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2010 DIGILAW 740 (PNJ)

Anil Talwar v. P. C. Verma

2010-02-01

S.D.ANAND

body2010
Judgment S.D.Anand, J. 1. The plea raised by the landlord (herein after referred to as the petitioner herein), to obtain ejectment of the tenant (hereinafter referred to as the respondent herein), found favour with the learned Rent Controller. In appeal, however, the finding was reversed and the petition was dismissed, thereby impelling the petitioner herein to file the revision petition. 2. Conceded facts in the first instance : 3. The petitioner herein purchased the tenanted premises (a room measuring 12x7 situated on the rear verandah on the first floor of Shop-cum-Flat No. 14, Sector 22-D, Chandigarh with entry from the rear side), vide sale deed dated 18.09.1992. The premises aforementioned was taken by the respondent herein on monthly rent of Rs. 500/-, vide rent note Ex.P1. Petitioner herein received a notice from the Estate Office, Chandigarh Administration, Chandigarh, requiring the demolition of the tenanted premises as being violative of the building bye-laws of the Chandigarh Administration, Chandigarh. In case of non-compliance, the held out threat was for the resumption of the entire premises (Shop-cum-Flat No. 14, Sector 22-D, Chandigarh). 4. Insofar as the learned Rent Controller is concerned, the view held was that the tenanted premises having been proved to be in violation of the building bye-laws of the Chandigarh Administration and a resumption order having been granted, the respondent herein is liable to be evicted in order to enable the petitioner herein to save the entire premises from resumption. It was observed that the mere act on the part of the landlord in having given the tenanted premises on rent (inspite of the construction thereof being in violation of the building bye-laws) would not disable him (landlord) from ejecting the respondent herein on the premise that there cannot be estoppel against the law and that mere agreement between the parties cannot override the provisions of law. 5. The learned Appellate Authority held that the Rent Legislation does not apply in view of the proven position that there was no act or conduct attributable to the respondent herein from which an inference could be drawn that the value and utility of the tenanted premises had been materially impaired. ("No act, omission or commission of appellant/tenant has been pleaded or proved vide which the value and utility of the demised premises has been materially impaired. ("No act, omission or commission of appellant/tenant has been pleaded or proved vide which the value and utility of the demised premises has been materially impaired. The appellant/tenant has not raised any construction in the demised premises, rather the room was constructed by the respondent/landlord himself. If there is any violation of the Punjab Act, then the same is committed by the landlord himself and not by the appellant/tenant.") 6. The learned Senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner herein, argued that the letting out of the tenanted premises being invalid from the inception itself, the respondent herein cannot resist eviction by relying upon the fact that he had not done any act to materially impair the value and utility of the tenanted premises. In that context, the attention of this Court was invited towards the fact that the resumption order could be got set aside from the highest forum only subject to the rider that the violation would be removed, but he would not be able to get the impugned violation condoned till the tenanted premises are demolished. It follows therefrom, the argument proceeded, that the entire building shall be resumed bv the Chandigarh Administration if the eviction order is not sustained and the petitioner herein is not enabled to demolish the tenanted premises and to bring the entire premises in conformity with the relevant building bye-laws. 7. The learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent herein, in an act of assistance, argued that the petitioner herein cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong in view of the fact that it was he only who had given the tenanted premises on rent with the full knowledge that the construction of the one room tenanted premises was in violation of the relevant building bye-laws. 8. I have given my careful consideration to the point in controversy. 9. It is apparent from the above quoted factual scenario that the very construction of the tenanted premises was violative of the relevant building bye-laws. There is acceptable material obtaining on the file to the effect that the Competent Authority, the Chandigarh Administration has reversed the resumption of the entire premises only if the violation is removed. 9. It is apparent from the above quoted factual scenario that the very construction of the tenanted premises was violative of the relevant building bye-laws. There is acceptable material obtaining on the file to the effect that the Competent Authority, the Chandigarh Administration has reversed the resumption of the entire premises only if the violation is removed. Even at the cost of repetition, it may be noticed here that there is no controversy about the fact that the construction of the entire tenanted premises (a one room accommodation) is violative of the relevant building bye-laws. In such an apparent eventuality, the law cannot countenance a plea by the tenant that the landlord is estopped from asking for his ejectment just because he happened to have rented out the premises initially. In the backdrop of that observation, it would be relevant to notice that the rent note Ex.P1 contains a stipulation that the tenant would abide by the provisions of the Capital of Punjab (Development & Regulation) Act, 1952 and Rules made thereunder. 10. The judicial pronouncements reported as Nand Kishore v. Yashpal Singh, 2009(3) R.C.R.(Civil) 829:2009(2) R.C.R.(Rent) 144 : 2009(4) R.A.J. 457: JT 2009(9) SC421,M/s. United Engineers through its Sole Prop. Sarup Singh and another v. Nirmal Bhasin, 2004(2) RCR 627 and Anil Kumar v. Avtar Singh, 1993(2) R.C.R.(Rent) 645 : 1993(2) Rev. L.R. 140, are fully supportive ofthis view of mine. 11. The learned Senior counsel for the respondent herein argued that the rulings aforementioned are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case in which there is not even an averment that the resumption order came about on account of an act on the part of the tenant. 12. The plea raised is denuded of merit. We have to notice that the petitioner herein had received a notice for resumption of the entire premises just on account of the fact that the very construction of the tenanted premises was violative of the relevant building bye-laws. The resumption order was conditionally set aside by the Competent Authority (vide order dated 05.11.2004 Ex.D 1) "subject to the conditions that the petitioner will remove the violations which are not sanctionable and will submit revised plan in respect of the violations which are sanctionable or compoundable". 13. The resumption order was conditionally set aside by the Competent Authority (vide order dated 05.11.2004 Ex.D 1) "subject to the conditions that the petitioner will remove the violations which are not sanctionable and will submit revised plan in respect of the violations which are sanctionable or compoundable". 13. By the very nature of things, the demolition of the tenanted premises cannot come about as long as the petitioner herein continues to be in occupation thereof. This is particularly so when there is no controversy that the construction of the entire tenanted premises is violative of the relevant building bye-laws. In that eventuality, the law laid down by the Apex Court in Nand Kishore v. Yashpal Singh, JT 2009(9) SC 421, and also by this Court in M/s. United Engineers through its Sole Prop. Sarup Singh and another v. Nirmal Bhasin, 2004(2) RCR 627 and Anil Kumar v. Avtar Singh, 1993(2) Rev. L.R. 140, would come to the rescue of the petitioner herein. 14. It would be appropriate to notice here that the plea raised by the petitioner herein for change of user had been appropriately discarded by the learned Appellate Authority in view of the fact that the shop had been rented out (vide documentation Ex. P1) for the purpose of running the business of goldsmith and there is no acceptable evidence on record to prove that there has been any change of user unconnected with the purpose for which the tenanted premises had been rented out by the petitioner herein to the respondent herein. 15. For the reasons noticed above, the petition shall stand allowed. The judgment dated 21.09.2007 rendered by the learned Appellate Authority in Rent Appeal No. 25 of 02.05.2006 shall stand invalidated; while the judgment dated 18.04.2006 rendered by the learned Rent Controller shall stand restored. 16. The respondent herein is afforded two months time from today to vacate the premises aforementioned. 17. Disposed of accordingly.