1967 from Khomie Mia for a consideration of a sum of Rs. 2,000/- and that the suit land never belonged to the vendor Khomie Mia By way of re-examination, PW 1 (Plaintiff) also proved the certified copy of the jamabandi of the new patta No. 16/617 covering the suit proved as Ext. A/10. From the cross examination of the Plaintiff by Defendant No. 1 we find that the case propounded by the Defendant alleging that the suit land was devolved upon him from the original owner by way of right of inheritance was not put to the Plaintiff. 16. PW 2 is a person who also purchased some land from the same vendor Khomie Mia during the relevant time. He stated that the suit land belonging to Khomie Mia which was purchased by the Plaintiff. PW 3 speaks about the possession of the suit land by the Plaintiff after purchased by him. 16. PW 2 is a person who also purchased some land from the same vendor Khomie Mia during the relevant time. He stated that the suit land belonging to Khomie Mia which was purchased by the Plaintiff. PW 3 speaks about the possession of the suit land by the Plaintiff after purchased by him. PW 4 is the scribe who wrote the Sale Deed Ext. A/7. In his deposition he stated that he wrote the sale deed executed by Khomie Mia who sold the suit land to the Plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 2,000/-. He stated that the sale deed was written at the request of the vendor and vendee and after completion of the writing he read over the contents thereof to them and they having admitted the contents the vendor put his signature on each page of the sale deed, exhibited as Ext. A/7. He also proved his signature as scribe on the deed as Ext. A 7/15 to Ext. A-7/27. He further proved the signatures of the vendor as Ext. A/7/1 to A/7/13 which were put in his presence. The scribe further deposed that the two attesting witnesses also put their thumb impressions on the deed in his presence after Khomie Mia, the vendor, put his signature on the sale deed. Although PW 4 was subjected to cross examination, his in chief evidence could not be demolished at all by the Defendant. 17. PW 5 is Md. Maheruddin who is one of the attesting witnesses. It is to be noted herein that PW 5 is the own paternal uncle of the Defendant Appellant. In his deposition he denied to have any knowledge about the sale transaction between Khomie Mia and the Plaintiff. Rather he stated that there was a mortgage transaction between Mahamad Mia father of the Defendant No. 1 and the Plaintiff and the suit land was mortgaged in favour of the Plaintiff securing a loan of Rs. 2,000/-. He deposed that the deed of mortgage was executed between the Plaintiff and Mahamad Mia where he was the attesting witness and the mortgage deed was drawn up by one Iboton Singh. He denied his signature in Ext. A/7 to be his own. PW 6 is Khomie Mia the vendor himself who is again the uncle of the Defendant Appellant. He deposed that the deed of mortgage was executed between the Plaintiff and Mahamad Mia where he was the attesting witness and the mortgage deed was drawn up by one Iboton Singh. He denied his signature in Ext. A/7 to be his own. PW 6 is Khomie Mia the vendor himself who is again the uncle of the Defendant Appellant. He denied to have executed the sale deed in favour of the Plaintiff and denied to have received a consideration sum of Rs. 2,000/-. PW 6 however admitted his signature as Ext. A-8/1 in Ext. A-8 and Ext. A-8/2 as the bailiffs report. In his deposition PW 6 stated that he has got another name as Abdul Latib @ Khomie Mia In his deposition sheet he signed as Abdul Latib and not as Khomie Mia PW 7 is the process server who proved that Ext- A/8 as the summon addressed to PW 6 and the same was served by him upon PW 6, wherein he put his signature as Ext. A 8/1, in his presence. 18. In contrast to the aforesaid evidence adduced by the Plaintiff, the Defendant Appellant examining him as DW 1 deposed that the suit land was the share inherited by his father Mohamad Mia from his father late Chaomacha Mia. He denied the suggestion that the suit land fell on the share of Khomie Mia. DW 1 further deposed that he filed the mutation case in the year 1983 after redeeming the mortgage from the Plaintiff repaying the mortgage loan. He also admitted filing of the appeal against the order of mutation in the Court of the Deputy Commissioner, Thoubal challenging the order was passed in his favour by the Sub Deputy Collector. He also admitted that the vendor is his paternal uncle younger brother of his father. Though he admitted that he married the daughter of the Plaintiff but he denied that he drove his wife out from the matrimonial home by inflicting torture upon her. DW 2 deposed that the suit land belonged to the Defendant No. 1 who inherited from his father and he is in possession thereof for the last twenty years. He further deposed that the father of the Defendant No. 1 Mahamad Mia during his life time distributed his landed properties to his two sons and on that basis the Defendant No. 1 is possessing the suit land. He further deposed that the father of the Defendant No. 1 Mahamad Mia during his life time distributed his landed properties to his two sons and on that basis the Defendant No. 1 is possessing the suit land. In his cross he admitted that he did not know Chaomacha Mia the father of Khomie Mia and grand father of the Defendant. He further admitted that while the distribution of the landed properties was made by Mahamad Mia he was aged about 13 years only. DW 3 in his deposition stated that the Defendant Appellant inherited the suit land from his father and he is in possession of the suit land and there was a division of the property of his father amongst his heirs during his life time and he was present at the time of division. 19. From careful and meticulous scrutiny of the evidence adduced by the Plaintiff in the suit as highlighted above, we find that the claim of the Plaintiff as made in the pleading to the effect that he purchased the suit land from Khomie Mia by a registered sale deed vide Exbt. A/7 on 1.5.67 for a valuable consideration of Rs. 2,000/- is a consistent stand. In order to prove the aforesaid fact, the Plaintiff examined himself and proved the sale deed vide Exbt. A/7. He has given a vivid description as to how the transaction was made and before purchasing the suit land he verified the right of vendor Khomie Mia from his other brothers and inspected the relevant revenue records and having satisfied, proceeded to purchase the suit land. The Plaintiff also proved that the sale deed was drafted by the scribe, PW 4 as per request of the Plaintiff and Defendant who supported the claim of the Plaintiff in no uncertain terms. The execution of the sale deed was proved by the Plaintiff and signature of the vendor was proved both by the Plaintiff as well as by the scribe, PW 4. As against this the positive statement of the Plaintiff as regards the execution and delivery of possession of the suit land in his favour by the vendor, however the PW 6, the vendor though was brought by the Plaintiff as his witness, denied the execution of the sale deed. He even went to the extent of denying his own signatures in the sale deed. He even went to the extent of denying his own signatures in the sale deed. He further spoke about the mortgage transaction of Rs. 2,000/-. The learned trial Court has rightly observed that the PW 6 who is the own paternal uncle of the Defendant No. 1 deposed against the Plaintiff so that benefit goes to his cousin, Defendant No. 1. 20. The pleaded case of the Defendant/Appellant is that the suit land was mortgaged for Rs. 500/- to the Plaintiff but in his deposition the same is stated that the mortgage was for Rs. 2,000/- that too by his father, and not by himself. Interestingly, although the Defendant projected that the suit land devolved upon him by way of inheritance his case was not put to the mouth of the PW 6 who would have the best person to depose in this regard. The Defendant No. 6 has not spoken anything regarding devolution of right of the Defendant No. 1 over the suit land and he appeared to depose only to deny the execution of the sale deed. 21. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case as emerged from the material evidence on record, the observation of the learned trial Court to the effect that the PW No. 6 have no regard for truth, the preponderance of probabilities lean heavily in favour of the Plaintiff. When a sale deed is produced by a party for necessary registration it is processed as per the procedure provided under the Registration Act and the Rules framed there under and only upon admission of the execution the sale deed is registered. Exbt. A/7 being a registered documents pre-supposes completion of the above necessary test of due execution before the Sub-Registrar and in the absence of proof to the contrary the factor of registration of the sale deed must be accepted to have been made following the due procedure. In this context, we also observe that the PW 5 who was the attesting witness, also denied the execution of the sale deed and he deposed about the attestation in a mortgage transaction for Rs. 2,000/- by the father of the Defendant, whereas the pleaded case of the Defendant is that the suit land was mortgaged for Rs. 500/- only by the Defendant No. 1 and not by his father. 2,000/- by the father of the Defendant, whereas the pleaded case of the Defendant is that the suit land was mortgaged for Rs. 500/- only by the Defendant No. 1 and not by his father. PW 5 is the paternal uncle of the Defendant No. 1 though came to depose as Plaintiff's witness, strangely, he denied his signature in the sale deed as an attesting witness. Accordingly, the trial Court rightly did not accept his version to be true. 22. Upon marshalling and balancing the statements of the witnesses produced by both the Plaintiff and the Defendant and taking note of the defence propounded by the Defendant as well as considering the close blood relationship of the PW 5 and 6 with the Defendant No. 1 the preponderance of probabilities lies heavily in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant. That apart, the admitted signature of the Defendant No. 6 vide Exbt. A-8/1 as proved by the PW 7 is found to be identical with his signature in Ext. A/7, as can be seen with bare eyes. The learned Counsel strenuously urged that such a course is not permissible to be adopted by the Court to compare the signature of the Defendant in the sale deed with that of the Ext-A 8/1 and only course available to the Court while such signature is denied by the alleged executant, to obtain the opinion of the handwriting expert; but Section 73 of the Evidence Act clearly empowers the Court to make such a comparison. The signature of the vendor, PW 6 vide Exbt. A-8/1 is his admitted signature and in order to ascertain whether the signature in the seed Exbt. A/7 is that of the PW 6 or not, the Court is entitled to compare the same with Ext-A 8/1 and on such comparison an opinion was formed as per provisions contained in Section 73 of the Evidence Act. In this respect we may profitably rely on the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Murari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 1980 (1) SCC 704 wherein the Apex Court in paragraph 12 held as follows: The argument that the Court should not venture to compare writings itself, as it would thereby assume to itself the role of an expert is, entirely without force. Section 73 of the evidence Act expressly enables the Court to compare disputed writings with admitted or proved writings to ascertain whether a writing is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written. If it is hazardous to do so, as sometimes said, we are afraid it is one of the hazards to which Judge and litigant must expose themselves whenever it becomes necessary. There may be cases where both sides all experts and the voices of science are heard. There may be cases where neither side calls an expert, being ill able to afford him. In all such cases, it becomes the plain duty of the Court to compare the writings and come to its own conclusion. The duty cannot be avoided by recourse to the statement that the Court is no expert. Where there are expert opinions, they will aid the Court. Where there is none, the Court will have to seek guidance from some authoritative textbook and the Court's own experience and knowledge. But discharge it must, its plain duty, with or without expert, with or without other evidence. We may mentioned that Shashi Kumar v. Subodhu Kumar AIR 1964 SC 529 and Fakhruddin v. State of M.P.: AIR 1967 SC 1326 were cases where the Court itself compared the writings. 23. Proof of signature and handwriting of person alleged to have signed or written document produced is provided under Section 67 of the Evidence Act. Section 61 provides that the contents of documents may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence and primary evidence means documents itself produced before the Court (Section 62). Section 68 of the Evidence Act, on the other hand, provides proof of execution of document required by law to be attested to the effect that if a document is required by law to be attested it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of providing its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence. Section 71 of the Act provides that if the attesting witness denies or does not recollect the execution of the document, its execution may be proved by other evidence. 24. In the instant case, primary evidence i.e., sale deed was proved as Exbt. A/7 without any objection. Section 71 of the Act provides that if the attesting witness denies or does not recollect the execution of the document, its execution may be proved by other evidence. 24. In the instant case, primary evidence i.e., sale deed was proved as Exbt. A/7 without any objection. The attesting witness, PW 5 having denied the execution, the relevant facts was brought through PW 4, the scribe who in clear terms stated about execution, attestation and registration by putting of the signature by the vendor and the other attesting witnesses on the sale deed. Even without resorting to the provision of Section 73 of the Evidence Act, in our considered opinion, balancing the preponderance of probabilities the Plaintiff could prove the execution of the sale deed in his favour vide Exbt. A/7 executed by the PW 6 by which the Plaintiff became the absolute owner over the suit property. 25. As regards the claim of the Defendant/Appellant regarding acquisition of right over the suit land by way of inheritance we find from the pleadings that the pleaded case of the Defendant Appellant is that after the death of Chaomacha Mia, the property left by him including the suit land devolved by Mahamad Mia and Mahamad Mia during his life time allocated the suit land in favour of the Defendant and none of other heirs did object to it. The aforesaid claim of the Defendant, on the face of it is unacceptable in the absence of the positive evidence supporting such right in favour of the Appellant. 26. Under the Mohammadan Law during his life time a father is not entitled to allocate a certain landed property without anything more conferring right, title and interest over the landed property which is alleged to have been made in favour of the Defendant Appellant. A person claiming right, title and interest over the property must prove his claim on certain legal foundation or on certain transaction valid in law. But the Defendant utterly failed to substantiate such right in his favour during the course of trial of the suit. Even the claim of right of the Defendant was not put before the Plaintiff. 27. A person claiming right, title and interest over the property must prove his claim on certain legal foundation or on certain transaction valid in law. But the Defendant utterly failed to substantiate such right in his favour during the course of trial of the suit. Even the claim of right of the Defendant was not put before the Plaintiff. 27. In view of the aforesaid position, we to hold that the Defendant/Appellant did not acquire any right title and interest over the suit land by virtue of inheritance, more particularly when the Plaintiff could establish and prove that Khomie Mia had transferable right over the suit land whose name was duly recorded in the Jamabandi as Pattadar and duly transferred the same by way of a registered sale deed, Exbt. A/7 for valuable consideration. 28. As regards the contention of the learned Counsel that the sale deed is violative of Sections 152and 154 of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1861 on the ground that the sale transaction resulted fragmentation of the holding. We find that the learned trial Court has correctly answered this question to the effect that the transaction completed by the sale deed vide Exbt. A/7 did not fall within the meaning of fragmentation as defined under 151(b) of the Act. In fact the suit land which is the only area left to be sold by Khomie Mia was used for personal cultivation at the material time and such a transaction is not hit under Section 152 of the Act. We endorse the view as expressed by the learned trial Court which is consistent with the true and proper interpretation of the provision of Section 151 and 154 of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1861. We also find from the evidence on record that the Plaintiff duly proved by clear and unimpeachable evidence that Khomie Mia had existing right to transfer the suit land in favour of the Plaintiff supported by the revenue record Ext- A/1 and this aspect of the proved facts could not be dislodged by the Defendant/Appellant. 29. We also find from the evidence on record that the Plaintiff duly proved by clear and unimpeachable evidence that Khomie Mia had existing right to transfer the suit land in favour of the Plaintiff supported by the revenue record Ext- A/1 and this aspect of the proved facts could not be dislodged by the Defendant/Appellant. 29. We have scrutinised all aspects of the matter in this Letter Patent Appeal as urged by the learned Counsel for the Appellant and upon such scrutiny we do not find that there is any infirmity or illegality in the decision arrived by the learned trial Court as well as by the learned single judge dismissing the claim of the Appellant and in passing/confirming the decree in favour of the Plaintiff Respondent. 30. In view of the above discussions, we do not find any merit in this appeal and the same stands dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 31. No costs. Appeal dismissed