JUDGMENT : M.Y. Eqbal, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 31.5.2002 passed by the 2nd Addl. District Judge-cum-Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal, Dhanbad in Title (M.V.) Suit No. 08 of 1998 whereby he has dismissed the claim case filed by the appellants u/s 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 claiming compensation on account of death in a motor vehicle accident. 2. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass: - On 03.6.1997, one A.S.I. of Khunti Police Station recorded fardbeyan of Jyoti Kerketta wherein she inter alia stated that she along with her mother Bironika Soren, sisters Anita Kerketta, Saroj Kerketta, Renu Premika Kerketta and brother Rakesh Kerketta were traveling in a Maruti Van bearing registration No. BER-1900. When the Maruti Van reached Mainu Garha More, a rashly and negligently driven truck bearing Registration No. BR 14A-9711 coming from opposite direction collided with the Maruti Van as a result the Maruti Van fell down in a ditch and caught fire. Due to this accident, her brother Rakesh Kerketta and sister Renu premika Kerketta died on the spot and her mother Bironika Soren, sisters Saroj Kerketta, Anita Kerketta and Dhama sustained simple and grievous injuries. It was also stated in the fardbeyan that deceased Rajesh Sharma was a motor mechanic and had a workshop in the district of Hazaribagh. On coming to know about the death of Rajesh Sharma, his father Banshilal Sharma immediately sworn an affidavit to the effect that his son Rajesh Sharma has died in the said accident and his name was wrongly recorded as 'Rakesh Kerketta'. The appellants being the legal representatives of the deceased Rajesh Sharma filed application for compensation u/s 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act for grant of compensation on account of death of Rajesh Sharma. On being noticed, the respondents appeared and filed their written statements. In their written statements, the respondents have denied the death of Rajesh Sharma in the said accident. 3. The Tribunal after discussing he case of the parties and considering the evidence brought on record, has recorded a finding that the claimants-appellants have failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the death of Rajesh Sharma in the said motor vehicle accident and on the basis of that finding, the claim case was dismissed. 4. We have heard Mr. H. Waris, learned Counsel for the claimants and Mr. A.K. Lal and Mr. 4. We have heard Mr. H. Waris, learned Counsel for the claimants and Mr. A.K. Lal and Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsels appearing for the respondents. 5. Before deciding the legality and validity of the impugned judgment and award passed by the Tribunal, I would first like to discuss the power of the Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act for deciding the cases relating to motor accident claims. Sections 168 and 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 lay down the procedure to be adopted by the Tribunal while disposing an application for compensation. Section 168 and 169 of the Act reads as under: “168. Award of the Claims Tribunal. - (1) On receipt of an application for compensation made u/s 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the provisions of Section 162 may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be: Provided that where such application makes a claim for compensation u/s 140 in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, such claim and any other claim (whether made in such application or otherwise) for compensation in respect of such death or permanent disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X. (2) The Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned expeditiously and in any case within a period of fifteen days from the date of the award. (3) When an award is made under this section, the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall, within thirty days of the date of announcing the award by the Claims Tribunal, deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner as the Claims Tribunal may direct. 169. (3) When an award is made under this section, the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall, within thirty days of the date of announcing the award by the Claims Tribunal, deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner as the Claims Tribunal may direct. 169. Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunal- (1) In holding any injury u/s 168, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. (2) The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed and the claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). (3) subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf the Claims Tribunal m ay for the purpose of adjudicating upon any claim for compensation, choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of any matter relevant to the enquiry to assist it in holding the inquiry. 6. From bare reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that in holding an enquiry on the claim application, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any Rules that may be made in this behalf, follow summary procedure. 7. In exercise of power conferred by the Act, Bihar Motor Vehicle Rules 1992 has been framed. Chapter X of the 1992 Rules lays down the procedure regarding disposal of application for compensation arising out of an accident. Rule 226 provides the procedure of filing of application. Rule 227 speaks about fee payable in such application. Rule 232 provides that on receipt of an application, the Tribunal may examine the applicant on oath and the substance of such application shall be reduced in writing and shall be signed by the member constituting the Tribunal. Rule 233 provides the summary dismissal of application. Rule 234 lays down the manner of service of notice to the opposite party and Rule 235 lays down the provision of examination of opposite party. Rule 239 speaks about the manner of recording of evidence. Rule 233 provides the summary dismissal of application. Rule 234 lays down the manner of service of notice to the opposite party and Rule 235 lays down the provision of examination of opposite party. Rule 239 speaks about the manner of recording of evidence. For better appreciation the relevant rules 232, 233 and 239 are quoted herein below: 232: Examination of applicant- on receiving an application under Rule 226, the Claims Tribunal may examine the applicant upon oath, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced in writing and shall be signed by the member constituting the Tribunal or as the case may be, the Chairman. 233. Summary dismissal of application- (1) The Claims Tribunal may, after considering the application and the statement, if any, of the applicant, recorded under Rule 232, summarily dismiss the application, if for reasons to be recorded, the Tribunal is of opinion that there are not sufficient grounds for proceeding therewith. 239. Recording of evidence: The member constituting the Claims Tribunal or the Chairman thereof shall make a brief memorandum of the substance of the evidence of every witness as examination of the witness proceeds and such memorandum shall be written and signed by the member or the Chairman thereof with his own hand and shall form part of the record; Provided that if the member of the chairman is prevented from making such memorandum, he shall record the reason of his inability to do so and shall cause such memorandum to be made in writing from his dictation and shall sign the same, and such memorandum shall form part of the record; Provided further that the evidence of any meticulous witness shall be taken down as early as may be, word for word. 8. From perusal of the provisions of Sections 168 and 169 read with the relevant Rules, quoted hereinabove, it is abundantly clear that the Tribunal has to adopt summary procedure in the disposal of the claim cases for the grant of compensation in case of death or injury in a motor vehicle accident. The Tribunal is not supposed to apply strictly the law of evidence, rather it can even allow the parties to lead evidences beyond the pleadings. The Tribunal has to follow such procedure for coming to a right decision on the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. 9. The Tribunal is not supposed to apply strictly the law of evidence, rather it can even allow the parties to lead evidences beyond the pleadings. The Tribunal has to follow such procedure for coming to a right decision on the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. 9. Besides the above, it is well settled that the Claims Tribunal shall hold an inquiry into the claim after giving notices to the parties and opportunity of hearing. The scheme as contemplated in the relevant provision of the Act is that the Tribunal, after hearing the parties and holding an inquiry into the claim, determine the amount of compensation and pass an award. The provision does not contemplate a full-fledge trial like that of a criminal case or a civil suit. Motor Accident Claim case is neither a criminal case nor a civil case. Unlike a criminal case, the matter is not to be proved beyond all reasonable doubts for passing an award. Similarly, unlike civil cases, the matter is not to be decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence. The standard of proof in claim cases is much below than what is required to be proved in criminal cases or in civil suits. About three decades before in a decision given by Supreme Court in the case of N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. Vs. M. Karumai Ammal and Others, AIR 1980 SC 1354 , His Lordship V.R. Krishna Iyer sitting with Justice D.A. Desai observed: “3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accidents Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasizing this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. 10. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasizing this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. 10. It is, therefore, clear that in a motor accident claim case, evidence should not be scrutinized in a manner as is done in a criminal case or in a civil suit. The Tribunal is not expected to adopt the nicety of a civil or a criminal case. The provisions contained in the Act are welfare legislation for the purpose of giving justice to the victims of the motor accident and to save them from starvation and sufferings. 11. In the light of the law and the principles discussed herein above, we shall now examine the facts of the case and the materials brought on record in order to find out whether the person died in the said accident was Rajesh Sharma or a different person, namely Rakesh Kerketta. 12. As noticed above, in the fardbeyan the informant Jyoti Kerketta, who was also travelling in the Maruti Van, stated about the death of his brother Rakesh Kerketta and sister Renu Premika Kerketta. It was further stated in the fardbeyan that Rakesh Kerketta was a motor mechanic and had a workshop at Hazaribagh. It appears that because of the name 'Rakesh Kerketta' mentioned in the F.I.R., the same mistake was repeated in the inquest report as well as the post mortem report. When the father of the deceased Rajesh Sharma learned about the mistake of recording the name of his deceased son as Rakesh Kerketta instead of Rajesh Sharma, he sworn an affidavit for rectifying the said error committed in recording the name of his deceased son. The affidavit sworn by the informant Jyoti Kerketta was also brought on record, who also admitted that error committed by her in mentioning the name of Rajesh Sharma as Rakesh Kerketta. Although owner of the Maruti Van denied that deceased Rajesh Sharma was travelling in the said Maruti Van for the reasons best known to him, but he neither examined himself, nor led any documentary evidence to that effect. Although owner of the Maruti Van denied that deceased Rajesh Sharma was travelling in the said Maruti Van for the reasons best known to him, but he neither examined himself, nor led any documentary evidence to that effect. On the other hand, the informant Jyoti Kerketta, who was travelling in the said Maruti Van, stated about the death of her brother Rakesh Kerketta examined herself as witness. She has admitted that Rakesh Kerketta alias Rajesh Sharma was driving the Maruti Van and died because of the accident. She further deposed that she has no brother namely Rakesh Kerketta rather Rajesh Sharma was driving the Maruti Van and he was called by her as 'Rakesh Bhaiya'. She denied that she has any brother named Rakesh Kerketta who died in a motor vehicle accident. No evidence was adduced on behalf of the owner of the Maruti Van or owner and insurer of the offending truck. 13. From the evidence brought on record, it is crystal clear that a person who was named as Rakesh Kerketta died in the said accident. Thus, said deceased was Rajesh Sharma who was mentioned as Rakesh Kerketta. The informant Jyoti Kerketta has admitted that she has no brother named Rakesh Kerketta who died in the motor vehicle accident. The photographs of the place of accident contained the picture of Rajesh Sharma named as Rakesh Kerketta died in the said accident. In spite of all these evidences, which prima facie and sufficiently proved the death of one person who was named as Rakesh Kerketta, but in fact, no such person like Rakesh Kerketta died, rather a person who died in the said accident was Rajesh Sharma. 14. From reading of the judgment, it appears that the Tribunal has proceeded to decide the claim case like that of a contested criminal trial case. Although he discussed the evidence but held that the claimants-appellants failed to prove beyond all reasonable doubts that the person died in the accident was Rajesh Sharma, who was named in the F.I.R. as Rakesh Kerketta. The procedure adopted by the Tribunal is absolutely erroneous in law. The Tribunal in fact misdirected himself in holding that the claimants failed to prove the death of Rajesh Sharma in the said accident beyond all reasonable doubts. The impugned judgment of the Tribunal, therefore, cannot be sustained in law. The procedure adopted by the Tribunal is absolutely erroneous in law. The Tribunal in fact misdirected himself in holding that the claimants failed to prove the death of Rajesh Sharma in the said accident beyond all reasonable doubts. The impugned judgment of the Tribunal, therefore, cannot be sustained in law. In our considered opinion, the claimants have proved the death of Rajesh Sharma in the said accident. 15. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and award passed by the Tribunal and remit the matter back to the Tribunal to decide the issue of quantum of compensation which the claimants are entitled to get on account of death of deceased Rajesh Sharma. Since the claim application was filed in the year 1998, we direct the Tribunal to decide the issue and dispose of the claim case as expeditiously as possible and preferably within two months from the date of receipt of records. Office shall immediately send back the records to the Tribunal. Jaya Roy, J.-I agree. Appeal allowed.